737 max returning to service ?

[Longtimer]

Time for a thread on "after the fix"
I wonder what other carriers are going to do and I see that the Southwest Pilots appear to be taking the highroad of waiting to see what is needed vs their corporation stance.

25 April, 2019
SOURCE: Flight Dashboard
BY: Ghim-Lay Yeo
Washington DC
Southwest Airlines does not expect its pilots to undergo simulator training as part of a process to return the Boeing 737 Max to service, as the carrier stresses its aviators are well-equipped to handle a problem that has emerged as a common link between two fatal crashes of the aircraft type.

"We are not hearing that will be a requirement," chief executive Gary Kelly told analysts on an earnings call on 25 April, in response to questions on whether pilots will have to undergo simulator training ahead of the aircraft's return to service.

Kelly says these indications were drawn from discussions the airline has had with several parties, including its pilots union, the US Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing. He stresses that the pilots of Southwest, the largest 737 operator in the world, are "extensively trained".

"Managing the aircraft in a runaway stabiliser scenario is something that we've already covered," says Kelly, saying the airline is "the most experienced 737 operator in the world". Investigations into two crashes of the 737 Max 8 have centered on an aircraft system that might have activated the aircraft stabiliser to push the nose down into a dive.

Training for 737 pilots transitioning to the 737 Max has emerged as a point of discussion in the scrutiny cast upon Boeing's newest narrowbody following two fatal crashes. Southwest's pilot union had criticised Boeing for not informing operators about the system, the manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system (MCAS), which the union called "ill-designed".

The Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SWAPA) says it is awaiting the proposed training programme for the software update. "Once we see the final training product from Boeing, we will decide if more training should be given to SWAPA pilots in conjunction with the company. If we and the company disagree, we will do what we think is best for our passengers and the flying public," says SWAPA's president Jon Weaks.

Southwest told FlightGlobal previously it will receive the first of three 737 Max simulators (https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/analysis-737-max-crashes-fuel-longstanding-safety-c-456772/) this year, while fellow 737 Max operator American Airlines will receive its first by the end of the year.

Dallas-based Southwest ended the first quarter with a fleet of 753 737 aircraft, including the 34 737 Max 8s that were grounded in March. The airline holds the largest order for the 737 Max that has been publicly announced, with 260 additional aircraft on its orderbook.

When and how the 737 Max will return to service remain unclear. The FAA has to certify the software upgrade from Boeing, which completed test flights earlier this month. If simulator training is required, airlines like Southwest will likely face an additional delay in getting the aircraft back into service.

Southwest, which grounded its 737 Max fleet on 13 March, has pulled the 737 Max from its schedules until 5 August. The airline's chief operating officer Mike Van de Ven says in the event that the aircraft is cleared to return to service before that date, Southwest will utilise its 737 Max 8s as spares to support its operations before resuming normal operations after 5 August.

The 737 Max grounding, along with other difficulties, reduced the airline's net profit by $150 million in the first quarter. While Kelly concedes the airline is "not happy" with the situation, he throws his support behind Boeing, calling the 737 Max 8 "the best narrowbody airplane in the world".

"That will continue to be the case when it returns to service with this software modification," he says.

Southwest has no intentions of reconsidering its status as an all-Boeing operator, says Kelly. The Air Current recently reported (https://theaircurrent.com/airlines/737-max-grounding-tests-boeing-southwest-relationship/) that a team of Southwest employees visited Europe to learn more about the operations of the Airbus A220, but executives say the trip was planned prior to the 737 Max grounding and was part of the airline's ordinary course of business to learn more about aircraft types.

Calling the timing of the trip "unfortunate", Kelly says, "We were not trying to send any message whatsoever… there is no plan to do anything other than grow our fleet with the Max."

[Bend alot]

Firstly I believe Boeing should refrain from any mention of what training might be required - my understanding is training requirements are the domain of the regulators, not Boeing. So just put forward your proposed fix and debate the outcome.

Secondly, I think every regulator should get hard evidence that the MAX meets every requirement "possible" that MCAS was developed for to meet certification - I simply can not understand how the new "handicapped" MCAS, can now keep the MAX within the certification requirements.

Thirdly every change made to the MAX must be justified as to why it was made, and exactly why no extra training was or will need to be give - this is not limited to MCAS.

Another step should be a list of all persons that were involved in discussions and decisions over the MCAS on the MAX and access to privately interview them - I doubt this will ever happen as I expect there is more to hide.

[crewmeal]

The problem now lies with passenger confidence.
Passenger lack of confidence

[groundbum]

a third crash, Heaven forbid, would be the death knell for Boeing AND whichever airline was flying it and put profit before safety. They've had enough warnings now. The tort lawyers would jump for glee. The MAX issues go beyond an MCAS software fix. If I worked for any airline in a management capacity there's no way my signature would be appearing on any return-to-service MAX paperwork....

G

[wheels_down]

I’m slightly disturbed from the comments from Southwest here, very much schedule over safety sort of vibe I am getting.

His Aviators are well trained he quotes. Well so are those over at say Virgin Australia, if not better, but those guys have publicly said they are not putting it into service next quarter without additional training over the initial requirements. The pilots don’t want it.

I highly doubt all WN pilots are happy with those comments.

[racedo]

Saying no new training needed is not something that will provide confidence to flying public.

DO THE TRAINING, even if not needed as you need to give confidence to the flying public otherwise they will not fly. Andy S Grove of Intel had a minor chip problem in 1990's, they saw it as minor and it was. Consumers saw it differently and it cost Intel $475 million and almost the company.

Bottom line it will require Boeing senior bods and airline bods to be on board a few Maxs to build confidence

[GordonR_Cape]

a third crash, Heaven forbid, would be the death knell for Boeing AND whichever airline was flying it and put profit before safety. They've had enough warnings now. The tort lawyers would jump for glee. The MAX issues go beyond an MCAS software fix. If I worked for any airline in a management capacity there's no way my signature would be appearing on any return-to-service MAX paperwork....

Saying no new training needed is not something that will provide confidence to flying public.

DO THE TRAINING, even if not needed as you need to give confidence to the flying public otherwise they will not fly.

Do the training, even if MCAS only makes up 1% of the time spent in the simulator, and the rest is on upset recovery (or something related). IMO getting pilots and the airlines onside is critical, and regaining trust that has been eroded, cannot be done cheaply.

The MAX needs to be seen as safer than before, since another crash (or even a B737 NG model) would attract intense media coverage. This would be true even if caused by something completely unrelated (such as the shooting down of MH17). Marketing and PR isn't just about shiny feel-good advertising and bland reassurances, gut-feel issues take longer to overcome.

[Clandestino]

I don't think that any additional MAX-related pilot training will be required or that passengers should be scared of flying on MAXes... ever.

[sixchannel]

I don't think that any additional MAX-related pilot training will be required or that passengers should be scared of flying on MAXes... ever.
I would appreciate knowing why you think that?
Happily my airlines of choice do not use them.

[Smythe]

sim time is the issue, tough enough to get as it is.

[Bend alot]

sim time is the issue, tough enough to get as it is.
Sim time should not have been an issue - it is an issue, because someone decided that to save costs and say it would require no extra training other than differences.

Had that not been a sales pitch (no pun intended) then there would have been simulators on hand.

[WingNut60]

sim time is the issue, tough enough to get as it is.

Does that not just equate to $$$$ ?

[Water pilot]

I don't think that Boeing or Southwest get how much has changed. Crashing two models of the newest plane within months for the same technical fault may have been a big deal in 1950 but it is an existential threat in the 2019s. Planes are not supposed to crash anymore, and generally they don't.

It seems like the least that Boeing could do for their loyal customers who they just %$@! over royally is to pay for more simulators to be built and simulator time for the pilots. Somewhere in the $1billion and counting budget they are talking about there should be room for a few millions (in actual cost) to train pilots. They should also pay for very nice hotels for the pilots who are being retrained. I would suggest that some paranoid instructor work on training all of the differences of the MAX from the other models, with and without whatever hackery Boeing did to meet certification. Now that MCAS is pretty much gone (Murphy says that an AOA disagree WILL happen when somebody actually has to pull into a high AOA for some reason) practice high AOA stalls and recovery, and whatever else follows from the different placement of the engines.

Edit: Boeing's line is that the planes are perfectly safe, the crashes were the pilot's fault, but they are resisting calling for more pilot training on the MAX! It is fascinating to watch the results of a collision between a corporate sales pitch and reality.

[GlobalNav]

a third crash, Heaven forbid, would be the death knell for Boeing AND whichever airline was flying it and put profit before safety. They've had enough warnings now. The tort lawyers would jump for glee. The MAX issues go beyond an MCAS software fix. If I worked for any airline in a management capacity there's no way my signature would be appearing on any return-to-service MAX paperwork....

G
Agreed, and whatever calculated risks Boeing might originally have rationally believed to be reasonable (i.e., talked themselves into), they had better not think so now. There are press reports that Boeing hired a public relations agency to deal with restoring public confidence. Just great. My confidence would be better restored by hiring an outside engineering firm to do a thorough, independent technical design review, along with independent test pilots to explore abnormal behaviors associated with a malfunctioning system considering all the failure modes. Sort of like the work the FAA ACO used to do before the recent advent of the Boeing ODA and BASOO. The key is INDEPENDENT, where financial and business considerations are not allowed to compromise professional engineering judgment.

By the way, any tort lawyer who would jump for glee at a third fatal accident is not one I would want to retain. Call me old fashioned.

[sixchannel]

Sim time should not have been an issue - it is an issue, because someone decided that to save costs and say it would require no extra training other than differences.

Had that not been a sales pitch (no pun intended) then there would have been simulators on hand.
Couldn't have put it better.
Beancounters rule the World.

[Pilot DAR]

Facts please. Comments from currently qualified 737 Max 8 pilots, or people who are involved with design, certification or return to service of the type are welcome. People's opinion of being a passenger in this type, or the flying skills of other pilots, do not contribute to the thread.

[PerPurumTonantes]

Facts please. Comments from currently qualified 737 Max 8 pilots, or people who are involved with design, certification or return to service of the type are welcome. People's opinion of being a passenger in this type, or the flying skills of other pilots, do not contribute to the thread.
100% agree, apart from the bit about "facts" ;)

[SMT Member]

The message I get from Boeing, SW and the FAA is something along the lines of 'let's not dwell too much on the overall design or dig too deep into other potential issues, here's quick MCAS fix now let's get the birds back in the air (before the investigations have concluded)'.

And that's money talking.

[Jetstream67]

"Money" is nervous certainly . . . but they forget passengers and crew will get nervous too when it looks like the problem is swept under the table either entirely or by one or two airlines . .

[vilas]

Simplest thing would have been to remove MCAS. Since it's not done means MAX cannot fly without it. The software upgrade consist of reduced authority of MCAS so that stabilizer will never override the elevator authority and using redundancy toto disab it in case of a disagree. Now the question is will reduced authority MCAS do the job of preventing the stall for which it was installed? Two aircrafts were driven into ground and if the third one is stalled into ground how will it be treated? Secondly in case of disagree the disabled MCAS will it be land ASAP?

[racedo]

I don't think that any additional MAX-related pilot training will be required or that passengers should be scared of flying on MAXes... ever.

Tell that to other companies who did not listen to consumer concerns.

[warbirdfinder]

What ever happened to the pilot action of pushing the power up when up the aircraft is slowing toward its stall speed? Or even better, of increasing power when your are 5-10 knots below your target speed so you never get to its stall speed.

[tdracer]

What ever happened to the pilot action of pushing the power up when up the aircraft is slowing toward its stall speed? Or even better, of increasing power when your are 5-10 knots below your target speed so you never get to its stall speed.

You don't have to be going slow to stall, you just need to be at too high of an angle of attack.

[hans brinker]

What ever happened to the pilot action of pushing the power up when up the aircraft is slowing toward its stall speed? Or even better, of increasing power when your are 5-10 knots below your target speed so you never get to its stall speed.


So, what is your stall speed? It might be hard to say if you have unreliable airspeed indications due to an AOA failure.

[Bend alot]

So, what is your stall speed? It might be hard to say if you have unreliable airspeed indications due to an AOA failure.

AoA failure would not be my first guess on an unreliable airspeed - why is it yours?

I would first expect a pitot issue and then move from there.

As a + 30 year LAME
#1 - is the pitot cover on or melted parts of one evident.
#2 - is there a pitot blockage or leakage.
#3 - is there a static blockage.
#4 is not a AoA failure.

[safelife]

Crash: Ethiopian B38M near Bishoftu on Mar 10th 2019, impacted terrain after departure (http://avherald.com/h?article=4c534c4a/0045&opt=0)

[Smythe]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Smythe https://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/620889-737-max-returning-service.html#post10456763)
sim time is the issue, tough enough to get as it is.
Does that not just equate to $$$$ ?

No, just logistics. It is very tough to get sim time, there simply arent that many.

You can do plenty without full motion on, maybe a scaled down, non-motion sim would help, and be a bit better than an iPad.

[Clandestino]

I would appreciate knowing why you think that?

Browsing through the preliminary reports of PK-LPQ and ET-AVJ demises and some pre-crashes marketing hype, I got a distinct feeling that Boeing engineers managed to produce aeronautical equivalent of IT's killer app, thanks to big state finally restricting its meddling into aeronautical design process through so called "certification". MAX is so good that Southwest CEO called it "the best narrowbody airplane in the world". He should know, he is a CEO.

Happily my airlines of choice do not use them.

I'm not particularly happy that my airline of choice has bet a pretty chunk of its future on the Ceaddlewash's best narrowbody aeroplane that failed to deliver promised performance in some minor technical areas, like number of crewmembers and passengers killed per megaflighthour. I have diligently completed conversion course though, as if I'm ever going to fly her. Don't believe the sensationalist media that want you to believe it is restricted to half an hour iPad session.

I have decisively proven it works on Huawei Android pad too.

[Longtimer]

Evidently some US Pilot groups are not satisfied with the level of training proposed by Boeing.
U.S. pilots demand better training if Boeing wants to rebuild trust in 737 MAXAmerican Airlines pilots have warned that Boeing Co.'s draft training proposals for the troubled 737 MAX do not go far enough to address their concerns, according to written comments submitted to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and seen by Reuters.Thomson Reuters · Posted: Apr 28, 2019 1:58 PM ET | Last Updated: an hour ago
American Airlines pilots have warned that Boeing Co's draft training proposals for the troubled 737 MAX do not go far enough to address their concerns, according to written comments submitted to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and seen by Reuters. (Matt Mills/Reuters)
The comments were made by the Allied Pilots Association (APA), which represents pilots at American Airlines Group Inc., the world's largest airline and one of the biggest 737 MAX operators in the United States.

Their support is important because Boeing has said pilots' confidence in the 737 MAX will play a critical role in convincing the public that the aircraft is safe to fly again.

Boeing's fast-selling 737 MAX was grounded worldwide in March following a fatal Ethiopian Airlines crash that killed all 157 on board, just five months after a similar crash on a Lion Air flight that killed all 189 passengers and crew.

Now it is readying for regulatory approval a final software update and training package to address an anti-stall system known as MCAS that played a role in both nose-down crashes.

A draft report by an FAA-appointed board of pilots, engineers and other experts concluded that pilots only need additional computer-based training to understand MCAS, rather than simulator time. The public has until April 30 to make comments.Protesters are expected outside Boeing's annual meeting in Chicago on Monday, where shareholders will also question the company over its safety record.

APA is arguing that mere computer explanation "will not provide a level of confidence for pilots to feel not only comfortable flying the aircraft but also relaying that confidence to the travelling public."

It said the MAX computer training, which originally involved a one-hour iPad course, should include videos of simulator sessions showing how MCAS works along with demonstrations of other cockpit emergencies such as runaway stabilizer, a loss of control that occurred on both doomed flights.
Required simulator training could delay the MAX's return to service because it takes time to schedule hundreds or thousands of pilots on simulators. Hourly rates for simulators range between $500-$1,000 US, excluding travel expenses.

American Airlines Chief Executive Doug Parker said on Friday that even if other countries delay the ungrounding of the MAX, once the FAA approves it, American will start flying its 24 aircraft.

Union pilots for Southwest Airlines Co., the world's largest operator of the MAX with 34 jets and dozens more on order, have said they were satisfied with the FAA draft report, but would decide on additional training once they see Boeing's final proposals.

[hans brinker]

AoA failure would not be my first guess on an unreliable airspeed - why is it yours?

I would first expect a pitot issue and then move from there.

As a + 30 year LAME
#1 - is the pitot cover on or melted parts of one evident.
#2 - is there a pitot blockage or leakage.
#3 - is there a static blockage.
#4 is not a AoA failure.


I think you misunderstood me. Somebody was saying:"just fly slightly faster than the stall speed and everything will be okay". I wanted him to answer where he would get a reliable source for airspeed from, with an AOA failure (and I think most of us agree the two crashed MAXes had AOA issues), at no point did I suggest AOA failure is more or less likely than a pitot issue. On the aircraft I fly I have seen min clean as low as 180 and as high as 245 depending on weight, pretty hard to guess the stall speed accurately enough.

[dontgive2FACs]

Regardless of the fix/how/when/retraining pathways, there has been significant damage done to the brand of the aeroplane.

When the aircraft is returned to service, I’m interested to see how public perceive the aircraft and what that does to the bottom line for its operators.

I can imagine that one more such crash would leave the aircraft irrecoverable in terms of sales. Also would leave a major blow to Boeing’s brand for years to come.

Time will tell.

[atpcliff]

I heard that SWA is seriously considering the A-220, because of Boeing's failure with the 737.

Boeing Whistleblowers Report More 737 MAX 8 Problems to FAA


https://interestingengineering.com/boeing-whistleblowers-report-more-737-max-8-problems-to-faa

[skol]

I'd like to buy some shares in Boeing, but I'm not sure just how bad this is going to get for them. Then there's the problems with USAF tankers and Dreamliners.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/business/boeing-dreamliner-production-problems.html

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-air-force-again-halts-delivery-of-boeings-tanker-over-debris/

[jack11111]

Well this has become the "New Coke" episode for Boeing. Remember New Coke from April of 1985. Had to be replaced with "Coke Classic". Disaster!

[skol]

That was very interesting about the 'New Coke'.

Boeing's got a similar problem and it won't go away anytime soon. There'll be passenger resistance, but many passengers have no idea what aircraft they're flying on anyway. There's also only 2 major commercial aircraft manufacturers in the world so many airlines have no choice but to
be going Boeing given the backlog of aircraft on order. They'll want to make sure they get this 100% right, so it could be a protracted grounding, very, very expensive, and Boeing have suspended guidance, so i might just wait a while longer before I make my purchase.

[daelight]

I'd like to buy some shares in Boeing, but I'm not sure just how bad this is going to get for them. Then there's the problems with USAF tankers and Dreamliners.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/business/boeing-dreamliner-production-problems.html

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-air-force-again-halts-delivery-of-boeings-tanker-over-debris/


Not just Aviation. Their space division also had recent early failure, not to kick em while they are down, but they really need to get it together, across the board.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/intelsat-says-satellite-made-boeing-fails-210810314--finance.html (https://www.yahoo.com/news/intelsat-says-satellite-made-boeing-fails-210810314--finance.html)

[6 DOF]

sim time is the issue, tough enough to get as it is.

I agree, even if not needed from a pilot point of view. But from the public view it is essential.

How soon can the sims be upgraded and re-certified?

Cheers

[racedo]

Well this has become the "New Coke" episode for Boeing. Remember New Coke from April of 1985. Had to be replaced with "Coke Classic". Disaster!

Later one "Intel" Chip in 1994.

Affected probably 1 in 5 million as it was in complex calculations, didn't matter as everybody wanted it changed, Intel said "No" until consumer and manufacturers started walking away from them. Almost cost them the company. Cost $1/2 billion to put right.

[Smooth Airperator]

Almost 400 deliveries of the Max but less than 5 operating sims in the world. Is that the worst aircraft to simulator ratio ever?

[Ancient Mariner]

I agree, even if not needed from a pilot point of view. But from the public view it is essential.

How soon can the sims be upgraded and re-certified?

Cheers
I don't think we, the public, care too much about sim time. How will we know? The Max is tainted and only Boeing can remedy that, how remains to be seen.
Per

[IESS]

September, soonest ... when EASA allows it to fly. Probably it will take longer, never took them shorter than announced :)

[SMT Member]

Simulators are indeed few and far between, but on the other hand there are +400 frames standing idle on the ground, why not bring them to use? Sure, it costs a hell of a lot more than using a sim, but, using them will reduce the time needed to get all crews trained.

So, how about we have Boeing trainers train the airline TRI/TREs in the real aircraft, and then have the TRI/TREs train the TCs in their grounded fleet, who in turn may train the line pilots, either in real aircraft or in simulators as available.

Such an approach would also have a large and positive effect on regaining public/airline/pilot trust. But such pragmatism is of course far less appealing to your average bean counting CEO than a 1-hour iPad session.

[EDML]

Hmm, after the outcome of two out of three MCAS failures it might not be a wise thing to train that very problem in the real aircraft.

[.Scott]

The purpose of the MCAS system was to tame the MAX's very bad approach to a stall. As the angle of attack increases, the very forward and very large engine cowlings catch the wind stream and aggravate a pitch up. To put it crudely, the MAX's are ready and willing to do back flips. I am a private pilot that has done sail planes, aerobatics, hang gliding, parachuting. If I was faced with an aircraft that had this kind of dynamic instability - or very marginal dynamic stability, I would be treating that machine as a rather scary creature.

As an engineer that has been involved in the development of several mission-critical and life-critical systems (though none have been aviation related), I would certainly invite the cockpit crews to explore the MAXs pitch up characteristics with and without MCAS. In the same way that student pilots practice minimum controllable to learn how the plane responds in that domain, I would suggest numerous MAX simulator runs where the limit of controllability is approached and sometimes exceeded. And, of course, several simulator runs where each MCAS failure mode can be explored - exercising very prompt and delayed responses.

I certainly appreciate the dollar factor, but in a situation like this, the question is not what constitutes adequate pilot training. The question is what constitutes really great pilot training.

[Cows getting bigger]

An interesting make-up of some big hitters from the safety world.

https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-airplane-panel-idUKKCN1RY1F7

[Water pilot]

An interesting make-up of some big hitters from the safety world.

https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-airplane-panel-idUKKCN1RY1F7

She also named Kenneth Hylander, chief safety officer at Amtrak


https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1332/180104_amtrak_derailment_mn_1550_a9909b30691e472b66066705969 b03c6_fit_2000w_3de8fb54205b23cf87a96f084955d18b81ee3a04.jpg
2017 Amtrak derailment over I-5 in Washington State crushes cars, kills three.

Well, that is certainly comforting. Amtrak is well known for their safety culture. (https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/pr20171114.aspx)


The National Transportation Safety Board (http://link.email.dynect.net/link.php?DynEngagement=true&H=s8mq%2BFF8Y8J/7/XrLp5ygdcwMPrxjsUdQBMch4EEnHhpCCjF3/NlfNgVOLjUy79fxTwn48SfK6xqkXEdoWygE8M95CFG6doM2%2BCOYbCSWrTS TwMO5TxF8g%3D%3D&G=0&R=https://www.ntsb.gov/Pages/default.aspx&I=20171115004836.000000613af4%40mail6-34-usnbn1&X=MHwxMDQ2NzU4OjVhMGI4ZWQ4YjBjYzE5MTM4ZTEyMmVkYjs%3D&S=E-7AN51XEFW00N59YS3aiSXeUQFYLV9jP62dKt6ZsLs)determined Tuesday the April 3, 2016, derailment of Amtrak train 89 near Chester, Pennsylvania (http://link.email.dynect.net/link.php?DynEngagement=true&H=s8mq%2BFF8Y8J/7/XrLp5ygdcwMPrxjsUdQBMch4EEnHhpCCjF3/NlfNgVOLjUy79fxTwn48SfK6xqkXEdoWygE8M95CFG6doM2%2BCOYbCSWrTS TwMO5TxF8g%3D%3D&G=0&R=https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/2017-DCA16FR007-BMG.aspx&I=20171115004836.000000613af4%40mail6-34-usnbn1&X=MHwxMDQ2NzU4OjVhMGI4ZWQ4YjBjYzE5MTM4ZTEyMmVkYjs%3D&S=oI89m4dxYBZf-gTCcOOx6oNoLz2sF6Z-EJJL0hjykOg) was caused by deficient safety management across many levels of Amtrak and the resultant lack of a clear, consistent and accepted vision for safety.


To be fair, he was hired in Jan, 2018 which is after those two crashes but the jury is still out on whether Amtrak has improved.

[Longtimer]

Boeing not proposing required simulator time for 737 Max pilots

29 April, 2019
SOURCE: Flight Dashboard
BY: Jon Hemmerdinger
Boston

Boeing does not believe pilots should be required to complete training in a flight simulator prior to flying the 737 Max once regulators lift the aircraft’s grounding.

The company’s chief executive Dennis Muilenburg confirms Boeing instead is developing computer-based training, though it intends to offer flight simulator time as an option later to some airlines’ pilots.

“We believe that the right training right now is computer-based training,” Muilenburg said during the company’s annual general meeting on 29 April.

He made the comment when asked if the company was developing simulator training as part of its work to bring the 737 Max back to service.

Boeing will, “where it makes sense”, provide airlines with the option to augment computer-based training with flight simulator training, he adds.

Muilenburg describes flight simulator training as a “downstream” option available “where it makes sense” and based on airlines’ “individual needs”. “We will be providing enhanced training and supplemental materials to our airline… customers,” he says.

His comments follow news last week that Boeing has been sharing the computer-based training session with US pilots.

The training reviews the 737 Max’s flight control software, including the speed trim system and manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system (MCAS), which has been implicated as a factor contributing to two recent 737 Max crashes, sources say.

That training would be available on laptop or table computers and takes about 15min to complete, sources have said.

Some pilots have said 15min of MCAS training is plenty, noting their familiarity with the 737 Max’s systems. Sources have also noted the complex logistics of running thousands of pilots through the few 737 Max simulators available, saying some airlines might need the better part a year to complete the process.

Two recent 737 Max crashes raised questions about MCAS – which Boeing is now updating – and about pilot training and the actions of the pilots in the cockpits of the two crashed jets.

Investigations into both crashes remain ongoing.

Boeing and Muilenburg have largely steered away from discussion of the role pilots may have played.

But recently Muilenburg has eased into more discussion of training, saying last week that Boeing will provide different types of training for different customers.

“Longer term, we're also deploying training packages and additional educational materials,” Muilenburg said during the company’s first quarter earnings call on 24 April. “I would call those above-and-beyond educational materials that are tailored for our various customers around the world. So, that'll be a longer-term effort where we work with them on training, education.”

[derjodel]

Boeing not proposing required simulator time for 737 Max pilots

Awww, how cute seing Boing protecting their shareholder’s value. And here I thought for a moment that it was about making airplanes safe.

[GlobalNav]

Boeing not proposing required simulator time for 737 Max pilots



29 April, 2019
SOURCE: Flight Dashboard
BY: Jon Hemmerdinger
Boston
Boeing does not believe pilots should be required to complete training in a flight simulator prior to flying the 737 Max once regulators lift the aircraft’s grounding.

Is it true Boeing would have to pay compensation to some airline customer(s) if more sim training is required, because of a stipulation in a sales agreement that provides a significant monetary penalty?

[kiwi grey]

Is it true Boeing would have to pay compensation to some airline customer(s) if more sim training is required, because of a stipulation in a sales agreement that provides a significant monetary penalty?

This:
ec - just as a reminder, Boeing introduced MCAS (in part or in whole) to allow the MAX to fly and "feel" enough like previous 73s that it would not require crews to go through special training in transitioning to the MAX.
And that was a selling point to customers, not just the regulators.
Word on the street is, Boeing gave, e.g. SWA, a $1-million-per-aircraft "performance guarantee" that no sim time would be required to transition from NG to MAX. Just "iPad ground school."

And:

There are rumours afloat, that the contracted Boeing signed with SW had a clause saying Boeing would pay SW 1 million USD for every aircraft delivered, if sim training was necessary to convert from NG to Max. That's 280 million good reasons why a bean counter and lawyer driven company would come up with an idea such as MCAS.

I haven't seen this denied, let alone refuted

[Sailvi767]

I think you misunderstood me. Somebody was saying:"just fly slightly faster than the stall speed and everything will be okay". I wanted him to answer where he would get a reliable source for airspeed from, with an AOA failure (and I think most of us agree the two crashed MAXes had AOA issues), at no point did I suggest AOA failure is more or less likely than a pitot issue. On the aircraft I fly I have seen min clean as low as 180 and as high as 245 depending on weight, pretty hard to guess the stall speed accurately enough.

It should be really easy to guess that speed as you should have a basic idea of your weight and about where that puts your stall speed. In addition you should have a set of go to pitch and power settings for various phases of flight.

[phylosocopter]

It should be really easy to guess that speed as you should have a basic idea of your weight and about where that puts your stall speed. In addition you should have a set of go to pitch and power settings for various phases of flight.


"you should have a set of go to pitch and power settings for various phases of flight."



I strongly feel that this should be the most essential training item for any unreliable , or uncertain airspeed issue combined with revert to gyro attitude display

This is basic stuff that has somehow been obscured by the "magenta line"

The "flight manager" should disappear and be replaced by gyro attitude display in any case of sensor disagree or does not compute situation

[safetypee]

Sailvi767,
Speed: - Except that AoA malfunction also affects speed, ‘speed disagree’; so which speed is correct. Thus the need for a third system cross check, but two different cues - stick shake and low speed awareness strongly suggest the lower (erroneous) speed is correct - mental conflict.
Higher workload / confusion immediately after liftoff; which might not aid safety.


phylosocopter,
Pitch power settings are a valuable guide, but as you note these are situationaly dependent.
Current drills differentiate ‘dynamic’ situations, such as takeoff, and ‘static’ situations for continued flight; thus crews have to identify, differentiate, and recall the appropriate procedure. In complex operations there will be more considerations.

The ‘obscuring’ Magenta Line view contributes to the difficulties of judgement. The phase does not relate to the dependence on automation, but knowledge of when to change the course of action; hence the underlying Magenta Line message was ‘Click Click’ (see video) - switch off automation, change plans, but nowhere does this consider how and when pilots would detect this point.
Magenta Line is a widely used catch phase, but one where few people understand the deep meaning and requirement to first understand the situation.

[RTO]

Yes, the MAX has a somewhat tarnished reputation now, well helped by a sensationalist media that smelled blood in the water (literally). Boeing did some really awful decisions about the MAX, like not telling anyone about MCAS, as well as trying to save a few dollars on not hooking up the second AOA sensor so they could compare values.

I do understand where this comes from. A quote from the Al Jazeera program “Broken dreams” pointed out that Boeing used to be this innovative company that was passionate about aviation. Today it is run by accountants that don’t give a rats a** about aviation, safety, planes, passengers or pilots. Their biggest fear is to actually have to invest in a new aircraft program. This is also why you see them beating all their dead horses, and resurrecting designs from the 1950’s that would never pass certification today.

That being said, I love the MAX. I would have no reservation to keep flying it after several hundred hours on it, even after the pathetic worldwide panic that spread like wildfire on March 12 despite having no new information on the table.

Yes the investigation is in progress, and the conclusion is probably years away, but the solid information so far from documents, FDRs and CVRs gives me a somewhat clear indication that neither the QRH, FCOM, FCTM or other publications guidelines was followed correctly in either case. IMO there is no need for additional training to operate the MAX now, the requirement was to accomplish the initial training correctly, and that obviously did not happen with all operators.

[hec7or]

All very good, but the fact remains that the Max is a modern aircraft which has been reverse engineered as a facsimile of an old aircraft and as such lacks a fit for purpose Crew Alerting System as one would find on all other modern aircraft.

[racedo]

Is it true Boeing would have to pay compensation to some airline customer(s) if more sim training is required, because of a stipulation in a sales agreement that provides a significant monetary penalty?

It doesn't matter what it sales in the sales agreement now, in reality Boeing will be paying.

Airline can just indicate it is no longer willing to fly the Max and looking to flog or return to Boeing.

Boeing could go to court but then would find itself having to defend everything that happened, the defendant able to continually file discovery motions to find what Boeing have or haven't been doing. Get that in a public court with wall to wall press coverage and they are finished. One single shortcut and airlines would have to desert them as Pax refuse to fly.

This is about confidence in the future, a single airline deserting them and handing back aircraft is a huge no confidence vote, other airlines will wonder "What do they know" with pax also asking the question.

Boeing is on the hook and no amount of press briefings and claims it is "Now" safe will make a difference. We know that Boeing costs in Q1 are $1 billion, they cannot forecast rest of year which gives you an idea of how bad it is. My initial view in another thread was $2 billion in compensation and cost, think that figure is light and likely to be closer to $10 billion and above. Customers will not order or hold off.

It is not just going to hit them just this year but the cost will be next year and likely the year after. Deepwater Horizon cost in excess of $61 billion to BP and less people died.

[ATC Watcher]

Virgin Australia said in a statement that it was deferring delivery of its first batch of planes from November 2019 to July 2021.

"Safety is always the number one priority for Virgin Australia. As we have previously stated, we will not introduce any new aircraft to the fleet unless we are completely satisfied with its safety," Virgin Chief Executive Paul Scurrah said Tuesday April 30th .



They have 48 on order, the users so far united front is maybe starting to crack..

[RetiredBA/BY]

Yes, the MAX has a somewhat tarnished reputation now, well helped by a sensationalist media that smelled blood in the water (literally). Boeing did some really awful decisions about the MAX, like not telling anyone about MCAS, as well as trying to save a few dollars on not hooking up the second AOA sensor so they could compare values.



That being said, I love the MAX. I would have no reservation to keep flying it after several hundred hours on it, even after the pathetic worldwide panic that spread like wildfire on March 12 despite having no new information on the table.

.

You would have been flying empty aircraft !

[Bend alot]

Yes, the MAX has a somewhat tarnished reputation now, well helped by a sensationalist media that smelled blood in the water (literally). Boeing did some really awful decisions about the MAX, like not telling anyone about MCAS, as well as trying to save a few dollars on not hooking up the second AOA sensor so they could compare values.

I do understand where this comes from. A quote from the Al Jazeera program “Broken dreams” pointed out that Boeing used to be this innovative company that was passionate about aviation. Today it is run by accountants that don’t give a rats a** about aviation, safety, planes, passengers or pilots. Their biggest fear is to actually have to invest in a new aircraft program. This is also why you see them beating all their dead horses, and resurrecting designs from the 1950’s that would never pass certification today.

That being said, I love the MAX. I would have no reservation to keep flying it after several hundred hours on it, even after the pathetic worldwide panic that spread like wildfire on March 12 despite having no new information on the table.

Yes the investigation is in progress, and the conclusion is probably years away, but the solid information so far from documents, FDRs and CVRs gives me a somewhat clear indication that neither the QRH, FCOM, FCTM or other publications guidelines was followed correctly in either case. IMO there is no need for additional training to operate the MAX now, the requirement was to accomplish the initial training correctly, and that obviously did not happen with all operators.

How is flight in pitch up when MCAS is inactive - but required for certification?

Have you trained for that? - is it a light or rapid change? - or just it wants to go vertical in an instant?

I guess you can not answer as you have never been there - but why change from the reported 0.6 degrees to a required 2.5 degrees?

That to me as an engineer, is the transition is/will not be slow when the cowls start to create lift. (MCAS runs the high speed trim)

[krismiler]

The only reason airlines are backing the MAX is that they need to get their fleet back in the air and keep them flying, they are dependent on them and can't simply switch. It's like being stuck in a bad marriage, walking out is easier said than done. Airlines that already have a significant percentage of their fleet in the MAX or have a major future commitment to the type must be getting desperate for a solution. Imagine the effect on a major B737 operator such as Southwest Airlines if the MAX is permanently grounded and they're faced with waiting years for an all new Boeing narrowbody or switching to Airbus with a years long waiting list.

[RTO]

How is flight in pitch up when MCAS is inactive - but required for certification?

Have you trained for that? - is it a light or rapid change? - or just it wants to go vertical in an instant?

I guess you can not answer as you have never been there - but why change from the reported 0.6 degrees to a required 2.5 degrees?

That to me as an engineer, is the transition is/will not be slow when the cowls start to create lift. (MCAS runs the high speed trim)
My understanding is that to trigger the pre-mod MCAS without an inop AOA sensor on the FCC in use, one would have to produce an upset and depart well beyond the normal operating envelope. That would be pretty bad in any transport category airplane. However with a faulty sensor (pre-mod) the appropriate procedures should not cause a loss of the airplane.

[Bend alot]

My understanding is that to trigger the pre-mod MCAS without an inop AOA sensor on the FCC in use, one would have to produce an upset and depart well beyond the normal operating envelope. That would be pretty bad in any transport category airplane. However with a faulty sensor (pre-mod) the appropriate procedures should not cause a loss of the airplane.
No we are talking flying - not a pre or post mod.

The aircraft could not be approved without the MCAS.

They needed to increase the design limits to meet certification.

Now they massively decrease MCAS.

?? How can it meet certification?

Forget now 1 or 2 AoA sensors.

[Walnut]

Boeing were required to install the MCAS to get it through the FAA certification process Since it then became a safety issue pilots needed to know if it was working. To charge airlines extra to provide a fault warning for the system is scandalous as reported by the New York Times. As such Lawyers should home in on this point.

[xyzzy]

"Boeing does not believe pilots should be required to complete training in a flight simulator prior to flying the 737 Max once regulators lift the aircraft’s grounding."

I have worked with regulators, but not in aviation. In the field I have experience of, the regulator has the power to overnight stop all trade by large organisations. In aviation, the same is true, with the difference that their power to ground aircraft, stop airlines from operating and close airfields has been used sufficiently frequently that it is no way a bluff. No airline is too big to ground, no individual model of aircraft too numerous.

So that said, do the regulators actually care what Boeing think about training requirements? The regulators all over the world have grounded the 737 MAX in its various forms. In the current political and media climate, they have no pressure at all to change their mind: September 2019, September 2020, September 2021: not their money, not their planes, not their problem. If the regulators don't like the proposals to put the aircraft back into service, they can just say "nice try, but no". In the end, what they want they get. Boeing can try judicial review or your country's equivalent, but (a) there are a lot of regulators, and a judicial challenge to all of them at once -- including, for example, the Chinese regulator -- would be very difficult and (b) getting the history of two fatal crashes into a court, with full discovery processes, would be to put it mildly a high stakes game.

This isn't Comet, with British stiff upper lip making people feel it was their patriotic duty to fly after a succession of accidents. The 737 MAX will have to satisfy regulators, and regulators will have to satisfy their stakeholders (politicians, passengers). Boeing's opinion on training requirements and three quid gets you a latte.

[clearedtocross]

Mr. Muilenbergs "denial strategy " might work with shareholders (for the moment). It might also work with the FAA that sits in the same rocking boat. I sincerly doubt that it will work with the authorities in the rest of the world where the POTUS has not made many friends lately. I remember EASA has made life difficult for the Robinson R66 because of lacking servo redundancy even when there where no accidents to prove the point. My best guess is that except the FAA no one will re-certify the Max before the final investigations of the two accidents are out and that could be a while. I think Boeing is in dire need of parking space and cash to pay the unsold production.

[BluSdUp]

XYZZY
Ahh we are back to the Comet are we.
Well, big difference, that was 2000 years ago.
AND:
They fixed the main problem, structural!
MAX has a aerodynamic instability problem that Boeing could easily fix with a tail modification.
Any float pilot knows You have to modify the tail on some aircraft if the floats are sticking out to fare forward when switching from wheel to floats in the summer!
But the Money people demanded a " software fix". Bahh .
Please do not mix basic infancy jetliner development with the Max, even if it does look like similar errors.
The first set the standard for aircraft destructive testing.
The other is criminal ignorance and sets the standard for destructive stress-testing of a large Company.
Lets hope the we do not have to fish a Max out of the Mediterranean the next few years.
Regards
Cpt B

[bill fly]

On the Nostalgia forum is this link:
https://www.aerosociety.com/news/audio-the-d-p-davies-interview-on-the-boeing-747-the-trident-vc10-one-eleven-the-boeing-727/

It leads to audio interviews with respected acceptance test pilot DPDavies (who wrote the book Handling the Big Jets).

If you are prepared to listen to all the audio about his flights in the V bombers and Concorde, you then get his unwashed straight opinion on the FAA and CAA effectivity and honesty at that time.

It makes for thought provoking listening - years ago of course but very pertinent to this discussion.

[Ian W]

You would have been flying empty aircraft !






Not at all.
I am currently SLF with more than 2 million miles down the back in the last few years and I would happily fly in a Max piloted by someone like RTO or 737 Driver.
However, I am really getting concerned about flying in any aircraft A or B, with some of the other posters here when they are in row 0. You know who you are, rather than fly the aircraft and then follow NNCs apparently you need to know and be briefed on the specific system fault prior to flying the aircraft including basics like just keeping the aircraft in trim, even when it takes the strength of both PF and PM to keep the control column back (and yet the manual electric trim ALWAYS stopped and overrode MCAS). So there they are thumbing a thesaurus about 'runaway' not meaning 'repeated' so we don't trim? Neither of these crashes would have happened if the pilots had trimmed back to unload the pull force as was shown in the penultimate Lion Air flight and the first minutes of the final Lion Air flight - only when the pilots stopped flying the aircraft - trimming - did they crash.

So yes - I am a concerned SLF now: But on ALL flights as I might be in an aircraft zoom climbed into a high level stall and held the wrong side of the drag curve, or one where the PF just decided to stop trimming.

[ATC Watcher]

The only reason airlines are backing the MAX is that they need to get their fleet back in the air and keep them flying, they are dependent on them and can't simply switch. It's like being stuck in a bad marriage, walking out is easier said than done. Airlines that already have a significant percentage of their fleet in the MAX or have a major future commitment to the type must be getting desperate for a solution. Imagine the effect on a major B737 operator such as Southwest Airlines if the MAX is permanently grounded and they're faced with waiting years for an all new Boeing narrowbody or switching to Airbus with a years long waiting list.
I was not thinking of anyone switching to brand A , but highlighting the Virgin CEO comment about waiting to see if the aircraft is safe before introducing it in their fleet. .and delaying this introduction to mid 2020. I guess a few NG and 300s are going to continue to fly a bit longer than initially planned.

[Cows getting bigger]

To be fair, there's no way a mass exodus from B to A would ever happen, even if there was a desire, not least because A have an order backlog of a little under 6000 narrow bodies.

[clivegore]

Well I for one have lost complete faith in the Max or should I say the top brass at Boeing.
‘I will never fly on any flight scheduled as a Max as for me the aircraft is fundamentally unsafe and needs to be permanently withdrawn.

[JLWSanDiego]

See Ya 😎 You won't be missed

[yanrair]

I would appreciate knowing why you think that?
Happily my airlines of choice do not use them.
Dear sixchannel
happily my airlines of choice haven’t lost a passenger in over 30 years and in some cases- never. And the Max has been flying for three years and the STAB TRIM pretty much unchanged has been on Boeing’s since the 707. 1950s design.
my choice of airline is directly related to the standards they apply to safety.
Happy flying
y

[yanrair]

"you should have a set of go to pitch and power settings for various phases of flight."



I strongly feel that this should be the most essential training item for any unreliable , or uncertain airspeed issue combined with revert to gyro attitude display

This is basic stuff that has somehow been obscured by the "magenta line"

The "flight manager" should disappear and be replaced by gyro attitude display in any case of sensor disagree or does not compute situation

if you mean “flight director” instrument- we already have three gyros ADIs and since the two crashes myself and remarkably few others have been saying “FLY ATTITUDE-PITCH POWER (AND GROUNDSPEED I add in). It’s all,you need to fly safely until you find out WTF is happening.
This is the sort of training that is still carried out by many first class airlines. Moreover pilots who pride themselves on knowing stuff like this devour it. You shouldn’t need magenta lines and speed tapes to fly a plane to a safe landing. Take QF 72 with 60+ faults. On a 747 - which I flew along with 707/737/757/767 L1011, in similar catastrophic circumstances with say an uncontrolled fire, the pilot might have said “I’ll just lower the gear on the emergency system land flapless at 200 kts and do no checklists.” On ground in a few minutes safely. But to do this you have to know how to fly and realize you’re not flying an X BOX that you imagine knows more than you do.
Y

[yanrair]

Mr. Muilenbergs "denial strategy " might work with shareholders (for the moment). It might also work with the FAA that sits in the same rocking boat. I sincerly doubt that it will work with the authorities in the rest of the world where the POTUS has not made many friends lately. I remember EASA has made life difficult for the Robinson R66 because of lacking servo redundancy even when there where no accidents to prove the point. My best guess is that except the FAA no one will re-certify the Max before the final investigations of the two accidents are out and that could be a while. I think Boeing is in dire need of parking space and cash to pay the unsold production.

Dear member

My best guess is that except the FAA no one will re-certify the Max before the final investigations of the two accidents are out

Don’t hold your breath for the final report which will no doubt absolve the pilots. I asked yesterday a large group about what caused the demise of the last jet liner to be grounded forever- Concorde.
Readers- please close your eyes and think what you believe and pause for ten seconds——————————





they all said more or less the same thing “debris on runway left by previous aircraft which damaged plane etc etc”.
oh dear!
We are in similar territory here.
Y

[yanrair]

RTO
I would fly with you in command in a heartbeat on a Max with an engine out and no flaps. Why.? Because you clearly know how to fly.
Y
ps should have added in “...and with multiple conflicting warnings”

As can this guy.....
https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/rhiannapatrick/richard-de-crespigny/10337426

[Cows getting bigger]

yanrair, I think you and I would disagree on apportionment of ultimate responsibility, but there is no escaping the fact that MCAS was a rather simplistic sticking plaster. For sure, lawyers will do their thing and we will continue to argue over ‘kludges’, airmanship etc, but can anyone seriously deny that the 737 has evolved as far as it can? Boeing have about 7000 or so on order; that should give them plenty of time to design the 737’s replacement, from scratch.

[RetiredBA/BY]

Not at all.
I am currently SLF with more than 2 million miles down the back in the last few years and I would happily fly in a Max piloted by someone like RTO or 737 Driver.
However, I am really getting concerned about flying in any aircraft A or B, with some of the other posters here when they are in row 0. You know who you are, rather than fly the aircraft and then follow NNCs apparently you need to know and be briefed on the specific system fault prior to flying the aircraft including basics like just keeping the aircraft in trim, even when it takes the strength of both PF and PM to keep the control column back (and yet the manual electric trim ALWAYS stopped and overrode MCAS). So there they are thumbing a thesaurus about 'runaway' not meaning 'repeated' so we don't trim? Neither of these crashes would have happened if the pilots had trimmed back to unload the pull force as was shown in the penultimate Lion Air flight and the first minutes of the final Lion Air flight - only when the pilots stopped flying the aircraft - trimming - did they crash.

So yes - I am a concerned SLF now: But on ALL flights as I might be in an aircraft zoom climbed into a high level stall and held the wrong side of the drag curve, or one where the PF just decided to stop trimming.
Your opinion !
Although now retired and only SLF but I have over 10 ,000 hours command time on 73s 75s and 76 s.

I have never flown a Max but have looked at a LOT of documentation re MCAS.

I still cant understand how the Max was certified for operation with just ONE component able to drive the most powerful control surface.

Further , despite current Boeing. philosophy, I would want to know and understand EVERYTHING. about a system, particularly one which could kill me, exactly how it works, how it can fail. and how to deal with it and have seen and practiced operation and failures in the simulator, BEFORE becoming type rated.

Many years ago I was posted to an RAF squadron as a replacement pilot for one killed in the Valiant crash believed to have been caused by a runaway stab. The aircraft were not modified BUT we all went into the sim to practice the recovery procedure as it was found that full elevator could just overcome the stab. Deflection. Boeing please note.

After that experience I absolutely beleive that if MCAS is retained its authority should not be greater than can be overcome be elevator input.

Until the. MAX crashes I had the very highest respect for Boeing aircraft. With the Max MCAS they, to quote a senior retired NTSB. inspector , dropped the ball, bigtime.

I am sure the Max will be returned to service in due course as a very safe aircraft. But in its single A of A Sensor coupled to its MCAS system it should never have been certified.
When I did my 737 conversion at Boeing in Seattle back in 1980 our instructors were adamant that all their aircraft were designed to be flown with ease by any and all of the worlds airline pilots. The Max seems to have beaten four with tragic results.

[yanrair]

Since MCAS Simulators are indeed few and far between, but on the other hand there are +400 frames standing idle on the ground, why not bring them to use? Sure, it costs a hell of a lot more than using a sim, but, using them will reduce the time needed to get all crews trained.

So, how about we have Boeing trainers train the airline TRI/TREs in the real aircraft, and then have the TRI/TREs train the TCs in their grounded fleet, who in turn may train the line pilots, either in real aircraft or in simulators as available.

Such an approach would also have a large and positive effect on regaining public/airline/pilot trust. But such pragmatism is of course far less appealing to your average bean counting CEO than a 1-hour iPad session.

You don’t need any of this in my opinion. A sim. Trainer on current NG sims can simulate MCAS by repeatedly introducing RUNAWAY STAB every time the pilot stops trimming ANU which will cause the wheel to spin AND again, until pilot counteracts and when in trim, - selects switches OFF . You only need a different sim. Where there are physical differences or significant handling differences. Since MCAS behaves like runaway stab. In the main, I think the trainer can do all that is needed here. Also refresh the guys on how to cope with stick shakers and unreliable airspeed in initial climb.
Cheers
Y

[yanrair]

yanrair, I think you and I would disagree on apportionment of ultimate responsibility, but there is no escaping the fact that MCAS was a rather simplistic sticking plaster. For sure, lawyers will do their thing and we will continue to argue over ‘kludges’, airmanship etc, but can anyone seriously deny that the 737 has evolved as far as it can? Boeing have about 7000 or so on order; that should give them plenty of time to design the 737’s replacement, from scratch.

Hi there again Cows!
in another thread I pointed out by way of agreement with you that the 737 is not a sixties design but actually it’s a 707 fifties design with two engines missing and will eventually when max retires have flown for over 100 years! Now, is this unreasonable? To have a trim system from 1950 still the same a century later? My view, if it’s not broke don’t fix it. MCAS is in need of three design changes. Fix those and off we go
y

[pitotheat]

I’m not too sure how SLF think they are qualified to comment whether they have 5 hours or 5 zillion hours they have no idea about the mess this incident highlights in the competency of the regulator and company. Nor the erosion of confidence in the pilots who have to operate these aircraft. It has become an increasingly common occurrence that pilots are being trained to a minimum standard with only a rudimentary level of technical knowledge for too long. As I approach my retirement I only hope this marks a watershed and the reversal of these trends. I think recent posts highlighting where Boeing were able to get away with a single source of information on a critical system without a warning to the pilots if this system was faulty, unless the company accountants ticked an option box, is simply criminal.
The current senior team at both Boeing and FAA must be dismissed and replaced before any thought of releasing this aircraft to service can be considered.

[DaveReidUK]

I asked yesterday a large group about what caused the demise of the last jet liner to be grounded forever- Concorde.Readers- please close your eyes and think what you believe and pause for ten seconds——————————
Or we could just read the investigation report.

they all said more or less the same thing “debris on runway left by previous aircraft which damaged plane etc etc”.

Obviously they had.

[Cows getting bigger]

Hi there again Cows!
in another thread I pointed out by way of agreement with you that the 737 is not a sixties design but actually it’s a 707 fifties design with two engines missing and will eventually when max retires have flown for over 100 years! Now, is this unreasonable? To have a trim system from 1950 still the same a century later? My view, if it’s not broke don’t fix it. MCAS is in need of three design changes. Fix those and off we go
y



But is broke. The basic aircraft (which has been a world leader) is outgrowing it's clothes. What are they going to do when son-of-LEAP pitches up, pump a bit more air in the tyres, give MCAS 2.7 units and call it a Max+? Time to buy a few reams of A1 paper and employ some more draftsmen, methinks. :)

[pontifex]

BA/BY It was a runaway trim not a stab. A trim cutout switch was installed on the centre bit right by the captain's hand. Almost every sim ride included a trim runaway thereafter. I lived through it!

[Kerosene Kraut]

I asked yesterday a large group about what caused the demise of the last jet liner to be grounded forever- Concorde.

Concorde was not "grounded forever". It got modified and was good to go again. And flew with paying passengers again.

[Back at NH]

Dear member

My best guess is that except the FAA no one will re-certify the Max before the final investigations of the two accidents are out

Don’t hold your breath for the final report which will no doubt absolve the pilots. I asked yesterday a large group about what caused the demise of the last jet liner to be grounded forever- Concorde.
Readers- please close your eyes and think what you believe and pause for ten seconds——————————





they all said more or less the same thing “debris on runway left by previous aircraft which damaged plane etc etc”.
oh dear!
We are in similar territory here.
Y



Loss of market after 9/11

[infrequentflyer789]

Concorde was not "grounded forever". It got modified and was good to go again. And flew with paying passengers again.

But Concorde is grounded forever, it will not fly again.

That final permanent grounding was not caused by the crash. That, I believe, was the original poster's point, which seems to have gone over several people's heads, probably in flames...

[Kerosene Kraut]

"Grounded" typically means grounded by authorities. Concorde got phased out by it's operators for economical reasons and because Airbus wanted to end the product support.
Concorde had been grounded for some time after the Paris accident. Then it got modified and was cleared to fly again. The grounding ended.

[Ian W]

Your opinion !
Although now retired and only SLF but I have over 10 ,000 hours command time on 73s 75s and 76 s.

I have never flown a Max but have looked at a LOT of documentation re MCAS.

I still cant understand how the Max was certified for operation with just ONE component able to drive the most powerful control surface.

Further , despite current Boeing. philosophy, I would want to know and understand EVERYTHING. about a system, particularly one which could kill me, exactly how it works, how it can fail. and how to deal with it and have seen and practiced operation and failures in the simulator, BEFORE becoming type rated.

Many years ago I was posted to an RAF squadron as a replacement pilot for one killed in the Valiant crash believed to have been caused by a runaway stab. The aircraft were not modified BUT we all went into the sim to practice the recovery procedure as it was found that full elevator could just overcome the stab. Deflection. Boeing please note.

After that experience I absolutely beleive that if MCAS is retained its authority should not be greater than can be overcome be elevator input.

Until the. MAX crashes I had the very highest respect for Boeing aircraft. With the Max MCAS they, to quote a senior retired NTSB. inspector , dropped the ball, bigtime.

I am sure the Max will be returned to service in due course as a very safe aircraft. But in its single A of A Sensor coupled to its MCAS system it should never have been certified.
When I did my 737 conversion at Boeing in Seattle back in 1980 our instructors were adamant that all their aircraft were designed to be flown with ease by any and all of the worlds airline pilots. The Max seems to have beaten four with tragic results.





That is the point though. If you are fighting MCAS with elevator you have already stopped flying the aircraft as MCAS stops when you trim - the button by your left thumb. Of course if you -_don't_ trim then you have already ceded aircraft control especially if you let the speed increase where the stab will always have more authority. But trimming to unload the control column forces should be instinctive, for those pilots for whom that is still the case they will fly the aircraft home.
I suspect that the FMEA showed that a rare AOA failure could cause MCAS to operate despite not being at high AOA but the crew were expected to react by trimming the aircraft. After all who would expect a professional crew to let the aircraft repeatedly trim down and not use the control column trim to put it back in trim? If MCAS operated with uncommanded nose down trim repeatedly after being recovered back to trim as in the Lion Air flights - then the flight crew would be expected to switch the stab trim off as the penultimate Lion Air flight did do. Nobody at Boeing thought that pilots would be saying "no the stab trim cut out switches are only for _runaway_ trim and that is _repeated_ trim". So now the single point of failure - which definitely should not have been there - even with FMEA showing that crews were expected to stop the problem- has been removed the repeated operation in a failure mode has been removed. What has not been removed is that concern about what NNCs are being considered as extremely specific by crews due to the tick box simulator training approach. There are going to be other complex failures (as in rodent eating a cable) that cannot be described in NNCs and where =Fly the aircraft= is really important regardless of horns shakers cavalry charges etc etc, and yet we have crews that will not even trim.
As 737 Driver has said this is looking more like a training issue

[Lake1952]

Small aircraft pilot for 35+ years, land and sea. To all those on this board who say when confronted with unreliable airspeed indications, "fly the aircraft" or 'Pitch and power".... doesn't the fact that the automatic trim functions triggered by the MCAS software require Herculean back preesure on the yoke change the equation for you even a little? And the fact that at certain airspeeds, it is difficult or nearly impossible to manually trim the aircraft to reduce or remove the need for massive back pressure?

[737 Driver]

Small aircraft pilot for 35+ years, land and sea. To all those on this board who say when confronted with unreliable airspeed indications, "fly the aircraft" or 'Pitch and power".... doesn't the fact that the automatic trim functions triggered by the MCAS software require Herculean back preesure on the yoke change the equation for you even a little? And the fact that at certain airspeeds, it is difficult or nearly impossible to manually trim the aircraft to reduce or remove the need for massive back pressure?

You’ve probably heard the old saw about the kid who killed his parents and then requested mercy before the court because he was an orphan. The Ethiopian situation is kind of like that.

Because of a lack of application of basic airmanship skills, the aircraft entered a flight regime where basic flying skills were no longer sufficient to save the ship. Some people keep looking at the condition of the aircraft at the five minute mark and declare it was no longer flyable without seriously considering what happened in the previous 4 minutes and 59 seconds.

[pedrop21]

MCAS put in 2.5 units of nose down and the pilots responded by putting .5 (half a unit) of nose up trim. This is a lack of hand flying ability. Competent airmanship would have you trim till the back stick pressure is trimmed out. Clearly they didn't do this. They could have. In fact, to use an extreme and silly point, they could have flown with MCAS operating continually. MCAS trims down and they trim it right back out. Of course at some point you would think you would decide to use the checklist and kill power to the trim. It would be reasonable to use the electric trim to trim to stable stick pressure, THEN stab trim cutout. Not the reverse. Also, you can't wait till you are going the speed of heat and full nose down trim. Won't work at that point.

The guy above nailed it. Looking at the last moments of the flight and ignoring the basic lack of flying skillset that preceded it is to miss a huge lesson. Flying skills, the basic hand flying stuff, needs to make a comeback. That plane was flyable, right up until they flight crew made one too many mistakes. They made a bunch of errors, but eventually it was one too many.

That isn't racism that is just observing and recognizing mistakes. Pretty much the point of an AI.

[krismiler]

Concorde had a design flaw which had previously been brought to the attention of the regulators by the FAA, the fuel tanks were vulnerable to damage from debris thrown up from the runway. The disaster proved that and the type was grounded until a satisfactory modification was approved, the tanks got armour plating. Commercial considerations led to the withdraw of the aircraft from service, the fuel consumption is horrendous.

[YYZjim]

To be precise about Concorde's withdrawal from service:

Concorde used tremendous amounts of costly fuel even at the time of the Paris crash. On the other hand, Concorde was a flagship product (think marketing) for British Airways and Air France. Analysis showed the marketing benefit outweighed the losses per flight, so the operators and manufacturer fixed the problem and put Concorde back into the air. In other words, "commercial considerations" kept Concorde flying.

Several years later, though, a different problem cropped up. The airframes were reaching the end of their certified number of cycles. In order to keep flying, the manufacturer would have had to re-certify for a longer life. That would have been extremely costly, and the costs of any required remediation were unknown. With less than a dozen airframes in service, the decision was made to end the project. This time around, "commercial considerations" let the Concorde expire at the end of its design life.

YYZjim

[laxman]

Reading through these posts has been painful for this MAX qualified pilot but since this is a public board, and many non-fliers are making comments and contributions that defy reason and logic, that are coming from an emotional basis, and one not based upon any experience or knowledge, I should not be surprised.

[John Marsh]

RetiredBA/BY:

When I did my 737 conversion at Boeing in Seattle back in 1980 our instructors were adamant that all their aircraft were designed to be flown with ease by any and all of the worlds airline pilots. The Max seems to have beaten four with tragic results.

How do today's airline pilots compare with those of 1980? If there has been a downward trend in competence in non-normal situations, has Boeing tailored its design philosophy to suit? How reasonable is it to expect Boeing to be able to make such an adjustment?

[RetiredBA/BY]

RetiredBA/BY:



How do today's airline pilots compare with those of 1980? If there has been a downward trend in competence in non-normal situations, has Boeing tailored its design philosophy to suit? How reasonable is it to expect Boeing to be able to make such an adjustment?

I dont know the answer to that, I have been retired for 20 years. That said I am convinced that handling skills have been going downhill for many years, precipitated by the introduction of aircraft with FMCS. Children of the magenta line etc. !

Perhaps I am fortunate having cut my teeth on the Canberra, no autopilot, no autothrottle, and a real handful on one engine, and I regularly hand flew my Boeing up and down to/ from around 20,000 feet and actually really enjoyed doing it.

But we actually flew the bloody things !

And as an aside, BA operated Concorde because it was profitable. Lord King and Colin Marshall challenged Brian Walpole, the then Flight manager, to make it so or it would be grounded, and with Jock Lowe’s acumen they did so. I was one of the main charterers for many years. That may not have been the case for AF.

[Kerosene Kraut]

If MCAS is creating more troubles than solving and if it is of no use for stall protection (Boeing's claim) why not just take out the entire MCAS? If authorities require heavier stick feel close to the stall for certification why not modify the feel system instead of violently interfering with the steering and using the trim to brute force the nose down? That dramatic amount of brute force applied by MCAS looks like more than just needed to create just some better "feel" for the pilots.

[hawk76]

How do today's airline pilots compare with those of 1980? If there has been a downward trend in competence in non-normal situations, has Boeing tailored its design philosophy to suit? How reasonable is it to expect Boeing to be able to make such an adjustment?

One possible cycle:

Less training/competence ==> more automation ==> less training ==> more automation ==> no pilot

If pilots can't fly a plane, why have them?

[GordonR_Cape]

If MCAS is creating more troubles than solving and if it is of no use for stall protection (Boeing's claim) why not just take out the entire MCAS? If authorities require heavier stick feel close to the stall for certification why not modify the feel system instead of violently interfering with the steering and using the trim to brute force the nose down? That dramatic amount of brute force applied by MCAS looks like more than just needed to create just some better "feel" for the pilots.

AFAIK this had been discussed elsewhere. My short answer is that the development, testing and certification delays associated with changing the elevator feel system, would be prohibitive in terms of costs and postponed deliveries. IMO at this late stage, MCAS is the only game in town. There might be a parallel process to do it properly, and retro-fit existing models in a few years time?

[yanrair]

Reading through these posts has been painful for this MAX qualified pilot but since this is a public board, and many non-fliers are making comments and contributions that defy reason and logic, that are coming from an emotional basis, and one not based upon any experience or knowledge, I should not be surprised.

Hi there Laxman
You are the man who should be taking on these outlandish comments!. Presumably you have the knowledge from having flown the Max to put things into a proper perspective. I have been surprised by the lack of comment from those who actually fly the Max but presumed they were keeping their heads down.
I flew 707s 737 200/400/800 NG and was airtest pilot on them in UK and at Boeing. Not 707 - only a boy then, but did 5000 hours on 707. And I would regard my comments as not unreasonable but yes, there are comments on this forum from persons who don't fly, and I actually find them helpful in that one can see what I don't see - the view of the general public.
In this case, or these two cases, it is apparent that the public as represented by the majority of postings have judged the Max as a death trap. I don't think so. But I could be wrong and it would be great to hear from someone who has been trained to fly them.
Happy flying
Y

[Smythe]

f MCAS is creating more troubles than solving and if it is of no use for stall protection (Boeing's claim) why not just take out the entire MCAS? If authorities require heavier stick feel close to the stall for certification why not modify the feel system instead of violently interfering with the steering and using the trim to brute force the nose down?

Its not for feel.

At certain AoA conditions, between the engines moved forward and up (moving the CG forward), coupled with the engine nacelles provide a sudden jump in lift, the nose pitches up.
MCAS sole purpose is to bring the nose back down when this happens.
Nothing other than to counter the nose kicking up.

why not just take out the entire MCAS?

the MAX does not meet cert requirements without MCAS.

Looking at the TOD greenband, the forward CG is likely why on the 738, it is 1.5 to 6.5 and the MAX it is 3 to 8....(and also why at conditions, there is more of a tendency for the nose to kick up)

[Kerosene Kraut]

If the future MCAS 2.0 runs only one time per flight -and less excessive- afterwards pilots have to fly "MCAS unprotected" in manual flight with flaps up conditions.
So all MAX pilots have to learn flying with no MCAS close to a stall anyway. Why is MCAS still required for certification? Obviously without MCAS a MAX is safe to fly as well if that system will be switched off after one use per flight. (I am aware of the stick feel close to a stall requirement)

[Smythe]

The LEAP engines are both larger and relocated slightly up and forward from the previous NG CFM56-7 engines to accommodate their larger fan diameter.
This new location and size of the nacelle cause the vortex flow off the nacelle body to produce lift at high AoA; as the nacelle is ahead of the CofG this lift causes a slight pitch-up effect (ie a reducing stick force) which could lead the pilot to further increase the back pressure on the yoke and send the aircraft closer towards the stall.

This non-linear/reducing stick force is not allowable under FAR §25.173 "Static longitudinal stability".

Several aerodynamic solutions were introduced such as revising the leading edge stall strip and modifying the leading edge vortilons but they were insufficient to pass regulation. MCAS was therefore introduced to give an automatic nose down stabilizer input during elevated AoA when flaps are up.​​​​​​​"

[Smythe]

14 CFR § 25.173 - Static longitudinal stability.



§ 25.173 Static longitudinal stability.Under the conditions specified in § 25.175 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.175), the characteristics of the elevator control forces (including friction) must be as follows:

(a) A pull must be required to obtain and maintain speeds below the specified trim speed, and a push must be required to obtain and maintain speeds above the specified trim speed. This must be shown at any speed that can be obtained except speeds higher than the landing gear or wing flap operating limit speeds or VFC/MFC, whichever is appropriate, or lower than the minimum speed for steady unstalled flight.

(b) The airspeed must return to within 10 percent of the original trim speed for the climb, approach, and landing conditions specified in § 25.175 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.175) (a), (c), and (d), and must return to within 7.5 percent of the original trim speed for the cruising condition specified in § 25.175(b) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.175#b), when the control force is slowly released from any speed within the range specified in paragraph (a) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173#a) of this section.

(c) The average gradient of the stable slope of the stick force versus speed curve may not be less than 1 pound for each 6 knots.

(d) Within the free return speed range specified in paragraph (b) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173#b) of this section, it is permissible for the airplane (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173), without control forces, to stabilize on speeds above or below the desired trim speeds if exceptional attention on the part of the pilot is not required to return to and maintain the desired trim speed and altitude.

[Amdt. 25-7, 30 FR 13117 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rio/citation/30_FR_13117), Oct. 15, 1965]

[GordonR_Cape]

If the future MCAS 2.0 runs only one time per flight -and less excessive- afterwards pilots have to fly "MCAS unprotected" in manual flight with flaps up conditions.
So all MAX pilots have to learn flying with no MCAS close to a stall anyway. Why is MCAS still required for certification? Obviously without MCAS a MAX is safe to fly as well if that system will be switched off after one use per flight. (I am aware of the stick feel close to a stall requirement)

The statements from Boeing have not been entirely clear, but my understanding is that there is one MCAS activation per event, not per flight. The ambiguity in the definition of an event is the sticking point IMO.

[slacktide]

The LEAP engines are both larger and relocated slightly up and forward from the previous NG CFM56-7 engines to accommodate their larger fan diameter.
This new location and size of the nacelle cause the vortex flow off the nacelle body to produce lift at high AoA; as the nacelle is ahead of the CofG this lift causes a slight pitch-up effect (ie a reducing stick force) which could lead the pilot to further increase the back pressure on the yoke and send the aircraft closer towards the stall.

This non-linear/reducing stick force is not allowable under FAR §25.173 "Static longitudinal stability".


Do you realize that you have just contradicted your previous post, which claimed that MCAS was not added to manipulate stick feel? 25.173(c) is ALL ABOUT stick feel.

(c) The average gradient of the stable slope of the stick force versus speed curve may not be less than 1 pound for each 6 knots.

[Smythe]

I suppose, stick force/feel, but then again, doesnt seem like it matters, push it/pull it, MCAS simply pushes the nose down 2.5 degrees with stab trim.

[krismiler]

Which is why I am so sceptical about the massive number of posts here that seek to blame a single cause - MCAS.

There is usually a chain of factors involved in a accident and it only takes one of the links to be broken for the accident to be avoided. The Lion Air aircraft would have crashed on a previous flight had it not been for another pilot on the jump seat who correctly diagnosed what was going wrong. Had the defect been rectified after that flight it wouldn't have occurred either.

Post #103 is an excellent example of an accident chain and shows the importance of a safety culture and crew discipline.

[Lonewolf_50]

There is usually a chain of factors involved in a accident and it only takes one of the links to be broken for the accident to be avoided. It has been noted in the various posts and threads on Lion Air and Ethiopia that the MCAS can be argued to have been doing what it was supposed to do, given the signal it was receiving.
That signal - be it a bad probe or a bad signal due to something in the signal's path - is the first hole in the cheese to open. But there were others. The larger questions on system design and redundancy have been done to death already, since the Lion Air crash, so I'll not comment on them but Boeing has to. The piece that has me scratching my head is the info regarding the AoA disagree, alerts, and why it is or isn't an option, etc. I have a number of friends who fly for SWA, and in time I'll get a chance to visit with them in person on this thing.

In order for those flying these aircraft to return to them to their intended service, a variety of aviation authorities need to be content that this system (overall) will either "break the links in the chain" (link in safety chain model) or "prevent a few of the holes lining up" (Reason's model) in future passenger carrying flights.
I agree with the poster who observed that the attempt to focus on a single factor (the smoking gun) is a fundamentally wrong way to look at both the accident and the systemic remedy/mitigation. Mr Reasons likely would weep at some of the assertions being made.
Regardless, the flight deck crews need to be aware of how their systems work, their known failure modes, and the mitigation for same.
That trifecta seems to me to be getting lost in some of the discussion . (I hope to hear from laxman if he's still interested in commenting).

[Dave Therhino]

Do you realize that you have just contradicted your previous post, which claimed that MCAS was not added to manipulate stick feel? 25.173(c) is ALL ABOUT stick feel.

(c) The average gradient of the stable slope of the stick force versus speed curve may not be less than 1 pound for each 6 knots.

The rule that the Max could not meet without MCAS is 14 CFR 25.203(a).

[slacktide]

The rule that the Max could not meet without MCAS is 14 CFR 25.203(a).

Is that fact, or is it your opinion, or is it someone else's opinion? Do you have any documentation of this that you can share?

[Flocks]

The statements from Boeing have not been entirely clear, but my understanding is that there is one MCAS activation per event, not per flight. The ambiguity in the definition of an event is the sticking point IMO.

I agree, I believe if AOA is too high, Mcas will activate once then wait that the AOA is back normal, if AOA is back normal and it goes up again, mcas will activate again.
The MCAS 2.0, will only activate is the 2 AOA show high angle (like for a stick pusher in the planes I used to fly)

i believe this one activation only, is for the case of the 2 AOA failed showing high AOA, you will have only one Mcas then no more for the full flight.


​​​​​

[VFR Only Please]

In order for those flying these aircraft to return to them to their intended service, a variety of aviation authorities need to be content that this system (overall) will either "break the links in the chain" (link in safety chain model) or "prevent a few of the holes lining up" (Reason's model) in future passenger carrying flights.

Seems to me there's no getting away from Boeing having "broken" the 737 by overtweaking it into a stall-happy monster, which then needed to have that proclivity Fixed.

The original Fix wasn't good enough and got a lot of people killed when the links held / holes lined up twice in five months.

The new Fix had better be flawless 100% of the time, because Boeing is now helplessly wedded to this monster, and any further crash may well have dire consequences for a company whose reputation is teetering badly.

[ATC Watcher]

The new Fix had better be flawless 100% of the time, because Boeing is now helplessly wedded to this monster, and any further crash may well have dire consequences for a company whose reputation is teetering badly.
And I think you should have put ANY in capital before "further crash" , Because the next Max that goes down for ANY reason will cause a huge steer up and the Boeing situation will become unattainable, even if a year after an NTSB report establish that the cause had nothing to do with the aircraft itself. The period between the crash and the report will be too long for people to wait to regain confidence.. We unfortunately live today in instant news and requiring immediate answers.

[VFR Only Please]

And I think you should have put ANY in capital before "further crash" , Because the next Max that goes down for ANY reason will cause a huge steer up and the Boeing situation will become unattainable, even if a year after an NTSB report establish that the cause had nothing to do with the aircraft itself. The period between the crash and the report will be too long for people to wait to regain confidence.. We unfortunately live today in instant news and requiring immediate answers.

Fully agree. All commercial interests are eager (though nervous in their heart of hearts) to get the thing back in the air. (If you fly from Winnipeg to Saskatoon these days, you might find yourself on a wet-leased Oman Air machine.) But what makes them think the travelling Public is going to take kindly to flying the Max? And if, as you say, one crashes for Any reason, all their fears will come roaring back. Boeing faces a long and exceedingly tricky path leading out of the doghouse. Interesting times.

[Smythe]

latest Seattle Time article is especially damning. AR engineers and process.

[L337]

A link to said article in the Seattle Times: Engineers say Boeing pushed to limit safety testing in race to certify planes, including 737 MAX (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/engineers-say-boeing-pushed-to-limit-safety-testing-in-race-to-certify-planes-including-737-max/)

[fdr]

I suppose, stick force/feel, but then again, doesnt seem like it matters, push it/pull it, MCAS simply pushes the nose down 2.5 degrees with stab trim.
J
er, nope, it doesn't do that. It may be semantics but the 2.5 degrees is not an attitude value, it is the shift of the trimmable horizontal stabiliser, THS by a maximum value of 2.5 degrees Aircraft Nose Down, AND, which is stabiliser leading edge up. [corrected for error]which will give whatever to the aircraft attitude, dependent on what the driver does on the control column. MCAS is an input for control force, it is not a pitch attitude adjusting system, of course left unchecked it apparently is good for about 40 degrees nose down...

[hec7or]

Aircraft Nose Down, AND, which is also stabiliser leading edge down..

are you sure?

[fdr]

Is that fact, or is it your opinion, or is it someone else's opinion? Do you have any documentation of this that you can share?

Dave The Rhino writes clearly. The second sentence of 25.203(a) would be a sticking point with the design as disclosed to date, 25.173 is more general in scope. The disclosed logic indicates that the problem arises in turning stalls, but the permissible pitch characteristics is in paragraph (a), and MCAS is definitely working in that area. That particular sentence is the reason for having stick pushers in some designs, most often T tail aircraft. In the normal course of affairs, this would occur around stick shaker so would not be readily observed by a pilot, there is enough happening to keep them busy at that point. That makes some sense as to why the OEM went that way, Adding a stick pusher would have been a notable change to the design, and stick pushers have the same capability of giving an out of trim condition unless deactivated.

[RickNRoll]

er, nope, it doesn't do that. It may be semantics but the 2.5 degrees is not an attitude value, it is the shift of the trimmable horizontal stabiliser, THS by a maximum value of 2.5 degrees Aircraft Nose Down, AND, which is also stabiliser leading edge down, which will give whatever to the aircraft attitude, dependent on what the driver does on the control column. MCAS is an input for control force, it is not a pitch attitude adjusting system, of course left unchecked it apparently is good for about 40 degrees nose down...

It changes the feel by changing the pitch of the whole plane. Which is a weird way to change the feel of the control column. Change the attitude of the whole plane.

[fdr]

It changes the feel by changing the pitch of the whole plane. Which is a weird way to change the feel of the control column. Change the attitude of the whole plane.

Not really; recall that the system is functional only in manual flight, which is when the pilot is in the control loop. The pilots task is to fly the aircraft to an attitude that gives the performance that is desired. With normal, compliant control characteristics, static stability results in an aircraft that wants to revert to trim speed (AOA) and so if below the trim speed, it will want to pitch down, which is countered by a pull force from the pilot to obtain an off trim speed condition that the pilot desires. That is exactly the same situation that occurs with MCAS, ll it is doing is exacerbating the off trim speed margin so that the desired force profile is achieved. With the information on the area of 203(a) that also indicates that the tendency for a reduction in stick force approaching an accelerated stall is offset by the nose down trim. If the pilot wants to fly at that AOA, he can, the force will be appropriate for a naturally compliant system. Arguably it is also similar in outcome to a stick pusher, except that it has input to the trim over time, not a direct and prompt push on the elevator. Stick pushers are pretty savage in their response compared to the initial triggering response of MCAS.

[Bergerie1]

fdr is right.

[DaveReidUK]

fdr is right.

Apart from the

Aircraft Nose Down, AND, which is also stabiliser leading edge down

bit.

[fdr]

Apart from the



bit.

oops, my mistake, long day, that is so, AND is stab LE up. Going back to sleep.

[Clandestino]

Simulators are indeed few and far between, but on the other hand there are +400 frames standing idle on the ground, why not bring them to use? Sure, it costs a hell of a lot more than using a sim, but, using them will reduce the time needed to get all crews trained.

So, how about we have Boeing trainers train the airline TRI/TREs in the real aircraft, and then have the TRI/TREs train the TCs in their grounded fleet, who in turn may train the line pilots, either in real aircraft or in simulators as available.

What a great idea! On top of everything, to assure the maximum chance of this unorthodox scheme's success, first batch of the program's pilots should be volunteers with unwavering faith in Boeing. I suggest using PPRuNe posts professing belief that there's nothing much wrong with the MAX, just with the pilots, as an initial method of fishing out such distinguished airmen.

Hmm, after the outcome of two out of three MCAS failures it might not be a wise thing to train that very problem in the real aircraft.
Depending on who you send up first.

You would have been flying empty aircraft !Not necessarily, there are plenty of non-pilot types around PPRuNe threads dealing with B-MAX, professing their belief in Boeing's finest narrowbody. We could send 'em up as safety observers.

Lets hope the we do not have to fish a Max out of the Mediterranean the next few years.I do not think that MAX will have to be fished out of anything in the next few years but I would really like to know if there's any significant difference between fishing the aeroplane out of the Mediterranean and the Java Sea?

Many years ago I was posted to an RAF squadron as a replacement pilot for one killed in the Valiant crash believed to have been caused by a runaway stab. The aircraft were not modified BUT we all went into the sim to practice the recovery procedure as it was found that full elevator could just overcome the stab. Deflection. Boeing please note.
I guess that you're familiar with 737 preMAX FCTM claim that it can be flown and landed with stabilizer in any position.

Well, "flown" part probably requires further qualification. Excessive Vee squared might get in a way at the extremes of the stabilizer deflection.

Interweb posting boards are full of superpilots who faced with simultaneous continual trim, stickshaker and airspeed discrepancy would have cut the trim switches and reduced speed. Thank FSM for the proliferation of good quality training and flying folks who are not inhibited by modesty to admit they 'ave received one.

Reading through these posts has been painful for this MAX qualified pilot but since this is a public board, and many non-fliers are making comments and contributions that defy reason and logic, that are coming from an emotional basis, and one not based upon any experience or knowledge, I should not be surprised.Dude, as a MAX qualified pilot (hey, up to grounding, as an 738 capt, I was lawfully required just to have a look at a couple of PPTs in order to act as a fully qualified commander on revenue MAX flight, no previous sim or line instruction needed) I deeply sympathize with your plight. However, as someone acquainted with the works of McRaney, Milgram, Fromm, Reich, Arendt et. al. I'm not in the very least surprised by the brand loyalty displayed on the MAX topics. Since it's only anonymous bulletin board affecting almost nothing, I don't find it disturbing, just mildly amusing.
How do today's airline pilots compare with those of 1980?Severe statistical improvement of civil transport aviation safety in last couple of decades is not only due to improvement of today's airline pilots performance but it would definitively have been impossible without one.
If there has been a downward trend in competence in non-normal situations, has Boeing tailored its design philosophy to suit?Such a trend has not been widely observed outside fear-mongering (mostly anonymous) rants.
How reasonable is it to expect Boeing to be able to make such an adjustment?I'd estimate reasonableness of such an expectation to be poor to nil.
If authorities require heavier stick feel close to the stall for certification why not modify the feel system instead of violently interfering with the steering and using the trim to brute force the nose down?My totally unqualified guess would be because it was cheaper this way.

I have been surprised by the lack of comment from those who actually fly the Max but presumed they were keeping their heads down.
I find the lack of recent flying experience on MAXes extremely unsurprising.

Adding a stick pusher would have been a notable change to the design, and stick pushers have the same capability of giving an out of trim condition unless deactivated.
No!

They do not have anything to do with the trim! They act on elevators!

David Petit Davies' deathless tract is still very much relevant 52 years after the first publication and 48 years after the last revision... and still quite misunderstood. Pages 130 onward apply. It is pretty clear that any stick pusher has to be designed so it can be manually overridden if it is activated unduly. Colgan 3407 is a case in point; pusher activation was really needed, yet the panicked pilot kept pulling ,overriding pusher, and stalled the aeroplane. Data from the catastrophes of PK-LPQ and ET-AVJ are still sketchy, but what little has leaked strongly suggests inability to stop pitch down with control column alone.

[RickNRoll]

My totally unqualified guess would be because it was cheaper this way.


MCAS is an extension of the existing STS. Very cheap to implement.

[johnnycakes]

Air Canada CEO Calin Rovinsecu quoted in Toronto Globe and Mail yesterday: "Mr. Rovinescu said it could take several weeks to fully deploy the 737 Max once it is cleared by regulators. But because Air Canada is the only airline in Canada or the United States with a 737 Max simulator (it has two in Toronto), its pilots are “modelling some of the scenarios that occurred in the two accidents. So that has given us a leg up in terms of the readiness for the pilots to go back into flying these aircraft.”

Hmmm. 400+ AC MAX pilots. MAX grounded since March 19. 2 sims. A lot of learning.....

[infrequentflyer789]

MCAS is an extension of the existing STS. Very cheap to implement.

Not only that, it already existed (albeit for slightly different design purpose) on the KC-46. All they had to do was rip it off there, remove the redundant AOA inputs and make it just work off one (can't have it depend on two on 737 because then FAA will mandate Sim training) and also remove the aft column cutout switch so it will still trim down even when the pilot is pulling up. Then when flight tests show your aero modelling was deficient, make it four times more powerful to compensate.

Job done, plane certified. Cease panic. Aaaaannnnd breathe. Now quietly collect bonus and run before the s:mad:t starts throwing itself out of the sky...

[Sultan Ismail]

Boeing Stock is down $9.62, that's 2.6%, in first 2 hours of trading.
This bird is not going to fly for a very long time.

[Andy_S]

Boeing Stock is down $9.62, that's 2.6%, in first 2 hours of trading.
This bird is not going to fly for a very long time.

The markets are down generally and 2.6% isn't excessive.

More to do with US / China trade tensions than anything else:

Stocks on Wall Street have continued to lose ground on Tuesday, and European markets - which were already lower - have fallen further since US trading began. (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/business-48149045)

[Smythe]

Interesting, Air Canada said they have 420 pilots idle due to the MAX grounding. The have 24 MAX.

[Australopithecus]

They were supposed to have 36 by the end of this year with more to come. So it seems they were front-running their training requirements with that many pilots. It typically takes around ten pilots per plane plus trainers and fleet management adding to the numbers. Air Canada doesn’t operate NGs so I guess Boeing will be paying some legacy pilot salaries for awhile.

[boaclhryul]

The Globe & Mail news article also said:

<<Calin Rovinescu, Air Canada’s [CEO], said the company has about 425 Max pilots who are spending their days training on a 737 Max simulator, but not flying customers. Some pilots who flew other planes in the past year – narrow-body Airbus or the Embraer 190 – will return to flying those models, [he] said.>> and <<because Air Canada is the only airline in Canada or the United States with a 737 Max simulator (it has two in Toronto), its pilots are “modelling some of the scenarios that occurred in the two accidents. So that has given us a leg up in terms of the readiness for the pilots to go back into flying these aircraft.”>>

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-air-canada-says-it-will-reassign-max-pilots-as-grounding-of-boeing/

[KRUSTY 34]

The Globe & Mail news article also said:

<<Calin Rovinescu, Air Canada’s [CEO], said the company has about 425 Max pilots who are spending their days training on a 737 Max simulator, but not flying customers. Some pilots who flew other planes in the past year – narrow-body Airbus or the Embraer 190 – will return to flying those models, [he] said.>> and <<because Air Canada is the only airline in Canada or the United States with a 737 Max simulator (it has two in Toronto), its pilots are “modelling some of the scenarios that occurred in the two accidents. So that has given us a leg up in terms of the readiness for the pilots to go back into flying these aircraft.”>>

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-air-canada-says-it-will-reassign-max-pilots-as-grounding-of-boeing/

Bravo on the timely housekeeping.

Unless of course it’s akin to making beds in a burning house!

[atpcliff]

This is a good article on Boeing certification problems:

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/engineers-say-boeing-pushed-to-limit-safety-testing-in-race-to-certify-planes-including-737-max/

Fly SAFE!

God Bless, and Namaste...

[737 Driver]

Another take on Boeing's culture problem....

RichardAboulafia.com (http://www.richardaboulafia.com/shownote.asp?id=610)

Dear Fellow Company Anthropologists,

To my deep regret, my only personal contact with Herb Kelleher, the great founder of Southwest Airlines who died in January, was, predictably, over a drink in a bar. As for any aviation fan, that moment made my list of career highlights, and indeed life highlights. Not only was he a remarkable character who helped reinvent the industry, he also provided what may be the best management quote ever: “Your employees come first. And if you treat your employees right, guess what? Your customers come back, and that makes your shareholders happy. Start with employees and the rest follows from that.” This was not only a humane vision of the world; it was also a great maxim for long-term company success.

Boeing really needs to learn from Herb. That’s the big lesson I can provide after 30+ years of following the company, and after spending the past months, like everyone else in the industry, studying the two 737MAX8 disasters and the subsequent groundings. The likeliest explanation for the design mis-steps that contributed to (but were not solely responsible for) these two crashes relates to company culture, and how Boeing values its employees, particularly engineers.

First, a few words in support of the 737MAX, against the mass of misinformation out there. This was the right product to launch. Boeing was not being greedy, desperate, or short-sighted; rather, there was no business case for a clean-sheet design. I advocated for it at the time, as did many others (see my July 2011 letter). And it was not a rushed job; six years is a lavish amount of time to allow for a derivative jetliner. The result is a good jet, but one with a problem. As Bank of America/Merrill Lynch analyst Ron Epstein told me, “It’s not a flawed product. It’s a good product with a flaw inserted inside it.”

But about that flaw. There were many causes of the two crashes, but MCAS connects them. And under examination, the design and integration of the MCAS looks shoddy. There are valid questions about the training requirements associated with its introduction, too. One upside: fixing the MAX isn’t a major technical challenge. The mistakes are too obvious to not be easily fixable.

As Epstein asked on Boeing’s earnings call this month, “How did this happen?” First, it wasn’t about money.There is no significant economic difference between doing MAX with a perfectly fine stall avoidance system and doing it with MCAS. The R&D budget for MAX was quite adequate. And it wasn’t about time – again, they gave it six years, so there’s no evidence at all that this was rushed.

That really just leaves one possibility: company culture. And there’s a lot to go on here. Like others, I’ve been writing about the rift at Boeing between engineering and management for decades (see my June 2002 letter). But during the key years of MAX development, things got toxic. If you want to keep reading, see my September 2014 and January 2013 letters. But to summarize, company management made a concerted effort to cut labor costs and to destroy labor’s bargaining power. Pensions were eliminated, and benefits cut.

Machinists were the primary target of the contract re-negotiations, which helps explain the recent spate of stories about production line issues on the 787 and KC-46, and the associated whistleblower allegations. But engineers were hit too. More importantly, the engineers were also marginalized, from a management perspective. The BCA president who launched the MAX left the company, and his replacement, in charge of the development phase, did not have an engineering degree. Neither did the company CEO, so you had an aerospace engineering company led completely by non-engineers. That company CEO, Jim McNerney, also bragged about his ability to make employees cower. Somehow, the two found a way to get through the 787 battery crisis by relying on the hard work of others, and perhaps not fully understanding what those others needed to do.

The big question: Was this dynamic a key factor behind the mistakes that led to MCAS? If so, how did that play out? First, in the absence of any other likely causes behind the MCAS debacle, this might be the right place to look. Second, it might have been an issue of empowerment and communications. This alignment of non-engineers, particularly when the CEO had a notoriously imperial style, could not have been good from the standpoint of correctly allocating resources, and most of all, listening to any concerns by engineers. Delivering bad news was generally regarded as a very bad career move, which explains why the CEO wasn’t told that the Dreamliner rolled out on 7-8-07 wouldn’t be ready to fly for another year.

In the backdrop of those labor problems Boeing enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, and was creating a seemingly unstoppable financial juggernaut, purely for the benefit of investors. In 2012, 19% of operating cash flow was given out in the form of shareholder dividends and buybacks. By 2015, the last year of McNerney’s reign as CEO, this had risen to 99%, or $9.3 billion in dividends and buybacks. McNerney’s salary skyrocketed, hitting $29 million in 2014.

The percentage of cash flow given to investors has since gone down, but the absolute amount has risen (2018 saw 84% returned, but a record amount of $12.6 billion). If there was a race to give away cash in the jetliner business, Boeing certainly won. Per Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, “Boeing has materially outperformed Airbus on capital return over the last 15 years, returning $78bn of capital to shareholders, vs. Airbus returning €11bn through dividends and buybacks.”

This juxtaposition of disgruntled labor and record shareholder rewards was basically a recipe for a rift between management and the people responsible to creating aircraft. And it was a perfect reversal of Kelleher’s maxim. Share price was obsessed over. Customers came second. Company assets, such as people, became a commodity, something to be measured against returns.

Has Boeing changed since those awful years of toxicity, the very years of MAX development? Can it continue to recover from those bad old days? Thankfully, both the head of BCA and Boeing now have engineering degrees, and there does seem to be a better approach to labor. People I speak with at Boeing seem a lot less angry than they did then (although there’s still plenty of anger out there). On the other hand, this month, CEO Dennis Muilenburg asked the board “to establish a committee to review our company-wide policies and processes for the design and development of the airplanes we build,” and somehow, as Ron Epstein noted, they created a committee without a single engineer.

And there’s also this conundrum: Management is addicted to growing the company’s share price, and investors are hooked. In February 2016 the was at a five year low of $109. Just before the second crash, it peaked at $446, and has stayed in the $375-380 range. So, as long as the share price stays reasonably high, there’s not much reason to think anything will change. And Boeing will be fine. Until the next crisis.

Yours, ‘Til President Trump Demands That Boeing Rename Itself,

Richard Aboulafia

​​​​​​Richard Aboulafia is Vice President, Analysis at Teal Group (http://www.tealgroup.com/). He manages consulting projects for clients in the commercial and military aircraft field, and has advised numerous aerospace companies. He also writes and edits Teal's World Military and Civil Aircraft Briefing, a forecasting tool covering over 135 aircraft programs and markets.

[safetypee]

The other threads have been closed due to lack of information, but perhaps this is the critical point in getting the 737 Max back in service.
There still is no clarity as to what exactly contributed to the incorrect value of AoA. There has been speculation about vane hardware, broken vane, signal conversion, and digital glitches, but none have been shown to be consistent with interpretations of the FDR across both accidents - even if they need to be.

If the problem is with the vane, then how might this effect other aircraft - in service inspections; conversely without problems, the vane manufacturer could publicly declare that it is not a contributing factor (but in either way they might be respecting the confidentiality of the investigation).
How many vane units have been found, in what condition.

The difficulty with electrics or software is that they rarely leave ‘witness marks’. If electrical shorting due to damaged cables, then no fleet-wide inspections so far. Why left side only.
Would software issues be just chance, random; at face value an unbelievable coincidence. (Yet I still buy my lottery ticket).

How can the regulators accept that a modified system provides sufficient defence against a further event if the ‘root’ of the problem is not know / not repeatable. Perhaps the regulatory process will also revert to probability.

If the two investigations are suffering similar difficulties, then the return to service date might depend on publication of the investigation findings.
But what if the findings are inconclusive, or differ. (Worth the price of a lottery ticket)

[Smythe]

damn, that is quite the explanation from Aboulafia..

On the other hand, this month, CEO Dennis Muilenburg asked the board “to establish a committee to review our company-wide policies and processes for the design and development of the airplanes we build,” and somehow, as Ron Epstein noted, they created a committee without a single engineer.

Lesson NOT learned...

[sixchannel]

damn, that is quite the explanation from Aboulafia..

On the other hand, this month, CEO Dennis Muilenburg asked the board “to establish a committee to review our company-wide policies and processes for the design and development of the airplanes we build,” and somehow, as Ron Epstein noted, they created a committee without a single engineer.

Lesson NOT learned...

​​​​​​Until said 'Committee' comes up with something that puts Safety and Customers joint first, AFAICS it's a 'show me the money' smoke screen

[Clandestino]

​​ fixing the MAX isn’t a major technical challenge.
Of course it is is not. All that is needed is the political will to change the temporary fix into permanent.

[infrequentflyer789]

The other threads have been closed due to lack of information, but perhaps this is the critical point in getting the 737 Max back in service.
There still is no clarity as to what exactly contributed to the incorrect value of AoA.


I'm not sure it matters - AOA vanes fail and I haven't seen, yet, any figures to indicate Max vanes (or AOA systems inc adiru) are failing at higher rate than expected. It would be interesting to check if they are and if there is a common cause, and hopefully the investigations will, but I'm not sure it's part of any fix.

I do recall finding a document (from Boeing?) which implied that left AOA vane on Max is notably closer to the air bridge (and therefore maybe more vulnerable) - that may be enough to account for the left-side bias.

If ET AOA had also failed like Lion - to +20 degrees but tracking right side, then I'd say (not that my opinion is worth anything) a wiring investigation and fleet inspection would be warranted, but it didn't. It looks like a different failure mode and I would agree with others that the vane likely departed the aircraft in the ET case. If it was me, I might just want to look in more detail at the Sunwing Max where adiru (left, again) was replaced following AOA issues - since that plane is still in one piece.

But in the end I still come back to the first point - AOA vane failures happen (I've seen mtbfs of <100k flight hours quoted) and even if only (say) one in ten failures result in errant MCAS (probably generous) and if 99% of crews are well trained enough to cope with errant MCAS (probably very generous), the resulting crash rate is still too high. The rate at which AOA vane failure leads to uncommanded AND trim needs to be drastically reduced - fix (or remove) MCAS.

[infrequentflyer789]

Another take on Boeing's culture problem....

RichardAboulafia.com (http://www.richardaboulafia.com/shownote.asp?id=610)



Could pick some big holes in that (not least the "stall avoidance" description) but overall it sounds about right.

It neatly dovetails with some of Dennis Tajer's words that struck me in the 60 minutes video ( youtube.com/watch?v=QytfYyHmxtc about 16:30):

...a very strong signal to us that somewhere in there the philosophy had been tainted, poisoned...

and also the certification change covered in Seattle Times from DERs reporting to FAA to ARs reporting to Boeing management who then (after filtering - I've never known a manager who doesn't) report to FAA.

The whole system failed from regulator downwards - and yes, probably pilots/training as well as you have previously stated. Your comment on stab trim runaway not being trained as it wasn't "statistically significant" also strikes me as relevant here, not because that is a bad thing per se, but because from an engineering point of view Boeing drastically (and entirely predictably) changed the probability of stab trim runaway from NG to Max and the system (i.e. Boeing, FAA, operators etc.) did not propagate that information down to those who were basing training programs on a completely different event probability. Boeing, and indeed the industry as a whole, has a lot more work to do to fix this than just a bandaid on MCAS (or indeed a steel box round a battery - which issue shows that this is a continuing systemic problem not a one off).

[Cows getting bigger]

There speaks a voice of reason. This really is Safety Management 101.

[Sinusoid]

There speaks a voice of reason. This really is Safety Management 101.

Not unlike the 737 rudder PCU problems in the 90’s, this will be a case studied in engineering schools when teaching FTA/FMEA/Functional Safety etc. One could make the argument USAir 427 and UA 585 crashed due to pilot error in response to a failure - pilots responded to uncommanded rudder deflection due to PCU jam by pulling the control column aft, increasing AoA, consequently increasing roll due to dihedral and decreasing roll authority of the ailerons to a point which recovery was impossible.

At least in this situation with the MAX, the FDR recorded the essential parameters required for investigators to perform their duties.

[GordonR_Cape]

Could pick some big holes in that (not least the "stall avoidance" description) but overall it sounds about right.

It neatly dovetails with some of Dennis Tajer's words that struck me in the 60 minutes video ( youtube.com/watch?v=QytfYyHmxtc about 16:30):

...a very strong signal to us that somewhere in there the philosophy had been tainted, poisoned...

and also the certification change covered in Seattle Times from DERs reporting to FAA to ARs reporting to Boeing management who then (after filtering - I've never known a manager who doesn't) report to FAA.

The whole system failed from regulator downwards - and yes, probably pilots/training as well as you have previously stated. Your comment on stab trim runaway not being trained as it wasn't "statistically significant" also strikes me as relevant here, not because that is a bad thing per se, but because from an engineering point of view Boeing drastically (and entirely predictably) changed the probability of stab trim runaway from NG to Max and the system (i.e. Boeing, FAA, operators etc.) did not propagate that information down to those who were basing training programs on a completely different event probability. Boeing, and indeed the industry as a whole, has a lot more work to do to fix this than just a bandaid on MCAS (or indeed a steel box round a battery - which issue shows that this is a continuing systemic problem not a one off).

I agree, the interview with Dennis Tajer (APA union) was the most interesting part of that video. There are text excerpts available: https://www.9news.com.au/national/60-minutes-inside-boeings-disaster-737-max-aircrafts/f5875c13-57d6-4957-8bf6-a0c47ddfe293
American Airlines veteran pilot Dennis Tajer told Hayes, “I called our safety experts and said, ‘Where is this in a book?" And they said, ‘It's not’.”

Tajer said the admission from Boeing felt like “betrayal”.

“This is an unforgiving profession that counts very heavily on the pilot's knowledge, background, and training, and there are lives depending on that.”

I can visualise a process something like this. A meeting between a manager, an engineer, and a pilot:
Manager: So if this new system fails, the pilots can handle it?
Engineer: Yes, there are procedures for that.
Manager: Pilots are trained to handle runaway trim?
Pilot: Er, yes. But it doesn't happen very often.
Manager: So, I don't see any problem...

Safety and training people: Not invited to meeting...

[sixchannel]

Safety and training people: Not invited to meeting...
Goodness me, NO! Why would you invite anyone who might blow the whistle?

[oggers]

"We've coined a term that has become a very important focus for us: right at first flight," said Keith Leverkuhn, Vice President and General Manager for the 737 MAX program. "It means making sure that by the time we put the airplane in the air for the first time on our flight test that we know how these systems are going to act and that they are mature enough. If it weren't for certification requirements, the systems would be ready to enter our customers' fleets."

Keith Leverkuhn. Massive Fail.

[Smythe]

Do not underestimate Aboulafia's words nor influence.

In regards to regulations, regulatory requirements, or certifications; those are the bare minimum to which the aircraft is unsafe to fly. Anything less, and the aircraft is unsafe.

Regulators are forbidden by law to dictate design changes to meet certification. That is called design by review and is illegal.

It is up to the manufacturer to show that the aircraft meets the MINIMUM requirements to be safe to fly.

In issuing the cert, regulators show that what the manufacturer submits, either meets or exceeds the minimum requirements, nothing more, nothing less.

Case in point: The 737 MAX REQUIRED MCAS to meet MINUMUM requirements to be safe to fly. Without MCAS the ac is NOT SAFE to fly.

[Dee Vee]

things are heating up...

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/who-is-looking-into-the-boeing-737-max

• The Department of Justice’s Fraud Section has opened a criminal investigation into the development and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX by the Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing. The Department of Transportation’s Inspector General and the FBI are participating in the investigation (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/fbi-joining-criminal-investigation-into-certification-of-boeing-737-max/). Federal attorneys are gathering evidence through a federal grand jury (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/grand-jury-subpoena-shows-sweep-of-criminal-probe-into-boeings-737-max-certification/) seated in Washington, D.C. Grand jury proceedings are conducted in secret and the Justice Department has declined to comment on the investigation. The FAA and Boeing have also declined to comment.

• The Transportation Department’s Inspector General is conducting a separate administrative audit (https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot1419) into the certification of the MAX. At a Senate subcommittee hearing in March, Inspector General Calvin L. Scovel III said such audits generally take about seven months, but could take longer given the complexity of the issue.

[Bend alot]

That one will hurt!

Anyone at the FAA going to sign off on the MCAS "fix" by Boeing with all this heat around?

Unless a escape goat is nominated, any person putting their name to paper with all these open investigations is taking a career deciding decision on the outcome of some very serious investigations.

If it fell on my desk for "approval" I would need an urgent vacation or sick leave or some sort of very long leave, until a few investigations had passed judgement.

I wounder when or if Boeing will put forward the "fix" to the FAA. If they do it now and FAA do not play ball and refuse it - that is very bad for Boeing. But if these investigations take a while and are not favourable, it is still bad for Boeing.

How much storage area at Renton?

[ATC Watcher]

The Transportation Department’s Inspector General is conducting a separate administrative audit (https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot1419) into the certification of the MAX. At a Senate subcommittee hearing in March, Inspector General Calvin L. Scovel III said such audits generally take about seven months, but could take longer given the complexity of the issue.
7 months ? we are then in 2020.
any person putting their name to paper with all these open investigations is taking a career deciding decision
Agree. Do not know in the FAA but knowing a bit how EASA works I can see nobody signing certification papers on the Max until all the currents reports from the various groups looking at it have published their conclusions. That probably includes this one.

[sixchannel]

Meanwhile back at the Boeing factory, does production of the MAX in current config continue and at what production rate?

[Bend alot]

Meanwhile back at the Boeing factory, does production of the MAX in current config continue and at what production rate?
I have not heard of any other production rate cuts since the one a few weeks ago.

Again the double edge sword, cut production more or altogether or do a mechanical modification to the airframe?

With so little of the 5,000 orders delivered, this is a very hard decision to make.

Personally I do not think a software patch can cover the requirements, based on information given to-date (much of that reluctantly).

[krismiler]

If the MAX is permanently grounded Boeing could revert back to producing the B737-800 series and selling them at a deep discount, possibly just over the cost of production, while they work flat out on a new narrowbody replacement to compete with Airbus. This would keep the factory going, the employees paid and the customers reasonably happy. Any airline agreeing to take a 800 instead of a previously ordered MAX could receive guarantees regarding price and delivery date when the replacement becomes available.

Taking a less efficient aircraft at a very low price and operating it for a few years, then replacing it with a brand new design which would likely offer a slight improvement over the A320 NEO could work out for some airlines.

[Less Hair]

It would take years to change back the Renton pipeline from MAX to NG. Boeing cannot afford to wait that long. So that sounds very unlikely to happen.

[Rated De]

It would take years to change back the Renton pipeline from MAX to NG. Boeing cannot afford to wait that long. So that sounds very unlikely to happen.

Yes, interestingly, analysts have been loathe to point out the different tooling necessary and the lag it generates.
Presently, the forecasts 'assume' production will simply ramp back up the instant after the aircraft is given its wings again by the FAA.

Lots of building short side risk for Boeing.