How Boeing lost their way

[Mark in CA]

“When the headquarters is located in proximity to a principal business—as ours was in Seattle—the corporate center is inevitably drawn into day-to-day business operations,” Condit explained at the time. And that statement, more than anything, captures a cardinal truth about the aerospace giant. The present 737 Max disaster can be traced back two decades—to the moment Boeing’s leadership decided to divorce itself from the firm’s own culture.

The Long-Forgotten Flight That Sent Boeing Off Course -- The Atlantic (https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/how-boeing-lost-its-bearings/602188/?fbclid=IwAR1-p97NeH76vOqxcbZVRZ2dJA-qUyjoiWO8X9e97h1d1QTy_vH3rL2NfoM)

[cattletruck]

This is exactly what corporate flunkies do. I know as I'm living it right now.

[Less Hair]

Boeing felt they were financially underperforming compared to MDD. They felt they were seen as some old, unsexy machine building company far off to the west. So they wanted to move closer to the east coast's capital markets and closer to D.C. and moved to that -back then- fancy rude GE management style. They did not win the JSF. Stock wise it still seemed to pay off. Strategically I am not so sure for the commercial business side. They would need to invest more instead of stock buy backs. It's still a very capable company so they will recover.
Actually A and B as the top group have even moved more far ahead from the rest of the industry.

[Chas2019]

The Long-Forgotten Flight That Sent Boeing Off Course -- The Atlantic (https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/how-boeing-lost-its-bearings/602188/?fbclid=IwAR1-p97NeH76vOqxcbZVRZ2dJA-qUyjoiWO8X9e97h1d1QTy_vH3rL2NfoM)

Lets see how much they can shift the culture back to on of engineering following the hearings in Congress. I am will to bet once they feel no one is looking it will be back to the old ways as it costs less and profits matter.

[Less Hair]

Program engineers now report to the chief engineer again, not to the program leaders like in between. This is intended to make them more independent even when delaying program milestones to get things right first.

[Chas2019]

Program engineers now report to the chief engineer again, not to the program leaders like in between. This is intended to make them more independent even when delaying program milestones to get things right first.

In theory is should happen as you say but a company has ways of circumventing these rules.

[Less Hair]

This affair is so expensive even "cost cutters" must support some more traditional approach to run the business.

[Rated De]

How the west was lost...

Cookie cutter MBA programs infecting corporates the world over.

Knowing the price of everything and the cost of nothing.

[GlobalNav]

This affair is so expensive even "cost cutters" must support some more traditional approach to run the business.

As they say, if you think safety is expensive, try an accident.

[Ranger One]

There's an old joke (but also a truism) that used to say something along the lines of... the best airliner in the world would be designed by Lockheed, marketed by MD - and built by Boeing.

The 'old' Boeing kinda ended with the 787 manufacturing process - an aircraft that was designed by Boeing, marketed by Boeing - and built by no-one in particular...

[Reluctant Bus Driver]

If Boeing wasn't such a huge defence contractor I would be concerned for it's very survival. Too big to fail of course and they know it. Long term, to get out of this hole they dug for themselves, they need to fire all the executives, restore the old engineering culture, and discontinue the jurassic 737 for something totally new and revolutionary. That or they will lose narrow body airplanes to Airbus for decades to come. Catastrophic for Boeing and customers that will lose leverage in pricing. What a clown show this once great company has become..

[Loose rivets]

The trouble with discontinuing the Jurassic 737 is that the ocean of MAXes will become valueless overnight.

[Chas2019]

If Boeing wasn't such a huge defence contractor I would be concerned for it's very survival. Too big to fail of course and they know it. Long term, to get out of this hole they dug for themselves, they need to fire all the executives, restore the old engineering culture, and discontinue the jurassic 737 for something totally new and revolutionary. That or they will lose narrow body airplanes to Airbus for decades to come. Catastrophic for Boeing and customers that will lose leverage in pricing. What a clown show this once great company has become..

With s backlog of almost 5000 737's that would be the death blow to Boeing.

[OldnGrounded]

The trouble with discontinuing the Jurassic 737 is that the ocean of MAXes will become valueless overnight.

Yes, but the jury is decidedly still out on the value of the MAXes if they are not abandoned (by Boeing).

[DaveReidUK]

and discontinue the jurassic 737 for something totally new and revolutionary

Point of order: The term "Jurassic" as applied to the 737 is normally used to mean the original P&W-powered -100/-200 Series, as distinct from the "Classic" (-300/-400/-500), NG and Max.

That's the problem with a 50-year-old design - you need so many different family names. :O

The last Jurassic was built over 30 years ago.

[AviatorDave]

If Boeing wasn't such a huge defence contractor I would be concerned for it's very survival. Too big to fail of course and they know it. Long term, to get out of this hole they dug for themselves, they need to fire all the executives, restore the old engineering culture, ...

That is true for most, if not all current companies that are into any form of engineering. However, I can nowhere see any signs that the trend gets reversed towards an engineering centric culture. Quite the contrary.
It is very likely that high value brand companies must totally fail in significant numbers first before any thought will be given to valuing true expert input and aligning businesses in accordance with it.

[Blackfriar]

Lets see how much they can shift the culture back to on of engineering following the hearings in Congress. I am will to bet once they feel no one is looking it will be back to the old ways as it costs less and profits matter.

So killing over 300 people, grounding the entire fleet of 737Maxs worldwide and paying airlines for all this is cheap?
The article in the Atlantic should be an MBA case study (I know, I did an airline based MBA) to show that profits and costs need to be measured over time and culture is very important. The MD people have ruined Boeing as they ruined MD with the "death cruiser" DC-10 that people in the airline business wouldn't fly on. Now they have done it again.
Boeing shareholders need to revolt and throw these MD/GE culture people out before it is too late.
We are also seeing the cost-cutting, outsourcing effects in pickle forks - parts that have been outsourced and are sub-stanadard because no-one even thought to have any kind of quality control on the parts they buy in. How many other hidden gotchas are yet to appear?

[BDAttitude]

It is very likely that high value brand companies must totally fail in significant numbers first before any thought will be given to valuing true expert input and aligning businesses in accordance with it.
This!
The attitude has spread like cancer in most industries. I am working for one of these old high value brands. I have seen slides from top management where they are bemoaning that the highest value omputer company (Apple) does not manufacture computers any more, that the most valueable telco (Facebook) does not own a single line, that the biggest accommodation business (AirBnB) does not own any hotels and the largest taxi businesses (Ueber) does not have a single taxi. Only we would make our hands dirty to make steel and plasics to cash with a substandard RoS instead of just grooming our brand and having someone else do the dirty work.

[Reluctant Bus Driver]

Point of order: The term "Jurassic" as applied to the 737 is normally used to mean the original P&W-powered -100/-200 Series, as distinct from the "Classic" (-300/-400/-500), NG and Max.

That's the problem with a 50-year-old design - you need so many different family names. :O

The last Jurassic was built over 30 years ago.
True, but the basic airplane is still there with new motors and updated avionics. It still has the 727 nose, which makes it really loud, it still has the Herb Kelleher mandated jurassic overhead panel for fleet communality where you still have to manually select a generator for petes sake! Time to kill it and move on. Even SW is considering adding another type to it's fleet which is pretty telling..

[PAXboy]

One of the problems for Board throwing out the previous generation is that:

It admits that the company were wrong. Count how many companies admit that - unless forced by courts of law.
Shareholders and customers wonder if ALL the bad wood has been thrown out? Perhaps some of those left are also wrong?

The corporate instinct is to pretend that everything is fixed now and fine. Boeing no different.

[industry insider]

Chasing quarterly cash call results rather than long term product excellence always ends up with a poorer product which becomes run of the mill.

[runner1021]

Boeing's priorities over the last 10 years:

#1) Increase shareholder (read executive's) value by repurchasing $43 billion worth of outstanding stock. Yes, that's $43 with a B.
#2) Build safe, reliable airplanes.

Share price, and executive net worth have done fantastically well.
Building safe and reliable airplanes; Well, not so much.

[CurtainTwitcher]

[Previously posted links]
If you want to see how this buy-back works, Ben Hunt does an excellent job for Boeing: When Was I Radicalized? (Boeing edition) (https://www.epsilontheory.com/when-was-i-radicalized-boeing-edition/). He calls it Boeing edition, in reference to his previous article on Texas Instruments buy-back story: Yeah, It’s Still Water (https://www.epsilontheory.com/yeah-its-still-water/).

Both are well worth a read to provide the back story for the modern financial landscape that we have all been thrust into, and why there is almost no R&D done anymore.

[tdracer]

Boeing felt they were financially underperforming compared to MDD. They felt they were seen as some old, unsexy machine building company far off to the west.

I have to disagree - it wasn't "Boeing" - it was Phil Condit. Condit was a shining example of the "Peter Principle" in action (basically, people get promoted to their level of incompetence). He was the first Boeing CEO who directly cared about the stock price (the CEO's before Condit apparently understood that if they did a good job, if the company did well, the stock price would take care of itself). He personally negotiated the terms of the merger with MacDac - never realizing that those terms would effectively put MacDac in charge.
Phil Condit will go down as one of the worst CEOs in US history.

[CurtainTwitcher]

But could Boeing have survived the pressure to become, euphemistically "shareholder value" driven, and the rivers of gold that would flow to the executive suite? I see it inevitable that this was bound to happen, it was just a question of when it would end in tears.

It is waaay beyond my knowledge and skill set to judge Boeing CEO's, but I suspect, that if it wasn't Condit, someone else would have come along and taken Boeing down the same path. It's not a Boeing thing, it's a much wider systemic problem, there is just too much money at stake to be looted by senior executives of public companies. We have entered the wild west of financialization.

The die was cast in the 1980's, a couple of great primers on the inevitability of this outcome: Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco and The Predators' Ball: The Inside Story of Drexel Burnham and the Rise of the Junk Bond Raiders.

[PAXboy]

I agree with CurtainTwitcher that it is now a systemic problem. Forty years of CEOs being raised on the motto Shareprice - at any Price. We can see it in so many companies. One example I might suggest is British Airways, whose product continues to dissapoint (another IT failure etc). EVERY corporation gets fat, lazy and complacent. VW had the good fortune to not kill anyone by false test results. Coca-Cola only hurt themselves with 'new Coke'. Boeing lost sight of everything and, as yet, have not made proper obeisance to the truth nor reparations. But this freshly minted business study case will take them a decade to recover from.

I suggest that NO executive or non-executive board member is entitled to ANY bonus for ten years. That's for starters to make it clear that - as they put money before people - now they should suffer the same and lose money. Because we can be sure tha no one will go to jail - which is the real crime. Nothing less than a decade of solid safety can repair their name, they had better start thinking long term again.

[tdracer]

But could Boeing have survived the pressure to become, euphemistically "shareholder value" driven, and the rivers of gold that would flow to the executive suite? I see it inevitable that this was bound to happen, it was just a question of when it would end in tears.

It is waaay beyond my knowledge and skill set to judge Boeing CEO's, but I suspect, that if it wasn't Condit, someone else would have come along and taken Boeing down the same path. It's not a Boeing thing, it's a much wider systemic problem, there is just too much money at stake to be looted by senior executives of public companies. We have entered the wild west of financialization.

Boeing had always elevated it's executives from within (Condit had been a Propulsion Engineer at one time) so they had an understanding an appreciation for the culture. Condit broke that when he arranged the merger with MacDac and started the downhill slide. It was quite telling that Condit was the first Boeing CEO to overtly focus on the perks of the job.
Perhaps Boeing would have eventually drifted down the 'shareholder value' path, but if they had made Alan Mulally CEO instead of Condit in 1996, it would have taken far, far longer.

[bcmpqn]

I agree that the Boeing failure is representative of a greater, systemic fall. In so many fields there was a time when if asked what the company did, a CEO would answer, we build cars, trains, planes, ... . Now it’s always about increasing shareholder value. On the other hand, our pensions and 401Ks depend on share value. What went wrong? Or is this simply the inevitable result of human nature?

[FlexibleResponse]

Last Century, bean counters tried killing the US Auto Industry by building sub-standard cars and designs that nobody wanted to buy. Some cars were killing customers. Bean counters did not listen to the Auto Engineers.

This Century it would seem that bean counters are killing the US Airliner Industry by building sub-standard aircraft. Some aircraft are killing customers. Bean counters seem not to be listening to Aviation Engineers.

[Winemaker]

I worked as a composite tool designer for BP Chemicals Advanced Materials in Kent, Washington back in the 90's; we manufactured nacelles for Grumman and Fokker, produced launch tubes for the TOW missile, and made some other composite stuff. The general manager, a certain Mr. N., was an MBA trained executive with impeccable clothing and a great handshake. He also was a follower of the business model of the day. We had had two 're-organizations' in a single year when Mr. N decided we still weren't 'efficient' enough, so he had each department head come up with another plan. Five of us grunts were selected to 'review' the department heads' plans and decide if they were useful or not. Foolish me, I actually sort of thought he wanted real feedback! We met over a period of a week and each head gave us a presentation of how they were going to, again, re-organize their departments. After listening to the presentations and discussing them; we all agreed that we had not allowed enough time for things to settle down after the two previous re-orgs and that the plans presented to us were just tossing things into the air again. Listening to the department heads it was obvious they felt the same way, but were carrying out orders to satisfy Mr. N.

We agreed we would tell Mr. N this when we reported, and we would recommend that nothing be done, that another re-org would simply waste everyone's time. Mr. N. came in to hear our analysis and, of course, when push came to shove no one would actually say what we thought. Except, at the end, foolish me. I told him we were just generating chaos with no constructive benefit and that we should just hang back and let the last re-org get figured out. A big mistake, to put it mildly! He got very angry and told us what we would report to the department heads that their plans were good and we totally supported the new re-org. So much for actually wanting our real feedback. Needless to say, I was put on the hit list big time. MBA's ...............

[Less Hair]

Just in case would Alan Mulally be available?

[Spooky 2]

Wasn't Alan Mulally in charge when the 737 hard over ruder problem showed up?

[WHBM]

I read all the above. However, MCAS was not designed by bean counters, or indeed anyone from Chicago. They would not have a clue about where to start; they probably don't possess a CAD station among all of them, and MCAS is entirely about aerodynamic characteristics. It was designed and checked and had test plans written by aeronautical engineers, no less, from Boeing. I suspect some detail elements would be subcontracted out, possibly even to the low bidder, but the short list preparation and selection would be done by aeronautical engineers.

Now the engineers may not have co-ordinated themselves adequately, and the various changes to MCAS characteristics during it's development may have been garbled along the way. But that wasn't bean counters who did the lack of liaison, was it ...

[pittsspecialguy]

Wanted: new CEO for Boeing. Only pilots need apply. They know better, after all.

[CurtainTwitcher]

The beancounters hold the purse. "Shareholder Value" translates to keeping the operational side of the business on starvation rations. Continuously one day from death is optimal solution. There is never enough money in the budget, never enough time, never enough resources. Unanticipated problems (ie non-compliant stick forces in the case of the MAX) require solutions without additional resources becoming available. Boeing's use of its regulatory delegations for certification essentially gave it the power to direct engineers to sign off or lose their jobs.

I know this as a low level functionary in a large organisation that is making large amount of money, yet you have continuous hacking of the business to the point of gross dysfunction, then they hack some more.

Yeh, the beancounters did do it.

[AviatorDave]

I read all the above. However, MCAS was not designed by bean counters, or indeed anyone from Chicago. They would not have a clue about where to start; they probably don't possess a CAD station among all of them, and MCAS is entirely about aerodynamic characteristics. It was designed and checked and had test plans written by aeronautical engineers, no less, from Boeing. I suspect some detail elements would be subcontracted out, possibly even to the low bidder, but the short list preparation and selection would be done by aeronautical engineers.

Now the engineers may not have co-ordinated themselves adequately, and the various changes to MCAS characteristics during it's development may have been garbled along the way. But that wasn't bean counters who did the lack of liaison, was it ...

The root cause is Boeing trying to quickly rush an A320NEO competitor to the market. A competitor that would not require a new type rating or otherwise cause non-commonality inconveniences for buying airlines.
It was entirely a management decision, and engineering most likely received the respective pressure to make it happen.

The engineers might have their share of the blame in this, but the real issue is on the executive levels.

[West Coast]

Just in case would Alan Mulally be available?


He’s in his mid 70s now. Largely has led a quiet life since leaving Ford. Anything is possible, but I have to believe the probability of his return is low.

[CurtainTwitcher]

I can't claim any credit here, but a great parable on modern beancounting, feeds right into the shareholder value ethos.
Funny story about Activity Based Costing (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/funny-story-activity-based-costing-rudi-burkhard)



I did not write this conversation and I have no idea who did. If someone recognises it as belonging to him, please let me know so that I can give full credit. If you read the conversation, keep in mind practices in your company. The story applies not only to ABC costing but to any sort of costing that allocates as described below. Standard costing, full absorption costing etc. all suffer from the problem behind the story. (https://www.colourbox.dk/billede/billede-af-en-flok-peanuts-i-en-skaal-billede-2790576) This link is to the source of my peanuts picture!

In discussing the costs incident to various types of operations, the analogy was drawn of the restaurant, which adds a rack of peanuts to the counter, intending to pick up a little additional profit in the usual course of business. However, the accuracy of the analogy is evident when one considers the actual problem faced by the Restaurateur (Joe)as revealed by his Accountant-Efficiency Expert (Eff. Ex.)

EFF. EX. Joe, you said you put in these peanuts because some people ask for them, but do you realize what this rack of peanuts is costing you?

JOE It ain't gonna cost. 'Sgonna be a profit. Sure, I pay $25 for a fancy rack to bags, but the peanuts cost 6 cents and I sell 'em for 10 cents. I sell 50 bags a week to start. It'll take 12-weeks to cover the cost of the rack. After that, I gotta clear profit of 4 cents a bag. The more I sell, the more I make.

EFF. EX. That is an antiquated and completely unrealistic approach, Joe. Fortunately, modern accounting procedures permit a more accurate picture which reveals the complexities involved.

JOE Huh?

EFF. EX. To be precise, those peanuts must be integrated into your entire operation and be allocated their appropriate share of business overhead. They must share a proportionate part of your expenditures for rent, heat, light, equipment depreciation, decorating, salaries for your waitresses, cook,...

JOE The cook? he gotta do wit' ? He don' even know I got'em!

EFF. EX. Look, Joe, the cook is in the kitchen, the kitchen prepares the food, the food is what brings people in here, and the people ask to buy peanuts. That's why you must charge a portion of the cook's wages, as well as a part of your own salary to peanut sales. This sheet contains a carefully calculated cost analysis which indicates the peanut operation should pay exactly $1,278 per year toward these general overhead costs.

JOE The peanuts? $1,278 a year for overhead? The nuts?

EFF. EX. It's really a little more than that. You also spend money each week to have the windows washed, to have the place swept out in the mornings, and to keep soap in the washroom. That raises the total to $1,313 per year.

JOE (Thoughtfully)But the peanut salesman said I'd make money -- put'em on the end of the counter, he said -- and get 4 cents a bag profit.

EFF. EX. (With a sniff)He's not an accountant. Do you actually know what the portion of the counter occupied by the peanut rack is worth to you?

JOE Ain't worth nothing - no stool there - just a dead spot at the end.

EFF. EX. The modern cost picture permits no dead spots. Your counter contains 60 square feet and your counter business grosses $15,000 a year. Consequently, the square foot of space occupied by the present rack is worth $250 a year. Since you have taken that area away from general counter use, you must the value of the space to the occupant.

JOE You mean I gotta add $250 a year more to the peanuts?

EFF. EX. Right. That raises their share of the general operating costs to a grand total of $1,563 per year. Now then, if you sell 50 bags of peanuts per week, these allocated costs will amount to 60 cents per bag.

JOE What?

EFF. EX. Obviously, to that must be added your purchase price of 6 cents per bag, which brings the total to 66 cents. So, you see, by selling peanuts at 10 cents per bag, you are losing 56 cents on every sale.

JOE Something's crazy.

EFF. EX. Not at all. Here are the figures. They prove your peanut operation cannot stand on its own feet.

JOE (Brightening)Suppose I sell peanuts - thousand bags a week 'stead a fifty?

EFF. EX. (Tolerantly)Joe, you don't understand the problem. If the volume of peanut sales increases, your operating costs will go up. You'll have to handle more bags, with more time, more depreciation, more everything. The basic principle of accounting is firm on that subject: "The Bigger the Operation, the More General Overhead Costs that Must be Allocated." No, increasing the volume of sales won't help.

JOE Okay, you're so smart, you tell me what I gotta do.

EFF. EX. (Condescendingly)Well -- you could first reduce the operating expenses.

JOE How?

EFF. EX. Move to a building with cheaper rent. Cut salaries. Wash the windows bi-weekly. Have the floor swept only on Thursday. Remove the soap from the washrooms. Decrease the square foot value of your counter. For example, if you can cut your expenses 50%, that will reduce the amount allocated to peanuts from $1,563 down to $781.50 per year, reducing the cost to 35 cents per bag.

JOE (Slowly) That's better.

EFF. EX. Much, much better. However, even then you would lose 26 cents per bag if you charge only 10 cents. Therefore, you must also raise your selling price. If you want a net profit of 4 cents per bag, you would have to charge 40 cents.

JOE (Flabbergasted) You mean after I cut operating costs 50%, I still gotta charge 40 cents for a 10-cent bag of peanuts? Nobody's that nuts about nuts. Who'd buy 'em?

EFF. EX. That's a secondary consideration. The point is at 40 cents, you'd be selling at a price based upon a true and proper evaluation of your then reduced costs.

JOE (Eagerly) Look! I got a better idea. Why don't I just throw the nuts 'em in a trash can?

EFF. EX. Can you afford it?

JOE Sure. All I got is about 50 bags of peanuts -- cost about three bucks -- so I lose $25 on the rack, but I'm outa this nutsy business and no more grief.

EFF. EX. (Shaking head) Joe, it isn't quite that simple. You are in the peanut business! The minute you throw those peanuts out, you are adding $1,563 of annual overhead to the rest of your operation. Joe, be realistic -- can you afford to do that?

JOE (Completely crushed) unbelievable! Last week, I was gonna make money. Now, I'm in a trouble -- because I think peanuts on a counter is a gonna bring me some extra profit -- because I believe 50 bags of peanuts a week is easy.

EFF. EX. (With raised eyebrow)That is the object of modern cost studies, Joe, to dispel false illusions



Funnily enough, exactly the same about the problematic allocation of costs argument is made in Boeings own internal study: Boeing OUT-SOURCED PROFITS –THE CORNERSTONE OF SUCCESSFUL SUBCONTRACTING (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ABPub/2011/02/04/2014130646.pdf)

The first issue to be examined, is precisely what is out-sourced and what is inevitably retained.
The superficial perspective might be that every internal activity that used to be related to a task that has
been out-sourced is no longer necessary. Even that is not true but, worse, it fails to acknowledge all of
the new internal tasks that had not previously existed. To add insult to injury, contemporary accounting
practices do not allow these unavoidable additional costs to be billed against that particular item of
work – because it is no longer identified as an in-house task – so these charges are allocated instead
as overhead to any remaining in-house work. This misrepresentation of true costs furthers the illusion
that outside production is cheaper than anything done inside, building the pressure to ship even more
work offsite, until there isn’t any left. The irony of this situation is that it is so easy to understand in the
extreme. Suppose that a manufacturer had succeeded in out-sourcing all of the work that it wished to
isolate from the preferred task of systems integrator. The unallocatable costs from the huge amount of
out-sourced work will now appear as overhead on the few remaining tasks, like sales and product
support, confirming that these were now even less profitable than manufacturing had been when the spiral began!

[Big Pistons Forever]

Re the email from Mr Marko, the Transport Canada engineer.

I was waiting for someone to hold up their hand and say enough lipstick on this pig.

Boeing did not want to spend the money on a modern FBW control system. OK fine but then it has got to fly like a normal airplane at all the corners of the flight envelope with out electronic bandaids, like the 737 100/200 (tel:737 100/200), the basis of the air frame certification

This is what happens when Boeing adopted the company culture of “You Engineers will never get time or money to do the job right, and by way we only want you taking the absolute minimum time and money to do it over to a just good enough standard to smoke it through the regulators”


Reply (https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/canadian-official-suggests-mcas-be-scrapped-on-max/#comment-2298)

[DingerX]

The people who signed the SWA contract promising a big, new engine and agreeing to a penalty if cockpit retraining were necessary did this.
The people who made it beyond debate that they penalty not be paid did this.
The people who installed a system where safety was merely a set of obstacles to overcome on the way to production did this.

This is already a classic study. The engineers are handed a series of hard parameters and told to come up with something. Their solution is brilliant: develop a system by tapping into an existing system; normally, this would cause a huge problem, since the existing system wasn't built for that, and, in effect, you're relying on a single sensor input to move a secondary flight control, but, hey, with small adjustments that can easily be overridden manually and countered by primary flight controls, that's not a problem. So it passes the regulatory hurdle. Then in testing, surprise surprise, we're going to need more authority. Well, you know safety, in for a dime, in for a dollar.

Sure, Engineers "did this". They were given a design, a serious of hard obstacles, and some time, and they worked around to find a solution in keeping with the priorities set by management. They built an aircraft even more successful than the MD-11 turtle.

I do like it when companies start calculating the cost of everthing, setting up internal billing schemes and bureaucracies to keep track of such things. It's a useful way to drive up costs and then that work to another company with more efficient accounting practices.

[pittsspecialguy]

Expanding: I am probably the only person on this forum who worked closely with every executive mentioned here and in this very dubious article. All of them were dedicated people who wanted to maintain Boeing’s commitment to excellence. To sideline them as avaricious people putting profit and personal gain before safety is insane. What possible reason could they have to do this? Most of them graduated the hard way, through years of gruelling work. They were and are great people. To have a bunch of pilots who know zero about running huge corporations to denigrate them on this forum is disgusting. Plus, it’s an insult to the many guys and girls on the shop floor who build your aircraft. I know many of them and they are probably as mad as I am about the ongoing Boeing-bashing on this forum. You should all be ashamed of yourselves.

[BoeingDriver99]

Do you reckon they are as mad as the surviving family members who’ve had their relatives smashed into the ground by poorly designed, corruptly certificated, out of date airliners?

[pittsspecialguy]

Do you reckon they are as mad as the surviving family members who’ve had their relatives smashed into the ground by poorly designed, corruptly certificated, out of date airliners?
Your excitable reply suggests that human factors may interfere with your ability to fly straight and level. I would also suggest that you are not a Boeing driver at all, but a pilot impersonator. If indeed you are a pilot and you hate Boeing so much, why not get a Bus ticket and fly an inferior aircraft. The people at Boeing have always been honourable. The next people, Stan Deal especially, will fix the current issues. You did not work with them. I did. Do you really think they sleep well at night? They don’t. You can though. Stop trolling and get the facts.

[DaveReidUK]

Do you reckon they are as mad as the surviving family members who’ve had their relatives smashed into the ground by poorly designed, corruptly certificated, out of date airliners?

Highly emotive.

But, sadly, entirely factually correct.

[Fly Aiprt]

They were and are great people. To have a bunch of pilots who know zero about running huge corporations to denigrate them on this forum is disgusting. Plus, it’s an insult to the many guys and girls on the shop floor who build your aircraft. I know many of them and they are probably as mad as I am about the ongoing Boeing-bashing on this forum. You should all be ashamed of yourselves.




'Great people', "know zero", "denigrate", "disgusting", "insult", "mad", "Boeing-bashing", "you should be ashamed"
How emotional from a supposed top brass airplane company runner...
Pittsspecialguy, have you watched Dennis Muilenburg's hearings some weeks ago ?
Are you sure he appeared as an example of a "great person" ?
If you really are what you claim you are, would you care to give some examples of what makes him and his partners greater than what they seem to appear ?

Guys and girls on the shop floor are certainly mostly great people. Nevertheless I feel uneasy about those FOD, tools, etc. left behind in an airplane.

And BTW, what makes you think everyone here might be ignorant of airplane design ?

[Uplinker]

@pitts, of course, nobody wanted these disasters to happen, and I hope that the managers you know genuinely thought the system (MCAS) would work safely.

But:

A system with autonomous authority to move an extremely important flight control is added but not documented. There is apparently no way in the cockpit to switch it off. The system relies on the data from a single sensor. There seems to be no way of the system self-detecting a fault? The software changes were written by 3rd parties with no core experience of the original software code, and none of the original software writers were consulted. The AoA disagree warning light is an extra cost option. The hand THS trim wheels are smaller, increasing the human mechanical effort required to turn them manually. (Please correct me if any of these assertions are wrong).

With the best will in the world, this was surely poor management?, whatever the reasons for it were. And I for one cannot understand why such a pioneering and respected aircraft designer and manufacturer, such as Boeing, could have got themselves into this situation.

[pittsspecialguy]

First, it’s Denis Muilenburg. Check your spelling. And yes, I worked with him and all CEOs back to 2000. PM me for proof. If he was sub-standard in his presentations, I can tell you that it was probably because he was just downright, old fashioned nervous. He’s an old—school guy and does not like PR spin. He tried his best. Even CEOs are not super-heroes and I doubt if he would want to gloss over anything. He’s too honest. I am convinced that he and Stan Deal will help to recover Boeing. They are decent human beings.

Second, I am not going to apologise for emotional language about a company I love. What especially grates with me is the commentary on this board that ultimately would affect thousands of blue collar workers who put their hearts and souls into building your aircraft. I am not going to comment on tools etc. Because I am honest enough to say I know nothing on this.

Third, I made little comments re airplane design. I referred to pilots commenting on how to run a huge corporation. You guys run your office well. So how about a bigger office? The only pilot I know who now runs a corporation is Willle Walsh. So how about it guys, what’s your comment on that and let’s imagine you are now CEO of Boeing. What would you do next? — cue silence or do you all have the cojones to reply that one?!

[pittsspecialguy]

I can’t answer your question but I really appreciate the sensible and measured reply.

[Fly Aiprt]

First, it’s Denis Muilenburg. Check your spelling.

Thank you sir for taking care of my spelling.


So how about it guys, what’s your comment on that and let’s imagine you are now CEO of Boeing. What would you do next? — cue silence or do you all have the cojones to reply that one?!

No need to be offensive, that proves nothing.
When asked if I was working for free like the Japanese would do, I suppose I would have answered that it had been the case for months. Salary as well as bonuses...

[Less Hair]

If I'd be the Boeing CEO I'd start the next narrowbody development program ASAP.

[pittsspecialguy]

Yes, totally right,instead of further 737 manipulations they should have concentrated on a new airframe. 1 point to you !

[pittsspecialguy]

I think I was being assertive but not offensive. If I offended you then I apologise.

[infrequentflyer789]

This is already a classic study. The engineers are handed a series of hard parameters and told to come up with something. Their solution is brilliant: develop a system by tapping into an existing system; normally, this would cause a huge problem, since the existing system wasn't built for that, and, in effect, you're relying on a single sensor input to move a secondary flight control, but, hey, with small adjustments that can easily be overridden manually and countered by primary flight controls, that's not a problem. So it passes the regulatory hurdle. Then in testing, surprise surprise, we're going to need more authority. Well, you know safety, in for a dime, in for a dollar..

Your classic study may need a few accuracy tweaks (or your recollection of thread history may be more accurate than mine :-) ):
1. MCAS was an existing system taken from another aircraft (KC-46) - this meant it did not need to be certified as "new or novel" (see JATR).
2. That existing system had dual AOA input.
3. Even after they removed the other AOA input, it was still not single-sensor dependent because it was triggered on both AOA and g conditions.
4. It wasn't just "more authority" required after flight testing, it was also removal of the g sensor condition
5. Don't forget, after removing the g condition, and increasing the authority of the system, don't bother reviewing the safety case for the system in case you turn up anything that might impact schedule...

As to "who did this" I'd start with those who said this design would fly right except in wind-up turns, way before it was actually built, and then those who said nothing when flight tests showed it didn't - that was the moment the cord should have been pulled and the whole program reviewed to determine (a) how we got it wrong (b) what else we might have got wrong knowing (a) and (c) how do we fix it properly (not just whack up the gain and remove a sensor from an existing system and call it safe because it was assessed as safe before). Six months delay to the MAX wouldn't have hurt anywhere near as bad as what's happened since.

[Fly Aiprt]

I think I was being assertive but not offensive. If I offended you then I apologise.

No problem sir !
Maybe a little too assertive for certain cultures, but it's OK ;-)

As instructed, checked Boeing's CEO's name spelling
First, it’s Denis Muilenburg
and corrected my typo : Dennis Muilenburg

[Fly Aiprt]

1. MCAS was an existing system taken from another aircraft (KC-46) - this meant it did not need to be certified as "new or novel" (see JATR).


Didn't we hear somewhere that the KC-46 MCAS was totally different from that of the MAX, apart from the name ?

[infrequentflyer789]

If I'd be the Boeing CEO I'd start the next narrowbody development program ASAP.

Already done (bar sorting out the regulators, no worries, we're good at that) - bought Embraer.

Bit of stretching and squeezing and we'll soon have the E2 (or whatever we call it - E-Max?) with enough seats to cover most of 737 market, it's also FBW from the start so no flight control problems from changes, oh, and it has yokes not sidesticks which is good, sidesticks would damage our image and credibility, retrofitting yokes would have been expensive.

With an updated, and slightly down-sized, narrowbody option we should have room for a New Midsized Aircraft, maybe, if we can afford to design it, and if we can build it to a price that competes with A321 but doesn't take 787 sales. That is the tough call.

[BDAttitude]

One n two n's burg or berg, the major blame towards him, as occured in his tenure - besides being a follower of the predominant sharholder value cult - should be in the way how the grounding was handled:

Numerous premature announcements of return to service, thereby manipulating the stock market.
By continuation of production, he defacto precluded any effective hardware solution or even termination of the 737 programme by making it a too big too fail gamble. Thereby he coerced the regulators and public to accept a series of substandard software band aids.
That's his legacy. And he should be held responsible.

[infrequentflyer789]

Didn't we hear somewhere that the KC-46 MCAS was totally different from that of the MAX, apart from the name ?

Yeah, I think from the press after KC-46 MCAS started to get some visibility following the accidents. Source? allegedly Boeing, but can't be because that would mean Boeing said one thing to the regulator to get it certified and the exact opposite thing later following crash...

[jan99]

What would you do next?

I would give up most of my ill received billion dollars to a good cause.

[jimjim1]

It was quite telling that Condit was the first Boeing CEO to overtly focus on the perks of the job.

I understand that you may have some more spare time now, if you have got over the new car:)

I recommend having a read of the links that CurtainTwitcher posted above.
Here they are again -

https://www.epsilontheory.com/yeah-its-still-water/
"... they’re not founders like Gates or Bezos. They’re not investors like Buffett or Dalio. They’re management. And now they’re billionaires. And all their captains and lesser brethren are centimillionaires. And all their lieutenants and subalterns are decamillionaires.
And everyone is perfectly fine with this. No one even notices that this is happening or that it’s different or that it’s a sea change in how we organize wealth in our society. It’s not good or bad or deserved or undeserved. It just IS."

https://www.epsilontheory.com/when-was-i-radicalized-boeing-edition/

Still not through my bull****-o-meter but I have read a few articles and it looks OK so far.

[WHBM]

I am probably the only person on this forum who worked closely with every executive mentioned here ... To have a bunch of pilots who know zero about running huge corporations to denigrate them on this forum is disgusting.
Ah, good morning Mr Muilenburg.

[OldnGrounded]

Ah, good morning Mr Muilenburg.

It looks like he may have extra free time now that he's not burdened with all that extra board chairman busy work.

[Diavel]

Expanding: I am probably the only person on this forum who worked closely with every executive mentioned here and in this very dubious article. All of them were dedicated people who wanted to maintain Boeing’s commitment to excellence. To sideline them as avaricious people putting profit and personal gain before safety is insane. What possible reason could they have to do this? Most of them graduated the hard way, through years of gruelling work. They were and are great people. To have a bunch of pilots who know zero about running huge corporations to denigrate them on this forum is disgusting. Plus, it’s an insult to the many guys and girls on the shop floor who build your aircraft. I know many of them and they are probably as mad as I am about the ongoing Boeing-bashing on this forum. You should all be ashamed of yourselves.
is what Muilenburg and the rest of these gentlemen are. They have no Aviation technical insight, or even interest it seems. Those gentlemen are responsible for destroying the reputation of a once great company. What your relation is with these people is, is irrelevant. Every CEO and boardmember since the infameous Mr Stonecipher has a lot to answer for.
In this industry beancounters will not be very respected.

[OldnGrounded]

is what Muilenburg and the rest of these gentlemen are. They have no Aviation technical insight, or even interest it seems. Those gentlemen are responsible for destroying the reputation of a once great company. What your relation is with these people is, is irrelevant. Every CEO and boardmember since the infameous Mr Stonecipher has a lot to answer for.
In this industry beancounters will not be very respected.


Muilenburg was an engineer. That means he has even less excuse than the bean-counters.

[The AvgasDinosaur]

.............................In this industry beancounters will not be very respected.[/QUOTE]
Or any ‘industry’ except their own myopic, self centred world.
David

[Diavel]

Muilenburg was an engineer. That means he has even less excuse than the bean-counters.
You are absolutely right, but Muilenburg behaves exactly like a typical beancounter.
I am quite sure he is not an engineer from the aeronautical industry, at least I hope not.

[ATC Watcher]

This whole saga starts to look like the GM story , I hope Boeing does not end the same way..
September 16, 1908 - General Motors Company is founded

1942-1945 - GM produces vehicles and weapons for use by the US military during World War II.

1954 - General Motors accounts for 54% of the auto market in the United States, up from 12% in 1921.

1971, GM pioneered the use of engines that could run on low-lead or unleaded petrol. Two years later it was the first to offer a car with an air bag and in 1974, it introduced the catalytic converter to reduce emissions.

The manufacturer helped develop the guidance and navigation system for the first Moon landing aboard Apollo 11, and designed and manufactured the Lunar Roving Vehicle for Apollo 15 – the first vehicle driven on the Moon.

1995, annual vehicle sales outside North America exceeded 3m units for the first time, while 5m vehicles were sold in the US and GM embarked on its first joint venture in China. Buick became China's most popular automotive brand.

2012 - GM is officially the top automobile manufacturer in the world (http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/19/autos/gm_global_sales_leader/). Nine million vehicles sold in 2011 helped to make it the largest automaker in China also.

2014 - GM expands a recall of compact cars to 1.37 million vehicles built between 2003 and 2007, due to possible ignition problems. Thirteen people have died in accidents.

2014 - GM releases the results of an internal probe relating to delayed recalls and the deaths of at least 13 people. GM Chief Executive Officer Mary Barra announces that 15 employees have been dismissed and five more have been disciplined.

2015 - GM's faulty ignition switch caused 124 deaths (http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/10/news/companies/gm-recall-ignition-switch-death-toll/), according to a final report from the attorney administering funds to accident victims.

2017 - Says it's selling its European business (http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/06/investing/general-motors-psa-opel-vauxhall-peugeot-citroen-deal/index.html) for $2.3 billion to France's PSA, the maker of Peugeot and Citroen cars, and announces it is laying off 1,100 workers (http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/06/news/companies/gm-layoffs/index.html) in Michigan

2018 - GM announces that it will shut down production at five facilities in North America and cut its staff (https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/26/business/gm-oshawa-plant/index.html), reducing its salaried workforce by 15%.




source : cnn , the whole timeline is here : GM facts (https://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/08/us/general-motors-fast-facts/index.html)

[Fly Aiprt]

You are absolutely right, but Muilenburg behaves exactly like a typical beancounter.
I am quite sure he is not an engineer from the aeronautical industry, at least I hope not.

Unfortunately,
Wikipedia
Muilenburg grew up on a farm in Iowa.[2] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Muilenburg#cite_note-stitcher.com-2)He graduated in 1982 from Sioux Center High School in Sioux Center, Iowa (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sioux_Center,_Iowa).[3] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Muilenburg#cite_note-3) He received a bachelor's degree in Aerospace Engineering from Iowa State University (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iowa_State_University), followed by a master's degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from the University of Washington (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Washington).[1] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Muilenburg#cite_note-bloombergprofile-1)

[Fly Aiprt]

Any engineer or executive can be pardoned for not being up to the task, but if this is confirmed, he can't definitively be "a great guy" :
Wikipedia

On March 12, President Donald Trump spoke to Muilenburg and received assurances that the aircraft was safe.[10] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Muilenburg#cite_note-10)

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airlines-trump-idUSKBN1QT2MQ

[OldnGrounded]

Any engineer or executive can be pardoned for not being up to the task, but if this confirmed, he can't definitively be "a great guy" :
Wikipedia

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airlines-trump-idUSKBN1QT2MQ

I think it's true. It was reported rather widely.

[RealUlli]

First, it’s Denis Muilenburg. Check your spelling. And yes, I worked with him and all CEOs back to 2000. PM me for proof. If he was sub-standard in his presentations, I can tell you that it was probably because he was just downright, old fashioned nervous. He’s an old—school guy and does not like PR spin. He tried his best. Even CEOs are not super-heroes and I doubt if he would want to gloss over anything. He’s too honest. I am convinced that he and Stan Deal will help to recover Boeing. They are decent human beings.

I'm absolutely sure he's a great guy. However, he is trying to steer a giant company by numbers and probably has a bunch of goals defined by the shareholders. He probably got the same problem as the guy with the peanut rack from another post, namely cost allocation. Safety is similar to IT: it's a cost center, but without it, you're f*cked. (I work in IT, I've seen what happens when a bean counter outsources critical parts of IT: no helpdesk, just a call center. Engineer's workstation broke. Took the contracting company a few days to set him up with a new one. All of a sudden, outsourcing is expensive, but nobody will admit to it...)


Second, I am not going to apologise for emotional language about a company I love. What especially grates with me is the commentary on this board that ultimately would affect thousands of blue collar workers who put their hearts and souls into building your aircraft. I am not going to comment on tools etc. Because I am honest enough to say I know nothing on this.


If you read the comments, you might have noticed that most of these blue collar workers are considered blameless for the situation.


Third, I made little comments re airplane design. I referred to pilots commenting on how to run a huge corporation. You guys run your office well. So how about a bigger office? The only pilot I know who now runs a corporation is Willle Walsh. So how about it guys, what’s your comment on that and let’s imagine you are now CEO of Boeing. What would you do next? — cue silence or do you all have the cojones to reply that one?!

I don't think a pilot should run Boeing. However, a pilot should have at least an equal say in the running of an airline. Maybe Boeing should be led by a team consisting of a pilot, an engineer and a guy who knows finance. I suspect Dennis was not qualified enough to keep the bean counters at bay, and not bold enough to make decisions that might not endear him to the shareholders but improve the long-term viability of the company. As someone else said, start on a new narrowbody, maybe even build a "mini-widebody" that is efficient enough to capture narrowbody marketshare. (Imagine a Do-328 Jet, just scaled up to 737 dimensions, with a high wing and 787 (like) engines. Maybe some fuselage sections designed for the 787 could be reused?)

Maybe establish a new Skunkworks to work on some really far-out ideas, e.g. a flying wing as long and wide as a 787, possibly with solar cells on top, a bunch of batteries and jet engines that are only spooled up during takeoff and landing... maybe re-visit some ideas from the past that were discarded because they were not viable with the technology back then but might be today...

I'm not even a pilot impersonator, I'm just SLF, but I'm interested in aviation and full of ideas.

[tdracer]

Muilenburg isn't completely blameless, but dumping this on him is rather unfair. When he became CEO in 2015, the MAX was already well along the development cycle, and more importantly he inherited twenty years of culture and communication problems that Condit started, and Stonecipher reinforced. Condit set in place a culture of questionable ethics and a "shoot the messenger" mentality that crippled the ability to communicate issues up the management ladder - and he did it amazingly quickly. The 'shoot the messenger' mentality was a huge part of the 787 train wreck - and even infected the 747-8 program. First hand knowledge on the 747-8 - we had a good chief engineer that I respected and that listened. He came to me at one point - noting that my system was on the critical path for first flight - and if I needed more resources to tell him and he'd make sure I got whatever I needed. But he made the mistake of telling the higher ups that we were behind schedule, resulting in his being demoted and replaced with someone from Long Beach who told the higher ups what they wanted to hear (and promptly blessed a cut my headcount). Of course that didn't help our schedule issues which got way worse with the new chief engineer...
I was actually seeing some signs of things getting better in the year after Muilenburg become CEO before I retired, but it may have been too late to prevent the problems with the MAX.

[FlightlessParrot]

This is addressed to pittspecialguy:
I am not a pilot. I do not pretend to be a pilot. I would not normally intervene, but you might like feedback on your intervention on your customers' customers, pax.

I now conclude that Boeing would rather deal with its problems by hiring internet trolls and professional debaters to attack its critics, than to address issues at source.

I once had to persuade myself that it was, actually, perfectly all right to fly on an aeroplane even if it wasn't made by Boeing. Now, I shall avoid Boeing aircraft whenever possible (except, of course, the 747).

It is not a question of personalities: the failures of Boeing, like those of many once-good companies, is the modern doctrine that the only target for a company is maximizing shareholder value, and the tendency to judge this on a very short timeframe. So it is a legally mandated requirement for management, NOT to put safety as a first priority, but to consider how many accidents to tolerate before the cost of compensation exceeds the cost of avoiding them.

Some people I know call this the crisis of late, or financial, capitalism. Some people think it is a result of the demonstrated tendency of management structures to encourage the rise of people with sociopathic tendencies. I wouldn't know. I just know that attacking the people who have to fly the things doesn't increase my confidence in the company you apparently love.

[fdr]

The CEO balances the needs of the operation with the requirements of the investors. Modern business has a view towards a very short horizon, which is why managers are given incentives towards short term outcomes, that is the consequence of the investors ADHD event horizon. Around the beginning of the year, the manufacturer had a pretty fair understanding of the issues involved, but determined in the manner that we have grown accustomed to, to emphasise the frailties of the human side of the operation. Even post the second accident, the response was biased towards the human causation in operations rather than design and certification issues. The CEO was following tried and proven responses of corporations with a myopic eye on shareholder value. Recognising, admitting and rectifying the underlying issue is a big step for the CEO but that is what he gets paid the big money to do, and what he ultimately needs to do for the preservation of shareholder value beyond the end of the days news cycle. The response to date may be disappointing, but hardly unusual.

[568]

This is addressed to pittspecialguy:
I am not a pilot. I do not pretend to be a pilot. I would not normally intervene, but you might like feedback on your intervention on your customers' customers, pax.

I now conclude that Boeing would rather deal with its problems by hiring internet trolls and professional debaters to attack its critics, than to address issues at source.

I once had to persuade myself that it was, actually, perfectly all right to fly on an aeroplane even if it wasn't made by Boeing. Now, I shall avoid Boeing aircraft whenever possible (except, of course, the 747).

It is not a question of personalities: the failures of Boeing, like those of many once-good companies, is the modern doctrine that the only target for a company is maximizing shareholder value, and the tendency to judge this on a very short timeframe. So it is a legally mandated requirement for management, NOT to put safety as a first priority, but to consider how many accidents to tolerate before the cost of compensation exceeds the cost of avoiding them.

Some people I know call this the crisis of late, or financial, capitalism. Some people think it is a result of the demonstrated tendency of management structures to encourage the rise of people with sociopathic tendencies. I wouldn't know. I just know that attacking the people who have to fly the things doesn't increase my confidence in the company you apparently love.

I would think that the people on this forum who have participated from this thread from day one would likely agree (as I do) with your comments.
Having reviewed the congressional hearings, I am aghast that the current CEO would have no knowledge of the following (not in any particular order and random thoughts);

1) Law suits pertaining to Lion Air/ ET being heard in respective Countries other than the USA
2) No knowledge of Boeing share price (even though this is shown on the home page on the intranet of ALL Boeing PC's when the user logs in!)
3) No knowledge of problems with flight test and current MCAS issues

I am also truly concerned that Mr."M" hasn't shown much or any emotions in any of the video press releases after the crashes, or at the Congressional hearings, with regard to the families who lost relatives in those crashes.
Furthermore, Mr. "M" didn't come across to the viewer as a CEO or leader of a huge Corporation, as he stumbled and had a hard time answering basic questions from the floor; he seemed quite embarrassed about the whole affair!
Perhaps the Boeing Board should have also been interviewed at the hearings!
Lastly, to bring closure to these horrible events, Boeing's top Management and board need to go, so a new set of eyes and ears can control ethics, quality and chart a new course for a "once" great Company!

Back to my regular spot........

[medod]

Expanding: I am probably the only person on this forum who worked closely with every executive mentioned here and in this very dubious article. All of them were dedicated people who wanted to maintain Boeing’s commitment to excellence. To sideline them as avaricious people putting profit and personal gain before safety is insane. What possible reason could they have to do this? Most of them graduated the hard way, through years of gruelling work. They were and are great people. To have a bunch of pilots who know zero about running huge corporations to denigrate them on this forum is disgusting. Plus, it’s an insult to the many guys and girls on the shop floor who build your aircraft. I know many of them and they are probably as mad as I am about the ongoing Boeing-bashing on this forum. You should all be ashamed of yourselves.

We can only go by the results. Profits up, share price up, 346 people dead and Boeing's biggest money-maker grounded for 8 months and counting, with net negative sales in that period.

[Uplinker]

I am no expert in big business or finance, but the MCAS debacle seems to be an example of what happens when shareholders and/or the money people - those with no understanding of designing and making the product - have too much authority over a company.

It’s a bit like unions. Workers need support and protection, but some unions become much too powerful, and have too much say in the running of a company, (or indeed a political party).

Boeing seem to have lost authority over their own company and appear to have lost sight of what constitutes a safe system, or practice. Repeatedly churning out revamps of the same restricted airframe was also questionable, despite the pressure from SouthWest etc.
.

[6000PIC]

One must mention previous US government FAA budget funding shortcomings going back decades which prevented regulatory oversight as a contributory and causal factor in this whole debacle. The whole process of self certification by the manufacturers themselves , of aircraft construction and design must never be allowed again. In short , the FAA , and the US government are themselves accountable.

[SMT Member]

Didn't we hear somewhere that the KC-46 MCAS was totally different from that of the MAX, apart from the name ?

When it suited Boeing's it was, but when it didn't it wasn't anymore.

As for PSGs comments, they are totally at odds with demonstrated facts. Facts are, that the Boeing leadership all the way back to the MacDac merger has been an unbroken line of the sociopaths from the GE school of cost cutting at all costs, which is so beloved by the most short sighted, greedy and incompetent twats on this planet: Money people (stock brokers, hedge fund managers, whatever they like to call themselves).

They might be nice people over a beer in the evening, but from 9 to 5 their actions speak a totally different language.

How's this for a thought: Boeing has not had a successful launch of any aircraft, new or derived, since the 777. Following the 787 the mantra was 'no more moonshots' which, I think anybody with just a smidgen of aviation insight will agree to, is exactly what is needed roughly every 20 years. But that doesn't make Wall Street happy and, in turn, doesn't make managers millionaires with the haste they're seeking.

[Three Lions]

How's this for a thought: Boeing has not had a successful launch of any aircraft, new or derived, since the 777.

When you consider the lack of real progression with the 737NG, the very sad incidents and the subsequent behaviours coming out of Boeing with the MAX, and then further consider onboard fires/engine issues/windscreen issues and the quite substantial still evident “teething problems” with the 787, it’s difficult to argue with this statement. The 777 is clearly a magnificent aircraft, and to many observers, the last successful introduction the Boeing managed.

Something has changed since the introduction of the triple. If you take the recent to mid term as a snapshot, it is something quite remarkable too. How does a company go from having the ability to bring something as high standard overall as the 777 then latterly offer the 787 and the 737NG then the pretty much total disaster that is the MAX.

I had it pointed out the other day how ironic the latest 737 marketing name is to its actual suggested current situation.

Unfortunately for the company, it may be the case that the mess could have that much latent momentum now that it will take serious political intervention to keep the company running in its current guise.

It is clearly a very very sad situation to witness.

[Nomad2]

I'm not a Boeing pilot, I fly the Embraer.
When the new GTF engines came along, Embraer were faced with the same problem as Boeing were- how to glue the new engines onto their existing design to get the efficiency benefits of the new engines?

So what did Embraer change when they made the E2?
Answer: Everything. New wing, new gear, moved the wing forward on the fuselage, new tail, new flight control system, new EFIS,I could go on but they basically rebuilt the aircraft from the ground up.

What did Boeing do?
New pylons, which didn't work very well. MCAS.

It's an interesting comparison, don't you think?

[SMT Member]

How does a company go from having the ability to bring something as high standard overall as the 777 then latterly offer the 787 and the 737NG then the pretty much total disaster that is the MAX

Greed, pure and unadulterated greed.

[PAXboy]

Living in the UK, it was in the early 1980s that I noticed both print and TV move the Stock Market from the financial pages to the front page. I saw this happening as the UK went through a recession and the numbers of unemployed, and the FTSE100 were taken as benchmarks of progress.

By the mid 1980s, I was working in The City of London (in Telecommunications) with an up close view of the developing boom, hastened by deregulation. This was also the start of Outsourcing, I was working for an American Company and saw this at first hand.

It was during the 1980s that the company 'horizon' was moved ever closer. I saw the Stock Market become a gambling table - just as it had done leading up to the 1929 crash.

Then came the next (entirely predictable) recession in 1989/1991. THEN the bean counters were unleashed and they have never stopped. Also in this decade, we saw old regulations come tumbling down. Notablely (as already mentioned) the US govt thought that companies could regulate themselves. Well, in the 1940s, 50s and 60s - they probably could have done - but following the 1980s? Not a chance. We saw regulations being swept aside in the UK, as Thatcher and her successors followed Reagan and the neo-cons.

By 2000, the new rules had already been incorporated into popular culture as shared by senior mgmt in their clubs and bars, also in MBAs. The Stock Markets continued to get drunk on IPOs and the managers saw how to get rich. Since then, we have also seen the emergence of a whole new style of company - ones built on debt and the absence of regulation on the Internet companies. This particular train crash is still building up speed, so stand back.

Perhaps most critically, in the late 1980s (in the UK) Thatcher loved the idea that we would progress as a country by providing services - rather than making things. To date, the jury is out on this.

In this century, we have seen a succession of companies make hideous mistakes as they place short term profits for the shareholders in front of everything. One of the most notable being VW and Dieselgate (2008). In government circles, the pressure to please the shareholder (the White House to secure more funding) was provided by the Shuttle Challenger Disaster in 1986.


I grew up in the era of 'Look after the company and the company will look after you' and that share holding was a long term prospect. All of that has gone because humans do not read history. Sons do not listen to their father (leave alone their grandfather) tell them of mistakes made in the past. Each generation thinks it can reinvent the wheel.

(thread drift: it is for these same reasons that the 1929 Crash is going to be repeated. The difference will be that, as the financial world is now larger and the world more interconnected - it is going to be very considerably worse than 1929, so stand well back as the current strength of the USD will not last.)

So, I would suggest that the writing was on the wall for Boeing from the moment they abandoned their heritage and left Seattle. At the time, many in these forums warned of the loss of heritage and combined knowledge. Boeing will survive because the Pentagon and White House need it to.

However, unless there are wholesale resignations (ALL of the main Board) and a return of bonus payments and REAL apologies and understanding? Then the world will not forgive them.

We can but hope that other engineering companies whose products carry humans have spent this year examining their process in microscopic detail.

[Chiefttp]

Pittsspecialguy,
I am a pilot and I’ve flown Boeing’s for the last 25 years to 8nclude the 727, 757, and 767...they are great aircraft. As far as your defense for Denis Muilenburg, all I have to say is he was the program manager for this project, The X-32

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/972x677/3b6a7e57_7af5_4613_8146_08d0e20960f5_a7e80679896c7c189e7ded8 73e52e98d39248e8a.jpeg
This aircraft represented Boeing’s proposal to compete for the biggest fighter contract for the next few decades, and this is what Muilenberg came up with! It was so screwed up that they had to re-design the entire wing platform to included a separate stabilizer/ tail, but this prototype didn’t incorporate the new design, so a flawed design, not remotely like the revised design competed against Lockheed’s F-35 and lost. Essentially, Under Muilenberg’s leadership Boeing dropped the ball big time and lost the contract. I always wondered why he eventually rose to the CEO position after this debacle. Maybe you can explain?

[Fly Aiprt]

Pittsspecialguy,
I am a pilot and I’ve flown Boeing’s for the last 25 years to 8nclude the 727, 757, and 767...they are great aircraft. As far as your defense for Denis Muilenburg, all I have to say is he was the program manager for this project, The X-32
...
I always wondered why he eventually rose to the CEO position after this debacle. Maybe you can explain?

Aw ! This is cruel...

Maybe he owes his ascension to his mediocrity, which allows his board to pull strings behind the scene...

BTW, I'm not expecting news from Pittsspecialguy any time soon, he's busy gathering the proofs of his working at high level with Boeing CEOs, which he imprudently promised to send me by PM...

[Grebe]

Essentially, Under Muilenberg’s leadership Boeing dropped the ball big time and lost the contract. I always wondered why he eventually rose to the CEO position after this debacle. Maybe you can explain?

Used to be and probably still in effect is the old meme- If you screw up and cost the company say 1 million $$, you likely get terminated or shuffled off to siberia . But if you screw up and cost say 100 million $$ or more, your name get attention of the top brass. They don't dare fire you since it would reflect on why the lower managers and themselves were so dumb as to put you in such a position. Thus a few years later- your name recognition is a bit faded, but most forget why they heard your name... and therefore you get promoted to at least one level above your competence- Peter Principle rules .

[golfyankeesierra]

Certainly cruel :) , any pilot or engineer would know: “if it looks good, it flies good”.
if Muilenberg is responsible for that ugly thing.. says enough.

[Loose rivets]

Awwww . . . be fair. It will at least run on plankton.

[Dave Therhino]

One must mention previous US government FAA budget funding shortcomings going back decades which prevented regulatory oversight as a contributory and causal factor in this whole debacle. The whole process of self certification by the manufacturers themselves, of aircraft construction and design must never be allowed again. In short , the FAA , and the US government are themselves accountable.

Section 212 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires complete delegation to ODAs as a default as lobbied for by Boeing. No changes to that law have been made.

[OldnGrounded]

Section 212 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires complete delegation to ODAs as a default as lobbied for by Boeing. No changes to that law have been made.

True, but change is, nonetheless, in the wind.

Europe Demands Approval of 777X (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/11/27/boeing-loses-right-declare-737-max-airworthy/)

FAA Takes Back Control of Key Safety Step from Boeing (https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisagarcia/2019/11/27/faa-takes-back-control-as-questions-linger-on-boeing-737-max-fix)

[keesje]

Shareholder value, greed and smart communications easily beat safety and long term strategy at Boeing.
It seems behind the curtains, a plan B is starting to be rolled out.. : https://leehamnews.com/2019/11/28/converting-customers-to-the-fsa/
A big part of the problem: Boeing has no answer to the nimble A321NEO's, selling by the thousands, to their customers, unchallenged.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/960x640/d7ecs3dxkaabnbq_1b046a8950ee3c3202f14768da7000bc395faa70.jpg

[6000PIC]

Section 212 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires complete delegation to ODAs as a default as lobbied for by Boeing. No changes to that law have been made.

...for the remainder of us knuckle dragging blue collar pirate types ... Could you explain in English please ? You lost us at Section 212....

[OldnGrounded]

...for the remainder of us knuckle dragging blue collar pirate types ... Could you explain in English please ? You lost us at Section 212....


The referenced Act is the legislation passed, last year, by Congress, to continue the FAA's delegated authority and revise the rules under which it operates. (Edit: This refers to the authority delegated to the FAA by Congress -- the cited section addresses authority delegated by the FAA to the ODA holders) See here:

https://www.faa.gov/about/reauthorization/

The full text is here:

https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ254/PLAW-115publ254.pdf

Section 212 begins on page 63.

[SLF3]

I think the rot (regulatory capture) started in the FAA when they fast tracked ETOPS approval for the 777 to take out competition from the A340.

So its not since the 777: the 777 started it.

[Grebe]

I think the rot (regulatory capture) started in the FAA when they fast tracked ETOPS approval for the 777 to take out competition from the A340.

So its not since the 777: the 777 started it.


BEEEP BEEEEP -Try again- first commercial flight was in June 1995- and was " ETOPS out of the Box "

The old DER system was not changed to ODA until about 10 years later .

First flight of 777 was in 1994 .

[SLF3]

That's kind of my point,. It was ETOPS out of the box.....

The FAA changed the rules to suit Boeing.

[Grebe]

slf3 said That's kind of my point,. It was ETOPS out of the box.....

The FAA changed the rules to suit Boeing.



Suggest you check your history re 777 ETOPS


September 2, 1996


Sept 2 1996
FARNBOROUGH - The GE90-powered Boeing 777 completed all 180-minute ETOPS (Extended Twin OPerationS) Type Design requirements in August after flying a demanding Early ETOPS 1,000-cycle flight test program.

During the flight test program, the GE90 performed flawlessly. One of the engines, #900109, which flew the entire 1,000-cycle test program in an unbalanced state to prove its strength and endurance, was on display at GE's Farnborough Exhibit.

In September, the highest-thrust engine ever certified by the FAA, the 92,000 pound (409 kN) thrust GE90-92B, will begin flight testing on a Boeing 777. This will be followed by flight testing in October on the Boeing 777-200 IGW (Increased Gross Weight) aircraft. The -92B will also be the first engine to enter service on the 777-200 IGW when the aircraft is delivered to launch customer British Airways early next year. The engine will enter service derated to 90,000 pounds (400 kN) thrust.

Since its initial delivery in late 1995, the 85,000 pound (378 kN) thrust GE90-85B has achieved an outstanding in-service record. The engine, in service on four British Airways and two China Southern 777 aircraft, has logged more than 21,000 flight hours while maintaining a 99.95 percent dispatch reliability rate. The engine is also demonstrating excellent performance retention, resulting in longer on-wing life and lower maintenance costs to airline customers.

The GE90 is produced by GE Aircraft Engines and its revenue-sharing participants Snecma of France, IHI of Japan, and FiatAvio of Italy.





So what Rules did FAA change ? Be specific please

[SLF3]

Suggest you check your history re 777 ETOPS




So what Rules did FAA change ? Be specific please

Look at "ETOPS 180 at introduction" in the link below. I'm not arguing that ETOPS was a mistake. Simply that the FAA bent the rules for commercial reasons to support the 777.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ETOPS

[Grebe]

Lets just end this off topic issue - youve listed the link as to History of ETOPS 180 etc - and infer that some " FAA Rules " were " bent "
What rules were " bent " - you refuse to state !

END END END

[SLF3]

Lets just end this off topic issue - youve listed the link as to History of ETOPS 180 etc - and infer that some " FAA Rules " were " bent "
What rules were " bent " - you refuse to state !

END END END

The rules were ETOPS 180 after one year in service at ETOPS 120. FAA certified the 777 at 180 from day 1, not accepted by EASA. I note you have 30 years with Boeing. You are likely a lot more knowledgeable than I am, but maybe less objective?

And it’s not of topic: Boeing would not be in the mess they are in if the FAA had done their job. I don’t think it is fanciful to suggest that this was the first sign of rot in the FAA visible to an outside observer.

[PAXboy]

I have just listened to a very interesting podcast on the BBC World Service - about CEO Stock Options. Only lasts 10 minutes but covers the 1990s and, I suggest, highly relevant to the discussion of changes in Boeing corporate mgmt.
In theory, stock options should motivate executives to perform better - but in practice, they haven't always had that effect. Why? (https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3csz2x6)

50 Things That Made The Modern Economy by Tim Harford of The Financial Times.

[Chewing the crud]

Surely the ETOPS saga is a Government Organisation favouring its national industry, rather than regulatory capture. It could be argued that the remit of the FAA encourages this type of behaviour. There are other examples of regulation used to favour US manufacturers such as the ITAR and EAR for military contracts.

[Dave Therhino]

Look at "ETOPS 180 at introduction" in the link below. I'm not arguing that ETOPS was a mistake. Simply that the FAA bent the rules for commercial reasons to support the 777.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ETOPS

The FAA issued special conditions to allow and set requirements for early ETOPS type design approval. Special conditions are a legitimate tool provided for in the US part 21 certification process regulations. I don't think anyone can legitimately argue that the 777 wasn't ready for ETOPS at the time it was approved, and it turned out to be one of the safest airplanes ever built. Boeing followed the special conditions for the 777 program very diligently.

[Grebe]

Just part of the real ETOPS story




Dave Hegy, manager, FAA Certification Management Office, also took this opportunity to announce that United Airlines has successfully complied with the requirements of their ETOPS plan and has demonstrated the ability to operate and maintain the 777 in a manner consistent with that required for 180-minute ETOPS operations.

"FAA approval for 180-minute ETOPS at service entry is one of the final milestones for the Boeing 777/Pratt & Whitney flight-test program," said Ron Woodard, president of Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. "This approval signifies that the 777 not only has completed the 1,000-cycle validation program, but that it has finished one of the most thorough laboratory, ground and flight testing efforts in aviation history. The 777 is truly service-ready."

To further ensure that the 777 is service-ready, the later part of the 1,000-cycle validation program consisted of 90 cycles -- totaling about 400 hours -- that were flown in conjunction with United Airlines ground and flight personnel. This also helped prepare United Airlines for ETOPS operations. During flight testing, the 777 performed eight 180-minute single-engine diversions for a total of 24 hours -- that's equivalent to the diversion hours accumulated during the initial five years of 767 ETOPS operations.

Woodard attributes much of the 777's success to the "working together" concept that involved the entire industry in design, development and testing, not only of the 777, but also the products used to support operation of the airplane.

"I believe that during the next half century the 777 will prove itself unparalleled in areas of operational economics and passenger comfort," he said.

"Acceptance by the FAA is extremely gratifying," said Dale Hougardy, Boeing 777 Division vice president and general manager. "In conjunction with regulatory scrutiny, customer and supplier involvement, design enhancement based on past experience, and extensive testing have helped to make this the preferred airplane in its class. Its economy and flexibility will benefit the airlines and the flying public."

"Making this an even more auspicious occasion," Hougardy added, "is the fact that this month marks the 10-year anniversary of ETOPS. Boeing aircraft -- 737, 757, 767 -- now traverse every continent and ocean of the world performing ETOPS flights."

"The impressive safety record established by twin-engine jets over the past decade has set the stage for the 777," Hougardy said. "Over the past 10 years, Boeing and engine manufacturers have gained valuable in-service experience from the 737, 757 and 767 twin-engine aircraft flying ETOPS routes. Currently, airlines fly more than 10,000 ETOPS flights each month on Boeing aircraft."

Hougardy cited the 777 as the first twinjet designed from the beginning to perform ETOPS flights. The No. 4 777 has undergone the equivalent of at least a year's worth of daily airline passenger service, to ensure the airplanes' reliability to fly all intended missions. As of May 22, the 777 test fleet has accumulated a combined total of 1,950 flights and 3,664 hours of flight time.

"With this portion of the flight-test program now complete, we look forward to seeing the 777 enter revenue service next month with United Airlines," Hougardy said.



and another part

The Boeing [NYSE: BA] 777-300ER airplane completed the longest engine-out demonstration flight ever in support of Extended Operations (ETOPS) certification, when it flew more than five hours with one of its two engines shut down.

During the approximately 13-hour Seattle to Taipei, Taiwan test flight, the airplane's crew shut off one of the two General Electric GE90-115B engines and flew the plane for 330 minutes on the other engine.

"The flight went flawlessly. We were very pleased with the way the aircraft and the GE90-115B engine performed," said Frank Santoni, Boeing 777-300ER (Extended Range) chief pilot.

ETOPS is a conservative, evolutionary program that allows airlines to fly twin-engine jetliners on routes that at some point take those planes more than 60 minutes flying time from the nearest airport.

The 777-300ER is the newest Boeing 777. Two are currently undergoing 1,500 hours of flight testing, and both have met or exceeded expectations as the program approaches its ninth month of testing. So far, crews have evaluated takeoff, landing, handling characteristics, fuel consumption, and now ETOPS.

There will be additional 330-minute ETOPS tests in various locations in the months ahead. In total, the airplanes will record approximately 220 hours of ETOPS flying. That will involve additional engine shutdowns for 330-minutes, various system checks and simulated malfunctions to ensure the systems are working in the long-range environment.

ETOPS certification by U.S. and European regulatory authorities is slated for early next year. The first 777-300ER will be delivered in April 2004 to International Lease Finance Corp.'s customer, Air France.

"Everything we've done so far is putting us in position for the ETOPS certification series of flights and final approval by the FAA," said Lars Andersen, program manager for the 777-300ER.


and in 1993 seattle times . .
Fact: The concern is that a twin loses thrust in one engine and, before it can make a safe landing, something else goes wrong with the second engine. It has never happened. In the entire history of twin-engine commercial jetliners, there has not been a single accident resulting from the shutdown of one engine and the subsequent loss of the other. Not one. The record of the Boeing 767 is illustrative: After more than 312,000 flights, only 15 planes have experienced an engine shutdown during the ETOPS portion of a flight. All diverted, turned back or continued - safely, as a result of rigorous ETOPS safety requirements.

The 777 needs to be proven safe for ETOPS on thousands of shorter flights first, but Boeing wants to use just a checklist of precautions.

Fact: When the first 777 takes flight next June, it will begin the most extensive flight-test program ever for any commercial jetliner. Three 777s will each fly 1,000 flights - the equivalent of a full year of airline service. Those 3,000 flights will simulate day-to-day airline operations and maintenance, and 270 flights will be flown by line crews of three of the world's leading airlines.

All new airplanes are plagued with glitches that need to be worked out in passenger service before allowing ETOPS.

Fact: Boeing's philosophy is, and always has been, to resolve safety concerns before passengers board any new airplane, including the 777. Guided by the experience we've gained from other jets, Boeing will use advanced technology to conduct more than 70 new tests for the 777's engines and more than 140 for its systems to prove the airplane's safety and reliability. The new lab we've built for this testing is literally a test plane that "flies" even as the first 777 is being built. With this unprecedented testing, most potential problems can be found and fixed before flight testing and well before passengers fly on the 777.

The FAA is about to grant Boeing's request for 180-minute ETOPS for the 777 at service entry; European authorities, in a setback for the 777, granted a more conservative 120 minutes.

++=

for example

September 2, 1996

FARNBOROUGH - The GE90-powered Boeing 777 completed all 180-minute ETOPS (Extended Twin OPerationS) Type Design requirements in August after flying a demanding Early ETOPS 1,000-cycle flight test program.

During the flight test program, the GE90 performed flawlessly. One of the engines, #900109, which flew the entire 1,000-cycle test program in an unbalanced state to prove its strength and endurance, was on display at GE's Farnborough Exhibit.

In September, the highest-thrust engine ever certified by the FAA, the 92,000 pound (409 kN) thrust GE90-92B, will begin flight testing on a Boeing 777. This will be followed by flight testing in October on the Boeing 777-200 IGW (Increased Gross Weight) aircraft. The -92B will also be the first engine to enter service on the 777-200 IGW when the aircraft is delivered to launch customer British Airways early next year. The engine will enter service derated to 90,000 pounds (400 kN) thrust.

Since its initial delivery in late 1995, the 85,000 pound (378 kN) thrust GE90-85B has achieved an outstanding in-service record. The engine, in service on four British Airways and two China Southern 777 aircraft, has logged more than 21,000 flight hours while maintaining a 99.95 percent dispatch reliability rate. The engine is also demonstrating excellent performance retention, resulting in longer on-wing life and lower maintenance costs to airline customers.

The GE90 is produced by GE Aircraft Engines and its revenue-sharing participants Snecma of France, IHI of Japan, and FiatAvio of Italy.

[SLF3]

I think you continue to make my case for me. ‘Special conditions’ is by definition an exception or modification of the rules. The net effect of the special condition was a significant commercial advantage for Boeing.

The fact Boeing complied with the special condition diligently and that ETOPS was a success is irrelevant.

The fact that the FAA rewrote the rules for Boeing’s benefit is.

[Dave Therhino]

You seem to be arguing that the FAA did something improper with the 777 early ETOPS special conditions. The provision in the US type certification procedural regulations (14 CFR 21.16) to deal with innovative products through special requirements can be traced back at least as far as CAM 04 in 1938. The FAA and its predecessor agencies in the US have responded to innovation with special conditions numerous times as called for by the governing statutes, regulations, and policy. Your preference may be for innovative products (or innovative use of existing products) to be held back until general rulemaking can be done, but that is not the way the US aviation regulations are set up.

[SLF3]

I think it was agreed to by the FAA under pressure from Boeing for commercial reasons. That was a commonly held view at the time. EASA certainly thought so, since they did not accept the special condition and insisted Boeing complied with the FAA rules as written.

Reprinting Boeing marketing material isn’t going to change that. Arguing the rules were followed doesnt doesn’t change it either. Boeing are arguing they followed the rules for MCAS too: that may be true, and maybe a defence in court: it doesn’t mean the FAA should have allowed it.

[Grebe]

I think it was agreed to by the FAA under pressure from Boeing for commercial reasons. That was a commonly held view at the time. EASA certainly thought so, since they did not accept the special condition and insisted Boeing complied with the FAA rules as written.


Of course EASA was pure and holy and had no commercial reason in mind as in protecting Airbus ? ;)

Despite over a few decades of 767 flights under ETOPS-180. :(

Thanks for your unbiased opinion..:suspect:

[SLF3]

767, a few decades of ETOPS 180 service.
Performance standard 1 IFSD in 50,000 flights.
777, a new design with new and bigger engines approved for ETOPS 180 based on 1,000 flights prior to entry into commercial service, based on 'special conditions'
I have no relationship with either Boeing or Airbus (other than as SLF). You have 30 years with Boeing. So who is more likely to be biased?
EASA likely have some dirty washing (EC225?) in their laundry basket, but right now they have rather more credibility than the FAA.

[jimjim1]

In the entire history of twin-engine commercial jetliners, there has not been a single accident resulting from the shutdown of one engine and the subsequent loss of the other. Not one.

Hmmm.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kegworth_air_disaster
" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kegworth_air_disaster)a Boeing 737-400 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737-400), crashed ... when a fan-blade broke in the left engine ... The crew mistakenly shut down the functioning engine ... Of the 126 people aboard, 47 died and 74 sustained serious injuries."

Seems quite lost to me.

[possel]

Hmmm.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kegworth_air_disaster
" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kegworth_air_disaster)a Boeing 737-400 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737-400), crashed ... when a fan-blade broke in the left engine ... The crew mistakenly shut down the functioning engine ... Of the 126 people aboard, 47 died and 74 sustained serious injuries."

Seems quite lost to me.
That's not the same thing is it? Only one engine had a problem, they shut down a serviceable engine.

[tdracer]

It wasn't EASA - EASA didn't exist in 1995 when the 777 was certified. It was the JAA. EASA came along later using the JAA as their blueprint.
Agree possel - crashing because you shut down a perfectly good engine isn't exactly an indictment of ETOPS. Furthermore they were only minutes from an airport when the failed engine failed.

[anotheruser]

But it fits precisely to the wording "shut down of one engine and subsequent loss of the other" ... (replies like these remind one to always be careful how you phrase something, people might always take you by the word ...)

[Ian W]

But it fits precisely to the wording "shut down of one engine and subsequent loss of the other" ... (replies like these remind one to always be careful how you phrase something, people might always take you by the word ...)

It doesn't fit it at all. If you include mishandling then no aircraft would be allowed off the ground. Are you arguing that fixed undercarriages are required because otherwise wheels up landings are possible?
You obviously have a personal axe to grind. But note that Airbus has taken advantage of the same rules for ETOPS - or perhaps I missed the thousands of hours of operations of the A-350 with new engines before ETOPS was allowed....

[Dave Therhino]

You can argue with whether it meets a semantic definition, but engine failure plus crew error is a serious threat on any conventional transport, and arguably even more so on twins. Industry and the regulators agree about this. That scenario is really a single failure (the first engine failure), with a cascading effect of crew error that has some conditional probability of occurrence. That conditional probability is debated a lot in risk assessment discussions.

[megan]

crashing because you shut down a perfectly good engine isn't exactly an indictment of ETOPS Exactly, Delta had a crew shut down both serviceable 767 engines at 1,200 - 1,600 feet shortly after take off, restarted OK after getting as low as 500 feet. Had happened previously as well on the 767.