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SliabhLuachra
24th Sep 2018, 00:10
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w9lXcDYTg3Q

Could've been much much worse. Thankfully UAL had their eyes ahead.

thunderbird7
24th Sep 2018, 00:23
WTF??? The controller almost didn't seem to realise what a cock up he'd made!!!!

Capn Bloggs
24th Sep 2018, 01:43
Clear left...

73qanda
24th Sep 2018, 09:43
WTF??? The controller almost didn't seem to realise what type of dog up he'd made!!!!
That is invariably the case when people make these kinds of errors. The truth is if you’re human, you’re susceptible to it, it gets scary when you’re human and you don’t realise you’re susceptible to it.
I was impressed with how all parties reacted and worked after the RTO.

AerocatS2A
24th Sep 2018, 10:42
Clear left...
one rolling, but weíll make it across in time...

His dudeness
24th Sep 2018, 14:22
I was impressed with how all parties reacted and worked after the RTO.

+1 and I think he realized it right after UA326 told him he had cleared them.

RufusXS
24th Sep 2018, 15:27
Sounds like they switch controllers (judging by the voices) at some point when 326 gets the line up and wait and requests a few minutes to reset some things?

Hotel Tango
24th Sep 2018, 15:51
It's only a guess but I would think that the controller (possibly a little shaken) requested to be relieved from his position. All I can say is that with multiple runway crossings at many major US airports, and the amount of tin that moves around at these airports, it's a wonder that these type of incidents don't happen more frequently. On the whole ATC do a magnificent job.

West Coast
24th Sep 2018, 16:35
If there was an operational error, the controller would have been relieved from the position.

Hotel Tango
24th Sep 2018, 17:24
If there was an operational error, the controller would have been relieved from the position.

That's for sure, but controllers will also voluntarily request to be relieved as soon as possible after an incident. They don't have to be told!

West Coast
24th Sep 2018, 18:14
That's for sure, but controllers will also voluntarily request to be relieved as soon as possible after an incident. They don't have to be told!


Their wishes vs process.

llondel
24th Sep 2018, 22:48
Their wishes vs process.

I suspect that any decent process will have such a request from a controller built in because it's a safety issue. I have vague recollection of reading an accident write-up (with fatalities) that was controller error where the unfortunate person couldn't be relieved for half an hour due to lack of someone to sit in the chair.

West Coast
25th Sep 2018, 00:57
What it really comes down to is whether the controller wants off or not, they are coming off and protocals are initiated, statements, pee in s bottle, NATCA rep, preservation of data, etc. Its nice to say he or she may ask to come off position, its moot, they're coming off.

Airbubba
25th Sep 2018, 01:18
At United does the crew require an amended dispatch release after a rejected takeoff for a non-maintenance reason? In recent years that seems to be a big deal with some outfits, not so big with others.

aterpster
25th Sep 2018, 14:51
Think night and moderate rain. Think Tenerife. Think Air Canada at SFO. Seems like the weakest link in the U.S. air transport system.

Hotel Tango
25th Sep 2018, 16:33
Think night and moderate rain. Think Tenerife. Think Air Canada at SFO. Seems like the weakest link in the U.S. air transport system.

I don't know if this is ATC bashing but let's get one thing straight: Tenerife was not an ATC error. It was pilot error! Furthermore, there was no ground radar to assist the controller. It was also an era when official ATC phraseology used the term "standby for take-off". A clipped transmission made the senior Captain think he had been cleared for take-off and he dismissed doubts expressed by other crew members! Since then we have CRM in the cockpit and "departure" iso "take-off" used by ATC with the sole exception of an actual take-off clearance. As for Air Canada at SFO, yet again pilot error!

golfyankeesierra
25th Sep 2018, 18:13
The only thing to bash here is airport layout requiring runway crossings..
I think by now everybody in the industry must understand the need for building taxiways around runways whenever possible, even though the extended taxi times can be a bit frustrating once in a while...

llondel
26th Sep 2018, 03:15
What it really comes down to is whether the controller wants off or not, they are coming off and protocals are initiated, statements, pee in s bottle, NATCA rep, preservation of data, etc. Its nice to say he or she may ask to come off position, its moot, they're coming off.

OK, I misunderstood what you were saying. However, when there is an incident like that, possibly not that bad but serious enough, who else in the tower knows about the screw-up? It may rely on the controller to flag the problem (no point in hiding it because someone's going to file a report) in the first instance to get things moving.

aterpster
26th Sep 2018, 14:08
I don't know if this is ATC bashing but let's get one thing straight: Tenerife was not an ATC error. It was pilot error! Furthermore, there was no ground radar to assist the controller. It was also an era when official ATC phraseology used the term "standby for take-off". A clipped transmission made the senior Captain think he had been cleared for take-off and he dismissed doubts expressed by other crew members! Since then we have CRM in the cockpit and "departure" iso "take-off" used by ATC with the sole exception of an actual take-off clearance. As for Air Canada at SFO, yet again pilot error!
Indeed, Tenerife was not ATC error, nor was SFO. IAD was. Airport layout as well. The public isn't going to care whose fault it is if another high speed collision between two large transports occurs on a runway at a major airport. Think: weak link.

climber314
26th Sep 2018, 14:32
Was the RWSL system not operational or just ignored by the crossing aircraft?

"Runway status lights (RWSL) are now operational on runways and taxiways at Washington-Dulles International Airport (IAD).

The fully automated lighting system is being implemented at airports throughout the U.S. as part of a program to help enhance runway safety. The lighting system provides direct runway status information to pilots and surface vehicle operators indicating when it is unsafe to enter, cross, or takeoff from a runway. It requires no input from controllers as it processes information from surveillance systems and then activates runway entrance lights and takeoff hold lights in accordance with the motion and velocity of the detected traffic.

Light fixtures embedded in the pavement are directly visible to pilots and vehicle operators.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans to have RWSLs operational at 23 U.S. airports by the end of 2016."

https://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/runway/20130725-runway-status-lights-debut-at-washington-dulles-airport.php

carmel
26th Sep 2018, 23:03
There's a great writeup of the Tenerife aiport disaster by Kathleen Bangs at disciplesofflight.com/remembering-tenerife-airport-disaster in case anyone wishes to learn more.

golfyankeesierra
27th Sep 2018, 07:26
There's a great writeup of the Tenerife aiport disaster by Kathleen Bangs at disciplesofflight.com/remembering-tenerife-airport-disaster in case anyone wishes to learn more.
Very good article indeed. Your everyday lesson, especially at then end in the sentence “the inescapable irony”.

netpog
27th Sep 2018, 07:50
If that link doesn't work, try it again without the "www.".

There's a configuration error at Disciples Of Fight (at least regarding mobile browsers, so it probably worked for Carmel & GYS, while failing for me).

DaveReidUK
27th Sep 2018, 08:00
Calamity and Coincidence: 40 Years Later Are We at Risk of Another Tenerife? (http://disciplesofflight.com/remembering-tenerife-airport-disaster/)

aterpster
27th Sep 2018, 14:27
There's a great writeup of the Tenerife aiport disaster by Kathleen Bangs at disciplesofflight.com/remembering-tenerife-airport-disaster in case anyone wishes to learn more.
Great article! I didn't know that about Jack Ridout, who lives in the San Diego area.

That PSA tragedy occurred only 60 miles from my home.

llondel
27th Sep 2018, 16:41
What it needs is a set of big traffic lights at each end of the runway and at every crossing. When ATC gives take-off clearance the controller hits a big button that turns all the intersection lights red and then the one visible to the departing crew green. Then they either stay red until the controller hits the other button or, if you trust the automation, it could automatically turn off the red lights as the departing aircraft passes. It still doesn't account for someone running a red light but it might at least cause a pilot to query ATC if given an instruction to cross when the light is red.

DaveReidUK
27th Sep 2018, 16:49
What it needs is a set of big traffic lights at each end of the runway and at every crossing. When ATC gives take-off clearance the controller hits a big button that turns all the intersection lights red and then the one visible to the departing crew green. Then they either stay red until the controller hits the other button or, if you trust the automation, it could automatically turn off the red lights as the departing aircraft passes. It still doesn't account for someone running a red light but it might at least cause a pilot to query ATC if given an instruction to cross when the light is red.

To all intents and purposes, that's what IAD already has (apart from the redundant green takeoff light). See post #20.

llondel
27th Sep 2018, 17:37
Clearly something didn't work then because if the red lights were on, no one queried ATC instructions to cross despite the red light. Or weren't they on? I guess the NTSB will reveal that at some point.

Shades of the TCAS-related collision in Europe where the Russian aircraft followed ATC directions and the other aircraft obeyed TCAS. There needs to be a clear direction here that if ATC conflicts with other signs then a query should be made. It's also a use for the green light at the end - explicit clearance confirmation for the departing aircraft.

Ian W
27th Sep 2018, 17:47
Was the RWSL system not operational or just ignored by the crossing aircraft?

"Runway status lights (RWSL) are now operational on runways and taxiways at Washington-Dulles International Airport (IAD).

The fully automated lighting system is being implemented at airports throughout the U.S. as part of a program to help enhance runway safety. The lighting system provides direct runway status information to pilots and surface vehicle operators indicating when it is unsafe to enter, cross, or takeoff from a runway. It requires no input from controllers as it processes information from surveillance systems and then activates runway entrance lights and takeoff hold lights in accordance with the motion and velocity of the detected traffic.

Light fixtures embedded in the pavement are directly visible to pilots and vehicle operators.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans to have RWSLs operational at 23 U.S. airports by the end of 2016."

https://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/runway/20130725-runway-status-lights-debut-at-washington-dulles-airport.php

It is obvious that the Sky West and AAL aircraft crossed as directed by the Tower controller and EITHER the RWSL system was not working OR they assumed that the controller's direction overruled the RWSL stop indications. This means that if the RWSL was not working it needs investigation; or, that a new rule needs to be put in place that RWSL indications have a higher priority than clearances from the controller - in a similar way as a TCAS RA must be obeyed regardless of what the controller is directing.

MarkerInbound
28th Sep 2018, 10:36
...or, that a new rule needs to be put in place that RWSL indications have a higher priority than clearances from the controller - in a similar way as a TCAS RA must be obeyed regardless of what the controller is directing.

RWSL training does emphasize that the RWSL indications do take priority over an ATC clearance just like TCAS.

Sailvi767
28th Sep 2018, 13:13
It is obvious that the Sky West and AAL aircraft crossed as directed by the Tower controller and EITHER the RWSL system was not working OR they assumed that the controller's direction overruled the RWSL stop indications. This means that if the RWSL was not working it needs investigation; or, that a new rule needs to be put in place that RWSL indications have a higher priority than clearances from the controller - in a similar way as a TCAS RA must be obeyed regardless of what the controller is directing.

There is no need for a new rule.RWSL lights are not to be ignored and if on aircraft are required to stop.

golfyankeesierra
28th Sep 2018, 22:39
I have only very limited knowledge of RWSL but I understand it is ao fed by radar data. So when an aircraft is cleared for takeoff but radar data sees it still stationary, will the RWSL be lit? My guess only when the departing starts to roll but it may well be too late. Anyone with some background info?

BTW, what training, if any, do the home carriers get?

DaveReidUK
28th Sep 2018, 23:31
I have only very limited knowledge of RWSL but I understand it is ao fed by radar data. So when an aircraft is cleared for takeoff but radar data sees it still stationary, will the RWSL be lit? My guess only when the departing starts to roll but it may well be too late. Anyone with some background info?

BTW, what training, if any, do the home carriers get?
Link in post #20, which in turn has a link to more material on RWSL.

MarkerInbound
29th Sep 2018, 17:30
I have only very limited knowledge of RWSL but I understand it is ao fed by radar data. So when an aircraft is cleared for takeoff but radar data sees it still stationary, will the RWSL be lit? My guess only when the departing starts to roll but it may well be too late. Anyone with some background info?

BTW, what training, if any, do the home carriers get?

I was a union safety representative when the FAA installed one of the first sets of RWSLs at DFW a dozen or so years ago. Got to drive cars up and down the runway at 3am and taxi a company 727 with a load of Feds from Washington to observe the lights in action. The Runway Entrance Lights activate when the departing aircraft reaches 30 knots and turn off just before the the aircraft passes the intersection. The Takeoff Hold Lights are a bit more complicated as I recall. The system looks at the taxiing aircraft's speed and distance from the runway and does the math to figure if it is likely to stop before entering the runway.

As to what training United gives their pilots I can't say but with the system installed at IAD, ORD, IAH, LAX and SFO, all United hubs, I would think the crews would be familiar with the system.

PAXboy
29th Sep 2018, 17:51
With that level of Tower workload - somethnig had to give.

golfyankeesierra
30th Sep 2018, 00:03
@Markerinbound, thanks for info, the airports you refer to is where I fly to as well, and our info is limited apart from some basic info in route manuals.
Also the links in post 20 don’t give a lot more but I guess the RWSL don’t work well in this specific situation.

DaveReidUK
30th Sep 2018, 07:59
Also the links in post 20 donít give a lot more but I guess the RWSL donít work well in this specific situation.

Fair enough. Personally, I thought the Q&A on that link was pretty helpful:

What is Runway Status Lights (RWSL)?
What are Runway Entrance Lights (RELs)?
What are Takeoff Hold Lights (THLs)?
What are the benefits of RWSL?
How do the lights work?
What precautions should be taken if verbal clearance is received from the tower, but the lights are illuminated?
What airports are receiving RWSL?
What do the lights look like and how are they installed?
How are the lights different from other runway warning lights?
Does RWSL communicate with other safety systems?
How does the system vary from one designated airport to the next?
What is the program doing to educate people?
What precautions should be taken if verbal clearance is received from the tower, but the lights are illuminated?
What airports are receiving RWSL?
What do the lights look like and how are they installed?
How are the lights different from other runway warning lights?
Does RWSL communicate with other safety systems?
How does the system vary from one designated airport to the next?
What is the program doing to educate people?

golfyankeesierra
30th Sep 2018, 09:52
You’re right, I skipped the Q&A.

Capn Bloggs
30th Sep 2018, 11:10
Snippets from the current FAA AIM:
Never cross over illuminated red lights. Under normal circumstances, RWSL will confirm the pilot’s taxi or takeoff clearance previously issued by ATC. If RWSL indicates that it is unsafe to takeoff from, land on, cross, or enter a runway, immediately notify ATC of the conflict and re-confirm the clearance

and

System lights can be disabled should RWSL operations impact the efficient movement of air traffic or contribute, in the opinion of the assigned ATC Manager, to unsafe operations.

Ritam
1st Oct 2018, 16:55
If the RWSL was INOP, is that something that would appear in a NOTAM?

Alternatively, from the FAA description, it seems that if a departing aircraft is cleared but <30 knots when the taxiing aircraft enter the runway, nobody would see RWSL at all.