Atlas Air 767 down/Texas

[Havingwings4ever]

One of you may be right, I'm not so sure that wing loading at max gross weight is what determines the negative g capability of an airliner. The -4 g claim may indeed be from a typo in a forum posting.

It looks to me like the Atlas 767 must have been very light to climb to FL400 immediately over the Gulf of Mexico.

Freighters continue to crash at a significantly higher rate than passenger planes at U.S. carriers as we have often observed here over the years.

There are a lot of B-763's still flying, I would think that if there was an early indication of a mechanical failure in this Atlas mishap, the NTSB would say something by now.


Yep, cargo drivers are forced to work longer and harder than the pax ones cause the FAA had the guts to treat cargo pilots as less "precious" . Absolutely astounding that they were allowed to differentiate....
And Amazon trying to push its shipping cost down by "operating" cargo ac from cheap labor holdings will just raise the chance for another crash with a loaded cargo plane full with dangerous goods, into a densely populated area.......corporate American greed has taken air safety hostage, Boeing, FAA, cheap cargo operators etc

Sometimes wondered when rolling down rwy 09 MIA, on our B747-4 cargo fully loaded with dangerous goods, and downtown MIA just beyond the rwy.....

[Lonewolf_50]

sudden updrafte, attempt to hold altitude..( vs attitude), hold that column forward...a bit longer than necessary
Your observation there pointed my brain to the SFO crash of the 777 a few years back and some discussions on contributing factors.
Granted, this is a 767.
Is there a possible link to FLCH (or similar feature in 767), or, was this flight not close enough to IAH for that feature to be a contributing factor?
Reference article and discussion (https://aviationweek.com/awin/were-asiana-pilots-caught-flch-trap)

[tdracer]

The maintenance manual and my 767 engineering training notes show no reference to the radio altimeters. Also, the logic for flaps and G/S capture is "or", not "and".

Most references show "flaps out of up" (although I do have one reference which says flaps >1).

The Flap/Slat Control Units on the 767 are relatively crude by current standards (not surprising - the basic design being nearly 40 years old). They put out analog discretes for 'flaps not stowed' - true anytime the flaps are not fully 'up', and 'flaps in landing' - true when flaps are ~23 degrees or greater (there may well be others - those are the ones that get used by the propulsion systems) - as well as digital outputs for use by systems such as EICAS. If anyone cares, on the engine side 'flaps not stowed' turns on continuous ignition, 'flaps in landing' selects approach idle - both via analog circuits (on newer aircraft this all gets done digitally).
There are two FSCU - Left and Right. Not sure about other systems, but the engines use left to left and right to right - so an FSCU failure only effects one engine.

IMHO the inadvertent TOGA selection is feasible, but this all remains conjecture until the NTSB releases something official.

[dusk2dawn]

Are the control cables rerouted / pullies repositioned on this conversion as in the -200 IAI/Bedek conversions?

[NSEU]

The Flap/Slat Control Units on the 767 are relatively crude by current standards (not surprising - the basic design being nearly 40 years old). They put out analog discretes for 'flaps not stowed' - true anytime the flaps are not fully 'up', and 'flaps in landing' - true when flaps are ~23 degrees or greater (there may well be others - those are the ones that get used by the propulsion systems) - as well as digital outputs for use by systems such as EICAS.

There are also FSPM's (Flap/Slat Position Modules) providing data directly to the AFDS & TMS, including position, not just (flaps out of up, etc) discretes. The leading edge flap position indication system also send signals to the PSEU (Proximity Switch Electronics Unit) for use with other systems. It's difficult to know which box does what.

Regarding your comment...

If anyone cares, on the engine side 'flaps not stowed' turns on continuous ignition.

Wiring schematic 74-31-01 shows an input into the ignition system from the Proximity Switch Electronics Unit (with a gate marked "SLATS RETracted"). However, the flight idle signal definitely comes from the FSEU.

There are also some lesser-known microswitches on the flap lever itself (at 1 unit) which input into the Thrust Management Computer and Flight Control Computers.

These switches are actuated in the flaps 1 detent position.
When actuated, the thrust management computer estimates the slats
moving to the flaps 1 position linearly in 5 seconds.

My training notes use this terminology in relation to GA Thrust Limit Mode:

The thrust limit mode transitions to GA when:
1) TO/GA is pressed on the TMSP (i.e. MCP) in the air
2) In air and the thrust limit mode is not in TO and the FCC signals GS Capture.
3) In the air and the thrust limit mode is not in T/O and flaps transition from zero to one.

The thrust limit mode will be locked in GA for flaps greater than 23.

[Lord Farringdon]

Sometimes wondered when rolling down rwy 09 MIA, on our B747-4 cargo fully loaded with dangerous goods, and downtown MIA just beyond the rwy.....


I would imagine the conflagration from a fully fuelled B747 would overwhelm most dangerous goods being carried.

[aterpster]

I would imagine the conflagration from a fully fuelled B747 would overwhelm most dangerous goods being carried.

No doubt about that.

[tdracer]

I would imagine the conflagration from a fully fuelled B747 would overwhelm most dangerous goods being carried.

Interesting that you edited to 'correct quote' - when I most certainly did not post what's quoted (hint, it was Havingwings4ever)

[Intruder]

I would imagine the conflagration from a fully fuelled B747 would overwhelm most dangerous goods being carried.OTOH, the dangerous goods could cause a conflagration that would not have otherwise occurred, e.g., UPS 6 Dubai, and Asiana 991 in the Sea of Japan...

[Lord Farringdon]

My sincere apologies tdtracer. I have re-edited my post to correct the attribution. I was a bit tired at the time and obviously screwed that up deluxe!

[Airbubba]

A blog post about the jumpseat rider's final flight home:

https://thepilotwifelife.com/the-last-leg-home-captain-archuletas-ashes-are-returned-to-his-wife-with-honor/

[Educated Airman]

About the loud thump heard in the CVR, the following is from the transcript of the Alaska Air crash due to tail plane jackscrew integrity.
1619:36.6 CAM [sound of extremely loud noise] [increase in background noise begins and continues to end of recording] [sound similar to loose articles moving around in cockpit]=left
1619:37 CAM-? *=left
1619:37.6 PA [sound similar to CVR startup tone]=left
1619:43 CAM-2 mayday.=left
1619:49 CAM-1 push and roll, push and roll.=left
1619:54 CAM-1 ok, we are inverted... and now we gotta get it….=left
1619:59 CAM [sound of chime]=left
1620:03 CAM-1 kick *=left
1620:04 CAM-1 push push push... push the blue side up.=left
1620:14 CAM-1 push.=left
1620:14 CAM-2 I'm pushing.=left
1620:16 CAM-1 ok now lets kick rudder... left rudder left rudder.=left
1620:18 CAM-2 I can't reach it.=left
1620:20 CAM-1 ok right rudder... right rudder.=left
1620:25 CAM-1 are we flyin?... we're flyin... we're flyin... tell 'em what we're doin.=left
1620:33 CAM-2 oh yea let me get *=left
1620:35 CAM-1 *=left
1620:38 CAM-1 gotta get it over again... at least upside down we're flyin.=left
1620:40.6 PA [sound similar to CVR startup tone]=left
1620:42 CAM-? *=left
1620:44 CAM-? *=left
1620:49 CAM [sounds similar to compressor stalls begin and continue to end of recording]=left
1620:49 CAM [sound similar to engine spool down]=left
1620:54 CAM-1 speedbrakes.=left
1620:55.1 CAM-2 got it.=left
1620:56.2 CAM-1 ah here we go.=left
1620:57.1 [end of recording]

[weasil]

A blog post about the jumpseat rider's final flight home:

https://thepilotwifelife.com/the-last-leg-home-captain-archuletas-ashes-are-returned-to-his-wife-with-honor/

Thanks for sharing this link. Heartbreaking stuff but I am so proud of the people in our industry. They always circle the wagons.

[ironbutt57]

About the loud thump heard in the CVR, the following is from the transcript of the Alaska Air crash due to tail plane jackscrew integrity.
1619:36.6 CAM [sound of extremely loud noise] [increase in background noise begins and continues to end of recording] [sound similar to loose articles moving around in cockpit]=left
1619:37 CAM-? *=left
1619:37.6 PA [sound similar to CVR startup tone]=left
1619:43 CAM-2 mayday.=left
1619:49 CAM-1 push and roll, push and roll.=left
1619:54 CAM-1 ok, we are inverted... and now we gotta get it….=left
1619:59 CAM [sound of chime]=left
1620:03 CAM-1 kick *=left
1620:04 CAM-1 push push push... push the blue side up.=left
1620:14 CAM-1 push.=left
1620:14 CAM-2 I'm pushing.=left
1620:16 CAM-1 ok now lets kick rudder... left rudder left rudder.=left
1620:18 CAM-2 I can't reach it.=left
1620:20 CAM-1 ok right rudder... right rudder.=left
1620:25 CAM-1 are we flyin?... we're flyin... we're flyin... tell 'em what we're doin.=left
1620:33 CAM-2 oh yea let me get *=left
1620:35 CAM-1 *=left
1620:38 CAM-1 gotta get it over again... at least upside down we're flyin.=left
1620:40.6 PA [sound similar to CVR startup tone]=left
1620:42 CAM-? *=left
1620:44 CAM-? *=left
1620:49 CAM [sounds similar to compressor stalls begin and continue to end of recording]=left
1620:49 CAM [sound similar to engine spool down]=left
1620:54 CAM-1 speedbrakes.=left
1620:55.1 CAM-2 got it.=left
1620:56.2 CAM-1 ah here we go.=left
1620:57.1 [end of recording]




No broken jackscrew....details are emerging, no problem with the airplane...wait a bit, much of it is sensitive to the crew and families

[zebravan]

"Thumps" also heard on Egypt Air 990 cvr

[Educated Airman]

No broken jackscrew....details are emerging, no problem with the airplane...wait a bit, much of it is sensitive to the crew and families

My theory is that the jackscrew did not fail, but rather that the fuselage attach hardware for the jackscrew fell out. The picture of the jackscrew shows the hardware missing, not failed structure.

[NSEU]

My theory is that the jackscrew did not fail, but rather that the fuselage attach hardware for the jackscrew fell out. The picture of the jackscrew shows the hardware missing, not failed structure.

Repeating theories does not make it so. I read your first post and I doubt you are familiar with the stabiliser ballscrew actuator assembly attachment points on a Boeing 767, the limits of travel of an unrestrained stabiliser, the number of safety mechanisms or with the relationship between the stabiliser and the elevator aft quadrants.

There is not one pin holding everything together. There are multiple pins and bushings with individual retaining devices.

[Meester proach]

My theory is that the jackscrew did not fail, but rather that the fuselage attach hardware for the jackscrew fell out. The picture of the jackscrew shows the hardware missing, not failed structure.
see two posts up, “ no problem with the aircraft “

if this is true, you are wasting your time .

[4runner]

The “thump” was the Jumpseater bouncing off the ceiling. The FO had a history of doing this. He was terminated from a previous airline according to a very reliable source. HR is in charge of all pilot hiring at atlas. They hit -4 g’s.

[kenparry]

The “thump” was the Jumpseater bouncing off the ceiling.

Why do you think that? He would have been strapped in at that stage of the approach.

They hit -4 g’s.

I think it has already been shown to be aerodynamically impossible for -4g at the IAS of the event - and structurally most unlikely

[ironbutt57]

The “thump” was the Jumpseater bouncing off the ceiling. The FO had a history of doing this. He was terminated from a previous airline according to a very reliable source. HR is in charge of all pilot hiring at atlas. They hit -4 g’s.

this from the boxes folks, heard the same thing from my insider connection, jumpseater thrown from under his unfastened belt, Captain sheared the control breakaway pulling so hard to override the FO who had his column forward, it is thought as flaps were called for, somehow the Capt inadvertently hit the TOGA levers, which then caused TOGA to activate when flaps "1" were selected, the pitch and startle factor caused the FO to aggressively move his controls nose down, with the captain fighting him to no avail, when the aircraft came clear of the clouds then the FO made some exclamation and began to pull back on the controls, but apparently not aggressively enough , I was not privy to the actual conversation on the CVR, this account was heavily redacted, might be a bit before all the story is heard, the word I heard used to describe it was "shocking"

[Capt Fathom]

So the report is out then?

[ironbutt57]

So the report is out then?


no.....not that I'm aware of...seems 4runner received the same info as myself,..the leaks are getting bigger, so I'm sure something will have to be released shortly...

[FLCH]

Heard same thing too ironbutt but did not hear about the unfastened seatbelt. It seems your self preservation instinct would kick in if you're in weather.

[Airbubba]

The FO had a history of doing this. He was terminated from a previous airline according to a very reliable source. HR is in charge of all pilot hiring at atlas.

In several of these widebody freighter mishaps a crewmember with a very unsatisfactory employment and training history is revealed in the investigation.

In the 1995 FedEx 705 hijack attempt Auburn Calloway was unable to check out as aircraft commander in the Navy and had been fired by American and Flying Tigers before he was hired at FedEx.

RS, the copilot in the 2003 FedEx 647 MEM MD-10 crash had her ticket pulled a couple of times prior to the mishap due to training deficiencies. She also had other employment challenges including DUI's.

CB, captain on the 2013 UPS 1354 crash at BHM had been let go by TWA prior to his 1990 hiring by UPS. He had a history of repeated training failures including open book homestudy exams but was eventually able to upgrade to captain in 2009.

On a perhaps related note, freighters continue to crash at a much higher rate than pax aircraft at U.S. carriers. Is this due to less oversight? Or lower standards and a more challenging operating environment?

In past years much of the discussion here was focused on the string of mishaps and hull losses at FedEx. As I posted in 2006:

>>by now FED EX must have one of the worst hull loss records in the industry!

Sadly, FedEx seems to have a widebody hull loss every two or three years. If they were a pax carrier there would be enormous adverse publicity and probably many casualties as well.

I've got friends over at FedEx who tell me the FAA has been all over their training for years now. Instead of annual AQP sim checks like most U.S. carriers, they are under a closely monitored old style six month program.

The pilot flying in the December 2003 MD-10 hard landing and fire at MEM had a history of busted checkrides before she was hired. In April, 1994 the feds pulled her ATP after an FAA inspector observed her performance. She took more training and got the ATP back and was hired by FedEx in 1996. At FedEx she had more checkride failures, a couple of DUI's and an altitude bust that set up the fateful Mad Dog line check back into MEM. Is it possible that "diversity" was promoted over performance in this case? A possibly similar precedent at FedEx was the overlooked poor employment history of Auburn Calloway who brutally attempted to hijack a FedEx DC-10 in MEM in 1994.

Traditionally, FedEx has had very high employment standards for the freight world, i.e. almost all pilots have college degrees (well, there are some Naval Academy graduates <g>) and many are like the founder, Fred Smith, ex-military aviators [I was later corrected on this point, FS was a Marine officer but not an aviator - Airbubba]. The company is consistently profitable and maintenance is excellent by most accounts.

Still, the mishaps and hull losses continue at what everyone agrees is an unacceptable rate...

Will Atlas 3591 turn out to be yet another widebody freighter loss due to 'human factors'? Is a higher accident rate acceptable for cargo planes since the crashes cause 'no significant loss of life'?

[fox niner]

no.....not that I'm aware of...seems 4runner received the same info as myself,..the leaks are getting bigger, so I'm sure something will have to be released shortly...

But isn’t a preliminary report supposed to be published after one month? And what is holding them back? I can understand the shocking nature of this and maybe the reluctance to report. But still, it will come out anyway so why not come in the open?
What I mean to say, is that despite the shocking truth, NOT reporting it is adding more speculation.

[AviatorDave]

The “thump” was the Jumpseater bouncing off the ceiling. The FO had a history of doing this. He was terminated from a previous airline according to a very reliable source. HR is in charge of all pilot hiring at atlas. They hit -4 g’s.

A hstory of doing what exactly? Losing orientation and messing up beyond acceptable level or of being a jerk and pushing the column to make jumpseaters hit the ceiling?

[Chiefttp]

Airbubba,
there is a common thread in your list of accidents. HR departments have taken over Pilot hiring from the Pilots! A friend at UPS was turned down at United because he didn’t perform well on some table top sim evaluation. He was an F-14 Tomcat Pilot in the Navy! The Hogan test has prevented many highly qualified pilots from pursuing a position at many other airlines as well.
As far as the quality of freight pilots vice pax..the two highest paid pilot groups in the US are Fed Ex and UPS by far, and if you look at retirement benefits it’s not even in the same galaxy, so I’m pretty sure at least UPS and FedEx have their pick of the litter over the last few years.

[ironbutt57]

The pilot flying in the December 2003 MD-10 hard landing and fire at MEM had a history of busted checkrides before she was hired. In April, 1994 the feds pulled her ATP after an FAA inspector observed her performance. She took more training and got the ATP back and was hired by FedEx in 1996. At FedEx she had more checkride failures, a couple of DUI's and an altitude bust that set up the fateful Mad Dog line check back into MEM

oh yah, had the displeasure of flying one quick turnaround with this one at a regional airline, what a confrontational, unhappy soul....

[aterpster]

Will Atlas 3591 turn out to be yet another widebody freighter loss due to 'human factors'? Is a higher accident rate acceptable for cargo planes since the crashes cause 'no significant loss of life'?
Packages don't sue nor do they have grieving families and friends.

[neilki]

The “thump” was the Jumpseater bouncing off the ceiling. The FO had a history of doing this. He was terminated from a previous airline according to a very reliable source. HR is in charge of all pilot hiring at atlas. They hit -4 g’s.
I can speak with personal experience about the hiring process at Atlas. The HR folks are very efficient and present in most of the Interview stages; but they use a number of retired and line pilots in the process; and they are highly experienced and very involved. I cannot imagine Atlas HR overruling a pilots' concerns about a candidates capabilities. The interview process there is very well run indeed.

[FIRESYSOK]

Man, that’s an insanely naïve viewpoint. In general, HR bring the candidates to interview. And no one really knows how hard up some of these companies really are. There is tremendous pressure to get meat into seats these days at various companies, IMO.

[413X3]

Right after the ethnicity of the first officer became public... all the rumors started blaming him.
Not only his poor skills that are verified by a RELIABLE source.
Also the blaming of minorities being forced into the cockpit by HR departments because of "diversity"
The racist comments are across many aviation sites.
This attitude is not being addressed and is never going to get better until these people are the ones finding themselves on the street and have no job offers AND are not welcome on websites either.

[BARKINGMAD]

Airbubba,
there is a common thread in your list of accidents. HR departments have taken over Pilot hiring from the Pilots! A friend at UPS was turned down at United because he didn’t perform well on some table top sim evaluation. He was an F-14 Tomcat Pilot in the Navy! The Hogan test has prevented many highly qualified pilots from pursuing a position at many other airlines as well.
As far as the quality of freight pilots vice pax..the two highest paid pilot groups in the US are Fed Ex and UPS by far, and if you look at retirement benefits it’s not even in the same galaxy, so I’m pretty sure at least UPS and FedEx have their pick of the litter over the last few years.

I wonder how many competent 73NG captains were rejected by Jet2 HR department due to the Compass Test farce?

I know of at least several ex-XL candidates who were OK'd by pilot interviewers but jettisoned by this totally unsuitable selection tool.

And yes, I was one and following the shabby treatment of a colleague who did get employed by them I'm glad the fickle finger of fate moved me in another direction!

[RoyHudd]

HR-driven pilot selection is a mistake. The numpties at BA prove this time after time, but BA is not alone.

Apart from the inadequacies of HR people in understanding the requirements of the pilot profession, they in part select on a quota basis as regards gender, race, and other parameters.

I recall an experienced A320/321 SFO who was LHR-based being turned down at interview by BA as "not enthusiastic enough about joining BA". (His career went well nevertheless)

[4runner]

I can speak with personal experience about the hiring process at Atlas. The HR folks are very efficient and present in most of the Interview stages; but they use a number of retired and line pilots in the process; and they are highly experienced and very involved. I cannot imagine Atlas HR overruling a pilots' concerns about a candidates capabilities. The interview process there is very well run indeed.

I can. I can do it from experience and I can validate the current hiring protocol and procedure. Whether through personal experience, or colleagues. This is a known factor at atlas and the teamsters union has addressed the hiring issue repeatedly. Now there’s a hole in the swamp and three dead aviators. I don’t believe in coincidences. Someone should answer for Their decisions. Oh wait, this is corporate America. No one is responsible, but all the peons are accountable.

[4runner]

Right after the ethnicity of the first officer became public... all the rumors started blaming him.
Not only his poor skills that are verified by a RELIABLE source.
Also the blaming of minorities being forced into the cockpit by HR departments because of "diversity"
The racist comments are across many aviation sites.
This attitude is not being addressed and is never going to get better until these people are the ones finding themselves on the street and have no job offers AND are not welcome on websites either.

its called a PRIA check. It stands for Pilots Records Inprovement Act. Several red flags exist on someone’s check that would have traditionally disqualified them from being hired, were it not for HR intervention or decisions. Other red flags related to the behavior and attitude of the individual in training are there. To be even more specific, red flags exist during stall recovery training with a certain individual. Furthermore, a certain individual may have mistaken the incident to be a stall and applied full nose down elevator. Red flags abound!!!

[4runner]

A hstory of doing what exactly? Losing orientation and messing up beyond acceptable level or of being a jerk and pushing the column to make jumpseaters hit the ceiling?

had a history of full forward input on stall recovery. This was mistaken as a stall they think.

[ironbutt57]

high altitude one may in fact have to input full forward controls to break the AOA, but most certainly not down where they were

[4runner]

Man, that’s an insanely naïve viewpoint. In general, HR bring the candidates to interview. And no one really knows how hard up some of these companies really are. There is tremendous pressure to get meat into seats these days at various companies, IMO.

HR brings AND selects candidates. At a lot of airlines, the pilot panels are of limited input or consequence in the hiring procedure. Being “hard up” and needing “meat in the seat” are not a valid excuse for hiring and keeping unsuitable candidates. This is especially true as lives are literally at stake. This is why HR pilot selection needs to stop.

[Stby4Higher]

First guess was incorrectly presumed to be a Stall, followed by bizarre recovery. Tragic, incredibly sad. It is all about the training. Assembly line training using FO’s with only a few individuals actually capable of insightful training is now industry standard.

Any commentary segueing into talk of ethnicity or slamming of HR is precisely the issue with all that is wrong with the industry. Legacy carriers try to give every applicant a shot. They understand that bias is real. They have fairly balanced diverse workforce’s for decades. If reputation is true, Atlas has not until recently. On the street they have long been known as white man’s world. Expat’s tell tales of racism, sexism always involving specific CP & DO. Competent minority pilots want nothing to do with the place.

Sounds like HR had to step in when incidents of bias, assaults, bigotry got out of hand.
That is logical enough conclusion. Also the Union clearly has a role in identifying bias issues. They should just get rid of the bad apples in top management that tolerate this conduct and fix the training.
If this FO had a history of misidentifying stalls, training failed him badly.
This certainly wouldnt be the first time on the cheap training would be at fault.

[The Ancient Geek]

How hard can it be to identify a stall ?
AD shows nose high
Airspeed decaying
Buffet
ASI unwinding
Nose drops unless there are excessive control inputs

All basic training stuff in a Cessna. How many more clues do you want ?

[Stby4Higher]

How hard can it be to identify a stall ?
AD shows nose high
Airspeed decaying
Buffet
ASI unwinding
Nose drops unless there are excessive control inputs

All basic training stuff in a Cessna. How many more clues do you want ?

Agreed. But details will come out in report re “decaying airspeed.” If TOGA activated - all bets are off.
This is not a Cessna.
Human factors - an FO that didnt let go of the stick. Bad.

[E.A.T]

Competent minority pilots want nothing to do with the place.

If this FO had a history of misidentifying stalls, training failed him badly.

This certainly wouldnt be the first time on the cheap training would be at fault.

1 Maybe competent minorities are seeking out the great jobs in aviation. It has been documented and Atlas doesn't appear to be one of them.
2 Atlas has increased training sessions and gone out of the way to help struggling students. They started giving students a session of just landings... I never got that. I did, however, always have a healthy fear of failing and not making the grade.

[fox niner]

You guys apparently know something about the ethnic background of the FO...why is it relevant? Where do you guys get this info? Is the HR dept applying affirmative action? Why doesn’t the ntsb publish something 35+ days after the accident? Is the fbi involved? Is that the reason?

[Old Boeing Driver]

Just a question..... Would/could Boeing put pressure on the NTSB to delay release of information on this accident due to other pending investigations?

[formulaben]

Right after the ethnicity of the first officer became public... all the rumors started blaming him.
Not only his poor skills that are verified by a RELIABLE source.
Also the blaming of minorities being forced into the cockpit by HR departments because of "diversity"
The racist comments are across many aviation sites.
This attitude is not being addressed and is never going to get better until these people are the ones finding themselves on the street and have no job offers AND are not welcome on websites either.

Is it racist if it is true? Do you not see the irony in your statement that diversity hire policies have left many good hires on the outside looking in, e.g. on the street? If there were no hires based on diversity but simply on flight experience and competency, then it would not be an issue. You can blame racism all you want, but the facts are the facts.

[jugofpropwash]

Just a question..... Would/could Boeing put pressure on the NTSB to delay release of information on this accident due to other pending investigations?

Seems unlikely. I would think that if it was a personnel problem, then Boeing would welcome the distraction from their issues.

[AnyOldPilot]

Does the rumor mill indicate that the FO was the PF?

[Old Boeing Driver]

Seems unlikely. I would think that if it was a personnel problem, then Boeing would welcome the distraction from their issues.

IF the issue is a personnel problem. What if it was/is another flight control issue.

[atakacs]

I'd say a systemic flight control issue seems extremely unlikely on the 767 after so many hours of service

[tdracer]

Further, if the NTSB suspected an aircraft problem, they almost certainly would have said something publicly about it by now, Keeping quiet could put other aircraft at risk which is completely contrary to the NTSB's purpose.

[413X3]

Is it racist if it is true? Do you not see the irony in your statement that diversity hire policies have left many good hires on the outside looking in, e.g. on the street? If there were no hires based on diversity but simply on flight experience and competency, then it would not be an issue. You can blame racism all you want, but the facts are the facts.

Diversity hires are causing aviation to be less safe... as aviation continues to become more and more safe through out the world. Your logic is flawless.

[Old Boeing Driver]

Further, if the NTSB suspected an aircraft problem, they almost certainly would have said something publicly about it by now, Keeping quiet could put other aircraft at risk which is completely contrary to the NTSB's purpose.

I agree with your comment. However, the NTSB is usually pretty good about having something out in a 30 day time period.

Since this thread has run the gamut from pilot input issues to structural failure, I just thought I would pose the question.

Thanks for your post.

[aterpster]

The F/O previously worked for TWA. As I understand it he left there in 1990.

[AviatorDave]

You guys apparently know something about the ethnic background of the FO...why is it relevant? Where do you guys get this info? Is the HR dept applying affirmative action? Why doesn’t the ntsb publish something 35+ days after the accident? Is the fbi involved? Is that the reason?




I personally could not care less about the ethnicity or gender of the guy/gal I am flying with, but if there is anything to it that the FO was a diversity hire despite having a questionable record of flying skills known to HR, it could explain the NTSB being so tight-lipped.
If the NTSB doesn‘t get facts and communication perfectly right, they will have the PC media tearing them apart.
This is a minefield these days ...

[ironbutt57]

The F/O previously worked for TWA. As I understand it he left there in 1990.


when he was 17 yrs old?

[dr dre]

If the FO was incompetent, then is it possible that he was hired not to meet a racial quota, but because US carriers at the moment are in a desperate shortage.

From what I understand regional airlines are taking pilots with 1500hrs and a pulse or otherwise are parking aircraft. Is Atlas in the same situation? I'm not sure but they don't strike me as being the most highly regarded carrier, and they are in a state of large expansion with the Amazon deal.

If they were at the point of an applicant shortage then I don't think they would care what race or gender a pilot was. Maybe they got to the stage where they would take any pilot who met the legal minimums, regardless of competence?

[AviatorDave]

If the FO was incompetent, then is it possible that he was hired not to meet a racial quota, but because US carriers at the moment are in a desperate shortage.

From what I understand regional airlines are taking pilots with 1500hrs and a pulse or otherwise are parking aircraft. Is Atlas in the same situation? I'm not sure but they don't strike me as being the most highly regarded carrier, and they are in a state of large expansion with the Amazon deal.

If they were at the point of an applicant shortage then I don't think they would care what race or gender a pilot was. Maybe they got to the stage where they would take any pilot who met the legal minimums, regardless of competence?

While the industry may face a shortage of pilots, there is still a difference between just being inexperienced and having repeatedly demonstrated incompetence.
I know quite some low timers who are excellent airmen/women.

[aterpster]

when he was 17 yrs old?
Then, I must have been given bad information. Do you know his age on the date of the accident?

EDIT: The person who had been let go by TWA was the captain of UPS 1354. Sorry for the confusion.

[Paul852]

The FO was reportedly 45, as I previously posted (but my post was silently censored for reasons that are not clear to me)

[last747fe]

what has happened to this report ?

[fox niner]

Apparently, something happended that is beyond anyone’s imagination. Right now, the ntsb does not consider the events as having any safety concern. Read about it in this thread.

[golfyankeesierra]

Because it’s cargo?

[Meester proach]

They’ve got the FDR and CVR so what’s the delay on more info ?

[Intruder]

I'd be willing to bet Atlas has some lobbyist trying to delay the preliminary report as long as possible.

[Old Boeing Driver]

I'd be willing to bet Atlas has some lobbyist trying to delay the preliminary report as long as possible.

That's what I think too

[wrench1]

I'd be willing to bet Atlas has some lobbyist trying to delay the preliminary report as long as possible.
Doubtful it's a lobbyist. More likely it concerns personal items related to the crew which are covered by Federal law (like CVR recordings) and require certain approvals prior to release.

[ironbutt57]

I'd be willing to bet Atlas has some lobbyist trying to delay the preliminary report as long as possible.

my source dried up, refuses to talk about it...NOT an airplane issue is all thats being said

[TowerDog]

my source dried up, refuses to talk about it...NOT an airplane issue is all thats being said

Sounds like an HR issue.
Can the public handle the truth? :sad:

[Dave Therhino]

I'd be willing to bet Atlas has some lobbyist trying to delay the preliminary report as long as possible.

Could be, but it also could be they are behind because of supporting the 737 Max accident investigation and design reviews.

[413X3]

If the rumors of the first officer are proven false can these people have their accounts deleted?

[aterpster]

If the rumors of the first officer are proven false can these people have their accounts deleted?

This section is called "Rumours & News."

[Organfreak]

Sounds like an HR issue.
Can the public handle the truth? :sad:

Pardon me if I am being dense, please! I do not understand. Is this subtext/innuendo about the race of the FO? If so, can somebody plz come out and say it?
Please tell me what it is that we public might not be able to handle! I'm all ears.

[MATELO]

Pardon me if I am being dense, please! I do not understand. Is this subtext/innuendo about the race of the FO? If so, can somebody plz come out and say it?
Please tell me what it is that we public might not be able to handle! I'm all ears.

Nothing to do with race. Its a quote from a film - A few good men.

[Organfreak]

Nothing to do with race. Its a quote from a film - A few good men.

Oh! Good. I saw it but never remember the lines. Plz excuse the interruption.

[Intruder]

Doubtful it's a lobbyist. More likely it concerns personal items related to the crew which are covered by Federal law (like CVR recordings) and require certain approvals prior to release.I doubt that. They could leave out ANYTHING in the preliminary report, and just publish what is allowed.

[ironbutt57]

Pardon me if I am being dense, please! I do not understand. Is this subtext/innuendo about the race of the FO? If so, can somebody plz come out and say it?
Please tell me what it is that we public might not be able to handle! I'm all ears.

i never heard or posted anything about the FO...

[wrench1]

I doubt that. They could leave out ANYTHING in the preliminary report, and just publish what is allowed.
In my experience with the NTSB, there are 2 reasons a preliminary report is not out in 30 days. Either the aircraft/CVR/FDR is missing or there is a direct crew related issue. It's been 47 days since the accident. Since they have the FDR and CVR if there was "anything" they could report with the aircraft they would have done so 17 days ago.

[CorpJetJock]

Heard this morning from a close source to the investigation, that an uncoordinated reaction to a mistake is going to be the final determination. I have been told that the copilot who was flying, asked the captain to select flaps down. In reaching around/over the pedestal to do so, the captain inadvertently hit G/A sending the auto throttles to max. The aircraft momentarily pitched up and the copilot pushed his yoke full nose down in reaction sending the aircraft into a dive as the engines continued to spool up. The captain grabbed his yoke and without calling that he was taking control yanked back on his yoke in opposition to the copilots force. Apparently enough opposing force caused the shear pin to shear, and the captain lost his input. Electric trim was attempted by the captain and some amount of throttle reduction was enacted, but it was too late the aircraft was far outside it's control envelope at way too low of an altitude to recover. It will be VERY interesting to hear more documented details, not sure when it will be out. So sad, crew coordination and basic flying skills still overshadow technology and knowledge of it.

[Organfreak]

In reaching around/over the pedestal to do so, the captain inadvertently hit G/A sending the auto throttles to max.

Wait a second-- Didn't I read that the throttles stayed at 94% throughout the event? Doesn't add up.
Oops, sorry, wrong thread!

[TheEdge]

Wait a second-- Didn't I read that the throttles stayed at 94% throughout the event? Doesn't add up.
Oops, sorry, wrong thread!
yep wrong Boeing bro...

[hans brinker]

Heard this morning from a close source to the investigation, that an uncoordinated reaction to a mistake is going to be the final determination. I have been told that the copilot who was flying, asked the captain to select flaps down. In reaching around/over the pedestal to do so, the captain inadvertently hit G/A sending the auto throttles to max. The aircraft momentarily pitched up and the copilot pushed his yoke full nose down in reaction sending the aircraft into a dive as the engines continued to spool up. The captain grabbed his yoke and without calling that he was taking control yanked back on his yoke in opposition to the copilots force. Apparently enough opposing force caused the shear pin to shear, and the captain lost his input. Electric trim was attempted by the captain and some amount of throttle reduction was enacted, but it was too late the aircraft was far outside it's control envelope at way too low of an altitude to recover. It will be VERY interesting to hear more documented details, not sure when it will be out. So sad, crew coordination and basic flying skills still overshadow technology and knowledge of it.

not saying some of this could not be right, but the exact same thing was said a few weeks already. Also if the pilots make different inputs the controls will disconnect from each other, but the left side will still work independently from the right side, so the captain would not have lost his input.

[49d]

Flaps down, 30 miles out?

[Organfreak]

yep wrong Boeing bro...
I tried to delete it but was unsuccessful.

[oceancrosser]

Heard this morning from a close source to the investigation, that an uncoordinated reaction to a mistake is going to be the final determination. I have been told that the copilot who was flying, asked the captain to select flaps down. In reaching around/over the pedestal to do so, the captain inadvertently hit G/A sending the auto throttles to max. The aircraft momentarily pitched up and the copilot pushed his yoke full nose down in reaction sending the aircraft into a dive as the engines continued to spool up. The captain grabbed his yoke and without calling that he was taking control yanked back on his yoke in opposition to the copilots force. Apparently enough opposing force caused the shear pin to shear, and the captain lost his input. Electric trim was attempted by the captain and some amount of throttle reduction was enacted, but it was too late the aircraft was far outside it's control envelope at way too low of an altitude to recover. It will be VERY interesting to hear more documented details, not sure when it will be out. So sad, crew coordination and basic flying skills still overshadow technology and knowledge of it.

To someone with 12K hrs on 757/767 this does not relly sound credible.

[svhar]

Same here, 9K hours 757/767.

[49d]

I agree, 12k in corporate another 12 in 737...i can't imagine that overreaction.. If they hit toga, no big deal, just pull the throttles back, pitch up, well lev it..... Unless this fo was a real whacko, but a loud I got it.. Should have fixed it

[Airbubba]

I tried to delete it but was unsuccessful.

The delete dialog has a default selection of 'Do Not Delete Message'. Clever, right? :ugh:


https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x610/delete_6ddc47d14606dcbabfdcc25b0786e1f58845d2ce.jpg

[B2N2]

Flaps down, 30 miles out?

If you look at the STAR they flew, two waypoints required a height of 6000’ and 7000’ respectively and both required a speed of 240kts which depending on weight would usually be “Flaps 1” which is leading edge slats only.

[extreme P]

If you look at the STAR they flew two waypoints required a height of 6000’ and 7000’ respectively and both required a speed of 240kts which depending on weight would usually be “Flaps 1” which is leading edge slats only.

I can't see a short domestic flight being at such a heavy weight on landing requiring flaps 1 at 240 kts. Likely 220 kts or less for minimum clean speed.

[B2N2]

Well maybe they intended to slow down even further in anticipation of a high close in descent, or simply more of a buffer considering weather or expected turbulence.
In any case it appears flaps were selected.
Does not really matter what you or I think.

[Airbubba]

If you look at the STAR they flew, two waypoints required a height of 6000’ and 7000’ respectively and both required a speed of 240kts which depending on weight would usually be “Flaps 1” which is leading edge slats only.

The plane must have been pretty light to climb directly to FL400 out of MIA. I think most of us would fly 240 knots clean in a B-763 even at max landing weight.

Which STAR did they fly with GILLL in it?

Did they fly the LINKK ONE GIRLY TRANSITION? The next waypoint after GILLL has a 210 knot speed constraint, they were taken off the STAR on vectors but maybe the call was made for flaps 1 in anticipation of slowing with some stall margin for the bumps.

[B2N2]

When they take you off a STAR it’s smart to keep altitude and speed constraints in the back of your mind as you may get cleared to a waypoint further down the line once clear of weather or slower/faster conflict traffic.
So even though they were on a vector they may have decided to slow to 210 and select flaps 1 as that was the constraint for the next waypoint.

[49d]

wreckage should have shown, flaps, or led s in or out .i wonder how they would do with a 100kt overspeed...

[aterpster]

wreckage should have shown, flaps, or led s in or out .i wonder how they would do with a 100kt overspeed...
Probably a lot of data from the DFDR as well.

And, then, there is the DCVR.

Both of which the NTSB is holding back, unlike if these were a 767 with 200 souls, or so, on board.

[747-8driver]

Texas Fishing Forum (https://texasfishingforum.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/13123493/houston-amazon-767-crash-23-feb-19)
Quite amazing if true.

[hawkeye red]

747-8driver...rubbish article. If your throttles advance to the TO/GA mode without you wanting that, you just disconnect autothrottle. Simple and easy...

[Airbubba]

Here's the post from the link above, the narrative is similar to other online versions supposedly leaked by someone privy to the CVR and FDR readouts.

Subject: Houston Amazon 767 Crash 23 Feb 19

From the net, courtesy of a reliable source.… [i.e. Now, this is no s**t... - Airbubba]

Just FYI… we’ve heard the full cockpit audio and seen the data. Here’s... what really happened (name redacted to protect the innocent!):

During the approach, at about 6,000 FT (being flown by the first officer), the Captain reached around the throttle quadrant to extend the flaps to the next position after being called to do so by the first officer (pilot flying)… very normal.

In many aircraft including the 767, that’s a very odd/difficult repositioning of your hand (from the left seat, all the way around to the right side of the center console), and requires intimate familiarity and slow deliberate motion to do successfully.

Well in any case, it was not done so this time. The captain accidently hit the “go around” switch while bringing his hand around for the flaps, which brought both engines up to full power. In the landing configuration, as this aircraft was transitioning into, that obviously causes a vast increase in lift… and the first officer (pilot flying) used everything he had to force the nose back down.
Still not sure why that occurred, as the crew should have just “gone around” and tried it again when properly configured… but they did not. And that started in motion a chain of events that lead to tragedy.

As the First Officer over-rotated downward, again with the engines at full power, the aircraft quickly accelerated and approached something we’re all trained to handle (at least in good training environments)… an “upset recovery”, countered by NON-AUTOMATION and basic “stick and rudder skills”.

This captain however, in turn, grabbed the controls without using positive command (“I’ve got”, “My aircraft”, or anything normally done), and countered the F/O’s control input by completely hauling his control column full aft… remember, while the F/O is pushing full forward.

In the process of doing that, he broke the “shear pin” on his control column (a device/mechanical safety interlock used to separate a control column from the “innards” of the control architecture in the event one control column is doing something it should not)… and that occurred here.

The captain, a few seconds later, now accelerating downward out of the control envelope of the 767 (remember, all of this started at 6000 FT and probably took less time to get to the fatal point than it did to read this far), recognizes the has no control column and then asks the F/O to pull up, get the nose up, or something to that affect. It isn’t 100% clear what he says.
The F/O then tries to pull aft on his column (going from full forward to full aft), but isn’t getting the response he needs, because the aircraft is out of the envelope of controllability and the controls are “air-loaded” in position.

At about 2000 FT, eventually the trim motors are able to start overcoming the air-load, and the aircraft begins to attempt to arrest its rate of descent… but alas it’s far too little, far too late, and the aircraft impacts about 30-40 degrees nose down, with what is believed to be about 4-5000 FT / minute rate of descent.

All during this time the throttles aren’t touched until somewhere during that last few seconds of flight… which is believed to be what enabled the trim motors to start working. Unclear who does it, and no audio indicates who it was.

Just FYI… we’ve attempted in our 767 simulators to recover from the event with the exact same setup, and thus far we’ve only had success when starting at 8000’ or higher… meaning we are fully established in the “out of control” position at 8000’, recognize it by then, and initiate recovery starting at 8000’.

These guys started the whole thing at 6000’ and were much lower when a true recovery attempt was initiated. No chance, and just shows you how quickly you can get “out of the envelope” when you don’t follow procedure, try some completely erroneous recovery technique, and don’t have a clue what you’re doing.

So many things went wrong with crew coordination, basic flying skills, aircraft envelope awareness, basic procedures, and such… that this will likely go down as one of the absolute worst “pilot error” events ever.

It needs to have serious impact throughout the Amazon flying circus (and associated partnerships), and show people that Jeff Bezos’ attempt to push the envelope at lower cost, all things else be damned, doesn’t apply to aviation.

This accident no doubt was absolutely horrible, and three people lost their lives…one of them (the jumpseater) through absolutely no fault of his own. But making an approach into Houston, TX, it could have been so much worse. In another few miles, they would have been over major population centers and who knows what would have happened then.

Know your aircraft. Know your procedures. And for God sakes, just FLY! It’s not a video game!

Relayed by your PJP Editor
Bert Botta
Aviation Writer
PJPFBO Editor
Email: bert@privatejetpilots

[Organfreak]

747-8driver...rubbish article. If your throttles advance to the TO/GA mode without you wanting that, you just disconnect autothrottle. Simple and easy...

Is it possible that they didn't realize that TOGA had engaged? (One would THINK not!)
:eek:

[Meester proach]

Same narrative again .
TOGA isn’t full power , it’s 2000 FPM.

whats happens with the shear pin ? Do you get your respective elevator or both ?

[flyingchanges]

Approaching 8 weeks with no prelim.

[Old Boeing Driver]

Same narrative again .
TOGA isn’t full power , it’s 2000 FPM.

whats happens with the shear pin ? Do you get your respective elevator or both ?See post #691. There is not a shear pin as in earlier Boeing's. Either yoke would control both surfaces.

[Airbubba]

Here's a description of the B-763 control column operation with one side jammed from page 12 of the MS990 NTSB accident report:

The captains and first officers control columns have authority to command full travel of the elevators under most flight conditions and normally work together as one system. However, the two sides of the system can be commanded independently because of override mechanisms at the control columns and aft quadrant. Therefore, if one side of the system becomes immobilized, control column inputs on the operational side can cause full travel of the nonfailed elevator. In addition, in many cases, control column inputs on the operational side can also result in nearly full travel of the elevator on the failed side through the override mechanisms. The elevator PCAs are installed with compressible links located between each bellcrank assembly and PCA input control rod to provide a means of isolating a jammed PCA, thus allowing the pilots to retain control of that elevator surface through its two remaining (unjammed) PCAs


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1199x878/b_763_elevator_a17404b1dbe94f111ae331c8c18341e43a641a02.jpg
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAB0201.pdf

[Bleve]

If TOGA thrust was inadvertently and unexpectedly applied, then the subsequent events have all the hallmarks of Somatogravic illusion. From:

Somatogravic Illusion - AviationKnowledge (http://aviationknowledge.wikidot.com/aviation:somatogravic-illusion)

...power is rapidly applied and the aircraft then accelerates rapidly ... As no visual cues exist, this generates a strong ‘tilt back’ sensation which the pilot interprets (incorrectly) as a rapid pitching up sensation. Despite this perception the aircraft may still actually be in a level attitude or only a slight climb ... This is the somatogravic illusion. The pilot will then push forward on the control column to control this (imaginary) climb thinking they are lowering the aircraft nose back to level flight, when in actual fact they are lowering the nose into a dive. As the aircraft nose lowers, the aircraft continues to accelerate, generating additional pitch up sensations, causing the pilot to lower the nose even further. Tragically, this illusion normal ends with the pilot commanding the aircraft into a high speed steep dive and contact with the ground quickly ensues.

Full Flight Simulators use this principle, except in reverse. Tilting of the simulator is used to simulate acceleration: tilt back = acceleration, tilt forward = deceleration.

If a rapid acceleration resulted in the F/O falling victim to this illusion, that would explain why he pushed full forward on the control column and also why he was unresponsive to the CPT's desperate attempts to get control of the aircraft. Having experienced this illusion once myself, I can tell you that it is overwhelming and results in almost total cognitive overload. The defence against it is awareness that it can happen and training in what to do if it does. In my training it was to 'Trust your Instruments'. ie Lock onto the AI and fly the attitude, regardless of what your body is screaming at you to do. And that struggle between doing what is right (fly the attitude) and what is wrong (push forward to counter the illusion) is all consuming - I doubt I would have been responsive to someone screaming at me either.

[FIRESYSOK]

Trusting instruments without discrimination is deadly. Many instances of this have resulted in crashes and serious upsets as well.

A wiser reaction— and one you have to think about beforehand— is to ask yourself- is this real? Sim training should address instrument failure and force this thought process. At 6000’, you have the time to recover from a low speed condition without moving the column full forward. On liftoff you see a sudden, incredibly dwindling, or increasing airspeed...is it real? A quick crosscheck can prevent disaster.

Fatigue, training, natural ability...all factor in. No doubt, somatogravic illusion can make you ill and many have never experienced it first hand. Don’t forget there is another crew member to defer to if suddenly you’re overwhelmed. It can happen.

[fox niner]

All this may be very true, but what was the last time the ntsb postponed or omitted to publish a preliminary report?
9-11?
Today is day 55. This is certainly going to be an interesting read.

[aterpster]

Approaching 8 weeks with no prelim.

That shouts out something.

[Dark Knight]

Re post 850 from a reliable source.

My thoughts.

Did not fly the 767 however, checking Captain Google images, the TOGA (Go Round) switches (as in most Boeings) are positioned such they require a premeditated, definite decision/action to trigger them.

I suggest it is almost impossible to do this when correctly selecting a flap reposition particularly should one have been properly trained: i.e. when selecting a flap reposition from the Left seat the hand always goes under the pilot flying (F/O's) arm. This prevents the Left seat pilot's arm getting in the way of the Pilot Flying (F/O) use of the thrust levers.
Further the hand/arm would not be anywhere near the TOGA switches.

Had for some reason TOGA had been initiated one would think autothrust would be immediately disconnected to maintain the required flight path/remain in control of the aircraft. Or is the required flight path was not able to be maintained a go round carried out.

This should be a fairly standard procedure which all training would demonstrate.

[Airbubba]

I suggest it is almost impossible to do this when correctly selecting a flap reposition particularly should one have been properly trained: i.e. when selecting a flap reposition from the Left seat the hand always goes under the pilot flying (F/O's) arm. This prevents the Left seat pilot's arm getting in the way of the Pilot Flying (F/O) use of the thrust levers.
Further the hand/arm would not be anywhere near the TOGA switches.

Had for some reason TOGA had been initiated one would think autothrust would be immediately disconnected to maintain the required flight path/remain in control of the aircraft. Or is the required flight path was not able to be maintained a go round carried out.

This should be a fairly standard procedure which all training would demonstrate.

No offense but are you an Ozmate FO perhaps? :confused: I've flown with a couple who had similar detailed ideas of the 'right' way to do things in the cockpit. One guy told me that I was folding the paperwork the wrong way. Maybe he was right...

Can you find any reference for this 'standard procedure' for your, uh, reach around?

Some FO's would have their hands on the throttles at 6000 feet with autoflight engaged, others would not in my experience. These are not TOGA switches, they are go-around switches on the B-763. I agree that clicking off the autothrottle and pulling back the thrust levers would be a simple way of handling the initial miscue. Or, selecting FLCH since 6000 is in the altitude window would automatically pull back the power and bring you back on altitude.

[extreme P]

Re post 850 from a reliable source.

My thoughts.

Did not fly the 767 however, checking Captain Google images, the TOGA (Go Round) switches (as in most Boeings) are positioned such they require a premeditated, definite decision/action to trigger them.

I suggest it is almost impossible to do this when correctly selecting a flap reposition particularly should one have been properly trained: i.e. when selecting a flap reposition from the Left seat the hand always goes under the pilot flying (F/O's) arm. This prevents the Left seat pilot's arm getting in the way of the Pilot Flying (F/O) use of the thrust levers.
Further the hand/arm would not be anywhere near the TOGA switches.

Had for some reason TOGA had been initiated one would think autothrust would be immediately disconnected to maintain the required flight path/remain in control of the aircraft. Or is the required flight path was not able to be maintained a go round carried out.

This should be a fairly standard procedure which all training would demonstrate.

What do you recommend for a "go round" at 6000' when flying a STAR?

[misd-agin]

The 767 Go-Around switches are in a different position than the one's on the 737NG and 777. The 737NG and 777 are forward of your hand and are activated by your finger tips. On the 767, if you let your throttle hand thumb relax and lower, it's in about the right position to engage the Go-Around switch. I've unintentionally engaged the Go-Around on both designs (767 and 777). It didn't happen on the 737 because the buttons are smaller and harder to move.
Maybe I'm a klutz but things get bumped.

[gearlever]

TOGA switches 767


https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/948x538/goaround_switches_2cf5bf899f830acd04fa9eb0f44f5ed7b0c60518.j pg

[IcePack]

On the 767/757 I was told the go around switches were palm switches. Seemed to work for me.

[Meester proach]

Actually preferred them in that position to the 78 reach over and down, seemed easier to find .

[6PapaWhishey]

Says nothing that wasn't known within a week of the mishap. I'm a noob, so can't post the URL.

[Jumbo744]

Re post 850 from a reliable source.

My thoughts.

Did not fly the 767 however, checking Captain Google images, the TOGA (Go Round) switches (as in most Boeings) are positioned such they require a premeditated, definite decision/action to trigger them.

I suggest it is almost impossible to do this when correctly selecting a flap reposition particularly should one have been properly trained: i.e. when selecting a flap reposition from the Left seat the hand always goes under the pilot flying (F/O's) arm. This prevents the Left seat pilot's arm getting in the way of the Pilot Flying (F/O) use of the thrust levers.
Further the hand/arm would not be anywhere near the TOGA switches.

Had for some reason TOGA had been initiated one would think autothrust would be immediately disconnected to maintain the required flight path/remain in control of the aircraft. Or is the required flight path was not able to be maintained a go round carried out.

This should be a fairly standard procedure which all training would demonstrate.


Where do you get these statements from? Who said there was a standard procedure for moving the flap lever? Just making this up? And also, how do you perform a go around at 6000 feet on a STAR? Do you know the definition of a Go-Around? On a Boeing, if you ever need to stop your descent on an arrival and need to climb back up, the easiest and smoothest way would be to set a higher altitude on the MCP and use Level Change. Unless you are about to hit something, you won't use TOGA at this point.

As far as hitting the TOGA switches accidentally, stranger things have happened, and it is possible.

[Meester proach]

[QUOTE=6PapaWhishey;10454240]Says nothing that wasn't known within a week of the mishap. I'm a noob, so can't post the URL.[/QUO

Cant see anything new on NTSB site after March .

[6PapaWhishey]

Cant see anything new on NTSB site after March .
[/QUOTE]

Here's the text from the report:

" On February 23, 2019, at 1239 central standard time, Atlas Air flight 3591, a Boeing 767-375BCF, N1217A, entered a rapid descent from 6,000 ft and impacted a marshy bay area about 40 miles southeast of George Bush Intercontinental Airport (KIAH), Houston, Texas. The two pilots and one nonrevenue jumpseat pilot were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed and highly fragmented. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 domestic cargo flight, which originated from Miami International Airport (KMIA), Miami, Florida, and was destined for KIAH."

The report can be found in the " Accident Synopses - by month" page of the NTSB site.

[Paul852]

Here you go (it's more or less content-free): https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190223X60222&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=MA

[PerPurumTonantes]

Here you go (it's more or less content-free): https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20190223X60222&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=MA
That's not a "report". It's a piece of paper generated because someone felt they had to generate a piece of paper. No information after this long lends more weight to the rumours earlier in this thread.

[testpanel]

Well, we all knew that.
Nothing new.
Time for the ntsb to come up with some real investigating news!

[armchairpilot94116]

https://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/16/16.63j/f12/MIT16_63JF12_A300.pdf

hitting the TOGA accidentally has resulted in crashes and near crashes before as in CI 140 Nagoya accident A300-600

[Lonewolf_50]

Time for the ntsb to come up with some real investigating news!
What's your hurry?
If they are being meticulous, and it takes time, where's the problem?

[lomapaseo]

https://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/16/16.63j/f12/MIT16_63JF12_A300.pdf

hitting the TOGA accidentally has resulted in crashes and near crashes before as in CI 140 Nagoya accident A300-600


I don't recall TOGA being the precipitator. I do recall the screaming call as they fell in a stall of "power Power"

They hit the ground flat with little forward speed

The CI crash in Tapei was involved with too much power, precip a stall on a canceled approach

[Lonewolf_50]

loma, I know very little about 767: if one accidentally hits TOGA, can not then pull the power back by hand? (Or otherwise disengage it?)

[Meester proach]

loma, I know very little about 767: if one accidentally hits TOGA, can not then pull the power back by hand? (Or otherwise disengage it?)


Of course.

[b1lanc]

I don't recall TOGA being the precipitator. I do recall the screaming call as they fell in a stall of "power Power"

They hit the ground flat with little forward speed

The CI crash in Tapei was involved with too much power, precip a stall on a canceled approach

VanderBurgh confirmed TOGA switch as precipitator in his video that includes runaway stab. You can choose to believe his information or not.

[armchairpilot94116]

I don't recall TOGA being the precipitator. I do recall the screaming call as they fell in a stall of "power Power"

They hit the ground flat with little forward speed

The CI crash in Tapei was involved with too much power, precip a stall on a canceled approach

i was in Taipei when that one went down
will have to find the accident report
memory fades but remember they were a bit high on the approach and did late go around with full load sans the fuel burn from Bali and stalled at low altitude into apartments

pilot fatigue was mentioned as a big
factor Power applied too late for successful go around it seems or the AOA too high

the accident happened at night

[Lonewolf_50]

Of course. Thank you for that. Your response leaves me looking at the "leaked" info (https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10451375)and more puzzled than before. The implication of that reported sequence is that once a mistaken hit of that switch, TOGA, the Left Seat pilot became inert, both physically and mentally.
I find that hard to believe, and so am quite keen to read the report when it comes out.
(My last areas of professional concentration before leaving aviation for other jobs was training, crew training, human performance, CRM, and human factors).

(Airbubba: I am in no way impugning your cred as a source - I've found your input to be generally solid over the years ... )

[Meester proach]

Thank you for that. Your response leaves me looking at the "leaked" info (https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10451375)and more puzzled than before. The implication of that reported sequence is that once a mistaken hit of that switch, TOGA, the Left Seat pilot became inert, both physically and mentally.
I find that hard to believe, and so am quite keen to read the report when it comes out.
(My last areas of professional concentration before leaving aviation for other jobs was training, crew training, human performance, CRM, and human factors).

(Airbubba: I am in no way impugning your cred as a source - I've found your input to be generally solid over the years ... )

I’m interested as well from the psychology point of view - startle effect etc. There’s very few situations where you have to react immediately .....especially not shoving the nose way down. I’d initially run with the TOGA , once we’d got a grip on the mistake , disconnect AP, AT, select FLCH return to cleared altititude and reengage both. Easy to say though from my couch.You going to have to take an altitude bust , but I’d rather get a kicking for that than overreact.

what would be more illuminating , if this is the scenario, the training and suitability background of the person that made this control inputs .

[ironbutt57]

I’m interested as well from the psychology point of view - startle effect etc. There’s very few situations where you have to react immediately .....especially not shoving the nose way down. I’d initially run with the TOGA , once we’d got a grip on the mistake , disconnect AP, AT, select FLCH return to cleared altititude and reengage both. Easy to say though from my couch.You going to have to take an altitude bust , but I’d rather get a kicking for that than overreact.

what would be more illuminating , if this is the scenario, the training and suitability background of the person that made this control inputs .
beginning to suspect that illuminating the suitability of someone in the flight deck is a stumbling point..

[GBV]

CI crashed two A306s during go around. I never read the report on the crash in Taipei but in the Nagoya crash the FO definitely pushed the TOGA levers and engaged the AP shortly afterwards. They tried to continue the approach but didn’t realized the AP was engaged. The fight went on for a while until they finally disengaged the AP. However the stab had moved to full nose up and we all know what happened next. Out of curiosity, it was exactly 25 years ago...

[Euclideanplane]

CI crashed two A306s during go around. I never read the report on the crash in Taipei but in the Nagoya crash the FO definitely pushed the TOGA levers and engaged the AP shortly afterwards. They tried to continue the approach but didn’t realized the AP was engaged. The fight went on for a while until they finally disengaged the AP. However the stab had moved to full nose up and we all know what happened next. Out of curiosity, it was exactly 25 years ago...
Noteworthy perhaps that in the Nagoya crash, the actions of the PF were entirely reasonable based on his training and previous experience on B747. Unfortunately the sim that he had trained on for the A300 was programmed with a different TOGA behavior than the actual plane in question. An Airbus precursor to Boeing's MCAS phenomenon?

[ironbutt57]

Noteworthy perhaps that in the Nagoya crash, the actions of the PF were entirely reasonable based on his training and previous experience on B747. Unfortunately the sim that he had trained on for the A300 was programmed with a different TOGA behavior than the actual plane in question. An Airbus precursor to Boeing's MCAS phenomenon?

more than one airplane will trim against manual inputs when the autopilot is engaged..

[Euclideanplane]

more than one airplane will trim against manual inputs when the autopilot is engaged..
Indeed. The point is that in simulator training, moving the yoke forward in GA mode would disconnect the autopilot.
When push came to shove in the actual flight, that did not happen. It wasn't the primary cause of the crash, but it contributed.

[ironbutt57]

Indeed. The point is that in simulator training, moving the yoke forward in GA mode would disconnect the autopilot.
When push came to shove in the actual flight, that did not happen. It wasn't the primary cause of the crash, but it contributed.


can't see how it relates the MCAS...

[tdracer]

can't see how it relates the MCAS...

Wrong thread - this 767 didn't have MCAS.

[AviatorDave]

No report yet?

[atakacs]

No report yet?Well I would not expect it before next year

[SamYeager]

Well I would not expect it before next year

Presumably AviatorDave is talking about the initial factual report rather than the final report?

[AviatorDave]

Presumably AviatorDave is talking about the initial factual report rather than the final report?

Correct. The prelim report that the NTSB usually gets out within 30 days.
No way they would have a final version by now.

[icemanalgeria]

What do you recommend for a "go round" at 6000' when flying a STAR?
Alt Hold Hdg Select works well.

[Prober]

I must agree with Lonewolf50 (post 881) about actions subsequent to TOGA selection.

During my time on the 76 I twice experienced inadvertent TOGA selection, once by myself as PF and the other time by the F/O as PF. Both occurred in very turbulent conditions on finals, at Tenerife and Las Vegas. It is some years ago now, but I cannot recall any drama. The aircraft left the G/S and went up like a lift and all we had to do was fly the machine, just as if it were an aeroplane. Flap 20, Gear UP, Levelled off and went round for another go. There is no doubt that it was the turbulence which caused both incidents – the palm switches were knocked by our hands being shaken by the hard rocking and rolling.

In this case, there must be more to it than that.

Prober

[fdr]

CI crashed two A306s during go around. I never read the report on the crash in Taipei but in the Nagoya crash the FO definitely pushed the TOGA levers and engaged the AP shortly afterwards. They tried to continue the approach but didn’t realized the AP was engaged. The fight went on for a while until they finally disengaged the AP. However the stab had moved to full nose up and we all know what happened next. Out of curiosity, it was exactly 25 years ago...








CI140 had the AP engaged in the GA 13 seconds after the inadvertent TOGA selection, but the pilot was not aware of that fact, and was forcing the yoke against the AP resulting in the excessive backtrim case. The TOGA engagement was accidental by the handling pilot.

The Nagoya flight was off a stable approach, but had the anomaly of the accidental TOGA triggering, and the subsequent engagement of the AP which the pilot fought against.

The Taipei A300-622R accident, CI676 was slightly different. It came off an unstable approach where the aircraft was high, 7,000' @ 16nm, which would have been manageable, but increased the workload. The crew disconnected the AP and shortly thereafter did a GA manually flown. The pitch up with full thrust ended up at 41 degrees nose up before any nose down elevator was applied, and trim was applied nose down 6 seconds later. At the top of the zoom climb, the crew achieved 42.5 degrees nose up, roll excursions laterally of 48.5 degrees right, a minimum recorded speed of 43KCAS at 2751'. Thrust was slightly reduced, and the nose lowered finally going to 45 degrees nose down, following a 79 degree left roll excursion. Last data was at 136RA (uncorrected for pitch) 599'PA, 237KCAS, 18 degrees nose down, pulling 2.2g and near wings level.

In the 90's there was a spate of wild rides on the 300-600 and the 310 with spectacular displays put on in Moscow and in Paris by visiting aircraft. Boeing's partial thrust GA (targeted rate of climb) is less likely to get the drivers out of sorts, and some bus users implemented a soft GA procedure which led to the wild ride GA at Melbourne of an A320 of an AUS carrier where the guys essentially did a downwards going GA, and missed planet earth by not much. At low weights, the application of full thrust on underslung engines will get the attention of the crew, with a considerable trim change requirement to be managed, or not. The or not gets mentions in the funny pages. Getting out of trim is not a Max8 issue alone, it is an issue with all of these aircraft, and it is a part of the cyclic matrix that is deficient in its practice. The SLF's prefer we don't practice en route, so there are limited occasions for the crew to practice AP and manually flown GA's.

CI140 more or less vertically parked adjacent to the runway at RJBB. it was nowhere near a recovery in the time and space available, the wreckage distribution was more or less within the planform of the aircraft.

[Dora-9]

Good post, fdr.

[Airbubba]

CI140 more or less vertically parked adjacent to the runway at RJBB.

Actually, CI140 crashed at Nagoya Airfield, RJNA. RJBB is KIX, Osaka Kansai.

After the A300 crashes the Dynasty Airbus fleet was made almost all expat and the planes were subsequently retired according to a friend who flew the B-744 at China Air during that deadly period.

I've done the dreaded two-engine missed approach in the A306, A310 and B-767 in years past. I'd say the A310 is the most challenging with the pitchup, the B-767 the most docile. Obviously, if you fight the autopilot on the go-around bad things can happen in any aircraft.

[ironbutt57]

every 2-engine go-around I ever did in a jet, my body was telling me excessive pitch up, however, the automatics, in fact, put the pitch exactly where it was supposed to be...look before you touch...

[Dora-9]

Actually, CI140 crashed at Nagoya Airfield, RJNA. RJBB is KIX, Osaka Kansai.


Correct - the wreckage was clearly visible from the terminal for a long time afterwards!

[Old Boeing Driver]

This accident was almost 3 months ago and nothing from the NTSB since the initial press reports. I know, they may take years, but as stated previously here, they usually have something out in 30 days.

Anyone know anyone on the "inside" for info?

[ironbutt57]

This accident was almost 3 months ago and nothing from the NTSB since the initial press reports. I know, they may take years, but as stated previously here, they usually have something out in 30 days.

Anyone know anyone on the "inside" for info?

all gone silent....

[filejw]

This accident was almost 3 months ago and nothing from the NTSB since the initial press reports. I know, they may take years, but as stated previously here, they usually have something out in 30 days.

Anyone know anyone on the "inside" for info?

There is an interim or preliminary report on the NTSB website but it doesn’t say anything really.

[Racing Snake]

Scroll to 3:00 to get to the Atlas Air info

https://youtu.be/PQLT9GLDYt0

[CurtainTwitcher]

Amazon's 1-Day Shipping Has an Alarming Downside That No One Is Talking About (Including Jeff Bezos)

Jeff Bezos (https://www.inc.com/scott-mautz/jeff-bezos-says-asking-these-12-questions-now-will-make-you-proud-of-life-youve-built-later.html) made a surprise appearance (https://www.wlwt.com/article/amazon-founder-jeff-bezos-makes-surprise-appearance-at-cvg-groundbreaking/27472630) this week at the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky airport to break ground on a new Amazon Air hub, a three million-square-foot facility that will help the company make good on its recent promise of free one-day package delivery for its Prime members.

The Amazon chief (https://www.inc.com/scott-mautz/jeff-bezos-just-released-his-annual-shareholder-letter-said-1-counterintuitive-thing-is-key-to-continued-business-growth.html) showed a video of what the facility will look like, ceremoniously moved dirt himself (displaying skills as a heavy equipment operator), and proudly chirped that the Hub would soon be populated with "Prime Air" emblazoned airplanes.

What's not to like? More jobs, faster package delivery, advancement, and growth.

But there's another side to the coin, hinted at by the fact that the pomp and circumstance took place in a closed ceremony with carefully controlled messaging, blocking out representation of one important group in particular and one particularly important issue: pilot safety.

Pilots were not a part of the fanfare, and were literally being interviewed off to the side of the sideshow. Robert Kirchner, a 42-year pilot and chair of the executive council of Atlas Air (a cargo-shipping airline), pointed out in an onsite interview that the fact that the ceremony is a closed one is telling.

His fear is that safety is being compromised as exhausted pilots ferry an increasing amount of packages increasingly fast, while attrition of burned-out pilots is thinning the ranks of people qualified to fly the planes that enable one-day shipping in the first place.

"There's a large uptick in fatigue calls, sick calls. Pilots are just being worn out," noted Kirchner in an interview with local Cincinnati TV station WLWT. "There are a lot of canceled flights, a lot of delayed flights, due to the pilot shortage and the staffing stressed operation, and that doesn't bode well for the future of this enterprise that Amazon is breaking ground on today."

Also this week, Amazon addressed head-on how to find people to drive vehicles to deliver more packages, faster. The company offered current employees three-months' salary and $10,000 in startup funding (https://www.inc.com/scott-mautz/amazon-just-announced-it-will-pay-employees-10000-3-months-salary-to-quit-do-this-instead.html) to quit their current Amazon post and start a ground delivery business. Obviously, they can't offer the same program for employees to quit and fly cargo planes.

So how will they address the needs of getting enough pilots and giving the current cargo flight operators a reasonable schedule that won't compromise their health and safety?

The increased workload generated by shuttling packages around one day after being ordered adds on to the issue of an already well-documented (https://www.voyagereport.com/news/extraordinary-pilot-shortage-threatens-flights/) pilot shortage (not to mention the intense trucking shortage (https://www.npr.org/2019/02/11/691673201/facing-a-critical-shortage-of-drivers-the-trucking-industry-is-changing)). And it adds to the mounting problem of industrywide pilot fatigue (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00140139.2018.1464667).

It's the dark downside of the home shopping boom. Ever more packages delivered ever faster to our homes means more ground and air congestion, and more opportunities for safety disasters if not carefully thought through and planned for. I like getting my loofahs the next day as much as the next person, but at what cost?

I'm not saying one-day shipping can't be a boon for everyone, and I certainly hope it is. But let's have open conversations and open planning to safely enable it, not hide the warts under the shadowed tents of shiny, closed ceremonies.


PUBLISHED ON: MAY 16, 2019

Amazon's 1-Day Shipping Has an Alarming Downside That No One Is Talking About (Including Jeff Bezos) (https://www.inc.com/scott-mautz/amazons-1-day-shipping-has-an-alarming-downside-that-no-one-is-talking-about-including-jeff-bezos.html)

[FIRESYSOK]

Sadly, this is America now. As long as Wall Street is happy with the stock performance, everything else is immaterial.

Planes full of loofahs crashing? Who cares. Earnings dividends are being paid.

[Airbubba]

Things are only bad these days says a country that used to enslave others as property and employ children to help profit ratios

Perhaps you mean England, the pilot flying's ancestors were owned by British masters in the Caribbean sugar trade.

Robert Kirchner, a 42-year pilot and chair of the executive council of Atlas Air (a cargo-shipping airline), pointed out in an onsite interview that the fact that the ceremony is a closed one is telling.

I've mentioned previously the Teamsters' long tradition of felony convictions of its leadership. Captain Kirchner certainly has street cred in this department.

[Intruder]

Planes full of loofahs crashing? Who cares. Earnings dividends are being paid.Exactly! If UPS6 crashed into the middle of Dubai, instead of into the desert outside the city, there would be no "cargo carveout" on crew rest rules.

[SquintyMagoo]

Sadly, this is America now. As long as Wall Street is happy with the stock performance, everything else is immaterial.

Planes full of loofahs crashing? Who cares. Earnings dividends are being paid.

Isn't that the big flaw in capitalism? Everything done for the stockholders and owners. Fire people, close plants, cheat salaries of rank and file, skirt safety as long as they can, etc., etc.,

[formulaben]

Funny you should mention that, they have a long thread discussing that exact topic at CCRUNE.ORG (closet communist rumor network) and I'm sure they'd love to hear your input.

[Hotel Tango]

Isn't that the big flaw in capitalism?

Apologies for the thread drift but strangely enough the topic was being discussed in our household today! Is capitalism failing? The conclusion was a resounding "YES"!

[Small cog]

If UPS6 crashed into the middle of Dubai, instead of into the desert outside the city, there would be no "cargo carveout" on crew rest rules.

I was on the Bahrain frq when the UPS 6 emergency unfolded and read the accident report with interest. I don’t recall duty hours being an issue.

[tdracer]

Exactly! If UPS6 crashed into the middle of Dubai, instead of into the desert outside the city, there would be no "cargo carveout" on crew rest rules.

What the :mad: does UPS6 have to do with crew rest?
(edit - I see Small Cog beat me to it).

[TRF4EVR]

Anyone know anyone on the "inside" for info?

If anyone is on the "inside", they're definitely not in a position to talk. But let's do a thought experiment here. If, as has been suggested, the PF responded to an inadvertent TOGA paddle press by pushing the nose down as hard as he could and then locking up, what safety bulletins would follow? "Hey, don't freak out and crash the plane"?

[fox niner]

.........what safety bulletins would follow? "Hey, don't freak out and crash the plane"?

Probably. A similar thing happened after the Turkish crash in Amsterdam. Conclusion: “if you fly an airplane, monitor your airspeed carefully when flying an ils approach.”

[deltahotel]

I don’t understand the reference to ‘cargo carve out on crew rest’ ??

[porkflyer]

Isn't that the big flaw in capitalism? Everything done for the stockholders and owners. Fire people, close plants, cheat salaries of rank and file, skirt safety as long as they can, etc., etc.,
Yes it is.

[Setpoint99]

Yes it is.

It is not merely capitalism, it is much deeper than that: human nature itself, which is prone to corruption and greed. And elites in all economic and political systems (including the "socialist paradise") look after themselves instead of common folk.

[Intruder]

What the :mad: does UPS6 have to do with crew rest?It has to do with the quoted reference I cited:
Planes full of loofahs crashing? Who cares. Earnings dividends are being paid.
The tendency is that nobody pays attention to an airplane crash where nobody is hurt except the pilots. Hence, a large segment of the industry is saddled with a lesser level of safety and regulatory scrutiny than the passenger carriers.

[aterpster]

The tendency is that nobody pays attention to an airplane crash where nobody is hurt except the pilots. Hence, a large segment of the industry is saddled with a lesser level of safety and regulatory scrutiny than the passenger carriers.
Excepting the NTSB.

[rcsa]

It is not merely capitalism, it is much deeper than that: human nature itself, which is prone to corruption and greed. And elites in all economic and political systems (including the "socialist paradise") look after themselves instead of common folk.

"Human nature itself, which is prone to competitive ambition". Competitive and ambitious individuals will use corruption to feed their greed if so allowed (by social /ethical/ legal standards). It is the preponderance of competitive and ambitious individuals in all races of our species that has brought us to absolute global dominance. It will also, probably, be our downfall.

If you take a 2 -3 million year view on Homo Sapiens from a million years hence, I suspect our super-size brain and highly developed 'id' and 'ego' will be seen as an evolutionary dead-end.

[PPRuNe Towers]

Going in circles until confirmed news or a formal report.

Rob