Shoreham Airshow Crash Trial

[DODGYOLDFART]

Would you seek to fly again if it was you in this position? Legally, I’m not sure anything but a medical issue can stop him getting back in the air.

If Mr Hill did get his licence back presumably he would need to obtain insurance of some sort. Do you not think he might find it difficult to do so?

[Jet_Fan]

If Mr Hill did get his licence back presumably he would need to obtain insurance of some sort. Do you not think he might find it difficult to do so?

No, I don’t.

[BEagle]

Would you seek to fly again if it was you in this position?

No. Provided that an applicant meets the relevant criteria for licence re-issue, including the relevant medical criteria, it's a matter purely for CAA personnel licensing.

Your stirring isn't helping anyone.

[Easy Street]

I wonder how Mr Hill intends to approach the matter of his susceptibility to, ahem, "cognitive impairment" when asked by the AMO during his renewal examination. After building his criminal defence upon an unpredictable occurrence of the condition (of which remarkably little - nothing? - seems to have been written since), it would be cakeism on almost a Johnsonian scale for him to claim to that he is now safe to fly. I wonder if the CAA is prepared to refuse a medical on the grounds of Hill's "impairment" to see if he will expose himself to ridicule by downplaying the "condition" on appeal?

[Jet_Fan]

I wonder how Mr Hill intends to approach the matter of his susceptibility to, ahem, "cognitive impairment" when asked by the AMO during his renewal examination. After building his criminal defence upon an unpredictable occurrence of the condition (of which remarkably little - nothing? - seems to have been written since), it would be cakeism on almost a Johnsonian scale for him to claim to that he is now safe to fly. I wonder if the CAA is prepared to refuse a medical on the grounds of Hill's "impairment" to see if he will expose himself to ridicule by downplaying the "condition" on appeal?

Do you remember Ernest Saunders? He built a defence based on being an Alzheimer’s sufferer and then became the only person in the world to fully recover from it.

[Jet_Fan]

No. Provided that an applicant meets the relevant criteria for licence re-issue, including the relevant medical criteria, it's a matter purely for CAA personnel licensing.

Your stirring isn't helping anyone.

If he reads this and has second thoughts it’s helped the families. If the families read this and see that the vast majority think Hill is being and AH in pursing this, then I’m sure that will come as some comfort.

Your accusation of stirring is inflammatory and uncalled for. This is obviously a matter that millions of people will have a view so I don’t know you would seek to close down this thread. Personal interest, maybe?

[B Fraser]

I wonder how Mr Hill intends to approach the matter of his susceptibility to, ahem, "cognitive impairment" when asked by the AMO during his renewal examination. After building his criminal defence upon an unpredictable occurrence of the condition (of which remarkably little - nothing? - seems to have been written since), it would be cakeism on almost a Johnsonian scale for him to claim to that he is now safe to fly. I wonder if the CAA is prepared to refuse a medical on the grounds of Hill's "impairment" to see if he will expose himself to ridicule by downplaying the "condition" on appeal?


Was his defence not that he lost awareness while pulling 4 g ? AFAIK, display flying to the same level has not been banned. What would happen if he got his licence back and had a problem at 3 g.

He should hang up his boots.

[Thoughtful_Flyer]

Does a driver convicted of causing death by dangerous driving receive a lifetime driving ban? The emotions of those close to one of those killed in the crash are understandable, but have no bearing on Mr Hill’s wish to fly again; that is a matter for CAA licensing whether he meets all the requirements of the process.

No, normally they don't.

Still less does a driver who is is acquitted of any crime - which is the situation with Mr Hill!

Assuming he passes the required medical and any flight tests that are needed, after how ever many years absence, he is as entitled to a licence as anybody else.

[alfred_the_great]

How will he prove that his impairment won’t reoccur again - even in straight and level flight?

[Jet_Fan]

No, normally they don't.

Still less does a driver who is is acquitted of any crime - which is the situation with Mr Hill!

Assuming he passes the required medical and any flight tests that are needed, after how ever many years absence, he is as entitled to a licence as anybody else.

Everyone knows this, so why it gets repeated so often is beyond me.

The question is, should he get back in the air given the complete horlicks he made of his last fight?

[Jet_Fan]

How will he prove that his impairment won’t reoccur again - even in straight and level flight?

Indeed.

[Thoughtful_Flyer]

How will he prove that his impairment won’t reoccur again - even in straight and level flight?

Nobody can!

As a CAA medical examiner round here used to say to private pilots "Well I'm pleased to say you have passed but of course that doesn't guarantee you won't die on the way home"!

[Thoughtful_Flyer]

Everyone knows this, so why it gets repeated so often is beyond me.

The question is, should he get back in the air given the complete horlicks he made of his last fight?

I would hope they do. However you only have to look a threads like this to see how it suits some peoples' agenda to heap all the blame on one individual rather than look at the whole picture.

"A chain is a strong as its weakest link" is a popular saying and of course it is true. However it may well not be the the whole truth. If the weakest link snaps the chain fails, maybe with disastrous consequences, but that does not mean the rest of the chain was fit for purpose. In my opinion there were a whole raft of issues that could all have potentially lead to a catastrophe and many of them have not been properly addressed as there was a convenient scapegoat.

Do you remember the far less debated crash of a Gnat at a show not that long before Shoreham? Because "only" the pilot was killed and the plane crashed in deserted woodland there was relatively little publicity. It should have raised all kinds of questions about the wisdom of operating these kinds of aircraft in civilian hands and them being flown quite legally by pilots, however experienced in the past, with very little (or virtually zero) currency on type.

20:20 hindsight now requires the B road that passes the end of Old Warden's runway to be closed on 10 days a year for their airshows, much to the annoyance of the local residents. Old Warden shows are 99.9% prop driven aircraft flown conservatively by some of the most experienced pilots in the country. They will have vastly more currency on the type of aircraft they are displaying than could ever be the case with a historic fast jet.

However, it was thought fit to run the show at Shoreham with multiple fast jets passing directly over a busy A road that was kept open. No effective steps were taken to prevent "freeloaders" congregating by the road, several of whom were killed.

Duxford however, despite having had fatal accidents immediately either side of the M11 motorway in the past, continues to have multiple large shows each year with the motorway remaining open. It has however taken elaborate steps to stop a relatively few photographers and enthusiasts congregating in the so called "naughty fields" to the south of the runway!

People really need to look at the whole picture!

[Jet_Fan]

I would hope they do. However you only have to look a threads like this to see how it suits some peoples' agenda to heap all the blame on one individual rather than look at the whole picture.

"A chain is a strong as its weakest link" is a popular saying and of course it is true. However it may well not be the the whole truth. If the weakest link snaps the chain fails, maybe with disastrous consequences, but that does not mean the rest of the chain was fit for purpose. In my opinion there were a whole raft of issues that could all have potentially lead to a catastrophe and many of them have not been properly addressed as there was a convenient scapegoat.

Do you remember the far less debated crash of a Gnat at a show not that long before Shoreham? Because "only" the pilot was killed and the plane crashed in deserted woodland there was relatively little publicity. It should have raised all kinds of questions about the wisdom of operating these kinds of aircraft in civilian hands and them being flown quite legally by pilots, however experienced in the past, with very little (or virtually zero) currency on type.

20:20 hindsight now requires the B road that passes the end of Old Warden's runway to be closed on 10 days a year for their airshows, much to the annoyance of the local residents. Old Warden shows are 99.9% prop driven aircraft flown conservatively by some of the most experienced pilots in the country. They will have vastly more currency on the type of aircraft they are displaying than could ever be the case with a historic fast jet.

However, it was thought fit to run the show at Shoreham with multiple fast jets passing directly over a busy A road that was kept open. No effective steps were taken to prevent "freeloaders" congregating by the road, several of whom were killed.

Duxford however, despite having had fatal accidents immediately either side of the M11 motorway in the past, continues to have multiple large shows each year with the motorway remaining open. It has however taken elaborate steps to stop a relatively few photographers and enthusiasts congregating in the so called "naughty fields" to the south of the runway!

People really need to look at the whole picture!

Hill was at the sticks, so the primary responsibility is his. The AAIB report is damning of Hill but less so of the organisers.

Personally, I don't believe for one minute that he suffered a metal impairment on the day but in his attempts to get closure for himself he's certainly suffered a moral one ever since, as have those who seek to deflect blame with weak whataboutary.

One fact remains, that being the verdict of unlawful killing. In the face of that, any attempt to get back flying is a repugnant abomination, imo.
The police aren't looking for anyone else to prosecute because they got their man. Hill's airmanship on the day was dreadful, right up there with that B52 pilot at Fairchild. Hill should keep a low profile but, every the showman, he manages to keep himself in the news.

[DAHenriques]

At the time Shoreham happened I reviewed the incident for World Airshow News; also as a back engineered study for Des Barker's excellent book on airshow accident history, "An Anatomy of Airshow Accidents", distributed by ICAS.
Here is that review;

Dudley Henriques

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VSPTk9AC3P8AASbjwpXBPfTl6TKdh15O/view?usp=sharing

[OvertHawk]

I've tried to stay away from this but feel the need to add my thoughts now.

I will preface this with the fact that there seems to be no verified source quoted for the fact that AH is attempting to get his licence back, but assuming that those reports are correct:

AH for whatever reason made a grievous error that killed 11 people and devastated the lives of countless others.

When held to account for it he offered a medical defence that he was cognitively impaired for some undefined medical reason. This defence was accepted by the jury and he was acquitted.

For him now to suggest that he would like his licence and medical to be restored to him despite the fact that he suffers from some undefined condition that leads to sudden cognitive impairment (not to mention the subsequent massive medical trauma of the accident including a significant head injury) strikes me as unreasonable.

I would imagine that it will seem unreasonable to the CAA medical branch as well! (Bearing in mind how difficult they have made the lives of certain of my colleagues who suffer from considerably less worrying conditions than AH reportedly suffers from).

I personally feel that AH has dodged a major bullet here and that if he had any concern for the wellbeing and reputation of our industry, the welfare of the people who continue to live the the consequences of his actions, or indeed a reasonable measure of common decency then he would bow out as gracefully as he can and fade quietly into the background.

Should he attempt to regain his licence I feel he will fully deserve the outcry, anger and further vilification that will certainly follow.

[DogTailRed2]

Would the laws on corporate manslaughter and medical exemption prevent a person medically impaired to operate a machine?
These laws were brought into place after the Glasgow refuse vehicle crash. Now all drivers (and I would assume also pilots) need to declare any medical conditions.
Then if said organisation was to approve them getting behind the wheel, stick and that person was to kill someone the person signing the relevant paperwork is liable to be charged with corporate manslaughter.

[GeeRam]

I've tried to stay away from this but feel the need to add my thoughts now.

I will preface this with the fact that there seems to be no verified source quoted for the fact that AH is attempting to get his licence back, but assuming that those reports are correct:

AH for whatever reason made a grievous error that killed 11 people and devastated the lives of countless others.

When held to account for it he offered a medical defence that he was cognitively impaired for some undefined medical reason. This defence was accepted by the jury and he was acquitted.

For him now to suggest that he would like his licence and medical to be restored to him despite the fact that he suffers from some undefined condition that leads to sudden cognitive impairment (not to mention the subsequent massive medical trauma of the accident including a significant head injury) strikes me as unreasonable.

I would imagine that it will seem unreasonable to the CAA medical branch as well! (Bearing in mind how difficult they have made the lives of certain of my colleagues who suffer from considerably less worrying conditions than AH reportedly suffers from).

I personally feel that AH has dodged a major bullet here and that if he had any concern for the wellbeing and reputation of our industry, the welfare of the people who continue to live the the consequences of his actions, or indeed a reasonable measure of common decency then he would bow out as gracefully as he can and fade quietly into the background.

Should he attempt to regain his licence I feel he will fully deserve the outcry, anger and further vilification that will certainly follow.

We don't know what type of licence he's trying to get, (if he is - it is the Sun after all) and we are assuming its one that does require a Class 1 or 2 medical....(which surely in the circumstances would be a no-no) but, it maybe he's just seeking to get a NPPL which doesn't need a medical and would restrict him to Part 21 aircraft only....?
Given what happened I'm surprised he'd even want to do that of course...!

[UWAS]

This is just information. It is not an opinion and although I followed the Shoreham disaster in the national press I have not read any official reports. Once I had to interview a man thankfully recovering from being totally buried in a deep trench the side of which had collapsed over him. He was dug down to and then pulled out unconscious after several minutes. It was clear that he was not responsible for his own accident. It was penny pinching by his employers not being prepared to pay for trench support. I met him a little later on and he said he could remember nothing at all of that day's events except that he remembered going to work and waking up in hospital.
Twenty years later I had a car accident three miles from my place of work, rolled the car completely and woke up to see a paramedic standing at my feet while I was lying in the road next to the upside down car. It must have taken at least 10 minutes for the ambulance to arrive, let alone the time taken for a call to be made. In addition I had switched off the engine while upside down, undone the seat belt, dropped to the roof of the car, fracturing my spine, before escaping from the car through the boot as the drivers door was un-openable. I have no memory of the accident until the paramedic was there. Later in hospital I recalled seeing in the driving mirror a car in sunlight arriving at a junction behind me located just before the accident site and thought that was the last memory. I learned it was raining at the time I had my accident by a member of my company staff who went to the scene. My professional life in accident investigation teaches me to be extremely cautious about the evidence that people unconscious at some point during the incident may be be asked about.

[hunty]

This is my personal view. I worked on the Hunters, when they were based at Exeter and Andy Hill used some of the T-7s, when he was trying to become current on the Hunter. None of the guys thought he looked confident, or knowledgeable and we were all very surprised when the chief pilot passed him as qualified to fly the jet. The guys at Exeter often wonder if he should have been passed after such a short time and maybe those eleven guys would still be alive, if he hadn't been passed, so quickly? Andy Hill should go back to Shoreham and read the names of the eleven victims on the plaque and then hang his head in shame.

[OvertHawk]

maybe he's just seeking to get a NPPL which doesn't need a medical and would restrict him to Part 21 aircraft only....?.!


Even for an NPPL he would need to make a medical declaration "affirming his medical fitness to fly". I don't see how such a claim could be compatible with the claims made on his behalf about his medical status in court.

The CAA can elect to review any medical declaration made and impose additional examination requirements.

[air pig]

This is a terrible mistake - the media will be writing as we speak and you can imagine the words they will use about him.................

You mean just like the one he made at Southport nearly putting a Strikemaster into the crowd at the Southport air show.

https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/watch-shoreham-air-crash-pilot-10827389

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwhLSHpeiE8

[Asturias56]

The original post in this resurgent post was "Mr Hill is now trying to get his licence back, which seems a trifle insensitive to little old me."

Has anyone seen any confirmation of this?

all there is that I can see is "Bob and Caroline Schilt spoke to ITV News Meridian ahead of a documentary airing tonight (28 December) on Discovery Plus which claims that the pilot is trying to have his licence reinstated." One journo quoting another journo about a TV claim which ....................................

[Jet_Fan]

The original post in this resurgent post was "Mr Hill is now trying to get his licence back, which seems a trifle insensitive to little old me."

Has anyone seen any confirmation of this?

all there is that I can see is "Bob and Caroline Schilt spoke to ITV News Meridian ahead of a documentary airing tonight (28 December) on Discovery Plus which claims that the pilot is trying to have his licence reinstated." One journo quoting another journo about a TV claim which ....................................

The original journalists will have two sources for this information (common practice) but they might not be able to reveal them. Hill could put this to bed by making a statement to the contrary, but he hasn't. It doesn't take much mental effort to work out why he hasn't.

[Asturias56]

I think the "two sources" is something you'll find in the quality media -

TV producers??? Not quite the same - (and I know several) - it's all about THE STORY

But agree absolutely - Mr Hill could kill this with a word. If he doesn't on his own head etc etc

[fdr]

You mean just like the one he made at Southport nearly putting a Strikemaster into the crowd at the Southport air show.

https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/watch-shoreham-air-crash-pilot-10827389

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwhLSHpeiE8


What on earth was that supposed to be???

The T5 is not the most fun little jet to fly, but it generally does what it is told to. That was... awful, and you are correct to be concerned, the potential to have parked that aircraft into the dirt was pretty high. Had someone taken the driver aside and counseled him at that point, it might have been a better outcome for lots of families affected by a similar untidy bit of flying.

For the T5 effort, the ailerons are adequate for rolls, the nose attitude at the start of the roll is less than would be desirable but bugging out part way around as it did doesn't improve the flight path at all, continuing the roll would maintain the greatest separation from the ground. If this was an intended maneuver such as a derry turn, then that is equally awful.

The control column of the T5 can take a little time to get used to, and some coupling of actual input vs intended input can occur, which normally gets resolved in the first few minutes of flying the plane. It'll do a nice aileron roll, slow roll, hesitation roll, and derry turns are straightforward. Given the aircraft has just come out of a loop, there was lots of energy, it is mainly just untidy.

[Shaft109]

I had never realised that JP display was flown by AH at Southport, was there with my young nephew probably slightly left of where that YouTube video shows.

I'd not pass comment on here about something I had no knowledge of or competency but just realised we might've been personally involved if he'd got that wrong - which it seems he did.

The video from that angle doesn't seem to show the full field of view perspective, as a smaller camera lens probably wouldn't due to optics. We were at beach level not that close to the crowdline (maybe 100m) looking up as he broke away to the North / Right after the roll - instantly realising from the visual of the Beach, Pier and the AC position he was low and close - closer and lower than it suggests on there.
Certainly it was one of those moments you sense as a pilot (relatively inexperienced though I may be) that it was a narrow escape, untidy might be too kind.

I do have a vivid memory of how bright the white and scarlet were backlit against a slightly murky sky as he climbed away.

Haven't loaded rolls / barrel rolls claimed lots of aircraft low down?

Edit: found this longer clip
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yQmq8i0HG4&list=PLj_NR3g9fowVABrckDOHbK6TRb1HECR6J

Go to about 9:50... he was actually over the Pier

[Asturias56]

"Haven't loaded rolls / barrel rolls claimed lots of aircraft low down?"

A friend was showing me a picture of a commemorative plaque in the Royal Berks. Hospital in Reading it includes :- "Crashed slow-rolling near ground. Bad show.
— Douglas Bader,"

[DogTailRed2]

Didn't the Typhoon have a very low recovery from a display one year?

[Ohrly]

Didn't the Typhoon have a very low recovery from a display one year?

You can't get much lower. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQbBxc7ixYM

[DaveJ75]

I bet the debrief was tense!

[DAHenriques]

You can't get much lower. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQbBxc7ixYM

There are myriad ways for display pilots to kill themselves when displaying an aircraft coming off Level one waivers. Some of these are errors involving BOTH low and high energy gates, density altitude as it affects both these parameters, energy loss maneuvers on the downline, barrel rolls due to the 3 dimensional factor causing arc error on the backside of the roll, and rolls where the pilot buries the nose and/or applies inside rudder early in the roll causing axis change to the roll coming off inverted and into the backside.
Low altitude display flying requires a dedication and concentration level found in very few other endeavors.
Even for highly experienced military pilots, display flying is best left to those SPECIFICALLY trained in its execution and protocols.
Dudley Henriques

[biscuit74]

I bet the debrief was tense!

My word, I bet it was. Presumably the display supervisor woudl have called 'knock it off' at that point, if the pilot hadn't already decided to do so. There is a lot of hard pull to the limits, with mushing, going on there - a pilot with a very old breath there I'd imagine as it actually bottomed out and started to climb.

Interesting to see how easily someone no doubt skilled, current and authorised can misjudge a maneouvre which has simultaneous pitch and roll; trying to define safe limit values for entry/continuation must be challenging.

As a very limited skill aerobatic pilot I think I can just about imagine how difficult that must be, keeping full situational awareness in such a fast changing circumstance.

[DogTailRed2]

Not to side track this thread too much but I wonder if the aircraft was a little hot for display flying in the early days?
I remember seeing (I think it was Southend, not sure which seaside display it was) a Typhoon getting a little out of shape during a manoeuvre and ending up over the town.

[DAHenriques]

My word, I bet it was. Presumably the display supervisor woudl have called 'knock it off' at that point, if the pilot hadn't already decided to do so. There is a lot of hard pull to the limits, with mushing, going on there - a pilot with a very old breath there I'd imagine as it actually bottomed out and started to climb.

Interesting to see how easily someone no doubt skilled, current and authorised can misjudge a maneouvre which has simultaneous pitch and roll; trying to define safe limit values for entry/continuation must be challenging.

As a very limited skill aerobatic pilot I think I can just about imagine how difficult that must be, keeping full situational awareness in such a fast changing circumstance.

Just as an example of how difficult it CAN be, consider the factors I covered in detail in the attached article about the solo pilots who perform Mirror Passes as done by the jet teams.
Dudley Henriques

​​​​​​https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XCDChumDVRfJBQwnhm09LkR6ZSWkjAOq/view?usp=drive_link

[Dr Jekyll]

There are myriad ways for display pilots to kill themselves when displaying an aircraft coming off Level one waivers. Some of these are errors involving BOTH low and high energy gates, density altitude as it affects both these parameters, energy loss maneuvers on the downline, barrel rolls due to the 3 dimensional factor causing arc error on the backside of the roll, and rolls where the pilot buries the nose and/or applies inside rudder early in the roll causing axis change to the roll coming off inverted and into the backside.
Low altitude display flying requires a dedication and concentration level found in very few other endeavors.
Even for highly experienced military pilots, display flying is best left to those SPECIFICALLY trained in its execution and protocols.
Dudley Henriques
Of course both that Typhoon pilot and the Thunderbirds F16 pilot in the Mountain Home incident were trained and current display pilots.

[DAHenriques]

Of course both that Typhoon pilot and the Thunderbirds F16 pilot in the Mountain Home incident were trained and current display pilots.
just to be clear, the intent of my comment wasn’t meant to suggest that highly trained display pilots are immune. As one can clearly see from the mountain home incident with Chris Stricklin and many others no pilot regardless of experience and expertise is immune from the dangers inherent in low altitude display flying

[RetiredBA/BY]

What on earth was that supposed to be???

The T5 is not the most fun little jet to fly, but it generally does what it is told to. That was... awful, and you are correct to be concerned, the potential to have parked that aircraft into the dirt was pretty high. Had someone taken the driver aside and counseled him at that point, it might have been a better outcome for lots of families affected by a similar untidy bit of flying.

For the T5 effort, the ailerons are adequate for rolls, the nose attitude at the start of the roll is less than would be desirable but bugging out part way around as it did doesn't improve the flight path at all, continuing the roll would maintain the greatest separation from the ground. If this was an intended maneuver such as a derry turn, then that is equally awful.

The control column of the T5 can take a little time to get used to, and some coupling of actual input vs intended input can occur, which normally gets resolved in the first few minutes of flying the plane. It'll do a nice aileron roll, slow roll, hesitation roll, and derry turns are straightforward. Given the aircraft has just come out of a loop, there was lots of energy, it is mainly just untidy.
The JPs were a very pleasant little jet trainer to fly, actually quite fun.
My experience ( 3 and 4 at FTS, 3 and 5 at CFS and a tour on the 4 at SORF as the senior standards QFI) I found the jet to be totally predictable and always did as it was told. That includes some high rotational partial control spins with 100 pounds in the tips refreshing Lightning pilots on spin recovery at Leuchars.
….. but that roll at Southport was crassly flown. The JP has a semi symmetrical wing set at a positive incidence , like the Piston Provost, its origin.. To maintain constant altitude it was neccessary to raise the nose a little as the roll started and PUSH as inverted was reached to keep a high nose attitude. Failure to do this is what happened at Southport, hence the escape manoeuvre, far from just untidy.
Incredibly lucky not to have hit the ground.

[tiger1411]

Do you remember the far less debated crash of a Gnat at a show not that long before Shoreham? Because "only" the pilot was killed and the plane crashed in deserted woodland there was relatively little publicity. It should have raised all kinds of questions about the wisdom of operating these kinds of aircraft in civilian hands and them being flown quite legally by pilots, however experienced in the past, with very little (or virtually zero) currency on type.


Yes, I was there that day and saw it happen, my thoughts are exactly the same as yours. Shoreham was more than just a failure by a single individual, the rules and regs regarding "vintage" jet displays were far too lax for far too long. All the warning signs for a catastrophic event like Shoreham were there in plain sight, but the window of opportunity to prevent it was missed.

And, for the record, the Gnat came down in woodland frequented by walkers, horse riders and dog walkers. And right on the edge of the public road cutting through the woods. A few hundred meters from a pub and similar distance from the event car parks and campsite if I recall. It too could have been so much worse, but for the grace of God and all that.

[Jet_Fan]

Yes, I was there that day and saw it happen, my thoughts are exactly the same as yours. Shoreham was more than just a failure by a single individual, the rules and regs regarding "vintage" jet displays were far too lax for far too long. All the warning signs for a catastrophic event like Shoreham were there in plain sight, but the window of opportunity to prevent it was missed.

Not read the tin kickers’ official report for a while but I seem to remember Shoreham was more an issue of the different parties assuming it was the responsibility of one or other of the other parties to check compliance with the regs rather than the regs themselves being lax. In other words, a lack of ownership.

[DaveJ75]

Not read the tin kickers’ official report for a while but I seem to remember Shoreham was more an issue of the different parties assuming it was the responsibility of one or other of the other parties to check compliance with the regs rather than the regs themselves being lax. In other words, a lack of ownership.

The report certainly burned a lot of pages on those issues. For me the bigger picture is that the despite previous accidents and close calls, the regulator still enabled an environment in which inappropriately complex aerobatic displays in vintage jet aircraft could be flown to inappropriately low heights by pilots who were insufficiently skilled or current to be doing so.

[Thoughtful_Flyer]

The report certainly burned a lot of pages on those issues. For me the bigger picture is that the despite previous accidents and close calls, the regulator still enabled an environment in which inappropriately complex aerobatic displays in vintage jet aircraft could be flown to inappropriately low heights by pilots who were insufficiently skilled or current to be doing so.

Exactly ^^^^^^^

[Thoughtful_Flyer]

Yes, I was there that day and saw it happen, my thoughts are exactly the same as yours. Shoreham was more than just a failure by a single individual, the rules and regs regarding "vintage" jet displays were far too lax for far too long. All the warning signs for a catastrophic event like Shoreham were there in plain sight, but the window of opportunity to prevent it was missed.

And, for the record, the Gnat came down in woodland frequented by walkers, horse riders and dog walkers. And right on the edge of the public road cutting through the woods. A few hundred meters from a pub and similar distance from the event car parks and campsite if I recall. It too could have been so much worse, but for the grace of God and all that.

So a fractional difference in the Gnat's trajectory and the result could have been even more tragic than Shoreham?

If I remember correctly (and it is a few years since I read the report) the pilot of the Gnat had the bare minimum number of hours in the preceding 12 months to retain a PPL? Yet it was lawful for him to fly that type of swept wing jet at a large public display!

Compare that with when the RAF still provided a solo Hawk display each season. How many hours practice would a much younger and very current fast jet pilot have in preparation for a display season? Even then, wasn't one of them grounded mid season for repeatedly "pushing the flight boundaries". However, at least in that case the supervision picked up the problem and took some decisive action.

[Jet_Fan]

Exactly ^^^^^^^
Well, it’s exactly NOT just that particular hole in this bit of Swiss cheese.

Anyway, Hill should be in prison for the primary part he played and others should have been held to account for the lesser roles they played.

[DogTailRed2]

So a fractional difference in the Gnat's trajectory and the result could have been even more tragic than Shoreham?

If I remember correctly (and it is a few years since I read the report) the pilot of the Gnat had the bare minimum number of hours in the preceding 12 months to retain a PPL? Yet it was lawful for him to fly that type of swept wing jet at a large public display!

Compare that with when the RAF still provided a solo Hawk display each season. How many hours practice would a much younger and very current fast jet pilot have in preparation for a display season? Even then, wasn't one of them grounded mid season for repeatedly "pushing the flight boundaries". However, at least in that case the supervision picked up the problem and took some decisive action.
Wasn't there a Hawk 100 flown by a current pilot that flew into the ground at a display abroad one year?

[Bob Viking]

I suspect you already know the details but try here anyway:

https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/546880-re-visiting-1999-hawk-200-crash.html

Post 10 especially should help to answer your questions. Rather than helping to prove your point, it rather proves the opposite. There is a difference between a current and qualified display pilot and a current pilot doing low level aerobatics.

If you re-read this thread you’ll find my thoughts on AH’s currency and qualifications to perform low level aerobatics in a Hunter. I don’t need to rehash them.

BV

[fradu]

Has anyone else watched the documentary on Discovery +?
It mentions at the end, that AH went to the High Court to appeal the Coroner's verdict, but was refused.

Sadly it also showed and confirmed that the video I saw years ago on youtube, of the scene on the A27 just after the impact, that the small silver car featured did indeed belong to the two Worthing United footballers. Not something I wished to re-watch.

[Diff Tail Shim]

I had never realised that JP display was flown by AH at Southport, was there with my young nephew probably slightly left of where that YouTube video shows.

I'd not pass comment on here about something I had no knowledge of or competency but just realised we might've been personally involved if he'd got that wrong - which it seems he did.

The video from that angle doesn't seem to show the full field of view perspective, as a smaller camera lens probably wouldn't due to optics. We were at beach level not that close to the crowdline (maybe 100m) looking up as he broke away to the North / Right after the roll - instantly realising from the visual of the Beach, Pier and the AC position he was low and close - closer and lower than it suggests on there.
Certainly it was one of those moments you sense as a pilot (relatively inexperienced though I may be) that it was a narrow escape, untidy might be too kind.

I do have a vivid memory of how bright the white and scarlet were backlit against a slightly murky sky as he climbed away.

Haven't loaded rolls / barrel rolls claimed lots of aircraft low down?

Edit: found this longer clip
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yQmq8i0HG4&list=PLj_NR3g9fowVABrckDOHbK6TRb1HECR6J

Go to about 9:50... he was actually over the Pier

Cowboy indeed. I was at North Weald before the pandemic and was talking to one of the vintage jet aircraft owners there. AH name was dirt. His attitude before the accident was the same afterwards as far as the man I was talking to was concerned, CAA should tell him to sod off.

[DAHenriques]

"Haven't loaded rolls / barrel rolls claimed lots of aircraft low down"?

The maneuvers chosen for level 1 display all should have one constant, that being the element of predictability of outcome.
Barrel rolls contain control pressure inputs for pitch and roll coupled with a requirement for control in yaw. These variables are EXTREMELY difficult to control with any EXACT element of predictability of outcome to the degree required for level 1 display. ANY deviation in application of ANY of the 3 control inputs applied during the first 90 degrees of the roll will affect the size of the arc flown during the backside recovery. This places the display pilot in the position of having to control the aircraft through 3 dimensions requiring predictable recovery altitude where any one or combination of control pressure can and WILL change the exact recovery parameters as the maneuver is being performed.
VERY BAD JU JU !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
It can be done, and indeed has been done, but the general "word" among professional display pilots is to pass on barrel rolls at low altitude and that would be my personal recommendation EXACTLY!
Dudley Henriques

[sycamore]

When teaching students to do `barrel-rolls`,I used a simple `tool`to demonstrate the key positions to reach during the manoeuvre....the spiral bound `toilet-roll/kitchen /paper roll`insert,,,,each may have a different `degree of spiral`,and can therefore show all combinations of large or tight `loaded rolls.`
Then draw little aircraft `symbols` along the `spiral`,whether left,or right spiral,at each 90* point around the spiral.
It should be noted that the `barrel` has `width`,and the centre of the roll axis is displaced out from the`nearest` display`foul-line`,and that the aircraft will be commencing the roll at an `offset` angle of maybe 30-60 *..
Having drawn our roll,,you now look though the`tube and align the centre with the horizon,and note the positions/attitudes of the `symbols`at the 5 critical points,bottom,mid-climb,top,mid-descent,bottom ,at end.
The most `critical point is at the `top` of the arc`,nose above the horizon,wings level(late,and you maybe in trouble..).Now tilt the roll down,and see the difference it makes to the 2nd half of the roll; you will be lower,maybe faster,need to roll faster,and reduce the `pull to escape`....
So,my mantra was`Always above..seldom level..never below`(the horizon),,for the roll axis...and never multiple rolls,,unless you are pointing `up`...

[DAHenriques]

When teaching students to do `barrel-rolls`,I used a simple `tool`to demonstrate the key positions to reach during the manoeuvre....the spiral bound `toilet-roll/kitchen /paper roll`insert,,,,each may have a different `degree of spiral`,and can therefore show all combinations of large or tight `loaded rolls.`
Then draw little aircraft `symbols` along the `spiral`,whether left,or right spiral,at each 90* point around the spiral.
It should be noted that the `barrel` has `width`,and the centre of the roll axis is displaced out from the`nearest` display`foul-line`,and that the aircraft will be commencing the roll at an `offset` angle of maybe 30-60 *..
Having drawn our roll,,you now look though the`tube and align the centre with the horizon,and note the positions/attitudes of the `symbols`at the 5 critical points,bottom,mid-climb,top,mid-descent,bottom ,at end.
The most `critical point is at the `top` of the arc`,nose above the horizon,wings level(late,and you maybe in trouble..).Now tilt the roll down,and see the difference it makes to the 2nd half of the roll; you will be lower,maybe faster,need to roll faster,and reduce the `pull to escape`....
So,my mantra was`Always above..seldom level..never below`(the horizon),,for the roll axis...and never multiple rolls,,unless you are pointing `up`...
Just to be clear; what you have described works perfectly well in the teaching of normal acro. In fact, my own pedagogy teaching barrel rolls isn't all that different.
Teaching barrel rolls in the classic sense and style is a world apart from the low altitude air show environment where show lines, min and max altitudes and most importantly energy state entering into and at egress are all pertinent factors present in the maneuver sequence requiring predetermined spacing and energy state as required for the next maneuver in the routine.
There is a TREMENDOUS difference between the air show aerobatic display environment and the environment used in the teaching of normal aerobatics.
One of the most difficult factors we find in transitioning aerobatic pilots into the airshow environment isn't found in the technical aspects involved with aerobatics per se' but rather in the required transition from the normal aerobatic environment into the highly specialized world of the display pilot.
It's a night and day comparison where what is normal as related to everyday acro can kill you in short order in the world of low altitude aerobatics.
These are just a few considerations in any and all ACE flight tests required here in the United States for any pilot wishing to obtain a card of competency as required to enter the air show industry as a display pilot.
Dudley Henriques

[DaveJ75]

And frankly barrel rolls don't look good enough from the ground to warrant the temptation to expose yourself to the risk!

[DAHenriques]

And frankly barrel rolls don't look good enough from the ground to warrant the temptation to expose yourself to the risk!
I just realized several of us may be discussing barrel rolls in opposing context.
When I speak on Barrel Rolls in the air show sense I'm talking specifically in the low altitude arena; in other words initiated and completed at low altitude.
We use Barrel Rolls in WW2 fighters all the time in display. These are recovered well above the low altitude area where the danger lies.
I'm sorry if my previous comment has been confusing.
I can possibly clear up any confusion by simply saying that ANY Barrel Roll initiated AND COMPLETED at low altitude (this would include any display pilot working a show on level one waivers) would be a VERY poor maneuver selection and extremely dangerous in the airshow display context.
Hope this is a bit more clear an explanation.
Dudley Henriques

[stickstirrer]

I am not sure if I am duplicating previous comments: teaching and supervising low level displays by military jet pilots I wasn’t keen on Barrel Rolls primarily because there are so many variables in pitch and roll rates that there were never any clear gate heights and speeds that could be used to judge whether the manoeuvre was going as planned. Entry speed, Minimum height and Max speed over the top of a loop are easily remembered and observed. If required gates are not achieved the manoeuvre can be abandoned safely. Barrel Rolls have no such easily recognised heights and speeds thereby making it very difficult to recognise quickly and easily when things are going wrong. I have one further controversial observation shared with another very experienced and very senior retired officer;, I have flown displays and supervised numerous jet pilots both in the medium level teaching environment and display arena. At the top of the ‘crooked loop’ which I think he believed he was flying rather than a BR; AH made the precise gate height and speed in the Hunter that he would expect to see in a loop in his JP display - a display he was far more familiar with……….
.I believe he had reverted to the type he was most familiar with in a stressful moment. (Trying to position the aircraft using a slightly non standard manoeuvre ( for him) was stressful. )
I also agree with the many comments re insufficient currency on the Hunter and that there are inherent dangers in trying to achieve or maintain currency on two vastly different types.
The RAF requirements were 5 runs at 5000’ 5 at 1500, 5 at 1000 and then cleared ( by Station Commander observing) to practice at 500’. All within a set (recent) period details of which I have forgotten. Being an ex test pilot does not make you immune to lack of currency; skill fade; or temporary lapses in awareness.

[treadigraph]

At the top of the ‘crooked loop’ which I think he believed he was flying rather than a BR; AH made the precise gate height and speed in the Hunter that he would expect to see in a loop in his JP display - a display he was far more familiar with……….
I believe he had reverted to the type he was most familiar with in a stressful moment. (Trying to position the aircraft using a slightly non standard manoeuvre ( for him) was stressful. )

Plus one...

(Going to Shoreham-by-Sea today for the first time since the sad event - can't believe nearly nine years have slipped by...)

[Bob Viking]

Let’s be honest here. Despite any evidence given in court and suggestions of temporary medical events there are those of us, mainly those that have flown aerobatics in fast jets, that are never going to accept the verdict. He and his friends can argue until they’re blue in the face but we will always believe what we believe.

AH doesn’t belong in prison but I for one would be happier if he, and anyone like him who thinks his display was a good idea, never again got the opportunity to display a vintage jet infront of a crowd.

As I have said before I grew up going to air shows and my love of jets as a kid gave rise to a 23 year RAF fast jet career. Since the Shoreham accident though I have never been tempted to take my family to an air show where vintage jet aircraft are displaying.

BV

[GeeRam]

AH doesn’t belong in prison but I for one would be happier if he, and anyone like him who thinks his display was a good idea, never again got the opportunity to display a vintage jet infront of a crowd.

As I have said before I grew up going to air shows and my love of jets as a kid gave rise to a 23 year RAF fast jet career. Since the Shoreham accident though I have never been tempted to take my family to an air show where vintage jet aircraft are displaying.


Well.......since Shoreham, and then the grounding of '558, and the Sea Vixen's wheels up at Yeovilton, its not a worry to have, as there has pretty been no airshow in mainland UK where you could have since any vintage jet displaying anyway now....well not any swept wing vintage jet.

[Bob Viking]

Good point. To be honest though apart from a couple of exceptions, air shows are just not something I really consider for family entertainment any more. Which I think is a crying shame.

BV

[dagenham]

Well.......since Shoreham, and then the grounding of '558, and the Sea Vixen's wheels up at Yeovilton, its not a worry to have, as there has pretty been no airshow in mainland UK where you could have since any vintage jet displaying anyway now....well not any swept wing vintage jet.

well apart from the draken, viggen, me 262, b52, skyhawk, phantom etc at RIAT and some others ?

[dervish]

A lot of recent comments imply the pilot denied making a balls of the manoeuvre and by being found not guilty somehow managed to persuade a jury he didn't. The truth is he admitted his error so why keep going on about it? I agree with the sentiments of Bob Viking, but also think they apply to the likes of the CAA who made very serious errors. And the AAIB's report is really lacking.

[OvertHawk]

A lot of recent comments imply the pilot denied making a balls of the manoeuvre and by being found not guilty somehow managed to persuade a jury he didn't. The truth is he admitted his error so why keep going on about it? I agree with the sentiments of Bob Viking, but also think they apply to the likes of the CAA who made very serious errors. And the AAIB's report is really lacking.

Not quite... He conceded that an error occurred but denied responsibility or culpability for it. I don't class that as "admitting your error".

[GeeRam]

well apart from the draken, viggen, me 262, b52, skyhawk, phantom etc at RIAT and some others ?

Well, the Swedish HF aircraft don't really get booked for UK because of the CAA restrictions, the 262 is operated by a mil contractor although civ reg'd and again, slightly different, plus it doesn't do aero's anyway......and the others you mention are not civilian owned and operated, so not part of this discussion.
I guess you meant Sea Hawk rather than Skyhawk? and the NavyWings Sea Hawk is straight wing, not swept and hasn't flown for over 10 years now, although NavyWings are hoping the engine issues can be resolved to enable it to fly again.......but, I have my doubts about that.

[DogTailRed2]

So when does a fatal crash become a bad fatal crash?
Many pilots have fatally crashed. The pilot at Shoreham killed people on the ground. So why does Shoreham make the pilot a worse pilot than all the others? Is it just a case of what was under him at the time? Or just unlucky to have survived?
I'm not trying to argue for or against any pilot.

[Bob Viking]

Have you read back through the thread? Maybe try a recap and you should find the answers.

BV

[KrisKringle]

So when does a fatal crash become a bad fatal crash?
Many pilots have fatally crashed. The pilot at Shoreham killed people on the ground. So why does Shoreham make the pilot a worse pilot than all the others? Is it just a case of what was under him at the time? Or just unlucky to have survived?
I'm not trying to argue for or against any pilot.


It is called 'outcome bias'.

I wouldn't bother wasting your time reading through this thread; it is full of nonsense written by 'keyboard warriors' biased by preconceived ideas, hearsay and snapshot press reports. Read the full AAIB report instead and you will learn that there is a lot more to this terrible disaster. It is a superb report although it does seem shallow on 'human factors' which were explored in far more substantive detail during the court case.

[Davef68]

I guess you meant Sea Hawk rather than Skyhawk? and the NavyWings Sea Hawk is straight wing, not swept and hasn't flown for over 10 years now, although NavyWings are hoping the engine issues can be resolved to enable it to fly again.......but, I have my doubts about that.

I suspect he means the Top Aces A-4N, which appeared at RIAT in 2022 and is due again this year. Although I think that's static display only

[dervish]

Not quite... He conceded that an error occurred but denied responsibility or culpability for it. I don't class that as "admitting your error".


Thank you. I didn't know he'd at first denied making an error, then conceded he did. I thought he admitted it up front but couldn't explain his actions except through his medical defence.
Either way, making an error doesn't require you to plead guilty.


It is a superb report


Can a report be 'superb' if it lacks analysis of the facts it presents? If the AAIB aren't meant to do that, who is? Or is it left to the prosecution and defence?

[DAHenriques]

It is called 'outcome bias'.

I wouldn't bother wasting your time reading through this thread; it is full of nonsense written by 'keyboard warriors' biased by preconceived ideas, hearsay and snapshot press reports. Read the full AAIB report instead and you will learn that there is a lot more to this terrible disaster. It is a superb report although it does seem shallow on 'human factors' which were explored in far more substantive detail during the court case.

If I may please;
Although true that any thread attempting explanation for an event such as Shoreham will attract a wide range of comment, I must say that some of what I've read here has merit and was obviously well intended, my own comment included of course.
In fact, if one reads the airshow industry standard text on airshow accidents, ( Anatomy of Airshow Accidents by Des Barker and distributed through ICAS world wide) my comment on the Shoreham incident from the display pilot's perspective can be read on page 525. I as well covered Shoreham in some detail for World Airshow News. That report I believe was posted here in this thread.
I mention these things not to be pedantic but rather to simply point out that one will find both good and bad in any open discussion on incidents such as the Shoreham crash.
About Mr Hill;
We will probably never know the exact truth about what constituted the mental process in play during those few seconds at Hill's top energy gate when he made the decision to continue instead of abort. There are several variables in the gate equation (AGL altitude, true airspeed, density altitude.......etc) and any one of these or combination of these miscalculated could have been a factor. All we have is the visual result and of course Mr Hill's testimony.
I can tell you that my experience indicates that in many of these incidents the real truth remains with the pilot involved.
In summation I will say that I have found this thread "interesting" at least. Some of the comment from RAF pilots with test and display background was quite factual and pertinent.
Of course there are always those commenting whose experience is shall we say..less factual.
Anyway, I hope I have managed to help clear the air just a bit on the issue.
Dudley Henriques

[dagenham]

Well, the Swedish HF aircraft don't really get booked for UK because of the CAA restrictions, the 262 is operated by a mil contractor although civ reg'd and again, slightly different, plus it doesn't do aero's anyway......and the others you mention are not civilian owned and operated, so not part of this discussion.
I guess you meant Sea Hawk rather than Skyhawk? and the NavyWings Sea Hawk is straight wing, not swept and hasn't flown for over 10 years now, although NavyWings are hoping the engine issues can be resolved to enable it to fly again.......but, I have my doubts about that.

to be pedantic the comment was don’t see vintage jets - well you do and I did mean Skyhawk as in Douglas A-4 Skyhawk

[Jwscud]

Having watched the documentary, I think a lot of people at Shoreham Airport/Gatwick will be very happy with it. AH is an easy target and they went for him good and proper. Barring a very brief comment from one of the bereaved relatives at the end, there was little acknowledgment that there was any wider involvement to be considered.

I have no display or high performance background but from a safety perspective, a display aircraft crashing on the runway centreline immediately outside the airfield boundary was a foreseeable event. While the pilot was responsible for the crash, he was significantly less responsible for the large number of people under his flight path. Nor was this the first fatal accident at the Shoreham Airshow. I would reserve my anger more for the display organisers and the regulator for allowing a foreseeable event to cause so much carnage.

[tiger1411]

From the mid-90's onwards the volume of vintage jets being displayed publically in private hands grew steadily year on year. Arguably also steadily increasing in performance and complexity, including JPs, L39s, Venom's, Vampires the Sea Vixen, Hunter's, Gnat's, Canberra's and of course the Vulcan.

For the layman, casual observer and aviation enthusiast this presented some amazing opportunities to continue to watch often long retired and iconic types in their natural environment.

All good excepting for the fact the rules and regs governing public displays of such exotica completely failed to adapt to this changing environment which effectively meant that environment became increasingly "permissive". Unfortunately, human nature is such that rules and regs, even in extreme and high risk environments, will be pushed to, and sometimes beyond, their intended boundaries. 99 times out of 100 there is no material impact, nothing really really bad happens and everyone enjoys the spectacle.

My point is that what happened at Shoreham was a long time in the making, all the warning signs were there, just waiting for the Swiss Cheese holes to line up to enable the disaster scenario. I'm in no way defending AH's actions on that day, however to place all the blame on any one individual is clearly wrong. I've not re-read the report recently, but my abiding memory was that it didn't really address those factors relating to the "inevitability" of such an event, due to those regulatory shortcomings. I also personally felt the subsequent, and still largely in place, heavy handed clamp down on vintage jet display flying was a tacit admission and acknowledgement of those regulatory failings.

One of those tragic events that should never have been allowed to happen, but equally where no single individual bears sole responsibility, in my opinion.

[GeeRam]

I have no display or high performance background but from a safety perspective, a display aircraft crashing on the runway centreline immediately outside the airfield boundary was a foreseeable event.

Except it wasn't even close to crashing on the centreline of the runway or the display axis, more like close to an angle of 45deg off the display axis.

[GeeRam]

to be pedantic the comment was don’t see vintage jets - well you do and I did mean Skyhawk as in Douglas A-4 Skyhawk

BV clearly meant civilian operated by his comment, which was obvious to all being in relation to the whole subject of this thread, as was my reply, which he clearly also understood also.
You are the only one that went off half cocked and mentioned stuff irrelevant to displays in the UK (and that includes the A4 Skyhawk, as there are none and never will be any privately owned Scooters in the UK, and the civvie registered ones in Germany on mil contract equally won't be doing a display here either)

[typerated]

I think the CAA having pushed the display line further out is a poor ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. How much more safe is a more distant display line?
It's really easy to bust - diving toward the crowd and turning hard onto the display line has many holes in a lump of cheese lining up!
They needed to ban low level airshow aerobatics, hard maneuvering and close formation. not try and make a sterile box around aircraft doing (potentially) unsafe things.
BBMF and the displays of the Shuttleworth collection are pretty good examples of how to safely display aeroplanes I'd suggest
Also, personally I'd find it more fun and much considerably safer for aircraft to make close and low straight and level passes with benign and prescribed turns to get back onto centreline.
I'm struck that modern fast jet displays are just high G routines often very close to the ground - literally a moment of "cognitive impairment" eats through a few hundred yards of safety space pretty quickly I imagine
I think the power and speed of the aircraft can be demonstrated in a much more benign way I'd suggest.
Yes I've seen a few smoking holes at airshows..

[Easy Street]

I'm struck that modern fast jet displays are just high G routines often very close to the ground - literally a moment of "cognitive impairment" eats through a few hundred yards of safety space pretty quickly I imagine

That is why military display flying has had such rigorous workup, qualification, supervision and currency requirements for a long time now - much longer ago than Shoreham. And that stringency is why the consensus opinion among military fast jet pilot colleagues is that poorly-supervised, low-currency, multi-type pilots like AH had (and continue to have) no business conducting low level aerobatics anywhere, let alone in front of a crowd. Lax regulation and organisation certainly contributed to the outcome, but in my view no more absolve AH of responsibility than an unrestricted autobahn speed limit absolves one who causes a fatal accident by driving beyond their capability.

[CISTRS]

BBMF and the displays of the Shuttleworth collection are pretty good examples of how to safely display aeroplanes I'd suggest

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
THIS

[B Fraser]

Well.......since Shoreham, and then the grounding of '558, and the Sea Vixen's wheels up at Yeovilton, its not a worry to have, as there has pretty been no airshow in mainland UK where you could have since any vintage jet displaying anyway now....well not any swept wing vintage jet.

The RAF fly 9 of them from time to time.

Hat, coat, door............ ;)

[Null Orifice]

Often only seven!

[Martin the Martian]

It troubles me that some seem to find Andy Hill almost blameless, and looking back through some posts that is how it reads to me. Whatever the regulatory issues, however they were set and how the show was organised, neither the CAA nor the show organisers were at the controls of that Hunter that day and making the final decisions that led to it hitting the ground.

[tucumseh]

Regarding the AAIB report, while it was certainly poor in some areas, it was infinitely better than any MoD report, which tend to look only at the final act.

What interested me most was that it refers to MoD aircraft publications containing the information MoD and the HSE claimed Martin-Baker hadn't provided when prosecuting them in the Sean Cunningham case.

As the AAIB report pre-dates the sworn evidence in court, and the HSE made a large contribution to it, that would confirm the HSE and MoD lied in court.

Nothing new there, but an important point nonetheless on a military forum.

[DaveJ75]

It troubles me that some seem to find Andy Hill almost blameless, and looking back through some posts that is how it reads to me. Whatever the regulatory issues, however they were set and how the show was organised, neither the CAA nor the show organisers were at the controls of that Hunter that day and making the final decisions that led to it hitting the ground.

Well, I guess things are different on Mars!

[falcon900]

It troubles me that some seem to find Andy Hill almost blameless, and looking back through some posts that is how it reads to me. Whatever the regulatory issues, however they were set and how the show was organised, neither the CAA nor the show organisers were at the controls of that Hunter that day and making the final decisions that led to it hitting the ground.
The point is that whatever happened in the air, the facts demonstrate with complete clarity that AH was able to survive the crash.
The only reason there are fatalities is that people were allowed to congregate where the risk to their lives had already been recognised, and the decision taken not to implement the mitigations which would have prevented them being in harms way. That has nothing to do with AH, and everything to do with the organisers and the CAA

[pasta]

The point is that whatever happened in the air, the facts demonstrate with complete clarity that AH was able to survive the crash.
The only reason there are fatalities is that people were allowed to congregate where the risk to their lives had already been recognised, and the decision taken not to implement the mitigations which would have prevented them being in harms way. That has nothing to do with AH, and everything to do with the organisers and the CAA
In my view, the culpability either lies with the people responsible for every layer of the Swiss Cheese, or with none of them. If one party can claim that their error was only consequential because other parties screwed up, then everyone else can make a similar claim, and it was always "someone else's fault".

[Asturias56]

"That has nothing to do with AH, "

the dead didn't crash the aircraft

[Diff Tail Shim]

The point is that whatever happened in the air, the facts demonstrate with complete clarity that AH was able to survive the crash.
The only reason there are fatalities is that people were allowed to congregate where the risk to their lives had already been recognised, and the decision taken not to implement the mitigations which would have prevented them being in harms way. That has nothing to do with AH, and everything to do with the organisers and the CAA
The Hunter Crashed due to pilot error. Everything to do with the pilot crashing a serviceable aeroplane on people doing their normal business on a road outside an airfield.

[tucumseh]

The Hunter Crashed due to pilot error. Everything to do with the pilot crashing a serviceable aeroplane on people doing their normal business on a road outside an airfield.

I'm afraid your claim as to serviceability is wrong.

The AAIB report confirmed it was neither airworthy, serviceable, nor fit for purpose. The pilot was not told this.

Regardless of any airmanship shortfalls (which I cannot and do not comment on), no pilot should be given an aircraft in such an appalling state.

We await an explanation from the CAA as to why the airworthiness certification was based on the premise that the RAF (not MoD) was the Hunter Design Authority, and therefore responsible for the Safety Case and an Aircraft Document Set which the AAIB reported was decades out-of-date.

MoD later confirmed it was NOT the Aircraft Design Authority, further proving significant liability on the part of the CAA.

You never just look at the final act. It's moronic.

[Diff Tail Shim]

I'm afraid your claim as to serviceability is wrong.

The AAIB report confirmed it was neither airworthy, serviceable, nor fit for purpose. The pilot was not told this.

Regardless of any airmanship shortfalls (which I cannot and do not comment on), no pilot should be given an aircraft in such an appalling state.

We await an explanation from the CAA as to why the airworthiness certification was based on the premise that the RAF (not MoD) was the Hunter Design Authority, and therefore responsible for the Safety Case and an Aircraft Document Set which the AAIB reported was decades out-of-date.

MoD later confirmed it was NOT the Aircraft Design Authority, further proving significant liability on the part of the CAA.

You never just look at the final act. It's moronic.

BCAR A8 is a pile of rubbish compared to Part M. Argee on your points that the aircraft should not have been flying. However it crashed due to a badly flown manoeuvre by the pilot flying it.

[langleybaston]

As mere self-loading freight, I keep up with this sad thread from time to time.

If ever "an accident waiting to happen" has ever applied to any accident, this one is surely it.

Unserviceable aircraft. Non-current pilot. Inadequate supervision. No ground mitigations present.
And seemingly nobody to take the rap. Why am I not surprised?

[idle bystander]

I'm afraid your claim as to serviceability is wrong.

The AAIB report confirmed it was neither airworthy, serviceable, nor fit for purpose. The pilot was not told this.

Regardless of any airmanship shortfalls (which I cannot and do not comment on), no pilot should be given an aircraft in such an appalling state.

We await an explanation from the CAA as to why the airworthiness certification was based on the premise that the RAF (not MoD) was the Hunter Design Authority, and therefore responsible for the Safety Case and an Aircraft Document Set which the AAIB reported was decades out-of-date.

MoD later confirmed it was NOT the Aircraft Design Authority, further proving significant liability on the part of the CAA.

You never just look at the final act. It's moronic.
You may very well be right that the aircraft was unsserviceable, but that has nothing to do with the accident. No-one has made any claims that the aircraft failed the pilot in any way. The failure was entirely his. There were failures by others that:
put this unqualified pilot in charge of the aricraft, and
approved a display plan that put the public at risk
but none of these were in any way related to airworthiness of the poor old hunter, the opportunity of flying which was no doubt enthusiasticly grabbed by the pilot concerned.

[tucumseh]

Idle B (and Diff)

It's not that I 'may very well be right', it's that I'm simply repeating the conclusions of he AAIB, which I agree with. And where they did not comment or explain, I'm relaying the meaning of the evidence they reproduced. (e.g. the incorrect certification). Unfortunately, the legal ruling meant there was little opportunity to discuss technical details, like the fuel pump being completely buggered.

Had the CAA got the facts right, then the aircraft would not have been flying. That's a root cause, in the same way the pilot's actions were. (In saying that I'm accepting the word of pilots here, coupled with his own admissions). Elsewhere, there were many Contributory and Aggravating factors. Each is part of an insidious chain, and the opportunity was there to break that chain long before the pilot climbed in.

I'd like to understand the CAA's thinking when predicating the Airworthiness Approval Note on the RAF being the Aircraft Design Authority. If they were, that would be the largest project team in MoD. Did they not even ask MoD? Does someone not go through the certification and double check the assumptions? And it's pretty clear MoD weren't told of this assumption, because when it was pointed out they very quickly refuted it. Given the duties of a Design Authority, the required output, and the pilot's complete dependency on it, there was simply no legal authority to fly that aeroplane. I came to realise long ago that pilots tend not to think of this, because it's taken as a given that the legal and technical audit trail resulting to them being given an aircraft to fly has been satisfied. After all, the grown ups in the CAA tell them it has.

I think you're probably right when saying the pilot grabbed an opportunity. I guess many would. But I'd like to hear his response if asked 'What would you have done if told the aircraft was manisfestly unairworthy and unserviceable?' If he said 'Fly it', then that would be a far greater sin than the error of airmanship he made. The obvious question is - Why wasn't he given that opportunity?

[typerated]

The Hunter Crashed due to pilot error. Everything to do with the pilot crashing a serviceable aeroplane on people doing their normal business on a road outside an airfield.

and the CAA is also guilty for letting him (and others like him ) be approved for low level aerobatics in front of a crowd with minimal currency. I'm surprised he was deemed current enough not to be dual!

I'm also amazed at their response to move the flight line (slightly ) further away from the crowd line and call it job done.

[fdr]

Idle B (and Diff)

It's not that I 'may very well be right', it's that I'm simply repeating the conclusions of he AAIB, which I agree with. And where they did not comment or explain, I'm relaying the meaning of the evidence they reproduced. (e.g. the incorrect certification). Unfortunately, the legal ruling meant there was little opportunity to discuss technical details, like the fuel pump being completely buggered.

Had the CAA got the facts right, then the aircraft would not have been flying. That's a root cause, in the same way the pilot's actions were. (In saying that I'm accepting the word of pilots here, coupled with his own admissions). Elsewhere, there were many Contributory and Aggravating factors. Each is part of an insidious chain, and the opportunity was there to break that chain long before the pilot climbed in.

I'd like to understand the CAA's thinking when predicating the Airworthiness Approval Note on the RAF being the Aircraft Design Authority. If they were, that would be the largest project team in MoD. Did they not even ask MoD? Does someone not go through the certification and double check the assumptions? And it's pretty clear MoD weren't told of this assumption, because when it was pointed out they very quickly refuted it. Given the duties of a Design Authority, the required output, and the pilot's complete dependency on it, there was simply no legal authority to fly that aeroplane. I came to realise long ago that pilots tend not to think of this, because it's taken as a given that the legal and technical audit trail resulting to them being given an aircraft to fly has been satisfied. After all, the grown ups in the CAA tell them it has.

I think you're probably right when saying the pilot grabbed an opportunity. I guess many would. But I'd like to hear his response if asked 'What would you have done if told the aircraft was manisfestly unairworthy and unserviceable?' If he said 'Fly it', then that would be a far greater sin than the error of airmanship he made. The obvious question is - Why wasn't he given that opportunity?




?



Whaaat? Are we saying that flying an aircraft that is a former military aircraft, withdrawn from service half a century ago, which flies under a PTF, is not airworthy as there is a question as to who was the approving office for the Military COA that the aircraft had around the time that the Wright Bros had tired of trying to chase flight attendants with bicycles and decided that a natty cap and bars would serve better?

I presume you wish to terminate the BBMF at the same time? After all, they are not CS-LIGHT/Part 23, or CS-LARGE/Part 25 and therefore should not be gracing the skies and threatening the public with the potential for a cloudy with a chance of meatball event. The Hunter crashed as the apogee of the manoeuvre did not have sufficient blue space below it for the speed that the aircraft was at, and the g that it could sustain to keep the shiny bits all in one piece. If the UK wishes to vacate the skies with the aircraft that are used to show the heritage of the country, which is a show of respect to those that have dedicated to protecting the very turf that your comment appears to be objecting to having their demonstration continue, then, please make sure I get an invite to the auction, there is a whole bunch of these that I would like to find a home in a country that is not run by tossers.

IMHO. If you can show any evidence that the aircraft crashed as the CAA or the RAF were remiss in 0.03 grams of paperwork stuck to the side of the cockpit, then I may reconsider the position that has been presented. I have less than 1,000 hours flying ex military high performance aircraft and only 5000 in uniform flying some state aircraft that were basely able to keep up with the ones I owned. If we enter a vertical manoeuvre and have failed to verify our energy state at the top of the manoeuvre, then in the unlikely event that we are still around to comment thereafter, I doubt that I would be complaining that the AFM was in Russian, and was last updated when Robin Olds was pushing tin over the highlands of North VietNam. To blame the CAA for this as far as the aircraft documentation goes is embarrassing. Again, if you guys don't want them, there are a lot of guys in other countries that would be happy to take them. (I prefer T-birds, it tempers one from getting too close to the edge of sanity). [The other 22,000 hours is common or garden heavies, R&D and certification, so maybe my opinion is irrelevant]

The Manoeuvre done on this occasion was badly done, and the fact that the pilot suggests that the event that took the lives of many other people was a medical condition that impacted his competency is not a grand basis to then come back and say, "I'm better now, whatever that was is over, can I go and do some more please?" If that is assumed to be prudent by the CAA and courts of the land, then perhaps y'all should turn up somewhere else where the barking mad is becoming the norm.

:}

[GeeRam]

I'd like to understand the CAA's thinking when predicating the Airworthiness Approval Note on the RAF being the Aircraft Design Authority.

That did seem a staggering statement, given that pretty much any average aviation spotter would likely tell you DA would be held by BAe given its inheritance of all Hawker designs, just as the CAA knew it was BAe in its dealings with the Vulcan, BAe having inherited the DA for all Avro/EE/HP/Hawker/Bristol/DH/Supermarine etc designs during the amalgamation of all the old companies into HS and BAC and then BAe.

[Chugalug2]

It is rather depressing that after all the airworthiness related fatal accident threads to be found in this forum, people can still refer to airworthiness (or more appropriately the lack of it) in flippant and truculent ways. Those threads account for over 100 avoidable deaths, the Mull of Kintyre crash of Chinook ZD576 costing 29 deaths alone. The RAF/MOD has still failed to explain why that accident happened, given that the infamous finding of Pilot Gross Negligence by the Inquiry Reviewing Officers was overturned by SoS for Defence Liam Fox. It seems that RAF leadership shares the same cavalier views exhibited by some posting here.

Tucumseh (and I, FWIW) have not claimed that the display pilot involved was not culpable in any way for this tragedy. What he has claimed is that the aircraft was unserviceable and unairworthy. The latter can and does kill. It is a serious matter that has not only cost needless deaths but has eaten away at our national defence capability. That one lone ex-military aircraft flying on a PTF happened also to also be unairworthy would scarcely have merited comment were it not for the tragic accident it was involved in. fdr mentions the a/c of the BBMF. Like all aircraft, they should have a complete sequential library (a lot more than 0.03 grams!!!) of fully audited paperwork to confirm that they are airworthy. No point asking tucumseh about that, try the MAA (and good luck!).

This thread seems to have moved on somewhat from the OP. That is perhaps no bad thing. Instead of so much emotional and angry outcry, perhaps it is time to step back and see the wood for the trees. Whatever Hill's part in this accident, his aircraft was unairworthy and should not have been flying. How many other such aircraft are also unairworthy? No matter where the CAA places its flight line, if an aircraft is unairworthy it remains so in transit to a display, during a display, and from a display, and in an overcrowded island at that. It should be doing none of those things and remain on terra firma. That the CAA assumes ex RAF aircraft to be airworthy simply because they are ex RAF is risible. Better they be assumed to be unairworthy unless proved otherwise!

[tucumseh]

?


Whaaat? Are we saying that flying an aircraft that is a former military aircraft, withdrawn from service half a century ago, which flies under a PTF, is not airworthy as there is a question as to who was the approving office for the Military COA that the aircraft had around the time that the Wright Bros had tired of trying to chase flight attendants with bicycles and decided that a natty cap and bars would serve better?


:}


Read the AAIB report, Appendix L, Airworthiness Approval Note No:26172, Issue 2, paragraph 3.

'Approval basis. ... The Design Authority now rests with the RAF, and support is supplied, if requested, by British Aerospace, Farnborough'.

Plainly. 'if requested' applies to the RAF, as no-one else is mentioned, and it is they (the RAF, not MoD) who the CAA assume have British Aerospace under significant contract.

This was signed on 3 July 2008. It refers to that date, forward. Not decades ago. The premise is completely wrong, and always has been. MoD was asked to comment, and agreed.

Now go and read what an Aircraft Design Authority does, and delivers. Their output is a prerequisite to declaring airworthiness, which is a prerequisite to declaring serviceability. The reason why most pilots don't see what an ADA does is because these prerequisites should be done and dusted before you see the aircraft, and for the most part invisible to you. The tiny bit that is visible may indeed be 0.3 grams of paperwork. But the true ADA will have hundreds of people working on the task, at huge cost. The AAIB report is chock full of shortcuts being taken because the ADA output was simply not there.

[fdr]

The AAIB report identifies the issue of the cartridges life as an airworthiness matter and it is however the timex status of the seat had no bearing on the accident. The state of supply of cartridges is a problem for this case, not that they don't exist, they are not available for purchase in general, and that constraint conflicts with the CAP requirement as stated. CAR 632 in the AAIB report is stated to indicate that swept wing aircraft must have their ejection seat serviceable:

"CAP 632 requires the pilot escape systems of swept-wing jet aircraft, such as the Hawker Hunter, to be ‘fully serviceable’. The use of time- expired ejection seat cartridges meant that the ejection seats fitted to G-BXFI did not meet this requirement." [section 3, p201 or the AAIB report] That is not what is stated in the CAP 632, at least at rev 8.

yet:

"If an aircraft is fitted with ejection seats that are an integral part of the aircrew escape system, these should be fully serviceable for all flights. New operators must seek approval from the CAA GAU at the earliest opportunity if it is intended to operate with inert ejection seats or other escape systems, prior to inclusion in their OCM". CAP 632 rev 8, §5.7, p25,

Whether this is post the event is unknown. There are PTF aircraft that it would be unwise to operate without a live seat, there are others that are tolerable risks to the occupants depending on the environment. Having operated both inert and live, there are merits to both cases, however, what they don't do is make the aircraft unsafe to operate, and the opportunity to inert the seats existed within the rules. I would be more concerned with the conduct of aerobatic operations without an operable G-meter, that is not a good look at all, particularly in the light of a botched vertical manoeuvre. The other noted non compliances are of a lesser form than the dropping of a plug from a Boeing, cowls opening up on engines in flight, and the rest of the saga of aircraft production we have grown accustomed to. In the report, there is enough to dwell on related to the processes of maintenance but nothing that was germaine to the failure to achieve entry speed, gate height, or energy over the top. A surprise admission was that the pilot was not trained in the escape manoeuver for missing the gate conditions.

The event was a horrific tragedy, however, IMHO, airworthiness and the PTF did not directly result in the accident.

In respect to Appendix L, what is stated is an issuance of a NPTF, duly signed on 6 July 2006, for the CAA. If there is some confusion on the background, that is a matter for internal review within the CAA or delegate system to correct, however there is a required signature on the document, and that would suggest that the aircraft was legally issued a PTF. The defect in the PTF does not itself invalidate the PTF. Consider the Max8 debacle, the plane was compliant with the TC as approved by the state of manufacture. The latent defect that existed was not known, and at the time of departure the aircraft was operated IAW the TC and associated requirements. After discovery, the issue of the AOM did not alter the airworthiness of the aircraft, that arose belatedly with the issue of an EAD.

The PTF, pyros didn't cause the accident. Running out of altitude did.

[tucumseh]

fdr

It would have been nice of you to acknowledge what the Approval Note does indeed say what I said it did. You might even speculate as to why the CAA didn't bother checking with MoD/RAF. Notably, at the same time (2008) the main evidence to the Nimrod Review had been submitted, demonstrating that the RAF/MoD had slashed the funding for such contracts by ~28% in the 3 years 1991-94, and it had never recovered. Waste of money apparently.

As to your new issue, at 1.18.15.2 the AAIB note that Martin-Baker withdrew all support for legacy seats in February 2015, six months before the accident. Their reason was that the design data had become obsolete, and what had been perfectly good documentation was now inadequate due to lack of training in how to apply it. (MoD denied this, saying lack of training is irrelevant). The AAIB reported that, like any good Design Authority, M-B took steps to assist an alternative source of support. What is lacking is an explanation as to how that evolved into someone being authorised to service the seats in his garden shed. Who was the Design Authority or Design Custodian for the seats at the time of the accident? As stated before, 'going there' would be highly inconvenient to the HSE and MoD, because the AAIB cited the information HSE and MoD had claimed M-B didn't provide in the Sean Cunningham case. And it raised the issue of whether the seats in Hawk T.1 were 'legacy' in this sense, because MoD chooses not to use the Design Authority approved ALARP build standard. Such a can of worms.





.

[Thoughtful_Flyer]

The AAIB report identifies the issue of the cartridges life as an airworthiness matter and it is however the timex status of the seat had no bearing on the accident.

The emergency services had to deal with a badly injured pilot who was still strapped to a live ejection seat. Presumably expired cartridges are potentially more unstable and dangerous than ones that are in date?

As an aside, given the danger these seats pose in the event of an accident where they haven't been fired, for whatever reason, and indeed the risk of accidental activation on the ground (as demonstrated tragically by the Red Arrows accident) should they even be allowed in vintage aircraft in civilian hands? After all the Red Arrows seat accident happened to very current professionals with ever resource at their disposal.

[GeeRam]

As an aside, given the danger these seats pose in the event of an accident where they haven't been fired, for whatever reason, and indeed the risk of accidental activation on the ground (as demonstrated tragically by the Red Arrows accident) should they even be allowed in vintage aircraft in civilian hands? After all the Red Arrows seat accident happened to very current professionals with ever resource at their disposal.

Well, as far as the UK is concerned that's largely irrelevant now, given the new CAA rules, plus MB's own withdraw of support for civvie owned 6 months prior to the Shoreham crash.

[dervish]

Seems to me that rather than wanting safety to be managed properly, some are advocating that it’s okay to somehow retrospectively waive parts of the process after an accident. Surely the general principle of not compromising on safety applies, and also taking equally seriously safety failures that the investigation identifies, even if not directly related to the immediate cause?The pilot was given a non-airworthy aircraft. If he hadn’t been, the accident wouldn’t have happened.

Sorry, unfamiliar with today’s terms. “Airworthiness certification” can’t be issued until the regulator is satisfied the aircraft can be put to safe use, which requires aircrew and groundcrew training. So training is a consideration in certification. If Mr Hill wasn’t properly trained, then the certification and safety cases were no longer sound. Looks like the CAA issue a lot of regulations, but don’t make sure they’re implemented. That rings a bell!!

[pasta]

The pilot was given a non-airworthy aircraft. If he hadn’t been, the accident wouldn’t have happened.
Not sure I agree with this part. Yes, the pilot was given a non-airworthy aircraft. However, if he'd been given an airworthy aircraft the accident could still have happened.

[Diff Tail Shim]

Not sure I agree with this part. Yes, the pilot was given a non-airworthy aircraft. However, if he'd been given an airworthy aircraft the accident could still have happened.
The accident still would have happened. He looked at the tech log and it was clear. Assume it was a MoD form 700 hunter layout. When ever did a pilot ever read a CLR or short forecast. My present employer only has a maintenance statement for Check to Check "A" only and LC1s as scheduled and B ADDs with limited deferment dates in the Tech Log with limited OOPS statements if requied. Anything else is computer recorded and thrown out by planning docs. Pilots do not see that.

[falcon900]

And let’s not forget that the safety case was predicated on there being no static traffic at the junction. The traffic lights were supposed to have been disabled. Without the traffic queue, the casualties would surely have been fewer.
And while advocating not forgetting material facts, let’s remember AH was found not guilty. Love it, hate it, our courts are generally very good.

[Diff Tail Shim]

And let’s not forget that the safety case was predicated on there being no static traffic at the junction. The traffic lights were supposed to have been disabled. Without the traffic queue, the casualties would surely have been fewer.
And while advocating not forgetting material facts, let’s remember AH was found not guilty. Love it, hate it, our courts are generally very good.
What have traffic lights got to do with Mr Hill crashing a working aeroplane?

[fdr]

fdr

It would have been nice of you to acknowledge what the Approval Note does indeed say what I said it did. You might even speculate as to why the CAA didn't bother checking with MoD/RAF. Notably, at the same time (2008) the main evidence to the Nimrod Review had been submitted, demonstrating that the RAF/MoD had slashed the funding for such contracts by ~28% in the 3 years 1991-94, and it had never recovered. Waste of money apparently.

As to your new issue, at 1.18.15.2 the AAIB note that Martin-Baker withdrew all support for legacy seats in February 2015, six months before the accident. Their reason was that the design data had become obsolete, and what had been perfectly good documentation was now inadequate due to lack of training in how to apply it. (MoD denied this, saying lack of training is irrelevant). The AAIB reported that, like any good Design Authority, M-B took steps to assist an alternative source of support. What is lacking is an explanation as to how that evolved into someone being authorised to service the seats in his garden shed. Who was the Design Authority or Design Custodian for the seats at the time of the accident? As stated before, 'going there' would be highly inconvenient to the HSE and MoD, because the AAIB cited the information HSE and MoD had claimed M-B didn't provide in the Sean Cunningham case. And it raised the issue of whether the seats in Hawk T.1 were 'legacy' in this sense, because MoD chooses not to use the Design Authority approved ALARP build standard. Such a can of worms. . Appendix L includes a signed and authorised approval. What is your malfunction of note that is pertinent to the crash of this aircraft?

Whether that is correctly actioned is a matter of process of the delegate of the CAA, it did not alter the airworthiness at the Time of issue.

As far as the MB seats go, you are giving a compelling basis to terminate all legacy fast jets from demonstration. Well done.

When those of us that have owned or operated ex mil aircraft do so, we are assuming risks inherent in their use. It doesn't matter if it is a Mustang, B-29, or Mosquito, to assume that they meet 2024 CS rules is asinine. The objective of a PTF is to manage risk to the public, there is no particular emphasis on the safety of the individual that is on board the aircraft. That is a risk that is accepted in taking aircraft that will have a 120-140 kt or greater approach speed and flying it without a hot seat. My most recent live seats have used FSR sourced pyros, and to have those live we actually had to get a production line restarted. Vlad's actions put that out of availability now. Without in date pyros, then the seats should be inerted. At that point, the choice is to fly with cold seats or not fly at all.

The seat state did not cause the accident. You are however insinuating a blame to the operator for what was a confusion in the process of the issuance of the PTF. The PTF did exist, had an inked signature on the document as far as the evidence that you presume I need to acknowledge states....exactly what???? It is Appendix L, it is signed, and whatever curiosity exists prior to signing that does not alter the fact that it exists. You refer on multiple occasions to facts that are not in evidence, perhaps you have the source documents for that, I do not know and really don't particularly care. The parties that may care are the CAA system that has oversight on the process of issuance of PTFs, and the review system within CAA.

The rest of the world will be quite happy taking some of the lower Vs aircraft that had seats in them that are precluded since 2022 in operating where they had MB seats, as the inerting of the seats, while increasing the risk to the crew only alters risk to the public by making the skies quiet in the absence of these exemplars of our history and service.

To the emergency services/RFF attending an accident scene where a live seat exists, there is risk, it is directly related to the seat. Where the pyros have timed, then the manner by which they are deactivated is normally by removal of the pyros. Should the seats have been inerted? As they were timex, and no approval existed to extend their life towards the shelf life, then yes, they should have been. Did that materially impact the casualties in this tragedy? No. The casualties were the direct consequence of an error in flightpath/energy management, and had nothing to do with the status of the seat, the curiosity in the PTF.

You are however acknowledged to be a component of the cadre that will remove flying examples of our aviation and military legacy from the air, so, well done, Sir! Kudos for removing the risk from the masses. However, as demonstrations (for reasons that are unfathomable) serve as a reminder of what those that served did in the past, whether a Hurricane, Ferret, or SLR, and are often a basis for some of those that serve thereafter as a point in time where their interest in service was piqued... then perhaps reinstating conscription would be also worthwhile.

While you are active in terminating ex-mil aircraft, perhaps you can turn your interest towards the more entertaining matters of RPT aircraft that kill more public for more inane reasons than stated in this case.

At this time, about the only supportable ejector seat is the FO-1, and that is only if Vlad stops his compensation for his stature.

[Easy Street]

And while advocating not forgetting material facts, let’s remember AH was found not guilty. Love it, hate it, our courts are generally very good.

Interesting time to be arguing that. I tend to think that the Post Office scandal has made clear just how vulnerable our courts are to being misled by bulls*** presented as fact by expert witnesses. But perhaps that's just me.

[Diff Tail Shim]

Appendix L includes a signed and authorised approval. What is your malfunction of note that is pertinent to the crash of this aircraft?

Whether that is correctly actioned is a matter of process of the delegate of the CAA, it did not alter the airworthiness at the Time of issue.

As far as the MB seats go, you are giving a compelling basis to terminate all legacy fast jets from demonstration. Well done.

When those of us that have owned or operated ex mil aircraft do so, we are assuming risks inherent in their use. It doesn't matter if it is a Mustang, B-29, or Mosquito, to assume that they meet 2024 CS rules is asinine. The objective of a PTF is to manage risk to the public, there is no particular emphasis on the safety of the individual that is on board the aircraft. That is a risk that is accepted in taking aircraft that will have a 120-140 kt or greater approach speed and flying it without a hot seat. My most recent live seats have used FSR sourced pyros, and to have those live we actually had to get a production line restarted. Vlad's actions put that out of availability now. Without in date pyros, then the seats should be inerted. At that point, the choice is to fly with cold seats or not fly at all.

The seat state did not cause the accident. You are however insinuating a blame to the operator for what was a confusion in the process of the issuance of the PTF. The PTF did exist, had an inked signature on the document as far as the evidence that you presume I need to acknowledge states....exactly what???? It is Appendix L, it is signed, and whatever curiosity exists prior to signing that does not alter the fact that it exists. You refer on multiple occasions to facts that are not in evidence, perhaps you have the source documents for that, I do not know and really don't particularly care. The parties that may care are the CAA system that has oversight on the process of issuance of PTFs, and the review system within CAA.

The rest of the world will be quite happy taking some of the lower Vs aircraft that had seats in them that are precluded since 2022 in operating where they had MB seats, as the inerting of the seats, while increasing the risk to the crew only alters risk to the public by making the skies quiet in the absence of these exemplars of our history and service.

To the emergency services/RFF attending an accident scene where a live seat exists, there is risk, it is directly related to the seat. Where the pyros have timed, then the manner by which they are deactivated is normally by removal of the pyros. Should the seats have been inerted? As they were timex, and no approval existed to extend their life towards the shelf life, then yes, they should have been. Did that materially impact the casualties in this tragedy? No. The casualties were the direct consequence of an error in flightpath/energy management, and had nothing to do with the status of the seat, the curiosity in the PTF.

You are however acknowledged to be a component of the cadre that will remove flying examples of our aviation and military legacy from the air, so, well done, Sir! Kudos for removing the risk from the masses. However, as demonstrations (for reasons that are unfathomable) serve as a reminder of what those that served did in the past, whether a Hurricane, Ferret, or SLR, and are often a basis for some of those that serve thereafter as a point in time where their interest in service was piqued... then perhaps reinstating conscription would be also worthwhile.

While you are active in terminating ex-mil aircraft, perhaps you can turn your interest towards the more entertaining matters of RPT aircraft that kill more public for more inane reasons than stated in this case.

At this time, about the only supportable ejector seat is the FO-1, and that is only if Vlad stops his compensation for his stature.
Watch out for CAA surveyor that oversee that type. He is not the most competent in knowledge. I was in disbelief on his knowledge of a 5A1. You know what a 5A1 is?

[fdr]

Watch out for CAA surveyor that oversee that type. He is not the most competent in knowledge. I was in disbelief on his knowledge of a 5A1. You know what a 5A1 is?

Are we referring to the MAA TAE 5000 series or to the Master Servicing Schedule such as the BAC T5A's A.P. 109B.2303.5A1? That is as understand from a review of the MAA DSA structure last year for bilateral military approvals would presumably fit now under the UK DSA's 4000 Series: Continuing Airworthiness Engineering Regulations (CAE).

With respect to the Airworthiness of the Hunter, the UK CAA spoke to that in their action on terminating the safety directive that had grounded the aircraft.

Reference: SD-2015/003
Title: Hawker Hunter Series Aeroplanes on UK Civil Register
Description: On 6 July 2017 the CAA withdrew the Safety Directive which grounded all Hawker Hunter aircraft on the UK register. This Safety Directive was introduced in the immediate aftermath of the tragic Shoreham airshow accident as a precautionary and unprecedented measure.

This action is a result of the CAA concluding there were no airworthiness issues relating to the Hawker Hunter aircraft that caused or contributed to the accident. This is based on our own extensive review and the AAIB’s final accident report.

All aircraft of this type will have to comply with enhanced maintenance and inspection requirements and, following normal practice, secure all relevant permits and other approvals before they are allowed to fly again.

The restriction on aerobatic manoeuvres by ex-military jet aircraft, now including the Hawker Hunter, at overland airshows remains in place. This means that they continue to be restricted to flypasts and associated manoeuvres only.

Status: Cancelled on 6 July 2017


Like it or not, the UK CAA reviewed the AAIB report on Shoreham and made their determination which is being challenged by those on this forum. The UK CAA, like the signatory have the right to conduct their duties and make determinations. If those are disagreed with, then the party that is objecting to the manner by which the CAA conducts its duties can presumably make representations to the UK CAA or to the DoT, or to their local MP.

None of this alters the stubborn fact the aircraft itself didn't cause this accident.

There was a single PIC determining the aircraft's trajectory, and stuff happens. My concern is that where cognitive impairment was raised as a mitigation of the event previously, how does someone then believe that it is reasonable to return to flying status medically? Latches applies does it not?

[tucumseh]

Appendix L includes a signed and authorised approval. What is your malfunction of note that is pertinent to the crash of this aircraft?

Whether that is correctly actioned is a matter of process of the delegate of the CAA, it did not alter the airworthiness at the Time of issue.

As far as the MB seats go, you are giving a compelling basis to terminate all legacy fast jets from demonstration. Well done.


.

No, it is not I who is 'giving a compelling basis...' It is a combination of:

a. Martin-Baker (correctly) withdrawing support for old seat designs in legacy aircraft, negating the Safety Cases and hence the airworthiness approval, and;

b. The apparent confusion caused by the CAA allowing inert seats in some aircraft, but not in others; and other EU countries mandating inert seats.

(I don't know what the CAA's argument is; they tend to state things without explanation or offering procedures for compliance. Like MoD's MAA. And it wasn't said how much notice Martin-Baker gave. The wording seems to indicate there was a hard cut-off in February 2015. Was there prior warning, and this was just the end-of life date? There seems little doubt this was in part influenced by the Hawk XX177 accident in 2011, where the evidence showed MoD had lost all corporate knowledge of how to maintain a seat with such an old design, and totally disregarded Martin-Baker's servicing instructions. M-B knew this immediately, when MoD visited the factory within days and admitted not using the correct tools, and not following correct procedures. That would have raised alarm bells, from which I infer they gave notice).

As a result of these decisions there MUST have been a major contract let on the Aircraft Design Authority to assess impact. If any aircraft type using the same seat, or variation thereof, was to be allowed to continue flying, then a decision had to be taken on various issues such as emergency egress. Who paid for that? Is there an 'Owner's Club' who share the costs by agreement? Perhaps the major user funds it and everyone else gets a freebie. Was the Shoreham accident aircraft flying under a Concession pending a decision? Given (e.g.) the cartridge issue outlined by the AAIB, I'm not sure I would have much faith in the Approved Maintenance Organisation knowing where to begin.

Which brings up the recurring point that many people miss. An Approved Maintenance Organisation is not necessarily a Design Authority. They can be, but there's a difference between Accreditation and Appointment. MoD's new regs make the same mistake, and it's dumbed down the entire safety management process to a dangerous level. Similarly, in this case, the CAA and AAIB, where the latter argued that the accident aircraft AMO was in every way an ADA. No, they 'do' (badly, according to the AAIB) continuing airworthiness, not maintaining airworthiness.

As for the rest of your post. Your first question rejects the premise upon which airworthiness approval is granted, and all accident investigations procedures. In that we shall have to agree to disagree. I happen to agree with the regulations and procedures, but also agree they are not implemented well. (The thrust of the Nimrod Review, which simply repeated the evidence presented to it). I think it is for you to explain why you don't, or which ones you would be willing to ditch. They're not always perfect by any means, but there is world-wide agreement on these two fundamental issues. A slightly different way of making the same point Dervish did above.

[Thoughtful_Flyer]

The AAIB report identifies the issue of the cartridges life as an airworthiness matter and it is however the timex status of the seat had no bearing on the accident. The state of supply of cartridges is a problem for this case, not that they don't exist, they are not available for purchase in general, and that constraint conflicts with the CAP requirement as stated. CAR 632 in the AAIB report is stated to indicate that swept wing aircraft must have their ejection seat serviceable:

"CAP 632 requires the pilot escape systems of swept-wing jet aircraft, such as the Hawker Hunter, to be ‘fully serviceable’. The use of time- expired ejection seat cartridges meant that the ejection seats fitted to G-BXFI did not meet this requirement." [section 3, p201 or the AAIB report] That is not what is stated in the CAP 632, at least at rev 8.

yet:

"If an aircraft is fitted with ejection seats that are an integral part of the aircrew escape system, these should be fully serviceable for all flights. New operators must seek approval from the CAA GAU at the earliest opportunity if it is intended to operate with inert ejection seats or other escape systems, prior to inclusion in their OCM". CAP 632 rev 8, §5.7, p25,

Whether this is post the event is unknown. There are PTF aircraft that it would be unwise to operate without a live seat, there are others that are tolerable risks to the occupants depending on the environment. Having operated both inert and live, there are merits to both cases, however, what they don't do is make the aircraft unsafe to operate, and the opportunity to inert the seats existed within the rules. I would be more concerned with the conduct of aerobatic operations without an operable G-meter, that is not a good look at all, particularly in the light of a botched vertical manoeuvre. The other noted non compliances are of a lesser form than the dropping of a plug from a Boeing, cowls opening up on engines in flight, and the rest of the saga of aircraft production we have grown accustomed to. In the report, there is enough to dwell on related to the processes of maintenance but nothing that was germaine to the failure to achieve entry speed, gate height, or energy over the top. A surprise admission was that the pilot was not trained in the escape manoeuver for missing the gate conditions.

The event was a horrific tragedy, however, IMHO, airworthiness and the PTF did not directly result in the accident.

In respect to Appendix L, what is stated is an issuance of a NPTF, duly signed on 6 July 2006, for the CAA. If there is some confusion on the background, that is a matter for internal review within the CAA or delegate system to correct, however there is a required signature on the document, and that would suggest that the aircraft was legally issued a PTF. The defect in the PTF does not itself invalidate the PTF. Consider the Max8 debacle, the plane was compliant with the TC as approved by the state of manufacture. The latent defect that existed was not known, and at the time of departure the aircraft was operated IAW the TC and associated requirements. After discovery, the issue of the AOM did not alter the airworthiness of the aircraft, that arose belatedly with the issue of an EAD.

The PTF, pyros didn't cause the accident. Running out of altitude did.

I don't think anybody is saying that they did.

However, the accident has served to highlight a whole number of safety issues / failings that otherwise may not have been noticed. I assume you are not suggesting that any "inconvenient" regulations should be ignored just so that historic fast jets can wow the crowds?

Also, as I have said earlier, I fail to see how in most circumstances pilots can have sufficient relevant currency on these types of aircraft to safely fly aerobatic routines in public. I have also mentioned the crash of the Gnat at a show less than a year before Shoreham. If I remember correctly the pilot had just enough total flying hours in the preceding year to maintain a PPL! Yet he was legally qualified to display a historic swept wing fast jet at a public show! Something very wrong with that situation.

[Easy Street]

Also, as I have said earlier, I fail to see how in most circumstances pilots can have sufficient relevant currency on these types of aircraft to safely fly aerobatic routines in public. I have also mentioned the crash of the Gnat at a show less than a year before Shoreham. If I remember correctly the pilot had just enough total flying hours in the preceding year to maintain a PPL! Yet he was legally qualified to display a historic swept wing fast jet at a public show! Something very wrong with that situation.

I completely agree. The Gnat pilot not only had inadequate currency but woefully inadequate total experience, having been medically discharged from the RAF while still a student at Valley. He, along with another Gnat Display Team (!) member whose only military flying was on a University Air Squadron (!!), was presented on the operator's publicity material as an experienced former RAF pilot. I regret to say that this clown show was indulged by a genuinely experienced veteran QFI, enjoying a bit of Gnat flying underwritten by what effectively were "pay to fly" display pilots with more money from their business careers than sense. The dead pilot left a wife and young children. I wonder what the QFI's reflections are.

[GeeRam]

I have also mentioned the crash of the Gnat at a show less than a year before Shoreham. If I remember correctly the pilot had just enough total flying hours in the preceding year to maintain a PPL! Yet he was legally qualified to display a historic swept wing fast jet at a public show!

The Gnat crash at Car Fest was barely 5 weeks before the Shoreham crash.

[Thoughtful_Flyer]

The Gnat crash at Car Fest was barely 5 weeks before the Shoreham crash.

Thanks for that. However my points relating to it remain and I still feel that in many respects (apart obviously from the outcome) it raised even more concerning issues than Shoreham, yet has received very little publicity.

It was also pointed out earlier in this thread that a tiny variation in the Gnat's trajectory could have lead to an even bigger catastrophe than the Shoreham crash.

[Thoughtful_Flyer]

One further related point....

Some years before the Shoreham (and Gnat) accidents I remember seeing the Hunter (and also the Jet Provost) being displayed at Old Warden on several occasions. From what I remember these were "flat" displays with some elegant top side passes round the famous curved display line. Surely this is a vastly safer way of displaying this type of aircraft for all kinds of obvious reasons?

[fdr]

The admission that the pilot had never trained the escape manoeuvre for the sequence he was flying pretty much sums up the risks that were being assumed. To do so would not have taken a great deal of flight time, and could have been accomplished at a height that would permit learning from errors. Seeing these aircraft fly does not need a show of exacting skills and daring. most of the crowd can't see the aircraft when it flies down close to the ground, and noise is not particular to much other than r^4. Conducting low level aeros with verticals benefits from a level of proficiency, however smoking holes exist in various locations from highly proficient operators who had bad days. Occasionally, level demonstrations go bad, but that is most often due to mechanical failure.


No, it is not I who is 'giving a compelling basis...' It is a combination of:
a. Martin-Baker (correctly) withdrawing support for old seat designs in legacy aircraft, negating the Safety Cases and hence the airworthiness approval, and;
b. The apparent confusion caused by the CAA allowing inert seats in some aircraft, but not in others; and other EU countries mandating inert seats.

It's about 5 years since I strapped into a hot seat, (not an MB) and about 15 since last sitting in a MB seat, which was inert. In between, both live and inerted Russian seats of various voltages. MB has done what they think is a good idea, I personally disagree, but they are free to do what they do. There are aircraft that I would not taxi without a live seat, there are others that the seat is just a discomfort to the driver. In all of these cases, live or inert, the airworthiness was not affected, the operator had a choice as to what risk they were prepared to take for their occupants. As far as the CAP goes, unless thee is one that predates rev 8 that states otherwise, the UK CAA does not mandate the seat to be live, it is an election by the applicant for their conditions of the NPTF. There is no confusion in the CAA accepting one operator electing top paint their plane pink and another wanting their plain in plaid, nor is there with an election for a seat being inert or not. MB, while undertaking a CYA did nothing to further the interests of safety by denying support for what you refer to as old, and what the counter view is tried and tested. My greasy "old" wright cyclone may be old, but they are pretty well tested by time as well. Fortunately, there are parts of the world that permit the operator to determine the risk they are prepared to assume, where there is no increase in risk to the public. There are also a few other seats out there, once Vlad stops being uppity.

[tucumseh]

MB has done what they think is a good idea, I personally disagree, but they are free to do what they do.

Thanks for that. As I suggested before, have a look at what an appointed Design Authority is required to do. It's far more than the accredited Aircraft Maintenance Organisation.

You have your experience flying aircraft, which I respect. I have mine, appointing and managing Design Authorities amongst other things. And, importantly, withdrawing that appointment if they don't abide by the regulations. The decision to withdraw an appointment is 100% one of safety. No notice is required. The last time I did it, I stopped a meeting, told the managing director I was suspending his appointment due to breach of contract (making his only experienced engineer on one product, a safety critical aircraft system, redundant) and said he could phone me any time to tell me when he'd reinstated him or employed someone of equal skill and experience. It took him 5 seconds to make his decision. These contracts are very expensive, for a reason. They are the means by which companies retain their corporate knowledge. And the means by which aircraft can be given certification, and retain it.

Martin-Baker acted as I would have expected and required them to. In being open and honest about their inability to support very old designs, which no longer meet modern standards, they met a OBLIGATION. If they didn't do that, I would deem them unfit to hold the appointment. In this sense, they are not free to do what they want to do.

As I said, I suspect an important factor was the MoD/RAF's decision to completely ignore their advice on how to maintain the seats, and then have to listen to MoD and the HSE perjure themselves in court in a (successful) effort to shift blame for a fatal accident.

[GeeRam]

Thanks for that. However my points relating to it remain and I still feel that in many respects (apart obviously from the outcome) it raised even more concerning issues than Shoreham, yet has received very little publicity.

It was also pointed out earlier in this thread that a tiny variation in the Gnat's trajectory could have lead to an even bigger catastrophe than the Shoreham crash.

Indeed, but it was largely because of the ground fatalities at Shoreham which thus overshadowed the Gnat crash just 5 weeks earlier, and I don't think the AAIB prelim report on the Gnat crash had even come out when Shoreham happened....??
Ironically both aircraft were operated out of North Weald.

[GeeRam]

One further related point....

Some years before the Shoreham (and Gnat) accidents I remember seeing the Hunter (and also the Jet Provost) being displayed at Old Warden on several occasions. From what I remember these were "flat" displays with some elegant top side passes round the famous curved display line. Surely this is a vastly safer way of displaying this type of aircraft for all kinds of obvious reasons?

There were indeed many such displays of Hunters in the previous years to Shoreham by higher time ex-Hunter service pilots, such as Jonathan Whalley, Craig Penrice, Dave Roome and the late Mark Hanna etc. There a very good in-cockpit film on Youtube of a display by Mark at Duxford in the Hunter, with excellent overdubbed commentary by Mark, and this display contrasts dramatically. IIRC, Mark Hanna was on the final TWU course that used the Hunter.

[Chugalug2]

fdr Post 1105:-
The seat state did not cause the accident. You are however insinuating a blame to the operator for what was a confusion in the process of the issuance of the PTF. The PTF did exist, had an inked signature on the document as far as the evidence that you presume I need to acknowledge states....exactly what???? It is Appendix L, it is signed, and whatever curiosity exists prior to signing that does not alter the fact that it exists. You refer on multiple occasions to facts that are not in evidence, perhaps you have the source documents for that, I do not know and really don't particularly care. The parties that may care are the CAA system that has oversight on the process of issuance of PTFs, and the review system within CAA.


Just to be clear (and apologies for the late response), are you saying that as long as something is signed off then that the system (a/c, seat, whatever) can be assumed to be airworthy and in compliance with the regs? At the Operator's level perhaps, unless they suspect to the contrary of course, but that is surely the crux of this debate. What is being talked of here is the post accident process of an inquiry, and sadly of an inquest, into so many avoidable deaths. Chinook ZD576 was signed off by a Release to Service into RAF squadron operation, but this was contrary to the CA release and, inked signature or no, was illegal! As a result 29 people, the full complement of pax and crew, were killed. An MOD/RAF cover up has existed to this day, despite the SoS for Defence setting aside the infamous finding of Gross Pilot Negligence.

The point of an accident inquiry is to attempt to determine all the safety shortcomings involved in an aircraft accident, whether or not they were directly involved in the accident. This inquiry should have revealed that the aircraft was both unserviceable and unairworthy, and to determine why that was. It didn't do so and hence laid the foundations for the next accident, fatal or otherwise. In failing to do that it protected the Civil Aviation Regulator (and the Military one for that matter) from being shown as having failed in one of its prime responsibilities, to ensure that the aircraft it regulates are airworthy or, failing that, grounded. Whatever the certification type; RTS, CofA, PTF, etc, that is the most fundamental responsibility of the CAA and MAA. Both it seems have failed in that, the MAA at least being a serial offender. Now it seems this malignancy is also infecting civil aviation. That is why an Air Accident Investigator must always be entirely independent of the Air Regulator.

[beamer]

I read the full report and have followed with interest these discussions. I am a career aviator both military and civil but have never been involved in any form of display flying. My personal conclusions are quite straight forward.

1. Aircraft, some high performance, were being flown in, and in some cases are still being flown in a manner for which they were never designed outside combat operations.

2. There are some very clever lawyers out there.

3. The pilot in the Shoreham accident made a mistake which was perhaps predictable bearing in mind his apparent record.

4. There are no winners in this.

[falcon900]

What have traffic lights got to do with Mr Hill crashing a working aeroplane?
The point is that there are others whose actions deserve scrutiny. I am most definitely not in the camp of those who may be seeking to exonerate him, but it would be fair to say that his actions have already been subject to a fair degree of scrutiny, including in a court of law.
The significance of the traffic lights is that the risk of a displaying aircraft crashing there had been identified before the show. The safety case upon which the decision to go ahead with the show was based called for the lights to be set to Green so there would not be the usual line of stationary cars waiting for them to change during displays.
The lights were not set to Green, nor as I understand it was this even requested of the council. As had been identified as a risk, an aircraft crashed into a line of cars waiting for the lights to change, with the tragic and significant loss of life which has kept this incident in the spotlight for so much longer than the Gnat incident.
The failure by the organisers to implement the safety case did not cause the aircraft to crash, but it was a major contributor to the magnitude of the consequences.

[falcon900]

Interesting time to be arguing that. I tend to think that the Post Office scandal has made clear just how vulnerable our courts are to being misled by bulls*** presented as fact by expert witnesses. But perhaps that's just me.
I hear you, but the post office inquiry is still a work in progress. I am inclined to wait for it rather than hand complete sovereignty in the matter over to the ITV drama department. They are due credit for finally propelling the scandal into the full public consciousness ( with some help from the fact this is an election year!) but I suspect what will emerge will be much more nuanced. Listening to some of the evidence from hands on Fujitsu programmers during the week gave some hint of that. Not seeking to promote thread drift, just a word in defence of our Courts. They are not easily or often duped.

[Chugalug2]

f900:-
Not seeking to promote thread drift, just a word in defence of our Courts. They are not easily or often duped.

Well they were duped enough to convict many of the PO scandal victims, and seemingly on perjured evidence. I wouldn't necessarily consider it thread drift either. Much of the evidence given to Coroners Courts, FAIs, Select Committees of both HoP, QCs, etc by MOD witnesses over the years have been somewhat selective with the truth/downright lies. Just as RAF VSOs have been protected by an Establishment cover up, not only by other RAF VSOs but; HSE, Asst Police Constables, even QC Reviews, one rather wonders if senior PO and FujitsuUK personnel will garner the same protection, rather than their subordinates. A lot in common so far with the RAF and PO scandals, it's the PBI that tends to cop it!

[Easy Street]

I hear you, but the post office inquiry is still a work in progress. I am inclined to wait for it rather than hand complete sovereignty in the matter over to the ITV drama department. They are due credit for finally propelling the scandal into the full public consciousness ( with some help from the fact this is an election year!) but I suspect what will emerge will be much more nuanced. Listening to some of the evidence from hands on Fujitsu programmers during the week gave some hint of that. Not seeking to promote thread drift, just a word in defence of our Courts. They are not easily or often duped.

As Chug says, this is not thread drift. The vulnerability of our courts to being duped by expert witnesses is precisely on point to this thread. While your attention may only have been drawn to the Post Office scandal by the TV drama, mine was not, and as such you might care to join me in having read the following:

- Mr Justice Fraser's 'Horizon Issues' judgement from the civil case in 2019
- His letter referring two of the expert witnesses from earlier prosecutions to the Director of Public Prosecutions
- The 'Clarke Advice' of 2013, disclosed in the Court of Appeal in late 2020
- The Court of Appeal judgement of 2021 quashing the first batch of convictions

All available through an easy Google search. The facts as collectively set out there are already damning enough for the reputation of the legal profession and expert witnesses, and the ongoing inquiry is making things worse, not better, in that regard. Accordingly I won't be joining you in sitting on the fence.

I am also reminded that AH's expert witness evidence was developed by a paediatrician, with no aviation medicine background, and (I may be wrong here) with some social connections into that segment of the aviation community. Try looking at that through the lens of the motivated reasoning shown by Fujitsu's expert witnesses and tell me you don't see anything to be concerned about.

Edit: in the final paragraph I've muddled up the criminal trial with the High Court hearing (https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2022/215.html) at which the Coroner sought disclosure of cockpit video, to which a paediatric oncologist friend of AH's submitted a paper about cognitive impairment which was rightly given short shrift by the court. The criminal trial had genuine expert witnesses whose evidence helped to create reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds. Oddly enough nothing more has been heard of CI since.

[dastocks]

The significance of the traffic lights is that the risk of a displaying aircraft crashing there had been identified before the show. The safety case upon which the decision to go ahead with the show was based called for the lights to be set to Green so there would not be the usual line of stationary cars waiting for them to change during displays
Can you provide a reference for this statement?
I took a very good look at the AAIB report before responding to your previous post on this topic here:
https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/619209-shoreham-airshow-crash-trial-45.html#post11356156
... so I would be very interested in finding out where this aspect of the safety case for the show was discussed *before* the accident.

[Diff Tail Shim]

The point is that there are others whose actions deserve scrutiny. I am most definitely not in the camp of those who may be seeking to exonerate him, but it would be fair to say that his actions have already been subject to a fair degree of scrutiny, including in a court of law.
The significance of the traffic lights is that the risk of a displaying aircraft crashing there had been identified before the show. The safety case upon which the decision to go ahead with the show was based called for the lights to be set to Green so there would not be the usual line of stationary cars waiting for them to change during displays.
The lights were not set to Green, nor as I understand it was this even requested of the council. As had been identified as a risk, an aircraft crashed into a line of cars waiting for the lights to change, with the tragic and significant loss of life which has kept this incident in the spotlight for so much longer than the Gnat incident.
The failure by the organisers to implement the safety case did not cause the aircraft to crash, but it was a major contributor to the magnitude of the consequences.
Your really are talking horse manure. Bloke was pole bending a control column on the edge of a stall. the video evidence was clean from the first day. If he had done that in a car, he would be in prison and no jury would have believed the rubbish from his defence Lawyer. It was the fault of the prosecution lawyers not to say that if he had "Blacked out" that the flight path of the aeroplane would have been like Jon Eggins Hawk at BOU and the aircraft unloaded in ptich. Hill was pulling the stick all the time. If he had been in a car , the jury would have sent him down.

[fdr]

Your really are talking horse manure. Bloke was pole bending a control column on the edge of a stall. the video evidence was clean from the first day. If he had done that in a car, he would be in prison and no jury would have believed the rubbish from his defence Lawyer. It was the fault of the prosecution lawyers not to say that if he had "Blacked out" that the flight path of the aeroplane would have been like Jon Eggins Hawk at BOU and the aircraft unloaded in ptich. Hill was pulling the stick all the time. If he had been in a car , the jury would have sent him down.

this case isn't "Galloping Ghost". On blacking out, which follows grey out for positive g, the elevator input would have decreased only with some certainty at the point of losing consciousness, but the term blacking out does not itself indicate the loss of consciousness. On G-LOC, a loss of consciousness, and the aircraft would have reverted to a flight path as a consequence of the trimmed speed from the THS at the time that the aircraft was last in trim. What was the story that the jury heard?

For many G-LOC cases, if the aircraft is at a high bank angle, the speed stability (AOA stability) will result in increasing loads as the spiral tightens. In this case, the wings were level, and the aircraft would pitch to achieve the in trim speed one way or the other, without intervention by the pilot. However, the pitch angle at initial ground contact suggests that there was someone pulling strenuously on the controls at that time, and that means the pilot would most likely have been conscious at that moment. The exact condition would be determinable by measurement of the stabiliser actuator if it remained anywhere near intact.

[Ridger]

I wish I had the staying power of this thread!

[dervish]

Those who think Andy Hill is solely to blame haven't been paying attention to pprune over the past 20 years!

I believe the AAIB report was not allowed in evidence? Yet was discussed at length here and available to anyone who wanted a look. Maybe the jury thought there was too much unheard evidence to convict on beyond reasonable doubt? It's a high bar when there's a report listing the defects and that the thing shouldn't have been flying.

[DaveJ75]

<hand grenade rolls gently into room...>

[DaveJ75]

Your really are talking horse manure. Bloke was pole bending a control column on the edge of a stall. the video evidence was clean from the first day. If he had done that in a car, he would be in prison and no jury would have believed the rubbish from his defence Lawyer. It was the fault of the prosecution lawyers not to say that if he had "Blacked out" that the flight path of the aeroplane would have been like Jon Eggins Hawk at BOU and the aircraft unloaded in ptich. Hill was pulling the stick all the time. If he had been in a car , the jury would have sent him down.

You might want to google '2014 Glasgow bin lorry crash'... Bloke who was was pole bending that didn't go down...

[H Peacock]

Those who think Andy Hill is solely to blame haven't been paying attention to pprune over the past 20 years!

Agreed, he’s not solely to blame for the carnage Dervish; I would opine it was about 95% down to piloting error!.

[RetiredBA/BY]

The admission that the pilot had never trained the escape manoeuvre for the sequence he was flying pretty much sums up the risks that were being assumed. To do so would not have taken a great deal of flight time, and could have been accomplished at a height that would permit learning from errors. Seeing these aircraft fly does not need a show of exacting skills and daring. most of the crowd can't see the aircraft when it flies down close to the ground, and noise is not particular to much other than r^4. Conducting low level aeros with verticals benefits from a level of proficiency, however smoking holes exist in various locations from highly proficient operators who had bad days. Occasionally, level demonstrations go bad, but that is most often due to mechanical failure.




It's about 5 years since I strapped into a hot seat, (not an MB) and about 15 since last sitting in a MB seat, which was inert. In between, both live and inerted Russian seats of various voltages. MB has done what they think is a good idea, I personally disagree, but they are free to do what they do. There are aircraft that I would not taxi without a live seat, there are others that the seat is just a discomfort to the driver. In all of these cases, live or inert, the airworthiness was not affected, the operator had a choice as to what risk they were prepared to take for their occupants. As far as the CAP goes, unless thee is one that predates rev 8 that states otherwise, the UK CAA does not mandate the seat to be live, it is an election by the applicant for their conditions of the NPTF. There is no confusion in the CAA accepting one operator electing top paint their plane pink and another wanting their plain in plaid, nor is there with an election for a seat being inert or not. MB, while undertaking a CYA did nothing to further the interests of safety by denying support for what you refer to as old, and what the counter view is tried and tested. My greasy "old" wright cyclone may be old, but they are pretty well tested by time as well. Fortunately, there are parts of the world that permit the operator to determine the risk they are prepared to assume, where there is no increase in risk to the public. There are also a few other seats out there, once Vlad stops being uppity.
If, as I believe, AH had been RAF trained and a QFI, and did not know how to fly an escape manoeuvre, I (as a former QFI myself) for one, don't believe him.
​​​​​​….and personally I think MB. DID act correctly in withdrawing support from privately operated vintage jets. They have a very fine reputation to maintain, 7,700 lives saved including mine, and recent events convince me, at least, its not good for them to be associated with poor maintenance and pilot skills.

[Ridger]

Agreed, he’s not solely to blame for the carnage Dervish; I would opine it was about 95% down to piloting error!.

Agree completely and you could probably say the same about 95% of airshow accidents.

Ironically, if display pilots were assumed to be 95% likely to crash then I suspect we'd have seen more effective oversight of DA issue and renewal, display sequence design, min heights, venue topography and infrastructure management before 2015... question is, is it any better now? Or do they just handcuff anyone who looks a bit like AH?

[Ridger]

If, as I believe, AH had been RAF trained and a QFI, and did not know how to fly an escape manoeuvre, I (as a former QFI myself) for one, don't believe him.

The way I'd read it was that he hadn't trained the escape manoeuvre.. so as you say, he probably knew how to fly one but hadn't considered that he might need one...

[Lordflasheart]

"... in withdrawing support from privately operated vintage jets."

"... its not good for them to be associated with poor maintenance ... "

Not quite 'privately' operated vintage jets - but quite relevant to this discussion ...

Perhaps Martin Baker would have been better advised if they had also withdrawn support for the Scissors Shackle seats in the Hawk when MoD refused to upgrade them to Gas Shackle - but allowed the upgrade for Tornado etc.

Look where that got MBA - A cheapskate decision by MoD plus poor management and maintenance plus lies to everyone etc. Despite adequate evidence of all those and more - the only folks who got blamed and caned for the death of Flt Lt Sean Cunningham when his seat didn't work properly (XX177 - 8th November 2011) were Martin Baker, who were evidentially squeaky clean.

Still wondering what pressure was put on MBA to plead guilty when they weren't.

LFH

[fdr]

Not quite 'privately' operated vintage jets - but quite relevant to this discussion ...

Perhaps Martin Baker would have been better advised if they had also withdrawn support for the Scissors Shackle seats in the Hawk when MoD refused to upgrade them to Gas Shackle - but allowed the upgrade for Tornado etc.

Look where that got MBA - A cheapskate decision by MoD plus poor management and maintenance plus lies to everyone etc. Despite adequate evidence of all those and more - the only folks who got blamed and caned for the death of Flt Lt Sean Cunningham when his seat didn't work properly (XX177 - 8th November 2011) were Martin Baker, who were evidentially squeaky clean.

Still wondering what pressure was put on MBA to plead guilty when they weren't.

LFH

MBA was railroaded by one of their customers over the MK10B1 seat event of 2011. The company took a hit for the team in the inquest which should not have happened, and the parties that benefitted were the DOD staff that had refused to upgrade per MBA recommendation. In the subsequent HSE prosecution, less than full candour was exhibited by the crown, over material facts that would have absolved MBA, evidence was belatedly presented to the court. which was conveniently disregarded by the court in its decision. MBA had its reputation tarnished by its customer, who just happened to be the crown.

As to withdrawal of support for private older seats, there were and are alternatives that could have been entertained that would continue to provide an escape mechanism for that group of operations, and the removal of support results in the removal of many of these types from display. It will be quieter where in spite of relief being available for the operator to assume their own risk, it becomes unacceptable to the operator.

[RetiredBA/BY]

The way I'd read it was that he hadn't trained the escape manoeuvre.. so as you say, he probably knew how to fly one but hadn't considered that he might need one...
If he had not seriously considered that he may need an escape manoeuvre at any and all points
of display aerobatics at low level, then he was inadequately prepared for such flights.

[Wetstart Dryrun]

Maybe he was performing a recovery from the vertical.

Perhaps clanking up the entry gate for a loop is more germane?

[stickstirrer]

I’m still convinced he reverted to his more familiar gate ht and entry speed for the JP with which he was more familiar and practiced. He achieved exactly those parameters in the Hunter……..A moment of stress and automatic reversion to type.

[Diff Tail Shim]

this case isn't "Galloping Ghost". On blacking out, which follows grey out for positive g, the elevator input would have decreased only with some certainty at the point of losing consciousness, but the term blacking out does not itself indicate the loss of consciousness. On G-LOC, a loss of consciousness, and the aircraft would have reverted to a flight path as a consequence of the trimmed speed from the THS at the time that the aircraft was last in trim. What was the story that the jury heard?

For many G-LOC cases, if the aircraft is at a high bank angle, the speed stability (AOA stability) will result in increasing loads as the spiral tightens. In this case, the wings were level, and the aircraft would pitch to achieve the in trim speed one way or the other, without intervention by the pilot. However, the pitch angle at initial ground contact suggests that there was someone pulling strenuously on the controls at that time, and that means the pilot would most likely have been conscious at that moment. The exact condition would be determinable by measurement of the stabiliser actuator if it remained anywhere near intact.
If he had been professional accident would never happened. He wasn't. I get my coat.

[megan]

If he had been professional accident would never happenedProfessionals have fatal accidents just like the rest of humanity.

[fdr]

If he had been professional accident would never happened. He wasn't. I get my coat.

hmmm; Jimmy Leeward was pretty experienced on the aircraft and RARA, he had flown over many years in the 80s and 90s, and then taken time off for10 years. The elevator tab problem had occurred before, but wasn't fatal to the other aircraft. The NTSB did consider the wear of the system made it susceptible to flutter. So, yes, that was a bad call. However, I've flown Boeing jet airliners that had enough flex in the ailerons to have LCO in level flight and within the envelope of the aircraft, so am not sure that it is justified to have called Jimmy unprofessional, he would have been well advised to have little or no slack in the flight control systems however.

[OvertHawk]

You might want to google '2014 Glasgow bin lorry crash'... Bloke who was was pole bending that didn't go down...

That the Bin Lorry driver did't "go down" was a travesty and the result of several systemic cock-ups and incompetencies in various agencies.

(IMHO)

[DaveJ75]

If he had been professional accident would never happened. He wasn't. I get my coat.

Mm...