How not to fly when aerial firefighting

[Jetscream 32]

https://twitter.com/avioesemusicas/status/1161381852063707137?s=21

Looking at recent social media footage of numerous air tankers in the USA and some in Europe there is a headline grabbing nasty accident just waiting happen.

Near CFIT, showboating, retardant drops so low they strip anything in their path including trees, people and animals

lots of poor airmanship on display - very sad in what is a difficult job for sure - but even more of a reason to make sure you and your crew go home each night!

[Smoketrails]

And the point of your post is?

[ehwatezedoing]

That there might be some pretty lousy firefighting flying lately.

[fdr]

That there might be some pretty lousy firefighting flying lately.

Fire ops have their moments, and that crew did not have much margin in their flightpath. It may be bad judgement, but it is always dependent on judgement, and occasionally it goes pear-shaped.

[andrasz]

Having looked at the video, I have to agree with the narrator.
Cannot confirm from the video, but I suspect with hands on throttles someone forgot the speed-brakes...

[VFR Only Please]

Saw this video yesterday. You can barely perceive a fire, except from what might have been lit by his exhaust on that hill.

Just last week a guy in southern France did the deed flying a converted Grumman Tracker. He'd been firefighting for six years and previously flown Mirages for over a decade, so I doubt his skills are in doubt. It's just that the terrain isn't always friendly, the convective turbulence must be brutal, and visibility sometimes pretty minimal. And on bad days they must just get tired. Dangerous business.

[hoss183]

Might be good to post a link to know which video we are talking about....

[West Coast]

As to the tanker in the OP's clip, do any of you fly them for a living?

[Jetscream 32]

As to the tanker in the OP's clip, do any of you fly them for a living?

Is that a leading question? There is a whole ton of expertise on here with Avro / RJ experience and quite a few with fire ops knowledge, what nobody can really justify from the clip shown is the reason for not following the USFS own guidelines on retardant drops that were recently published here (https://www.doi.gov/aviation/safety/safety_alerts) and by the grace of God being a few feet from certain fatal consequences. It was no doubt a lesson that will be learned hopefully very quickly and not repeated any time soon, both to other operators as well as either Neptune or Aeroflite - whoever's a/c it was that was in the clip...

[DaveReidUK]

as well as either Neptune or Aeroflite - whoever's a/c it was that was in the clip...

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/799x477/n473na_5575cef72ccd343417c1b1fe9fb7693e150b8bc2.jpg

[Meester proach]

I’ve 1500 hrs 146, none as a water bomber.
But regardless I’m sure I wouldn’t wanna be 10’ from death at any point .

[hoss183]

I- whoever's a/c it was that was in the clip...
There is no clip/link in this thread

[Airbubba]

There is no clip/link in this thread

Here's a link to the video:

https://twitter.com/avioesemusicas/status/1161381852063707137

[Porrohman]

ISTR reading that a Martin Mars water bomber crashed into a mountain on Vancouver Island in the early 60s after, it is suspected, the drop mechanism failed and, as a result, the aircraft was too heavy to avoid colliding with terrain. Since then, the possibility of a failure of the drop mechanism has been factored into the drop planning. In this incident, we can only speculate what might have happened if the drop mechanism had failed.

[Easy Street]

That video looks to me like a nasty example of ‘hidden ridge’, a known illusion where terrain in the foreground has a similar appearance to that in the background and ‘disappears’ until it starts to bloom rapidly at short range. The usual defence of GPWS is not so effective if warnings are experienced frequently while maintaining a safe flightpath, as is often the case at low level in mountainous terrain: a certain degree of desensitisation is likely. Other defences are to fly along the grain of terrain (not always possible) and to watch carefully for changing sight line rates of approaching terrain. I have no fire fighting experience myself but I’d imagine that the pilots are well aware...

[West Coast]

Is that a leading question? There is a whole ton of expertise on here with Avro / RJ experience and quite a few with fire ops knowledge, what nobody can really justify from the clip shown is the reason for not following the USFS own guidelines on retardant drops that were recently published here (https://www.doi.gov/aviation/safety/safety_alerts) and by the grace of God being a few feet from certain fatal consequences. It was no doubt a lesson that will be learned hopefully very quickly and not repeated any time soon, both to other operators as well as either Neptune or Aeroflite - whoever's a/c it was that was in the clip...

You have no experience in airborne firefighting then?

You post a clip of one aircraft and then reach conclusions about the industry.

[bunk exceeder]

Well here’s some experience right here:

https://youtu.be/yYKIGT7EgSA

I think we can all agree with FAR 91.875, the pilot in command shall not use the plane to hit the bushes.

[DaveReidUK]

I think we can all agree with FAR 91.875, the pilot in command shall not use the plane to hit the bushes.


Did you just pick that FAR number at random, or does it have some hidden relevance ?

[bunk exceeder]

Random. I was being witty. But any pilot in command who uses the plane to hit the bushes shall submit, upon request, a written report to the administrator within 10 days. I don’t think bushwork appears in NTSB 830.... Of course you have to throw in Careless and Reckless....

[Switchbait]

Firework is inherently high risk. A miss is as good as mile...... I’m sure the crew involved will be reviewing their actions over a well earned cold beer.

[RickNRoll]

Saw this video yesterday. You can barely perceive a fire, except from what might have been lit by his exhaust on that hill.

Just last week a guy in southern France did the deed flying a converted Grumman Tracker. He'd been firefighting for six years and previously flown Mirages for over a decade, so I doubt his skills are in doubt. It's just that the terrain isn't always friendly, the convective turbulence must be brutal, and visibility sometimes pretty minimal. And on bad days they must just get tired. Dangerous business.

A firey was telling me how they lose someone every year. It's a dangerous job, just like it is for the people on the ground.

[ironbutt57]

looks to me to be a post by an armchair critic who is full of shiite, and himself...have 2 seasons behind me in a Douglas...it aint easy...exhilarating, frightening, tiring...not easy...the "easy" drop is when you hit something due to complacency...

[currawong]

Wake/ downwash raises dust.

Big deal....:rolleyes:

[Cyclic Hotline]

It would appear that the Crew shares your concern. They came damned close to buying the farm!

https://www.safecom.gov/searchone_new.asp?ID=23587

[Carbon Bootprint]

It would appear that the Crew shares your concern. They came damned close to buying the farm!

https://www.safecom.gov/searchone_new.asp?ID=23587
Good follow-up to the event!

[India Four Two]

As someone said somewhere else about this event: “Target fixation”.

[Big Pistons Forever]

I spent 17 years in fix wing fire suppression and have got to say that video was hard to watch and the crew was very lucky they did not hit the hill. I never thought this job was especially dangerous as we had good SOP's and excellent equipment. One thing I never like about the US program was, unlike Canada, lead planes were not mandatory. I firmly believe that this near miss would not have happened if they were operating with a lead airplane as the lead airplane would have determined the safe ridge crossing height and min drop altitude before the tanker got low and would have explicitly warned about the ridge on the exit or more likely would have found a better line for the drop.

[evil7]

As there is no link anywhere - here you go
https://twitter(dot)com/avioesemusicas/status/1161381852063707137/video/1

Replace the (dot) by a dot :-)

[goeasy]

Thanks evil7.... that is eye watering! The time between ‘miss’ and wake dust says it all.....

[LowObservable]

He did not buy the farm. But I'll bet he left a big deposit.

[fdr]

Random. I was being witty. But any pilot in command who uses the plane to hit the bushes shall submit, upon request, a written report to the administrator within 10 days. I don’t think bushwork appears in NTSB 830.... Of course you have to throw in Careless and Reckless....


Your C130A accident video, N130HP, on June 17, 2002 does not itself show careless or reckless operation. The video shows that the aircraft is essentially within its normal flight envelope.

The NTSB report suggests that the aircraft may have exceeded the ZFW earlier by up to 232lbs, but at the time of the accident, it was within limits. The report additionally opines that the aircraft may have exceeded the flap extended g limit of 2.0, however that is inconsistent with the wings level near level flight attitude in the video, the aircraft was within the speed limit for the 50% flap that was extended at that time. The report extensively covers the fatigue cracks on the wing center section, which compromised the structural integrity of the aircraft.

The NTSB report suggests that the aircraft was manoeuvring at 2.4g based on "video" at the time of the pull up that occurred before the wing failure, however, the video that has been released does not show a 2.4g pull pitch rate occurring for a speed of 146KCAS. Equally, at 91,000lbs, the actual load on the aircraft did not exceed the 2.0g load limit for the flap extension, being 75% of the permitted weight to be subject to a 2.0g load factor. The load factor itself is a limit, not the ultimate load necessary which would be a 3.0g load at 120,000+ lbs, which well exceeded the manoeuvring at the time of the failure. It is possible that in 2002 there was other video capturing the seconds prior to the pull up that the NTSB could base their statement on, but it is not the video that hit youtube.

Fatigue failures occur at 1.0g when they are ready. Two different aircraft types I have flown have had wing failures at 1.0g, and of course the Piper PA28RT201 loss at Daytona Beach with the CPL candidate and examiner occurred at 1.0g.

The early C130's had demonstrated potential failure of the CWS during hydrostatic testing that led to the inspection program for that area. The outer wing panels had their own issues. Significant fatigue cracking was found at the failure point so I am not sure that passing comment on reckless flying of the deceased has merit or is in good taste.

FYI, in 1994, N135FF, another C130A doing duty in fire fighting lost the left wing at the CWS in level, unaccelerated flight. The critical crack length for propagation was reported at about 1", the 2002 accident aircraft had a crack in excess of 12" prior to the failure on examination post accident.

[FullOppositeRudder]

Yes, that was close.

The footage leaves me ever more comfortable with the policy adopted in my part of the world where a fleet of AT-802s are the only fixed wind a/c we use for aerial fire attack. They work very well in our particular spread of variables which come in every new fire situation.

[Sailvi767]

Can’t get facebook link to paste. Interesting fire drop.

https://www.facebook.com/104563622953080/posts/3035325553210191/

https://fireaviation.com/2019/08/14/a-shocking-drop-by-a-bae-146/ (https://www.facebook.com/104563622953080/posts/3035325553210191/)

[Less Hair]

That was close!

[jmmoric]

They'll probably have a talk about it when they get home.

Could happen to most of us, misjudging distance, or altitude, flying in an unknown area.

[Rodney Rotorslap]

This looks not unlike the video that started this thread in August last year.

[Lookleft]

It is the same video!

[LTNman]

Wake/ downwash raises dust.

Big deal....:rolleyes:

The shadow merged with the aircraft.

[jmmoric]

As long as you continue to see it ;)

[RatherBeFlying]

A fine illustration of the danger of the vortices downwind and below, sometimes even above, a ridge crest.

[Lord Farringdon]

Not a pilot, but having flown on the flightdeck of C-130's many times in low level airdrop and tactical navigation scenarios (200 feet) including the provision of another pair of eyeballs for turning point identification, I am well aware of how deceptive rolling and hilly terrain can be. You're not flying instruments here, it's all eyes out looking but you may not always be looking at what you think your looking at. Add some turbulence and some significant g force in to the mix and momentary task distraction and concentration lapses can occur.

The video shows a few distinct points of interest. First, the speed brakes have been deployed as have the flaps. Accordingly, I presume the engines will spooled similar to a normal approach speed for this aircaft type. It seems a normal speed for the drop but the target area is tight to get into (and out of ). As I said , rolling terrain can be deceptive. How many have noticed the ridge they flew over to get to the target? Look at 00.05 on the video and see the aircraft shadow. Now your attention has been brought to it, this entry ridge stands out but how many never saw that ridge to start with? They crossed about 100 feet over that ridge on their approach down into the valley below. See how far below the ridge, the retardant falls after it is released. This just further amplifies the steep nature of the terrain and its deceptiveness. I'm not saying the crew didn't see that ridge, simply that the terrain is clearly deceptive making the exit strategy subject to being misread. In one account that accompanies one of the video's there is a suggestion (if it is from this incident) that the pilot admits he crossed the ridge below their normal ridge crossing altitude and that tunnel vision may have contributed to that. I suspect he's talking about the exit ridge, not the entry ridge. Another name for tunnel vision might be target fixation. Effectively, the PF is hunting to be in the pocket for a good drop.

Release time is about two seconds and it seems from other information related to demo drops of the BAE 146, that two seconds may only be about half the load. It also seems from the video that stop dump and pitch up occur very close together as though the crew have now realized they have reached the very edge of their escape envelope and must now exit. The first pitch up did not do it for them and at about 00.11 in the video they pitch up again, without which the outcome would have been CFIT. So the intriguing part for me is why the pilot flying didn't 'make an assertive enough pitch up to start with. Were the entry and exit ridges closer together than he thought? This could have been as a result of the terrain deceptiveness. Perhaps he expected the aircraft to perform better from spool up ie perhaps the crew planning was for a complete load release followed by exit with an expectation of an empty aircraft with corresponding performance. But with only half the load gone, the aircraft wasn't as agile in the limited exit profile and a secondary pitch up was necessary. Perhaps a downdraft coming over the exit ridge and rolling down towards the fire? Perhaps all of these factors combined to provide us all with a very dramatic ridge crossing.

But despite all that drama, I don't think he was scratching to make this. He knew from the first pitch up or perhaps as part of the approach to this drop that his ridge clearance was going to be possibly below SOP. This was evidenced by his first pitch up after the drop which was accompanied by a slight right wing drop to place him level with the ridge line in order to maximize wingtip clearance. So he knew then exit profile was going to be tight. But the second pitch up signaled an issue with clearance that didn't seem to be a concern at the first pitch up. Even then, it wasn't excessive or panicky and was almost just an adjustment to achieve a parallel path with the hillside, albeit a closer hillside than he had originally was planning! I would have thought that he could have and would have pitched up significantly more if he really thought it wasn't going to make it.

In summary, there is no doubt this drop was in a tight area and perhaps was not as well executed as perhaps it could have been had another approach path been selected. But then we can't see the line of fire so who knows. The pilot seems to have been comfortable with applying only the pitch up necessary to clear the exit ridge but had to adjust this perhaps due to terrain deception, lower than expected aircraft performance, down drafting or some combination of any or all of these factors. Whatever, the reason, it seems he had some spare maneuvering capability such that excessive pitch didn't appear necessary so long as one was comfortable with seeing lizards basking on rocks while your supposedly still flying!!

As an aside I recall in a multinational operation during the Gulf War where a C130 special ops crew (national identity not disclosed to protect the innocent) arrived in our Ops area to pick up some spare parts they had requested. We asked them what the parts were for and the flight engineer rather sheepishly indicated it was the underbelly VHF aerial to replace the one they lost recently during some level flying over sand dunes.Which kind of makes our firefighting crew pussy cats by comparison! While not in anyway condoning gung ho flying, I guess I am just saying some operations require a level of tolerance to risk and reduced margins of safety that cannot easily be measured against normal commercial operations.

[J.O.]

The video shows a few distinct points of interest. First, the speed brakes have been deployed as have the flaps. Accordingly, I presume the engines will spooled similar to a normal approach speed for this aircraft type.
Spot on. The run is essentially flown in the final approach configuration with the landing gear retracted. This keeps the fans spooled up for the go-around.

It seems a normal speed for the drop but the target area is tight to get into (and out of ). As I said, rolling terrain can be deceptive. How many have noticed the ridge they flew over to get to the target? Look at 00.05 on the video and see the aircraft shadow. Now your attention has been brought to it, this entry ridge stands out but how many never saw that ridge to start with? They crossed about 100 feet over that ridge on their approach down into the valley below. See how far below the ridge, the retardant falls after it is released. This just further amplifies the steep nature of the terrain and its deceptiveness. I'm not saying the crew didn't see that ridge, simply that the terrain is clearly deceptive making the exit strategy subject to being misread.
We don't know all of the facts that led up to this run so this is only supposition based on what I can see. There's a previous retardant line and it appears they were trying to tag on and extend it to prevent spread of the fire down the valley (smoke can be seen in the lower right - rising out of the valley). As was said above, they did not follow a lead plane for the run but that doesn't mean they weren't given a target by a lead plane crew. But if the lead plane doesn't fly the same run to look for hazards, it's left up to the tanker crew to see and avoid them. Tanker Ops 1.01 says you should avoid climbing exits as much as possible, to account for a drop system failure and/or a power loss at a critical time. A proper run assessment by a lead plane pilot (we call it birddogging here in western Canada) would have seen the rising terrain and they may not have recommended this run. If they had, they would have made the crew aware of the terrain and probably would have set a higher minimum target altitude.