Shoreham Airshow Crash Trial [Archive] - Page 2

kwh

12th Mar 2019, 14:42

A few people have pointed out that cognitive impairment might easily have led him to fly the Hunter that he had very few hours in like the Jet Provost that he had a lot in. The logic that follows is that if that basic error was the result of mild cognitive impairment then he's not to blame. Should we accept that view, if he is a highly experienced FJ pilot, instructor & ATPL pilot/BA Captain? Surely risk analysis - the risk of not having enough hours to be current enough to safely fly the display he wanted to fly - was entirely his own responsibility. That he had the right ticks in the right boxes was surely nowhere near enough, as demonstrated by the fact that he crashed the way he did, but more than that, he should have _known_ that the risk factors identified here were all holes in a Swiss Cheese that were lining up, waiting for him to have a fuzzy moment & fly a loop in a Jet Provost rather than the Hunter he was actually sitting in... in that interpretation, mild cognitive impairment isn't a defence, it's the mechanism by which his failure to manage his own personal risk factors, through gathering all the right box ticks without any of the reassuring current experience they are meant to warrant & represent, risk factors he had the experience to know about in advance, led to the 11 deaths.

Either those 11 deaths are just one of those terrible downsides of airshows and aerobatics 'being a thing', and we all just have to accept that one day the Red Arrows _WILL_ plunge into a primary school after a Ramstein style mid-air catastrophe, because that's the price of us having air displays over places where people live on & travel over the ground OR this happened because somebody [possibly multiple people] were negligent & failed to do their job of ensuring that this did not happen and/or ensuring that if it did happen, due to the hypothetical impossibility of preventing it, nobody was going to be underneath it when it did.

If Andy Hill had parked himself & his Hunter 6 foot under an empty field, I suspect that this would be a long forgotten incident, but he didn't & it isn't. However, I also can't shake the thought that if it hadn't been Mr Hill & his Hunter, we would at some point have been having a similar discussion about a bird strike afflicted Vulcan hitting a Tesco Extra or a formation of mid-air colliding warbirds at Duxford wiping out a couple of coach parties stuck in traffic on the M11...

Pontius Navigator

12th Mar 2019, 14:58

Tay Cough

12th Mar 2019, 15:05

Has anyone answered the Why? he was the display pilot?

Was this Hunter a regular event aircraft or flown as rarely as Hill flew it?

If it was a regular display aircraft, where was it's regular pilot?

I seem to remember that CH was supposed to be the pilot for the display but was unavailable, hence AH flew it. I don't know the reason, nor do I know the normal usage for this aircraft.

GeeRam

12th Mar 2019, 15:13

I seem to remember that CH was supposed to be the pilot for the display but was unavailable, hence AH flew it. I don't know the reason, nor do I know the normal usage for this aircraft.

CH was on his family holiday, IIRC, and thus AH had been in the frame for flying the display instead at Shoreham for about a month previously.

DODGYOLDFART

12th Mar 2019, 16:12

I might have misunderstood?, but I thought that was the comparison point, given Mark even said on the commentary as he pulled up, 'full power', and thus plenty of energy.........whereas I thought there was a question mark over AH not even using full power when he pulled up in the T.7 thus compromising the already reduced energy available...??

Absolutely. GeeRam thanks for making my point more specifically.

Capt Kremmen

12th Mar 2019, 16:57

Martin the Martian

12th Mar 2019, 17:35

Capt Kremmen

12th Mar 2019, 17:49

Except that seeing a stream of aircraft being flown sedately up and down the crowd line will get very boring very quickly for Joe Public, and probably also for many enthusiasts. We don't all carry several thousand pounds' worth of cameras and lenses as long as a MANPAD, and restrictions such as these would be the end of the air display industry. God knows it's taking a hell of a beating from the Shoreham fallout already.

I did narrow my suggestion down to Historic Aircraft only. I've been attending air displays only for around fifty years. The clear impression I have is that most carry a camera of reasonable proportions seeking the shot that perhaps justifies their attendance.

Onceapilot

13th Mar 2019, 09:08

It might be that the re-occurrence of an event of a similar nature to that being discussed, would be lessened if Historic Aircraft, already a finite source, would of necessity be confined to a more sedate display.

I'm second to none in my liking for, and appreciation of, displays of energetic aerobatics flown with panache but, pulling high G loads does not bode well for the extended lifespan of Historic Aircraft airframes.

The public, by and large, attend air displays with a camera and are thrilled and excited by the appearance of their favourite aircraft. Photo opportunities of Historic Aircraft making sedate passes, wing overs, gentle turns are surely all that is required. Pilots and airframes alike could benefit from more restrained displays, thus providing some additional element of safety to the routine.

Seeing the aircraft in restrained flight is almost as good as seeing it demonstrated exuberantly.

Keep the perspective. Privately owned and maintained aircraft can be used within their capabilities according to the regulations. The wear and tear is up to the owners. "Sedate" displays are not a panacea for accidents. However, that is not to say that "the regulations" were satisfactory and, no amount of over-regulation will ever stop all accidents.
One big point that may colour the future of displays is, the apparent establishment that a CI may occur at anytime and absolve blameworthiness. :ooh:

OAP

Air Snoop

21st Mar 2019, 16:45

While the CAA did get some stick (not blame) from the AAIB for the current state of the rules etc, is it really necessary to write a rule saying "Thou shalt not start an aerobatic manoeuvre too low and too slow and outside the display area." I know we only needed a few 'O' levels to fly in the RAF but we really don't need a rule to spell out the obvious.
Much talk of escape manoeuvres and 'g' and impairment from the fighter jocks but as a trucky, I reckon if you start in the right place and do the business, you will probably end up in the right place:ok:

Pontius Navigator

21st Mar 2019, 17:49

I reckon if you start in the right place and do the business, you will probably end up in the right place

And the converse is probably true too.

Caramba

21st Mar 2019, 18:04

Relying on the Beeb or newspaper articles for accuarate reports of the court proceedings gives a totally flawed impression of what happened, mainly because the defence does not give regular updates to the press, while the prosecution does.

Wng Cdr Green got trashed over his G-calculations and knowledge of CI. JW got trashed for a lot of what he said and the evidence for previous cavalier or reckless flying turned into nothing. After that the prosecution didn’t have a lot going for it.

As a (non-aviation related) expert witness in the past, I would say they failed to do their research adequately and did not establish key facts before giving evidence and being cross examined. They left the goal open and Mr Khalil just had to tap the ball in.

the public interest argument might have been sting but the chance of a guilty verdict were slender.

caramba

Treble one

22nd Mar 2019, 13:00

Does anyone know what the restrictions around the use of the AAIB report/findings were in court please? I'm curious because if (as the prosecution were alleging) that AH was negligent, and this negligence caused the crash, then 'exhibit 1' should have been the nuts and bolts of how he flew the manoeuvre?

Air Snoop

22nd Mar 2019, 15:19

Does anyone know what the restrictions around the use of the AAIB report/findings were in court please?
AAIB are tasked not to apportion blame or liability. The method of gathering evidence is not compatible with criminal investigation requirements and statements are not taken under PACE rules, and the conclusions reached are often based on the balance of probabilities. This may be acceptable in a Civil Court but in a criminal case it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The police do use AAIB reports as a guide as they have little expertise in aviation, but anything they wish to use in court must be independently proven. The AAIB Reports are, however, often used in inquests which have a similar purpose ie what-when-where-why and what can we recommend to stop it happening again.

Maybe a legal beagle can clarify this pilot view.

Fortissimo

22nd Mar 2019, 15:39

You can find the answer on AAIB report admissibility here (http://www.hfw.com/Landmark-English-Court-of-Appeal-decision-accident-investigation-reports-March-2014). The case was Rogers v Hoyle - to cut a long story short, the AAIB reports are considered to be expert and may be used. (And was on this occasion too.)

The coroner has been making noises about the inquest, and many people are expecting a whole new 'investigation'. They may be disappointed. To quote the Lord Chief Justice when he ruled in 2016 on the Norfolk Coroner's demand for access to the CVR/FDR for an AW139 accident:“In the absence of credible evidence that the investigation into an accident is incomplete, flawed or deficient, a Coroner conducting an inquest into a death which occurred in an aircraft accident, should not consider it necessary to investigate again the matters covered or to be covered by the independent investigation of the AAIB. […] [T]he findings and conclusions should not be reopened.”
I think it will be hard for anyone to suggest that the AAIB report in this case is incomplete, flawed or deficient.

Legalapproach

22nd Mar 2019, 16:03

Treble one

22nd Mar 2019, 16:46

AAIB reports are admissible in Civil (ie liability) proceedings - as per Rogers v Hoyle

They are not admissible in criminal proceedings nor is the material obtained in the course of the AAIB investigation. It is annex 13 'protected' material. See also EU Regulation 996 0f 2010 Article 14 1(d) and Regulation 25 of The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 2018
The AAIB report was not used in evidence during the Shoreham trial

Thank you Legalapproach et al. As a prosecution barrister (say) how would you be able to 'get around this' if theres any way at all? After all, in this case, trying to prove negligence to get a conviction would be highly dependent on an analysis of the aerobatic manoeuvre, and how it was flown, incapacitated or not. Thats a seperate issue.

Legalapproach

22nd Mar 2019, 19:41

Treble one, as one of AH's defence barristers (and the defence barrister in the Hoyle criminal case) I'm not sure I ought to give away how the prosecution should do it!!

GirlsWithWings

22nd Mar 2019, 19:45

Has any fault been attributed to the show organisers?

H Peacock

22nd Mar 2019, 20:48

Ah, Hoyle! Another tragic example of what happens when a loop is poorly flown!

Treble one

22nd Mar 2019, 20:52

Treble one, as one of AH's defence barristers (and the defence barrister in the Hoyle criminal case) I'm not sure I ought to give away how the prosecution should do it!!

I think that is fair enough m'learned friend. :-)

Easy Street

23rd Mar 2019, 09:02

Treble one, as one of AH's defence barristers (and the defence barrister in the Hoyle criminal case) I'm not sure I ought to give away how the prosecution should do it!!

Acknowledging that you have no duty to prove anything, I’d still have thought that you’d welcome the opportunity to defend your client successfully against a complete and well-put case!

Is there a procedural barrier to a prosecution using an AAIB report as a handrail and asking the appropriate questions of the appropriate witnesses to bring out the same evidence in admissible fashion?

Legalapproach

23rd Mar 2019, 11:13

It was a tongue in cheek answer. The way the prosecution deal with it is to commission their own experts to review the available/admissible evidence and give an opinion. The prosecution were able to use film of the incident, NATS radar data and in some instances non AAIB witnesses who had provided opinion to the AAIB ( i.e. medical witnesses, the test pilot (who had been commissioned jointly by the police and AAIB) etc. Because all of this was available independent of the AAIB and not protected material. The witnesses essentially gave fresh statements.

Ah, Hoyle! Another tragic example of what happens when a loop is poorly flown!

In fact no, that was the allegation made by the prosecution but denied by the defence. The defence produced evidence that the aircraft was not flying a loop. In reaching their not guilty verdicts the jury were not satisfied that a loop was being flown.

falcon900

23rd Mar 2019, 11:20

Has any fault been attributed to the show organisers?
A good question Girls with wings, and one which I suspect will occupy the Coroner and may feature in any civil proceedings.
That a display might go wrong, for whatever reason, is all too obvious, and history is strewn with examples which have led to crashes (including at Shoreham not so many years previously).
Factor in Fast Jets and high energy, and not much imagination is required to foresee the potential for an outcome such as that which so tragically unfolded at Shoreham. The risk assessment for the event must surely have conducted some evaluation of the likelihood of an accident and the potential consequences thereof. IMHO, to reduce the residual risk to an acceptable level given the likely catastrophic consequences of the risk occurring, a ridiculously optimistic probability would have to have been attached to the likelihood of the risk occurring.
Put differently, even a perfect pilot flying a perfect aircraft in a perfect manner represented an unacceptable level of risk flying that display at Shoreham given the potential for disaster if something did go wrong.

H Peacock

23rd Mar 2019, 11:45

Put differently, even a perfect pilot flying a perfect aircraft in a perfect manner represented an unacceptable level of risk flying that display at Shoreham given the potential for disaster if something did go wrong.

Same could be said for a busy airport in a large built-up area. Thankfully after G-ARPI at Staines there wasn't this huge over-reaction that things have to change. Yes there is a risk, but Im afraid that's life. If say one in every 20 years an airliner will go down in a built up area then just accept it and get on with life!. Things really were all for the better before this ridiculous US style 'blame' culture!

Easy Street

23rd Mar 2019, 13:13

Same could be said for a busy airport in a large built-up area. Thankfully after G-ARPI at Staines there wasn't this huge over-reaction that things have to change. Yes there is a risk, but Im afraid that's life. If say one in every 20 years an airliner will go down in a built up area then just accept it and get on with life!. Things really were all for the better before this ridiculous US style 'blame' culture!

All of which would be a fine and dandy argument if display accidents ran at one every 20 years. Sadly not the case.

LOMCEVAK

23rd Mar 2019, 13:25

It is possible for parts of an AAIB report to be used as evidence in a criminal trial if the content is deemed admissible and the required parts are presented formally as a witness statement. In AH's trial, one example was that 'Annex H - Report on Data Gathering Flying Related to the Accident to G-BXFI' from the AAIB report was presented by the author and thereafter was available to the court. At this point, the author, who had been working for AAIB as an advisor, became an expert witness for the trial.

falcon900

23rd Mar 2019, 14:57

H Peacock,
I am not suggesting that we can live in a world which is risk free, but simply that there are sometimes consequences which are so unpalatable that the risk of them occurring has to be demonstrably extremely small to allow the activity to rationally take place. I would respectfully submit that civil aviation operations around busy airports are demonstrably very low risk, whereas display flying particularly of vintage fast jets is not.
Don't get me wrong, I love to see vintage aircraft put through their paces, but the venue has to be appropriate to the intended display. I don't think Shoreham was, and I don't think that is down to the pilot.

Finningley Boy

23rd Mar 2019, 19:25

All of which would be a fine and dandy argument if display accidents ran at one every 20 years. Sadly not the case.
As far as the UK goes fatalities and accidents at air shows generally have been through a spate in the last 20 or so years. Biggin Hill saw two in as many days in 2001, a Hurricane was lost with the Pilot at Shoreham a few years ago, there have been others, all so far have involved vintage ex military types. Back in the late forties and early fifties, every annual Battle of Britain 'At Home' day would see at least two fatalities! But then we're looking at around 70 odd similar events on the same day! Something else to make the modern mind boggle.

FB

megan

24th Mar 2019, 02:01

Put differently, even a perfect pilot flying a perfect aircraft in a perfect manner represented an unacceptable level of risk flying that display at Shoreham given the potential for disaster if something did go wrongEven the best practised are not immune from errors, though in this case he had a safe place in which to crash. The Hunter test pilot, Bill Bedford, demonstrating the aircraft to the Swiss made the error of forgetting he was displaying at a high altitude airport and on the down line of a loop realised he may not make it, but did.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=alo_XWCqNUQ

Schnowzer

24th Mar 2019, 06:27

I am not surprised at the verdict, but was surprised at the defense that won the day. Fast jet flying has always been an unforgiving environment and people make mistakes that if fatal usually just cost crew lives. In my career through the 80/90s I knew of 10 colleagues that died under the age of 30. BV expressed my view many pages ago when he said that as a current FJ pilot you wouldn’t get him near a display jet without currency and a proper work up. Yet that is what happened.

In the modern world we have become sanitized to the true threats of high energy maneuvering. In F1, cars have catastrophic crashes and our hero’s usually walk away unscathed. If you really want to understand the risks of aviation with 50s jets you need to take a history lesson. My dad started flying in 52 and was the only one of his course of 19 still alive by the end of the 60s. Most died in air crashes.

In the time of the Hunter the UK military lost on average 1 aircraft each and every day! Youngsters will scoff at that stat but in 56 we had lost 40 before the end of January. If you want a proper understanding of the risks of 50s aviation, look no further:

UK Military Aircraft Losses (http://www.ukserials.com/losses-1956.htm)
I am all for displaying war birds, what is missed by some that display them is the watching public don’t really care about the quality or difficulty of the display; it’s not a competion! They want a nice safe environment, lots of noise (low and fast works best) and a bit of upside down. A wacky ‘wifadil’ entry into the display line might satisfy the pilot but the average person in the street doesn’t give a rats ass.

Nige321

24th Mar 2019, 14:00

It was a tongue in cheek answer. The way the prosecution deal with it is to commission their own experts to review the available/admissible evidence and give an opinion. The prosecution were able to use film of the incident, NATS radar data and in some instances non AAIB witnesses who had provided opinion to the AAIB ( i.e. medical witnesses, the test pilot (who had been commissioned jointly by the police and AAIB) etc. Because all of this was available independent of the AAIB and not protected material. The witnesses essentially gave fresh statements.

In fact no, that was the allegation made by the prosecution but denied by the defence. The defence produced evidence that the aircraft was not flying a loop. In reaching their not guilty verdicts the jury were not satisfied that a loop was being flown.

If it wasn't a loop, what was it...?!

LOMCEVAK

24th Mar 2019, 14:19

Even the best practised are not immune from errors, though in this case he had a safe place in which to crash. The Hunter test pilot, Bill Bedford, demonstrating the aircraft to the Swiss made the error of forgetting he was displaying at a high altitude airport and on the down line of a loop realised he may not make it, but did.

As much of this post involves discussion of loops, to keep the record straight I believe that Bill's event that you describe was actually during the recovery from an intentional spin, not a loop.

My dad started flying in 52 and was the only one of his course of 19 still alive by the end of the 60s. Most died in air crashes.

In the time of the Hunter the UK military lost on average 1 aircraft each and every day! Youngsters will scoff at that stat but in 56 we had lost 40 before the end of January.

I feel that there is little correlation between these statistics and the Shoreham accident. You have to look at why the accident rate was as it was in the '50s and '60s. There is nothing to indicate that at Shoreham there was any causal factor related to the aircraft type or its era. There are certainly factors related to it being a swept wing jet but those apply equally to types that are in production today. The Hunter has generally very good, benign flying qualities. Its main (only?) deficiency is that it is easy to exceed the g limit during manoeuvres involving rapid g onset rates but that will not cause air display accidents. The main consideration with aeroplanes of this era is that for flying in IMC the instruments, unless updated, require 'old skills' and are unreliable. However, as the aircraft that are displayed are cleared for VMC only that is not a safety factor in this context.

One more point of accuracy with respect to 'In the time of the Hunter ..', the Hunter remained in RAF service until 1994 and MAA registered ones are still flying today!

Schnowzer

24th Mar 2019, 15:54

One more point of accuracy with respect to 'In the time of the Hunter ..', the Hunter remained in RAF service until 1994 and MAA registered ones are still flying today!

Thanks for the education Mr Lomcevak, I am sorry, I didn’t realize posts were being graded on this thread. I assumed comment was still allowed. I’ll run the next post past my lawyer.

Oddly enough even with my lack of SA, when I was flying in close with a Hunter in the 90s, I actually spotted it was still flying. But then as 6 crashed on the same day in 1956, I reckon that carries more weight. Using your logic, we still live in the time of Bleriot seeing as the Shuttleworth collection get one out every now and then.

LOMCEVAK

24th Mar 2019, 16:03

Schnowzer,

I was just trying to put your comments into context. Did the Raynham Hunter accident occur because they were Hunters or because of how they operated at the time? Today, old aeroplanes such as the Hunter are not operated in the same way as they were 50 years ago. Therefore, any attempt to analyse accident statistics need to be put into the context of the time.

andrewn

24th Mar 2019, 16:33

So, on the topic of Dad's ....mine kept the newspaper cuttings from most of the 50s air crashes and I recall the six Hunter article - my recollection is it was weather related, with most of the jets running out of fuel after trying to find somehwere to put down in thick fog.

TEEEJ

24th Mar 2019, 16:45

[email protected]

24th Mar 2019, 18:39

It would seem a dangerous precedent has been set - have a defence of cognitive impairment that is impossible to prove either way (but the burden of proof is on the prosecution) and you can basically do anything in an aircraft and get away with it - frankly sir the law is an ass!

langleybaston

24th Mar 2019, 18:43

Digression but this may be of interest.
I joined the Met Office that year. The West Raynham Hunter debacle was infamous, but I never understood why the purveyor of the rubbish forecast was not himself/ herself infamous ........ cock ups much less serious were embedded in the folklore, such as losing 1000 racing pigeons.or suggesting that Holme on Spalding Moor would be a good div.
Perhaps losing aircraft to rubbish forecasts was all in the day's work.

Treble one

24th Mar 2019, 19:45

I have to say Legalapproach, that you and your colleagues played an absolute blinder by introducing the Cognitive Impairment aspect to the defence. With no way of proving that it did or didn't happen via medical evidence, then strictly by the book, there is no way a conviction could have occurred under the burden of proof.

Job done. Forget about everything else. 1-0 to the defence.

Just This Once...

24th Mar 2019, 20:31

If a true jury of peers drawn from suitably qualified pilots had sat for this case I wonder if the verdict would have been different. Juries always seem to struggle with more specialist cases (eg Mike Morison) and now high-performance aviation and aviation medicine can be added to the list of troublesome topics.

I still don't know how AH can live with himself with the defence he offered. My professional open-mindedness was slammed shut when he claimed almost no knowledge and no RAF training with respect to the effects of G when flying high-performance aircraft - including the relatively low G available when flying so slow. These were utterly absurd and untruthful statements that were designed to deceive, yet the prosecution did not have the counter to hand. I understand that he was entitled to defend himself and that the burden of proving a case is with the prosecution but you would struggle to find any RAF or RN fast-jet aircrew who thought his answers on that subject were accurate or truthful.

The chap came close to crashing on take-off on that fateful day - that could have been a better outcome for all concerned. We could then just debate the wisdom of no proper performance calculations and the mystery of accepting a tailwind in an aircraft that he had almost no experience flying.

effortless

24th Mar 2019, 22:24

The first person we have t convince when we need to defend ourselves is ourself. Many if us gave been around enquiries and perhaps wondered at the strength of the need not to seem guilty. Andy Hill must believe in his defence.

We have, in many cases, adopted no blame enquiries. This started in aviation but is now seen in medicine. Vis. CHIRP We need to know what happened in order to reduce future risk. Too much arse covering arse covering allowed bad practices to continue.

megan

25th Mar 2019, 01:37

I believe that Bill's event that you describe was actually during the recovery from an intentional spin, not a loopHi LOMCEVAK, all the references I've seen say loop when demonstrating the aircraft to the Swiss, during one course the event was used as an example of the effects of DA on performance, and as an example of even the best are capably of screwing the pooch without any help. The spin event was another item on Bill's CV.

Legalapproach

25th Mar 2019, 09:37

I still don't know how AH can live with himself with the defence he offered. My professional open-mindedness was slammed shut when he claimed almost no knowledge and no RAF training with respect to the effects of G when flying high-performance aircraft - including the relatively low G available when flying so slow. These were utterly absurd and untruthful statements that were designed to deceive, yet the prosecution did not have the counter to hand. I understand that he was entitled to defend himself and that the burden of proving a case is with the prosecution but you would struggle to find any RAF or RN fast-jet aircrew who thought his answers on that subject were accurate or truthful.

Just This Once
When the defence lawyers receive material from the prosecution etc they go to independent experts to confirm the accuracy or not of the material and whether any opinion based on the material is correct/whether there is a conflicting body of opinion, whether there are areas that have not been properly investigated etc etc. Sometimes the independent expert will say "I agree" sometimes they will say "No it is wrong and for this reason". This is what happens in many many cases. It is what happened here. AH remembers nothing about the flight , he never put himself forward as a medical expert. His defence was not created by him nor by his lawyers but put forward by independent expert witnesses.

As to G knowledge I am afraid that you base your opinion on what was reported in the newspapers. This was not completely accurate and taken out of context. Prosecution witnesses had already given evidence that G knowledge and training has changed dramatically in recent years. At the time AH was trained, there was limited (mostly classroom based and brief) G training, no centrifuge training, no use of the expression A-LOC etc. If you and then many like you accuse AH of telling deliberate lies then the prosecution witnesses must have been likewise perjuring themselves. This evidence was unchallenged by the prosecution because many of their own witnesses confirmed it.
Don't believe everything you read in the newspapers. I read reports of KKQC cross examining particular witnesses and the xx apparently reported verbatim including his name. Those witnesses were called on a day when AFAIK KK was in New York and some other bloke was doing the XX!

Training Risky

25th Mar 2019, 10:44

Nice to see that with a bit of money you can buy your way out of any trouble you cause. I must remember that one.:mad:

Capt Kremmen

25th Mar 2019, 10:45

Defence lawyers everywhere may well be smacking their lips ! A plea of cognitive impairment means that no one will ever be guilty of anything !

Wwyvern

25th Mar 2019, 10:55

Bill Bedford addressed a symposium of the European SETP in Switzerland in 1989 I think it was, and recounted the tale. His close encounter with the ground was during his famous multi-turn spin demonstration. He was on a sales drive to sell Hunters to the Swiss some years before the symposium and the incident was caused by an inaccurate altimeter setting, I believe.

Nige321

25th Mar 2019, 10:58

Legalapproach, can I ask again...Originally Posted by Legalapproach https://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10427553#post10427553)It was a tongue in cheek answer. The way the prosecution deal with it is to commission their own experts to review the available/admissible evidence and give an opinion. The prosecution were able to use film of the incident, NATS radar data and in some instances non AAIB witnesses who had provided opinion to the AAIB ( i.e. medical witnesses, the test pilot (who had been commissioned jointly by the police and AAIB) etc. Because all of this was available independent of the AAIB and not protected material. The witnesses essentially gave fresh statements.

In fact no, that was the allegation made by the prosecution but denied by the defence. The defence produced evidence that the aircraft was not flying a loop. In reaching their not guilty verdicts the jury were not satisfied that a loop was being flown.If it wasn't a loop, what was it...?!

Treble one

25th Mar 2019, 10:58

The CI defence elicits a whole host of questions does it not Legalapproach?

When did it begin? This is critical of course-was it before the start of the manoeuvre, or during it? If the pilot felt 'a bit odd' should he not just have abandoned the display, and if he didn't is that not negligence to continue flying it?
If CI was a contributory factor to the event, then what are the odds of a qualified display pilot, who is medically fit and has otherwise shown no similar symptoms over many years display flying, suffering such an event at that very moment, causing the catastrophic consequences it did? Holes. Cheeses. Lots. I would argue a miniscule probability.
And it seems to me (although I am no expert) that this CI incident must have been quite short lived, as it seems that the pilot was pulling quite hard at the end of the manoeuvre, when he realised he was going to end up running out of airspace? Presumably the CI incident was over then, as his judgement seemed to be restored at that point?

Just for the record-I have no connection with anyone affected by the Shoreham incident. I usually attend the airshow (in the airfield) but did not that year. My friend was attending and he messaged me with the details of the incident shortly after it occurred. I am merely interested in the legal process.

LOMCEVAK

25th Mar 2019, 11:23

Megan,

Thanks. I was only aware of
the spin incident. That was the one that Bill always talked about!

Rgds

L

Legalapproach

25th Mar 2019, 11:25

Training Risky
What does money have to do with it? What are you suggesting - that, as I stressed, independent experts are prepared to perjure themselves and risk their reputations if paid enough? Does that also apply to experts paid for by the prosecution? Can the prosecution get people wrongly convicted with a bit of money?

Capt Kremen
Rubbish. Cognitive impairment has been recognised as a potential defence to some offences for decades - it rarely comes up (you would need medical evidence to support it) and the courts continue to convict people.

Dominator2

25th Mar 2019, 11:51

I still don't know how AH can live with himself with the defence he offered. My professional open-mindedness was slammed shut when he claimed almost no knowledge and no RAF training with respect to the effects of G when flying high-performance aircraft - including the relatively low G available when flying so slow. These were utterly absurd and untruthful statements that were designed to deceive, yet the prosecution did not have the counter to hand. I understand that he was entitled to defend himself and that the burden of proving a case is with the prosecution but you would struggle to find any RAF or RN fast-jet aircrew who thought his answers on that subject were accurate or truthful.

The chap came close to crashing on take-off on that fateful day - that could have been a better outcome for all concerned. We could then just debate the wisdom of no proper performance calculations and the mystery of accepting a tailwind in an aircraft that he had almost no experience flying.

I totally agree. The fact that AH had been trained and qualified as an RAF fast jet pilot mean that he HAD been trained in G Awareness and all of its facets, be it on aircraft performance or effect on the human body. The fact that the prosecution did not expose these lies makes them negligent in performing their duty. A qualified RAF QFI, past or present, could have testified as to what RAF pilot training involves.

As for In fact no, that was the allegation made by the prosecution but denied by the defence. The defence produced evidence that the aircraft was not flying a loop. In reaching their not guilty verdicts the jury were not satisfied that a loop was being flown.

What a load of nonsense. AH's display card showed that an offset loop was planned at that point. Apart from starting a few hundred feet TOO Low and over 100kts TOO Slow there was clear intent to attempt a loop. At that point in time, due to "something" he clearly thought that he was in a different aircraft , possibly a JP? Poor discipline based on complacency.

Legalapproach

25th Mar 2019, 11:57

Nige321
In the Hoyle case a hare was set running that the fatal manoeuvre was a loop. This came from an eye witness who had seen a Tiger Moth enter a loop in roughly the location of the accident. During the course of the trial it became apparent that (because of timings) the witness had seen an earlier flight in which it was known a loop had been flown. The timings had never been properly looked into before and so the witness statement had influenced both the AAIB report and the prosecution case with many assuming that she had seen the final flight. She had not and she could not have done because the timings could be pretty well pinpointed..

On the accident flight the pilot described performing a tightish turn and experiencing a rudder restriction which, in attempting to recover, had caused the aircraft to flick into a spin. This was confirmed by experts who attempted to replicate the various possible flight profiles and this scenario was the one that in fact fitted.

Dominator 2
Loop
I wasn't talking about the Shoreham crash but the Hoyle case and responding to a comment where someone suggested that Hoyle was another case resulting from a badly flown loop. Please read my post #276 carefully before accusing me of spouting a load of nonesense.

G training
The prosecution called qualified RAF QFI's both past and present and their evidence was consistent with what AH actually said.

Herod

25th Mar 2019, 11:58

I did my basic training on the JP way back in '65-'66. We had aeromed lectures and practical demonstrations of the effects of G. Only very basic (I was never on FJ), but surely it was retained in the syllabus?

Legalapproach

25th Mar 2019, 12:18

Herod

Spot on - that's what AH and others spoke about at the trial. The training back in the day was fairly basic when compared to today's training. That was the only point, all the witnesses agreed. The news reports of his evidence were not complete and not put in proper context.

LOMCEVAK

25th Mar 2019, 12:18

Apart from starting a few hundred feet TOO Low and over 100kts TOO Slow ......

Your statement as quoted is not correct. In CAP403 it always has been, and sill is, permissible to commence a loop from the Flypast minima. AH was above his for the final manoeuvre. Where you can fly below SERA 5005 minima and down to your DA minima is a separate issue for which there was considerable ambiguity at the time of the accident. As a Hunter DAE, I consider the minimum entry speed for a singleton Hunter T7 to pull up for a complete loop is 350 KIAS. AH pulled up at 310 +/- 15 KIAS.

Dominator2

25th Mar 2019, 13:25

Your statement as quoted is not correct. In CAP403 it always has been, and sill is, permissible to commence a loop from the Flypast minima. AH was above his for the final manoeuvre. Where you can fly below SERA 5005 minima and down to your DA minima is a separate issue for which there was considerable ambiguity at the time of the accident. As a Hunter DAE, I consider the minimum entry speed for a singleton Hunter T7 to pull up for a complete loop is 350 KIAS. AH pulled up at 310 +/- 15 KIAS.
The few hundred feet too low, witness the result. There is no doubt that 350kts with 2 notches of flap AND full power the T7 would loop fairly comfortably with a current pilot at the controls!! What is current, that is for you "experts" to decide?

meleagertoo

25th Mar 2019, 13:50

The chap came close to crashing on take-off on that fateful day --- We could then just debate the wisdom of no proper performance calculations and the mystery of accepting a tailwind in an aircraft that he had almost no experience flying.

I saw nothing in the AAIB report about that apart from doenwind t/o and lower than usual rotate speed stated, wigh no note of censure. (Did I miss something elsewhere?)

Anyone care to amplify this please?

Brian W May

25th Mar 2019, 18:35

He's 'talked' his way out of a conviction but I wouldn't have his karma . . .

LOMCEVAK

25th Mar 2019, 18:38

The few hundred feet too low, witness the result. There is no doubt that 350kts with 2 notches of flap AND full power the T7 would loop fairly comfortably

The entry height is not a problem; the entry speed needs to be appropriate for the entry height. 350 KIAS is a very safe minimum entry speed for a loop entered at flypast minima (30 ft for some pilots) with 0 flap and will give you an apex height of in excess of 5000 ft albeit, as you say, needing full T7 thrust.

DODGYOLDFART

26th Mar 2019, 15:24

I am reasonably cognoscente of the effects of "G" on pilot performance and there has been a fair amount of discussion of it on this thread. However I am slightly puzzled by what appears to be AH's claimed knowledge of such and particularly so as whilst in the RAF I believe he served a tour on Harriers as an operational jockey. Plenty of high "G" experience there I would have thought!

CAEBr

26th Mar 2019, 16:59

All of which would be a fine and dandy argument if display accidents ran at one every 20 years. Sadly not the case.

The point was being made with regard to accidents causing the death of spectators at the air show or those going about their business outside the airfield boundaries - as was the case at Shoreham. The mitigations put in place wrt crowdlines, not flying over or towards the crowd etc have successfully ensured that spectators and others are not put at risk, going all the way back to Derry's accident at Farnborough, significantly more than 20 years.

The unfortunate kneejerk response to display requirements taking much of the flying further away from the crowd and thus outside the boundaries provides even further protection to the crowds, who don't really need it, and increased risk to those outside the airfield, who in some cases are now closer to the aircraft than the paying spectators.

Peter Carter

26th Mar 2019, 17:54

I was both a Hunter and Hawk QFI in the early 80s. I have about 1,000 Hunter hours including 65 sorties on WV372 (bit miffed that ‘my’ jet has been trashed). Looped probably thousands of times. MRTs in the Hawk were ‘pull 6 squeeze 7’ initially then ‘pull 5 squeeze 6’ when it was thought that we might use too much fatigue. We received (and gave) plenty of training on the safe application of high G, both rapid and gradual onset, although expressions such as ALoc and GLoc were probably not in the vocabulary. So I am puzzled that possible incapacitation from high g should be used as an argument by the defence team, especially in a Hunter at 300kts when you're likely to hit the buffet before 4g. Also, it appeared to me that the aircraft was under positive control for the last half of the loop (and it was a loop).

Legalapproach

26th Mar 2019, 19:32

andrewn

26th Mar 2019, 21:53

Peter

Thank you for making the point about the expressions A-LOC and G-LOC were not really used in the 80's. That was what AH said in evidence and has been leapt on by people suggesting he lied when he said he hadn't heard certain expressions because he said he didn't know about the effect of G. He didn't lie, he talked about the limitations of training and imparted knowledge at the time compared with knowledge/training today. Other witnesses, prosecution witneses, confirmed what he said.

This High-G (https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a196171.pdf) briefing doc from 1988 gives some good context on timings for when G-LOC was first recognised, noting of course this is US specific and it always takes some time for new discoveries to cross the pond. The doc does highlight that G-LOC really only came about as a result of the highly maneuverable F-15 & F-16 fighters, which matches my own understanding as I distinctly recall the G-LOC phenomena (as it was then) becoming more commonplace in the UK/Europe in the mid-late 80's - coincident with the widespread adoption of the Viper by many Nato air arms.

Cat Techie

26th Mar 2019, 22:12

I was both a Hunter and Hawk QFI in the early 80s.. Also, it appeared to me that the aircraft was under positive control for the last half of the loop (and it was a loop).

Because it was. Even more so with the pole bending going on with the realisation that a muck up was occuring.

Onceapilot

26th Mar 2019, 22:53

Peter

It was a loop and my comments in a previous post related to a different case. The defence never suggested that it was possible incapacitation from high G. Very few people who are commenting on this case heard any of the evidence that was given at trial. Many have been selective in picking bits read in newspapers and newspapers are themselves selective in what they report "always worth sacrificing the truth for a good headline"

Can I make it quite plain this case was never about high G, it was never about G-LOC it was never about A-LOC please read my post at #132 above where I sought to give an explanation as to what the issue actually was.

Thank you for making the point about the expressions A-LOC and G-LOC were not really used in the 80's. That was what AH said in evidence and has been leapt on by people suggesting he lied when he said he hadn't heard certain expressions because he said he didn't know about the effect of G. He didn't lie, he talked about the limitations of training and imparted knowledge at the time compared with knowledge/training today. Other witnesses, prosecution witneses, confirmed what he said.

Hello Legal. You said this in #132:
" However, there is a potential area of impairment below this. It is not widely known but involves relatively low levels of Gz that do not prevent blood circulation to the brain but do involve a reduction of oxygenation to the blood. The physiology is interesting. Gz straining involves muscles consuming more oxygen thus depleting the normal amount in the blood. G suits restrict the diaphragm reducing lung expansion. Low levels of Gz have a pooling effect in the lungs which, coupled with the diaphragm issue, results in less oxygenation of the blood in the lungs. This in turn results in a de-saturation of oxygen in the blood that continues circulating. The subject can continue to function, particularly with regard to learnt motor skills, but has reduces judgement and the ability to deal with abnormal situations. This was the evidence presented from eminently qualified experts by the defence and was the issue in the case."

Now, I do not know you but, this is absolute bread and butter info to a FJ pilot and you should know it. It is a prerequisite that a FJ pilot can maintain their personal ability to perform across the whole spectrum of the cockpit environment. A personal ability to maintain awareness through technique, physiology, mental awareness, motivation and personal effort is essential. In my opinion, claiming that a qualified FJ display pilot can innocently fall into some sort of "armchair zombie" state shows that either, they should not be qualified as a FJ display pilot or, they have a medical problem or, they were actually flying the aircraft in a negligent manner.

OAP

Lonewolf_50

27th Mar 2019, 02:29

Necessary Assumption (which may be false)
Poster named Legalapproach is in fact a member of AH defense team.
This Poster won in court, and you did not.
Now think about that for just a minute.
A professional in law did "that law thing" and was successful.
Some of your are playing "armchair lawyer" just like people play "armchair pilot" after a variety of accidents, crashes, and close calls.

And if the assumption is false?
You've all been trolled.

Either way, you are spinning your wheels. Welcome to the internet.

Legalapproach

27th Mar 2019, 06:42

Onceapilot

Now, I do not know you but, this is absolute bread and butter info to a FJ pilot and you should know it.

Interesting, then, that RAFCAM were unaware of it and it has never been part of any anti-G training. Where do pilots pick up this bread and butter knowledge of potential sub A-LOC impairment, because it's not part of the syllabus?

Easy Street

27th Mar 2019, 07:22

Interesting, then, that RAFCAM were unaware of it and it has never been part of any anti-G training. Where do pilots pick up this bread and butter knowledge of potential sub A-LOC impairment, because it's not part of the syllabus?

Where do we pick it up? Every time we trained under G from early aerobatics on elementary trainers, through maximum possible rate turns at basic and advanced flying training, and onto air combat training at the front line. It may not have been taught at RAFCAM or given a name, but the understanding that even ‘simple’ things are more difficult while under G and the need to make appropriate allowance are things that a fast jet pilot recognises as a straightforward consequence of having passed the training, let alone having survived a career spanning thousands of hours. Failure to meet performance standards (eg height, speed, fuel awareness, quality of tactical decision-making), whether or not G-induced, is a common reason for application of remedial action up to and including withdrawal from flying duties. BV can provide a QFI’s perspective, but for me as a former front-line instructor, would a G-induced cognitive impairment excuse an individual from the professional consequences that might follow? Absolutely not.

I get that this wooliness leaves space for a legal argument and acquittal in a court of law. Fine. But that has no bearing on the judgement of the court of professional opinion. This forum is part of the latter, so LW50, your point is irrelevant. Views expressed here have no consequence for AH as a citizen, but we are entitled to hold them irrespective of the legal position.

Onceapilot

27th Mar 2019, 08:49

Onceapilot

Interesting, then, that RAFCAM were unaware of it and it has never been part of any anti-G training. Where do pilots pick up this bread and butter knowledge of potential sub A-LOC impairment, because it's not part of the syllabus?

More interesting, it seems to me that a basic reality of the physical and mental effects of flying FJ type aircraft in a dynamic envelope is being misunderstood or misrepresented?

OAP

DODGYOLDFART

27th Mar 2019, 09:40

Extremely well put EA and OAP. It is always difficult to get across to the uninitiated what the training is like to be able to fly and fight a FJ. It is that type of innate knowledge that frankly sorts the men from the boys!

Legalapproach

27th Mar 2019, 10:08

Easy Street et al

Ah yes, the court of opinion that hasn't heard any of the evidence. I have done my best to try and encapsulate the medical position and to try and inform the debate but with limited success. We are all (well some of us) familiar with the more recognisable effects of G and how to combat it. I've experienced A-LOC 'grey out' as it was termed in my day and I could detect it at the time, but we weren't talking about grey out, blackout (or even red out).

The issue of CI in AH's case was a form of hypoxia. Remember the trip to North Luffenham and being put in the altitude Chamber? Remember being tasked to count down from 100 subtracting in 7's, coming off the oxygen, carrying on, oxygen back on and only then noting the gibberish on the clip board? One of the difficulties with hypoxia is the subject not being aware of it at the time. Possible symptoms - feeling of euphoria, sense of confidence?

Onceapilot
Misunderstood or misrepresented - by whom? By the highly respected experts who gave evidence? If you have have read the expert reports (from both sides) and have heard the evidence, please point out the misrepresentations (assuming you are confident that you are not libeling the medical experts by suggesting deliberate misrepresentation on oath) because I would be fascinated to know how we got it so wrong and Pprune gets it so right.

beardy

27th Mar 2019, 10:25

I am surprised that the low level of g being talked about that would induce blood pooling in the chest cavity would be enough to inflate g pants at all, never mind enough to constrict the diaphragm. Is there rigorous experimental evidence from an operational environmental or is it a theory? I don't believe I ever noticed this effect but my wife tells me that I am insensitive.

Capt Scribble

27th Mar 2019, 10:41

The court of opinion has many thousands of hours flying high performance aircraft. Jurys can be easily flumoxed by selected technical evidence. Hypoxia, he should have been so lucky to be so high. Didn’t I read that AH had been a QFI and responsible for teaching RAF pilots aerobatics?

Bob Viking

27th Mar 2019, 11:11

I’ve thought long and hard about what I think regarding this event. My thoughts are thus:

If the jury ruled that AH suffered from CI after listening to hours of evidence then who am I to argue? I will still admit to not fully understanding it based on what has been explained on here.

I sat through two BFM sorties today and whilst exposed to prolonged G I don’t believe my faculties to have been adversely affected in any way.

If we are to state that AH is an ‘experienced FJ operator’ then I think we need to define what we mean by that. The elder statesmen of this forum regularly pour scorn on the youngsters who have far less hours than they accrued during their service careers.

AH had 1500 FJ hours (800 of which were on the JP) and left the RAF 21 years before the accident. There was then a 9-10 year gap before he started flying JPs again.

I wouldn't argue for a second if someone said he was an experienced JP pilot. With 14000 total flying hours we can all agree he is also an experienced pilot. The bit I take issue with is that most of his flying was either so distant or on a completely unrelated type to the Hunter.

I stated earlier I have a fair amount of current Hawk experience but I wouldn’t go and fly low level aerobatics tomorrow without an appropriate work up (or work down depending on how you look at it).

I apologise if this is not the Pprune approved opinion but it is mine.

I can accept that AH was not criminally negligent. I also accept that the CAA bear a lot of blame for allowing the regulations as they were. As an ‘experienced FJ operator’ though I question why he felt suitably qualified and current to fly those manoeuvres.

The upshot, for me personally, is that I would not take my family to an air show with these old Warbirds displaying as things stand. I’m all for flying them as a hobby (I wouldn’t do it but I understand why others want to) and even performing flypasts but until I know something has changed markedly then my family and I will not partake.

Rip me to shreds if you must but you can’t change my opinion.

BV

Edited to add: Capt Scribble, you don’t need to be at altitude to suffer from hypoxia. Hypoxia is a deficiency in the amount of Oxygen reaching the tissues. That can be for many reasons. Altitude is just the one that we, as pilots, are most familiar with.

Dominator2

27th Mar 2019, 11:52

BV,

I totally agree with all that you state. I would like to add that there is no way that a "check out" in a JP should qualify one to fly a Hunter.

Any pilot who is disciplined and professional who performs aerobatics (at any height, let alone low level) sets and learns gate heights and speeds for the whole display. They are written on a knee board and if low level engraved on ones mind. Even if one was suffering from the effects of "hypoxia" these numbers would be almost the last to go from ones memory. As stated previously, a fast jet pilot is trained so that his/her mind can still prioritise even when operating under duress. Operating under g forces, the effects of, and how to counter them were all taught in the RAF since the Meteor. Just because the USAF discovered gLoc in the late 70s and we learnt from them does not mean that there was not such training previously.

Is it possible that the supposed "hypoxia" was caused by hyperventilation due to anxiety. Was AH over-breathing and thus filling his lungs with Carbon Dioxide? Was he dumped with the Shoreham display (a difficult venue for a fast jet) at a late stage and he was not able to say No. The downwind takeoff and track taken prior to the display are not necessarily the actions of one in total control! Even so, if properly trained and qualified he should have been able to over come the situation that he put himself in. The accident was avoidable!

Just This Once...

27th Mar 2019, 14:38

I seem to recall flying straight and level achieved around 1G. Running-in to a display and not being at or above the minimum entry speed at or before pitching into the vertical is a decision made in the most benign of circumstances. I am struggling to see how or why this action could be impaired by any G-related physiological effects.

I can accept that AH was not criminally negligent. I also accept that the CAA bear a lot of blame for allowing the regulations as they were. As an ‘experienced FJ operator’ though I question why he felt suitably qualified and current to fly those manoeuvres.

I can only agree that the CAA's lax or incoherent regulation played a part in this incident but we don't blame the police if they fail to identify and stop a bad driver before a car crash. This pilot will have known that he was attempting something that the RAF would have never authorised him to do - fly an unfamiliar fast jet at a public display with just a handful of hours on type. Even in his day job his employer would not allow him to operate any aircraft type with such poor currency.

As you say BV, most of us would not consider attempting such a display even when current on type. Unfortunately a few pilots had convinced themselves that the lack of civil regulation was a green light to undertake anything they were personally prepared to do.

KenV

27th Mar 2019, 14:54

Is it possible that the supposed "hypoxia" was caused by hyperventilation due to anxiety. Was AH over-breathing and thus filling his lungs with Carbon Dioxide? Was he dumped with the Shoreham display (a difficult venue for a fast jet) at a late stage and he was not able to say No. The downwind takeoff and track taken prior to the display are not necessarily the actions of one in total control! Even so, if properly trained and qualified he should have been able to over come the situation that he put himself in. The accident was avoidable!Avoidable? Yes, certainly. Essentially all accidents are avoidable/preventable. But that was not the point in the trial. The point in the trial was: did the failure to avoid/prevent the accident rise to the level of a crime? Specifically, did that failure constitute criminal negligent manslaughter? After hearing all the evidence, the jury clearly and unanimously said no. The rest is moot. And pointless.

airsound

27th Mar 2019, 14:58

I sat through the seven-odd weeks of the case (apart from three days in the middle), and I have contemporaneous notes of most of the proceedings.

There were two pieces of evidence that particularly struck me, over many days of detailed offerings.

The first was from one of the ‘first responders’ who attended AH as he lay beside the wreckage of the Hunter cockpit. AH was at death’s door - indeed his life was only saved by the timely introduction of a needle into his lung. He was speaking, although not particularly coherently. But, according to the evidence of Mark Durham, AH said he had “at some point blacked out in the air”. Although this was not an actual ‘death bed statement’, it could be considered to have a similar status, since he was, effectively, about to die.

The second piece of evidence that seemed particularly significant to me, was offered by the defence ‘human factors’ expert witness, Dr Stephen Jarvis. He adduced seven, eight, or possibly even twelve, piloting errors in the 23 seconds leading up to the aircraft’s arrival at the apex of the accident manoeuvre (the bent loop). They included:

Unexplained power reduction.
Continuing the turn beyond the appropriate inbound track.
Failure to notice low speed.
Pitch oscillations.
Incorrect roll in the vertical.
After, the apex, the failure to eject. That would have been a rule-based action, from his training.

Dr Jarvis did not include the failure to conduct an escape manoeuvre as one of his errors, because he said that was not his area of expertise.

Also not mentioned in his evidence, but clearly visible in the cockpit GoPro camera footage, was the fact that the aircraft was lined up on the road, apparently intentionally, during its final descent. Why would any pilot in his right mind do that, unless he was under the impression that he was lining up on a runway?

Dr Jarvis pointed out that one type of accident is an accumulation errors, which are not independent. In this case he was unable to find any relationship between the errors. The chances of that happening, he said, were astronomically improbable. That makes them very difficult to explain - other than by some degree of cognitive impairment.

He was asked about the possibility of this all being due to “extremely bad piloting”. He couldn’t accept that. AH was a very experienced and expert pilot, he said. Bad piloting didn’t fit, when he made ten or more errors in 23 seconds. “He’s in front of an audience, he’s on peak performance, [and] gash, complacent behaviour doesn’t fit.”

It may be worth reminding ourselves that AH has no memory of anything from Thursday 20 August 2015 (two days before the crash) to when he came round from his induced coma, in hospital, the following week. His amnesia was medically attested to by Legalapproach in his post #132, when Legalapproach also pointed out that the prosecution had not sought to discredit the amnesia. So in all of AH’s three and a half days in the witness box, he was not able to describe at first hand anything that happened during the accident flight or its immediate preparation.

Bearing in mind that the jury (of eleven people) came to a unanimous verdict after about seven hours of consideration, it seems clear that they accepted the defence arguments over the prosecution’s. Who are we to disagree with that?

Incidentally, the reason for there being eleven jurors, rather than twelve, was that, on 29 January, one juror fell ill and was taken to hospital by ambulance. She was excused further jury service.

airsound

Caramba

27th Mar 2019, 15:29

Dominatior 2: “Is it possible that the supposed "hypoxia" was caused by hyperventilation due to anxiety. Was AH over-breathing and thus filling his lungs with Carbon Dioxide?”
Hyperventilation will not, cannot fill anybody’s lungs with carbon dioxide. There is damn all carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, even in these climate warming times. Hyperventilation leads to a reduction of arterial CO2, which in turn leads to a decrease in cerebral blood flow. That’s why you start feeling a bit dizzy when you blow up an air bed. So if AH was hyperventilating, it might contribute to cerebral hypoxia but nothing to do with CO2.

Bob Viking - what a sensible balanced post.

Legalapproach - keep trying! You are doing a good job. BTW is it possible, can I get a transcript of the judge’s and prosecution’s summing up? For my interest and education. Thanks.

Airsound: you were there, you know what a load of cobblers the press coverage was, and I agree totally with your comments.

Caramba

orca

27th Mar 2019, 18:29

Hi airsound,

Thank you for your post. Can you tell us how it was established that the pilot was both expert and experienced and which criteria were used?

I wasn’t present and haven’t read the proceedings (or very much of the open press coverage tbh) but there seems to be the ‘expert opinion’ that something must have been wrong because the pilot’s perceived status ruled out other explanations. Just wondering how that status was established and tested.

Thanks in advance for any light shed.

Just This Once...

27th Mar 2019, 19:34

Bearing in mind that the jury (of eleven people) came to a unanimous verdict after about seven hours of consideration, it seems clear that they accepted the defence arguments over the prosecution’s. Who are we to disagree with that?

We are professional aviators who are expected to understand and learn from tragedies such as this. I also don't doubt the independence, professionalism or experience of the AAIB and their report is sobering. I would be concerned if AH was presented as a skilled or experienced Hunter pilot - he was not. I would count someone such as LOMCEVAK as a highly skilled and experienced Hunter pilot and he didn't achieve that status with a handful of sorties.

AH 'qualified' after 3hrs 25min flying the Hunter. By the time of the crash 4 years later he had amassed 19hrs 25min total time displaying the Hunter, including transits, with an average of just 5 sorties per year. It was the only fast jet he had flown since leaving the RAF 11 years earlier, after completing just 1 frontline tour and with no RAF display experience.

Easy Street

27th Mar 2019, 20:40

the defence ‘human factors’ expert witness, Dr Stephen Jarvis ... adduced seven, eight, or possibly even twelve, piloting errors in the 23 seconds leading up to the aircraft’s arrival at the apex of the accident manoeuvre (the bent loop). They included:

Unexplained power reduction.
Continuing the turn beyond the appropriate inbound track.
Failure to notice low speed.
Pitch oscillations.
Incorrect roll in the vertical.
After, the apex, the failure to eject. That would have been a rule-based action, from his training.
Dr Jarvis did not include the failure to conduct an escape manoeuvre as one of his errors, because he said that was not his area of expertise.

Also not mentioned in his evidence, but clearly visible in the cockpit GoPro camera footage, was the fact that the aircraft was lined up on the road, apparently intentionally, during its final descent. Why would any pilot in his right mind do that, unless he was under the impression that he was lining up on a runway?

Dr Jarvis pointed out that one type of accident is an accumulation errors, which are not independent. In this case he was unable to find any relationship between the errors. The chances of that happening, he said, were astronomically improbable. That makes them very difficult to explain - other than by some degree of cognitive impairment.

He was asked about the possibility of this all being due to “extremely bad piloting”. He couldn’t accept that. AH was a very experienced and expert pilot, he said. Bad piloting didn’t fit, when he made ten or more errors in 23 seconds.

This is readily explained by the condition known in the military aviation profession as being ‘maxed out’, or stretched beyond the limits of mental capacity. Most often seen in student pilots, its recurrence is a common reason for suspension, whether in initial training or under carefully supervised conditions on postgraduate courses such as the Qualified Weapons Instructor Course. Many a current and capable second- or third-tour aviator with greater ability than AH has failed the latter by becoming ‘maxed out’ despite operating at what most would consider peak performance. The condition is typically suppressed outside the training environment by the application of a process known as ‘flying supervision’, which begins with regulations setting out minimum qualification and currency requirements and upon which a layer of professional judgement is applied, culminating in a signature authorising a particular sortie. Even the most experienced and expert military aviators are limited in what they are permitted to do when outside of currency stipulations, in part because of the risk of making errors and mistakes while ‘maxed out’.

He’s in front of an audience

Widely known in professional circles, and most especially in the display world, as one of the *very* highest risk factors for poor decision-making and self-induced pressure, while performing and even on the ground beforehand. Evidence: B-52 Fairchild AFB 1994, C-17 Elmendorf AFB 2010, Tucano Linton-on-Ouse 2009, plenty of other case studies, and the enormous quantity of military regulation that existed to control flypasts, role demonstrations and displays even before the Shoreham accident.

he’s on peak performance

Not a barrier to becoming 'maxed out', see my QWI course example above. More significantly, the statement is way beyond the bounds of credibility given AH's currency and experience on type.

gash, complacent behaviour doesn’t fit

A straw man argument in relation to the sequence of errors recounted. AH could have been doing his very best at that point in the occurrence. The key to our profession is not putting pilots in a place where their best is not good enough.

I am being deliberately tongue-in-cheek with all of this because I can’t think of many sortie profiles more likely to stretch a pilot beyond the limit of their mental capacity than a low-level aerobatic display at a tricky venue with patchy currency and less than 20 hours on type. Frankly I find it astonishing that a human factors expert would offer the pilot's supposed 'experienced and expert' status as an absolute barrier to poor performance, given countless historical examples of 'experienced and expert' pilots performing very poorly indeed.

Easy Street et al

Ah yes, the court of opinion that hasn't heard any of the evidence. I have done my best to try and encapsulate the medical position

Few, if any on here are disputing the verdict duly reached in court of law; perhaps that makes our discussion off-topic given the word 'trial' in the thread title. However you should be unsurprised to learn that the verdict and medical position have been examined carefully by military authorities, as the outcome could be taken to infer that the military is unaware of the potential for CI at relatively low G, which would be a significant issue for legally-accountable aviation duty holders. So you'll have to take it as read that some of us may be more informed on the medical position than you think. Your statement of that position was enough to prevent the criminal standard of proof from being reached, but I'm afraid it won't wash with the majority here.

andrewn

27th Mar 2019, 20:52

Great post BV - hope you dont mind if I give my own thoughts in line below...

If we are to state that AH is an ‘experienced FJ operator’ then I think we need to define what we mean by that.
Why does that need defining? If your point is "was he experienced enough to be flying that aircraft that day at an airshow" then per the CAA display flying rules and regs of the day he either met or exceeded all the criteria laid down related to experience, currency and competency.

AH had 1500 FJ hours (800 of which were on the JP) and left the RAF 21 years before the accident. There was then a 9-10 year gap before he started flying JPs again.

I wouldn't argue for a second if someone said he was an experienced JP pilot. With 14000 total flying hours we can all agree he is also an experienced pilot. The bit I take issue with is that most of his flying was either so distant or on a completely unrelated type to the Hunter.

You make some salient, but obvious, points. The question, in my mind, is why was the environment so permissive that it allowed (you could almost say encouraged) AH and others to display high performance vintage jets in a public environment with such appalingly low levels of overall flying time, type experience and/or currency? If you want a real eye-opener look at the flying hrs table in the AAIB report (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5714f1f040f0b60385000072/Folland_Gnat_T_Mk_1_G-TIMM_05-16.pdf) (P.68/69) for the Carfest Gnat crash. I should add, with respect to the deceased, that like AH he was in full compliance with the rules and regs of the day....

I stated earlier I have a fair amount of current Hawk experience but I wouldn’t go and fly low level aerobatics tomorrow without an appropriate work up (or work down depending on how you look at it).

I can accept that AH was not criminally negligent. I also accept that the CAA bear a lot of blame for allowing the regulations as they were.

That's a fair viewpoint and I personally believe rules and regulations, although not a substitute for commonsense, are there for a reason - usually to try and prevent the worst excesses of human nature (fallibility) from spilling over. But for any rules/regs to be effective in preventing whatever they are meant to prevent they need to be appropriate at the outset, kept under regular review, be open to change as circumstances dictate, and be enforced consistently. Unfortunately, in my opinion, the CAA display flying regs in place at the time of the Shoreham tragedy failed most of those key tests.

As an ‘experienced FJ operator’ though I question why he felt suitably qualified and current to fly those manoeuvres
Questioning why AH got in the cockpit that day to fly those manoeuvres in that way in that plane is a bit like asking why somebody that mowed down a child was driving at 30mph past a school at 8.30am or 3.30pm. With our sensible head many of us would recognise that it's inappropriate but in many areas its still legal to do it, so some of us take advantage of it. It's human nature to be overly confident in our own abilities and generally have an overly optimistic view of possible impacts and consequences. And when we are confident we are fully compliant with the laws of the day that makes the decision making process a whole lot easier. Unfortunately what seems so obvious to some is often completely overlooked by others - back again I am afraid for the onus to be on the rules and regs to be fit for purpose.

The upshot, for me personally, is that I would not take my family to an air show with these old Warbirds displaying as things stand. I’m all for flying them as a hobby (I wouldn’t do it but I understand why others want to) and even performing flypasts but until I know something has changed markedly then my family and I will not partake.

So a personal recollection that I think I shared on here some time ago, so forgive me for repetition. I was at the Carfest event that the Gnat crashed at and saw it unfold first hand. I had a deep sense of foreboding the moment I saw the Gnat pair arrive in the overhead and ushered my wife and kids into a marquee whilst I stood outside and watched what I believed was a inappropriate display at an unsuitable venue in marginal weather conditions. I've read on here that others had a similar sense of unease as they saw AH pull up into the vertical at Shoreham. Not possible to turn back the clock, regrettably, but I do believe a LOT of lessons have now been learned (or re-learned) and that many of the factors that led to both these accidents have now been addressed, such as to make the chances of reoccurence substantially lower. I still regularly attend airshows and take my family with me occasionally.

airsound

27th Mar 2019, 21:59

orca. You ask
Can you tell us how it was established that the pilot was both expert and experienced and which criteria were used?

Well, AH graduated from advanced FJ training at RAF Valley and became a ‘creamy’ - that’s to say, he was so good that the RAF ‘creamed’ him off as as a first tour instructor before sending him on to a frontline squadron. When he did go on, he was posted onto Harriers - an indication that he was amongst the top echelons of RAF pilots.

When he left the Air Force in 1995, having been an instructor in advanced combat manoeuvres and formation flying, he got his ATPL and flew for Virgin and BA, becoming a captain for BA.

But he also became a display pilot, flying the Extra 300, Bulldog and Vans RV-8. He became a light aircraft test pilot and taught aerobatics. He was part of a two-ship RV-8 team called the RV-8ors (geddit?), and did more than 300 displays with them. They were a very popular part of the display scene. AH also displayed the JP, and was eventually invited to display the Hunter. He was trained in that by the experienced and distinguished Hunter pilot, Chris Heames.

So I suggest that it was clear AH was ‘expert and experienced’ as a display pilot - although not, by military standards, as a Hunter display pilot. He was, though, fully qualified on the Hunter for CAA purposes.

It is also noteworthy that, at his trial, his defence team produced an extraordinary array of fourteen highly positive character references from distinguished pilots. The referees included:

A past leader of the Red Arrows,
A former director of the Empire Test Pilots’ School and subsequent founder of the ‘Ultimate High’ flight safety training organisation,
A Red Bull Air Race World Championship pilot,
A pilot to the royal families of the UK and Jordan who was also British National Aerobatic Champion and flew as a BA captain and a warbird pilot.

The referees spoke of AH’s high personal standards and his awareness of regulatory, operational and aircraft limits. One mentioned “his superior intellect [and his ability] to project ahead, identifying potential errors or hazardous situations and mitigating them.” Another spoke of his “threat error management”. Yet another said “Compared to his peers, AH’s ‘Situational Awareness’ was excellent.”

airsound

Easy Street

27th Mar 2019, 22:12

airsound

Had Lt Col Arthur 'Bud' Holland and Captain Jacob van Zanten survived their respective accidents and been put on trial, I'm sure their defence lawyers could have amassed dozens of general officers (in Holland's case) and senior captains and managers (in van Zanten's) who would have sung the praises of these outstandingly experienced and respected aviators. Whether that would have presented a true picture in court would rather depend on how much effort the prosecution spent establishing contrasting views from squadron commanders (Holland) and co-pilots (both), and whether it could protect its less 'prestigious' witnesses from attacks on their credibility. The truth behind both accidents would have been found in their evidence.

We have spent many years in aviation trying to get away from the notion of the infallible pilot. Medicine is just setting off on that journey with its consultants. It disappoints me to see the trend being reversed.

212man

28th Mar 2019, 09:14

This is readily explained by the condition known in the military aviation profession as being ‘maxed out’, or stretched beyond the limits of mental capacity. Most often seen in student pilots, its recurrence is a common reason for suspension, whether in initial training or under carefully supervised conditions on postgraduate courses such as the Qualified Weapons Instructor Course. Many a current and capable second- or third-tour aviator with greater ability than AH has failed the latter by becoming ‘maxed out’ despite operating at what most would consider peak performance. The condition is typically suppressed outside the training environment by the application of a process known as ‘flying supervision’, which begins with regulations setting out minimum qualification and currency requirements and upon which a layer of professional judgement is applied, culminating in a signature authorising a particular sortie. Even the most experienced and expert military aviators are limited in what they are permitted to do when outside of currency stipulations, in part because of the risk of making errors and mistakes while ‘maxed out’.

Widely known in professional circles, and most especially in the display world, as one of the *very* highest risk factors for poor decision-making and self-induced pressure, while performing and even on the ground beforehand. Evidence: B-52 Fairchild AFB 1994, C-17 Elmendorf AFB 2010, Tucano Linton-on-Ouse 2009, plenty of other case studies, and the enormous quantity of military regulation that existed to control flypasts, role demonstrations and displays even before the Shoreham accident.

Not a barrier to becoming 'maxed out', see my QWI course example above. More significantly, the statement is way beyond the bounds of credibility given AH's currency and experience on type.

A straw man argument in relation to the sequence of errors recounted. AH could have been doing his very best at that point in the occurrence. The key to our profession is not putting pilots in a place where their best is not good enough.

I am being deliberately tongue-in-cheek with all of this because I can’t think of many sortie profiles more likely to stretch a pilot beyond the limit of their mental capacity than a low-level aerobatic display at a tricky venue with patchy currency and less than 20 hours on type. Frankly I find it astonishing that a human factors expert would offer the pilot's supposed 'experienced and expert' status as an absolute barrier to poor performance, given countless historical examples of 'experienced and expert' pilots performing very poorly indeed.

Few, if any on here are disputing the verdict duly reached in court of law; perhaps that makes our discussion off-topic given the word 'trial' in the thread title. However you should be unsurprised to learn that the verdict and medical position have been examined carefully by military authorities, as the outcome could be taken to infer that the military is unaware of the potential for CI at relatively low G, which would be a significant issue for legally-accountable aviation duty holders. So you'll have to take it as read that some of us may be more informed on the medical position than you think. Your statement of that position was enough to prevent the criminal standard of proof from being reached, but I'm afraid it won't wash with the majority here.

Great post which I think resonates with many here. Having met Dr. Steven Jarvis and seen him presenting at conferences/workshops several times, I can say that he is a very dynamic and charismatic character (positively 'bounces' around the stage!) and it is easy to see how his evidence to a jury would be found to be very compelling.

DODGYOLDFART

28th Mar 2019, 09:58

Just to add a further thought to Easy Street's comments about being "maxed out". Please excuse the slight divergence form the main thread.

It is worth considering what happened to a Red Arrows pilot (Jon Egging) at the Bournemouth Air Show back in I think 2011. He died following a formation break to land. If I remember correctly the following C of I attributed at least some of the cause to possibly pulling too much G (up to 6G+) in trying to avoid flying over the built up part of Bournemouth and consequently became maxed out or CI to use the latest vernacular. For those that don't know, flying over that part of Bournemouth particularly in circuit or at low level is almost a hanging offence and I guess this was at the forefront of the Eggmans mind at that time.

I am not trying to relate the Bournemouth accident to the Shoreham and AH but just pointing out that even current military display pilots can run into trouble from time to time.

Bob Viking

28th Mar 2019, 10:20

To give my reply some context I am a Bournemouth lad who has used the airport multiple times in both Hawk and Jaguar. I also knew Eggman and read the report with interest as we all did.

I think it would be fair to say there are quite a few inaccuracies in your post and you may wish to do more research and edit it accordingly.

For starters, Poole is miles away and not even a Jaguar would struggle to stay away from it during a break to land. If you understood the RAFAT break you’d know what profile they were flying and local geography had nothing to do with it.

As for the cause of Eggmans crash it was ALOC/GLOC related. From what I’m beginning to understand this CI phenomenon is different to GLOC. I don’t think we should confuse the two.

That was as polite as I could make it.

BV

DODGYOLDFART

28th Mar 2019, 10:33

BV I am happy to stand corrected due to your superior knowledge of the area. However as you admit it was ALOC/GLOC related and according to the trial so was AH's hypoxia or whatever his form of CI was.

Bob Viking

28th Mar 2019, 10:48

Without wishing to read the entire report again and, since I have not read the court transcripts, I will trust that you are correct on the CI vs ALOC/GLOC issue.

I personally had not made a connection between the Bournemouth and Shoreham events. I see more similarities with the Car Fest event and Shoreham to be honest.

I will leave it there since I don’t want to drag this too far off topic.

BV

airsound

28th Mar 2019, 11:30

Easy Street, BV and andrewn.

I don't necessarily disagree with the general sense of your responses to my two posts. But I would like to point out that I was mostly writing about what took place at Court 8 at the Central Criminal Court (the Old Bailey) between 16 January and 8 March 2019.

I do believe that the ramifications of this case have hardly started, and I was aware, E Street, of the military interest in CI that you mention.

The next significant happening will probably be the inquest. At the moment, the West Sussex Senior Coroner, Penelope Schofield, plans to hold a case management hearing on the afternoon of 8 April 2019. I understand it is not expected to last longer than that day. At that stage, she may reveal the start date for the full hearing, and also whether this will be an Article 2 Inquest (in which a state organisation may be implicated).

airsound

Evalu8ter

29th Mar 2019, 10:51

BV - "I see more similarities with the Car Fest event and Shoreham to be honest."

100%

Ex-mil FJs are expensive to operate - even more so than a SEP Warbird (with the exception of acquisition cost & hull cost insurance). Therefore, selected pilots fly few hours with irregular currency. Perhaps its time for a more stringent look at "who flies what" in front of the public. By all means, if you have the money and can afford the training, take your Spitfire, P51 or JP up for a dance amongst the clouds at Medium Level (which is 500ft and above in my terms…). I am, however, very nervous when I see the same set of names dynamically displaying lots of different aircraft with relatively low hours on each in front of the public. Yes, I appreciate that this could cause issues and the increased costs might remove popular aircraft from public display, but there's nowt to stop the larger operators restricting their pilots to a couple of types to display, and rotating every couple of years. It might encourage the training and selection of new pilots, and prevent the "he's a great bloke, everybody likes/rates him, he's got thousands of hours - I'm sure he'll be fine displaying the Gnat/JP/Hunter/T33 with less than enough hours for a Prog Check on an OCU spread out over 3 years…." oh, and of course, no simulator to practise emergencies in. The Boultbee Spitfire simulator (http://www.boultbeeflightacademy.co.uk/spitfiresimulator) initiative is to be applauded, and, IMHO, should be something that Insurance companies start to insist that pilots conduct recurrent training in, including emergencies at various stages of their display. sequence...

KenV

29th Mar 2019, 15:29

jindabyne

29th Mar 2019, 20:46

Time to knock it off Mods?

orca

29th Mar 2019, 21:27

Why? Many of us would be interested in the simple yes/no answer to the question posed.

DB6

29th Mar 2019, 21:47

From what I have seen of the Southport incident it was a roll, not a loop, that caused puckering.

beardy

29th Mar 2019, 21:49

Having established that Andy Hill is not guilty of the charges levelled against him, where does the buck stop?

T28B

30th Mar 2019, 02:41

For jindabyne:
The discussion is in touch. So no, "knock it off" is not the correct call.
Carry on, please keep it professional.

Homelover

30th Mar 2019, 13:29

So may I ask, what part of the Shoreham tragedy was caused by a lack of time/experience in type by the pilot? Or even contributed to it? I personally see nothing. And I don't see how the above handwringing measures would have altered the outcome one iota.

Err, probably the crashing part?

LOMCEVAK

30th Mar 2019, 14:05

Dr Stephen Jarvis. He adduced seven, eight, or possibly even twelve, piloting errors in the 23 seconds leading up to the aircraft’s arrival at the apex of the accident manoeuvre (the bent loop). They included:

Unexplained power reduction.
Continuing the turn beyond the appropriate inbound track.
Failure to notice low speed.
Pitch oscillations.
Incorrect roll in the vertical.
After, the apex, the failure to eject. That would have been a rule-based action, from his training.

I would like to postulate reasons for three of these errors listed above:
- Continuing the turn beyond the appropriate inbound track. We do not know precisely what point on the display line AH planned to point towards. From the height and distance that he was from the display line the sightline angle was very shallow and he may not have had a full perspective of the runway. Similarly, judgement of the required pull-up point is difficult and is a purely visual assessment and that is one of the biggest potential errors in flying this manoeuvre. There is a great deal of scope for all of us to make an error with judging this aspect of such a manoeuvre.
- Pitch oscillations. This reference was to immediately after rolling out of the turn prior to the pull-up when about 2 cycles of a very low amplitude pitch oscillation occurred. This is a normal open loop Hunter response, and if anyone wishes I am quite happy to give a full explanation.
- Incorrect roll in the vertical. In this manoeuvre, the required roll angle will always be different every time that you fly it due to the angle off the display line, distance from the display line and on/off crowd wind component. There are no visual cues that you can use when the roll angle required is small; you make the input with partial aileron by cadence alone and there is a great tendency to 'over-roll', especially if, during the pull-up, you realise that you have pulled up too soon and try to roll through more than the angle required for the heading change in order to displace and exit on the display line.

All of the above potential error mechanisms may occur without cognitive impairment. With respect to a rule based ejection option, this would have included rolling wings level then pulling to a level or slightly nose high pitch attitude which is the same as an escape manoeuvre. However, no competent display pilot would ever consider that ejection should be an option at the apex of a loop when the gate height has not been achieved and, therefore, I contend that ejection would never be a rule-based action in this situation.

There have been many comments on here regarding hours on type, currency and flying multiple types. A few points to ponder:
- Military display pilots, except for those involved with dedicated display teams such as RAFAT or BBMF, typically fly only one or occasionally two display seasons. Therefore, they have low overall display experience which is mitigated by flying rigidly defined sequences with a great deal of practise and stringent currency requirements. These mitigations are not necessary to the same extent for pilots who have decades of display experience on multiple types.
- Flying and displaying multiple types can be done safely but does require the pilot to have a robust philosophy and protocol for how they will refresh their competence. Under MAA (and precursor organisation) regulation pilots have maintained type currency on up to 9 widely different types of aircraft, including displaying some of them. What is interesting is that significantly different types are not a problem; it is types that are similar where cognitive errors tend to be made. The worst aspect is flying different airframes of a given type with some ASIs in KIAS and some in mph!
- An experienced display pilot can start displaying safely a new type on which he has few hours and with little practise or recency if the display sequence and the manoeuvres are appropriate ie. no pulling through the down vertical in looping manoeuvres, all rolls on a climbing line, no maximum AOA turns. I am happy to give examples.
- All of the above require two factors. First, a pilot with the requisite experience, ability and attitude. Please note that I am making no comment here about Shoreham but I am talking generically. Not all pilots and not all display pilots do have the required attributes, but those who do should not be prevented from flying displays which they are capable of doing safely just because other pilots cannot. Secondly, mentoring/supervision/training. Some pilots need more than others but these are essential aspects that are not always to the required standard.

Again, I will not make any comments about Shoreham specifically but mentoring and supervision need to be considered. However, I will raise one specific aspect regarding training and that is flying escape manoeuvres. At the time of the accident CAP403 did not require pilots to ever practise or demonstrate their ability to fly escape manoeuvres and AH stated that he had not done so. It was only required to be discussed under the 'Emergencies' aspect of DA issue. Thankfully, this is now a requirement for DA issue. Allied to this, an Aircrew Manual such as that for the Hunter will never cover in detail, if at all, how to fly these manoeuvres, especially at low IAS. This has to be an essential aspect of training, even if it is just a briefing on how to do so. The Hunter has outstanding handling qualities in this respect and the AAIB flying demonstrated that an escape manoeuvre could be flown safely at 80 KIAS without any abnormal skill. Any skill based activity is ~70% confidence, and if a pilot has never been briefed or practised an escape manoeuvre in a swept wing aircraft at an IAS significantly below the 1g stall speed then they may lack the confidence to do so for real when required.

Capt Scribble

30th Mar 2019, 17:52

Ridger

30th Mar 2019, 22:04

Dear Lomcevak, I enjoyed your post - sounds like the case could have benefitted from your expertise as an expert witness (assuming you didn't indeed do so)

If you don't mind me asking, I am very interested in the cognitive aspects of these sort of activities You stated that some of the errors could occur without cognitive impairment and as you are clearly an expert in the field, could you help clarify some of the points you robustly made? Every day is a school day as they say!

[Similarly, judgement of the required pull-up point is difficult and is a purely visual assessment and that is one of the biggest potential errors in flying this manoeuvre. There is a great deal of scope for all of us to make an error with judging this aspect of such a manoeuvre]. If, as you suggest, cognitive impairment wasn't necessarily present in this error, can you describe what aspects of the judging/visual assessment could cause an error?

[This is a normal open loop Hunter response, and if anyone wishes I am quite happy to give a full explanation]. Please do, this sounds unusual and interesting!

[during the pull-up, you realise that you have pulled up too soon and try to roll through more than the angle required for the heading change in order to displace and exit on the display line]. What cues would be used to inform the realisation that you'd pulled up too soon? If a pilot didn't realise they had pulled up soon, what would they need to do next?

[Any skill based activity is ~70% confidence] Please can you let me know what research produced that finding? I've never seen this statement before. For example, Fitts & Posners' 1967 three stage model of skill acquisition doesn't mention confidence at all. Obviously it's plausible confidence plays a role but I'm fascinated by a potential of 70%. Is the other 30% perception and judgement?

Sorry for the questions but I never pass up an opportunity to learn something new!

Lonewolf_50

31st Mar 2019, 03:48

For example, Fitts & Posners' 1967 three stage model of skill acquisition doesn't mention confidence at all. Obviously it's plausible confidence plays a role but I'm fascinated by a potential of 70%. Is the other 30% perception and judgement? ! Was Fitts and Posners' work to do with aviation, or something else? We have a variety of skill sets that call for mastery or proficiency, particularly perishable skills, that also have currency requirements.
As an example, landing an aircraft on a naval ship at night.
Unless you know how to do it, have done it before (both are elements of confidence), and have some recency of experience, and at least minimum proficiency, you are more likely to cock it up.
I've seen lack of confidence lead people to turn in their wings and deselect from flying status. So yeah, confidence is necessary.
Aerobatics, particularly at low level/display, is similarly a non trivial task to get right.
I won't comment further on aerobatics as Lomcevak has the floor and is a far better source.

Ridger

31st Mar 2019, 10:06

Was Fitts and Posners' work to do with aviation, or something else? We have a variety of skill sets that call for mastery or proficiency, particularly perishable skills, that also have currency requirements.
As an example, landing an aircraft on a naval ship at night.
Unless you know how to do it, have done it before (both are elements of confidence), and have some recency of experience, and at least minimum proficiency, you are more likely to cock it up.
I've seen lack of confidence lead people to turn in their wings and deselect from flying status. So yeah, confidence is necessary.
Aerobatics, particularly at low level/display, is similarly a non trivial task to get right.
I won't comment further on aerobatics as Lomcevak has the floor and is a far better source.

Well, this is exactly why I asked the question really - I'm interested in seeing any aviation research which has tested the role of confidence in skill based tasks

LOMCEVAK

31st Mar 2019, 12:34

The fact that the escape manoeuvre had not been practised or demonstrated is yet another red herring. It is not possible for an RAF QFI who taught aerobatics not to know what to do when a vertical manoevre goes wrong. The argument suggests that an experienced low-level aerobatic pilot did not have the knowledge, and possibly skill, to safely escape his predicament if he did not make the ‘gate’ at the top of the loop. Not possible and I would consider it wreckless to pull up for loop without that knowledge.

The RAF teaching for what to do when a vertical manoeuvre goes wrong is to close the throttle and centralise the stick and rudder pedals. That is not an appropriate recovery when a gate height is not achieved during a looping manoeuvre in a display.

Low speed light aircraft do not use a gate height during low level looping manoeuvres because it is not appropriate with the high pitch rate at the apex and the small radius. Therefore, rigid application of a gate height protocol will not be a familiar procedure for a display pilot whose experience is mainly light aircraft, however experienced he is.

I most certainly agree that a pilot who pulls up for a looping manoeuvre at a display and does not have a robust plan of what to do at any stage around the manoeuvre when the airspeed and height are insufficient to continue the manoeuvre safely is indeed being reckless.

Ridger,

The errors in the pull-up point are because there are many variables (airspeed, wind, angle off the display line, unfamiliar display site etc) and the pilot has to make a purely visual judgement, often with a very shallow sightline angle and, therefore, little plan view perspective. Therefore, it is easy to make a misjudgement. During the pull up more plan view is available aiding judgement and allowing for corrections to be planned. If the roll angle is not varied on the way up then a 'bend' can be used on the vertical down line to help regain positioning.

The pitch oscillations following a rapid change in angle of attack are (and you did ask!) caused by a low frequency and only moderately damped short period pitch oscillation, resulting from high pitch inertia and low angle of attack stability.

The '70% confidence' comment comes from something that I was told many years ago but I am afraid that I cannot remember the source. However, it is consistent with what I have observed in pilots over many years. The other ~30% is motor skills, hand-eye co-ordination etc. I will admit that this is not a real area of expertise for me and there are others far more knowledgeable than I am on this.

beardy

31st Mar 2019, 13:59

The RAF teaching for what to do when a vertical manoeuvre goes wrong is to close the throttle and centralise the stick and rudder pedals.

Only when you run out of airspeed.

LOMCEVAK

31st Mar 2019, 14:54

Only when you run out of airspeed. True, but to the best of my knowledge nothing else has ever been taught. The concept of a rigid gate height protocol for medium level aerobatics in training has never, as far as I am aware, been taught in the RAF. So saying, I am not advocating that this should be taught in flying training because altitude loss during pull through is a function of TAS and so will vary markedly with altitude.

orca

31st Mar 2019, 15:05

Lomcevak,

For me you nail the whole argument in your paragraph about it being reckless to enter a manoeuvre without a plan for the eventuality of being unable to continue safely.

Evalu8ter

31st Mar 2019, 15:08

KenV,
I would humbly suggest that a total of 43 hours on type in 4 years was the "part of the Shoreham tragedy (that) was caused by a lack of time/experience in type by the pilot?". Less than half what a pilot would get on a far more intensive 6-month OCU course, and a fraction of the legal mandated flying (let alone Display) currency for a military Fast Jet pilot. It opens up all sorts of question marks about cognitive failure, recency and currency in my book. I would suggest that flying an airliner for 1000s of hours and displaying light piston aerobatic aircraft is no comparison, and his JP background both in the Service and as a civilian could perhaps muddy the waters further. I don't consider it "handwringing" to question such low currency and overall experience when displaying a powerful jet aircraft at low level in front of the public, a lot like the Carfest accident. I'd shared a coffee with AH a few weeks before the accident - in no way did he come across as a slipshod or cowboy aviator; a little quirky, perhaps, but manifestly not a rip-sh1t. This is why I remain convinced that his lack of familiarity on type, lack of swept wing FJ hours (in recent decades), lack of recency and multiple aircraft types he flew all conspired (perhaps with some transient medical issue) to make him see normality when there was deviation…...

Tay Cough

31st Mar 2019, 16:52

Low speed light aircraft do not use a gate height during low level looping manoeuvres because it is not appropriate with the high pitch rate at the apex and the small radius.

I have some limited light aircraft display experience and I have always used a gate height for what I hope would be obvious reasons. I don’t fly a high performance type such as an Extra so the margins available to me are less, although undeniably greater than in a FJ.

While I haven’t flown FJ, I’m aware that in that case the gate height is also often connected to gate speed - something which does not apply to light aircraft aerobatics. That said, I don’t believe that to say a gate height is not used in low level light aircraft aerobatics is accurate.

Capt Scribble

31st Mar 2019, 19:48

Lonewolf_50

1st Apr 2019, 00:35

Well, this is exactly why I asked the question really - I'm interested in seeing any aviation research which has tested the role of confidence in skill based tasks I'll take that as a "no, Fitts and Posner had nothing to do with aviation." If you want to see the research, I'll offer you a search term that you may pursue if you like.
NATOPS. That program was the result of some research that was mostly written in blood.
As to observations, I'll support Lomcevak's point. I'll also point out that it was institutional knowledge before I entered into flight training about four decades ago.
If you want to delve into Instructional systems Design, you will find various schools of thought on that constitutes "mastery" and I'll go no further as that takes us well off topic.

Ridger

1st Apr 2019, 08:40

The RAF teaching for what to do when a vertical manoeuvre goes wrong is to close the throttle and centralise the stick and rudder pedals. That is not an appropriate recovery when a gate height is not achieved during a looping manoeuvre in a display.

Low speed light aircraft do not use a gate height during low level looping manoeuvres because it is not appropriate with the high pitch rate at the apex and the small radius. Therefore, rigid application of a gate height protocol will not be a familiar procedure for a display pilot whose experience is mainly light aircraft, however experienced he is.

I most certainly agree that a pilot who pulls up for a looping manoeuvre at a display and does not have a robust plan of what to do at any stage around the manoeuvre when the airspeed and height are insufficient to continue the manoeuvre safely is indeed being reckless.

Ridger,

The errors in the pull-up point are because there are many variables (airspeed, wind, angle off the display line, unfamiliar display site etc) and the pilot has to make a purely visual judgement, often with a very shallow sightline angle and, therefore, little plan view perspective. Therefore, it is easy to make a misjudgement. During the pull up more plan view is available aiding judgement and allowing for corrections to be planned. If the roll angle is not varied on the way up then a 'bend' can be used on the vertical down line to help regain positioning.

The pitch oscillations following a rapid change in angle of attack are (and you did ask!) caused by a low frequency and only moderately damped short period pitch oscillation, resulting from high pitch inertia and low angle of attack stability.

The '70% confidence' comment comes from something that I was told many years ago but I am afraid that I cannot remember the source. However, it is consistent with what I have observed in pilots over many years. The other ~30% is motor skills, hand-eye co-ordination etc. I will admit that this is not a real area of expertise for me and there are others far more knowledgeable than I am on this.

Thankyou Lomcevak; that's very interesting stuff!

Ridger

1st Apr 2019, 08:42

I'll take that as a "no, Fitts and Posner had nothing to do with aviation." If you want to see the research, I'll offer you a search term that you may pursue if you like.
NATOPS. That program was the result of some research that was mostly written in blood.
As to observations, I'll support Lomcevak's point. I'll also point out that it was institutional knowledge before I entered into flight training about four decades ago.
If you want to delve into Instructional systems Design, you will find various schools of thought on that constitutes "mastery" and I'll go no further as that takes us well off topic.

Awesome - thankyou sir! Exactly what I was after https://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/srss/Documents/PUBS/OPNAV%203710_7T%20-%20General%20NATOPS.pdf

DODGYOLDFART

1st Apr 2019, 09:33

FWIW I believe you may find that the originator of the concept of what is termed the Hierarchy of Competence was the celebrated psychologist Abraham Maslow. He identified four stages of Competence, Stage 1 Unconscious Competence, Stage 2 Conscious Incompetence, Stage 3 Conscious Competence, Stage 4 Unconscious Competence.

Maslow's work was then adapted by just about every training situation you can imagine from business through to medicine and beyond. So aviation must have picked it up somewhere along the way!

Haraka

1st Apr 2019, 09:48

I think Stage 1 is "Unconscious Incompetence,"

MPN11

1st Apr 2019, 10:25

I think Stage 1 is "Unconscious Incompetence,"So it would seem ... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_stages_of_competence

hugh flung_dung

1st Apr 2019, 10:52

This is a fascinating thread but I take issue with one comment: Low speed light aircraft do not use a gate height during low level looping manoeuvres because it is not appropriate with the high pitch rate at the apex and the small radius. Therefore, rigid application of a gate height protocol will not be a familiar procedure for a display pilot whose experience is mainly light aircraft, however experienced he is.. I taught aerobatics in light aircraft (such as Bulldog, Cap10, Stearman) for many years and introduced gates from almost the first trip, exits from cock-ups were taught fairly soon after. The teaching was reinforced by introducing gates that could not be achieved and therefore forcing an escape manoeuvre. AFAIK this is fairly standard and reinforced by the aerobatic syllabus.
As others have said, it is almost inconceivable that someone with AH's experience would not know how to escape from a whole range of errors.

HFD (not ex-mil)

just another jocky

1st Apr 2019, 10:58

True, but to the best of my knowledge nothing else has ever been taught. The concept of a rigid gate height protocol for medium level aerobatics in training has never, as far as I am aware, been taught in the RAF. So saying, I am not advocating that this should be taught in flying training because altitude loss during pull through is a function of TAS and so will vary markedly with altitude.

That is my experience too and agree with your reasoning.

For interest, we do currently teach EFT trainee pilots to check for a minimum IAS once inverted before pitching through the vertical on a 1/2 Cuban 8 and if that minimum speed is exceeded, they should roll out of the manoeuvre and re-commence. We do not teach gate heights, though a nominal height requirement for looping manoeuvres should be known to prevent minimum height busts by pitching through too low.

I also displayed a Hunter T7 for about a year and we (the team pilots) deliberately chose not to attempt any looping manoeuvres due to our perception of the risk levels in a low level aerobatic display. Interestingly, as a current RAF pilot with 20+ years on FJ and now current QFI'ing, it took me less than 8 hours on the Hunter, an ac I had never flown before nor had I any experience of low level aerobatics, to get cleared down to 200ft for any manoeuvre (and also formation on any ac and any number of ac) at Public Events.

In hindsight, this seems inadequate, though at the time I felt I knew what I was doing and indeed performed safely throughout the season.

DODGYOLDFART

1st Apr 2019, 12:16

Thanks for the correction Haraka. Either a touch of the Advanced Fuddyitus or perhaps my bl**dy spell checker again!

LOMCEVAK

1st Apr 2019, 14:10

hugh flung_dung and Tay Cough,

Many thanks for your comments about gate heights in low speed aircraft. I have little experience in this end of the performance range but no-one else has ever said to me that they do use them and I certainly have asked many people. For the small amount of low level aerobatics that I have done in light aircraft, for straight loops I have always just used a minimum pull-up speed and pull-up height, and I certainly would never pull-up from flypast minima as I do in more powerful aircraft. However, for planned control inputs for spins etc I most certainly do use minimum heights. This is becoming serious thread drift but I am interested in your thoughts about the time for making a decision to fly an escape manoeuvre at the apex with respect to the high pitch rate, resulting low nose attitude when you start to roll and, in some aircraft, poor roll performance. Happy to go onto PMs if you wish.

Capt Scribble,

Re your comment I’m sure we are all familiar with the recovery from an ‘Unusual Position’, an expeditious recovery from somewhere you did not want to be, to a position of safety. Not only taught to all RAF pilots but examined in the annual IRT. Useful in all situations from disorientation to aerobatics. In the context of the Shoreham accident manoeuvre, at 105 KIAS at the apex of a loop the standard UP recovery for the Hunter would have been to close the throttle, centralise the stick and rudder pedals, wait until the IAS reached 200 KIAS, roll wings level and recover back to level flight. This is certainly not an appropriate escape manoeuvre at the apex of a low level loop.

KenV

1st Apr 2019, 15:09

Err, probably the crashing part?This thread is about the trial. Nothing in the trial pointed to lack of time/experience in type. The jury concluded that the accident was caused by cognitive impairment, which is totally independent of time/experience in type.

KenV

1st Apr 2019, 15:43

KenV,
I would humbly suggest that a total of 43 hours on type in 4 years was the "part of the Shoreham tragedy (that) was caused by a lack of time/experience in type by the pilot?". Less than half what a pilot would get on a far more intensive 6-month OCU course, and a fraction of the legal mandated flying (let alone Display) currency for a military Fast Jet pilot. It opens up all sorts of question marks about cognitive failure,May I politely point out that in this case the cognitive failure was judged not to be due to inexperience in type, but due to some kind physical impairment. The physical impairment was independent of time/experience in type. The incident pilot failed to recognize he was both low and slow when entering the maneuver and then exacerbated the problem by reducing power during the upward portion of the vertical maneuver. These cognitive failures were not due to lack of time/experience in type. Clinically, cognitive failures are due to the following factors: overload of short-term memory capacity, reduced attention and vigilance level, incidental learning, and divided attention. LINK (https://www.bartleby.com/essay/Cognitive-Failure-F3XYPZEKRZYS) Experience in type would not have changed any of these cognitive failure factors. Further, the jury clearly and unanimously decided that a physiological event triggered the cognitive failures in this incident. Again, no amount of experience in type would have altered that.

orca

1st Apr 2019, 16:05

Hi Ken,

You post with authority.

Did the jury really unanimously agree that a CI had occurred and could clearly be attributed to environmental factors - or did they decide (unanimously or by majority) that, given the evidence proposed, a Guilty verdict for 11 counts of Gross Negligence Manslaughter could not be arrived at?

A genuine question as I can’t find any transcript of proceedings that would let me know; and I wasn’t there; and as I understand it the open source accounts are not to be relied upon.

LOMCEVAK

1st Apr 2019, 16:12

The jury concluded that the accident was caused by cognitive impairment, which is totally independent of time/experience in type.
Further, the jury clearly and unanimously decided that a physiological event triggered the cognitive failures in this incident

KenV, I think that the your emphasis is not quite correct. I think that it would be more accurate to say that the jury decided that it was not beyond reasonable doubt that cognitive impairment could have occurred. The judge, in his direction to the jury, said that it was the prosecution's task to demonstrate that cognitive impairment did not occur which is not an easy task! Therefore, it is not as black and white as you have stated; it is the 'beyond reasonable doubt' requirement for this charge which has a great impact on the verdict.

Treble one

1st Apr 2019, 16:30

The CI issue was simple. There are no medical tests to prove whether it occurred or not. Therefore it might have. Hence a not guilty verdict because the prosecution couldn't prove it hadn't happened.

Whether you think thats a lot of holes in a lot of cheese lining up at a very inopportune time in tragic circumstances, as some may, well thats by the by.

It seems like based on the opinion of a lot of experienced aviators here that the lack of time in the jet was certainly an aggrivating factor.

Whether or not you consider its reckless and negligent to perform an aerobatic display in an aircraft without the requisite training and knowledge as to do if things go a bit t*ts up, is of course, a seperate matter, which maybe wasn't fully considered.

Wrathmonk

1st Apr 2019, 17:29

The CI issue was simple. There are no medical tests to prove whether it occurred or not.

Anyone know what the medical test is for amnesia? I assume it's not as simple as just saying "I don't remember"? Can a scan pick up damage in the relevant part of the brain?

Evalu8ter

1st Apr 2019, 18:21

KenV,
Couple of points if I may. In my experience, cognitive failure is likely exactly when overloaded and capacity sapped - we revert to the familiar (how many times have I used, for example, the wrong downwind checks....Bulldog in a Grob Tutor comes immediately to mind). AH was a low hour,low currency Hunter pilot with much more familiarity with the JP - I can see a distinct possibility he had a JP moment or something akin to it. As for CI being caused by a transient physiological issue, you are right that the court agreed - but only on the high bar of certainty necessary for a guilty verdict for the serious crime he was accused of. I would venture that a lower burden of proof at civil action level may well see a different outcome....

BEagle

2nd Apr 2019, 08:30

Anyone know what the medical test is for amnesia?

I've forgotten....

Finningley Boy

2nd Apr 2019, 08:41

Its not quite the same thing, but there is a Medical test for Dementia, the Doctor will ask a series of simple questions then while doing something like checking Blood Pressure will ask the questions again to see if the same answers are forthcoming.

FB

Caramba

2nd Apr 2019, 12:24

Anyone know what the medical test is for amnesia? I assume it's not as simple as just saying "I don't remember"? Can a scan pick up damage in the relevant part of the brain?

There is no definitive test. Occasionally, patients with retrograde amnesia ie before the precipitating event, are found to have hippocampal abnormalities. But that’s it. Additionally, if and when memory returns, the recollections are often jumbled or inaccurate, and hence are unreliable.

many patients who spend time in an intensive care unit have retrograde amnesia - presumably as a consequence of the precipitating event and the various sedative or analgesic drugs they receive.

Caramba

airsound

2nd Apr 2019, 12:56

orca, you ask:Jury’s Findings......
Did the jury really unanimously agree that a CI had occurred and could clearly be attributed to environmental factors - or did they decide (unanimously or by majority) that, given the evidence proposed, a Guilty verdict for 11 counts of Gross Negligence Manslaughter could not be arrived at?

A genuine question as I can’t find any transcript of proceedings that would let me know; and I wasn’t there; and as I understand it the open source accounts are not to be relied upon.

I posted on 27 MarchBearing in mind that the jury (of eleven people) came to a unanimous verdict after about seven hours of consideration, it seems clear that they accepted the defence arguments over the prosecution’s ..... Incidentally, the reason for there being eleven jurors, rather than twelve, was that, on 29 January, one juror fell ill and was taken to hospital by ambulance. She was excused further jury service.I suggest that that is all that can be deduced from the jury's verdict. As I presume you know, an English jury's considerations are secret for life, and we are extremely unlikely ever to find out what actually led to their verdicts

airsound

Easy Street

2nd Apr 2019, 20:21

it seems clear that they accepted the defence arguments over the prosecution’s

I don't think you can even say that much, especially the word 'over'. The defence arguments need only be strong enough to introduce reasonable doubt, which could be achieved while still considering the prosecution's arguments to be stronger as a whole.

airsound

2nd Apr 2019, 21:02

Easy - semantics!

airsound

PlasticCabDriver

3rd Apr 2019, 08:53

orca, you ask:

I posted on 27 MarchI suggest that that is all that can be deduced from the jury's verdict. As I presume you know, an English jury's considerations are secret for life, and we are extremely unlikely ever to find out what actually led to their verdicts

airsound

...and in Scotland too. Before we were allowed to go after the trial I sat on (attempted murder, a fascinating insight into the whole process (the legal process that is, not the attempted murder process!!)), we were strongly reminded of that fact, and the consequences of doing so. Everything we had in the jury room relevant to the trial (notes, handouts, statements etc) were removed and shredded. Some of us went for a beer afterwards and realised we could no longer talk about it, even amongst ourselves!

If we do ever find out what the jury thought in this case, someone has broken the law.

airsound

3rd Apr 2019, 17:11

There’s an immense amount of knowledge and experience on show in this thread - in fact it’s probably a good example of PPRuNe at its best! (Albeit on a tragic subject).

I have some questions that I’d like to put to some of the assembled experts. My queries are best illustrated by reference to a video (one of many) of the flight.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wGA51y0XQs
Note: the video is OK to watch to 50 seconds. From 50 seconds it jumps to just prior the crash and the crash itself, so, if you don't want to see the crash, do not go beyond 50 seconds

Questions:

The RAF Centre of Aviation Medicine (RAF CAM) report for the AAIB suggests that, in the run-up to the accident manoeuvre (the bent loop), the aircraft never exceeded 2.7g. Looking at the video, does that look likely? In fact, in his second report, a prosecution expert witness, Wg Cdr Nicholas Green, who is the RAF Duty Holder for g risks, had estimated the maximum g at 2.4. He admitted in cross-examination that that had been incorrect. Also, the long left turn after the derry is not level, but descending, and downwind.
Do you notice anything strange about the rate of pitch change at 43 seconds in the video?
From 43 seconds to 50 seconds, does it look as if anyone is really flying the aircraft?

If you now correlate the engine noise from the video with Figure 11 in the AAIB report (below), more questions arise:
Time 12:21:56.5 in Figure 11 corresponds with 39 second in the video.
How to account for the abrupt power reductions at:

12:21:49 [32 seconds in the video, at the end of the left turn]
12:21:59 – 12:22:00 [42 – 43 seconds in the pull-up, coincident with pitch above] ??

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/488x546/aaibfig11_8d69fdc84f1ab9542355880df3d175c9cc2d0a03.png

airsound

beardy

3rd Apr 2019, 17:30

Is it possible that the power was being adjusted to provide the anticipated parameters for the next manoeuvre? Is it possible that the anticipated parameters were incorrect for the display aircraft?

Wander00

4th Apr 2019, 12:47

One wonders if such technical issues are best judged by a jury of lay people, perhaps 2 or 3 judges with an expert advisor might be more appropriate

Lonewolf_50

4th Apr 2019, 13:01

One wonders if such technical issues are best judged by a jury of lay people, perhaps 2 or 3 judges with an expert advisor might be more appropriate As I understand the legal system insofar as jury trials are concerned, that is why each side calls expert witnesses (or can). That trial is a very different animal than the AAIB's investigation, and as I understand the UK system it is also different from the coroner's report. (inquest?)

3wheels

4th Apr 2019, 16:03

One wonders if such technical issues are best judged by a jury of lay people, perhaps 2 or 3 judges with an expert advisor might be more appropriate

I attended the trial of the B747 pilot who nearly hit the Penta Hotel at Heathrow.It was held near West Drayton.

As an ATPL holder I tried in vain to understand the Engineering evidence about the autopilot unserviceability. I was lost, and I am sure the Judge and Jury were too.

The Judge kept remarking about "The Plane" which made me cringe every time he said it.

How the jury (12 "locals" from Uxbridge, if you know what I mean) arrived at their conclusion that he was innocent of one charge but guilty of the other I do not know. Both charges were almost identical.

At the time I had the same thoughts as wanderer00 and felt that this should never be allowed to happen again. Alas...

GeeRam

4th Apr 2019, 19:54

I attended the trial of the B747 pilot who nearly hit the Penta Hotel at Heathrow.It was held near West Drayton.

Forgotten about that......didn't he commit suicide a couple of years afterwards?

3wheels

4th Apr 2019, 22:11

Yes he did. A real tradegy all round.

pbeardmore

5th Apr 2019, 08:14

As an expert witness (in IT forensics) I can confirm that taking any expert knowledge and transferring that to the jury is becoming a bigger and bigger challenge as life becomes more complex but the jury system remains. When training other potential experts, I tell them about my mum who has never used a computer and does not even have a cashpoint card. She can be called for jury duty at any time. She would be as lost in the World of gigabytes, IP addresses, spoofing etc as she would be in the World of fighter jet aerobatics. When giving evidence, I always imagine that my mum is in the jury. We can't assume they know anything. The concept of "twelve good men and true" is a nice and noble one but IMHO, it really struggles in our modern, complex environment.Change is required.

melmothtw

5th Apr 2019, 08:38

She would be as lost in the World of gigabytes, IP addresses, spoofing etc as she would be in the World of fighter jet aerobatics. When giving evidence, I always imagine that my mum is in the jury. We can't assume they know anything. The concept of "twelve good men and true" is a nice and noble one but IMHO, it really struggles in our modern, complex environment.Change is required.

If I learned one thing from my jury service it is that I don't ever want to be tried by a jury. The thought that my life could be decided by any of the juries that I sat on is frankly terrifying.

megan

6th Apr 2019, 01:03

The concept of "twelve good men and true" is a nice and noble one but IMHO, it really struggles in our modern, complex environment.Change is requiredTrouble is, who do you get to sit in judgement in this complex world. Even a Judge would be lost. Put in place a jury of folks who have expertise in the field of endeavour ie in this case a jury of FJ folk with display experience?

Pontius Navigator

6th Apr 2019, 07:52

Put in place a jury of folks who have expertise in the field of endeavour ie in this case a jury of FJ folk with display experience?
And get them to agree?

The Old Fat One

6th Apr 2019, 09:43

If I learned one thing from my jury service it is that I don't ever want to be tried by a jury. The thought that my life could be decided by any of the juries that I sat on is frankly terrifying.

Absolutely! My exact thoughts as I sat thru it!

Even more chilling...I have a cousin-in-law who is a prominent QC. Try telling someone like that, that juries decisions are frankly random and arbitrary on far too many occasions.

PS 15 in Scotland.

kenparry

6th Apr 2019, 09:55

a prominent QC. Try telling someone like that, that juries decisions are frankly random and arbitrary on far too many occasions.

I think most lawyers are well aware of that - they say you can't predict what a jury will do.

DODGYOLDFART

6th Apr 2019, 10:16

On the subject of juries or as an alternative a panel of knowledgeable people. I sat through a Courts Marshal back in the late '50's which was full of technical issues but not much controversial evidence. When the verdict was announced many of us could not believe our ears. We were fully expecting a guilty verdict with an accompanying harsh punishment but instead it was a not guilty. Afterwards when I asked one of the defence team how this had come about the reply was Triple "B" or to give it its full term "Bullsh*t Baffles Brains. A common term in use in those days!

megan

7th Apr 2019, 01:09

And get them to agree?I'm sure they would if you let them know the bar hours.

The Old Fat One

7th Apr 2019, 07:12

I think most lawyers are well aware of that - they say you can't predict what a jury will do.

They know it for sure...whether they think anything is wrong with it, or that it needs changing is debatable. When I suggested to my QC cousin "12 good men/women" juries be replaced by "specialists" of some kind (as is common practice in many countries and used to be the case with Diplock Courts in NI) he looked at me like I was something the cat dragged in. Still he does make eye-watering sums of money convincing juries to pay seven figure sums to victims of NHS neglect, so I guess I get where he is coming from.

Wwyvern

7th Apr 2019, 09:39

I used the "Bu****it Baffles Brains" comment to an engineering colleague, and he replied, "But think what brains can do with bu****it".

ORAC

16th Jul 2019, 07:03

https://www.theargus.co.uk/news/17771824.shoreham-families-suffer-delays-distress/Shoreham families suffer delays distressFAMILIES of the Shoreham Airshow crash victims are being caused “unnecessary distress”, a coroner has said.

Eleven men were killed when pilot Andrew Hill (https://www.theargus.co.uk/search/?search=%22Andrew+Hill%22&topic_id=8444) crashed a Hawker Hunter on to the A27 next to Lancing College on August 22,2015. But families will have to wait for a second Air Accident Investigations Branch (AAIB) investigation to be published around the time of the 4th anniversary and until next year at least before an inquest will be held.

During a hearing yesterday West Sussex senior Coroner Penelope Schofield criticised delays and said the AAIB’s intention to re-investigate - which could jeopardise any inquest - was only brought to light on Friday. The AAIB may decide to assess whether cognitive impairment was a factor in the tragedy - a key feature of Mr Hill’s defence during his criminal trial last year.......

The coroner scheduled another preliminary hearing for November 29. She said a decision about whether a jury will be used would also be made after the AAIB’s decision, which is expected to become clear in August.........

BEagle

16th Jul 2019, 12:07

The AAIB may decide to assess whether cognitive impairment was a factor in the tragedy - a key feature of Mr Hill’s defence during his criminal trial last year.

Who made such a comment? I doubt whether it was the AAIB or the Coroner, so is this just some journalistic speculation?

Ambient Sheep

25th Jul 2019, 02:03

Asturias56

25th Jul 2019, 09:04

Time to shut down all the enquiries and hold the Inquest - you can see this dragging on like the N Ireland stuff for decades to the delight of the lawyers

Blossy

25th Jul 2019, 09:48

Quite right Asturias. Whatever the problem it seems inevitable that the lawyers will magnify it and prolong court proceedings.

Treble one

25th Jul 2019, 12:02

I don't know, but according to an article on page 42 of the latest Private Eye (#1501) it's...

"...the crash pilot [that] has now asked the AAIB to reopen its inquiry.

"Only days before West Sussex coroner Penelope Schofield was expected to set an inquest date, lawyers acting for the AAIB told her that investigators had been asked to reconsider their original finding that the crash had been the result of pilot error.

"Andy Hill [...] had asked the AAIB to look again at the case after he was found not guilty of 11 manslaughter charges at the Old Bailey earlier this year. He was cleared by a jury after arguing that the g-forces [sic] he experienced during the flight had caused a cognitive impairment -- not a factor originally considered by air investigators..."

:hmm:

If true is it just me that finds this a little distasteful?
The pilot was acquitted largely because the prosecution were unable to prove that he had NOT suffered a Cognitive Impairment during the manoeuvre. Basically they couldn't prove that he didn't suffer something that its impossible to prove (there is no known test).
Should he just accept that he is a free man, and not cause even more misery to those who are left behind and are suffering?

Mil-26Man

25th Jul 2019, 14:16

Quote:
a prominent QC. Try telling someone like that, that juries decisions are frankly random and arbitrary on far too many occasions.
I think most lawyers are well aware of that - they say you can't predict what a jury will do.

Having served on a jury, I have learned that I never want to be tried by one.

Ambient Sheep

25th Jul 2019, 15:57

If true is it just me that finds this a little distasteful?
::
::
Should he just accept that he is a free man, and not cause even more misery to those who are left behind and are suffering?

IF true, then I do tend to agree with you; on the other hand perhaps it's a sign of the guilt that he's going through that he feels the need to try to get himself absolved further.

Is what's being suggested (petitioning the AAIB to reopen an inquiry) even possible, or has the Eye got its wires crossed?

airsound

25th Jul 2019, 16:25

Treble One - you ask if anyone finds this a little distasteful, and you suggest that Andy Hill should just keep quiet.

I wonder if you were in court for the 8-week manslaughter trial. Experts there demonstrated that something unusual and, so far largely inexplicable, happened. The jury of eleven people took most of a day to consider their verdict, and were unanimous in their ‘not guilty’ verdict. They had considered a lot of complex evidence, which had taken the judge two days to sum up.

As you say, all the defence had to do was show that the prosecution had failed to prove that cognitive impairment did not occur. But, as the defence QC said in his opening remarks, the defence could, and did, go much further.

More relevant to this debate is that much of the expert evidence, both prosecution and defence, was in conflict with the AAIB report.

Private Eye (of which I’m a huge fan) is wrong in one respect. The defence adduced a cascade of errors, starting at a specific time and position, which could only be explained by some form of, so far unspecified, cognitive impairment. G-forces were only one potential cause, whether total or partial.

A glance at The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 2018
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2018/321/regulation/18/made
will show, under Reopening of safety investigation
18.—(1) Subject to paragraph (3), where, following publication of a final safety investigation report relating to an accident or serious incident, evidence has become available which, in the Chief Inspector’s opinion, is new and significant, the Chief Inspector must cause the safety investigation to be reopened.

(2) Subject to paragraph (3), following publication of a final safety investigation report relating to an accident or serious incident, the Chief Inspector may cause the safety investigation to be reopened for any other reason where the Chief Inspector considers it appropriate to do so.

(3) The Chief Inspector must not reopen a safety investigation into an accident or serious incident in respect of which the task of conducting the safety investigation has been delegated to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, ….. without first obtaining the consent of the head of the investigation authority which so delegated that task.

I don’t think (3) applies. (1) and (2) are clear that the only person who can decide is the Chief Inspector, and (1) relies on ‘new and significant’ evidence. I suggest that the evidence from the trial is clearly ‘new and significant’. Are you, Treble One, suggesting it should be ignored?

As far as I’m concerned, having sat through most of the trial, there was evidence, presented by both sides, that left the AAIB report unsupportable. So I, for one, am not surprised that the AAIB are considering reopening.

airsound

Ambient Sheep

25th Jul 2019, 18:15

Thank you for that very informative post, airsound.

Treble one

26th Jul 2019, 12:38

Thanks for your informative post Airsound. I still remain in the belief that AH should let this lie.

He has answered his charges in court, he has been acquitted fair and square under the 'beyond reasonable doubt' requirement. I personally think his legal team played a blinder by introducing CI as a possible reason that the accident occurred, knowing that the prosecution were unable to prove it had, or hadn't.

Whether someome considers that this 'new evidence' (i.e. he MAY have suffered CI-remember there is no way to prove he did) is enough to reopen the AAIB report, then I don't know.

Perhaps though letting sleeping dogs lie wont necessitate questions like 'when did this potential CI incident occur'

Was it before he was too slow and too low entering the manoeuvre?
Was it before he failed to rech his gate height?
Was it before he failed to recognise this and failed to abandon the manoeuvre?
Or was it just before his jet hit the ground (whilst he appeared to be pulling for all he was worth)?

I have no axe to grind with Mr Hill. I know no-one affected either directly or indirectly with the incident. I'm not a pilot, (I do have a degree in biology). To me there seems to have been a lot of holes in a lot of cheeses lining up at the most unfortunate of times to come to the conclusion that CI was a potential causal factor in this accident, in a pilot who had not shown any signs or symptoms of such an in a long military, civilian and display flying career. he has also, of course, been through considerable physical and mental trauma due to this whole incident.

So thats why I'd move on.

Easy Street

27th Jul 2019, 09:27

One imagines that the CAA and MAA have commissioned urgent research into cognitive impairment. Unless sufficient understanding of the condition can be gained for it to be screened for by aviation medical examiners or recognised at onset by pilots, a further tightening of display flying regulations to mitigate a risk of unknown probability and catastrophic impact would appear to be the logical outcome of AH’s line of argument. Unintended consequences...

falcon900

27th Jul 2019, 10:18

Asturias56

27th Jul 2019, 11:03

Surely the issue is that IF evidence led in the trial contradicts or challenges the AAIB report, this needs to be bottomed out?
Quite a big "if", and I have only heard Airsound suggesting it, but there can be no mileage in leaving any ambiguity where it can be avoided.

Pointless - until his lawyer turned up no -one mentioned it & sold it to the jury

I think everyone who has followed the case has made up their minds and this is just another awful waste of public funds that will enrich the lawyers and defer closure for the families

Timelord

27th Jul 2019, 12:46

As far as I am aware the term “Cognitive Impairment “ was coined by the defence team and had no legal definition. The AAIB report ruled out physical impairment like g LOC on the grounds that the pilot was making control inputs right up to impact. So the jury was presented with this argument.

The pilot was experienced and professional
This experienced and professional pilot did something really wrong.
The only explanation is that he was “cognitively impaired”

Which explains every mistake any of us have ever made.

If I was Mr Hill, I think I would leave it at that!

Wander00

27th Jul 2019, 13:48

Timelord, nicely put. Why does my mind immediately go to a player bouncing his tennis balls......at what point was he "cognitively impaired" - surely not at the top of the manoeuvre, subject to normal 1g. If ever a trial convinced me that there were trials of technical complexity such as to need the jury replaced by "technical assessors/advisors" this was it. Just saying......

airsound

27th Jul 2019, 15:34

Thanks for kind words, Ambient Sheep and 111.

Treble one, you are of course fully entitled to suggest that AH should let this lie. But don’t forget, an inquest is waiting to investigate this tragedy again, so it’s not going to be allowed to lie.

The recent ‘Norfolk’ high court judgement about the helicopter crash addresses the question of Inquests and AAIB reports (see para 56 in particular).
https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2016/2279.html

But anyway, I’m with falcon900 when s/he says
IF evidence led in the trial contradicts or challenges the AAIB report, this needs to be bottomed out?

111, you do go on to ask some pertinent questions about when the potential CI occurred. The start point was covered more than once in trial evidence. It was referred to as ‘Point X’, and detailed by some witnesses as time 12:21:49.
Was it before he was too slow and too low entering the manoeuvre?
Yes, it was before he entered the manoeuvre. Too slow? Expert witnesses said 300K was sufficient. However, why the speed was low is important. It should - and could easily - have been higher. Why wasn’t it? And (height) too low? It was not alleged at trial that he was too low entering the manoeuvre.
Was it before he failed to rech (sic) his gate height?
Yes. But the question there is why the aircraft was so low on energy. There was some strange flying and a lot of energy destroyed. Why?
Was it before he failed to recognise this and failed to abandon the manoeuvre?]
Yes - but why did he not recognise it? Over the apex little was done, either correctly or incorrectly. The aircraft did not seem to be flown with any intent – good, bad or otherwise. That was stated by very experienced aviation witnesses in the trial.
Or was it just before his jet hit the ground (whilst he appeared to be pulling for all he was worth)?
Whatever CI there had been, if any, was receding by then – no disagreement.
I personally think his legal team played a blinder by introducing CI as a possible reason that the accident occurred, knowing that the prosecution were unable to prove it had, or hadn't
The AH legal team did not invent the concept of cognitive impairment. I think you’ll find that the issues were well aired beforehand - not least on PPRuNe.

From the evidence of a first responder at the crash site - AH said he “blacked out in the air”. Either he’s a quick thinking liar, or is there something else? He was very near death at that stage - indeed, his life was only saved a few moments later by the quick reactions of another first responder. What might be meant by “blacked out”? A person will not necessarily know if he has been unconscious.

We shall see if the AAIB does decide to reopen their inquiry.

airsound

Asturias56

27th Jul 2019, 16:32

Lets not relive the 22 pages of past comment please....................................

Treble one

27th Jul 2019, 20:44

Airsound-we are going to have to disagree on this.

For the record, I am not suggesting that the defence team 'invented' the issue of CI. It clearly is possible. In certain circumstances. My personal opinion is, however, that it would be extraordinarily unlucky and coincidental that it happened at such a critical moment in a flight, in a pilot who has shown no previous indication this may happen. Its just as well the boot was not on the other foot and the defence had to prove it did happen.

The AAIB report was unable to be used as evidence in the trial I am led to believe? In fact from the reporting I saw on the trial, it seems that the nuts and bolts of the whole mishap (in terms of the actualities of the flight profile) were merely skimmed over-which surprised me greatly.

As for AH saying he had 'blacked out'-well that could easily have been GLOC rather than CI. Again, its you bringing up the concept of 'liar'. I didn't.

typerated

28th Jul 2019, 07:14

Well it looks like the CI might have going going a while.

Southport in the JP? At the very least he needed to have a good hard look at himself after that - or preferably someone else should have.

How about 'choosing' to do low level public aerobatics in a fast jet in which you have very little time or currency - a CI problem?

Downwind take off on the day - CI??

Just This Once...

28th Jul 2019, 07:54

Indeed, anything reckless, selfish, unprofessional or indeed anything that involves rule-breaking can now be written-off as a CI even when the individual has shown no previous health issues, felt no onset of symptoms and makes a miraculous recovery from symptoms when their life is clearly threatened.

The idea that evidence of rule breaking can become the sole evidence of cognitive impairment, on the basis that an individual would not break a rule unless medically impaired, is preposterous.

hunterboy

28th Jul 2019, 08:22

What he said ^^^

typerated

28th Jul 2019, 08:58

That said,

Even if he was found guilty I don't think it should have come with a heavy sentence - it was not a malicious act.

But if I was him, for my soul, I'd spend the rest of my life working as hard as I could for the families of the people that had died.

Legalapproach

28th Jul 2019, 09:35

Just This Once.... and hunterboy
The idea that evidence of rule breaking can become the sole evidence of cognitive impairment, on the basis that an individual would not break a rule unless medically impaired, is preposterous.

You are quite correct, but evidence of 'rule breaking' was not the sole evidence of cognitive impairment which is why there was expert medical evidence called at the trial.

Distant Voice

28th Jul 2019, 11:41

Nige321

2nd Aug 2019, 09:30

From the AAIB..

Following a detailed review of the G-forces, the AAIB has decided not to re-open its investigation into the accident near Shoreham Airport on 22 August 2015.

In March 2017, the AAIB published its investigation report into an accident involving a Hawker Hunter aircraft near Shoreham Airport.

Our investigation was wide-ranging, looking at everything from the maintenance of the aircraft and the pilot’s training to how the public was protected through risk management and the governance of air displays.

We made 32 safety recommendations as a result of our investigation, all of which were accepted.

Action to address our safety recommendations is already being taken by the relevant authorities.

In June, the AAIB was presented with further material regarding the potential effects of G-forces on the pilot.

We have considered the material very carefully with a dedicated team of inspectors with extensive expertise in aircraft performance, human factors, fast jet operations and display flying.

The work has taken some time as we have been using recently developed analytical tools that have enabled us to determine the aircraft’s flight path in more detail and hence calculate the G-forces more accurately than was previously possible.

We have also undertaken an independent review of the Human Factors analysis presented to us and consulted subject matter experts on aeromedical aspects.

The results confirm that the findings of the AAIB safety investigation published in 2017 remain valid and we will not be reopening the investigation.

However, we will publish a supplement to our Final Report with full details of the review conducted which we hope all parties will find informative.

This will take some time to complete but we will publish the supplement as soon as possible.

We appreciate that this is a difficult time for all those affected by the tragic accident in August 2015.

We are keeping the Coroner and the families of those who died in the accident updated on our work.

Davef68

2nd Aug 2019, 09:50

As far as I am aware the term “Cognitive Impairment “ was coined by the defence team and had no legal definition.

No, it's an acknowledged medical term, usually used in relation to age related disorders like 'Mild Cognitive Impairment'

Treble one

2nd Aug 2019, 10:13

So does this mean that the AAIB don't consider the 'CI' to be a factor in the accident (as they haven't re-opened the inquiry)?

ORAC

2nd Aug 2019, 11:02

212man

2nd Aug 2019, 13:12

The statement would seem to indicate that they discount g-forces as having been a factor in any possible cognitive impairment, but goes no further than that.

The defence in the trial, as reported by the BBC, did not claim g-forces as the possible cause, instead mooting cerebral hypoxia.

Whether that was considered and also discounted by the AAIB will no doubt be covered in the supplement to their report.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-sussex-47324182

that’s exactly what they claimed:

He wrote a report for the defence that concluded the level of G-force experienced by Mr Hill during his display may have led to cognitive impairment caused by cerebral hypoxia, the court heard.

falcon900

2nd Aug 2019, 14:27

Whilst I am not sure that I understand the substantive difference between reopening their enquiry, and writing an addendum, this sounds like a very sensible way forward for the AAIB. It serves no useful purpose for there to be any suggestion that something wasn't properly covered by the AAIB, and the addendum should hopefully put any such notion to rest.

Homelover

2nd Aug 2019, 20:01

Perhaps “Cognitive Impairment" should be considered in the loss of Tornado ZG 708 in September 1994. This cases was only considered by an MoD 'in-house' Board of Inquiry and never found its was to a Scottish court. It is most unlikely that MoD would consider re-opening the inquiry but it could be the subject of an FAI in the light of new evidence.

DV

And why don’t we just re-open every Inquiry from the last 50 years while we are at it?? Or, alternatively you could accept that, in each case, Subject Matter Experts carried out a thorough investigation which was subject to plenty of independent scrutiny. Stop the muck-raking Jimmy, you sound like a stuck record.

Easy Street

2nd Aug 2019, 22:37

We have also undertaken an independent review of the Human Factors analysis presented to us and consulted subject matter experts on aeromedical aspects.

My reading of this part of the AAIB’s statement is that their review went beyond analysis of G-force and covered other aeromedical matters. Presumably that would mean that they looked into CI; indeed it would be surprising if they haven’t after it formed the basis of AH’s acquittal. So the fact that they aren’t changing their findings could mean that their experts were unconvinced by the evidence for CI. Or maybe it just reflects the wide gap between the weight of evidence needed to sow ‘reasonable doubt’ and that needed to demonstrate ‘likely cause’. It’ll certainly be interesting to see.

Distant Voice

3rd Aug 2019, 10:09

was subject to plenty of independent scrutiny

Please enlighten me, Homelover, who carried this out?

DV

Homelover

3rd Aug 2019, 14:25

DV.
People not connected with the units involved, free from any pressure that senior officers might be applying, in order to ensure that all possibilities were considered. I was Air member for a BOI in the past; I lived and breathed the investigation, but at each stage there was an independent there, to challenge our assumptions and ensure we considered all eventualities.Nowadays that is the role of the DAIB, but they have just formalised the independence; it always existed.
Which you would know if you had ever served on a BOI or an SI, but you haven’t, have you Jimmy? You think you know how it works but you don’t. Because you’ve been out of it for so long that you only have experience of pouring over what is available on line, making up those conspiracy theories in your silly little head, and behaving for all the world like some weird amateur ambulance chaser. Do yourself a favour and give it a rest eh?

tucumseh

4th Aug 2019, 10:28

pouring over what is available on line,

Which reminds me of the various Boards of Inquiry discussed here, where MoD flatly denied the existence of key policies and documents, only for the likes of DV and others to simply download them and submit them to Coroners Walker and Masters, Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip.

"We never heard of ESF until after XV179 crashed in 2005". Mr Masters was most interested in the 1990 specifications, downloaded from MoD's website.

Air Staff - "There is no such thing as a Release to Service". Lord Philip probably though it quite amusing to be sent a copy of the Air Staff copy.

Chinook ZD576 - "We don't have the policy on Safety Critical Software". Here we go.... handed out to every MoD avionic project manager, and here's the Def Stans that reflect these Ministerial edicts. Oh, and here's the author, a retired Sqn Ldr.

And the classic e-mail plea from Lord Philip. "MoD don't have the policy document that sets out the No Doubt Whatsover rule. Can you provide a copy?" Every addressee sent him a copy.

And quite recently - We carried out a thorough investigation and there is no evidence of MoD knowing how to ensure the ejection seat works. Well, apart from a 107 minute RAF training film found on the internet along with a raft of comprehensive APs. How can a thorough investigation fail to even ask the question, or Google "ejection set + training". Did no one 'challenge the assumption' (and later statement under oath) that between 1952 and 2011 no one in MoD was taught how to ensure a parachute deployed?

The people who sat on those Boards were no doubt very good at their day jobs. But not one of them got remotely near the root causes. And true Subject Matter Experts weren't allowed near the Boards. And then the reports were 'independently' scrutinised and issued by those allowed to judge their own case. And no, of course this doesn't apply to all Boards. But it does to the cases DV is discussing.

Who benefitted?

Play the ball, not the man. Let's hear your views on the above examples.

Blackfriar

4th Aug 2019, 10:40

How can these people/organisations lie under oath and never be held to account?

falcon900

4th Aug 2019, 11:14

Whilst I too do not always agree with DV, I do not feel that Homelovers comments are accurate, fair, or appropriate.

Homelover

4th Aug 2019, 17:04

tucumseh

4th Aug 2019, 18:34

Homelover

Does that mean you WERE involved in the inquiries DV refers to?

The Boards in the cases I mentioned were serially misled, and some blatantly lied to, by other parts of MoD. The inaccuracies/misleading/dissembling simply continued at the public and legal inquiries. Even so, the Board/SI members would have been expected to know this but their investigations simply didn't 'go there'. When told, the 'independent' convening authorities did nothing, and we had recurrences. But let me know when you read the evidence. Constructive feedback is always welcome.

I think DV's question still stands. Who provides independence? It isn't the convening authority; shown all too clearly in the XX177 case, where it was directly involved in the decision that killed Flt Lt Cunningham, yet provided the Prosecution's 'star witness'.

Chugalug2

4th Aug 2019, 20:10

Tecumseh.

I dont one have a view, because I wasn’t involved in those inquiries, so I don’t know all the facts. And I’ll refrain from answering until I do. But I was asked a simple question by DV: “who provided independence?” and I believe I answered that question. Of note, the cases you refer to are instances of inaccuracy given to public inquiries, not the Service Inquiries on the same incidents.

I dont agree with DVs agenda; I make no secret of that. I’m done.

So suddenly you're done and have nothing else to say, having delivered an ad hominem against DV?

DV's 'agenda' is to reform UK Military Air Accident Investigation and insure its independence from anyone and anywhere, what's yours?

As to answering his question I can't see that you've answered it at all, other than to say in effect that UK BoIs/SIs are independent because they are independent. Mr Spock might have had something to say about that response...

Lonewolf_50

5th Aug 2019, 17:24

If we could get back to the Shoreham incident, and discussion pertaining to that, it would be great.
Whether or not the MoD has the means or the desire to reopen that Tornado investigation 25 years later would surely warrant a thread of its own?

Homelover

5th Aug 2019, 18:09

I’ve PM’d both those who continue to question my assertion on independence, as I’m not going to enter into futher discussion on an open forum where there is a tendency for what is written to end up as an FOI or a PQ. And I absolutely agree we’ve drifted.
Back to it; I’m sure I’m not alone in thinking that Andy Hill reminds them of a puppy sitting next to a pile of poo. If you start a loop too low and too slow, and don’t abandon it when you don’t make your gate height at the top, then you’re guilty of poor judgement and poor airmanship. If you continue with the manoeuvre and you end up killing innocent people, then your decisions must be held to account. It’s time to hold your hands up and say “guilty as charged”.

tucumseh

5th Aug 2019, 19:00

your decisions must be held to account. It’s time to hold your hands up and say “guilty as charged”.

The deprecation of Mr Hill here is noticeably absent in other threads. Sometimes what might seem like thread drift is simply drawing attention to the tendency of many to compartmentalise.

However, as legal authorities continually fail to pursue others responsible for even more deaths, despite irrefutable evidence, Mr Hill was entitled to think 'Why pick on me?' and plead not guilty. We need some consistency. His legal team played a blinder and the Prosecution was unprepared. Which in no way should detract from the tragic deaths.

airsound

5th Aug 2019, 19:27

Homelover - I’ve stayed out of jousting with you because you seem so far out of kilter that I imagined that you would be rapidly shot down. But your latest references to puppy poo, and your statement that If you start a loop too low and too slow, and don’t abandon it when you don’t make your gate height at the top, then you’re guilty of poor judgement and poor airmanship. If you continue with the manoeuvre and you end up killing innocent people, then your decisions must be held to account. It’s time to hold your hands up and say “guilty as charged”.
are so far beyond the facts that I have to confront you.

Andrew Hill was not “guilty as charged”. A jury of eleven people unanimously found him not guilty of manslaughter by gross negligence. That after an Old Bailey trial that lasted eight weeks, and included a day’s consideration by the jury of their verdict.

I was there for almost all the eight weeks of the trial, and it was my firm impression that the jury, encouraged by the judge, formed their judgement after hearing the evidence of the expert witnesses for the defence.

Of course, if you were only able to form your judgements from the reporting in many national newspapers, you might have missed that. Most of their reporters were noticeably absent from much of the trial. In fact, they seemed largely to have drawn their conclusions from the opening presentations of the prosecution - which were later roundly demolished by defence witnesses. But by that time, those national paper reporters had lost interest. Not so the jury, who were obliged, of course, to consider all the evidence.

airsound

Chugalug2

5th Aug 2019, 19:37

I’ve PM’d both those who continue to question my assertion on independence, as I’m not going to enter into futher discussion on an open forum where there is a tendency for what is written to end up as an FOI or a PQ. And I absolutely agree we’ve drifted.

Homelover, as a recipient of one of those pm's in which you continue to attack DV and call him a troll, as well as informing me that I am a fool to believe that he wants to reform Mil Air Accident Investigation, I would appreciate it if you played the ball rather than the man (no more Latin tags you'll notice!).

Whatever the pros and cons of the AAIB's findings in this case, at least they are the AAIB's and not that of someone else pulling its strings.

As you seem to have an aversion to PQ's and FoI's, perhaps the answer is for the MOD to stop withholding information and lying in FoI replies. If in addition it followed its own regulations in the first place there would be far more resources for it to devote to safety.

Tuc is right, there is a queue of those who have issued rulings and illegal orders. People have died as a consequence. The RAF has been diminished in its capability as a consequence. Should they be required to make a plea, or just Andy Hill?

Homelover

5th Aug 2019, 20:27

[QUOTE

Of course, if you were only able to form your judgements from the reporting in many national newspapers, you might have missed that.

airsound[/QUOTE]

Actually Airsound, I formed my judgement from knowing that, if you are flying a fast jet, doing aerobatics at Low Level, and you attempt to pull through when you haven’t made your gate height, then you are likely to hit the ground, even if you pull as hard as you can - into the deep stall as it happens- in the latter part of your ill-judged manoeuvre. So you will have made an error of judgement, or poor decision, or displayed poor airmanship, or whatever you wish to call it. And if people end up dead because of that error, then.... do I need to go on?

tucumseh

5th Aug 2019, 22:04

Homelover

Your position addresses airmanship (which I cannot and do not comment on), but as a military pilot and past Board member you will know that MoD's stated criteria also includes technical and legal (and hence illegal); and in this case Mr Hill's defence added medical. I'm sure you'd want the same criteria to apply equally. And so to Chug's final sentence. Should those directly responsible for, say, civilian deaths in military aircraft (e.g. ZD576), be subject to the same scrutiny as Mr Hill? I see no difference, but none have even been interviewed, never mind charged. All I ask for is consistency.

And no, it isn't thread drift, because there is a great deal of overlap, not least in the legal authorities who took the decision to prosecute Mr Hill, while concurrently ignoring what was effectively a series of confessions by MoD in various SI/BoI reports.

Capt Scribble

5th Aug 2019, 22:47

Homelover
Juries are unlikely to contain aerobatic pilots, and lawyers are skilled at leading them in areas in which they have no expertise. This jury was persuaded that a pilot with a class 1 medial might have experienced a mental impairment during the loop and was therefore not responsible for busting his gate. Despite the point you make, and I made earlier in the thread, the clever legal eagles won the day by using an argument that could not be disproved.

Homelover

5th Aug 2019, 22:50

Tucumseh - The thread is about the Shoreham trial. You continue to try to take this away from the discussion, evidenced by your latest chat about ZD756. That is thread drift. End of.

Captain Scribble. - Agreed. I think the aircrew on here know what really happened and so do the AAIB. Unfortunately, Andy Hill’s Defence lawyer was ‘better’ than the Prosecution.

weemonkey

5th Aug 2019, 23:24

Tucumseh - The thread is about the Shoreham trial. You continue to try to take this away from the discussion, evidenced by your latest chat about ZD756. That is thread drift. End of.

Captain Scribble. - Agreed. I think the aircrew on here know what really happened and so do the AAIB. Unfortunately, the Andy Hill’s Defence lawyer was ‘better’ than the Prosecution.

"free from any pressure that senior officers might be applying"

surely the only way to be completely sure board members aren't being diddled is to ensure they are a completely separate entity in career/employment and fiscally?

How many times have you heard the phrase spoken, in jest or not, "it ain't worth my pension"??

flighthappens

6th Aug 2019, 01:39

Is there a definition anywhere for what constitutes “cognitive impairment” in the aviation context, and is it related to what most mil aircrew call “capacity”?

i ask because as has previously been noted it seems more of an aged/dementia related issue than one likely to be brought about through the sheer act of flying...

tucumseh

6th Aug 2019, 06:48

[QUOTE=Homelover;10537684][LEFT]Tucumseh - The thread is about the Shoreham trial. You continue to try to take this away from the discussion, evidenced by your latest chat about ZD756. That is thread drift. End of.

No. I'm afraid you continue to deprecate someone who has been found not guilty after a fair trial. But do not seem to want the same depth of investigation into those who caused far more civilian deaths, despite dire warnings as to the consequences of their illegal actions. It would be nice to know why the different attitude. It's not just you. We've seen it before here, and the legal system is the same. The recurring themes are (a) the relative seniority of the persons involved, and (b) only looking at the final act. Another factor is the different role of the AAIB when looking at civilian accidents, and assisting in military ones. Very seldom does the AAIB get to tell the whole story in a military accident. ZD576 is always a good example, even though the AAIB had to wait 16 years.

Chugalug2

6th Aug 2019, 06:56

Tucumseh - The thread is about the Shoreham trial. You continue to try to take this away from the discussion, evidenced by your latest chat about ZD756. That is thread drift. End of.

That's pretty rich coming from you HL! It was you that responded to DV's post #432 which raised the possibility that CI might have been a factor in the loss of a Tornado in September 1994. Instead of arguing pro or con you launched an ad hominem attack on DV himself. Further invective followed in pm's to tuc and myself who sought to defend DV's record of countering the MOD's lies and misinformation about that and many other tragedies.

Tuc's point is well made that you call for further action against Andy Hill yet seem relaxed that RAF VSOs issued illegal orders to subvert the airworthiness regulations, covered up ever since by succeeding RAF VSOs. I'd call that pertinent comment rather than thread drift.

Your personal attacks on those you disagree with is pure thread drift as well as obnoxious behaviour. Oh, and the Latin quoted above is just for you. :E

jindabyne

6th Aug 2019, 09:46

Captain Scribble and Homelover
I entirely agree with your comments (aside from the personal pokes). I think the aircrew on here know what really happened . I would say, especially Hunter aircrew - especially those with 2000 hours on type. And especially those with several BoI memberships under their belt.
I'm not a dinosaur (yet), but IMHO such views are now clouded on this thread by the 'JB Brexit style' of discussion into which it has evolved.

airsound

6th Aug 2019, 10:25

Do I need to go on? No, Homelover, I think you’ve already gone on quite enough!

Some of us are more interested in finding out why an experienced display pilot behaved in this way. As one of the expert witnesses put it in his trial evidence, when referring to the eight or more unconnected errors that occurred shortly after 'Point X' in the manoeuvre sequence, “Why would any display pilot in his right mind do that?”

Have you actually seen any of the detailed video coverage of the flight? If you had, I think you would probably be asking the same question.

It is the question I’m asking - and I suggest the existence of that question is not dissimilar to the situation of the late Flt Lts Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook after the Mull of Kintyre disaster. In their case, it took many years for the finding of their guilt to be overturned by the revelation of hitherto concealed evidence. Or, incidentally, are you, Homelover, perhaps one of those people who still cling to the idea of their guilt?

But despite the confirmation of their innocence, as tucumseh and Chugalug point out, no one else has apparently even been investigated, never mind prosecuted, despite ample publicly available evidence to support such actions. And the same situation demonstrably applies in many other British military aviation fatalities, up to and including the death of Flt Lt Sean Cunningham, Red 5

Whereas Andy Hill was prosecuted - and in this case, his innocence has been established.

We still need to know, though, why he did as he did. As, I suspect, does he - to say nothing of the desperate need of the families and loved ones of the people who died that day on the A27. And, as Distant Voice suggests, an answer to that question may also have relevance for some of the other hitherto unexplained incidents.

airsound

Timelord

6th Aug 2019, 10:42

[QUOTE=airsound;10538010

We still need to know, though, why he did as he did. As, I suspect, does he - to say nothing of the desperate need of the families and loved ones of the people who died that day on the A27.

airsound[/QUOTE]

Surely the AAIB answered that. Because he wasn’t experienced or current enough on the Hunter, and because the display authorisation process was slipshod to say the least.

Caramba

6th Aug 2019, 10:51

airsound - thank you for your sensible and informed posts. It is deeply regrettable that the press completely misrepresented the court proceedings for AH, and as you say, seemed solely to rely on prosecution press releases.

it is my clear understanding that the prosecutions star witnesses were comprehensively trashed - one had clearly not done his homework about previous events involving AH, the other was forced to admit that his estimations of G were wrong. It might be helpful if some of the entrenched critics present here were aware of what a dismal case the prosecution mounted. I’m surprised the judge did not suggest that they not appear again as experts in the the future. Or maybe he did?

Whether or not previous BoIs have been subverted I have no idea - but if correct, that is truly dismal and one wonders how many more accidents and deaths might have been avoided if the plain simple truth had been sought and obtained. At least the case against AH has been heard and dismissed. But given Wing Cdr Green’s admission in court, one wonders why the AAIB does not re-examine the evidence and its report.

Stuart Sutcliffe

6th Aug 2019, 11:01

Tucumseh - The thread is about the Shoreham trial. You continue to try to take this away from the discussion, evidenced by your latest chat about ZD756. That is thread drift. End of.
End off? Really? In your opinion? Goodness me! So 'shout harder and louder' means that you are undeniably correct? :rolleyes:

On a side note, everyone, do be careful with your post formatting, particularly when quoting others. It is usually a missing '[' or ']' that messes up what you were trying to do. The preview button is a very useful tool for checking your post will appear as you intended, before actually submitting it, and only takes a handful of seconds to use.:ok:

airsound

6th Aug 2019, 12:50

Caramba, many thanks for kind words!

You go on to say one wonders why the AAIB does not re-examine the evidence and its report. One does indeed wonder. But they say they've conducted a thorough review, using a team of inspectors with expertise in aircraft performance, human factors, fast jet operations and display flying. And they've decided not to reopen their inquiry. But - and I believe this is significant - they will publish a supplement to the final report, with full details of the review they conducted. Could that be a face-saver for them?

Also - and I have no firm information on this - but I believe the supplement may not be available until near the end of the year. That could account for the Coroner's decision not to launch the Inquest proper until early 2020.

airsound

airsound

6th Aug 2019, 13:20

flighthappens - you ask Is there a definition anywhere for what constitutes “cognitive impairment” in the aviation context...?
Part 1.4 of the Red Arrows XX179 Service Inquiry gives some examples:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/37025/20121206-XX179_SI_Part_1-4-1-U.pdf
Such as:

Pilot Disorientation (which could be visual or more medical)
Pilot Distraction – this seems more of a Human Factor than impairment?
Pilot Incapacitation

The last starts a discussion about G-induced impairment which is covered in later sections.

At the Old Bailey trial, cerebral hypoxia was cited as a potential cause of cognitive impairment. Cerebral hypoxia is simply lack of oxygen in the brain (if I've understood it correctly). It can be due to a good blood supply where the blood is lacking oxygen (seen at high altitudes). Or it can be caused by a good level of oxygen in the blood, but not enough blood (G-LOC, A-LOC or some combination). Cerebral Hypoxia can also be caused mechanically, for example by stroke or strangulation.

There are other aviation cognitive impairment factors, such as heat, fumes, dehydration, illness, blood sugar, alcohol, hyperventilation and fatigue.

In the trial, alcohol was mentioned as a well known example. Alcohol was not a factor at Shoreham, but the symptoms might be: well known automatic tasks (think changing gear) are less affected than executive decisions (reaction time to unexpected events).

airsound

Easy Street

6th Aug 2019, 13:21

they've conducted a thorough review, using a team of inspectors with expertise in aircraft performance, human factors, fast jet operations and display flying. And they've decided not to reopen their inquiry. But - and I believe this is significant - they will publish a supplement to the final report, with full details of the review they conducted. Could that be a face-saver for them?

You (deliberately?) omitted to mention this part of the statement:

We have also ... consulted subject matter experts on aeromedical aspects.

Which reduces the likelihood of this being a face-saving exercise rather sharply. As indeed does the continuation of display flying under both CAA and RAF auspices, especially in the latter case when you consider the fact that its medical experts did not previously have awareness of CI. The various Duty Holders could hardly have pressed on regardless given the intense scrutiny they would be under, which suggests that an expert review of the evidence might have concluded that CI is either not a 'thing' or does not pose a concern. How many display pilots have lost their medical categories as a precaution against it, especially among the 'older/experienced' community on the civilian circuit? And if it can't be screened for and is distinct from g-effects, what would be the wider implications of one man's defence for the whole aviation sector?

I also remain deeply uncomfortable with the notion that AH was too good/experienced/sensible/respected (etc) to have made the mistakes he did. That is the kind of thinking that belongs to a bygone age in human performance study and it speaks to the woeful inadequacy of the prosecution that it wasn't roundly demolished with two simple words: 'Bud Holland'.

I think the reason AH gets a harder time from today's pilots than do the VSOs of years gone by is partly that he is one of 'us' - operating in the same era, to the same societal and regulatory constraints, his actions have had a very serious impact on the display flying scene that enthused so many of us in our formative years. And then avoiding criminal accountability for it through a defence that persuaded a jury but appears not to have swayed the AAIB in determining cause or the RAF in continuing to display. We can be indignant about that without absolving the VSOs for their misdeeds; it's just that justice has never been so close to hand in their cases.

Caramba

6th Aug 2019, 13:57

Easy Street - it would seem from the USAF report that Bud Holland was the antithesis of AH!

“The accident board stated that Colonel Holland's macho (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macho), daredevil personality significantly influenced the crash sequence. USAF personnel testified that Holland had developed a reputation as an aggressive pilot who often broke flight-safety and other rules. The rule-breaking included flying below minimum-clearance altitudes and exceeding bank-angle limitations and climb rates.” (From Wikipedia).

Whereas the alleged rule breaking by AH alleged by the prosecution (Southport, Duxford) turned into nothing once the facts were examined. And character witnesses testified to AH’s safety consciousness and discipline.

The prosecution might have mounted a duff case, but they didn’t have a good hand to start with. Something of a misconceived prosecution, public interest/expectation rather outweighing any more rational appraisal.

There’s plenty of other excellent pilots who have died as a consequence of apparently bizarre decisions. So maybe CI is a “thing”.

Toodlepip.

Caramba

Easy Street

6th Aug 2019, 14:24

Caramba,

You're inferring specifics from a general point, which wasn't that AH's flying mirrored Bud Holland's. The point is that in a putative trial of Lt Col Holland, a defence so minded could have wheeled out general after general to testify to Holland's impeccable standards, airmanship and skill. Which would have sounded impressive to a lay jury, but would have had no bearing on the circumstances of his accident.

There was no need to prove that AH had flown poorly at Southport or anywhere else: it would have been enough to show that prior excellence is no guarantee of future piloting performance.

Cheerio!

Timelord

6th Aug 2019, 14:45

I am afraid That I still do not understand what the CI was supposed to be in this case. When the question has been asked here; “what is CI?’ Examples have been quoted from Alzheimer’s to Alchohol, but none of them demonstrably applicable in this case. As I understand it, he was acquitted because the prosecution could not prove that they were NOT applicable. Is it suggested that, had AH been wired up to the right sensors at the time, something could have been measured in his physiology that accounted for his errors, or is it that some unknown and undetectable influence must have caused them?

This is a genuine attempt to understand what is to stop any pilot (or surgeon or engineer) who makes a huge blunder just saying “well, I was cognitively impaired”

Easy Street

6th Aug 2019, 16:07

This is a genuine attempt to understand what is to stop any pilot (or surgeon or engineer) who makes a huge blunder just saying “well, I was cognitively impaired”

I want to know that, too. My example would be a driver who's just caused a terrible road accident through poor judgement and claims cognitive impairment.

airsound

6th Aug 2019, 16:31

Timelord and Easy Street - would I be right in thinking that you were not present at the Old Bailey trial?

In the eight weeks that I was there, there were probably three occasions that really stuck in my mind as being pivotal.

The first was when a first responder talked about AH lying beside the wreckage of his aircraft, very near to death (his life was only saved shortly afterwards by the quick reactions of another first responder). AH was still conscious, and he said “I blacked out” (in flight).

The second occasion was the first time I saw the full video of the flight, alongside positional analysis. My reaction was ‘what on earth is he doing that for?’ His manoeuvres made no sense at all.

The third time was when a highly qualified aviation human factors expert identified at least eight, and possibly twelve, unconnected errors between ‘Point X’ at the start of the crash manoeuvre and the time, 23 seconds later, when it was too late to recover. Asked ‘How do you analyse the importance of those errors?’ he replied ‘One type of accident is an accumulation of errors, so they’re not independent.’ ‘Why do pilots do this?’ ‘There are many reasons. It could be a conscious decision, or it could be unconscious. But here I can’t find any relationships between the errors. They’re not related. It’s very difficult to explain. The chances of eight to twelve errors happening within the short time of 23 seconds are very remote. The probability [of this happening] is very low.

The point of that human factors evidence for me was that it wasn’t just a single blunder which you could put down to carelessness, or indiscipline, or whatever.

So Timelord’s question
what is to stop any pilot (or surgeon or engineer) who makes a huge blunder just saying “well, I was cognitively impaired”
is a good one. But that doesn’t mean that there is no such thing as cognitive impairment of the kind that is being discussed here. The point about all of this is that we just don’t know enough about it, and there is very little research to draw on. I understand (but I don’t know for sure) that the death of Flt Lt Jon Egging (Red 4), near Bournemouth in 2011, resulted in the RAF doing new research into the effects of G at levels lower than normally thought dangerous. But I definitely don’t know if there were any useful results from that research.

airsound

Timelord

6th Aug 2019, 18:39

Thanks Airsound. I was not present for any of the trial, but I remain a bit sceptical. My experience is that once you make a bad decision, others follow pretty quickly. Would, for example, using heights and speeds for a different type be a c**k up or cognitive impairment? What about the Hillsborough match commander, to be retried I believe on similar charges of gross negligence manslaughter. Can he claim to have been cognitively impaired when he made the catastrophic decision to open that gate?

So, apart from the near death statement that “I blacked out” the evidence for CI is just inexplicably bad flying?

jmelson

6th Aug 2019, 22:41

I want to know that, too. My example would be a driver who's just caused a terrible road accident through poor judgement and claims cognitive impairment.

Another interesting case is the F-18 that crashed in Bethalto, IL. June 19, 1996. The pilot was a Navy Top Gun, Navy test pilot, then Boeing test pilot doing a practice run through for a Chech air show, and went over the top of a reverse half cuban 8 at much too low an altitude (about 1500' AGL as I recall.) The only thing the investigation could come up with was he had flown a similar routine the previous weekend in his Pitts Special, where 1500' AGL would have been fine.

How could a guy with THAT MUCH experience make such an error?

Jon

DODGYOLDFART

7th Aug 2019, 08:19

@Timelord good comparison but at the time of Hillsborough the term used may have been cognitive overload or in other words too much information. In such situations it is not unknown for the person concerned to freeze or do something out of the ordinary. I am not saying that was the case with AH at Shoreham and I guess we will never know the truth.

falcon900

7th Aug 2019, 09:17

Airsound,
I am very interested in your synopsis of the key points from the trial, particularly the expert evidence regarding the 8 / 12 unconnected errors during the key phase of the flight. To me, at face value, the notion that someone could make that number of unconnected errors in the space of 23 seconds points to something else going on, and is certainly worthy of further consideration.
Are you able to recollect what the errors were? I don't remember this being identified in the AAIB report, and certainly don't remember any significance being attached to the frequency of the occurrences. I remain puzzled as to the significance of the distinction between reopening their report and publishing an addendum, but in any event, I hope they clearly address the issue

airsound

7th Aug 2019, 11:29

Timelord - I'm afraid I'm not going to comment on your comparison with the Hillsborough match commander, because I believe his case is sub judice. It is true, however, that he also is charged with gross negligence manslaughter.

Falcon900 - probably the best account of the twelve errors appears in this report by Michael Drummond in the Shoreham Herald. And you're right - the errors did not figure in this detail in the AAIB report. Michael Drummond's report is another example, if one were needed, of the value of a local paper being able to have a good court reporter attend the majority of a trial.
https://www.shorehamherald.co.uk/news/crime/these-12-errors-by-shoreham-airshow-pilot-andy-hill-show-he-was-cognitively-impaired-expert-says-1-8824257

Another well-balanced report - although not detailing all twelve errors - was by Adam Lusher in the Independent. Sad to say, that's no longer a printed paper, but it does have a good website.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/shoreham-air-crash-trial-andy-hill-verdict-court-case-pilot-old-bailey-disaster-fireball-dual-a8810671.html

These reports stand in some contrast to much of the rest of the printed press, whose representatives were often noticeable by their absence from court. Several of them seemed to have taken their stories from the 53-page summary of the prosecution case handed out at the start of the trial; they seemed unaware of the detail of the strong - and eventually successful - case mounted by the defence. I except from that criticism the excellent work of PA, the Press Association, who were present throughout. And also, most of the broadcasters took care to be present for much of the time.

It all goes to show that you shouldn't believe everything you read in the papers!

airsound

Treble one

7th Aug 2019, 12:12

Easy Street

7th Aug 2019, 14:20

He was also asked about the prosecution's assertion that the tragic crash was a result of 'extremely bad piloting' and not cognitive impairment.

Dr Jarvis said: "I can’t really accept that.

"Obviously Mr Hill was very experienced as a pilot and it just doesn’t seem credible to me."

I really hope that there are crucial elements missing from that report. One, I hope that Dr Jarvis had many more substantial reasons than 'experience' on which to base his dismissal of the prosecution's hypothesis. Two, I hope that there are many more unrelated errors in the full list of 23, because the sample provided reads to me very much like the sort of mistakes that would be made if an aerobatic routine had got out of shape and the pilot was trying to recover the situation by modifying manoeuvres on the fly and either running out of mental capacity or flying skill while doing so. I say that because a sequence of errors like that would be found in at least half of my occasional attempts at aerobatic sequences, and sometimes in my air combat manoeuvring too (despite being very experienced I'm easy meat for the Sqn QWI, unfortunately, but luckily the only crowd is in the debriefing room and the base height is 5000ft). A lot of crucial facts must be missing from that report.

airsound

7th Aug 2019, 14:27

Yes, Treble One, I do believe the Shoreham Herald, because Michael Drummond's account ties in with my own contemporaneous notes. :ok:

On the question of whether the CI became "suddenly 'unimpaired'", I can do no better than quote the evidence of the very experienced Chairman of the Shoreham Flying Control Committee, Derek Davis - who, interestingly, was on the stand as a prosecution witness. He said he thought the aircraft was not being controlled [in the descent from the apex], and that there was something wrong with either the aircraft or the pilot. He went on to say that there had been a violent pitch-up of the aircraft at about 100ft - but it kept going down. That was an indication that the pilot had plenty of back stick. He had a lot more elevator to use, indicating that he hadn’t used it before. Derek Davis thought that at 100ft [the pilot] saw something, and pulled in an attempt to regain control.

airsound

Asturias56

7th Aug 2019, 14:29

I don't think we're getting anywhere here - some believe in CI and a lot don't

And there is absolutely no evidence that will turn up that can prove it one way or the other.................

falcon900

7th Aug 2019, 14:34

Thanks for the links Airsound, I have now read the articles, and having done so, I would have to say that I am not drawn towards the conclusion that they are all unconnected. IMHO, a decent proportion of them could be grouped under the heading of loss/lack of situational awareness. That said, the two glaring exceptions are the power reductions, which go well beyond the counterintuitive and deep into thoroughly irrational territory. These have never been explained, nor adequately dissociated with problems which I am told were experienced with the particular mark of Avon engine whilst in service.

Nige321

7th Aug 2019, 14:50

Is there a transcript of the trial available...??

orca

7th Aug 2019, 16:32

Having read the articles at the links I am minded to use the examples of Air to Surface weapon deliveries as comparators.

I have graded (and had graded) any number of attacks where any or all of the following would be true: an attack was off LOA, high, low, velocity vector placement questionable, pitch control inadequate, cross wind allowance not quite right, pickle position early or late, comms incorrect, late arm discipline poor, incorrect attack mode, wrong height source, fast, slow, G on recovery inadequate - or even an over stress.

If you look hard enough every single attack will contain some mistake, maybe multiple mistakes; the worst I ever saw was by a squadron CO and test pilot (who still managed a DH).

I find the notion that multiple mistakes can only be explained by CI to be contrary to what I’ve experienced.

I accept the ruling that they may have been caused by CI.

Maxibon

7th Aug 2019, 17:13

I’ve read through a lot of this and what strikes me most is that it appears, as with everything legal, that the best lawyer wins; and that ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ might be considered a cop-out.

No procrastination or expert opinion (note the word: opinion) will resolve this and I personally don’t buy the CI decision but hey, that’s my opinion.

What is clear is that there were unfortunate deaths and whilst the loss of the individuals is inexcusable, the effects on families and friends can only amplify the loss, hurt and anger. AH knows what happened inside and, obviously, he is either innocent (as proposed by his brief), or guilty. I’m always reminded of sitting in Whittle Hall some thirty-odd years ago, covering values and standards and that often over-looked but oh so important word: integrity. I might have exhibited some terrible behaviour as a young officer but I can honestly say that in thirty two years of commissioned service that I have always performed my duties and carried the responsibilities assigned to me. If AH is innocent then I really feel for him having to carry the burden of these lives for the rest of his; if, however, he was to blame, then think about the integrity word and make the right decision, away from the umbrella of your lawyer.

just another jocky

7th Aug 2019, 17:22

Could someone save me the trouble of searching and tell me who introduced this concept of CI please? Where does it originate? As an experienced long-term FJ pilot and QFI, until this trial I had never heard of it.

And what was Dr Jarvis' professional credentials?

Not pre-judging, just trying to find out some facts.

Thanks.

cessnapete

7th Aug 2019, 17:56

Thoughtful_Flyer

7th Aug 2019, 18:20

Why all these endless irrelevant pages of Posters trying to change a Court verdict.
The pilot was prosecuted, found not guilty, end of.
Quite!
I think it is absolutely appalling that this debate is being allowed to continue. It is noting but a thinly disguised character assassination.
We have a system in this country. If your guilt is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of 12 good (wo)men and true (who have actually heard ALL the evidence) then you are innocent.
Also, as this was not a murder charge, the matter cannot be re-opened in a criminal court in the future.

As you say, end off!!!

jindabyne

7th Aug 2019, 18:52

Close it Roj!

just another jocky

7th Aug 2019, 19:15

Why all these endless irrelevant pages of Posters trying to change a Court verdict.
The pilot was prosecuted, found not guilty, end of.

What?

I merely asked for some information that is likely held within these pages but wondered if some kind soul could point me in the right direction to save me trawling through page after page.

Where did I say I wanted to change a Court verdict?

Part of me would like tear you a new one......but some of us are a little more considered than that. In future, read the ******* post before making unfounded accusations.

dagenham

7th Aug 2019, 21:49

Just a thought, this discussion may become very relevant, the age of display pilots seems to be increasing and the effects of ci may become a wider concern

my own take is that ci is being taken to be a form of TIA or transient ischamic attack, a heart attack of the brain of you will. This is caused by either a clot caused by any element of vichod’s triad or good old fashioned congestion of the arteries. If a TIA has occurred the medical history of brain scans may show this. It will of course be complicated by any head trauma and I understand there was a lot. However, the signs may well still be there. Would the board have had access to this?

Legalapproach

8th Aug 2019, 09:46

just another jocky - basic qualifications are:
PhD, MSc, BEd(Hons), CErgHF, MIEHF, FRAeS, Editor and Principal Author CAP737 (CAA Human Performance Factors Manual)
The qualifications of the defence principal medical expert were
BSc, PhD, MB ChB, DAvMED, MRAeS, FFOM, ASCAB, Principal Medical Advisor QinetiQ

CI is a recognised medical condition that can arise from a number of factors. For the physiological issues in this case see my post at #132 above.

There was no issue that they were both highly qualified to act as experts and give the evidence/opinions they did.

A number of people have remarked that the best/most expensive lawyers won. Whilst extremely flattering, the prosecution lawyers are both highly respected, capable barristers who could only act with the hand they were dealt. They dealt with the case doggedly and professionally and I retain nothing but the highest respect for them. They suffered from an inherent lack of aviation knowledge and more importantly a lack of such amongst some of the people who were advising them. As a result the prosecution proceeded on a number of false assumptions including a number of criticisms of AH's previous flying that they subsequently had to abandon. There were further criticisms that they had to withdraw before ever getting to the jury as a result of representations we made to the prosecution and the trial judge.

Both sides were on publicly funded rates and I expect paid pretty much the same.

just another jocky

8th Aug 2019, 10:53

G0ULI

8th Aug 2019, 11:44

The quirks of the justice system require that the jury makes a judgement purely on the evidence laid before them. Many "facts", opinions and matters of public record can be suppressed during a court hearing following various legal precedents. Based on the evidence admitted, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty and that is legally the end of the matter.

Pilots with aerobatic experience will have arrived at their own judgement as to what happened but they along with all the other PPRuNe readers are in possession of information and/or experience that was not made available to the jury. We are all guilty of bad decision making at times. Mostly we don't end up being called to account for a moments madness and it gets filed away in the don't do that again folder.

Parson

8th Aug 2019, 12:00

A criminal trial and an air accident investigation are two very different things. If the Hunter had crashed in a field and no-one was killed, would CI have even been mentioned? Probably not.

airsound

8th Aug 2019, 13:30

just another jocky - You'll find even more on Steve Jarvis at Steve | Jarvis Bagshaw Ltd (http://jarvisbagshaw.com/3_steve.html)

G0ULI - you saidPPRuNe readers are in possession of information and/or experience that was not made available to the jurySorry but that's just not true. Many people gave evidence who have plenty of experience of fast jets, display flying in all its aspects, and the rest. In particular, there were two prosecution expert witnesses, and one defence expert witness, with oodles of time on fast jets - on ops as well as in displays. And the judge was meticulous in ensuring that all witnesses spoke clearly and without technical jargon, and making sure that the jury understood.

airsound

Easy Street

8th Aug 2019, 17:26

G0ULI - you said
Quote:
PPRuNe readers are in possession of information and/or experience that was not made available to the jury

Sorry but that's just not true.

It is true. We are in possession of the information that the AAIB has not seen fit to change its findings in the light of the court verdict, and those currently serving may also have seen a RAFCAM note to duty holders on the issues raised. I don’t think anyone is trying to argue that the verdict was wrong on the case as presented. Indeed given the differences in ‘question’ and standard of proof between criminal trial and accident investigation, the verdict can coexist perfectly well with the AAIB findings without the need for face-saving by any party to this discussion.

Where I think the discussion has a valid purpose, and maybe needs to carry on in a differently-titled thread without specific reference to AH, is on the implications for medical standards and screening, AvMed training for AMOs and aircrew, flying supervision, discipline and accountability. For instance what would the position be if, despite a claim of CI, a military pilot was found to be negligent in an occurrence, disciplined, and then took redress in civil law against the effect of the disciplinary action on their career? What does a claim of CI mean for their future flying career, anyway? Lots of questions to hamster wheel over...

My final thought in this thread. Many experienced aircrew, on here and in my personal acquaintance, have real-life experience of making rapid sequential and unrelated errors while flying high-performance jets, typically under some form of pressure or distraction. With no slight intended to Dr Jarvis and his impressive body of work, I do wonder whether this area would benefit from more research given that a scenario he found incredible appears quite credible to many practitioners. Improvements in reporting culture in recent years might make fast jet pilots more willing to share details of their ‘low average’ moments with HF researchers if asked on a rigorous survey (of the sort routinely done by RAFCAM for disorientation and G-LOC). Out.