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View Full Version : 787s departing localizer into HKG - below minimum safe alt


b1lanc
6th Mar 2020, 17:06
Now 4 incidents between July and October of last year - Virgin Atlantic (2), Etihad, and Ethiopian. Two reported on AVH today.

Maninthebar
6th Mar 2020, 18:18
Now 4 incidents between July and October of last year - Virgin Atlantic (2), Etihad, and Ethiopian. Two reported on AVH today.

Link to data please?

b1lanc
6th Mar 2020, 19:05
Link to data please?
Incident: Virgin Atlantic B789 at Hong Kong on Oct 18th 2019, deviated from localizer and descended below minimum safe altitude (http://avherald.com/h?article=4d42d0b5&opt=0)

fokker1000
6th Mar 2020, 19:32
And so? What"s you point?

b1lanc
6th Mar 2020, 20:05
And so? What"s you point?
Really?
All 787s
All on approach to 25R
All veer right off the localizer and descend below minimum safe.

You don't see a curious trend?

kiwi grey
6th Mar 2020, 20:06
And so? What"s you point?
I should imagine the OP's point is that there have been four strikingly similar incidents in a short time period with three different airlines (Virgin Atlantic, Etihad, and Ethiopian) but the same aircraft type - Boeing 787.

What is going wrong with the B787 under these specific circumstances, and why?

Chris2303
6th Mar 2020, 20:11
I should imagine the OP's point is that there have been four strikingly similar incidents in a short time period with three different airlines (Virgin Atlantic, Etihad, and Ethiopian) but the same aircraft type - Boeing 787.

What is going wrong with the B787 under these specific circumstances, and why?

And is there a correlation between the ground based equipment and the airborne equipment in the 787? Is the 787 more sensitive to spurious signals from this particular installation on the ground for instance.

b1lanc
6th Mar 2020, 22:30
I should imagine the OP's point is that there have been four strikingly similar incidents in a short time period with three different airlines (Virgin Atlantic, Etihad, and Ethiopian) but the same aircraft type - Boeing 787.

What is going wrong with the B787 under these specific circumstances, and why?
Thank you and if you believe Avherald, two of the four AC were .3nm and 370odd feet from CFIT (would that not have been Max 2.0?). If a 270 heading can blank 737 screens.....

buggaluggs
6th Mar 2020, 22:34
Interesting, I be interested to know if they’re deviating right after they’re established on the LOC, or if the FMC is cocking up the interception turn? 25R ILS is not an approach that you want to be drifting right of while descending on the G/S!

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1518x1340/9724a988_fa9e_4d47_86dd_5d537eeb3b3a_20e788bd6ca370267d7cb19 74b9d3209b278284c.jpeg

Superpilot
7th Mar 2020, 04:11
We experienced this into Madrid 18L or 18R. After making the correction, it happened again 30s later. Reported it to mechanics on the ground at Madrid who said both Air Europa and Norwegian reported intermittent cases of the same and Boeing have been informed. This was late 2018.

swh
7th Mar 2020, 04:44
We experienced this into Madrid 18L or 18R. After making the correction, it happened again 30s later. Reported it to mechanics on the ground at Madrid who said both Air Europa and Norwegian reported intermittent cases of the same and Boeing have been informed. This was late 2018.


Virgin has had earlier incidents, I remember one day very early on in the operation the 787 into HKG ATC giving them a terrain alert for sailing through the LOC near RIVER.

In 2028 AI314 got a GPWS warning at 200 feet approximately 2.6 nautical miles from 07R before performing a go around while flying the ILS.

The difference now is aircraft investigation is now done by an independent body, earlier incidents were reviewed by the HKCAD as there was no independent body.

DaveReidUK
7th Mar 2020, 07:17
I should imagine the OP's point is that there have been four strikingly similar incidents in a short time period with three different airlines (Virgin Atlantic, Etihad, and Ethiopian) but the same aircraft type - Boeing 787.

Previous thread on the Ethiopian July 2019 event: PPRuNe: Ethiopian serious event Hong Kong (https://www.pprune.org/fragrant-harbour/627862-ethiopian-serious-event-hong-kong.html)

DogSpew
7th Mar 2020, 07:33
To all 787 pilots this issue is well known and documented in an FCOM Bulletin that was released in mid-Dec of last year. The investigation into the HKG events resulted in the release of the Bulletin and was found to be a software anomaly that affects the CLC (Consistent Localiser Capture) mode during an approach. This occurs when the intercept vector onto the inbound Localiser course exceeds a certain angle (usually greater than 40 degrees). This HKG approach is also given as an example within the FCOM Bulletin and this issue may occur with less than 40 degrees onto RWY 25R due to LOC signal effects, and should be a ‘threat’ that all crews brief when operating into HKG. This issue has also been seen at other airports when ATC provide large angled vectors onto the LOC.

By the way this issue does not affect raw data on the PFD. With my LTC hat on - crews should ALWAYS be monitoring raw data (on every approach - regardless of airplane type) and backing up the automation. If it doesn’t do as advertised then either:
a. reduce the level of automation (ie. HDG SEL to return to LOC),
b. take it manually and correct the flightpath, or
c. conduct a Missed Approach.

Which is what the incident crews at HKG did.

Boeing state that a future update to the Flight Control Module software will correct this issue.

Jumpjim
7th Mar 2020, 08:36
Which FCOM bulletin are you referring to?

If you’re referring to BAB-61, that deals with the aircraft entering a stabilisation mode following loss or degradation of the ILS signal. It is not a software bug....

Jumpjim
7th Mar 2020, 09:02
One wonders why the 787 doesn´t have a localizer needle on the PFD like every other aircraft. Only this little bug below the Rad Alt. It´s so easy to miss in a high work load environment.

I genuinely have NO idea what you're talking about. The ILS indications are the same as the 777, 747, 737, A320, A350 etc...

Little bug below the Rad Alt???? I'm assuming you don't fly the 787... Could we get back to discussing this with people who know what they're talking about...
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/519x854/img_b65712d78c2c_1_068d3745f22785d877917f5f695bf777368440bd. jpeg

Jumpjim
7th Mar 2020, 09:31
You might like to elaborate what previous type you were on.

The display, as shown above is the same as the 777, 747, A320, 737, A350 and most commercial airliners. The only reason it looks different to the types I mention previously is the fact that the horizon line crosses the entire PFD and not just a box in the middle. It is a STANDARD display.

For info I am a 787 Examiner/Instructor/LTC and check Captain and have genuinely NO idea what you are talking about...

Would you like to show me an example of your previous type display so we can get a grasp of what you are saying please..

Jumpjim
7th Mar 2020, 09:33
Are you talking about an expanded ILS display on the ND possibly....? If so I can safely say that I very rarely IF EVER used that on the 777 in 15 years and 10,000 hours of flying it. I find the "Small bug" perfectly adequate...

jetsam
7th Mar 2020, 11:45
This approach is an accident waiting to happen in my opinion. Any fly through the loc. Is a major threat. An RNAV onto a 10D point or a 20 Mn straight in would be better.
not aircraft specific I am sure.

Superpilot
7th Mar 2020, 12:29
In trouble with Boeing for posting a picture of a simulated PFD? If that were even remotely possible, every MS and X-Plane Flight Sim developer would've been sued by now.

Maninthebar
7th Mar 2020, 12:59
In trouble with Boeing for posting a picture of a simulated PFD? If that were even remotely possible, every MS and X-Plane Flight Sim developer would've been sued by now.

I am QUITE sure that MS and any other commercial developer would put in place measures to recognise Boeing's IP as appropriate.

Jumpjim
7th Mar 2020, 13:12
The attitude stabilising mode is NOT a software bug. It maintains the attitude if there is a loss or interruption of the ILS signal. If this is what is happening in Hong Kong it’s down to an issue with the ILS emitters and not the aircraft.

As far as I know there is no bulletin published currently that would explain this away.

wiggy
7th Mar 2020, 13:53
The attitude stabilising mode is NOT a software bug. It maintains the attitude if there is a loss or interruption of the ILS signal. If this is what is happening in Hong Kong it’s down to an issue with the ILS emitters and not the aircraft.
.

But if this is only happening on the 787 then surely :rolleyes: there is an issue, at least in part, with the aircraft?

AFAIK 744s and 777s have been flying that approach for years yet this is the first I’ve heard of this phenomenon happening on a regular basis...

Jumpjim
7th Mar 2020, 14:50
The stabilisation mode is present on the 777 as well. Not sure about the -400 but wouldn’t be surprised:rolleyes:

wiggy
7th Mar 2020, 16:51
I’m aware it’s on the T7. Don’t recall it ever being mentioned on the 744 during my time on it...

gearlever
7th Mar 2020, 17:01
I've read the reports over and over, but struggling to understand what happened.
Did the aircraft deviate from the correct approach course with a centered LOC indication, or was the LOC diamond to the left?
Thx

de facto
7th Mar 2020, 17:15
IF YOU DONT READ YOUR AIRCRAFT TECH BULLETINS you may get into TROUBLE.
This issue is mentionned.

Jumpjim
7th Mar 2020, 18:56
IF YOU DONT READ YOUR AIRCRAFT TECH BULLETINS you may get into TROUBLE.
This issue is mentionned.

Where and in which bulletin? Be specific.

Apart from managing to be extremely patronising, if you’re referring to BAB-61, which I specifically mentioned earlier, then it says the following...

”All of the reports Boeing has received regarding this issue have been for unexpected pitch guidance during glideslope capture or tracking. The AFDS manages localizer capture and tracking differently from glideslope capture and tracking. Boeing has not received similar reports of unexpected guidance during localizer capture and tracking.”

So which Bulletin are you referring to?

Roj approved
7th Mar 2020, 21:49
The mini map below the PFD. Suffice to say Collins ProLine4 and ProLine21 change the indication on the mini map from a pure nav display to an ILS display by using blue needles and changing the sensitivity accordingly. From what heard the Embraer 190 is the same (?) I had a discussion with a former Embraer cpt who wasn´t too impressed by the lack of it on the 787. Imho, it´s easier to spot a deviating needle on the mini map than a 'bug' on the PFD.

Anyhow, back to topic. The attitude stabilizing mode seems to have been a contributing factor. Case of false sense of security?

Originally Posted by wondering View Post
One wonders why the 787 doesn´t have a localizer needle on the PFD like every other aircraft. Only this little bug below the Rad Alt. It´s so easy to miss in a high work load environment.

The AvHerald says the weather was pretty good, so my question is, with 2 x PFD’S, a Standby, 2x Nav displays, PLUS 2x HUD’s showing all the information you could possibly need, was anyone monitoring the flightpath VISUALLY?

The Boeing instructors hammered C H I P s into us.

Cleared for approach

HDG within 40°

ILS tuned

Pointers in correct sense

I know, in IMC you couldn’t look out the window and monitor the path visually, but the 787 has so much information available to the “head up pilot “(PF) to help maintain the correct flightpath in this situation without having to go “head down”.

DogSpew
8th Mar 2020, 08:16
Which FCOM bulletin are you referring to?

If you’re referring to BAB-61, that deals with the aircraft entering a stabilisation mode following loss or degradation of the ILS signal. It is not a software bug....
My Company’s version of the FCOM is tailored for my Airline and therefore our FCOM Bulletins will have different numbers (but I assume the dates should be the same).

The FCOM Bulletin you’re referring to regarding the attitude stabilising mode is not the same Bulletin I’m referring to. In my FCOM, the attitude stabilising mode Bulletin is dated 18Oct19 and titled “Erroneous Autopilot Flight Director System (AFDS) Guidance when Instrument Landing System (ILS) Signal Interference occurs”. You are correct this is not a software issue.
The Bulletin I’m referring to is dated 18Dec19 and titled, “Localizer Capture Anomalies.” This is a software issue.

Jumpjim
8th Mar 2020, 09:01
Not seen that nor is it a current BAB and we operate -8 and -9 787s. Unless you have an old block point revision I’m surprised. Could you email me a copy? [email protected]

Dan Winterland
8th Mar 2020, 11:00
This approach is particularly high threat, especially as the 3 degree path intercept is almost co-incident with waypoint RIVER. ATC often vector to space aircraft at exactly 5nm - they don't always get it right. The local guys are aware of this and many of us just go DCT RIVER if it looks like the intercept is going to be close. That's the threat mitigated for most types. Not sure if it's the same with the 787 - but I don't see why not.

gearlever
9th Mar 2020, 23:18
I'm an airbus guy, so don't know the exact wording for 787 autoflight modes, sorry.

Anyhow, is it SOP on Boeings to go from L/NAV (?) to ILS (?) mode, without using HDG?

b1lanc
9th Mar 2020, 23:32
Avherald has a copy of the Boeing bulletin here - https://avherald.com/h?article=4d42d0b5&opt=0

Impacting all aircraft, most frequently seen 25R Hong Kong. Reproduced in an engineering simulator and will be fixed in FCM blockpoint 5.1

swh
10th Mar 2020, 05:41
Impacting all aircraft, most frequently seen 25R Hong Kong. Reproduced in an engineering simulator and will be fixed in FCM blockpoint 5.1

Most airliners have a Rockwell Collins GLU-920/925 MMR installed as the ILS receiver, some part number differences exist to provide GLS RNP(AR) ADS-B etc.

It is only seems to be one brand of aircraft with one brand of MMR that seems to be impacted, some customers have opted for a different MMR like the Honeywell RMA-55 or the Thales TLS-755.

Others may have a Collins GLU-920/925 installed in a different manufacturers aircraft. They are not impacted.

The issue seems to be with the aircraft manufacturers specific autopilot gains and how it processes the LOC output from the MMR. If the PFD is showing the aircraft passing through the LOC with the LOC captured one has to ask what the autopilot is actually capturing, it is not capturing what is on the PFD.

Bullethead
10th Mar 2020, 11:25
Not the same aeroplane and it’s been a while but in locations where LLZ capture was known to be problematic I would leave LNAV/NAV selected until on or very close to the localiser before selecting APP mode. Worked without fail.
Cheers,
BH.

Capt Flinstone
10th Mar 2020, 11:41
What about TEM ?? MUST be part of APP Briefing i guess >>

ImbracableCrunk
10th Mar 2020, 20:53
"Fair Use" for educational purposes. You're not trying to make a buck off of pprune.

tcasblue
25th Apr 2020, 03:15
I guess they haven't been reading this thread.....


2020-04-21

C-FNOH, a Boeing 787-9 operated by Air Canada was conducting flight AC2287 from Vancouver
International Airport (CYVR), BC to Hong Kong International (VHHH), Honk Kong. Approaching
VHHH, the flight crew were cleared to waypoint LOTUS for an ILS approach Runway 25L. When
the aircraft arrived over LOTUS, the flight crew contacted AirTraffic Controller (ATC) and reported
being established on the ILS. ATC advised the flight crew to change to the tower frequency. Just
after, ATC observed the aircraft overshooting the localizer of Runway 25L and descending to 3900
feet above sea level (ASL), which is below the minimum sector altitude of 4300 feet ASL. ATC
provided a terrain warning to the flight crew and the flight crew corrected the flight path to reintercept
the ILS Runway 25L. The aircraft landed at VHHH without further incident.
The flight crew reported receiving a false capture of the ILS Runway 25L and being visual with
terrain and the airport during the event. The operator is conducting an internal assessment in
accordance with their safety management system (SMS).