safetypee
18th Nov 2019, 13:14
The original MCAS had no function with the autopilot engaged; no force feedback required as for manual flight, thus presumably not requiring any AoA input (AP automatically disengaged with AoA disagreement, presumably via the cross monitored air data parameters).
Assuming a similar AP configuration after modification, how might pilots react to a sudden AP disconnect due to MACS lockout (air data disagree) when flying in the stability sensitive parts of the flight envelope ?
In stability terms the aircraft would be ‘different’ because of the lack of MCAS contribution with trim, also the AP disengagement would be a sudden change, becoming an aircraft with reduced stability margin (different handling qualities) presumably more difficult to transition too, to fly - surprise.
Should this be a situation considered in recertification ?
Assuming a similar AP configuration after modification, how might pilots react to a sudden AP disconnect due to MACS lockout (air data disagree) when flying in the stability sensitive parts of the flight envelope ?
In stability terms the aircraft would be ‘different’ because of the lack of MCAS contribution with trim, also the AP disengagement would be a sudden change, becoming an aircraft with reduced stability margin (different handling qualities) presumably more difficult to transition too, to fly - surprise.
Should this be a situation considered in recertification ?