Aeromexico Crash

[ORAC]

Aeromexico flight reported to have crashed on takeoff from Durango. No details.

[billyg]

Embraer 190 , there are already some images on social media !

[billyg]

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DjduGm-XgAAkm-A.jpg

[Airbubba]

Apparently flight AM2431, aircraft XA-GAL.

[Titania]

XA-GAL Aeroméxico Connect Embraer ERJ-190AR (ERJ-190-100 IGW). First flight date unknown, but built 2008. Delivered to AeroMexico on 27 June 2014. Left gate at 15:08 local.

[Airbubba]

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmforum.com-vbulletin/1200x675/djdxc15xoaaszwg_5ec03992d4abaa60d37489c8f6701b5f7492089a.jpg

A picture from a Twitter post.

[Airbubba]

Social media reports of ambulatory survivors and a video of 'the pilot' being taken to the hospital in a private vehicle:

https://twitter.com/RealNewsLine/status/1024414037797494785

[FIRESYSOK]

First impression is an overrun. I hope everyone got out..

[Airbubba]

The governor of the state of Durango says there are no fatalities:

https://twitter.com/AispuroDurango/status/1024417175380127744

[slfool]

Nobody killed according to the beeb: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-45027112
"The crash happened 10km (six miles) from the airport just after take-off." so doesn't sound like an overrun...

[cncpc]

First impression is an overrun. I hope everyone got out..

Now saying it was five minutes after takeoff.

[dmba]

Aeromexico say 97 passengers, 4 crew.

[RiSq]

BBC reporting problem occurred on runway and was too fast to abort.

[dmba]

First impression is an overrun. I hope everyone got out..

From an interview with a passenger this would appear what happened.

[lomapaseo]

BBC reporting problem occurred on runway and was too fast to abort.

so why didn't it fly?

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

Well, either an over-run or a crash six miles from the airport: It can't be both.

Hope the reports of all surviving are true.

[dmba]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GUPTB7LBWqc

[Willoz269]

interesting...the passenger states it was a high speed abort....the aircraft was at high speed when it went beyond the fence and kept going beyond the airport boundary.

very fortunate

[archae86]

The current Wall Street Journal story is posted here (but may be firewalled)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/airliner-crashes-in-mexico-no-reported-deaths-1533076351?mod=hp_listc_pos1

It asserts the the aircraft came to rest within airport grounds about 400 meters from the end of the runway. That sounds like a high-speed abort to me if accurate.
Regarding passenger and crew condition, the current New York Times article (also may be firewalled):
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/world/americas/aeromexico-plane-crash.html?hpw&rref=world&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well

Asserts that 80 people are under hospital treatment, with 12 of the 18 at just one hospital listed in critical condition.

[malr]

That sounds like a high-speed abort to me if accurate.

Shouldn't a high-speed abort (before V1) leave enough runway to stop without the overrun?

[RobertS975]

Shouldn't a high-speed abort (before V1) leave enough runway to stop without the overrun?

You are making a huge assumption about what transpired. With intact recorders, possible airport vicinity video and hopefully healthy pilots, there will be lots of data to dissect on this accident.

[archae86]

Shouldn't a high-speed abort (before V1) leave enough runway to stop without the overrun?
My mistake, I guess. I'm not a pilot, and was speaking English, not realizing I had inadvertently employed a reserved term with a formal meaning. I just meant "terminated the takeoff while going pretty darn fast". As distinct from crashing minutes after takeoff, as some early reports had it.

[Two's in]

My mistake, I guess. I'm not a pilot, and was speaking English, not realizing I had inadvertently employed a reserved term with a formal meaning. I just meant "terminated the takeoff while going pretty darn fast". As distinct from crashing minutes after takeoff, as some early reports had it.

Not a mistake at all Archae, there are multiple definitions for V speeds but in general, V1 = The speed beyond which the takeoff should no longer be aborted. It's a reasonable assumption that shortly after V1, either aviation is being committed, or you're coming to a halt within the runway length. There are of course all sorts of traps and gotcha's to complicate that assumption, but the very reason for defining V1 in jet aircraft is to avoid high speed landscaping or low speed, single engine, terminal aerobatics. Like all accidents, in this case there will be a series of events that allowed a foolproof preventative measure being anything but foolproof, but in this case it looks like most people survived; which can only be good news.

[rationalfunctions]

Based on the photos from the BBC article, it looks to have come to a rest around 375m beyond the threshold, past the RESA but well within the airport fence.

Fingers crossed that the injured passengers and crew make a recovery

[lomapaseo]

Based on no fatalities most likely a overrun.


Agree .. but to get that far from an expected V1 decision point it would seem that he had to be going pretty damn fast as an overrun.

Of course like any accident it doesn't add up until the facts start coming in.

[Airbubba]

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/www.gmforum.com-vbulletin/2000x980/durango_crash_e8d20f552ae7387541b91362b4ef8fa0382e6919.jpg

Photo by Kevin Alcantar Drones Durango

There seem to be multiple reports that the plane took off into a heavy rainstorm.

[Clandestino]

Avherald (http://avherald.com/h?article=4bbcb11c&opt=0) has posted a video showing that the poor bird "jettisoned" its engines to the left of the runway and before DER. So far I'd speculate it wasn't ordinary too-high-speed abort messup and that keeping the bird upright throughout the crash sequence required the heavy dose of good luck.

[pattern_is_full]

Aviation Herald report: Accident: Aeromexico Connect E190 at Durango on Jul 31st 2018, veered off and overran runway after rejected takeoff and burst into flames (http://avherald.com/h?article=4bbcb11c&opt=0)

MMDO 312150Z 12007KT 10SM BKN020CB BKN025 OVC200 22/14 A3023 RMK 8/903 BINOVC=
MMDO 312103Z RTD 28007KT 7SM OVC015CB 17/14 A3024 RMK SLP118 57014 956 8/9// PISTA CERRADA POR ACFT ACCIDENTADA BINOVC=
MMDO 312018Z 07003KT 7SM TSRA BKN020CB 20/13 A3023 RMK 8/900 TSRAB13=
MMDO 311941Z 01005KT 10SM BKN025CB 28/10 A3023 RMK 8/300=
MMDO 311844Z 12003KT 12SM BKN025TCU BKN200 26/11 A3026 RMK 8/201 ISOL CB=

Airport elev. 6102 ft/1860m. Calculated DA (mine, from METAR above) 7934ft/2418m

AH map shows both engines found off left side of runway, between RWY and TWY A, and between TWY A hold point and twy B. My observation (from misc airport photos) is that there appears to be a full-length drainage ditch between runway left side and the parallel taxiway A, in about the lateral location where the engines were found. Rest of aircraft travelled about 250 m/yds past the point the engines were found. Time between the aircraft comes to a stop, and fire ignition, about 3-4 minutes, thus the moderatel casualties.

It appears to me the drainage area is a swale or valley (shallow but not flat - close order of 1.5 m/yds deep?), with the taxiways crossing it on berms to access the runways - just an impression from the look of the ground around the taxiways (google earth) and how far the ditch "tunnels" past the tawiways.

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Aeropuerto+internacional+de+Durango/@24.1345029,-104.5203682,681m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0xe546f3c57c7750be!8m2!3d24.1260 432!4d-104.5338168

My speculation - aircraft departs left side of runway under asymmetric thrust after engine failure, descends into swale, travels along concrete-lined ditch, loses one engine in rough ground, hits berm for TWY A hold position, lose second engine (and perhaps gear) to ground obstruction (berm), slides across TWY A hold point and along concrete ditch lining on belly, until stopping.

Weight (97 seats out of 100 filled), density altitude and minimal wind may explain high true/ground speed required and achieved. Someone with EMB-190 references may be able to figure that out.

Shades of Continental 1404 runway excursion and loss of gear and one engine in rought ground DEN Dec. 2008, and SWA fall into ditch off taxiway at Nashville Dec. 2015.

EDIT - Airbubba added his excellent photo while I was posting. Obviously better info about final aircraft position. Confirms hold point for 21 could have been an obstruction if they got into the weeds - emphasize "could", not "did." That's a nasty ditch. I think I see an S-curved trace through the grass from the top of the image to the taxiway, but that could be "confirmation bias."

[Airbubba]

The weather around the time of departure did not look good:

MMDO 312018Z 07003KT 7SM TSRA BKN020CB 20/13 A3023 RMK 8/900 TSRAB13

[mosquito88]

You are making a huge assumption about what transpired. With intact recorders, possible airport vicinity video and hopefully healthy pilots, there will be lots of data to dissect on this accident.

He's not making an assumption, he's asking a question.

[KelvinD]

From the BBC News article:
The airport operator, Grupo Aeroportuario Centro Norte, said early data suggests bad weather was the cause, with the plane taking off during a heavy hailstorm before being forced to make an emergency landing.

[PastTense]

Time between the aircraft comes to a stop, and fire ignition, about 3-4 minutes, thus the moderate casualties.


My thought is it would take substantially longer than this to evacuate all the passengers with some injured. [There is also the issue of passengers removing luggage from overhead racks.]

Anyone know?

[slfool]

A more comprehensive report in The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/31/mexico-plane-crash-durango

Eighty-five people were injured – some seriously – but José Rosas Aispuro, the governor of Durango state, said there were no fatalities among the 97 adults, two children and four crew members on board ... A spokesman for the Durango state health ministry said two of the victims were in critical condition.

Aispuro later said at a press conference that information he had received suggested that “after the plane had taken off, suddenly it was hit by a gust of wind that made it go down briskly and touch the ground with its left wing, detaching its two engines.“The aircraft was projected off of the runway … and fell approximately 300 metres [away].

[pattern_is_full]

My thought is it would take substantially longer than this to evacuate all the passengers with some injured.

The certification requirement is that it can be done (and demonstrated) in 90 seconds. They got 870 people out of an A380 in 77 seconds in its test.

But yes, real-world factors will change the actual performance. Injuries can occur in the evacuation itself, or even post-evacuation (flying blobs of burning fuel, etc.) That'll all come out eventually.

[Lookleft]

From the photo, the marks on the ground go from the aircraft to the end of the runway, it doesn't appear to have become airborne, which is probably why the aircraft remained intact.

[bud leon]

From the photo, the marks on the ground go from the aircraft to the end of the runway, it doesn't appear to have become airborne, which is probably why the aircraft remained intact.

The aircraft would normally have been airborne well before the end of the runway.

[ONE GREEN AND HOPING]

Have only speed-read all the above, but sometimes it can be a nasty shock at VR to realise something got missed out on the check list....like flaps or reduced thrust settings. A bit early to run out of fuel...We'll just have to wait and see

[Joe_K]

From the photo, the marks on the ground go from the aircraft to the end of the runway, it doesn't appear to have become airborne

Which seems to be what Mexican media are now reporting: "Luis Gerardo Fonseca, director general de DGAC, señaló que el piloto interrumpió la carrera antes del despegue, lo que provocó que éste saliera de la pista." (from El Financiero | Las noticias de finanzas, economía y política más importantes del país. (http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx) )

[Sailvi767]

Big thunderstorm, marble sized hail with gusty winds. Sounds a lot like a setup for a classic wind shear or microburst.

[double_barrel]

locked bins may...

We now have electric emergency exit locks on some models (no good Idea IMHO) to prevent passengers from opening them if not desired, it would be a piece of cake to have electric locks on the bins. They may actually even prevent them from opening during hard landings if designed accordingly.

I don't think people evaluate the situation and 'form a view', I think it is sheer mindless habit that you get your bag before you get off. I understand that, even in an obviously life threatening situation, many passengers automatically head for the front left because that is how they boarded.

Thus I think that locked overhead bins would make the situation worse as passengers would stand around aimlessly fiddling with the catches and waiting for the bins to be unlocked.

[RVF750]

It's long past the time when certificating authorities should do a proper evac test. By this I mean brief the test passengers, a mix of ages and mobility, and brief them with cash prizes for first ones off, factored for position on aircraft of course, but also brief ONLY a smaller percentage of a VERY healthy additional bounty if they get their bags off too. $$$ talks, and such a staged Evac would be absolutely fascinating to watch....

[Clandestino]

From the photo, the marks on the ground go from the aircraft to the end of the runway, it doesn't appear to have become airborne, which is probably why the aircraft remained intact.

This video This video shows separated engine abeam first TDZ marking, so we are looking at minimum 500 m ground slide after the wing-engine separation has been achieved. I'd say that by the time engines decided they had enough on-wing time, main gear was either gone or retracted.

[alexandrantonia]

Big thunderstorm, marble sized hail with gusty winds. Sounds a lot like a setup for a classic wind shear or microburst.

That's what I thought as well.

[DaveReidUK]

FlightGlobal reporting "engine failure at or around V1".

[guadaMB]

Almost litteral translation of the statement of the (non illiterate, surely wealthy) passenger inteviewed on video of post#17

"The AC was all OK for TO, run in conditions "with good wind for TO" but when a little aloft (apparently) a sudden gust of wind made it (the AC) to "go back down" and don't TO, then crossed the limits of the runway (supposedly a side of the RW) for ABOUT 2-3 kilometres [1&half miles] --*--
Me (the pax), this man (gesture signaling somebody out of sight in the video) and "la señora" (this meaning "my wife") were seated in BUSSINES (says clase PREMIER) so we could go out "that fast", but all the move (evac procedure) was made in 3-4 minutes until all the junk got fire ("comenzar a explotar").

--*-- Considering the lenght of Durango's RW (9200 ft/2800mt) this measurement is almost accurate taking in account the final position of the AC


Note: the pax (in the video) DOESN'T SAY ANYTHING about any storm, hail, rain or anything related to atmospheric bad conditions as a cause for the accident. Only says "strong wind".

[The Old Fat One]

Well having read the whole thread, I'm going to go ahead and add my speculation.

If everybody ends up walking away from that there will have been:

a lot of luck involved

and, any number of hero's.

[guadaMB]

Weather in Durango (at the moment of TO)

Until CCTV cameras from the airport (surely THERE ARE) show the exact moment of the TO, it's not sure to talk about "heavy rain, hail & etc".

In the video of post #17 can be seen a ditch with a generous (but not an ocean) amount of water at the back of the interview. Muddy water: this means +/- recent rain.

In the video of post #42 (the ride of an airport's car along the RW, no real date/time of recording) doesn't show traces of a BIG RAIN. Asphalt shows to be slightly WET in some areas, but no "pools" as sign of a recent shower

[ExSimGuy]

It's long past the time when certificating authorities should do a proper evac test. By this I mean brief the test passengers, a mix of ages and mobility, and brief them with cash prizes for first ones off, factored for position on aircraft of course, but also brief ONLY a smaller percentage of a VERY healthy additional bounty if they get their bags off too. $$$ talks, and such a staged Evac would be absolutely fascinating to watch....

An "interesting" thought about tests, but how could that affect "real life"?
Would "automatic locking overheads" help, or would they cause more evac delays as pax struggled trying to get them open? :confused:

[Alpine Flyer]

Have only speed-read all the above, but sometimes it can be a nasty shock at VR to realise something got missed out on the check list....like flaps or reduced thrust settings. A bit early to run out of fuel...We'll just have to wait and see

Not wanting to say that can't be a factor but it would require at least a bigger mistake in setting up the take-off in the MCDU as the E-Jets will not accept empty take-off settings (defaulting to max thrust) and warn if the flap setting is different from the one set on the take-off data pages.

Not familiar with characteristics of this type of engine and hot and high operations, though.

[ONE GREEN AND HOPING]

ALPINE FLYER........I suppose I was thinking about that four engined Airbus that left somewhere in Australia for the Middle East having set a too low assumed temperature - or what ever system they used for less than rated t/o thrust. They got airborne ok that time, but not without collecting a few twigs and airport souvenirs in the process. My last modern type was the 744 twenty years ago, so I'm not up to date with technology. When I began as junior trash, it was a case of working speedily through several fine printed pull-out graphs with added interpolations and corrections. Ironically it was probably simpler to avoid gross errors than reading off numbers from a table and twiddling knobs.

[Nails]

Old Fat: I retired from 25+ years as an accident investigator and have concluded, among other things, that--by far--most aviation luck is good. Unfortunately there are always exceptions.

[Airbubba]

Some pax reports from media articles:

“We took off—it was pouring rain—honestly I thought ‘why in the world are we even taking off,’” Dorelia Rivera of Elmwood Park said.

Rivera was on the plane with nine other from Chicago, she said. She talked to NBC 5 from the hospital in Durango, Mexico.

“Within a couple minutes the plane just started shaking,” she said. “We heard a loud noise behind us—and the next thing we knew it was starting to smoke and fire.”

...Alberto Herrera, who was also on the plane, said he was with Sanchez after the crash."We said a prayer for everybody on board. There was like 20 of us, we didn’t know if everybody got out we were just hoping for the best that everybody got out," he told NBC 5 Wednesday morning.

Herrera said he could feel "insane" winds as the plane took off. But all he could do was "hope for the best" as it came back to the ground.


https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Chicago-Area-Priest-Injured-in--489685751.html


It felt like the aircraft was battling the heavy rain and wind before it hit the ground twice during the crash, said Anabel Estrada, a passenger from Joliet, Illinois."The second impact was a lot stronger. This is when I jumped and hit my head against the ceiling," Estrada said. "After the second impact, I saw flames in the cabin ahead of me."

https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/31/americas/aeromexico-plane-durango/index.html

Alberto Herrero, from Chicago, told NBC’s "Today" that he escaped from the rear emergency exit of the plane and helped others climb out behind him as the cabin filled with black smoke.

“As we were taking off … we ended hitting a hailstorm that caused a lot of turbulence. As we were starting our ascent … it just brought us back down," he recalled. “I have felt turbulence before but this time it was different."


https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/aerom-xico-crash-how-everyone-aboard-jet-survived-n896431

[gearlever]

There is a video of the takeoff run on AvHerald.
Scary......

[speedbirdconcorde]

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=KbWLVuiLFA4

[WHBM]

It's long past the time when certificating authorities should do a proper evac test. By this I mean brief the test passengers, a mix of ages and mobility, and brief them with cash prizes for first ones off, factored for position on aircraft of course, but also brief ONLY a smaller percentage of a VERY healthy additional bounty if they get their bags off too. $$$ talks, and such a staged Evac would be absolutely fascinating to watch....
The very approach, including the cash bonuses but also setting off smoke, that you mention was abandoned when it was found that about 1 in 10-20 of such evac test participants suffered a serious injury (which probably reflects reality itself, but whatever). On one of the last such tests done on a widebody in the US, a volunteer was paralysed for life.

http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-06/business/fi-830_1_evacuation-test

Be careful what you wish for.

[er340790]

I retired from 25+ years as an accident investigator and have concluded, among other things, that--by far--most aviation luck is good.

True... though most incidents I have seen over the last 42 years involved the pushing of that luck.... right up until it ran out. :sad:

[Alpine Flyer]

ALPINE FLYER........I suppose I was thinking about that four engined Airbus that left somewhere in Australia for the Middle East having set a too low assumed temperature - or what ever system they used for less than rated t/o thrust. They got airborne ok that time, but not without collecting a few twigs and airport souvenirs in the process. My last modern type was the 744 twenty years ago, so I'm not up to date with technology. When I began as junior trash, it was a case of working speedily through several fine printed pull-out graphs with added interpolations and corrections. Ironically it was probably simpler to avoid gross errors than reading off numbers from a table and twiddling knobs.

Slightly OT, but no system is fool-proof obviously, and there are ways to mess up the Embraer's performance calcs for sure.

I'm with you on the speed advantage of the graphs, for a regional jet operating on non-limiting runways most calculations were as simple as checking that max. FLEX was possible and reading off three V speeds. Now we type lots of data into a computer to get much more accurate results in much more time. There are error messages to warn you of potentially inconsistent data but some of them (such as GW < MZFW) pop up for every calculation which results in them being clicked away as a matter of routine.

[seadoons]

testing for a new member!

[DaveReidUK]

I am assuming the actual aircraft in question

Yes, the comments on YouTube make it clear that it is.

Though the title, courtesy of Avherald, "Aeromexico Connect E190 at Durango on Jul 31st 2018, overran runway on rejected takeoff" doesn't seem to be supported by the content.

[simfly]

It is possible the gear had started to retract, the aircraft had definitely got airborne. Remember what happened in DXB with the EK 777. Potentially similar result despite that being lack of thrust and returning to earth, and this one being that or wind shear. Would explain the engines location.

[Doors to Automatic]

There is a video here of the full take-off run ........

https://youtu.be/8qAeZRhuM-s

[lomapaseo]

It is possible the gear had started to retract, the aircraft had definitely got airborne. Remember what happened in DXB with the EK 777. Potentially similar result despite that being lack of thrust and returning to earth, and this one being that or wind shear. Would explain the engines location.

I don't think so about the gear.

I tend to see lift but little rotation and no engine pops or spool downs

Lots of possibilities to be explored

[Concours77]

I don't think so about the gear.

I tend to see lift but little rotation and no engine pops or spool downs

Lots of possibilities to be explored

yep. No positive rate of climb, No reasonable AoA to suggest a climb. It appears to have impacted reasonably level. Suggests wind shear.....imo.

[Lookleft]

Passengers and their phones can be a nuisance but in this case it gives a lot of detail. It certainly enters a heavy shower and is still on the runway when it passes over the upwind touchdown markers. It will be interesting to see if the windshear alert warning was activated during the takeoff run.

[dmba]

Would using what was left of the runway and getting back down to the ground have potentially been what prevented disaster?

[Sailvi767]

They took off into a strong thunderstorm. Passenger video show rain increasing as the rotate. Occums razor! Microburst or severe wind shear. Storm was very high as it left large hailstones. Classic microburst conditions.

[Volume]

On one of the last such tests done on a widebody in the US, a volunteer was paralysed for life.
Be careful what you wish for.
This is the reason why in many countries there is no more spin training or single-engine-out exercises during check rides on twin engine GA aircraft.
The number of accidents during such training intended to prevent future accidents made it questionable.

However, if we accept that it is too risky to test it, how can we rely on it to be a safe procedure in case of an emergency? Giving the message to all crews that an evacuation is too risky to test, how do we expect them to take the decission in a real emergency? Just compare with the discussion for the BA in Las Vegas.
Being able to safely evacuate an aircraft is one of the basics in aircraft design and certification. So we should make sure it really works.
It is quite encouraging to see, that in the last 20 years it did. It is the big question whether the situation has become worse since (more carry on, more uneducated passengers...).

All recent accidents showed that:
- there are high risks, passengers do not follow the instructions, crews do not always take the best decissions
- it works

Passenger video show rain increasing as the rotate. Occums razor! Microburst or severe wind shear.
Or engine failure/flameout due to heavy rain... Engines are tested to accept heavy rain in flight, we do not assume that pilots would take off in such situations, we do not design engines to accept any ammount of rain at take-off power, potentially also ingesting additional water from the nose wheel spray.

[sabenaboy]

Some media are already calling the captain a hero. :}
https://www.forbes.com.mx/carlos-galvan-meyran-el-piloto-que-salvo-la-vida-de-mas-de-100-personas/ (Translation (https://translate.google.be/?hl=en&tab=wT#es/en/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com.mx%2Fcarlos-galvan-meyran-el-piloto-que-salvo-la-vida-de-mas-de-100-personas%2F))
I don't like it when people jump to conclusions, blaming the crew, but calling him a hero so soon...?
Didn't he have enough clues that starting the take off roll was not a good idea? The investigation will tell if he's a reckless fool or a hero or a victim of circumstances...

[CurtainTwitcher]

Engines are tested to accept heavy rain in flight, we do not assume that pilots would take off in such situations, we do not design engines to accept any amount of rain at take-off power

Can you elaborate on this point? My type doesn't have any limitation for rain, nor advise me to delay takeoff with precipitation.

[Volume]

FAR 33.78, CS E.790 Rain and hail ingestion

The ingestion of large hailstones (0.8 to 0.9 specific gravity) at the maximum true air speed, for
altitudes up to 4 500 metres, associated with a representative aircraft operating in rough air, with
the Engine at Maximum Continuous power/ thrust, must not cause unacceptable mechanical
damage or unacceptable power or thrust loss after the ingestion, or require the Engine to be shut
down.
Pilots are not supposed to perform a take-off in a hailstorm.

In addition to complying with (CS/FAR specific) and except as provided in (CS/FAR specific), it must be
shown that each Engine is capable of acceptable operation throughout its specified operating
envelope when subjected to sudden encounters with the certification standard concentrations of
rain and hail as defined in Appendix (CS/FAR specific).
Appendix (CS/FAR specific) gives a diagram which requires 20 g/m³ Water up to an altitude for 20.000ft, which is the value relevant for take-off.

Pilots are not supposed to perform a take-off in extreme rain exceeding 20 g/m³ (which is extreme, but happens). In most countries you only encounter such rain in heavy thunderstorms, pilots are not supposed to take off in that situation, especially as you typically just have to wait a few minutes before it has passed.

Aircraft are certified to flown reasonably by the pilot. Every pilot is trained to avoid severe weather.
Sometimes the job of a pilot is to just say no.

[guadaMB]

They took off into a strong thunderstorm. Passenger video show rain increasing as the rotate. Occums razor! Microburst or severe wind shear. Storm was very high as it left large hailstones. Classic microburst conditions.

THere is ANOTHER video taken from a port window in which is clearly seen that the "storm" is INCREASING during the TO procedure.
When it begins, seems to be a "regular" rainy TO (nothing unusual in lots of places on Planet Earth) but increases once rotation begins.
Possibly metars weren't given correctly to the PIC for the TO calcs...
Just a guess.

[SMT Member]

Rather than redefining the parameters for an evacuation test, how about using real-life data from the last 10 years? There's been quite a few evacuations, following different kind of incidents and in wildly different settings. 'Real life' data will always give us a better picture of how passengers and crew will act than any simulation, regardless of how well thought out it may be, so why not use that data to see if there are any reasons for change? It should start with a couple of very simple questions: Was evacuation achieved within 90 seconds? If not, what caused the slow down?

[costalpilot]

Can you elaborate on this point? My type doesn't have any limitation for rain, nor advise me to delay takeoff with precipitation.
we had a mileage restriction relative to thunderstorms which certainly precluded TO in one.

[320DRIVER]

Those passenger videos will become an invaluable training tool.

Up to now we only had sterile diagrams showing a generic aircraft going in one side of the rain shaft and being hurled to the ground as it exited it with the negative wind shear.

It will also be interesting to look at the decision making as no one sets out to crash an aircraft and to see what the onboard WX radar and PWS were showing.

http://learntoflyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/17-16-takeoff.png

[Capt Fathom]

Having watched the videos, the visibility didn’t look that bad. Not that it is an indicator of windshear or a microburst.

[Sailvi767]

THere is ANOTHER video taken from a port window in which is clearly seen that the "storm" is INCREASING during the TO procedure.
When it begins, seems to be a "regular" rainy TO (nothing unusual in lots of places on Planet Earth) but increases once rotation begins.
Possibly metars weren't given correctly to the PIC for the TO calcs...
Just a guess.

He had a radar and eyeballs as well as thunderstorms reported.

[passengerby]

Difficult to see on the video but I have the impression that no flaps were set.

[Global Aviator]

The results of the investigation will be interesting. I haven’t read the entire thread.

Yes the E190 is very modern so the radar would have predictive wind shear and wind shear ahead functions? I don’t know the systems, any inhibited periods?

The mark 1 eyeball can see a thunderstorm however that’s about it.

[lomapaseo]

we do not design engines to accept any ammount of rain at take-off power, potentially also ingesting additional water from the nose wheel spray.

The higher the power to more easier it is to ingest rain.

With today's engines the majority of the rain is centrifuged by the fan or diverged behind the fan to not pass through the engine innards. More fan RPM at slow speeds shields the compressor more. In flight low fan rpm and high air speed drives the rain droplets straight.

The cycle of the engines is also important as it affects air to water ratio and the energy needed to process the rain to a gas. Thus the higher the power is good.

Many other considerations enter into this in flight conditions

[hunbet]

Looks like a very violent and brief squall with hail and windshear. The predictive windshear would have been inhibited just prior to the time they encountered it . Many warnings are inhibited during T/O until established in climb.
Note that the after crash videos don't show any rain.

[320DRIVER]

Looks like a very violent and brief squall with hail and windshear. The predictive windshear would have been inhibited just prior to the time they encountered it . Many warnings are inhibited during T/O until established in climb.
Note that the after crash videos don't show any rain.


PWS is available up to 100 kts on most aircraft as that’s the whole point, and the WX radar should have given quite a distinct picture. Having said all that, we don’t know if PWS was fitted on this aircraft.

[FIRESYSOK]

:ugh:While I agree most would of been inhibited by take off it doesn't say much for the system if it didn't pick up a cell capable of putting an aircraft back on the deck during the early roll.. (assuming the cell theory)

And if the bulk of the cell was approaching from behind? The outer edge of a microburst from a cell behind the runway threshold would create a tailwind, which is what happened here. If they were flying into a cell, an increasing performance would have occurred, followed by a decrease, well off the airport boundary.

[RatherBeFlying]

The on board radar shows what's ahead in a narrow cone. There's a lot of sky and possible nastiness in the hemisphere surrounding the aircraft that's not in that cone.

If the Mexican government offers weather radar images on the web, the pax might have better SA with their phones (airplane mode off) ;)

[hunbet]

The microburst could have formed directly above the airport just as they were on the takeoff roll.The weather radar would have been incapable of detecting anything close.
Moments later it wasn't even raining at the crash site.

[nbenford]

Watching the LiveLeaks video from the left side, you can hear what sounds like wind whistling right when the aircraft rotated and leaves the ground. Soon after, the wind sounds stops and the plane comes back down sans gear. Reminds me of DAL 191: “you’re gonna lose it all of a sudden” when the L1011 enters the rain shaft and encounters a strong headwind. The headwind shears to a downdraft, and all the airspeed is gone. For both aircraft, the time betweeen headwind and downdraft is quite short.

Anyone have the expertise to tell if the rotation point is before what would be expected of a plane at this weight in those conditions? If it rotated too soon, it may be because the pilots got the headwind and thought they got a nice “bonus” on takeoff only to lose it.

[PJ2]

If you can set aside the music and narration and just watch the video, we can see what some (not all) microbursts look like and how they behave.

At the start of the takeoff run the vis is good off to the right, (slightly less so to the left) in these videos, but rain & wind increase just prior to rotation. The aircraft gets briefly airborne and settles back, hard, onto the runway.

It is apparent in the video that the leading-edge devices are deployed as expected. Could be classic windshear, or "rain-roughened" wing surfaces or a combination of these factors.

Regarding reduced-thrust and assumed temperature power settings, this would have been a full-thrust takeoff given the METARS. But, as always, what we think should be the case doesn't explain the accident, (Sid Dekker, Field Guide to Understanding Human Factors).

This aircraft type has very good recorders and the QAR may have an even more detailed set of parameters so determining aircraft energy, system & power settings, control inputs, accelerations and so on will be (or should be!) straightforward. The CVR will be interesting in terms of any discussions regarding awareness of weather and the decision to takeoff.

NOTE: Bear in mind that this is time lapse work and the speed with which this "rain bomb" moves may be exaggerated.

Tuscon microburst video - (time lapse)

[Chris Scott]

Re the evacuation, what strikes me most about the on-board video/audio is that - admittedly in the absence of pictures after the severe impact - the degree of audible panic among the passengers is much lower than I would have expected in the circumstances.

It will be interesting to find out in due course, perhaps, what the thumping noises were. Sounds as if someone near the camera was trying to fight past or through an obstruction. Was the fuselage breached even before the fire destroyed it?

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

It will be interesting to find out in due course, perhaps, what the thumping noises were. Sounds as if someone near the camera was trying to fight past or through an obstruction. Was the fuselage breached even before the fire destroyed it?

Or someone fighting with an overwing exit to get it open/tossed out of the way? Pure speculation on my part.

[cappt]

Wind shear warnings in the aircraft I fly are prohibited until 15'agl radar altimeter.

Why o why they didn't sit at the end of the runway 20 minutes and takeoff in the clear.
TEM threat-error-management.

[pattern_is_full]

As a reminder, a microburst after take-off put a Pan Am 727 into the ground from 150 feet altitude (Flt. 759, Kenner (New Orleans), 1982). No survivors. In a weird way, this flight was "lucky" if the microburst (if real - high probability) prevented it from getting significantly airborne, if at all. Of course, 36 years ago we were only just starting to get a handle on detecting and handling microburst threats.
______________________
Any followup on the original reports of engine failure? Was that just "fog of war?" If real, what are the odds it was caused by hail or rain ingestion from the same weather event? cf: take-off video.

On the positive side, AvHerald quotes hospital as saying the captain is recovering from spinal surgery and can move arms and legs. :ok:

[aeroskipper]

..the authorities are already stating it can be a lengthy investigation, depending on the condition of the recorders and that the captain is assisting in the investigation..
..that already sounds like the recorders are good enough, but that they are now preparing the "actual happening" of the accident to hold water reg. insurance and upcoming passenger law suits..
..lure me - if indeed it was a windshear - that they are already preparing to put all blame on the captain for a takeoff into a windshear "which he is expected to be able to predict from the current WX situation based on education, experience and good judgement"
..just my guess - we've seen it all before..

[HarryMann]

True... though most incidents I have seen over the last 42 years involved the pushing of that luck.... right up until it ran out. :sad:

Same here, very wise words. I know I've had my 9 lives !
It's so nice to hear of a serendipitous outcome in these tines of angst, trouble and strife pretty well everywhere around the world.

[Onceapilot]

Same here, very wise words. I know I've had my 9 lives !
It's so nice to hear of a serendipitous outcome in these tines of angst, trouble and strife pretty well everywhere around the world.

Yes, less than worst case. :ok: However, this was not serendipitous, if this was primarily caused by downburst, ignoring the adverse conditions and taking-off was pure risk taking. Unfortunately, I have witnessed similar many times from the flightdeck. :oh:

OAP

[neilki]

These days with assumed temp and derates etc etc very hard too tell. Only guide I'd have is if we aren't rotating by the time I'm getting into 900m (alt red white) I'd be getting twitchy.
In this Wx? not gonna happen. No one in any possession of their senses would use derated thrust for takeoff in LLWS conditions...

[mickjoebill]

Video of takeoff from port side passenger window. Also clearly shows smoke direction after the crash.
Audio of distressed victims following the evacuation

https://www.buzzfeed.com/briannasacks/aeromexico-plane-crash-video?utm_term=.yoyMkq37e9#.yoyMkq37e9

mjb

[daelight]

Yes, less than worst case. :ok: However, this was not serendipitous, if this was primarily caused by downburst, ignoring the adverse conditions and taking-off was pure risk taking. Unfortunately, I have witnessed similar many times from the flightdeck. :oh:

OAP/

Does Mexico have such a 'blame the crew' culture like 3rd world countries such as Bolivia, Italy and France?

[N90-EWR]

/

Does Mexico have such a 'blame the crew' culture like 3rd world countries such as Bolivia, Italy and France?

Taking off under those conditions was an extremely poor judgement call, and as so often I am reminded in these forums, the captain is the ultimate authority in deciding whether to go or not to go, so yes, the blame is on the crew on this one, and the "culture" over there has nothing to do with that.

[Daysleeper]

Taking off under those conditions was an extremely poor judgement call, and as so often I am reminded in these forums, the captain is the ultimate authority in deciding whether to go or not to go, so yes, the blame is on the crew on this one, and the "culture" over there has nothing to do with that.

A good investigation will want to understand why they made the decision that they did, not just that they made that decisions. Say responsibility rather than blame, tends to get more help from the crew.

[Mora34]

/

Does Mexico have such a 'blame the crew' culture like 3rd world countries such as Bolivia, Italy and France?

No it's the other way around. It's praise the crew (no matter what).

[lomapaseo]

It's way too early to talk of blame and such talk un-nerves future passengers from flying.

As an aviation forum we must be aware that it's corrective actions that count towards calming passengers. Best to concentrate on getting facts and lessons learned

[1.3vso]

[QUOTE=Alpine Flyer;10211832]Not wanting to say that can't be a factor but it would require at least a bigger mistake in setting up the take-off in the MCDU as the E-Jets will not accept empty take-off settings (defaulting to max thrust) and warn if the flap setting is different from the one set on the take-off data pages.
On the E170/190s, before takeoff, pressing the take-off config test button (as you enter the runway) will alert you "No Takeoff" if the data is not entered (also alerts you if your flaps setting and the settings input on the MCDU don't match).

One possibility I was thinking was that the autothrottles may not have been armed correctly and didn't go into TOGA. Shouldn't have been a problem if the crew caught that early enough but left undetected a lot of runway was like used before the plane accelerated to V1.

[Flugjung]

[QUOTE=Alpine Flyer;10211832]Not wanting to say that can't be a factor but it would require at least a bigger mistake in setting up the take-off in the MCDU as the E-Jets will not accept empty take-off settings (defaulting to max thrust) and warn if the flap setting is different from the one set on the take-off data pages.
On the E170/190s, before takeoff, pressing the take-off config test button (as you enter the runway) will alert you "No Takeoff" if the data is not entered (also alerts you if your flaps setting and the settings input on the MCDU don't match).

One possibility I was thinking was that the autothrottles may not have been armed correctly and didn't go into TOGA. Shouldn't have been a problem if the crew caught that early enough but left undetected a lot of runway was like used before the plane accelerated to V1.

Very unlikely.

I fly the very same aircraft with that airline. Flight deck discipline is very high. From time to time one of us may forget to arm the autothrottle (not part of any checklist) but I have seen this no more than 3 times. I have nearly 2000 hrs in that type.

I have been many times in MMDO, Durango, and it is really a treacherous airport to fly in. Usually conditions are VMC but in summer there are a lot of fast moving CBs and thunderstorms. Both Metar and Taf were not showing anyhing unusual but i have seen very sudden gusts and shifts in short final while the tower reported “calm”. The airport is in a flatland surrounded by a very tall montain range.

[fisher22]

As a reminder, a microburst after take-off put a Pan Am 727 into the ground from 150 feet altitude (Flt. 759, Kenner (New Orleans), 1982). No survivors. In a weird way, this flight was "lucky" if the microburst (if real - high probability) prevented it from getting significantly airborne, if at all. Of course, 36 years ago we were only just starting to get a handle on detecting and handling microburst threats.
______________________
Any followup on the original reports of engine failure? Was that just "fog of war?" If real, what are the odds it was caused by hail or rain ingestion from the same weather event? cf: take-off video.

On the positive side, AvHerald quotes hospital as saying the captain is recovering from spinal surgery and can move arms and legs. :ok:
Mexico is still in prehistoric times when it comes to air traffic and weather technology and overall airport infrastructure, in places like Durango (or any other airport for that matter) for ATIS and METARs you'll have a dude looking out the window and guessing what the current conditions are (apart from basic wind/temp/pressure data). In this case I'm sure he saw some rain, estimated the cloud base and put it out on the report, any low level windhsear, microbursts and the like simply can't be detected

[Flugjung]

Mexico is still in prehistoric times when it comes to air traffic and weather technology and overall airport infrastructure, in places like Durango (or any other airport for that matter) for ATIS and METARs you'll have a dude looking out the window and guessing what the current conditions are (apart from basic wind/temp/pressure data). In this case I'm sure he saw some rain, estimated the cloud base and put it out on the report, any low level windhsear, microbursts and the like simply can't be detecte

stop saying nonsense, I have flown in my airline all over Mexico, US, Central America and the Caribbean

Eveb the smallest airports with airline operations like Matamoros MMMT, Minatitlan MMMT, or Nuevo Laredo MMNL have more than acceptable survelliance equipment.

Durango’s weather has always being treacherous. You have no idea and by the way you write, I really doubt you have left your home PC.....

[aterpster]

stop saying nonsense, I have flown in my airline all over Mexico, US, Central America and the Caribbean

Eveb the smallest airports with airline operations like Matamoros MMMT, Minatitlan MMMT, or Nuevo Laredo MMNL have more than acceptable survelliance equipment.

Durango’s weather has always being treacherous. You have no idea and by the way you write, I really doubt you have left your home PC.....
You airline pilots in Mexico and the Mexico ATC system are first rate with, of course, some exceptions. Having said that, as a "gringo" who lives in Southern California, I am afraid to go to Mexico for my safety, your first-rate pilots and ATC notwithstanding.

[Willoz269]

You airline pilots in Mexico and the Mexico ATC system are first rate with, of course, some exceptions. Having said that, as a "gringo" who lives in Southern California, I am afraid to go to Mexico for my safety, your first-rate pilots and ATC notwithstanding.

Not sure that was necessary....as a foreigner, I and a few people are actually afraid to visit California or anywhere in the US for our safety....

Back to Mexico's setup....suggest we await the investigation preliminary report to see what factors were found that need to be considered when analysing the outcome of this event.

[fisher22]

stop saying nonsense, I have flown in my airline all over Mexico, US, Central America and the Caribbean

Eveb the smallest airports with airline operations like Matamoros MMMT, Minatitlan MMMT, or Nuevo Laredo MMNL have more than acceptable survelliance equipment.

Durango’s weather has always being treacherous. You have no idea and by the way you write, I really doubt you have left your home PC.....

Are we supposed to be impressed that you've flown to the Caribbean and Central America? Come on man, not on this forum.

I wrote what I wrote because I've seen it first hand, or are any of the airports you mentioned equipped with LLWAS? A microburst alert system? Terminal Doppler radar? What about AWOS, RVR measuring systems?

Don't take it personal, but with the technology that exists today maybe the Mexican government should look into investing into better equipment so pilots and controllers are more aware of what's going on around them to keep accidents like this from happening. To say Mexican airports are equipped with state of the art weather measuring systems is just kidding ourselves.

[Flugjung]

Are we supposed to be impressed that you've flown to the Caribbean and Central America? Come on man, not on this forum.

I wrote what I wrote because I've seen it first hand, or are any of the airports you mentioned equipped with LLWAS? A microburst alert system? Terminal Doppler radar? What about AWOS, RVR measuring systems?

Don't take it personal, but with the technology that exists today maybe the Mexican government should look into investing into better equipment so pilots and controllers are more aware of what's going on around them to keep accidents like this from happening. To say Mexican airports are equipped with state of the art weather measuring systems is just kidding ourselves.



I’m an Aeromexico Connect first officer with more than 3,000 hrs on the type, so I REALLY know Durango. My last flight was from there.

I’m not trying to impress anybody, simply STOP writing NONSENSE. Saying facilities in Mexico are “prehistoric”, is one.
Durango is a small airport with its most impirtant routes being to MEX and TIJ with Volaris and Aeromexico.

BTW, ONLY the most important airports in the US have LLWAS , RVR, or Doppler radar. Those systems are expensive and are NOT worth the expense in arports with low traffic.

[Lonewolf_50]

Not sure that was necessary....as a foreigner, I and a few people are actually afraid to visit California or anywhere in the US for our safety. Back to Mexico's setup....suggest we await the investigation preliminary report to see what factors were found that need to be considered when analysing the outcome of this event. Either you need to take this crap to JB, or grow a clue. I stopped traveling to Mexico in about 2008. Before that, I used to drop in south of the border with reasonable frequency. I am familiar with why terp's PoV is what it is. But it's naught to do with aviation, so it probably needs to not be in this particular thread.

@FlugJung: thanks for your experienced-based points regarding why that particular airport was not set up with LLWAS.

@fisher: making a broad brush assertion like that is going to get a pointed response; not sure why you chose to stir the pot, but to each his own I guess. I'm just glad they all got out.

[West Coast]

You airline pilots in Mexico and the Mexico ATC system are first rate with, of course, some exceptions. Having said that, as a "gringo" who lives in Southern California, I am afraid to go to Mexico for my safety, your first-rate pilots and ATC notwithstanding.

Just spent a week in Mexico on family vacation, absolutely no issues. Fish the Sea of Cortez every other year, no security threats what so ever. Are there areas not to visit, sure. Just the same, just because someone gets whacked in Compton doesn’t mean I won’t go to Santa Monica.

Willoz.

I’ve visited your nation a number of times and never had an issue, but I knew where to avoid to stay out of trouble. There’s areas of Sydney that I’d avoid for my safety, doesn’t mean the whole nation is off limits. You might want to consider a similar approach to the US.

[Halfnut]

Just because the airport has LLWAS , RVR, and Doppler radar it still won't stop stupid pilots from doing stupid stuff.

[His dudeness]

Just because the airport has LLWAS , RVR, and Doppler radar it still won't stop stupid pilots from doing stupid stuff.

Bit similar to pprune, which has moderation, yet some guys post stupid stuff.

[Passenger 389]

Bad weather caused Aeromexico crash in July, investigators say

September 5, 2018 / 10:25 PM

MEXICO CITY (Reuters) - An Aeromexico plane crash in July that injured dozens of people in northern Mexico was likely caused by bad weather, authorities investigating the accident said on Wednesday.

Jose Armando Constantino, the director of analysis of accidents and incidents for Mexico’s civil aviation agency, said there was no evidence of human error or mechanical failures.

"There is no evidence that the motors had a mechanical or technical problem," he told a news conference.

"The air speed indicates there were many fluctuations, there was an external factor. The external factor is a microburst, the probable cause (of the accident) was due to meteorological factors," he said.
* * * * * * * *
Investigators have found no evidence indicating that the crew should have known not to take off, Constantino said.
A pilot in training served as copilot while the plane was taking off, he said.
The agency will later present a final report detailing its findings about the accident.

[there is more elsewhere, but others are more qualified to post and comment upon it. ]

[DaveReidUK]

It's interesting that, more than a month after the event, we are still seeing reports that it was an RTO gone wrong, despite there being no evidence to support that assertion.

Accident: Aeromexico Connect E190 at Durango on Jul 31st 2018, veered off and overran runway after rejected takeoff and burst into flames (http://avherald.com/h?article=4bbcb11c)

Link to Reuters/DGAC article quoted above:

Reuters: Bad weather caused Aeromexico crash in July, investigators say (https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-gpo-aeromex-crash/bad-weather-caused-aeromexico-crash-in-july-investigators-say-idUKKCN1LL36G)

[lomapaseo]

It's interesting that, more than a month after the event, we are still seeing reports that it was an RTO gone wrong, despite there being no evidence to support that assertion.

It's hard to describe it to the general reader otherwise. The devil is in the details which is in the final report

[Concours77]

The evidence does support RTO somewhat. Once through the hail, the aircraft settled back onto the runway, without rolling pitching or yawing. Engine noise is gone, and the screams do not start until we see debris flying past the window frame. No “rotation”. The slog through the overrun was the gear snagging on irregular surface and planted soil, gravel?

[DaveReidUK]

The evidence does support RTO somewhat. Once through the hail, the aircraft settled back onto the runway, without rolling pitching or yawing. Engine noise is gone,

I'd suggest that the absence of engine noise might be due to the absence of the engines by that point ... :O

Given that the intact, detached engines have been available to investigators for several weeks, I think we'd know by now if a reverser had been deployed on either/both before they departed the wing.

[wiedehopf]

In the preliminary report on page 39 it shows 91% N1 and 95% N2, is that maximum for the conditions (28 C at 6600ft) or was this a reduced thrust takeoff?
There is also 75.0 and 75.3 printed on the throttles in the bottom right of the picture.
http://avherald.com/files/aeromexico_e190-xa-gal_durango_180731_preliminary_report.pdf

[guadaMB]

On page 41 of the preliminary report (pdf), third paragraph, begins with "se detectó...", says "there was detected a non-authorized en-route habilitation session. One "crew member" acted as co-pilot, with Commander's surveillance until he (the Commander) asked for the control. The aeronautical authorities were given word of this".
This means a THIRD CREW member was in the cockpit at the moment of the TO procedure, acting as co-pilot and made the TO procedure actions until the PIC asked for the controls of the AC.
This was confirmed in a press conference in Mexico and is published in several media:

https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/09/05/mexico/1536176632_422381.html

http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/cartera/negocios/atribuyen-condiciones-climatologicas-accidente-de-avion-de-aeromexico

[Concours77]

Given the impact, belly first, the engines were gone immediately. The lack of noise starts whilst still airborne, due to retarded throttles....

just a theory, I’ll push it until I see the final. Meanwhile, thanks for the reply:ok:

[Austrian Simon]

It's interesting that, more than a month after the event, we are still seeing reports that it was an RTO gone wrong, despite there being no evidence to support that assertion.

Accident: Aeromexico Connect E190 at Durango on Jul 31st 2018, veered off and overran runway after rejected takeoff and burst into flames (http://avherald.com/h?article=4bbcb11c)

Still on your personal agenda and vendetta?

What options were left when the aircraft couldn't fly?

[wiedehopf]

Rejecting a takeoff is somewhat of an active decision, is it not? This case seems more like a crash shortly after takeoff.

But i guess it's a question of definition really. So it's just an astonishment that you would label it something that does not fit what one might call an RTO.
Why not discuss the definition instead of throwing labels at each other? Oh what do i say continue it's the internet after all :)

[Concours77]

If in the outflow of a microburst, loss of lift will put your heart in your mouth. With a newbie at the helm, the LHS may have initiated corrective action in concert with “my aircraft...” Gear retracting? Why does that not fit RTO? It’s in the timing, and once in the blender, things can get interesting, no? Was there Rotate call out? If they were descending without stick, no one would initiate (or maintain) an initial climb. Flameout, loss of lift, gear coming up? Thank God they were able to control the outcome such that no one died. Look at the last part of the video, before the upset and the screaming? It settled onto its belly. Doesn’t that suggest some minimum amount of control?

ready to abandon my conjecture. I haven’t rejected any other proposal....

By the way. There may have not been an RTO. The crash may have been unrelated to their intentions, expressed or implied? It may have been “Rejected Climb Out”, is Mother Nature on the CVR?

[Concours77]

All that....Agreed.

[Concours77]

I'd suggest that the absence of engine noise might be due to the absence of the engines by that point ... :O

Given that the intact, detached engines have been available to investigators for several weeks, I think we'd know by now if a reverser had been deployed on either/both before they departed the wing.

Wait.... Are you suggesting the engines left the wings prior to ground contact? Are you suggesting the pilots deployed reversers whilst in the air?

[guadaMB]

Wait.... Are you suggesting the engines left the wings prior to ground contact? Are you suggesting the pilots deployed reversers whilst in the air?


No and no.
Apparently the #1 engine touched the paved side of the RW after a sudden wind (see report).
In fact, this was the FIRST ground contact.
#2 engine left a little after, possibly due to some unbalance
The fuselage ground contact happened about 600 metres (2000 ft) AFTER the #2 engine was lost on the RW.

BOTH ENGINES are pictured in the scenario (preliminary report).
The same report shows NO TRACE OF DEPLOYED REVERSERS.

[DaveReidUK]

They could have taken an active decision to put the aircraft back on despite the gear in transit, or they could not have taken that decision.

Yes, either of those is possible. Neither scenario fits the ICAO definition (or indeed any generally accepted definition) of an RTO. I stand by my comments.

Wait.... Are you suggesting the engines left the wings prior to ground contact? Are you suggesting the pilots deployed reversers whilst in the air?

No, and no.

In fact, in the absence of any reported evidence, I'm not suggesting that the pilots deployed reversers at all. Are you ?

[Concours77]

Yes, either of those is possible. Neither scenario fits the ICAO definition (or indeed any generally accepted definition) of an RTO. I stand by my comments.



No, and no.

In fact, in the absence of any reported evidence, I'm not suggesting that the pilots deployed reversers at all. Are you ?

Of course not, why did you bring it up? Reversers? They started to sink, on purpose or not, and hit the runway and started a debris trail immediately. They wouldn’t Have considered reversers unless and until they established ground track. You had something in mind when you introduced them. What?

I am pretty sure we are talking around each other. No harm no foul.

[theNotoriousPIC]

According to the report no one was able to save the flight in the simulator. A microburst can exceed the performance of the aircraft regardless of crew experience.

[Concours77]

According to the report no one was able to save the flight in the simulator. A microburst can exceed the performance of the aircraft regardless of crew experience.

The video gives us a specific view of the intensity and shape of the microburst, due to the presence of hail. Entry, transit, and exit are discrete, and very telling....In fact, I think the specific cell is visible past the aircraft from photography done by phone on the ground. I swear it looks embarrassed.

[DaveReidUK]

You had something in mind when you introduced them. What?

Simply that had it been an RTO in the accepted sense (i.e. before V1, or failing that, at least before VR), then it would be reasonable to find evidence of deployed reversers.

We appear to be agreed that no such evidence has emerged as yet, and probably would have by now had that been the case.

[Concours77]

Had they been deployed at all, it would have been prior to, or after, launch. Neither seems plausible. If the gear was in transit, (Other than down, locked) that is enough evidence for me. After hitting the ground, well, the circuits were, um, “discontinuous”?

At what point was the aircraft in any shape to commmand “gear up”?

[guadaMB]

Had they been deployed at all, it would have been prior to, or after, launch. Neither seems plausible. If the gear was in transit, (Other than down, locked) that is enough evidence for me. After hitting the ground, well, the circuits were, um, “discontinuous”?

At what point was the aircraft in any shape to commmand “gear up”?

It wasn't:
Recordings (CVR) aren't published, but in the report both GEARS appear DOWN & LOCKED until the last second at 20:22:55 (UTC) in which could be interpreted as both were being unlocked and beginning to "go up". Page 27 of preliminary report.
At that moment, both engines rested about 300 metres back...

[Concours77]

What is the basis of the finding? (Down and Locked)? What is “selected” with both engines off wing and a thousand feet behind suggests what? If the gear was not in transit ever, then reverse may have been selected. I submit only that having the whole of the a/c path visible to us, I see no point at which gear or reversers would (should) be touched.

[DaveReidUK]

Recordings (CVR) aren't published, but in the report both GEARS appear DOWN & LOCKED until the last second at 20:22:55 (UTC) in which could be interpreted as both were being unlocked and beginning to "go up". Page 27 of preliminary report.
At that moment, both engines rested about 300 metres back...

I'm confused, too.

We know where the engines ended up and we can deduce approximately where they were torn off (more accurately in the case of No 1 engine because of the marks on the tarmac).

But how are you relating that to the timeline in the FDR readout ? We can see that the gear was selected up at some point between 20:22:50 and 20:22:52, at which point the aircraft had rotated and was between 5' and 15' above the runway.

I can't see any charts in the FDR readout that show the horizontal position of the aircraft vs time.

[tdracer]

You can pull the throttles to idle and select the reverse levers to 'deploy' at any time - even at 39k (there is a mechanical interlock that will prevent moving the reverse levers from 'stow' if the throttles are above idle'). BUT, nothing will happen with regard to the reversers unless 'weight on wheels' (WOW) is true.

[wiedehopf]

Regarding my earlier post about thrust settings:
75 degrees thrust lever angle is TO/GA at least according to:
http://aviationconsultantsworldwide.com/E190Engines.pdf

75 degrees was set and constant according to the FDR readout in the preliminary report.
Also there is a reserve power setting that is automatically activated for wind shear, engine failure or by placing the thrust levers at 85 degrees.

[RatherBeFlying]

MM:SS Hdg A/S G/S Wθ xWθ WV HW =cos(xWθ)*WV
22:42 32 146 122 47 15 33 32
22:47 34 144 139 63 29 18 16
22:50 32 145 146 103 71 11 4
22:56 30 124 159 204 174 21-21
22:57 30 127 162 220 190 24-24

Unfortunately the source tag fails to put out a fixed pitch font. Mods, feel welcome to fix

Note the change in airspeed and groundspeed in close step with headwind component - a signature of windshear incidents and accidents.

While these photos are at variable intervals, they do show a - 56 kt h/w shear over 15 seconds.

[guadaMB]

I'm confused, too.

We know where the engines ended up and we can deduce approximately where they were torn off (more accurately in the case of No 1 engine because of the marks on the tarmac).

But how are you relating that to the timeline in the FDR readout ? We can see that the gear was selected up at some point between 20:22:50 and 20:22:52, at which point the aircraft had rotated and was between 5' and 15' above the runway.

I can't see any charts in the FDR readout that show the horizontal position of the aircraft vs time.

I sincerely doubt any action of "gear up" in those last two seconds.
The AC skidded and bounced (pictures from above the RW end) for at least 100 meters (300 ft) before stopping.
What is showed in the SIM screen captures (pages 34 to 39) is not correlated with real timeline.

[EDML]

Maybe the Gear Up indication was triggered by the gear being ripped off.

[DaveReidUK]

I sincerely doubt any action of "gear up" in those last two seconds.
The AC skidded and bounced (pictures from above the RW end) for at least 100 meters (300 ft) before stopping.
What is showed in the SIM screen captures (pages 34 to 39) is not correlated with real timeline.

I'm not really sure what point you are trying to make ?

You will be aware, obviously, that the FDR charts on Pages 27/28 of the report stop at the point where the aircraft started to descend.

The last plots on the chart, at 20:25:55, show the aircraft climbing through 30' AGL, engines performing normally and gear in transit having been selected Up.

Incidentally, although my statement

I can't see any charts in the FDR readout that show the horizontal position of the aircraft vs time.

was correct, you can very approximately estimate the point along the runway at which the aircraft became airborne by integration from the longitudinal acceleration plot, which clearly shows the start of roll followed by a roughly constant 0.2 g (say 2 m/s²) acceleration for approximately 35 seconds before rotation.

This gives a ground roll of approximately 1200 m which, had it started on the piano keys (it may not have) would have meant rotation just past Twy D. If the takeoff roll had been from the Twy E or Twy D intersections (though the sim screens suggest not), rotation would have been around 650/1150 m further on, respectively.

By comparison, Twy B, where the No 1 engine impact witness marks were found, is approximately 2400 m from the piano keys.

[guadaMB]

@DaveReidUK
Your figures coincide with some PAX statements.
This means the AC was aloft in the region of 1000/1200 meters. There's no FDR data from 20:22:55 until the "stop" of the AC on soft ground.
It's supposed the max alt was in the region of 30/40 ft AGL (with the data given by the preliminary report)

The "gear up" selection is not at 30 ft but at less than 15 ft AGL.
And in the SIM captures appears to be made at 8 ft AGL (supposedly made after copying the FDR data).

In those extremely bad conditions, what could made the PF order "gear up" when the AC was LESS than 15 ft AGL (because the command "gear up", takes a while to the FO to move the arm/hand, find the lever and push, besides [I suppose] there wasn't a pleasant TO procedure to take it in the calm way).
If things happened as the data shows, the PF commanded "gear up" being 6 to 9 ft AGL and that's difficult to understand (to me).

[guadaMB]

Let me add something:
We're having some discussions based on data given by the Mexican authorities.
The same "authorities" introduce a THIRD PILOT in the cockpit, in a kind of non-authorized training action, making the beginning of the TO procedure until the PIC asks for the command of the AC.
This third pilot appears at the very END of the report, in a 36 words paragraph, as saying: "Ahhhh, we forgot to comment the TO started not with the PIC and the FO but with another pilot in training, playing FO, of course not authorized..."
If this third pilot made the beginning of the TO procedure, had to be seated in the right seat, am I right?
And the FO was in the "observer seat".
One thing is sure: the PIC was sitting in the left seat because had to be evacuated PILOT AND SEAT together when the AC took fire and this was made by the only Spanish passenger on board.

The FDR datasheet maybe not "that real" (this is a guess, I'm a bad boy)

[fisher22]

What was only a rumor has now been confirmed by Mexican authorities, a new to the company First Officer flying as an observer was the pilot at the controls. Apparently he was undergoing training on the E-Jets, not yet type rated, regular non-training flight, captain wasn't qualified as instructor.

The three pilots involved have now been terminated

[Concours77]

Good Lord. Great CRM then.....I won’t erase my comments, but having based them on some assumptions of a legal crew, I think they (comments) were based on data that is wholly unreliable. Sorry.

[guadaMB]

What was only a rumor has now been confirmed by Mexican authorities, a new to the company First Officer flying as an observer was the pilot at the controls. Apparently he was undergoing training on the E-Jets, not yet type rated, regular non-training flight, captain wasn't qualified as instructor.

The three pilots involved have now been terminated

There's a possibility that things went as you tell, but...

Confirmed:
The third pilot was at the controls at the beginning of the TO procedure (not being known until what step of TO) and these were returned to the PIC.
What is assumed by the Mex authorities is that there weren't any waiver to make any training in that flight/AC.
Evidently all was under the carpet just to avoid the insurances waterfall but rumors made them to assume it (besides it was made almost buried by a lot of technical data in the preliminary report).
After being medical treated, pilots were under curfew.
The Spanish pax that made a complex evac of the PIC with the cockpit under fire intended to have a phone call with the PIC (the pax in Durango's hospital and the PIC in a Mexico DF hospital) and could only talk to an Aeromexico employee who said "the PIC was recovering from surgery, thanks".

[sabenaboy]

With the flight data, confirmed by meteorologists, simulator tests were conducted, no flight crew was able to get through the scenario with a different outcome.

From the report:

"No existe evidencia de fallas humanas en la conducción de
la aeronave. No hubo información para que la tripulación
considerara demorar el despegue y los ejercicios de
simulador concluyeron todos con el mismo resultado."

They are saying there was no human error in the HANDLING of the aircraft and then insisting that there was no information to make the crew consider delaying the take off.

The question is: "How many crews would have decided to delay the T.O. or NOT to T.O. if they saw what this crew saw when they started the take off roll?

I think most crews would not depart if they saw this coming.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=pRJ5-T9dwpY

[fox niner]

Discussion going on at the avherald site, claiming that the Mexican ALPA is organising a strike by all AeroMexico pilots. Reason: the 3 pilots involved in this accident have summarly been fired.
The reason for them being fired appears to be the fact that the captain did not have an instructor licence, the pilot flying did not have a type rating yet, and the third pilot, who was supposed to be in the right hand seat, was actually on the jump seat.
The pilot in he right hand seat was due to begin his simulator training and was a personal friend of the captain.
As this was apparently the cockpit setup, the insurance company refuses to pay out.
Sounds like a real mess.

Accident: Aeromexico Connect E190 at Durango on Jul 31st 2018, veered off and overran runway after rejected takeoff and burst into flames (http://avherald.com/h?article=4bbcb11c&opt=0)

[Herod]

The pilot in the right hand seat was due to begin his simulator training and was a personal friend of the captain.

I'm not surprised the insurance company won't pay out. If this is true, the mind boggles. The pilots are going on strike? Do they want the crew re-instated?

[fisher22]

The Aeromexico pilot union is considering going on strike (99% sure they won't) because everybody got their jumspeat privileges taken away by management as a knee jerk reaction to this accident, which is an actual breach of contract by the company. It's not because the actual termination of the pilots.

[guadaMB]

The Aeromexico pilots "reaction" towards a strike is favouring Aeromexico.
Takes attention out of the real focus: THE ACCIDENT.
Insurance companies always want to find a way to don't pay. This is not new.

@sabenaboy

If the microburst came suddenly (not to believe the video's time lapse as the happened in the airport), it's not difficult to understand that crew could be got in underpants.
PIC talking to his friend (right seat) about the AC cockpit, this beginning TO procedure and then PIC asks for the command...
And the burst came into action with the AC in full thrust. This is corroborated by several pax statements. TO thrust begun "normally" and no extreme rain or wind at that time.
Then the cockpit had to be a real mess. Confusion had to be the right word.
Because GEAR UP is being made when the AC was 3 or 4 meters (9 to 12 ft) AGL...(data from the preliminary report, if we have to believe it)
My question is:
- who is going to order GEAR UP being almost on ground?
- E190 and all ACs can fly hundreds of miles GEAR DOWN.
- besides there's no trace of any RTO intention, if you're in trouble during TO, would you prefer to land back on your three set of wheels or belly-first?
- why to do an useless action (gear up) that takes time and concentration of the other crew, provided he/she is able to handle the AC?

[ironbutt57]

One might suspect a bit of machismo being demonstrated here, the Captain showing his buddy the new trainee just how well they could handle any weather

[pezetaroi]

Outrageous how the Mexican DGAC is trying to make a cover up for the nonsense of the pilots, minimizing the fact that the observer shouldn’t have been seated operating the aircraft under ANY circumstance. The windshear was severe, but I’m sure that if the captain have had controls during the whole takeoff phase, we wouldn’t be discussing this right now. Also, the Union is also doing a very poor job by trying to protest against the involved pilots been fired. You cannot defend someone that risked the life's of so many people by doing something so stupid like that!
Anyway, they’re many issues still to be raised here, including all the passengers who sued the airline...

[sabenaboy]

Outrageous how the Mexican DGAC is trying to make a cover up for the nonsense of the pilots, minimizing the fact that the observer shouldn’t have been seated operating the aircraft under ANY circumstance. The windshear was severe, but I’m sure that if the captain have had controls during the whole takeoff phase, we wouldn’t be discussing this right now. Also, the Union is also doing a very poor job by trying to protest against the involved pilots been fired. You cannot defend someone that risked the life's of so many people by doing something so stupid like that!
Anyway, they’re many issues still to be raised here, including all the passengers who sued the airline...

That's exactly the point. It's hard to believe that there was not something looking very mean when this "crew" looked down the runway just prior to starting the take off roll. Haven't we all heard of severe microbursts associated with downpoors during training? A captain that lets a non rated observer act as F/O during departure is not likely to be the prudent type who would say: 'that doesn't look reassuring at the end of the rwy, let's just wait a bit and sit it out.
I think that a lot of normal crews would have had the common sense not to start the take off roll. The question if they aborted or not, or if they could have made it through the microburst is not important.
THÉ question is "could and should a normal crew have known that they were heading to a potentially dangerous microburst? If what they saw through the cockpit windows vaguely resembled what you can see in the youtube video above, the answer is YES!

[fisher22]

Also, the Union is also doing a very poor job by trying to protest against the involved pilots been fired. You cannot defend someone that risked the life's of so many people by doing something so stupid like that!

Like I said in a previous post the Union is not defending the fired pilots, they're protesting against the fact that 2,000+ other Aeromexico, Aeromexico Connect, Aeromar and Mexicana pilots got their jumpseat privileges taken away by the company, this being a breach of contract.

[Concours77]

Prohibiting jumpseat privilege is shortsighted and confrontational. Because it was abused by one crew doesn’t (should not) create any need to remove it. imo.

[guadaMB]

Outrageous how the Mexican DGAC is trying to make a cover up for the nonsense of the pilots, minimizing the fact that the observer shouldn’t have been seated operating the aircraft under ANY circumstance. The windshear was severe, but I’m sure that if the captain have had controls during the whole takeoff phase, we wouldn’t be discussing this right now. Also, the Union is also doing a very poor job by trying to protest against the involved pilots been fired. You cannot defend someone that risked the life's of so many people by doing something so stupid like that!
Anyway, they’re many issues still to be raised here, including all the passengers who sued the airline...



Page 41 of the preliminary report:
"Se detectó una sesión de habilitación en ruta no autorizada. Un tripulante desarrolló las funciones de copiloto, con el acompañamiento del Comandante, hasta que este le pidió los controles. Se dio aviso a la autoridad aeronáutica."
Translation:
"It's been detected a non authorized training session. A crew member developed copilot functions along with the Commander until this (the commander) asked for the controls. It's been given word of this to the aeronautic authority".

This is the sole mention to a breach in the rules. It's not clear until WHEN (which part of the TO procedure) the PIC asked for the controls of the AC.

[pezetaroi]

What I mean is that the DGAC entirely blames the event on the weather, letting know that whoever was on the controls, the outcome would have been the same, clearly minimizing the fact, that the observer acting as a PF and then PM could have been the cause of the accident.

[aterpster]

Prohibiting jumpseat privilege is shortsighted and confrontational. Because it was abused by one crew doesn’t (should not) create any need to remove it. imo.Absolutely. This jump seat rider was presumably approved by the company. If not, so what as to jump seat privileges?

[guadaMB]

What I mean is that the DGAC entirely blames the event on the weather, letting know that whoever was on the controls, the outcome would have been the same, clearly minimizing the fact, that the observer acting as a PF and then PM could have been the cause of the accident.

D'accord, but...
To understand the policy of blaming mainly on Wx (putting under the carpet the crew affaire), have to dig into the insurance contracts. Not reachable for us, but easy to suppose its terms.
Besides it, it's not to forget some peculiarities that could concur. All depends on the possible godfather/s of the crew members (inside & outside the carrier).
Can't say more...

[fox niner]

So how is the strike coming along? Is it going to happen or are they wisely going to skip that.
The captain should have waited 2 months, and he could have flown with his friend many times.

[guadaMB]

Apparently no signs of any strike.
Possibly came to an armistice in sight of returning privileges.

[aterpster]

So how is the strike coming along? Is it going to happen or are they wisely going to skip that.
The captain should have waited 2 months, and he could have flown with his friend many times.
Perhaps not. The crash would have happened anyway.

[fisher22]

The Mexican DGAC has released a circular effectively prohibiting the use of the jumpseat to pilots of every airline and operator in Mexico citing "safety reasons". Only pilots are the ones affected since it remains open to various airline, maintenance, DGAC, and medical personnel, even air traffic controllers riding as observers amongst others, go figure.

Seems more like a punishment to me.

Such is life in the third world.

[Squawk7777]

Comment from the Mexican aviation portal Vuela.com.mx

link (http://vuela.com.mx/am/mensaje-editorial/4914-desmenuzando-el-caso-de-los-pilotos-del-accidente-de-durango.html?utm_source=Diario+Am%C3%A9rica+Vuela&utm_campaign=d1fc960d75-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_10_03_15&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f57422a403-d1fc960d75-365300005) (in Spanish only)
DESMENUZANDO EL CASO DE LOS PILOTOS DEL ACCIDENTE DE DURANGO

La confirmación de anomalías en la actuación de los pilotos del vuelo 2431 de Aeromexico Connect, que se accidentó al intentar despegar del aeropuerto de Durango bajo la furia de una tormenta, detonó una escandalosa bomba cuya onda expansiva ha alcanzado proporciones internacionales, tanto que merece un mayor análisis el papel que cada quien está representado en esta tragedia de interés público y las implicaciones que ya existen para los Pilotos, su Gremio, la Empresa, los Pasajeros y las Autoridades:Los pilotos. No cabe la menor duda que cometieron una falta inadmisible, más allá de que un piloto viajara en la cabina en el lugar conocido como "jump seat" en calidad de pasajero, lo que es práctica habitual, el que el capitán le permitiera tomar los controles para efectuar el despegue (y que el primer oficial le cediera su lugar) es una acción indefendible que se puede calificar desde irresponsable hasta criminal. Los tres cometieron esta falta a sabiendas que era ilegal, porque el "tercer piloto" en cuestión aún no contaba con la certificación para volar ese tipo de avión y aunque con este detalle se ha querido manipular la información, para que quede bien claro: por ley un avión como ese en servicio comercial debe ser tripulado por DOS pilotos debidamente certificados con la capacidad correspondiente. Iniciar el vuelo sin un piloto calificado a los controles hace ilegal la operación y moralmente no se puede desligar de este hecho cualquier cosa que haya pasado después.
Tan grave es este asunto que ya se han desatado toda una serie de cuestionamientos, dentro y fuera de la industria, sobre cuáles pudieron ser las verdaderas razones por las que los pilotos hicieron tal tontería, e incluso si estaban realmente aptos para volar.
Tampoco se ha aclarado si el mentado "tercer piloto" participó en el "briefieng" de prevuelo, revisó los informes meteorológicos o siguió algún procedimiento para realmente ayudar en algo al capitán a operar con seguridad la aeronave, especialmente ante las condiciones climáticas que imperaban, que muchos pilotos y meteorólogos de prestigio que he consultado consideran que aconsejaban extremar las precauciones y hasta postergar el despegue.
El vuelo no empezó al ser golpeados por la microrráfaga, eso fue en parte consecuencia ineludible de todo lo que se hizo desde antes de que se iniciara la carrera de despegue, y los pilotos de este trágico vuelo en vez de cumplir con su deber, rompieron la ley y los procedimientos de seguridad, incluyendo el fundamental protocolo de "cabina estéril".
Dicen las autoridades que ningún piloto hubiera podido salvar el avión de esa tormenta, pero ningún piloto verdaderamente responsable y profesional habría hecho las tonterías que ellos cometieron, deliberadamente, antes de la tragedia...El gremio. Es inevitable que estos acontecimientos estén revolviendo las entrañas de la comunidad đe pilotos aviadores. Se ha interpretado erróneamente que la Asociación Sindical de Pilotos Aviadores (ASPA) tiene la postura de solapar la conducta de estos pilotos, pero en realidad está haciendo lo correcto al defender el debido proceso en su despido por parte de la aerolínea, es nada más un tema laboral y esa es la principal función de un sindicato, tanto pilotos como empresas deben cumplir sus obligaciones. Es el Colegio de Pilotos Aviadores de México, que a mi humilde juicio funciona como un apéndice de ASPA, el que debería tener un papel más definido en este asunto, y es que ni siquiera se han pronunciado oficialmente al respecto con un comunicado, al tiempo que se han mostrado cerca de la investigación como un incómodo juez y parte, representados en el panel de la investigación por pilotos que son empleados de Aeroméxico, mientras que en otros casos no han dudado en apuntar el dedo acusador, especialmente contra la aviación general o las empresas que no están afiliadas a ASPA.
Por otro lado, es una pena que por unos pocos se afecte el prestigio de muchos excelentes y muy profesionales pilotos aviadores, muchos de ellos a los que admiro con gran respeto, pero desafortunadamente esos "pocos" ya se están haciendo demasiados y la lista de incidentes de pilotos indisciplinados ya es preocupante: hay registrados muchos casos de pilotos que no responden a llamados de la torre de control como si se hubieran quedado dormidos, de unos que se enfilan a las pistas equivocadas, de otros que aterrizaron en el aeropuerto equivocado y luego escaparon volviendo a despegar creyendo que nadie se daría cuenta, pasando por el idiota que apagó un motor en pleno vuelo nomás para fanfarronear y muchos otros que juguetean con los aviones para presumir en las redes sociales, sin mencionar a los que se van de parranda en las pernoctas. Esto debe parar, ASPA y el Colegio de Pilotos deben pintar bien la raya entre proteger los derechos de sus agremiados y solapar las fechorías de los irresponsables.
Me precio de contar con la amistad de varios exSecretarios Generales de ASPA y les he reconocido que el sindicato fue un importante garante de la seguridad aérea, pues antes para una empresa tener al sindicato implicaba un costo que valía mucho la pena, pues era en parte un "seguro" del alto nivel de sus pilotos. Hoy lamentablemente los hechos apuntan a que ya no es así y en este sentido creo que ASPA no es "ni el polvo de aquellos lodos".
No puedo creer que se haya tenido la poca sensibilidad, al día siguiente de que se dieron los avances preliminares del accidente, de publicar la convocatoria para contratar 28 nuevos copilotos justamente para Aeroméxico Connect, pidiendo como requisitos 18 años de edad y 250 horas totales de vuelo, cuando saben perfectamente que sus pares en Estados Unidos, por ley, no los aceptan con menos de 21 años y 1,500 horas de vuelo, precisamente porque saben la importancia de esa experiencia para garantizar la seguridad aérea en las aerolíneas. En Estados Unidos los sindicatos de pilotos apoyaron y defendieron el aumento de requisitos para poder volar en las aerolíneas, lo que ellos mismos afirman que ha contribuido a disminuir la tasa de accidentes e incidentes; el que en México los reglamentos en la materia sean obsoletos no es impedimento para que el gremio de pilotos asuma su responsabilidad en este problema y apoyen que se exijan mayores requisitos.
Ojalá que puedan reconocer esta situación, dejar la soberbia a un lado y realizar acciones más concretas para garantizar que no lleguen a las cabinas pilotos irresponsables e incapaces, y se enaltezca esta hermosa profesión...La empresa. Aero Litoral SA de CV, parte del Grupo Aeroméxico que opera bajo el nombre comercial de Aeroméxico Connect, enfrenta con este problema su más fuerte crisis. Apenas se celebró el primer aniversario de la asociación del Grupo con Delta Airlines, y de buena fuente sé que los "gringos" están preocupadísimos con las consecuencias que pueda traer esta situación. Si bien Andrés Conesa, presidente del Grupo Aeroméxico, al darse a conocer del actuar de los pilotos los despidió, al momento de esta publicación aún no ha emitido un comunicado con un pronunciamiento oficial hacia la opinión pública, y esto es muy criticable, pues los pasajeros merecen una explicación urgentemente.
Sin embargo, el comunicado interno sobre el despido, que califica con dureza la conducta de los pilotos, deja entrever lo serio del asunto y afirma la importancia de no permitir que se ponga en riesgo el sostén de las 16 mil familias que dependen de Aeroméxico ni la confianza de los 20 millones de pasajeros a los que se deben. Aunque la empresa se perfile como "víctima" de la "violación deliberada de los procedimientos" por parte de los pilotos, el daño ya está hecho y la confianza de los pasajeros ya se puso en riesgo, pues pese al obvio intento de minimizar mediáticamente las faltas de los pilotos y abrir la "caja china" del clima invencible e impredecible como causa directa del accidente, ya hay muchos medios masivos de comunicación que han explicado detalladamente las cosas.
Al Grupo Aeroméxico sólo le queda asumir su responsabilidad y creo que a nivel directivo deberían también rodar cabezas, pues en las áreas de seguridad operacional y capacitación es evidente que se ha fracasado, y para que se recupere la confianza en la empresa deberían contratar a los mejores expertos del mundo para ocupar esos cargos, cueste lo que cueste y "cacarearlo", de otra manera no será fácil sanar las heridas causadas al prestigio de la aerolínea.
Y todavía le falta aguantar el golpe de una tormenta tan fuerte como la que supuestamente tiró su avión: la de las demandas y problemas de seguros, que ya enegrecen las nubes sobre su cabeza...Los pasajeros. Los derechos de los pasajeros es lo primero que se debe proteger. La competencia para las aerolíneas es muy fuerte y sobra decir que el esfuerzo de todos los empleados, en especial de las tripulaciones de vuelo, es fundamental para conservar la preferencia de los clientes. Francamente Aeromexico no anda muy bien, desde hace varios años ha ido decayendo en la preferencia de los pasajeros, basta recordar que en el "ranking" de las 100 mejores aerolíneas del mundo cayó al penoso lugar 99 y con este escándalo de los pilotos del avionazo de Durango seguramente le irá muy mal.
Me pongo como ejemplo y debo confesar que decidí desde hace casi año y medio no volar más por Aeroméxico, debido a la mala experiencia que sufrí en un vuelo a París, en que alguien sustrajo mi equipaje de mano del avión y dejó otra maleta muy similar en su lugar; los sobrecargos se portaron pésimo, totalmente irresponsables y ajenos a la gravedad del asunto, sobre todo porque había alerta terrorista en Europa y era a los pocos días de unos atentados en Londres. Tuve que resolver el problema por mí cuenta (y con la ayuda de la Policía), pues el personal de la aerolínea literalmente huyó de su responsabilidad. Creo que Aeroméxico ha bajado mucho la guardia en cuanto a la calidad del servicio tanto como en seguridad operacional, lo que se ha notado mucho, pero este es un tema que atañe a toda la industria, pues hay otras aerolíneas que más vale que vayan poniendo sus barbas a remojar.
Corresponde a todos el reto de superar esta crisis y cuidar que el personal de vuelo de todas las empresas de aviación, comerciales y privadas, esté a la altura de los niveles de seguridad, eficiencia y servicio de clase mundial. Los pasajeros merecen la tranquilidad de estar seguros de que van en las mejores manos...Las autoridades. ¿Cuáles? Pues la Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil (DGAC) y su Comisión Investigadora del Accidente, encabezadas por el ingeniero Luis Gerardo Fonseca.
El papel que la DGAC está desempeñando en todo este asunto me parece muy triste y está siendo muy criticado a nivel mundial, lo cual es una vergüenza para nuestro país. Revelar con tal timidez y minusvalorando la participación del tan traído y llevado "tercer piloto" es muy preocupante. Tal pifia podría explicarse con el Principio de Hanlon, donde no se puede atribuir a maldad algo que simplemente es por estupidez, pero la forma en que la DGAC evita señalar que ese avión no debió despegar con tales irregularidades nos deja muchas sospechas, pues parece que están protegiendo ciertos intereses, en vez de señalar los hechos con la fuerza, integridad e imparcialidad que se espera de la Autoridad.
La omisión por parte de dichas autoridades y la empresa de mencionar la existencia del "tercer piloto" desde que sucedió el accidente de Durango (pues dieron los nombres de la tripulación con toda claridad) contribuye a acentuar la ilegalidad de la acción de los pilotos y no se puede alegar que se trataba de una "sesión de habilitación no autorizada", pues este piloto no estaba en ese proceso de su capacitación, y está claro que solo pretendía trasladarse a la Ciudad de México, destino del infortunado vuelo, usando una prestación que dicho sea de paso ya fue restringida por la aerolínea.
Lamentablemente la DGAC ha perdido casi toda su credibilidad, la pobreza con la que se desempeña se balancea entre la incompetencia y la corrupción. Tristemente ya es un "cliché " que cada que hay un accidente aéreo que llega al escrutinio público se descubren irregularidades con las licencias de los pilotos. Por tanto es entendible que ya se cuestione tras bambalinas que los propios inspectores de la DGAC, relacionados con los procesos de certificar como aptos a los pilotos involucrados en este accidente (y muchos otros), pudieran no haber estado debidamente habilitados.
La clara condición de juez y parte de la DGAC en este asunto está alimentando una marea muy escandalosa de especulaciones, supuestas filtraciones y datos sobre los involucrados, que está generando gran preocupación y creo que por bien de la industria aeronáutica todos esos rumores y sospechas deberían ser bien esclarecidos y disipados...La complejidad de este asunto es ya un tema de seguridad y prestigio nacional y considero que debería involucrarse a la Procuraduría General de la República (PGR) para investigar a fondo todos los aspectos que escapan a la competencia de la DGAC y demás partes. Sé de buena fuente que ya hay personas trabajando en una denuncia de esta naturaleza, pues consideran muy importante que se aclare bien si existe corrupción o encubrimiento detrás de este lamentable caso.
Hay muchas cosas que aclarar más allá de lo que pasó al momento de la fatídica "microrráfaga", como qué hicieron los pilotos el día y la noche anterior ¿descansaron bien? ¿Cuáles fueron los resultados de la valoración médica de los pilotos inmediatamente después del accidente? O cómo fue al detalle su capacitación y habilitación como pilotos de Embraer 190. Son puntos muy importantes, no se trata de crucificar a nadie, pero si de acallar los rumores, dar certeza a la opinión pública e identificar problemas que puedan estar amenazando la seguridad aérea y que podrían ameritar la realización de acciones correctivas cuanto antes.Toda esta situación me hace recordar en algo la película "El Vuelo", una historia de ficción donde el personaje interpretado por Denzel Washington es un piloto que enfrenta con gran destreza una situación en vuelo casi imposible de salvar, pero habiendo cometido una grave falta no relacionada directamente con el accidente. Cuando gracias al gran aparato burocrático y legal que lo protege está a punto de escapar de la responsabilidad de su falta, tiene la integridad y el valor moral de decir toda la verdad y afrontar las consecuencias de sus actos con la conciencia limpia. Pero parece que eso solo pasa en las películas...
Saludos


Héctor Dávila.

[CurtainTwitcher]

From Google Translate (https://translate.google.com.au/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&js=y&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fvuela.com.mx%2Fam%2Fmensaje-editorial%2F4914-desmenuzando-el-caso-de-los-pilotos-del-accidente-de-durango.html%3Futm_source%3DDiario%2BAmérica%2BVuela%26utm_c ampaign%3Dd1fc960d75-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_10_03_15%26utm_medium%3Demail%26utm_t erm%3D0_f57422a403-d1fc960d75-365300005&edit-text=) (this link retains page formatting and is easier to read). Don't take the AI translation too literally.
The confirmation of anomalies in the performance of the pilots of Aeromexico Connect Flight 2431, who crashed while trying to take off from Durango Airport under the fury of a storm, triggered a scandalous bomb whose expansive wave has reached international proportions, so much that it deserves more analysis the role that each one is represented in this tragedy of public interest and the implications that already exist for the Pilots, their Guild, the Company, the Passengers and the Authorities:

The pilots. There is no doubt that they committed an inadmissible fault, beyond a pilot traveling in the cabin in the place known as "jump seat" as a passenger, which is common practice, which the captain allowed him to take the controls to carry out the takeoff (and that the first officer gave him his place) is an indefensible action that can be qualified from irresponsible to criminal. All three committed this fault knowing that it was illegal, because the "third pilot" in question still did not have the certification to fly that type of plane and although with this detail they wanted to manipulate the information, so that it is very clear: an airplane such as that in commercial service must be manned by TWO duly certified pilots with the corresponding capacity. Starting the flight without a qualified pilot to the controls makes the operation illegal and morally you can not separate from this fact anything that happened afterwards.
So serious is this matter that a whole series of questions have already been unleashed, inside and outside the industry, about what could be the real reasons why the pilots did such nonsense, and even if they were really fit to fly.
Nor has it been clarified if the aforementioned "third pilot" participated in the preflight briefing, reviewed the weather reports or followed any procedure to really help the captain to operate the aircraft safely, especially given the weather conditions that prevailed, that many prestigious pilots and meteorologists that I have consulted consider that they advised extreme precautions and even postpone take-off.
The flight did not begin to be hit by the microburst, that was partly unavoidable consequence of everything that was done before the start of the takeoff race, and the pilots of this tragic flight instead of fulfilling their duty, broke the law and safety procedures, including the fundamental protocol of "sterile cabin".
The authorities say that no pilot could have saved the plane from that storm, but no truly responsible and professional pilot would have done the nonsense that they committed, deliberately, before the tragedy ...

The guild It is inevitable that these events are stirring the bowels of the community - pilots aviators. It has been misinterpreted that the Association of Airline Pilots (ASPA) has the position to overlap the conduct of these pilots, but in fact is doing the right thing to defend due process in his dismissal by the airline, is nothing more than a labor issue and that is the main function of a union, both pilots and companies must fulfill their obligations. It is the Association of Pilots Aviators of Mexico, which in my humble opinion works as an appendix of ASPA, which should have a more defined role in this matter, and is that they have not even officially pronounced about it with a statement, at the same time who have shown themselves close to the investigation as an uncomfortable judge and part, represented in the investigation panel by pilots who are employees of Aeromexico, while in other cases they have not hesitated to point the finger, especially against general aviation or Companies that are not affiliated with ASPA.
On the other hand, it is a pity that for a few the prestige of many excellent and very professional aviator pilots is affected, many of whom I admire with great respect, but unfortunately those "few" are already becoming too many and the list of incidents of undisciplined pilots is already worrisome: there are many cases of pilots who do not respond to calls from the control tower as if they had fallen asleep, some who are heading to the wrong tracks, others who landed at the wrong airport and then escaped taking off again believing that no one would notice, passing by the idiot who turned off a motor in mid-flight just to brag and many others who play with the planes to show off on social networks, not to mention those who go on a spree in the overnight stays. This must stop, ASPA and the Pilots Association must paint the line well between protecting the rights of their members and overlapping the misdeeds of the irresponsible.
I value the friendship of several former General Secretaries of ASPA and I have recognized that the union was an important guarantor of aviation security, because before for a company having the union involved a cost that was very worthwhile, as it was partly a "sure" of the high level of its pilots. Unfortunately today, the facts point to the fact that this is no longer the case and in this sense I believe that ASPA is not "nor the dust of those muds".
I can not believe that there was little sensitivity, the day after the preliminary progress of the accident occurred, of publishing the call to hire 28 new co-drivers just for Aeroméxico Connect, requesting as requirements 18 years of age and 250 total hours of flight, when they know perfectly well that their peers in the United States, by law, do not accept them with less than 21 years and 1,500 flight hours, precisely because they know the importance of that experience to ensure airline safety on the airlines. In the United States, the pilots' unions supported and defended the increase of requirements to be able to fly in the airlines, which they affirm has contributed to reduce the accident and incident rate; that in Mexico the regulations on the matter are obsolete is not an impediment for the guild of pilots to assume their responsibility in this problem and support that greater requirements are demanded.
Hopefully they can recognize this situation, leave pride aside and take more concrete actions to ensure that they do not reach the irresponsible and incapable pilot booths, and this beautiful profession is extolled ...

The company. Aero Litoral SA de CV, part of the Aeromexico Group that operates under the commercial name of Aeroméxico Connect, faces its biggest crisis with this problem. The first anniversary of the Group's partnership with Delta Airlines was just celebrated, and I know from good sources that the "gringos" are very concerned about the consequences that this situation could bring. Although Andrés Conesa, president of the Aeroméxico Group, when he made himself known about the pilots' actions, he dismissed them, at the time of this publication he has not yet issued a statement with an official statement to the public opinion, and this is very criticized, since passengers deserve an explanation urgently.
However, the internal statement on dismissal, which harshly qualifies the conduct of the pilots, hints at the seriousness of the matter and affirms the importance of not allowing the support of the 16 thousand families that depend on Aeromexico to be put at risk. the confidence of the 20 million passengers who are owed. Although the company is seen as a "victim" of the "deliberate violation of procedures" by the pilots, the damage has already been done and the trust of the passengers has already been put at risk, despite the obvious attempt to minimize the media. lack of pilots and open the "Chinese box" of the invincible and unpredictable climate as a direct cause of the accident, there are already many mass media that have explained things in detail.
The Aeromexico Group only has to assume its responsibility and I believe that managers should also roll heads, since in the areas of operational safety and training it is evident that it has failed, and in order to regain confidence in the company they should hire the The best experts in the world to occupy those positions, no matter what the cost and "cackle", otherwise it will not be easy to heal the wounds caused to the prestige of the airline.
And he still has to endure the blow of a storm as strong as the one that supposedly threw his plane: that of the lawsuits and insurance problems, which already clouds the clouds above his head ...

The passengers. The rights of passengers is the first thing that must be protected. The competition for the airlines is very strong and it goes without saying that the effort of all employees, especially flight crews, is essential to preserve the preference of customers.Frankly Aeromexico is not very good, for several years has been declining in the preference of passengers, just remember that in the "ranking" of the 100 best airlines in the world fell to the painful place 99 and with this scandal of the pilots of the plane Durango will surely go very wrong.
I set myself as an example and I must confess that I decided for almost a year and a half not to fly more for Aeromexico, due to the bad experience I suffered on a flight to Paris, when someone took my hand luggage from the plane and left another suitcase very similar instead;the flight attendants behaved badly, totally irresponsible and unrelated to the seriousness of the matter, especially since there was a terrorist alert in Europe and it was a few days after some attacks in London. I had to solve the problem on my own (and with the help of the Police), because the airline staff literally fled from their responsibility. I think that Aeroméxico has lowered its guard in terms of quality of service as well as operational safety, which has been noted, but this is an issue that concerns the entire industry, as there are other airlines that are better placed his beards to soak.
It is up to all of us to face the challenge of overcoming this crisis and take care that the flight personnel of all aviation companies, commercial and private, are up to the standards of safety, efficiency and world class service. The passengers deserve the peace of mind to be sure that they are in the best hands ...

The authorities. Which? Well, the General Directorate of Civil Aeronautics (DGAC) and its Investigation Commission of the Accident, headed by engineer Luis Gerardo Fonseca.
The role that the DGAC is playing in this whole issue seems very sad to me and is being criticized at a global level, which is a shame for our country. Revealing with such shyness and underestimating the participation of the so-called "third pilot" brought and taken is very worrying. Such a blunder could be explained by Hanlon's Principle, where something that is simply stupid can not be attributed to evil, but the way in which the DGAC avoids pointing out that this plane should not have taken off with such irregularities leaves us with many suspicions, since it seems that they are protecting certain interests, instead of pointing out the facts with the force, integrity and impartiality expected of the Authority.
The omission on the part of said authorities and the company to mention the existence of the "third pilot" since the accident in Durango (since they gave the names of the crew with all clarity) contributes to accentuate the illegality of the action of the pilots and it can not be alleged that it was an "unauthorized habilitation session", since this pilot was not in the process of his training, and it is clear that he only intended to move to Mexico City, destination of the unfortunate flight, using a service That by the way was already restricted by the airline.
Unfortunately, the DGAC has lost almost all its credibility, the poverty with which it works is balanced between incompetence and corruption. Sadly it is already a "cliché" that every time there is an air accident that reaches public scrutiny, irregularities are discovered with the pilots' licenses. Therefore it is understandable that it is already questioned behind the scenes that the inspectors of the DGAC, related to the processes of certifying as fit the pilots involved in this accident (and many others), may not have been properly qualified.
The clear condition of judge and part of the DGAC in this matter is fueling a very scandalous tide of speculation, alleged leaks and data on those involved, which is generating great concern and I believe that for the sake of the aviation industry all these rumors and suspicions should be well clarified and dissipated ...

The complexity of this issue is already a matter of national security and prestige and I believe that the Attorney General's Office (PGR) should be involved in thoroughly investigating all aspects beyond the competence of the DGAC and other parties. I know from a good source that there are already people working on a complaint of this nature, as they consider it very important to clarify well if there is corruption or cover-up behind this unfortunate case.
There are many things to clarify beyond what happened at the time of the fateful "microburst", as what pilots did the previous day and night did they rest well? What were the results of the medical assessment of the pilots immediately after the accident? Or how he went to detail his training and qualification as Embraer 190 pilots. They are very important points, it is not about crucifying anyone, but about quieting the rumors, giving certainty to the public opinion and identifying problems that may be threatening the security and that could warrant the implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.

This whole situation reminds me of the movie "The Flight", a story of fiction where the character played by Denzel Washington is a pilot who faces with great skill a situation in flight almost impossible to save, but having committed a serious fault directly related to the accident. When, thanks to the great bureaucratic and legal apparatus that protects it, it is about to escape responsibility for its lack, it has the integrity and moral courage to speak the whole truth and face the consequences of its actions with a clear conscience. But it seems that only happens in movies ...


regards


Héctor Dávila.

[fox niner]

Well. That is a sobering read....
I am going to have some coffee first and then re-read it.

[guadaMB]

Really a Google Translate?

Not only good, but transfers the "sense" of a Spanish writer into English, which is not always easy.
Kudos for Google :8

The long speech is nothing new. All was talked in PPRune but comes concentrated in "one dose".

[fdr]

I am stunned, however, this is not the first time, but hopefully it will be the last.

A long time back, I joined an airline to be part of their Standards program. 7 days after arriving in country, I passengered on one of the airlines narrow body jets early in the morning, to do a validation examination at the nations capital. On the departure from the main city's international airport, I watched a tail strike develop, and felt that though my seat in first class. The other expat pilot beside em slept through the tailstrike... Anyway. Was curious whether the crew would do the NNCL procedure which is pretty much the same, irrespective of the aircraft brand, and is summed up as don't pressurise, land. So we flew at FL280 for 40 minutes and landed at the nations capital. On arrival, the flight crew deplaned promptly and ran to the back of the aircraft, returning with long faces.

3 months later, having completed the company line training as Captain, and also as trainer/instructor, and about to enter standards, I passengered back to this wonderland in one of my type aircraft. When about to close doors, a passenger sitting immediately behind me stood up, picked up a bag form the overhead and walked off the plane. The Cabin crew closed the doors. Curious, I went forward to chat to the senior cabin attendant, who said on quesioning that the passenger was a "No Show". I was missing something in the translation. After confirming that the cabin crew were quite prepared to dispatch the aircraft, I picked up the company FOM on my ipad, and read out the relevant part of security, and also noted that FYI, there are 2 countries in the world that what this crew were about to do was a criminal offense. Eventually, we got the Captain to chat with me, and lo and behold he is a good friend of mine. asking the Captain what he had been told by the system about the pax situation indicated that he had ben told that the pax had never turned up at check in. 2 hours later, and with an airport manager who was wondering about lying to the captain, we departed.

Arrived at the airlines home plate some time later, and at breakfast this story came up. One of the other crew commented that we didnt have much luck with the locals. I asked why, and the other pilot related the back story of the tailstrike.

pilot had a friend on the flight...
pilot invited friend to cockpit (offense)
Captain asked FO to vacate seat for passenger
Pasenger sat in FO seat for flight departure
Captain gave takeoff to Passenger... (pull back, houses get smaller)

OK... breakfast is not looking so good.

m'K, so was the passenger a NAA FOI? Nope
was the passenger an airline pilot on another type? Nope
was the passenger a military pilot, An F-5 Major perhaps??? Nope
was the passenger anything to do with flying???? Nope.
Had the passenger ever had a flying lesson?????? Nope.

m'K, you got me. So, was the Captain handed over to the police for the criminal actions?
Nope.
What happened to the Captain? He got 2 weeks paid vacation.

60 minutes after this conversation, I had visited the Head of Safety, a nice but troubled man, who was dealing with serious events on a weekly basis, and by serious I mean eye watering, not the stuff you want on your headlines sort of things... off runway with 5kts XW, 7kt xwind pod strike on left AND right engines on the one landing. circling in the wrong direction into mountains, circling in wrong direction into mountains, again, and... again. basically your hand over your AOC and go home sort of stuff. So, head of safety confirms the event, and more importantly the insipid, spineless company response.

5 minutes later, I have met the DFO, and handed my Company ID back to him, saying it was fun, but you really have issues that we are not going to sort out if the company gives holiday packages to criminal behaviour. The DFO is/was a nice guy, trying to change the program, but apparently there are different standards to an operation.

6 hours later, I depart the country in question. Didn't fly on the same airline, and won't.

So then, fast forward, and we have the same sort of nonsense occurring again. Is there some sort of problem we have in front of the flight deck door? Do rules of purely rational behaviour, compliance with criminal provisions of the law. These cowboys jeopardise the passenger, bystanders, the cabin crew, themselves, the airline, and even the countries accreditation on the world stage, and the management gives 2 weeks holiday as a penalty. Once I considered the industry was professional, I think the beancounters and HR have led the industry to the precipice.

But then maybe beauty is only in the eye of the beholder.

If the crew put a non pilot or non authorised pilot into an operating seat, and then took off in the middle of severe weather, then I cannot imagine any non punitive response is appropriate. I hope the story is completely wrong, as I assure you, if you find out that some goat played poker with your life and 167 others to get an ego trip, then it is hard to find forgiveness for the perpetrator or the system that condoned that behaviour.

Happy flying folks. You get the system that you are prepared to pay for.

recall Aeroflot Flight 593?

[fdr]

And before the usual "3rd world operator... we, the rest of the first world don't do things like that.... " sort of BS starts. the post above was a JAA CERTIFIED OPERATOR.
Stupidity is universal, as is non compliance.

[fdr]

The preliminary report shows a loss of airspeed in the rotate, and a very early gear retraction. At the same time the aircraft is encountering an increasing crosswind. The pitch angle never becomes particularly high, but the airspeed is low throughout so there was not much energy left to manage altitude with. The gear retraction with a decaying flight path put the plane on the deck and thereafter the engines departed the scene. Overall, a day that the crew would probably rather have a do over of all of their decisions. The longitudinal acceleration increasing just before impact is the vertical component of gravity being measured, although ground speed was increasing relative to airspeed, the plane was in at least a horizontal wind shear, which probably had a vertical component in which could be determined by isolating the component from horizontal only from the underlying energy state of the aircraft for non wind shear conditions. The E JET doesn't have such a pronounced performance loss from the retraction cycle as say a B74 does, but it still unwise to be retracting the gear near the ground under any questionable performance cases, we saw that dump a B773ER on it's butt recently.

This is supposed to be a profession. WTF.

[fox niner]

Final report is out.

Accident: Aeromexico Connect E190 at Durango on Jul 31st 2018, veered off and overran runway after failed takeoff and burst into flames (http://avherald.com/h?article=4bbcb11c/0000&opt=0)

[DaveReidUK]

Informe Final de Accidente (http://www.sct.gob.mx/fileadmin/DireccionesGrales/DGAC-archivo/modulo4/informe-final-accdtafa0342018mmd0-22022019.pdf)

[A0283]

Avherald says this Mexican report is in spanish only... When you following the link the report has a photo format, so you cannot even copy paste the text into translation software.

So according to comments and articles above a bad report, no english version, and not even easily translatable. So not only Mexico dropping the proverbial ball here, but gets time for ICAO too to start doing something. I recently (had to) spend an inordinate amount of time on translating a Russian report (not successful...) and a large number of spanish language incident reports from Spain. You might call that a necessary waste of time.

You might say you take a high risk if you fly on planes from countries that do not publish reports. And take a medium risk if you fly on planes that do not publish an english version of their reports.

[DaveReidUK]

Avherald says this Mexican report is in spanish only... When you following the link the report has a photo format, so you cannot even copy paste the text into translation software.

So according to comments and articles above a bad report, no english version, and not even easily translatable. So not only Mexico dropping the proverbial ball here, but gets time for ICAO too to start doing something. I recently (had to) spend an inordinate amount of time on translating a Russian report (not successful...) and a large number of spanish language incident reports from Spain. You might call that a necessary waste of time.

You might say you take a high risk if you fly on planes from countries that do not publish reports. And take a medium risk if you fly on planes that do not publish an english version of their reports.
ICAO does not, and cannot, mandate that accident investigation reports should be published in any particular language, regardless of what Anglocentric readers might think. Spanish is, after all, one of the six official UN/ICAO working languages.

The fact that it's a scanned document and not a native PDF is, I assume, for legal reasons given that every page is countersigned by 5 individual members of the board of investigation.

[infrequentflyer789]

ICAO does not, and cannot, mandate that accident investigation reports should be published in any particular language, regardless of what Anglocentric readers might think. Spanish is, after all, one of the six official UN/ICAO working languages.

Indeed, and Chinese, Arabic or Russian would be a lot harder (for us english speakers) to work with.

The fact that it's a scanned document and not a native PDF is, I assume, for legal reasons given that every page is countersigned by 5 individual members of the board of investigation.

That does not prevent them including a text layer in the PDF to make it searchable and accessible (the latter is also a legal requirement in many places, although frequently overlooked). Even if you start from the printed page and scan, a decent scanning a publishing workflow will put an OCRed text layer in. Cheap/poor scanning and/or conversion - odd number pages are all skewed, even are marked down the middle, may have been originally printed double-sided and scanned with a poor auto-feeder - it hasn't been done manually page-by-page, the faults are too consistent. Also it's either a poor quality scan or maybe a poor jpeg conversion, lots of artifacts which will make it harder for OCR - suspect someone just ticked a "smallest size, lowest quality" option somewhere.

Nevertheless, it can be OCRed and then auto-translated with not too much effort. The probable cause and contributing factors took me <30secs. Professional OCR tools (which I no longer have) with spanish language input would do a better job, but then so would a spanish speaker with Mk1 eyeball...

For those interested, my basic OCR and google-translate of probable cause and contributing factors (no manual corrections):



Probable cause

IMPACT AGAINST THE TRACK ORIGINATED BY THE LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT IN THE FINAL PHASE OF THE WINDSHEAP Abandonment CAREER LOW HEIGHT AT PRODUCIPSE A LOSS OF SPEED V SUSTAINABILITY


CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:
Crew
a) Reduction of the situational awareness of the crew of flight SL12431 when performing the
commanding unauthorized instructional tasks without being qualified to provide
flight instruction and assign co-pilot and pilot functions f, I thnk that lying from the aircraft to a pilot
Not certified or authorized.
b) Omission in detecting the variations of iridication that the airspeed indicator showed in the PFD21
during the takeoff race
c) Lack of adherence to sterile cabin procedures and operational procedures (TVC:
Changes of runway and / or its conditions to take off after closing doors; Take off in
adverse conditions windshear) established in the Flight Operations Manual, in the Manual
of Dispatch and in the Standard Operating Procedures, of Aerolitoral, S. A. de C. V.


If you read past the OCR errors + google-translate-isms, I think that is pretty much as expected.

[vmandr]

I read it as
"Loss of control at lift-off, due to low-level wind shear" (cause)
runway impact, loss of speed, loss of lift are the results and not the cause.

[cappt]

Unbelievable, unqualified cabin passenger flying the plane?

[4runner]

D'accord, but...
To understand the policy of blaming mainly on Wx (putting under the carpet the crew affaire), have to dig into the insurance contracts. Not reachable for us, but easy to suppose its terms.
Besides it, it's not to forget some peculiarities that could concur. All depends on the possible godfather/s of the crew members (inside & outside the carrier).
Can't say more...

what language are you using?