UK Air Defence - Cold War

[typerated]

I never quite understood what the Soviet air threat was in the southern north sea.
In the north it is obvious - Backfires etc flying down off Norway to launch cruise missiles at Scotland.

But what 'trade' were Binbrook, Coningsby, Wattisham expecting to face?
Obviously partly as a backstop to the above.
But there always seemed to be an expectation of tactical aircraft crossing the southern north sea to attack the UK. As in Priory type exercises
Fencers seemed to be the only aircraft with the range to get to the UK from Poland/ East Germany and they would have had to fly past/through Denmark/West Germany/Netherlands first - and until Flankers came on the scene this would have to be done unescorted.
Seems very unlikely to me

What Soviet aircraft and based where were a practical threat to the Southern UK? Assuming that the west still held Germany.

If the Soviets has come west to the channel then of course that would have been a different story - but then our air defence was set up to look east - not south!

I'm sure someone can put me on the right track?

[Pontius Navigator]

As late as the 80s the Badgers of the Smolensk Air Army penetrating Baltap and making ASM attacks on the ADGE sites was seen as a likely threat. Backfires flying round the top could do one mission per day, through Baltap they could do too. Similarly Blinders could attack the southern North Sea.

A couple of us noted the difference in Badger assignment between the SNAF and the Air Force. IIRC the SNAF Badger tankers would probably have been used to extend the range of the ASM carriers. There were fewer tankers available to the Air Force. We assessed that their Badger ECM aircraft were fuel limited and would benefit from the tankers more than the bombers.

As you said, Fencers of the Legnicia Air Army could reach USAFE bases in East Anglia, I can't remember how far they could reach.

One NATO Intelligence assessment disagreed with the BALTAP theory and favoured a single penetration probably on the 2/4ATAF boundary. This penetration corridor could be exploited by Fitted aircraft broadening and deepening the front achieving local air superiority with Hawk sites shot out or knocked. Then the NATO rear could be interrupted and a corridor open to UK and France.

[GlosMikeP]

There were instances of Soviet long-range ac popping up in the southern North Sea in the 80s, in the Neatishead sector. It appeared they'd been 'studying' the oil and gas platforms.

[Heathrow Harry]

No point in planning to hit dozens of SNS platforms when there were only 3-4 terminals on the coast - a much easier target.....................

[India Four Two]

No point in planning to hit dozens of SNS platforms

Perhaps they were confused by the names of some of the "V Fields" - Valiant, Victor and Vulcan.

[airpolice]

I thought the Binbrook & Coltishall fighters were just to protect Boulmer, Staxton, Northern & Neatishead.

With the huge overhead of Midland Radar, it was not considered to be worthy of being a target.

[wiggy]

But there always seemed to be an expectation of tactical aircraft crossing the southern north sea to attack the UK. As in Priory type exercises
Fencers seemed to be the only aircraft with the range to get to the UK from Poland/ East Germany and they would have had to fly past/through Denmark/West Germany/Netherlands first - and until Flankers came on the scene this would have to be done unescorted.
Seems very unlikely to me

1. Friendly Air Defence to the east may have been overrun/supressed/fired out/saturated very early in any conflict, so a clever planner would plan on there being some “leakage”.

2. It’s possible the CAP positions for the likes of the Wattisham force won’t have been situated over Southwold or just off the Beach at Clacton.....:oh:

[Pontius Navigator]

Wiggy, and there was the Irish neutrality question. Maps of the UKADR omitted Ireland 😀

[goofer3]

Wasn't it also a case of, "the other way round". We could go low level from southern North Sea into the "Red bits"?

[typerated]

Thanks Wiggy,

I understand that - Defence in depth.
Yes, I'd expect Wattisham to be on CAP in Dutch airspace.

I was more interested in what Soviet aircraft would have tried to get through - and where would they have been based?
Seemed like a suicide mission to me

[GlosMikeP]

No point in planning to hit dozens of SNS platforms when there were only 3-4 terminals on the coast - a much easier target.....................
And they may well have been 'investigating' them, too. They didn't file flight plans.

[MPN11]

As the subject still has operational relevance, I will desist from adding info from my time in War Plans and Policy at MoD.

By all means theorise, chaps, but do remember that although some border states have shifted away from the Soviets there is still a threat ... with better aircraft than in days of yore!

[Pontius Navigator]

Seemed like a suicide mission to me
Bomber crews do not do suicide missions. For a start it rather b*gg*rs up subsequent attacks. Attrition is expected but not your own crew.

The purpose of low level attack - Fencer for instance - is to minimise the vulnerability time to Air Defences. AWACS was procured to negate that.

The purpose of ASM/ARM is again intended to minimise vulnerability. A Badger firing at maximum range was vulnerable to outer caps alone.

Again AWACS can enable better control at the edge of ADGE cover, especially if they have their heads down. So enter the AWACS killer.

it is a glorified chess game each side attacking the king and endearing to convert pawns to queens.

[typerated]

Absolutely PN,

Just like the first RAF daylight bomber raids were massacres - next move night bombing.
I just can't the Soviets having tried it - until Germany/Denmark have been overwhelmed.

MPN11 - I think the situation now has no relevance without soviet aircraft based in East Germany/Poland

[Wensleydale]

The primary aim of UK Air Defence during the 50s/60s was protection of the nuclear deterrent which was mostly in southern UK. With the bases already down there, they just stayed after the RN took over the formal deterrent in '69.

[DODGYOLDFART]

Many of the original London air defence airfields with front line fighters like Biggin Hill, West Malling, Odiham and Tangmere either closed or changed function in the late 1950's or early 1960's. I think this was foreseen in the !957 Sandys cuts. So there was a general drift away from the south and towards the north from that point.

[MPN11]

...
MPN11 - I think the situation now has no relevance without soviet aircraft based in East Germany/PolandFair comment. But at the risk of diverting the thread, a quick invasion of Ukraine/Poland could shift the centre of gravity quite quickly! Nothing in this game is ever static.

[Pontius Navigator]

The primary aim of UK Air Defence during the 50s/60s was protection of the nuclear deterrent which was mostly in southern UK. With the bases already down there, they just stayed after the RN took over the formal deterrent in '69.
To a point, the ring of steel was to protect the Thor IRBM and MBF main bases. When the dispersal policy was adopted there was no money for infrastructure or additional defences.

The Bloodhound 2 replaced the Mk 1s and continued to protect the bomber bases, including Cyprus, long after the RN provided the principal deterrent.

[Cazalet33]

Did the red team ever penetrate UK territorial airspace, ie within 12nm of the coastline?

If so, did it appear to be deliberate or was it a nav cockup or a misjudgement of turning radius etc?

[dook]

Yes, I'd expect Wattisham to be on CAP in Dutch airspace.

Our CAPs from Wattisham were variable (Lightnings).

[NutLoose]

There was also the RAF Regiment from Brize with their Rapier looking after the US Bases nearby.

And if you fancy owning one...

https://www.trinitymarine.co.uk/shop/ex-falklands-war-rapier-missile-launching-system/

[seer557]

Well thank you NL......................just wasted spent 30 minutes on a fascinating tour of that site!

Might just order a nice Trotman anchor to stop the grandkids parking on the grass.

Seer

[MPN11]

There was also the RAF Regiment from Brize with their Rapier looking after the US Bases nearby.

And if you fancy owning one...

https://www.trinitymarine.co.uk/shop/ex-falklands-war-rapier-missile-launching-system/Inflating the tyres might enhance saleability!

[ORAC]

NATO agreed to pay for the HAS build/hardening of the UK airfields as long as the UK provided SAW cover. So the old RAFG/Cyprus Bloodhound were put in place at Bawdsey, West Raynham etc and Rapier units to cover those outside their cover such as LM, KS, BZ etc. No computer links, such at Gata, were ever put in place with the UKADGE units, and in fact for most of their existence the HMEZ/LMEZ were not even updated on the the radar maps.

IIRC Within 6 months of NATO signing the cheques for the hardening programme the Boodhound force was disbanded.

Thats not counting the ex-Argentine Oerlikon/Skyguard equipped sqns at Waddington - at least until the ammunition time expired.

[NutLoose]

Thats not counting the ex-Argentine Oerlikon/Skyguard equipped sans at Waddington - at least 7ntil the ammunition time expired.

Didn't the Radar then become a "speed trap" for low flying aircraft, to be used after any public complaints?

Found it

The ex-Argentine Skyguard/35mm cannon combination was used as part of the air-defence system at RAF Waddington for a number of years until retirement. The Skyguard was then found a new use with the RAF Police and the low-level flying monitoring team. A lot of the captured kit is on display in various units here in the Falklands.

[typerated]

Didn't the Radar then become a "speed trap" for low flying aircraft, to be used after any public complaints?

Found it

It was too. I remember a Highland Cardinal or OSEX in Wales when (Bassoon?) was giving the location of the skyguard (somewhere near Bala) on initial contact :)

[Pontius Navigator]

IIRC Within 6 months of NATO signing the cheques for the hardening programme the Boodhound force was disbanded.
It depends when the cheque was signed. If it was before the hardening then that is wrong. Coningsby was fully hardened by 1987 and the B H withdrawn in 1990.

Now I know the Noggie s said they would install SHORAD, for the money and then didn't.

[ORAC]

IIRC the money was paid out after completion and inspection (as happened with the hardened UKADGE bunkers - I remember the fun they had moving the parts from the Large Screen Display from bunker to bunker over night to get each working for the inspection team travelling around to make sure everything worked.

Cant remember which was the last airfield hardened. Lossiemouth?

[Yellow Sun]

Cant remember which was the last airfield hardened. Lossiemouth?

Off the top of my head, I thought that the HASs at St Mawgan were completed after Lossiemouth. Then there was the provision of HPS and the dispersals in the woods at Kinloss. Did the funds for that project come from the same budget?

YS

[Pontius Navigator]

YS, no, that was SACLANT budget.

[Mortmeister]

There was also the RAF Regiment from Brize with their Rapier looking after the US Bases nearby.

And if you fancy owning one...

https://www.trinitymarine.co.uk/shop/ex-falklands-war-rapier-missile-launching-system/

Nutty,

My wife is probably going to want your head on a pole now. What a treasure trove of goodies on that website.

I'm quite fancying the polished and trimmed Canberra ejection seat for my 'man-cave!'

Regards
Mortmeister

[MAINJAFAD]

NATO agreed to pay for the HAS build/hardening of the UK airfields as long as the UK provided SAW cover. So the old RAFG/Cyprus Bloodhound were put in place at Bawdsey, West Raynham etc and Rapier units to cover those outside their cover such as LM, KS, BZ etc. No computer links, such at Gata, were ever put in place with the UKADGE units, and in fact for most of their existence the HMEZ/LMEZ were not even updated on the the radar maps.

IIRC Within 6 months of NATO signing the cheques for the hardening programme the Boodhound force was disbanded.

Thats not counting the ex-Argentine Oerlikon/Skyguard equipped sqns at Waddington - at least until the ammunition time expired.


The Bloodhound Mk 2 data link system wasn't in the RAF LCP's when the system was procured in the early 1960's (The Swedish and Swiss had it fitted from the git go). The decision to fit the RAF systems with the Digital control mode was made in 1966, and a modification program to allow the LCP's to employ the Digital Control method of operational and install the required Digital Data Link Mk 5 equipment was carried out on the 23 LCP's in RAF service in 1967. Enough DDL Mk 5 equipment sets for the whole operational force of 21 Sections were ordered in 1966, however when the East of Suez decision was made in mid 1967, the order for the 10 DDL Mk 5 sets for the FEAF Squadrons (33 and 65) were cancelled. 41 and 25 Squadron's did use it in exercises with the GL161 systems of 1ACC and one DLL Mk 5 set was swapped around the FEAF sections to prove the modifications and allow a bit of training in Theatre before the FEAF Bloodhound Squadrons started to draw down in 1968. The Basic reason the DC mode was not employed in the UK was most likely SLEWC wasn't software engineered to support Bloodhound operations (not in the specifications as the main UK SAM defences were withdrawn in 1968/69 with the drawdown of the MBF in the QRA role (There were no more than 3 Bloodhound Mk 2 sections in that role anyway (112 Sqn at Woodhall Spa until April 1967 when they went non operational for the move to Cyprus and 41 Sqn at West Raynham until June 1969))), plus the fact that there wasn't enough DDL Mk 5 sets available to equip half of the Bloodhound Mk 2 force as finally rolled out in 1983/4 (three set were given to Singapore for the 3 sections sold to them). When the Computers and displays were replaced on Bloodhound 2 in 1986-89, they did include data links that allowed the whole system to be digitally integrated with itself along with command and control functions being carried out at Flight, Squadron and Force level. I do believe it was also going to be integrated into IUKADGE, but of course that didn't become operational until long after Bloodhound was canned.

[glad rag]

Nutty,

My wife is probably going to want your head on a pole now. What a treasure trove of goodies on that website.

I'm quite fancying the polished and trimmed Canberra ejection seat for my 'man-cave!'

Regards
Mortmeister


The "Original Reclaimed German Aluminium Ships Bulkhead Light" is quite a catch too, although it must be said, somewhat lacking in synergy..

:bored:

[Chairborne 09.00hrs]

During one of the "Cold War" lunchtime lectures at Cosford I was disappointed to learn that we had only one re-load round for each Bloodhound launcher.

[Pontius Navigator]

During one of the "Cold War" lunchtime lectures at Cosford I was disappointed to learn that we had only one re-load round for each Bloodhound launcher.
You need to qualify that statement. Which Mark and what year? I know we acquired reloads in late 70s.

[MAINJAFAD]

Mk 1 - 575 production missiles produced between 1959 and 1961. On top of that were up to 110 pre production missiles used for the service acceptance firings at Woomera (93 known to have been fired) and up to 180 experimental prototypes built from late 1955 onwards) 11 squadrons formed between 1958 and 1960. 23 1/2 Fire Units ordered. 264 Sqn at North Coates had three, though only 2 were ever used at one time (the originally missiles there in 1958 were prototype rounds that were not part of the main production run). The other 10 squadrons had 2 Fire Units and the 1/2 one was at Aberporth for trials firings (with only 4 launchers). Each Fire unit was spilt into two sections each of which consisted of fire control systems that controlled a Type 83 Radar and 8 missiles on launchers. Each section could lock all 8 missiles onto a target and fire 4 of them in a single salvo against that target. Therefore 32 missiles on launcher per squadron and 8 held as spares giving a total operational force of 352 missiles on launcher and a ready use force of 440. The other missiles were held in reserve to support service evaluation firings not completed at Woomera (mainly to do with ECCM), modification proofing and replacements for Squadron missiles fired in training shoots at Aberporth. 182 production missiles were fired between mid 59 and Nov 63 with the vast majority of that figure from the start of 1961 onwards.
The first squadron to reach IOC was 263 Squadron at Watton in November 1960 (the weapon system didn't complete its service acceptance trials until the middle of that year and it wasn't until 18th November that a fully armed production missile was loaded onto an operational fire unit). The force was finally at full strength in February 1962 with the handover of the last Type 82 and tactical control centre at Lindholme. The whole force was declared to SACEUR on the 1st May 1962 and commenced ORA operations with one section at 10 minutes readiness, the other half of its fire unit at 30 minutes and the rest of the squadron at 2 hours. This was the height of the Bloodhound Mk 1 force and it lasted a total of 28 DAYS!!!! On the 28th May 62, 264 Squadron was taken off alert to allow the squadron to be used in training for the rest of the force in the use of a number of major modifications that had been instigated by HQ Fighter Command in 1961 and were rolled out into the force in early 1962. The main change was the introduction of a sector search capability on the Fire Unit's Type 83 radar which allowed it to find its own targets. Before that, precise target putting on information was given to the Fire Unit automatically from its Tactical Control Centre and without that finding targets by itself required a man in the radar display van to turn hand wheels to steer the dish in azimuth and elevation and then hope. This made the TCC's and the Type 82 radar's redundant as target data could be fed directly to the Fire Units from a Master Radar Station via voice and they were closed down at the end of 1962 / early 1963. The plan was that the Force was to run on until 1965, however, budget cuts resulted in Squadron's being shut down at a rate of two every three months starting with 263 and 94 Squadrons in March 1963 and ending with 62 and 242 Squadrons going non-operational at the end of June 1964. An operational SAM defence of the UK did not then reappear until early 1966 with 112 Squadron at Woodhall Spa.

Bloodhound Mk 2 buy 374 missiles for 5 squadrons.

25 Squadron formed 1963 - Primary role - Production system proofing trials, post R&D and acceptance service trials and Operator Training. Planned equipment allocation - 2x Type 87 Sections 1x Type 86 section all with 4 launchers. 15 Missiles. 1 Engagement control simulator.

65 Squadron formed 1964 - Primary role - Tropical system proofing trials, base defence of Singapore, deployable FEAF Bloodhound 2 force. Planned equipment allocation - 3x Type 87 sections for base defence with 8 launchers. 3x Type 86 sections with 4 launchers for deployment use. 72 missiles. 1 Engagement control simulator.

112 Squadron formed 1964 - Primary role - base defence of Cyprus, however formed at Woodhall Spa due to doubts about the future of the requirement for a SAM defence on the Island which were removed in the 1966 defence review. Planned equipment allocation - 4x Type 87 sections for base defence with 8 launchers. 64 Missiles. 1 Engagement control simulator.

33 Squadron formed 1965 - Primary role - base defence of Butterworth. Planned equipment allocation - 4x Type 87 sections for base defence with 8 launchers. 64 Missiles. 1 Engagement control simulator.

41 Squadron formed 1965 Primary role - UKAD / Reinforcement manpower support to NEAF/FEAF, deployable NEAF Bloodhound 2 force. Planned equipment allocation - 3x Type 87 sections for base defence with 8 launchers. 3x Type 86 sections with 4 launchers for deployment use. 72 missiles. 1 Engagement control simulator.

RAF Newton - primary role - Technical Training 1x Type 87, 1 x Type 86 1x LCP, 2 launchers (missiles as required (normally 3 from reserve stocks)).

RAF Aberporth - primary role - firing range - 1x Type 86 section with 2 launchers. 30 missiles for modification proofing and post service evaluation trial firings.

Operational reserves for squadron firing training - 57 missiles.

With the exception of 112 Squadron who never got their full allocation of equipment, all of the squadrons were fully equipped as above by 1966. The missile evaluation trials which started at Woomera in late 1962 massively overran and were not completed until April 1965 (a mixture of major technical issues which were not easily fixed, the original wing wasn't strong enough for low level use and had to be redesigned, the original boost motors were not powerful enough and there were major problems with the radars. plus the weather in south Australia in 1963-64 was not that good as one D Campbell found out). Likewise the Service acceptance trails at North Coates also massively overran into October 1966, thus even a limited release to service was not issued until late 1965 and the weapon system was still operating on that well into 1967.

65 Squadron was the first Unit to reach IOC in November 1965, with 112 Squadron following in January 1966 with 2 sections with 4 launchers a piece, they gradually built up to the full establishment of 72 missile by the end of 1966, but only had three working sections by the start of 1967 and only 12 launchers with 26 missiles actually available for use or reload, the rest were in boxes. 33 Squadron became operational in late 1966 and 41 Squadron didn't become combat capable until May 1967 when they took over from 112 Squadron. 41 Squadron's 3 Type 87 sections held the 12 hour readiness role until June 1968 and as soon as the RN started deployment of Polaris patrols, 2 of the sections were put on care and maintenance. the remaining section stayed on 12 hour readiness until the day after the bombers came off QRA at which point it was shut down and all three sections were dismantled. As for 25 Squadron, they inherited the three Type 86 radars from 65 Squadron in late 1967 when the FEAF deployable force was wound up. The Squadron was then rerolled to have 4 type 86 sections with 4 launchers (both of the type 87 sections ended up with a full compliment of 8 launchers. One section was allocated as a trails and training section, while the rest became deployable sections for use in NEAF, along with the remaining deployable sections of 41 Squadron. The FEAF force drew down throughout 1968 and 1969 with 33 Squadron returning all of their kit to the UK, while 65 Sqn returned all of remaining parts of their type 86 sections and all of their missiles (most of which were quite badly corroded). The three Type 87 sections were retained for hand over to Singapore. At this point the RAF missile stocks stood at 340, 34 having been fired at Aberporth, though 50 of the 340 were earmarked for transfer via refurbishment at Filton to Singapore. The plan was then to have three sections of 112 Squadron with 12 launchers and 48 missiles on Cyprus, while 25 Squadron's 4 sections would moved to West Raynham and join 41 Squadron thus resulting in the station having 7 sections each with 4 launchers, plus the remaining missiles. One section for trials and operator training use and the rest for deployment when required in either Malta or Libya. This all changed when the requirement for active air defence of airbases in RAFG came up in 1969, which would open a big pot of NATO money. Thus all of the deployable kit, bar the trials section was shipped off to the Clutch Airfields with 25 Squadron in 1970.

The RAF did buy 66 missiles back of the Swedes in 1978 and they did become operational from 1980 onwards (after all of the modifications required that hadn't been embodied by the Swedes were finally manufactured). The RAF ended up firing 90 odd missiles and there were 297 left when the force was phased out in 1991 (at least 2 were scrapped in the 70's due to excessive corrosion or being dropped during loading operations!!!)

The high water mark of the Bloodhound Mk 2 force in the UK would have been between 1984 and late 1985, when there were 6 operational sites with 16 operational sections.
85 Sqn A Flt West Raynham 3x sections with 20 launchers (two with 6 and one with 8).
85 Sqn B Flt North Coates 3x sections with 24 launchers
85 Sqn C Flt Bawdsey 2x sections with 12 launchers
85 Sqn D Flt West Ranyham 2x sections with 12 launchers (earmarked for Coltishall)
25 Sqn A Flt Barkston Heath 2x sections with 16 launchers
25 Sqn B Flt Wyton 2x sections with 16 launchers
25 Sqn C Flt Wattisham 2x sections with 12 launchers

Thus there were 112 operational launchers at the high point with 300 available missiles (the last three were fired in 1986). In theory there was nearly 2 reloads per launcher, however there were a few missiles that were rust buckets that wouldn't have survived a launch (the last RAF missile fired was such a round and it broke up during launch).

[Pontius Navigator]

Mainjafad. Fascinating, thank you. Not disagreeing with you for a moment. I heard about the buy back of Swedish and Swiss missiles. Now I heard that the missiles sold to them were 100% perfect. Now I heard the Swedes accepted the package on the basis that any modifications deemed essential by us would be incorporated by BAC. The other country accepted them as is.

Clearly it was not the Swedes or they didn't get all the mods.

[ORAC]

The only point I wil add is that during any 3 day AD exercise the force had always expended all it’s Mx stocks by the end of day one.

Working on historic kill rates from Vietnam/Arab-Israeli/Indo-Pakistan conflicts the general view was that in a shooting war they’d, hopefully, achieve 3-5 kills, and hopefully against any Kitchen/Kingfish Mx above and outside F-4 Sparrow snap-up range.

[MPN11]

Fascinating read, MAINJAFAD ... thank you. :ok:

Always grateful for the Bloodhound force for eventually giving ATC the jolly decent T82 radar to use in a more peaceful role, allowing Mil Area ATC to provide a better service in those relatively early days. It provided a step change in capability when compared with the T80 (slow, 4 rpm) and 264 (enormous blips at range), and of course shared use of the Scopies' T84/T85 (4 rpm).

[Wensleydale]

When the Computers and displays were replaced on Bloodhound 2 in 1986-89, they did include data links that allowed the whole system to be digitally integrated with itself along with command and control functions being carried out at Flight, Squadron and Force level. I do believe it was also going to be integrated into IUKADGE, but of course that didn't become operational until long after Bloodhound was canned.

Back in the '80s, I remember being tasked with "Voice Control of SAM" while working Neatishead from the NAEW E-3A. It sounds more interesting than it was, as the control just consisted of a track voice tell format which was usually responded to by a very bored "Roger" from the ground unit.

[MAINJAFAD]

The only point I wil add is that during any 3 day AD exercise the force had always expended all it’s Mx stocks by the end of day one.

Working on historic kill rates from Vietnam/Arab-Israeli/Indo-Pakistan conflicts the general view was that in a shooting war they’d, hopefully, achieve 3-5 kills, and hopefully against any Kitchen/Kingfish Mx above and outside F-4 Sparrow snap-up range.

That was basically what the only study on the system's effectiveness in a general war that has been released to the National Archives and was produced in 1975 for the three 85 sqn sites said. shot out on day one. the projected kill number was 0.8!!!! As regards the ASM's, not a hope. The Radar's were fully capable of tracking them at useable ranges but the seeker in missile wasn't, plus 65000ft was about the limit for the missile's manoeuvrability and the warhead / fuze combination was very much designed to chop bombers in half.

As regards the effectiveness of the system as compared to the Soviet systems and early models of Hawk, Bloodhound Mk 2 was streets ahead of them as regards ECCM. One major advantage was that the engagement controller had a view of what the missile was actually seeing shown on his console and the capability to control certain aspects of the missile's receiver systems operation while the missile was in flight. The Missile was fully capable of switching between semi active and passive homing (and vice versa) by itself and if it lost lock it would try and regain lock by itself on the last known good target Doppler shift which the EC could update in flight when jamming was quite. The system had only two major limitations and those were laws of physics related. The first and major one which was never fixed was target discrimination of two or more targets in close formation (and by close formation I'm talking about separations of around 1500 feet or less). The missile's dish had a field of view of around 4.5 degrees, thus if their were two targets within its field of view both of which were being illuminated equally by the radar, it would only see them as one target and the missile would fly through the gap in-between. If the missile missed either of them by more that 110 feet, the proximity fuze wouldn't detonate the warhead as the effectiveness of the Con Rod warhead dropped of massively as soon as the hoop of steel generated broke apart. The only other way that the missile could discriminate between targets was by target radial velocity (Doppler shift), but seeing its "speed gate" was around 48 knots wide, that not going to be much use if both targets were traveling in the same direction and speed. However when various formations of drones were engaged at different distances apart in firings at both Woomera and Aberporth, except for very close formations, the missile normally got a sniff of a stronger signal off one of the targets and successfully got within lethal warhead miss distance of that target. The RAF though this was a major problem as they were looking for an 80% success rate in trials and the best they got was around 58% in this trial condition. This problem was common for most radar guided weapons of the era anyway. The other issue was low level intercept over water. During the missile evaluation trials at Woomera in the first half of the 1960's, the missile successfully intercepted targets as low as 180 feet AGL. When they tried low level shots at Aberporth (below 400ft), the missile had a tenancy to dive into the sea in front of the target. The main cause of this was the target reflected a small bit of the illumination beam up into the air (the missile being well above it and diving down onto the target) and a larger part of the signal onto the sea. If the sea was calm, this signal was reflected back up into the air and was stronger than the signal off the target, so naturally the missile went for the stronger signal. At least 8 missiles ended up doing this, however at least one officer at Aberporth correctly identified that the main problem was Aberporth's radar being located 450ft above the sea on a cliff top and that the problem would be less of an issue at North Coates or Bawdsey.

[Pontius Navigator]

That was basically what the only study on the system's effectiveness in a general war that has been released to the National Archives and was produced in 1975 for the three 85 sqn sites said. shot out on day one. the projected kill number was 0.8!!!! As regards the ASM's, not a hope. The Radar's were fully capable of tracking them at useable ranges but the seeker in missile wasn't, plus 65000ft was about the limit for the missile's manoeuvrability and the warhead / fuze combination was very much designed to chop bombers in half.

As regards the effectiveness of the system as compared to the Soviet systems and early models of Hawk, Bloodhound Mk 2 was streets ahead of them as regards ECCM. One major advantage was that the engagement controller had a view of what the missile was actually seeing shown on his console and the capability to control certain aspects of the missile's receiver systems operation while the missile was in flight. The Missile was fully capable of switching between semi active and passive homing (and vice versa) by itself and if it lost lock it would try and regain lock by itself on the last known good target Doppler shift which the EC could update in flight when jamming was quite. The system had only two major limitations and those were laws of physics related. The first and major one which was never fixed was target discrimination of two or more targets in close formation (and by close formation I'm talking about separations of around 1500 feet or less). The missile's dish had a field of view of around 4.5 degrees, thus if their were two targets within its field of view both of which were being illuminated equally by the radar, it would only see them as one target and the missile would fly through the gap in-between. If the missile missed either of them by more that 110 feet, the proximity fuze wouldn't detonate the warhead as the effectiveness of the Con Rod warhead dropped of massively as soon as the hoop of steel generated broke apart. The only other way that the missile could discriminate between targets was by target radial velocity (Doppler shift), but seeing its "speed gate" was around 48 knots wide, that not going to be much use if both targets were traveling in the same direction and speed. However when various formations of drones were engaged at different distances apart in firings at both Woomera and Aberporth, except for very close formations, the missile normally got a sniff of a stronger signal off one of the targets and successfully got within lethal warhead miss distance of that target. The RAF though this was a major problem as they were looking for an 80% success rate in trials and the best they got was around 58% in this trial condition. This problem was common for most radar guided weapons of the era anyway. The other issue was low level intercept over water. During the missile evaluation trials at Woomera in the first half of the 1960's, the missile successfully intercepted targets as low as 180 feet AGL. When they tried low level shots at Aberporth (below 400ft), the missile had a tenancy to dive into the sea in front of the target. The main cause of this was the target reflected a small bit of the illumination beam up into the air (the missile being well above it and diving down onto the target) and a larger part of the signal onto the sea. If the sea was calm, this signal was reflected back up into the air and was stronger than the signal off the target, so naturally the missile went for the stronger signal. At least 8 missiles ended up doing this, however at least one officer at Aberporth correctly identified that the main problem was Aberporth's radar being located 450ft above the sea on a cliff top and that the problem would be less of an issue at North Coates or Bawdsey.
We were once quoted 187 feet at quite a short range and the Mk1 something !ike 850 feet, that was when SA2 was 3,000 feet. On height of the fire unit, that was an SA2 issue at Last Peruse Strait when they tried to engage a P3.

[MAINJAFAD]

Mainjafad. Fascinating, thank you. Not disagreeing with you for a moment. I heard about the buy back of Swedish and Swiss missiles. Now I heard that the missiles sold to them were 100% perfect. Now I heard the Swedes accepted the package on the basis that any modifications deemed essential by us would be incorporated by BAC. The other country accepted them as is.

Clearly it was not the Swedes or they didn't get all the mods.

The modification in question was introduced in the mid 1970s, I suspect the Swedes didn't embody it as they had already decided to can the system and were not going to pay for it. Their is also the possibly that it wasn't considered essential as it's major role was to protect an element of the fuel control system from static discharges (i.e. Lightning Strikes) if the missile was left on the launcher. Seeing that the Swedes used the kit mostly in a deployable role and not in the static role like the Swiss and UK, it is quite possible that was the reason the swedes didn't embody the modification. The UK never bought anything back off the Swiss, They were after more Bloodhound kit as well and they got in first as regards in buying missiles of the Swedes (30 missiles in total) The CONOPS of the system were not all the same for the three nations and each nations system's had specific build standards that were exclusive to themselves.

[MAINJAFAD]

We were once quoted 187 feet at quite a short range and the Mk1 something !ike 850 feet, that was when SA2 was 3,000 feet. On height of the fire unit, that was an SA2 issue at Last Peruse Strait when they tried to engage a P3.

As far as I can find from the 15JSTU firing reports the lowest intercept they got with a Mk 2 was on 13th November 1964 with Missile S204 which successfully proximity fused on an approaching Meteor flying at 315 knots and an altitude of 174ft AGL at a impact range of 8NM.

Low level firing of Mk 1s were done at Aberporth in the August and September of 1963. According to the records 2 missiles were fired to the trial condition with involved a Jindivik at 2500 feet. only the first one on the 23rd August was successful and it was Missile 148 fired by a team from 247 Sqn. The Missile scored a direct hit and splashed the drone. The other missile failed in flight. That is about as low as anything that was recorded in any of the acceptance, Service or R&D firings for the Mk 1.

[Chairborne 09.00hrs]

Pontius, the lecture was about RAF AD in 1978. He also stated that we would have run-out of AAMs by Day 3...

[Pontius Navigator]

Thank y ou. If the number of ship-sets properly matched the number of targets . ..

[ORAC]

Pontius, the lecture was about RAF AD in 1978. He also stated that we would have run-out of AAMs by Day 3... Which of course was the day in every exercise when the nukes started to fly and we hunkered down into shelter posture. Nothing was was supposed to last longer than 3 days - which is why all the messes shut and all the staff went in guard duty.

The shock when OOA Ops started up and we actual had to plan to supported life for more than 3 days was a major shock - which is why it took a MOB of 3 squadrons to support one deployed squadron on Ops - plus many others gutted to provide drivers, cooks, suppliers etc.

[MAINJAFAD]

Pontius, the lecture was about RAF AD in 1978. He also stated that we would have run-out of AAMs by Day 3...

That was made public 10 years ago. In the case of Bloodhound 2, the original LTC for the system was based on an operational life of 12 years from 1963 - 1975 when the procurement order was signed off in 1962 and there was only one reload per launcher in the order across the whole of the operational force of which only 14 sections were intended to have the full LUE of 8 launchers that it could support.The rest of the missiles were built as instrumented firing rounds with all of the cabling already installed for telemetry equipment that would been used at Aberporth at an average firing rate of 8 per year.

The RAF Fighter Orbat in 1976 as far as planning was (taken from a document at Kew written in 1974/75) :

Wattisham - 20 Phantom
Leuchars - 22 Phantom (RAF) + 18 Phantom (RN)
Coningsby - 32 Phantom (AD + OCU) + 10 Phantom (Recce)
Binbrook - 32 Lightning (Inc OCU)

That is 102 Phantoms with 4 x Sparrow and 4 x Sidewinder = 816 missiles of each type in the UK war stocks at minimum (1632 in total). There would have been more for a set number of rounds to be fired per year on MPC's over a set period.
32 Lightnings with 2 x AAM (Firestreak and Redtop). 128 rounds minimum, again there would have been additional missiles in the stocks for MPC firings.

At the time that the above was written, the estimated Soviet AF treat to the UK was (as at mid 1974) :-

Fencer 10
Bear 20 + (45 Nuclear only)
Bison 20
Badger 350
Blinder 70 + (100 Nuclear only)
Backfire 30

as regards the Soviet Naval AF the figures were

Badger 35 + (95 nuclear only)
Blinder 25
Backfire 0
Bear (recce) 25
Badger (Recce) 30

which meant that 605 conventional armed plus 238 nuclear strike aircraft were likely to be tasked against targets within the UKADR

The estimates for 1980 were

Soviet TAF / LRAF
Fencer 300
Bear 15 + (30)
Bison 20
Badger 200
Blinder 50 + (90)
Backfire 240

SNAF

Badger 35 + (85)
Blinder 25
Backfire 40
Bear (Recce) 25
Badger (Recce) 25

which took the total to 675 + (205)

https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/dec/30/james-callaghan-missile-defence-fears

[Coochycool]

Wasnt it subsequently learned that Blinder (perhaps amongst others) was a paper tiger?

Heard tell that once bombed up to do its dastardly deed, it couldnt actually carry enough juice to deliver it. And thats to say nothing about weapons efficacy.

Of course its all just arbitrary stats anyhow. I wonder how many would have headed south not west, planning a prolonged vacation in the (natural) sunshine instead

Cooch

[MAINJAFAD]

Blinder was generally hated by both its air and ground crews according to stuff that came out after the wall came down, The early Backfires were also not known for their reliability, thus a play on its official designation (All Weather Missile Carrier) becoming a nickname (All Weather Defect Carrier).

Sparrow was never known for its reliability either, though I suspect that the AIM-9G would have done better that the early Sidewinders in Vietnam.

A look through the Aberporth ORB's may give a good idea of how effective the weapons would have been, I did an estimate of Bloodhound Mk 1 based on both the Service Acceptance Trials at Woomera, plus the service Firings at Aberporth, which I was later able to match up to an operational assessment of the System by HQ Fighter Command's Operational Research Branch done after the system was phased out of service in late 1964. My guesstimate and the HQFC figures ended up almost the same with the missile having a SSPK of around 25% for a single missile launch in Semi Active mode and 44% for a two round Salvo. The Missile also had a passive home on jam capability (though the missile couldn't switch between the semi active and passive modes automatically like the Mk 2 could, it had to be launched in one mode or the other). This worked quite well, however the proximity fuze had a nasty habit of spurious firing in flight before reaching the target and in the Semi Active mode a range gate system used normal operation of the guidance system was also used to isolate the warhead firing chain until the missile was close to the target. In the passive mode this range gate was disabled and in 12 firings in passive mode, only once did the fuze not fire before the missile got to the target.

[Pontius Navigator]

Also relevant was the number of drop tanks for reloads. The F4 could also carry the gun which would give a few more K but also involved entering the gun EZ on the bombers - 500 yards.

[BEagle]

It was good having 25 Sqn C Flt at Wattisham. Mainly because they were often asking for airfield attacks so that they could train their crews. This was much appreciated by the resident F-4 squadrons; unfortunately one crew came over the ATC tower and OC Ops office at about 500 KIAS and rather low, which resulted in speed / height / authorisation restrictions being applied by the fun detectors.

A few years earlier we used to practise attacking West Raynham in the Vulcan, trying to get inside the minimum engagement range before they could hoof off a rocket. Run in at low level on the bomb steer; as soon as the AEO detected radar lock, turn at 60 deg AoB and beam the spike, reversing to fly a constant radius turn around the site to achieve zero doppler. This was achieved using AEO commentary to harden / ease as necessary to stay 90 deg off the direct track to the site. Fly the constant radius turn for 10 sec, then reverse onto a new track from the Nav Rad, following the bomb steer until the Bloodhound locked again, then repeat the manoeuvre as oft as ye shall have need. Rather hard work, requiring a lot of crew coordination, but successful! As a result, we were asked to repeat the attack when 85 had some Air Wheel watching. So we did - and later heard that he hadn't been very impressed by 85's kit limitations.

But when I tried the same thing against 25 at Wattisham, it didn't work. It seems that in the period between our Vulcan attacks and my F-4 attempt, the Bloodhound squadrons had acquired some improved piece of kit which had defeated our efforts!