glofish
1st Apr 2019, 04:38
After more than 42 years in commercial aviation and slowly leaving the building, I allow myself having a bone to pick with it.
To start my case I present a sarcastic resume of the latest events:
The newest marvel presented by company X is so much more powerful, that they deemed the pilots no longer capable of safely operating it without the help of new automated protections. All this is self-certfied by delegation of the friendly regulator and through grandfather rights achieved by the model’s 50 year old predecessor. The pilots will still be highly trained onto the new model by distant on-line learning modules of 59 minutes, where the above engineering achievement does not even find mention, because going into its detail would overstretch the pilots capabilities. Furthermore hands-on training in simulators is deemed futile due to the claimed vast redundancies built in. If however the extremely remote situation should arise and such automation should malfunction and pose a threat to safety, then it is up to those pilots to instantly recognise the threat and switch off the malfunctioning system.
I guess anyone realises the perversion in this statement.
Now this gets to my bone to pick:
1. Manufacturers
Manufacturers are on one hand under constant pressure from competitors and accuse each other regularly of unfair subsidies. On the other hand they are often of essential local/national economical interest. The same applies for many airlines. This led to a very cosy collaboration between manufacturer, regulator and airline. Delegation for self-supervision of training (airlines) and certification (manufacturer) are quite common. The same applies to re-certification of enhanced models based on so called ‘grandfather rights’. Any concern criticising this cosiness or these procedures are dismissed referring to the stringent ‘safety first’ mantras and professionalism of all involved, but even more with the argument of finance, stating that the regular path would increase cost beyond feasibility (meaning the competition), by that ironically devaluating the former mantra!
2. Innovation
Innovation can be a blessing. Take TCAS or GPWS that really enhanced safety with almost no side effects. Other innovations were welcomed as well, but some went in the wrong direction or went a tad too far. This can be said of many other innovations on earth and is inherent of the progress learning curve. Some outfall might be socially acceptable i.e. in high end research or the military field with both its high risk character. It is however not acceptable when adapted into public normal life as in commercial aviation. The reason I bring this up is, that there is a high reluctance to correct any appearing design weakness. Mainly due to the cost of re-design and re-training of personnel, but just as much due to the high cost of re-certification, a little bit of engineers pride and let’s not forget the omnipresent fear of litigation. Manufacturers boast their product to distinguish it from the competition, so there is no incentive at all to lose face, money or market share. The only consequences are either a software patch or a bulletin to operators to take extra precaution and to do this and that by heart in case of a malfunction. The root of the glitch however will rarely be attacked. A classic example is the side-stick design by Airbus. A welcome import from military aviation, some accident analysis showed that a no-input-duplication design in a 2-man cockpit could be detrimental to situational awareness (AF447). The refusal to correct this was argued with that it would cost too much and add a penalising weight increase, although you can buy a 300 gram rumble-stick at any game store fulfilling this function for 29$. Boeing has its case with the speed-brake design on the 757(Cali) grandfathered to the 777. Their refusal to change is based on the fear of huge litigation processes. So in both cases the manufacturer just shoves the mis-design down the food-chain (and years) to the pilots who have to remember in very startled and tense moments what to do to counteract a design weakness that could have been altered.
3. Pilot training
Training pilots for airlines has changed considerably the last 60 years. It started with mainly ex Air Force trained guys that needed some CRM but certainly no upset training. They were joined by the guys and gals working their way and hours up postal/bush/taxi flying with underpowered single and twins, then via weak regional props up to the main carriers, having acquired a good amount of experience in difficult conditions to be converted to very capable airline captains. Today there are more and more MPL/ab initio pilots going through ever shorter crash courses from zero to hero onto big twin aisle airliners, especially where there is national pride to propel young locals into cockpits of prestige born carriers in certain regions. Not to mention the fake hours pilots weaselling their way in. Not one of the latter has ever recovered from a spin, flown an Immelmann or wrestled a choking 207 over a mountain range with howling downdrafts at night . A German saying goes what Little Johnny does not learn, Big John will never learn. That is where some latest accident reports point at. As a consequence we see the incorporation of manual handling and upset recovery simulator sessions at almost all serious airlines. It is however a futile fig leaf to cover up the blatant lack of basic skills of most new applicants that can hardly be trained at later stage. If taken seriously it would imply a much more comprehensive syllabus and not only in simulators. But again, that would be too expensive, so everyone works with the bandaid only and continues to pretend it’s a fixing surgery.
4. Automation
Automation is meant to help and alleviate pilots. A lot of it does well, just think of the autopilot. Unfortunately its development has shown a tendency to push the pilot into the monitoring role. A role that many studies show does not suit humans best and would be the typical better role for automation. My first airliner, the DC-9 had a wonderful annunciator called the bowtie. The were 4 big arrows on a display, pointing outwards at 30°/120°/210°/280°. They could light up red and green. When performing a CatII approach, once the system was armed, it showed 4 greens meaning both pilots could continue automated to landing or go around. If there was any malfunction, one, two or three arrows went red indicating with the green one left who could still land or go around. Easy! Now take todays CatIIIb approaches. Below minimum the FO has to monitor and check the FMA if the system goes into align, flare and retard mode. If not, he has to call no-align etc. This typical if = then ; if not = then other situation is a classic binary computer function. This should rather be executed by the system, as in the bowtie example. It should not be the pilots having to wait for 35ft, analyse by reading the FMA if the system performed ok or not and what to say if not. Leave either partner to his particular talent: Automation to monitoring and warning, pilots to executing accordingly.
5. Protections
A newer part of automation are the so called protections. They are basically welcome, but have partly gone the wrong way as well. The word protections contains the danger already. Who is protected from whom? It seems as the industry strives to protect the aircraft and its content from the pilot rather than protect it from unsafe flight. The pending MCAS disaster is the best example. Not being fully able to shut off a malfunctioning protection is a perversion of safety and protection. I have repeatedly demanded a “red button” that allows the pilot to cut off all protections/automation and give him full authority onto flight controls, be that cables, hydraulic or electric actuators, and the full range of the envelope. If an aircraft would no longer be able to be flown manually and stable that way at any stage, it would need to be re-designed.
What do I expect by publishing this my bone? Not much to be honest. But if someone would ask me anyway, here’s my answer:
From the regulators I would expect a more distant and more precise oversight, going back to what the legislator mandated them in the first place. Higher price should not hold up as an excuse for shortcuts and self regulation by the industry. It didn’t work in finance, it seems not to work in aviation. And let’s recite that if you think it’s too expensive, try accidents! I hope the FAA and Boeing will be taught a hefty lesson with the MACS drama. As for places where regulator, legislator and airline owner are basically the same body, having both main manufacturers in still quite democratic places, there should remain some leverage to counter these dictatorial complacencies. Just think overflight rights. I also wish that the complex ‘grandfather rights’ in certification would see some limits. A 50 year old design still fathering rights for a new model stretches it too far. The thrust level and shifted pane of the MAX with its tricky consequences should be a huge warning sign that it went too far. A new certification would never allow an inadequate patch like the MCAS to pass. The same tightening I would like to see in training syllabi. They need more depth and oversight from the regulating authorities.
From manufacturers I expect a more evidence based correction of some detected flaws of design. Price should not hold as an excuse, see above. They however need assistance from the politicians, the legislators. It is high time that they should establish a decree that if there are clear findings by approved safety boards that a change of a system would increase air safety considerably, it should be a) mandated to be incorporated and b) mandated that no litigation invoking such incorporation can hold up as admittance of guilt by the manufacturer or new evidence for an accident. This might sound harsh, but the gain in safety for millions of users could outweigh such a precedent. The manufacturer would pay a hefty price in re-designing anyway, but for users this money is better spent there than on tons of lawyers and courts.
From the airlines I do not expect much. They are businesses after all, run mainly by beancounters and marketing gurus, or rich entities who don’t care about profit, only prestige. Both hide behind the debased statement “we fulfil all requirements and regulations” and the even more thumbed down “we put safety first”. They could simply try to fulfil a fraction of what they pretend on their colourful commercial posters and videos, especially concerning training and real experience of their pilots.
From IATA I would wish they’d establish a mandatory global record of stick-time for all their members. Starting from 2-man cockpit commercial twins every hour has to be logged there with tail number etc. That would allow unbiased verification after incidents or contested assessments, to avoid the 1500 hours wonder-pilots who can’t even fly a visual circuit without FD and FMC. With the actual IT capabilities this should very doable, affordable and it would protect the entire industry.
From customers, what to expect? They all want the safest, most luxurious and at the same time the cheapest product. Naively they pretend that the regulator is certainly overseeing the industry very diligently and the pilots would obviously refuse flying if their training and working conditions would not absolutely meet the required standards. Keep on dreaming … and keep on buying RyanAir flights to Malaga for 19£. Such seat-mile cost not only mocks the slimmest environmental conscience and their math skills, but also leads the very own customer safety expectation ad absurdum.
From us pilots ….. what to expect! It is difficult to act when you are at the bottom of the food chain and when your career is set up like an individual sport. No one else really cares and your voice is not heard. Just look after yourself , your provident fund and try keeping your dignity. This will lead you for your best.
I know many will now gleefully dissect my arguments like sleazy Vegas lawyers. I don’t mind, they are certainly not scientifically underlaid, but I guess you all get the drift.
Safe flights, glofish.
To start my case I present a sarcastic resume of the latest events:
The newest marvel presented by company X is so much more powerful, that they deemed the pilots no longer capable of safely operating it without the help of new automated protections. All this is self-certfied by delegation of the friendly regulator and through grandfather rights achieved by the model’s 50 year old predecessor. The pilots will still be highly trained onto the new model by distant on-line learning modules of 59 minutes, where the above engineering achievement does not even find mention, because going into its detail would overstretch the pilots capabilities. Furthermore hands-on training in simulators is deemed futile due to the claimed vast redundancies built in. If however the extremely remote situation should arise and such automation should malfunction and pose a threat to safety, then it is up to those pilots to instantly recognise the threat and switch off the malfunctioning system.
I guess anyone realises the perversion in this statement.
Now this gets to my bone to pick:
1. Manufacturers
Manufacturers are on one hand under constant pressure from competitors and accuse each other regularly of unfair subsidies. On the other hand they are often of essential local/national economical interest. The same applies for many airlines. This led to a very cosy collaboration between manufacturer, regulator and airline. Delegation for self-supervision of training (airlines) and certification (manufacturer) are quite common. The same applies to re-certification of enhanced models based on so called ‘grandfather rights’. Any concern criticising this cosiness or these procedures are dismissed referring to the stringent ‘safety first’ mantras and professionalism of all involved, but even more with the argument of finance, stating that the regular path would increase cost beyond feasibility (meaning the competition), by that ironically devaluating the former mantra!
2. Innovation
Innovation can be a blessing. Take TCAS or GPWS that really enhanced safety with almost no side effects. Other innovations were welcomed as well, but some went in the wrong direction or went a tad too far. This can be said of many other innovations on earth and is inherent of the progress learning curve. Some outfall might be socially acceptable i.e. in high end research or the military field with both its high risk character. It is however not acceptable when adapted into public normal life as in commercial aviation. The reason I bring this up is, that there is a high reluctance to correct any appearing design weakness. Mainly due to the cost of re-design and re-training of personnel, but just as much due to the high cost of re-certification, a little bit of engineers pride and let’s not forget the omnipresent fear of litigation. Manufacturers boast their product to distinguish it from the competition, so there is no incentive at all to lose face, money or market share. The only consequences are either a software patch or a bulletin to operators to take extra precaution and to do this and that by heart in case of a malfunction. The root of the glitch however will rarely be attacked. A classic example is the side-stick design by Airbus. A welcome import from military aviation, some accident analysis showed that a no-input-duplication design in a 2-man cockpit could be detrimental to situational awareness (AF447). The refusal to correct this was argued with that it would cost too much and add a penalising weight increase, although you can buy a 300 gram rumble-stick at any game store fulfilling this function for 29$. Boeing has its case with the speed-brake design on the 757(Cali) grandfathered to the 777. Their refusal to change is based on the fear of huge litigation processes. So in both cases the manufacturer just shoves the mis-design down the food-chain (and years) to the pilots who have to remember in very startled and tense moments what to do to counteract a design weakness that could have been altered.
3. Pilot training
Training pilots for airlines has changed considerably the last 60 years. It started with mainly ex Air Force trained guys that needed some CRM but certainly no upset training. They were joined by the guys and gals working their way and hours up postal/bush/taxi flying with underpowered single and twins, then via weak regional props up to the main carriers, having acquired a good amount of experience in difficult conditions to be converted to very capable airline captains. Today there are more and more MPL/ab initio pilots going through ever shorter crash courses from zero to hero onto big twin aisle airliners, especially where there is national pride to propel young locals into cockpits of prestige born carriers in certain regions. Not to mention the fake hours pilots weaselling their way in. Not one of the latter has ever recovered from a spin, flown an Immelmann or wrestled a choking 207 over a mountain range with howling downdrafts at night . A German saying goes what Little Johnny does not learn, Big John will never learn. That is where some latest accident reports point at. As a consequence we see the incorporation of manual handling and upset recovery simulator sessions at almost all serious airlines. It is however a futile fig leaf to cover up the blatant lack of basic skills of most new applicants that can hardly be trained at later stage. If taken seriously it would imply a much more comprehensive syllabus and not only in simulators. But again, that would be too expensive, so everyone works with the bandaid only and continues to pretend it’s a fixing surgery.
4. Automation
Automation is meant to help and alleviate pilots. A lot of it does well, just think of the autopilot. Unfortunately its development has shown a tendency to push the pilot into the monitoring role. A role that many studies show does not suit humans best and would be the typical better role for automation. My first airliner, the DC-9 had a wonderful annunciator called the bowtie. The were 4 big arrows on a display, pointing outwards at 30°/120°/210°/280°. They could light up red and green. When performing a CatII approach, once the system was armed, it showed 4 greens meaning both pilots could continue automated to landing or go around. If there was any malfunction, one, two or three arrows went red indicating with the green one left who could still land or go around. Easy! Now take todays CatIIIb approaches. Below minimum the FO has to monitor and check the FMA if the system goes into align, flare and retard mode. If not, he has to call no-align etc. This typical if = then ; if not = then other situation is a classic binary computer function. This should rather be executed by the system, as in the bowtie example. It should not be the pilots having to wait for 35ft, analyse by reading the FMA if the system performed ok or not and what to say if not. Leave either partner to his particular talent: Automation to monitoring and warning, pilots to executing accordingly.
5. Protections
A newer part of automation are the so called protections. They are basically welcome, but have partly gone the wrong way as well. The word protections contains the danger already. Who is protected from whom? It seems as the industry strives to protect the aircraft and its content from the pilot rather than protect it from unsafe flight. The pending MCAS disaster is the best example. Not being fully able to shut off a malfunctioning protection is a perversion of safety and protection. I have repeatedly demanded a “red button” that allows the pilot to cut off all protections/automation and give him full authority onto flight controls, be that cables, hydraulic or electric actuators, and the full range of the envelope. If an aircraft would no longer be able to be flown manually and stable that way at any stage, it would need to be re-designed.
What do I expect by publishing this my bone? Not much to be honest. But if someone would ask me anyway, here’s my answer:
From the regulators I would expect a more distant and more precise oversight, going back to what the legislator mandated them in the first place. Higher price should not hold up as an excuse for shortcuts and self regulation by the industry. It didn’t work in finance, it seems not to work in aviation. And let’s recite that if you think it’s too expensive, try accidents! I hope the FAA and Boeing will be taught a hefty lesson with the MACS drama. As for places where regulator, legislator and airline owner are basically the same body, having both main manufacturers in still quite democratic places, there should remain some leverage to counter these dictatorial complacencies. Just think overflight rights. I also wish that the complex ‘grandfather rights’ in certification would see some limits. A 50 year old design still fathering rights for a new model stretches it too far. The thrust level and shifted pane of the MAX with its tricky consequences should be a huge warning sign that it went too far. A new certification would never allow an inadequate patch like the MCAS to pass. The same tightening I would like to see in training syllabi. They need more depth and oversight from the regulating authorities.
From manufacturers I expect a more evidence based correction of some detected flaws of design. Price should not hold as an excuse, see above. They however need assistance from the politicians, the legislators. It is high time that they should establish a decree that if there are clear findings by approved safety boards that a change of a system would increase air safety considerably, it should be a) mandated to be incorporated and b) mandated that no litigation invoking such incorporation can hold up as admittance of guilt by the manufacturer or new evidence for an accident. This might sound harsh, but the gain in safety for millions of users could outweigh such a precedent. The manufacturer would pay a hefty price in re-designing anyway, but for users this money is better spent there than on tons of lawyers and courts.
From the airlines I do not expect much. They are businesses after all, run mainly by beancounters and marketing gurus, or rich entities who don’t care about profit, only prestige. Both hide behind the debased statement “we fulfil all requirements and regulations” and the even more thumbed down “we put safety first”. They could simply try to fulfil a fraction of what they pretend on their colourful commercial posters and videos, especially concerning training and real experience of their pilots.
From IATA I would wish they’d establish a mandatory global record of stick-time for all their members. Starting from 2-man cockpit commercial twins every hour has to be logged there with tail number etc. That would allow unbiased verification after incidents or contested assessments, to avoid the 1500 hours wonder-pilots who can’t even fly a visual circuit without FD and FMC. With the actual IT capabilities this should very doable, affordable and it would protect the entire industry.
From customers, what to expect? They all want the safest, most luxurious and at the same time the cheapest product. Naively they pretend that the regulator is certainly overseeing the industry very diligently and the pilots would obviously refuse flying if their training and working conditions would not absolutely meet the required standards. Keep on dreaming … and keep on buying RyanAir flights to Malaga for 19£. Such seat-mile cost not only mocks the slimmest environmental conscience and their math skills, but also leads the very own customer safety expectation ad absurdum.
From us pilots ….. what to expect! It is difficult to act when you are at the bottom of the food chain and when your career is set up like an individual sport. No one else really cares and your voice is not heard. Just look after yourself , your provident fund and try keeping your dignity. This will lead you for your best.
I know many will now gleefully dissect my arguments like sleazy Vegas lawyers. I don’t mind, they are certainly not scientifically underlaid, but I guess you all get the drift.
Safe flights, glofish.