Army F-35?

[chopper2004]

US Army general quoted / hinted that the army aviation branch may want the F-35 for CAS.

https://www.foxnews.com/tech/the-us-army-wants-the-f-35-for-close-air-support

It brings back memories of their 1950s/60s attempts to have their in-house FAC with the likes of the T-37, A-4, N156 and Fiat G91
And of course participating in the Kestrel program.

cheers

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/289x174/3fff2924_2ded_44ec_8793_ab016b204b43_11be6182c6216a5c73513ca 691a7525e963c0118.jpeg
https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/409x194/179a1dee_f1f5_4121_a690_92ed40c3ef2b_e7b58cecc0ba0a1bf970a17 0b3aa14aa6d4f9481.jpeg

[melmothtw]

Beyond the headline (which itself is ambiguous), there is nothing in that story that says the US Army wants to operate the F-35. What the general says is that the F-35 can provide effective support for his troops, but that's not even close to him saying the US Army should fly it.

[Pontius Navigator]

It was the same with the Barrier in RAFG, a division level asset.

However do the maths stack up? Using a hugely expensive sledge hammer to hit a very cheap nut?

[KenV]

First off, the Army is not even considering operating the F-35. They're just saying they are satisfied the F-35 can do the CAS job.

Secondly, even if they were it would never happen. USAF would see this as Army trespassing on their exclusive turf and scream bloody murder. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program was an Army program to replace several small Army fixed wing cargo aicraft. The Army selected the JCA configured C-27J Spartan from Alenia. USAF protested saying C-27J was too much airplane for the Army and violated the roles and missions rules. It took only two years before USAF took over the program which they then immediately killed. The 14 aircraft already contracted for by the Army flew directly from the factory to the Davis Monthan boneyard for storage. Coast Guard eventually got them.

[Rosevidney1]

I'm sorry to say the USAF can be really petulant when they set their minds on it...…...

[TBM-Legend]

The General did not say the US Army wants to operate its own F-35's, he simply said they look forward to them being used for CAS etc and he thinks its characteristics are a potential game changer..the operator could be USAF/USMC/USN [or coalition too I'd say]

[West Coast]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnson-McConnell_agreement_of_1966

[Engines]

West Coast, good link, many thanks. Really informative.

Best Regards as ever to all those having to deal with inter service silliness

Engines

[LowObservable]

The latter paragraphs of the story degenerate into some of the uttermost :mad: that has ever been written on the subject, and that is a :mad: high bar.

The writer seems unaware that - at the present moment and until some unspecified future date - any aircraft with a current-generation targeting pod and ROVER capability has better sensors and comms for CAS than an F-35. But even that's not the worst:

Could it draw upon its “hovering” technology to loiter near high-value target areas? To what extent could it keep flying in the event that major components, such as engines or fuselage components, were destroyed in war?

//weeps softly, bangs head on desk....

[ORAC]

If the engine was destroyed it could be stuck up there for days.......

[pasta]

Could it draw upon its “hovering” technology to loiter near high-value target areas? To what extent could it keep flying in the event that major components, such as engines or fuselage components, were destroyed in war?
In fairness, I think that's meant rhetorically, the implied response being, "Of course it can't, so please don't take away our A-10s"

[KenV]

Regarding the Army/USAF turf wars, keep in mind how the A-10 came to be. After the 1966 Army/Air Force agreement restricting Army operation of fixed wing aircraft and USAF operation of rotary wing aircraft, Army developed the AH-56 Cheyenne helicopter. But there were two political problems: 1) the Cheyenne had eye watering performance and was going to be a fantastic aerial tank killer. USAF viewed aerial tank killing as their exclusive turf, never dreaming a helicopter could do that mission. 2) the Cheyenne was a compound helicopter with a pusher prop and small fixed wings, which USAF argued violated the 1966 agreement. The turf battle raged for years and was finally resolved when Army agreed to cancel the compound Cheyenne and develop the AAH pure helicopter tank killer, which ultimately became the AH-64 Apache, and USAF agreed to develop the fixed wing A-X tank killer, which became the A-10. The turf wars have calmed down considerably, but not enough for USAF to ever allow Army to operate F-35s. The F-35 operates on turf which USAF views as forever and always belonging exclusively to them.

[LowObservable]

Frankly, I suspect that attempting to operate any F-35 variant from anyone's turf would be a messy failure and would :mad: up the turf good and proper.

Historical note: the AH-56 itself survived the Air Force's challenge, emerging unscathed from the 1971 Senate review of different service CAS requirements. I believe it was the Army's decision, in the light of technical problems and combat experience, to replace the AH-56 with the AAH, which became Apache.

[KenV]

Historical note: the AH-56 itself survived the Air Force's challenge, emerging unscathed from the 1971 Senate review of different service CAS requirements. I believe it was the Army's decision, in the light of technical problems and combat experience, to replace the AH-56 with the AAH, which became Apache.What killed Cheyenne was USAF General Momyer's (commander, Tactical Air Command) who cited the helicopter casualty statistics at Operation Lam Son 719 during Senate testimony. This forced the Army to convene a special task force in 1972 under Army General Marks to reevaluate their requirements for an attack helicopter and develop an "updated and defensible" material needs document. This was followed by a weapons demonstration for the Senate Armed Services Committee. Sadly the first TOW missile failed and flew into the ground. Even though this was a missile failure and not a fault of the launch platform, the Cheyenne was tainted by the failure. The Senate's report on CAS then recommended to fund USAF's A-X and USMC's Harrier programs, but was silent on the Cheyenne and lukewarm at best on the general subject of attack helicopters with a requirement that their survivability be improved. Three months later (August 1972) Cheyenne was cancelled and the Army's AAH program launched a week later. The AAH was a pure helicopter and USAF had no grounds to oppose it. That program resulted in the Apache.

And then Cheyenne #7 with the new AMCS (advanced mechanical control system) flew and showed it had resolved the Cheyenne's controllability and stability issues, improved handling, improved maneuverability, and reduced pilot workload. It also reached a speed of 215 knots in level flight and 245 knots in a dive, very good numbers to this day. But Cheyenne was dead as a program. Lockheed tried to resurrect it by competing for AAH with a modified Cheyenne with two engines and no pusher prop, but failed. And this killed Lockheed's attempt to get into the helicopter market. McDonnell Douglas used a different approach to get into that market. It bought Hughes Helicopters which had a line of both commercial and military helicopters. But McDonnell never understood the commercial aviation business and ended up slowly killing both their commercial airliner and helicopter businesses by failing to invest.

[KenV]

Besides the turf wars between USAF and Army, USAF engaged in turf wars with USN. P-8A Poseidon was originally intended to include WARP (Wing Aerial Refueling Pods) and have a fleet aerial refueling mission. The P-8s were to be assigned to tactical air wings and follow a carrier as it deployed. P-3s would provide not only ASW, ASuW and ISR support, but also tanking support whenever there were flight ops. USAF cried foul stating they were the sole providers of strategic tanking. USN responded this was tactical, not strategic tanking, but to no avail. The tanking capability was removed from the P-8's requirements.