737NG Memory Items - Challenge/Response?

[Viv Savage]

Hi everybody

I’m struggling to find any references for the correct method on how crews should action memory items for an event such as an engine fire.

I’m aware about areas of responsibility and have heard of both “challenge & response” and “challenge/response/response” but can’t find any written examples on who does what and when. Does this vary from operator to operator as there is nothing (that I can see) in the FCTM?

Any examples and thoughts would be appreciated.

Many thanks.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Hi everybody

I’m struggling to find any references for the correct method on how crews should action memory items for an event such as an engine fire.

I’m aware about areas of responsibility and have heard of both “challenge & response” and “challenge/response/response” but can’t find any written examples on who does what and when. Does this vary from operator to operator as there is nothing (that I can see) in the FCTM?

Any examples and thoughts would be appreciated.

Many thanks.

FCTM 8.9 Recommended technique for an In-Flight Engine Shutdown

[jetjockey696]

At the end of QRH.. Checklist Instructions...NON-NORMAL CHECKLIST USE..

[JCO7]

The principle from the QRH is that each pilot does the memory items per area of responsibility. The FCTM also specifically recommends that the PF retards the thrust lever during engine fire memory items. So theoretically PF will call for the Engine Fire memory items, after which he will disengage A/T, retard the thrust lever on the affected engine (after confirmation) and move the start lever to cutoff (after confirmation) - although in my company this step is actually done by the PM. The PM will then pull the fire switch (again after confirmation) and rotate. Memory items are done above 400' minimum.

The above are as far as Boeing goes in terms of guidance (as far as I know). The rest should be filled in by your company SOPs, i.e. specific calls, method of identifying the failure/fire etc.

[ManaAdaSystem]

The principle from the QRH is that each pilot does the memory items per area of responsibility. The FCTM also specifically recommends that the PF retards the thrust lever during engine fire memory items. So theoretically PF will call for the Engine Fire memory items, after which he will disengage A/T, retard the thrust lever on the affected engine (after confirmation) and move the start lever to cutoff (after confirmation) - although in my company this step is actually done by the PM. The PM will then pull the fire switch (again after confirmation) and rotate. Memory items are done above 400' minimum.

The above are as far as Boeing goes in terms of guidance (as far as I know). The rest should be filled in by your company SOPs, i.e. specific calls, method of identifying the failure/fire etc.

Wrong. Your company follows Boeing procedures. PM handles the start lever after confirmation from PF.

[JCO7]

Wrong. Your company follows Boeing procedures. PM handles the start lever after confirmation from PF.

I'd be interested to see your reference for this.

Like I say, at our company PM actions the start lever, but going purely on the QRH Checklist Instructions principles, each pilot must action memory items in area of responsibility.

The FCOM area of responsibility for start levers is PF (at least as far as I can make out from the area of responsibility diagrams).

[Capn Bloggs]

As soon as I read about the concept of "Area of Responsibility" I thought who dreamed this stuff up?

Anybody who thinks that the PF should be doing this:

The FCTM also specifically recommends that the PF retards the thrust lever during engine fire memory items. So theoretically PF will call for the Engine Fire memory items, after which he will disengage A/T, retard the thrust lever on the affected engine (after confirmation) and move the start lever to cutoff (after confirmation) -
potentially when hand-flying, needs their head read. If it's a fire, don't pull the throttle back quickly, that's all.

[ManaAdaSystem]

As soon as I read about the concept of "Area of Responsibility" I thought who dreamed this stuff up?

Anybody who thinks that the PF should be doing this:


potentially when hand-flying, needs their head read. If it's a fire, don't pull the throttle back quickly, that's all.

For JCO7, my reference is the Boeing FCTM part that I posted in my first answer in this thread.

Bloggs, which aircraft do you fly? PF retards the thrust lever because he is hand flying and can coordinate thrust reduction and rudder input. As pr Boeing recommendation. So, they are the ones who need their heads read.
What does the FCTM or eqivalent for your aircraft type say?

[JCO7]

For JCO7, my reference is the Boeing FCTM part that I posted in my first answer in this thread.


Thanks, I found that. It certainly is the most logical way of doing it and how I've been doing it for 11 years.

Would you agree that there is a bit of a contradiction though between the recommendation for engine in-flight shutdown and the concept of actioning memory items within each pilot's area of responsibility, as it pertains to start lever cutoff?

[ManaAdaSystem]

Yes. And if you do the engine fire CL on ground in a stationary aircraft, who does what?
Capt, the thrust lever and the start lever, Copilot, the fire switch? That is how the Evacuation CL is done, but area of responibility does not say specifically who handles fire switches. Just an arrow across the throttle quadrant and those are the captains items.

[Centaurus]

As soon as I read about the concept of "Area of Responsibility" I thought who dreamed this stuff up?


Agree. The area of responsibility policy introduced by Boeing years ago has always caused confusion on who does what and when. It's a messy policy IMHO. Others like it. It was much clearer when the captain directed the actions and the copilot performed them and the challenge and response checklist was one pilot challenged and the other pilot responded. Now you have the illogical situation where some checks require the pilot challenging himself and responding to his own challenge.

Long time ago the copilots on my old airline (B737-200) demanded an audience with the chief pilot to complain about lack of standardisation of the check captains in simulator training when it came to who does what and when for engine failure after take off. They were tired of each check captain insisting his method was the right method. The senior check captain escorted the unhappy copilots (small airline and few copilots) to the chief pilot's office. With some temerity, for the chief pilot was known for his short fuse and impatient dismissive manner, the check captain knocked on the door and said in an apologetic manner "Captain -the copilots would like to see you to discuss their problem with lack of standardisation among our check captains in the simulator when it comes to engine failure after take off."

The CP being a brusque individual showed immediate scorn and said "That's an easy one. The captain closes the throttle after confirming its the correct engine and the copilot closes the start lever and etc etc."

There was a moment of stunned silence as the copilots and check captain digested the pronouncement of the chief pilot. The embarrassed check captain then spoke up. " Sorry Your honour Sir, but that is not quite correct. The SOP says it is the copilot who closes the throttle etc etc

The copilots had made their point perfectly.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Agree. The area of responsibility policy introduced by Boeing years ago has always caused confusion on who does what and when. It's a messy policy IMHO. Others like it. It was much clearer when the captain directed the actions and the copilot performed them and the challenge and response checklist was one pilot challenged and the other pilot responded. Now you have the illogical situation where some checks require the pilot challenging himself and responding to his own challenge.

Long time ago the copilots on my old airline (B737-200) demanded an audience with the chief pilot to complain about lack of standardisation of the check captains in simulator training when it came to who does what and when for engine failure after take off. They were tired of each check captain insisting his method was the right method. The senior check captain escorted the unhappy copilots (small airline and few copilots) to the chief pilot's office. With some temerity, for the chief pilot was known for his short fuse and impatient dismissive manner, the check captain knocked on the door and said in an apologetic manner "Captain -the copilots would like to see you to discuss their problem with lack of standardisation among our check captains in the simulator when it comes to engine failure after take off."

The CP being a brusque individual showed immediate scorn and said "That's an easy one. The captain closes the throttle after confirming its the correct engine and the copilot closes the start lever and etc etc."

There was a moment of stunned silence as the copilots and check captain digested the pronouncement of the chief pilot. The embarrassed check captain then spoke up. " Sorry Your honour Sir, but that is not quite correct. The SOP says it is the copilot who closes the throttle etc etc

The copilots had made their point perfectly.

With good training and standardisation this concept works well.
The biggest problem with Boeing SOP is the lack of challenge and response in normal operations.
If the captain is FP, the copilot will do the cockpit preparations, read and respond the preflight checklist, and also read and respond the after takeoff checklist. The captain can read the newspaper most of this time. He is supposed to check what the copilot is doing but there is no active involvement.
Now, think back to Helios. This was the exact set up for that flight.

[Capn Bloggs]

PF retards the thrust lever because he is hand flying and can coordinate thrust reduction and rudder input.
Mana, as I said, don't rush it and it is no problem for the PF to FLY, while the PNF/PM closes the throttle. Done it many times in the sim over decades. When I'm ready, I'll look to check that the PM has got his finger on the correct throttle, then call "confirmed". Then I'll continue flying.

The biggest problem with Boeing SOP is the lack of challenge and response in normal operations. If the captain is FP, the copilot will do the cockpit preparations, read and respond the preflight checklist, and also read and respond the after takeoff checklist. The captain can read the newspaper most of this time. He is supposed to check what the copilot is doing but there is no active involvement.
If a company doesn't assign duties and responses for each normal checklist item, it shouldn't be in business. If there is "no active involvement", is that a failure of the procedure/SOP?

As for the captain or the FO making the fuel switch selection depending on which area of responsibility it is in, when airborne with a failure or fire (or any other non-normal, for that matter), it just goes to show how silly an idea it is. There should be no "area of responsibility". Each normal action/check should be allocated to a specific crewmember, and the checklist should be written that way. During Abnormal and Emergency drills, to have the PF leaning up flicking off/cycling switches because they are on his side of the panel on a particular procedure just doesn't make sense to me. Certainly, the switches on the centre console are in easy reach of both pilots and the "area of responsibility" system is ludicrous. Maybe that is why Boeing conveniently ignores it when it suggest the PF closes the throttle during a fire... :rolleyes:

[ManaAdaSystem]

Mana, as I said, don't rush it and it is no problem for the PF to FLY, while the PNF/PM closes the throttle. Done it many times in the sim over decades. When I'm ready, I'll look to check that the PM has got his finger on the correct throttle, then call "confirmed". Then I'll continue flying.


If a company doesn't assign duties and responses for each normal checklist item, it shouldn't be in business. If there is "no active involvement", is that a failure of the procedure/SOP?

As for the captain or the FO making the fuel switch selection depending on which area of responsibility it is in, when airborne with a failure or fire (or any other non-normal, for that matter), it just goes to show how silly an idea it is. There should be no "area of responsibility". Each normal action/check should be allocated to a specific crewmember, and the checklist should be written that way. During Abnormal and Emergency drills, to have the PF leaning up flicking off/cycling switches because they are on his side of the panel on a particular procedure just doesn't make sense to me. Certainly, the switches on the centre console are in easy reach of both pilots and the "area of responsibility" system is ludicrous. Maybe that is why Boeing conveniently ignores it when it suggest the PF closes the throttle during a fire... :rolleyes:

Which aircraft do you fly? You sound very much out of the loop of what is SOP for all operators who use Boeing SOP.
Write a letter to Boeing and tell them how stupid they are.
I follow SOP. I don't just do stuff on my own.

[exfocx]

I flown under both methods and don't see any issue with either of them. I'd wouldn't mind betting that those who have a strong preference for one have more that likely used that method most.

[Viv Savage]

Many thanks for all the replies and document references-slightly annoyed I missed them!

At my previous operator (turboprop), PM would retard power/condition levers after confirmation from PF, so the Boeing philosophy is slightly different to what I’ve been used to.