Boeing stays firmly on course... to the bottom

[UltraFan]

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/boeing-clashes-with-faa-over-727-auxiliary-tank-explosion-risk/135973.article

Boeing and the US FAA have clashed over a safety modification for Boeing 727s, with the regulator rejecting three attempts by the airframer to have the proposal withdrawn.

Boeing claims the fleet exposure is continuing to decline as a result of ageing and retirements, and that the FAA’s proposals will generate unnecessary costs and will not advance air safety.

The FAA counters that it is obliged to inform about aircraft affected by safety issues, regardless of where they are operated, adding that its determination of the unsafe condition was “not driven” by a fleet risk assessment.

I don't know and, honestly, don't care which of the two unscrupulous organizations are right in this particular case. What amazes me is that, even in the middle of the MAX disaster, Boeing still has the audacity, or, rather, insolence, to juxtapose safety against costs. What ELSE do they need to finally start saving what's left of their reputation?

[The Ancient Geek]

Hmmm - there cant be many 727s with aux tanks still flying and the've not blown yet in many years of service.
Sounds like a storm in a teacup.

[etudiant]

Seems that both organizations are posturing, trying to establish new post Max ground rules. Clearly the FAA would prefer to see its word as law, something Boeing would rather not be the case.

[ATC Watcher]

Boeing points out that 272 aircraft were built with the auxiliary tanks but only six were operated under FAA jurisdiction when the modification was originally proposed.
Does Boeing implies that since the risk extremely low in the USA or in the 6 US registered 727s, it is OK for the others since they are operated outside the US?

[ivor toolbox]

Does Boeing implies that since the risk extremely low in the USA or in the 6 US registered 727s, it is OK for the others since they are operated outside the US?

You said it. I expect Boeing don't want the costs involved in developing a compliant solution to the problem, and would rather it just went away

Ttfn

[lomapaseo]

It's not that it is unsafe today when it was considered safe yesterday. It's just that now years later it looks unsafe in the new eyes of the regulator even though no associated faults have been demonstrated in its limited service life.

Obviously there are many previously certified products out there from all manufacturers that may fit this interpretation, so the issue needs adjudication in fairness. IMO the issue should be treated under continued airworthiness of a certified product where the good experience trumps the what-ifs.

at this time I'm not predicting the outcome but I am disappointed in the suggestions of previous posters that nobody is to be trusted


.

[Dave Therhino]

If you want to see Boeing's comments and see how the FAA actually responded, here's the link to the AD publication. The discussion of the Boeing comments is at the beginning.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/f2395e53d671b5e6862584e1004d0528/$FILE/2019-23-04.pdf

[Australopithecus]

Reading those comments, and thinking of the issue of a long term latent in-tank fault, I was wondering then why the master MEL could not be revised to require electrical isolation of the in-tank components in the event of an unserviceable condition? Would that not address the issue of a latent fault setting the stage for the then unlikely adjacent ground path fault?

On the other hand: 727. Now wonder why I even care?

[Dave Therhino]

That AD is one of a series of ADs proposed in 2016 for the same design architecture concern on multiple Airbus and Boeing models. The issue is with latent (undiscovered) failures in the wiring inside the tank combined with a hot short to FQIS wiring outside the tank from co-routed power wiring. Not all FQIS in-tank issues result in flight deck effects that trigger troubleshooting. My understanding is that Boeing is considering revising the MEL to do just what you suggest, but that only helps if you know you have a fault.

[Water pilot]

The plane is unsafe, according to the FAA. It is also uneconomical to operate. I'm not sure what Boeing is balking at, it is a relatively small cost to engineer a fix and come up with a cost for it, at which point the few remaining operators will scrap the already uneconomical plane. I would note that the chances of an electrical fault with old wiring that has possibly been exposed to fuel is rather more likely than in a newer aircraft. It may feel like a pointless exercise, but so was estimate that the insurance company had an auto rebuilder generate for my wrecked car, to prove that it was a total loss.

There are millions of tons of products that have been scrapped because they can't meet modern safety requirements and that is a good thing. The world evolves.

I'm not sure why there is a thumbs down above, apologies for a technical error.

[robdean]

This seems to have caused no incidents yet in long service, but on the other hand, given an identified risk, the FAA can hardly be expected to default to waiting until people die before they act.

If you want to see Boeing's comments and see how the FAA actually responded, here's the link to the AD publication. The discussion of the Boeing comments is at the beginning.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/f2395e53d671b5e6862584e1004d0528/$FILE/2019-23-04.pdf

❝Boeing reported that its system safety assessment determined that the FQIS on the Model 727 airplane does not have an unsafe condition. The FAA disagrees (...) Boeing did not provide specific details about the type of assessment that was performed (total fleet risk, average risk per flight hour, peak individual flight risk, etc.).❞

It seems from the above that a factor here is not just Boeing being cheap about implementation, but being cheap about the case they make to contest implementation, & the FAA insisting that the latter, at least, is not good enough.

[megan]

Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. :confused: Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".

[ATC Watcher]

Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. :confused: Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".
I fail to understand the logic of that statement in relation with the Max /MCAS. In the Max would have been autonomous , taking the Lion air case, the accident would have occurred a day earlier on the first flight , but not prevented it.

[Kit Sanbumps KG]

to juxtapose safety against costs

That is what all of us involved in aviation do, every time we fly. There is nothing remarkable about it.

In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.

[Easy Street]

I fail to understand the logic of that statement in relation with the Max /MCAS. In the Max would have been autonomous , taking the Lion air case, the accident would have occurred a day earlier on the first flight , but not prevented it.

Well, if you don’t have any pilots, you don’t need to worry about stick force gradient (which is where MCAS came in), and with direct control of power and attitude the computers could be programmed to avoid the envelope corners which cause the problem. I’m not saying I agree with the premise, or that the 737 is equipped with sufficient air data sensors to implement in this case, but there is at least some logic there.

[MechEngr]

Seems like the FAA can issue an AD telling operators to deactivate the tanks.They could even ground all the affected aircraft until the deactivation is confirmed. Done. All of the operating aircraft are now safe.

If users care to sue Boeing for some compensation then that sets the economic incentive to generate a solution. If that is not enough incentive, then it will moot the issue of creating a fix.

[Hot 'n' High]

...... In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.

Not arguing either way on the point you made Kit, just a more general observation really. When did this first come to light? Reading Page 2 of the AD, it states ".... At the time of the unsafe condition determination [which seems to imply the discovery of the general issue with the FQIS] in April 2003, Boeing acknowledged that the Model 727 body-mounted auxiliary fuel tanks are high-flammability fuel tanks" but I think the actual 727 analysis was completed in 2016 - "The NPRM published in the Federal Register on September 23, 2016 (81 FR65579). The NPRM was prompted by the FAA's analysis of the Model 727 fuel system review conducted by the manufacturer.". Now an AD in early 2020 despite the Boeing request to withdraw the NPRM.

A case of someone being asked to see what other potential skeletons relating to Boeing products there are hidden in the FAA files - maybe the FAA checking in their 6 o'clock?

[Harley Quinn]

Isn't this issue similar to what is thought to have brought TWA800 down? As a layperson I wouldn't be surprised to learn this system was similar to that in the ill-fated 747.

[MechEngr]

Isn't this issue similar to what is thought to have brought TWA800 down? As a layperson I wouldn't be surprised to learn this system was similar to that in the ill-fated 747.

It could be; however TWA 800 had the misfortune of the crew pumping the fuel out of the suspect tank, thereby admitting a large amount of air which created an explosive mixture. As long as that rapid emptying isn't done then the situation should not repeat. Notwithstanding, the ignition source should not have been available on TWA 800.

However this is not much different than automobiles which mostly use a submerged electric pump with an electric fuel level sensor in the gasoline tanks and it generally doesn't cause a problem as the fuel vapor pressure is high enough to exclude the oxygen rich air.

[fergusd]

Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. :confused: Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".

Why wouldn't you, if you could ? . . . properly designed (and there's the catch) automated systems don't make mistakes, don't get tired, don't drink or take drugs, don't have only 200 hours experience and have never actually flown an aircraft. don't have any of the other aspects of normal human life that effect performance, kids, wives, money issues, they don't need trained, they are 100% capable every day, week, year . . . so if you can make them, they will probably be safer, and they could be proven to be safer mathematically . . .

Boeings human/hybrid approach is demonstrably problematic.

[UltraFan]

Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. :confused: Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".

A much better solution would be to automate servicing and release decisions. If part X required to fix fault Y does not pass test Z, the aircraft does not fly. Better yet, and more realistic, is to outsource release decisions to a third party bound by the contract with insurance company. You lose a plane - you pay for damages. Money is a MUCH better incentive in today's crazy world than little things like human lives. Lots of auto-manufacturers (e.g. Maserati) have implemented this system and it works brilliantly.

[woptb]

That is what all of us involved in aviation do, every time we fly. There is nothing remarkable about it.

In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.

We have a failure mode,if realised, that could be catastrophic and you don’t think it should be addressed?

[Kit Sanbumps KG]

We have a failure mode,if realised, that could be catastrophic and you don’t think it should be addressed?

It certainly should be addressed.

But only once all the higher priorities have been dealt with - and they are legion.

Regulators and accident investigation organisations often obsess about the trees, while the wood burns around them. This is certainly one of those cases. (Manufacturers, in the main, are quite good at trying to make profit, as their first goal, as they should).

[DaveReidUK]

Isn't this issue similar to what is thought to have brought TWA800 down? As a layperson I wouldn't be surprised to learn this system was similar to that in the ill-fated 747.

The AD specifically makes that point.

[Turbine D]

Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. :confused: Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".
The key take-aways from the rather lengthy WSJ article in today's paper:
While the MAX’s problems stemmed from a misguided design of automation, many engineers and airline executives remain confident that properly devised computerized features have proven extremely reliable and will prevent accidents. They cite the safety benefits of everything from automated engine adjustments to computer-controlled landing maneuvers that are more precise and predictable than any pilot commands. Over the years, Boeing rival Airbus (https://quotes.wsj.com/EADSY) has tended to devise systems where pilots are trained to let automated systems handle emergencies, and company executives say that approach will continue. Executives at Boeing and Airbus have said they are also designing flight-control systems tailored for younger pilots, who generally have less flying time in their logbooks—and a more innate familiarity with technology—than aviators of years past.

[Fursty Ferret]

Airbus (https://quotes.wsj.com/EADSY) has tended to devise systems where pilots are trained to let automated systems handle emergencies, and company executives say that approach will continue. Executives at Boeing and Airbus have said they are also designing flight-control systems tailored for younger pilots, who generally have less flying time in their logbooks—and a more innate familiarity with technology—than aviators of years past.

An interesting view. In 5000 hours on the A320 series at no point did I feel like I was letting an "automated system" handle emergencies. I handled the emergency, and used the benefit of the fly-by-wire and system management to reduce my workload. I can't think of any conceivable reason why I might want to deliberately stall, pull more than 2.5G, or bank beyond 67 degrees a transport category aircraft, but I can think of situations where being able to extract every ounce of performance it can offer might be useful.

FADEC is designed to exploit maximum performance from an engine while protecting it from overtemp / overboost, yet I don't hear people complaining about it.

[Ian W]

Well, if you don’t have any pilots, you don’t need to worry about stick force gradient (which is where MCAS came in), and with direct control of power and attitude the computers could be programmed to avoid the envelope corners which cause the problem. I’m not saying I agree with the premise, or that the 737 is equipped with sufficient air data sensors to implement in this case, but there is at least some logic there.


You are right in your assessment. I doubt that it will be used as an argument for the Max - but expect new designs to be more autonomous and have less requirement for pilots to pick up the pieces of systems failures. Autonomy is improving all the time with fewer cases that the automated systems cannot handle. The costs of making aircraft simple to fly by human pilots in exceptions (all specified in FARs) is approaching the same levels of cost and complexity of building autonomous aircraft that meet DAL-A. Once it is the same or cheaper to build aircraft that are DAL-A and fully autonomous and that are safe in all failure modes, do not expect any support from aircraft operators for aircraft to be designed for pilots.

[Water pilot]

You might think that there would have been more important things for NHTSA to worry about than the safety of World War II era amphibious vehicles with no particular commercial or military value. However, a marketing genius decided to convert them into tourist attractions in coastal cities such as Seattle. One of them lost an axle on the Aurora bridge and swerved into an oncoming tour bus, killing and maiming passengers in both vehicles. Another one sank in a thunderstorm, killing all aboard (I believe.) While you could argue that the passengers on the vehicle should have known the risks of riding a discarded military assault craft, certainly the Japanese tourists in the properly modern and licensed tour bus had the right to assume that all of the other vehicles on the road were as safe as modern practice can make them.

If there is an unsafe old aircraft out there, somebody is going to find a reason to fly it; maybe they got it for free so in the short term the fuel costs are immaterial. In my opinion, a few man weeks of engineering time is really a small price to pay to ensure that at least the obvious faults are either fixed or the airframe is grounded. Owners of old commercial buildings have have to spend millions to retrofit them to survive earthquakes; a much grumbled about cost but when an earthquake causes mass casualties in other countries the first thing we point to is "lax building codes."

[Dave Therhino]

Isn't this issue similar to what is thought to have brought TWA800 down? As a layperson I wouldn't be surprised to learn this system was similar to that in the ill-fated 747.

Yes. This is pasted from the AD preamble:

The Boeing SFAR 88 report for the Model 727 showed that a combination of an in-tank wire fault or contamination condition (which can remain latent for multiple flights) and a hot short outside of the tank between the affected FQIS tank circuit and other aircraft power wiring cobundled with FQIS tank circuit wiring could result in an ignition source in the fuel tank. That combination of failures was classified by the FAA as a “known combination of failures” under the criteria in the policy memo due to the similarity of the Model 727 FQIS system architecture and design details to those of the Boeing Model 747 airplane involved in the TWA Flight 800 catastrophic fuel tank explosion accident in 1996. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that an FQIS failure combination as described above was the most likely cause of that accident.

[BDAttitude]

... If they think it is uneconomical for them to develop a fix and offer further support for that type, they should buy the remaining airworthy airframes back.