When are you allowed to put your hand back on thrust levers after V1? [Archive]

piratepete

9th Apr 2018, 22:18

Like many issues flying jets this is left deliberately not addressed because airmanship should be applied using common sense as a back up to these automation systems.Personally I always place a hand back on the thrust levers (even on an airbus) once the gear is up because I was once taught a good lesson.Departing VTBU at night with a close in turn and the autothrottle in "throttle hold mode" ie thrust levers should not move before the selection of another vertical mode, the left thrust lever , at around 600 feet very rapidly retarded to idle position for no apparent reason (pre-fadec engine).Fortunately this was picked up in my scan and take off thrust was immediately restored but this could have ended quite badly.

Feather44

9th Apr 2018, 22:23

Whenever you want

maggot

9th Apr 2018, 22:32

All ya Gunna do on a bus is bump it out of a detent in turb.
Even without your hand on em you can have Toga in a flash

Whenever you feel

piratepete

10th Apr 2018, 01:36

Tactile Feedback = feel something , then respond.You cant feel something if you are not touching it........

sheppey

10th Apr 2018, 02:04

V1= Remove your hand

Why? Because leaving it there is dangerous.

There is sure some quaint thinking in aviation.
There is no need to remove your hand off the thrust levers at V1. It was originally an old airline taught "tradition" that you intended to "Go".

Traditions have their use-by date in flying aeroplanes. It is just as easy to rotate with one hand on the control column wheel as it is to use the computer joy stick on an Airbus type. IMHO, It is common sense and good airmanship to keep one hand on the thrust levers during the take off roll and initial climb even with autothrottle system engaged.

ACMS

10th Apr 2018, 03:31

Trying to re-invent the wheel.

Take your hand off at V1.......

Lead not to temptation is the plan.

They don’t need your help, leave them alone.

Reims_Rocket

10th Apr 2018, 07:12

After you feel that your airplane is well trimmed. In my opinion it is not when you are "allowed" but when is it "convenient" All is about priority. If you have a mistrimmed stabilizer in excessive nose down position, you may need your both hands to pull the control column. I think once you feel comfortable you can put back your hand on thrust levers...although some super instructors have a strict rule about it.

FE Hoppy

10th Apr 2018, 08:34

When selecting reverse after landing?

dixi188

10th Apr 2018, 08:48

I always thought one of the reasons for removing ones hand from the thrust levers at V1 was in case your seat slid back on rotation.
As well as having trouble flying the aircraft the last thing you want is closed thrust levers!

Wizofoz

10th Apr 2018, 09:10

For me usually as soon as I'm established and trimmed at the initial climb attitude- then the extra precision of two hands on the column isn't needed, and obviously I'm not going to instinctively try and reject!

applecrumble

10th Apr 2018, 10:45

There is sure some quaint thinking in aviation.
There is no need to remove your hand off the thrust levers at V1. It was originally an old airline taught "tradition" that you intended to "Go".

Traditions have their use-by date in flying aeroplanes. It is just as easy to rotate with one hand on the control column wheel as it is to use the computer joy stick on an Airbus type. IMHO, It is common sense and good airmanship to keep one hand on the thrust levers during the take off roll and initial climb even with autothrottle system engaged.

If you have a large V1,VR split then you can say that you won't reject all you like but when in the sim you are programmed to shut the thrust levers at the sound of a master warning then you may do the same instinctively. The major aircraft manufactures recommend taking your hand off at V1.

stilton

10th Apr 2018, 23:42

There is sure some quaint thinking in aviation.
There is no need to remove your hand off the thrust levers at V1. It was originally an old airline taught "tradition" that you intended to "Go".

Traditions have their use-by date in flying aeroplanes. It is just as easy to rotate with one hand on the control column wheel as it is to use the computer joy stick on an Airbus type. IMHO, It is common sense and good airmanship to keep one hand on the thrust levers during the take off roll and initial climb even with autothrottle system engaged.

I couldn’t disagree more, there’s a very good reason
Boeing procedure has you removing your hands from
the thrust levers at V1

It means you are committed to go, to continue the take
off from that point and not reject barring the most catastrophic
circumstance

Your performance planning is based on this analysis

The chances of a pilot initiating a reject in error
above V1 (ie most) are significantly increased by
leaving your hand on the thrust levers

You are physically tempting an action which
is extremely poorly advised

That, along with defying the manufacturers
recommendations is a complete lack of airmanship

Killaroo

11th Apr 2018, 01:31

This thread sums up the airline training and standards ‘industry’ for me.
Every bugger has a theory. When they become Chief Pilot they start foisting it on the rest of us, right or wrong.

Capt Pit Bull

11th Apr 2018, 04:16

There is sure some quaint thinking in aviation.
There is no need to remove your hand off the thrust levers at V1. It was originally an old airline taught "tradition" that you intended to "Go".

Traditions have their use-by date in flying aeroplanes. It is just as easy to rotate with one hand on the control column wheel as it is to use the computer joy stick on an Airbus type. IMHO, It is common sense and good airmanship to keep one hand on the thrust levers during the take off roll and initial climb even with autothrottle system engaged.

What type do you fly?

Have you ever worked as a sim trainer?

My anecdotal observations: So many trainees leave hands on the TLs and reject after V1. Like 90% will have their hands in the wrong place at some point during their first few takes offs on their first multi type. If they are still messing that up (or slide back to it in later sessions) during a v1 cut they are 50% likely to reject above v1.

vilas

11th Apr 2018, 04:26

speedbird787

11th Apr 2018, 07:44

It's too simple ...Hands off the thrust leavers at V1,. Passing thrust reduction altitude hand back on the thrust lever and pull it back to CLB gate if it's an Airbus .....And if you need additional thrust for what ever reason in between hand OFF and ON..Just select TOGA...It doesn't take ages to get your hands back on the Thrust levers.( It does take some time for people to recognize that they need TOGA ..But once you know it does not take long)..I have seen people in the sim retarding thrust just after takeoff when they have hands ON

ACMS

11th Apr 2018, 10:27

KISS method.

Do exactly what the MANUFACTURER stipulates in their FCOM, nothing more nothing less.

Stop making your own crap up.

Ok :ok:

Basil

11th Apr 2018, 10:49

KISS method.

Do exactly what the MANUFACTURER stipulates in their FCOM, nothing more nothing less.

Stop making your own crap up.

Ok :ok:
I'd agree.
I flew for an airline which had a thing about doing it THEIR way which was not necessarily that of the manufacturer. It was for 'commonality' across fleets.
I thought that we had a course to convert from one type to another :confused:
They are a respected and safe operator but just had to do it their way.

sonicbum

11th Apr 2018, 10:52

172_driver

11th Apr 2018, 11:09

Whenever You need to, if You need to. Guarding the thrust levers in any phase of flight other than approach will most likely do more harm than good as there is nothing You need to do with these thrust levers except if you experience wind shear. All the other possible scenarios of thrust levers handling are pretty much covered by non normal procedures.

I doubt the romanian A310 crew had much time to contemplate non-normal checklists when they flipped over due to a throttle jam. Enlighten me as to what harm my hands do on the thrust levers after gear is selected up.

sheppey

11th Apr 2018, 13:16

I doubt the romanian A310 crew had much time to contemplate non-normal checklists when they flipped over due to a throttle jam. Enlighten me as to what harm my hands do on the thrust levers after gear is selected up.

One particular 737 operator (Asian) had a policy during an instrument approach of both pilots putting their hands on their knees unless operating a lever or MCP panel switch. The simulator instructor suggested it was a good idea for the PF to rest his hand lightly on the thrust levers during the latter part of a coupled ILS approach. The PF, who was chief pilot, rejected that recommendation.

The next sequence was a 15 DME arc leading to an ILS. As the 737 was descending during the arc with 18 track miles to touch down, it was clean at 210 knots at idle thrust. Both pilots had their hands on knees. With the thrust levers at idle power, at this point the instructor failed the No 1 thrust lever clutch motor. There is no warning light of this in the 737 and the pilots would not have been aware of anything unusual until an increase of power was needed

Turning final, the PF called for the usual sequence of flap extension to slow up including gear down and final flap. The autothrottle system then increased power to counter drag and set up the three degree still coupled approach. Due to the "failed" clutch motor on the No 1 thrust lever, that lever stayed closed at idle while the No 2 engine spooled up to high power required by gear and landing flap down. Initially about 75% N1. The PF must have seen the control wheel deflection - in fact both pilots would have been aware of it as they were both experienced on type. Yet, neither pilot said a thing.

The autopilot reacted by applying considerable control wheel rotation to counter the increasing yaw and roll. The PF and PM still had their hands on their knees as per company SOP. At 1500 feet the autopilot suddenly disengaged itself, unable to cope with gross control wheel angle.

Under the influence of high thrust on one engine and idle thrust on the other engine, with the PF taking absolutely no action (not even rudder) to prevent the aircraft from rolling into a spiral, the PF then, to the astonishment of the simulator instructor, called for the engine failure and shut down checklist. The PF's hands were still glued to his knees. There was nothing wrong with the idle power engine that manually pushing up its thrust lever would not have fixed.

While the PM was heads down scrabbling around the floor trying to locate the QRH page on engine failures, the 737 went into an ever steepening spiral past 90 degrees angle of bank all the time the PF kept both hands on his knees shouting for the PM to hurry up and read the QRH

The simulator instructor then mercifully "froze" the simulator to prevent further "loss of face." The apparent culture of the operator meant that the PM would not dare to speak up.:ugh:

if the PF had kept his hand on the thrust levers during the ILS approach, he would have quickly picked up the ever increasing split thrust levers and (hopefully) take the appropriate action of disengaging the autothrottles and operated them manually.

sonicbum

11th Apr 2018, 13:55

I doubt the romanian A310 crew had much time to contemplate non-normal checklists when they flipped over due to a throttle jam. Enlighten me as to what harm my hands do on the thrust levers after gear is selected up.

Do not know well the details of the accident You have mentioned so I will refrain from any comments. The harm is to act instinctively and erroneously below a safe height to a possible engine malfunction as a result of startle effect, this is why when You deal with NNC thrust levers closure does require confirmation by both pilots.
On the other hand, as I have mentioned earlier, there are multiple very valid reasons to guard the thrust levers in approach.

lomapaseo

11th Apr 2018, 15:29

I doubt the romanian A310 crew had much time to contemplate non-normal checklists when they flipped over due to a throttle jam

This accident as well as the earlier one (B737)in China both involved thrust lever anomalies over several seconds that were not detected nor acted on by the crew. The upset was a culmination rather than a primary cause.

sonicbum

11th Apr 2018, 16:43

This accident as well as the earlier one (B737)in China both involved thrust lever anomalies over several seconds that were not detected nor acted on by the crew. The upset was a culmination rather than a primary cause.

Fully agree.

EI-PAUL

11th Apr 2018, 16:53

I think is mainly a matter of risk assessment here.
Personally, the only occasion I could think I may need to move my hand back on the thrust levers after V1 is if we have to deal with an engine failure after V1 during a flex take off, on a wet runway with a big split between V1 and Vr, a very heavy aircraft on an hot/humid day.
If I have any doubt (especially regarding the second segment) I may elect to use TOGA immediately when still on ground, touching the thrust levers after V1.
Obviously, if that were the case, I would have already informed my colleague during the emergency part of the take off briefing so as to prevent him / her from thinking that I am rejecting the take-off after the V1.
Personally I cannot think of other contingencies for which I would go back to getting my hands on the thrust levers during climb out and below a safe altitude (except wind shear of course, that’s a memory item anyway …).
Just my 2 cents …

LEM

11th Apr 2018, 16:57

In the beginning of aviation, there was no V1.

Then they realized a V1 was needed. Good.

But why to remove one's hand, if only for increased awareness about commitment to go, as some say?
Answering "Checked!" would be enough.

But no, you MUST REMOVE your hand from there!

Why?
Because it' dangerous.

Countless accidents have happened because the captain initiated a reject beyond V1.

Either because:
A wrong decision.
An instinctive reaction in panic or whatever.
A heart attack or similar.

The captain of a BOAC Trident suffered one, and the takeoff was rekected when just airborne.... all dead.
Or, the captain of a Garuda DC10 rejected after V1 because eng2 exploded... 150 deads....

And the list is very long.

It is nowadays universally accepted that the ***** hand must be removed at V1 because leaving it there IS DANGEROUS!

Why is it so dangerous?

Because the mishap is NOT REVERSIBLE at low altitude.

Now, if it is true that the hand MUST be removed, the question is:

WHEN CAN I PUT IT BACK THERE?

Isn't it ridiculous to remove it at V1 and put it right back after a couple of seconds, as many do?

How come nobody in aviation culture has raised this matter so far???

I get scared when my FO put their hand there during rotation right after I've removed mine!
(When I see that, I promptly put mine back again behind theirs to guard from a catastrophic mishap!!!)

This thing is written nowhere, so I can't blame them.

I can only blame the general lack of insight.

Now, as it is also universally agreed to take no action below 400ft in case of failure, BECAUSE A POSSIBLE MISHAP WOULD NOT BE REVERSIBLE, I suggest to use the same value as the earliest time when one can put his hand back on the thrust levers, as a mishap would then be reversible.

Once again, and to all my fella, I DONT WANNA SEE ANY HAND THERE BELOW 400 feet during takeoff!!!

On the contrary, putting your hand there is a MUST during the approach, and even during taxi!!! (see the Pegasus Trabzon accident for what can happen during taxi....)

LEM

11th Apr 2018, 17:02

Being ready to advance Thrust levers to TOGA in case you need, as many say, is nonsense!

Except for winshear, there is no reason to do that!
And increasing thrust on the working engine when one fails is a very bad idea!

The risks of an instinctive wrong decision to abort are way higher than the microsecond it takes to put your hand back there in case of windshear!

Bergerie1

11th Apr 2018, 17:07

LEM,

BOAC never operated Tridents. It's a good idea to check the facts before posting.

LEM

11th Apr 2018, 17:24

Youre right, it was BEA.

Basil

11th Apr 2018, 17:39

Youre right, it was BEA.
Can we have the details of this accident?

wiedehopf

11th Apr 2018, 18:06

One particular 737 operator (Asian) had a policy during an instrument approach of both pilots putting their hands on their knees .....
....
...

The simulator instructor then mercifully "froze" the simulator to prevent further "loss of face." The apparent culture of the operator meant that the PM would not dare to speak up.:ugh:

if the PF had kept his hand on the thrust levers during the ILS approach, he would have quickly picked up the ever increasing split thrust levers and (hopefully) take the appropriate action of disengaging the autothrottles and operated them manually.

So they wouldn't have handled an actual engine failure any better would they?

Apart from that engine failure means putting the other engine on MCT which would involve the thrust levers does it not?
Sounds to me they normally only trained engine failures after being told: now we train engine failure.

Surprising autopilot disconnects sound like something that should be sprinkled all over other simulator training. But i guess that doesn't leave time for the required items that are to be trained.

Cak

12th Apr 2018, 00:43

I get scared when my FO put their hand there during rotation right after I've removed mine!
(When I see that, I promptly put mine back again behind theirs to guard from a catastrophic mishap!!!)

If you are scared and don’t believe your FO, you should takeover and fly yourself, but not having both hands around thrust levers as it’s not standard procedure and you haven’t briefed it probably.
Also, putting your hands behind will make FO suprised and he will be looking what are you doing. You will be also focusing more then neccessary to thrust levers which means that both of you are not completely focused on instruments when you should be to the maximum.
Don’t invent procedures! That is one of the most dangerous things in aviation today.
Following your logic, do you have your hands behind levers also during short finals. What if your FO cuts power at 100ft?
Do you check where your FO holds his feet during TO when you are PF? Fully on pedals or heels on the floor?
Do you ever go out on a toilet during cruise, crossing Atlantic? Do you believe that your FO will handle engine fail correctly? Do you brief him before exiting cockpit?
There are too many ‘if situations’ and it’s impossible to guard against all of them.
Type rating should mean that you know how to operate the aircraft safely and in accordance with SOP. We all know there are better and worse guys, but most are in standard. Germanwings FO was probably quite standard FO....

piratepete

12th Apr 2018, 03:31

My favourite exercise in the sim is EFTO followed by NPA using LNAV/VNAV AUTOPILOT FLIGHT DIRECTOR to minimums.For some reason more than 60% of trainees end up losing control and crash due to poor thrust/trim management (not an issue on an airbus due to auto rudder trim and a/t).They can fly a S/E ILS without a problem but this exercise causes a LOT of grief.........strange.

moswey4a

12th Apr 2018, 07:11

I fly on a business jet, and we always include in the emergency briefing "no actions below 400ft, except gear retraction". So I put my hands back on the thrust levers at 400ft. For example in case of an engine fire, the flying pilot takes the appropriate engine back to idle, after reaching 400ft. The PNF then confirms it and shuts it off according to the checklist (memory items). This is according to our OM(B) and I think it makes sense.

Centaurus

12th Apr 2018, 07:36

Taking your hand of at V1 ensures that you don't reject. It's a mental message. This manoeuvre requires predetermined action since there is no time to think. Keeping your hand there you are tempting yourself. On another day you may live to regret

Read the following accident report where because of the particular circumstances at the time, the pilot rejected the takeoff seconds after airborne. If he had elected to continue the take off, the fire was so severe that the aircraft would have surely crashed in flames.

ASN Aircraft accident British Aerospace BAe-748-378 Srs. 2B G-OJEM London-Stansted Airport (STN) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19980331-1)

There may be one time in a pilot's career he may be forced to throw away the book and make an instant decision far removed from a company SOP.
That accident was one such case.
So it is a false premise to say dogmatically "Taking your hand off at V1 ensures that you don't reject."

Centaurus

12th Apr 2018, 07:52

Obviously, if that were the case, I would have already informed my colleague during the emergency part of the take off briefing so as to prevent him / her from thinking that I am rejecting the take-off after the V1

My goodness, how things have changed over the years where nowadays we are required to brief the PM of practically anything that might happen. Can you just imagine in the old days of WW2 if this dogmatic requirement that the PF cover his arse via the CVR because of fear of legal implications.

I can see it now. "In the likely event we are attacked by an enemy fighter I will corkscrew towards him. If he comes underneath us I will bunt like hell and maybe even drop a bomb on the Hun bastard. Do you agree with that Mr Copilot? Please don't hesitate to say you disagree of if you have a better idea. Although I am the captain of this crew we are still a democracy and you are always welcome to speak up in the name of CRM:ok:

Meikleour

12th Apr 2018, 08:17

Centaurus: If you read the whole AAIB report of this accident you will find that NO fire drill was carried out. This was probably what made it so catasrophic.

Basil

12th Apr 2018, 09:41

By the time you are given a command you should have flown enough, thought enough and listened to other captains in the bar enough to have some idea of what you are going to do in a catastrophic situation. You'll still get some things wrong.

A colleague had an uncontained #2 failure in a trijet and abandoned after V1. They were light on a long runway. The aircraft had lost three of its four hydraulic systems.

N.B. I am NOT recommending stopping after V1.

EI-PAUL

12th Apr 2018, 09:49

My goodness, how things have changed over the years where nowadays we are required to brief the PM of practically anything that might happen. Can you just imagine in the old days of WW2 if this dogmatic requirement that the PF cover his arse via the CVR because of fear of legal implications.

I can see it now. "In the likely event we are attacked by an enemy fighter I will corkscrew towards him. If he comes underneath us I will bunt like hell and maybe even drop a bomb on the Hun bastard. Do you agree with that Mr Copilot? Please don't hesitate to say you disagree of if you have a better idea. Although I am the captain of this crew we are still a democracy and you are always welcome to speak up in the name of CRM:ok:

Cool :D
Unfortunately I did not say this, but something different: if the conditions I mentioned on my post were to appear on a particular day I would not hesitate to share my mental model with my colleague regarding use of thrust levers; this could happen two, three times or maybe never during my career, but it only takes 10 seconds longer and it could be useful to sort out any doubts and perplexities on my colleagues and to avoid instinctive and unwanted actions; It seems to me that this is one of the reasons why we apply the CRM rules in “modern” aviation.

vilas

12th Apr 2018, 10:44

There may be one time in a pilot's career he may be forced to throw away the book and make an instant decision far removed from a company SOP. There are far too many rejects done when they should have carried on. Stating one unusual incident doesn't prove anything. And if anyone is smart enough to recognize out of the box thinking Will be smart enough to put his hand back and reject. You don't develop procedures for once in 1000 scenario.

CHfour

12th Apr 2018, 12:05

Read the following accident report where because of the particular circumstances at the time, the pilot rejected the takeoff seconds after airborne. If he had elected to continue the take off, the fire was so severe that the aircraft would have surely crashed in flames.

ASN Aircraft accident British Aerospace BAe-748-378 Srs. 2B G-OJEM London-Stansted Airport (STN) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19980331-1)

There may be one time in a pilot's career he may be forced to throw away the book and make an instant decision far removed from a company SOP.
That accident was one such case.
So it is a false premise to say dogmatically "Taking your hand off at V1 ensures that you don't reject."

I had a friend who survived a serious car accident as a result of not having worn his seat belt (he was thrown clear). Does that mean it's safer to drive without wearing them? What is the point in carrying out a pre departure brief and then doing the exact opposite? The 748 crew got away with it but it was still a bad decision.

galaxy flyer

12th Apr 2018, 19:58

Good grief, three pages discussing when the pilot can put his hands on the throttles! I agree with taking them off at V1; but we did NOT do so in the USAF and don’t have a record of overruns due to aborts past V1. It’s a nice training standard, has a perhaps a marginally rational reasoning, but once airborne past the DER, surely no one would try landing a jet transport. Yes, I’ll acknowkedge the idiots in
Phillie on the Airbus.

gf

dweeks

12th Apr 2018, 20:32

V1= Remove your hand

Why? Because leaving it there is dangerous.

Most guys put it back right after a second.

Not only ridiculous, but dangerous!

How come in our history nobody has raised the question: When can you put it back there?

I suggest not before 400ft.

If doing a reduced thrust takeoff and then there is an engine failure, my carrier allows the PF to call for TOGA if needed/desired. He thens sets TOGA, and the PNF verifies it. If the PNF thinks more power might be helpful, he can call "TOGA available."

A37575

13th Apr 2018, 05:06

If the PNF thinks more power might be helpful, he can call "TOGA available."

Talking about being helpful. Anecdotal story of the ever polite co-pilot who was waiting for his captain to ask for landing gear down. Close to touch down and the gear still up, he asks the captain "Would you like the gear down now, Captain - or do you prefer to land with wheels up?":ok:

Gauges and Dials

14th Apr 2018, 03:09

Three pages and nobody's brought up the 30 year old joke about the progress of cockpit automation?

Used to be, running an airliner took a crew of 4 highly experienced grey hairs: captain, FO, engineer, navigator. Gradually, automation has reduced the workload and skill required. Latest cockpits require one 19 year old flight academy grad and a dog. And the dog's job is to bite if the pilot tries to touch any of the controls.

The answer to when after V1 it's OK to put your mitt back on the throttles? Watch the dog as you move your hand judiciously toward the quadrant, and see how he reacts.

(On narrowbody airbus you can even hear the dog barking his head off when on the ground the pilot runs one but not both engines. Dogs are sticklers for symmetry.)

vilas

14th Apr 2018, 04:23

Removing the hand at V1 is important to prevent a reject, notwithstanding the one in million possibility of need to do otherwise. Putting it back in Airbus it is on when required basis, if below THR RED ALT place it back after airborne. In OEI, WS what's the big deal? Just do what is required. The only requirement to keep the hand there is minimum at 1000ft on approach.

Pugilistic Animus

14th Apr 2018, 04:56

I actually don't remember this in any training...not the 707 and not the 757...I have no idea now where my hands were tbh

RAT 5

14th Apr 2018, 09:21

What I find curious is that pilots are quoting the type specific FCTM. How can this be anything other than airmanship across all types? And it is not something that needs writing down. There is too much of that already and basic 'pilot thinking' has been replaced by SOP memorising.

Meikleour

14th Apr 2018, 11:51

RAT 5: That is because some people are used to moving autothrottle systems that MAY slide back whereas on the Airbus family, the thrust lever detents are just electrical switches for the FADEC. Thinking back to the days when I flew with real Flight Engineers even they, after having "trimmed" the power settings would keep their hands well away from the throttles prior to selection of climb thrust.

LEM

14th Apr 2018, 14:08

Still, many keep missing the point, which has nothing to do with automation, nothing to do with specific type.

All (except some weirdos) seem to aknowledge the fact that the hand MUST be removed at V1.
The majority seem to aknowledge the fact that this is because our hand in that position is a real danger, as the long list of statistics demonstrate.

Strangely, very few have asked themselves my original question.
Many answers call for AIRMANSHIP as the magic solution to everything, but this is often a comfortable reply for those who don't dig enough.

The fact is that a wrong reaction at a very low altitude IS NOT REVERSIBLE.
That's why we shouldnt put our hand back there below 400ft (same value for the actions in an emergency, for the same reason).

FlightDetent

14th Apr 2018, 16:22

LEM: in agreement with all of your last post.

A certain Co's policy:

Departure: Hand goes off at V1, back on only once you need it (covers all cases). And stays until FL 100.
Arrival: PF below FL 100.

As a general rule, in Sterile phase PF should keep the hands on the steering and TLs, staying head-up at all times. Not other activity is desirable - OM.A rule.

In alignment with the above, for the non-A/THR types, hand also goes on the TLs at 1000' to level-off. That A/C is the initial/entry with the operator, thus many continue to do so on the larger fleet as a personal habit.

FlightDetent

14th Apr 2018, 16:27

Note: on the back-driven A/THR type, the technique for PM was :
- after moving the L/G lever up
- place hand palm-down on the quadrant, behind the TLs

Capt Ecureuil

14th Apr 2018, 17:36

.

Countless accidents have happened because the captain initiated a reject beyond V1.

Either because:
A wrong decision.
An instinctive reaction in panic or whatever.
A heart attack or similar.

The captain of a BOAC Trident suffered one, and the takeoff was rekected when just airborne.... all dead.

Are you referring to G-AYVD in Bilbao?

I seem to remember that the hands were removed from the thrust levers but the Captain then put his hands on them and closed them whilst still firmly on the ground due to running in to standing water and certainly no heart attack and no one died.... I might be wrong though about the hands.
I can't think of another Trident accident anything like similar except G-ARPI where it was suggested the Captain Stan Key might have been suffering a heart attack but that certainly wasn't a reject or anything near.

Not thinking of a TWA Tristar aborting after getting airborne at JFK are you? But then no one was killed in that.

To add.... I remove hands at V1 and then guard them at Thrust reduction, nothing in the FCOM contradicts that as far as I'm aware......I also take my hands off the thrust levers after landing and then let my oppo pull reverse..... but that's a different conversation

tdracer

14th Apr 2018, 23:42

Many years ago, Boeing did a study of high speed RTOs - and not surprisingly found that a large percentage of aborts above V1 ended badly, often very badly. Boeing then started a campaign to educated pilots of the importance of NOT rejecting above V1 unless the aircraft simply wasn't airworthy. Part of that was the instruction to remove the hand from the throttles at V1 to prevent a 'startle' reaction retarding the throttles and initiating an RTO.
I fully agree to keep the hands off the throttles until 400 ft. AGL.

LEM

15th Apr 2018, 09:27

Thanks tdtracer, I like the expression STARTLE REACTION :ok:

sonicbum

15th Apr 2018, 10:15

Thanks tdtracer, I like the expression STARTLE REACTION :ok:

The harm is to act instinctively and erroneously below a safe height to a possible engine malfunction as a result of startle effect, this is why when You deal with NNC thrust levers closure does require confirmation by both pilots.

Startle effect was not good enough ? :E:E:ok:

Deepinsider

23rd Apr 2018, 11:15

tdracer is exactly right. (as you would expect from Everett!)
Not flown the 'bus' but don't imagine an important difference.
400 ft... that's the answer for this question.

pineteam

23rd Apr 2018, 11:43

I don’t see any valuable reasons to rush the hand back on the thrust levers just after v1. It takes a fraction of second to put it back in the very unlikely you need to use them. As mentionned many times before, the startle effect is too dangerous, so I keep my hand well rested on my leg usually until gears are up.
When you are driving your car, you don’t put your foot exactly on top of the brake pedal so why would you put your hands on the levers...

Bergerie1

23rd Apr 2018, 13:34

I totally endorse what tdracer has said. Stopping a large aircraft at max weight from V1 is a serious manoeuvre in its own right, stopping after V1 is sheer folly - - unless you know beyond any shadow of doubt that the aircaft is unairworthy.

And what he says about the 'startle effect' is so true. 400ft AGL is a good rule of thumb, but it isn't absolute!

Centaurus

24th Apr 2018, 01:39

400ft AGL is a good rule of thumb, but it isn't absolute

This 400 feet thing as a safe altitude. Does that originate from the fact that 400 feet is the minimum height for certification of the beginning of the 3rd segment part of take off climb profile?

Killaroo

24th Apr 2018, 04:05

Think of it like a gun. Don’t put your hand on it (after takeoff) unless you intend to use it.
What you planning to do with them at 400ft if the donks are running normally anyhow?
Leave them alone.

FlightDetent

24th Apr 2018, 07:15

Completely agree.

172_driver

24th Apr 2018, 10:34

Think of it like a gun. Don’t put your hand on it (after takeoff) unless you intend to use it.

Some Boeing pilots, me included, like feedback what the automatics is doing. There have been cases where the A/T has misbehaved. Thrust retarding to/towards idle at thrust reduction is one example.

I don't tend to use them, unless they misbehave, which I likely will pick up by resting my hands on them.

When in a steady climb and the runway is way out of my sight, gear is retracting, I am probably around 400 ft.. or soon there.. what's wrong with one hand gently resting on the thrust levers. I wouldn't think my startle would cause me to try a straight ahead landing. Only in an ASEL. For good reason, too.

Bergerie1

24th Apr 2018, 13:00

centaurus,

There is no magic in 400ft AGL - which is why I said rule of thumb. I used to fly 747 Classics, thus the flight engineer watched and trimmed the power during the initial climb. I did not handle the thrust levers until I needed to either adjust the ROC or level out at an intermediate altitude on the departure. I only suggested 400ft because tdracer suggested it.

I am really amazed this thread has generated so much comment. My only hard and fast rule was to take my hands off at V1, partly because it was an SOP but mainly, as tdracer has said, to avoid any 'startle effect'. Otherwise I handled the thrust levers as required - it really doesn't need an SOP - just do what is necessary!

When using autothrottle I always rested my hands lightly on the trust levers so that I maintained the tactile feedback of what the automatics were doing.

RAT 5

24th Apr 2018, 13:59

I am really amazed this thread has generated so much comment.

Indeed. At a time when there has been much discussion of airmanship v trained monkey where some people need to be told every minutiae of what & when.

When using autothrottle I always rested my hands lightly on the trust levers so that I maintained the tactile feedback of what the automatics were doing.

Indeed. I used to 'encourage' newbies to follow through the auto-throttle when large changes were commanded, e.g. a full power climb, idle descent etc. There was often quizzical look and a "where is that written down?" There then ensued an airmanship discussion including the what if an auto throttle clutch malfunctioned. A humph. I then asked "why do you follow through the TL's when selecting TOGA on take off?" "Because it's an SOP." "And why is that?" "Dunno." Oh dear.

Check Airman

24th Apr 2018, 15:38

With all this talk about when to put hands where, and malfunctioning AT, I guess Airbus got it right then!

☺️☺️

Killaroo

25th Apr 2018, 03:36

RAT5 - I agree wholeheartedly with you about Airmanship v v SOP's. But how did it get like this? Who created this situation? Not the pilots!

In almost 40 years in this business I've seen SOP's morph from being a set of guidelines for the wise, into a rigid and obscure labyrinth of Do's & Don'ts,
Pilots don't know WHY certain things are SOP? Who can blame them? Often the reasons are hangovers from a past incident or accident an airline had decades ago on a now defunct fleet, or from some personal obsession a Training Manager has carried with him.

New joiners aren't privy to all the history of a company, and the attitude of so many "Trainers" is - 'Don't ask stupid questions, just do what you're told'.
Asking a stupid question (why do we do that SOP) may be taken as a sign of impertinence (you're NEW here, are you questioning us?), or lack of knowledge (keep your mouth shut or you'll show your ignorance). Rote Learning and Robotic Repetition is all that is REQUIRED of them.

Quite often new SOP's are a knee jerk reaction by Management to a recent 'undesireable event' and are clearly efforts at slamming the stable door after the horse has bolted. In modern parlance 'Management Ass Covering'. These are often operationally impractical directives that get filed in the OM-A, until some poor guy gets cornered and falls foul of them, and then it's a Gotcha! I can give tons of examples of those!

Training Managers will tell you they have to write EVERYTHING down because of cross cultural/language impediments that make it necessary to cater to the 'lowest common denominator' in their pilot group. There's some truth in that. Unfortunately the result is that EVERYBODY is dragged down to that level - the performing monkey.

Lets not forget the Fear Factor either.
I don't know if you've worked outside of Europe (you're Ryanair, right?) - but in many parts of the world, pilots live in a Fear and Punishment Culture. Certain societies believe human error or failure is best prevented or dealt with by punishment. This creates an atmosphere of fear. Fear to question. Fear to think for yourself. The reasoning becomes 'If I just follow the SOP's they can't punish me, even if they're stupid SOP's'. So fear of punishment and fear of losing your job/upgrade becomes the driving behaviour. Not Airmanship.

Oh, here's a good one for starters. One of my personal favourites.
You push back in icing conditions and start #1. You then turn on the Eng Anti Ice to protect that engine while starting #2.
But the Airbus SOP is to NOT switch on the anti ice until you do the After Start Checklist.
Airmanship would tell you otherwise. But in my airline, if you switch on the #1 Anti Ice before doing the After Start Checklist - you will be marked down on the PC/RT.
Its not SOP.

PS Airbus is a large part of this problem because of the often inexplicable and mind bogglingly prescriptiveSOP's they produce. I believe their agenda is indeed to engineer pilots into being Robots, all the more easily replaced in a future generation of Artificially Intelligent aircraft . Flown Robotically.

sheppey

25th Apr 2018, 13:04

Some Boeing pilots, me included, like feedback what the automatics is doing. There have been cases where the A/T has misbehaved. Thrust retarding to/towards idle at thrust reduction is one example.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Southern_Airlines_Flight_3943
This is what happened when one throttle failed to advance on levelling out and the crew did not notice it. Automation addiction at its most dangerous.

On another occasion during simulator training of a crew from the above mentioned country, the clutch motor of No 1 thrust lever was failed while the engine was at flight idle. As gear and flaps were lowered during an ILS and power increased by autothrottle to maintain coupled approach, only the No 2 throttle advanced while No 1 throttle remained at idle. The crew did nothing even through the throttle split was obvious. Eventually the autopilot disengaged itself, the aircraft rolled over to the left and entered a spiral dive while the crew watched in horror and did nothing and were mere spectators to the crash. Good job it was a simulator. if the PF had kept his hand on the throttles during the coupled approach he could not have failed to notice only one throttle was working and hopefully(?) would have fixed the problem by disconnecting the A/T and used both throttles manually. Again Automation addiction at its most dangerous..

RAT 5

25th Apr 2018, 13:13

Killaroo: Spot on in so many ways, and I don't admit to anywhere in my past other than it was very varied on type (all Boeing), operators & XAA's (all EU), but I recognise a lot of your sentiments. As a TRE/TRI the first rule was 'there are no stupid questions.' And your other comments, I always used to try, time allowing, to explain why some of the SOP's had been designed. The good ones that is.

It's interesting your story about EAI during engine start. I, as a TRE, 'tried' to have a discussion with the training dept about this. I had been doing a winter ops RST. It was blowing snow and freezing conditions. I started the first engine and selected EAI ON and started 2nd engine. In the debrief the TRE commented that EAI was an After Start Cx-list item, and showed me where it was written. I countered with the FCTM and Vol 2. where it says that "when operating in icing conditions, or anticipated icing conditions EAI should be ON."
He understood my argument, but was obliged to enforce SOP's. OK. Let's change the SOP then. That was like asking the Pope to allow priests to marry. That means I'll be a SOP monkey in the sim and an airman of the line. My bum is firmly on the ground in the sim, but on the line.............There were others.

Killaroo

25th Apr 2018, 14:16

He understood my argument, but was obliged to enforce SOP's. OK. Let's change the SOP then. That was like asking the Pope to allow priests to marry.
Very true. This is the corner we paint ourselves into with this nonsense.
Incidentally, in the above example the RT scenario included an aborted start on the #2 followed by a second failed auto start, and a subsequent successful Man Start. The whole process took at least 10 minutes including time spent digging out the Man Start checklist and pre-reading the procedure. All that while the #1 engine is meant to be left running in icing conditions with no Eng Anti Ice.
Because that's the SOP.
Madness.

Check Airman

25th Apr 2018, 14:23

Very true. This is the corner we paint ourselves into with this nonsense.
Incidentally, in the above example the RT scenario included an aborted start on the #2 followed by a second failed auto start, and a subsequent successful Man Start. The whole process took at least 10 minutes including time spent digging out the Man Start checklist and pre-reading the procedure. All that while the #1 engine is meant to be left running in icing conditions with no Eng Anti Ice.
Because that's the SOP.
Madness.

Doesn't the Airbus FCOM include a statement about using good judgment where the SOP fails to adequately address the situation?

RAT 5

25th Apr 2018, 18:40

Doesn't the Airbus FCOM include a statement about using good judgment where the SOP fails to adequately address the situation?

That presupposes that captains, especially, and in only 4 years experience, have acquired the knowledge to make good judgment and have the courage to deviate and apply it. That is a big IF.

Busserday

25th Apr 2018, 21:03

What is the altitude where you can begin your immediate action procedures if an engine fails? Until then, concentrate on flying and trimming the airplane.
Maybe a wind shear at 100 feet with a large loss of airspeed may have you thinking about something to do with your thrust leavers.

Check Airman

25th Apr 2018, 22:41

Maybe a wind shear at 100 feet with a large loss of airspeed may have you thinking about something to do with your thrust leavers.

Devil's advocate- if you get windshear at 100ft and your hand isn't on the thrust levers, what precludes you from reaching over and grabbing them?

cobblers

26th Apr 2018, 08:30

I would think this is a hangover from the days big pistons were around. You kept your hands near or on the power levers in case they vibrated closed. Too tight a friction nut could inhibit the closing of the throttle in case of fire in these petrol fed monsters. People today are so used to jets and paraffin fuels they forget how tight performance and safety margins used to be.

LEM

1st May 2018, 15:41

LEM

1st May 2018, 15:47

Having said that, I'm amazed too at how many replies there have been to my question.
Thanks to all for that!
Once again, automation, aircraft type or moving/not moving thrust levers have nothing to do with my original concern.
I'm a fanatical advocate of tactile feedback, and that's why I despise Airbus.
Keep your hand on the thrust levers as much as possible, but please, NOT DURING THE FIRST 400FT!!!
Your hand there is dangerous, and that's why you HAVE to REMOVE it at V1!

Thank you,

LEM

pineteam

1st May 2018, 16:52

Once again, automation, aircraft type or moving/not moving thrust levers have nothing to do with my original concern.
I'm a fanatical advocate of tactile feedback, and that's why I despise Airbus.

It’s been discussed before and I will repeat myself but even if I agree that having auto throttle has its advantages, the way Airbus has designed its instruments, you really don’t need them.
From FCTM: « The Flight crew can easily and intuitively monitor the energy of the aircraft via current energy cues (speed, speed trend, engine parameters), and not via ambiguous thrust levers movement. »
And I could not agree more, in a glitch of an eye you know exactly what your engines are doing.:cool:

Papa_Golf

2nd May 2018, 10:41

83 (eighty-three) post of discussion for something I though common practice on most types/manufacturers. I am aghast.
I really don't see the need of putting back your hand on the throttles after liftoff in "normal" ops, assumed you took it off at or prior to V1 of course.
Maybe you could guard the TLs, after 400ft, if you want to be extra careful and verify that reaching the trust reduction altitude (or elevation, name it) the autothrottle gives you a climb setting. Once the latter is established there's no need for touching.

Flying Torquewrench

2nd May 2018, 11:00

About the Engine anti ice thing on the Airbus: the reason the manufacturer wrote such SOP is that as soon as you turn ONE engine antiice on a MEMO will appear: ENG ANTIICE ON.
Turning only one on would create a trap in making you believe they are both on before takeoff, the phase in which they are really needed.

They privileged the safest solution between two contrasting requirements.

And that is the reason why we should look at the actual switches and not just believe what ECAM says. It surprises me how often people set the parking brake but don’t check the tripple indicator. Even though the parking brake handle is set to ‘on’ and ‘parking brake’ is displayed on ECAM does not mean that the parking brake is actually on and holding pressure. The only way to check that is by looking at the tripple indicator.

pineteam

2nd May 2018, 11:20

The only time I had problem with the brakes was during my base flight. When I released the parking brake, the Ecam memo was still showing "Parking brake" and the triple indicator was also showing pressure but the handle was definitely set to off and the orange light on the nose gear was also still on. The ecam memo is always the reality but not the switches, at least from my experience and that's what I was told during my type rating. It's true tho in case of engine anti ice, you can't be sure it's on for both engines unless you look at the actual switches or the engines EPR/N1 limits discrepancy :E. Saying that, guys looking down at the flaps levers , or gears levers for instance to confirm the position are doing the check incorrectly. the correct flaps or gears setting is confirmed by looking at the ecam or the landing gear indicator lights only. Except during cockpit preparation to confirm the levers match the correct gears/flaps position.

vilas

2nd May 2018, 11:23

It surprises me how often people set the parking brake but don’t check the tripple indicator. This habbit needs to be built in type rating itself. In a FBW when you operate a lever you just send an electrical signal like switcing on an electric bulb but unless the bulb has lit it's not on.

pineteam

2nd May 2018, 11:36

This habbit needs to be built in type rating itself. In a FBW when you operate a lever you just send an electrical signal like switcing on an electric bulb but unless the bulb has lit it's not on.

It's shocking the number of people looking at the parking brake handle during the before start checklist below the line instead of looking in front of them at the triple indicator and/or ecam memo.:}

Busserday

2nd May 2018, 13:52

Devil's advocate- if you get windshear at 100ft and your hand isn't on the thrust levers, what precludes you from reaching over and grabbing them?
Not a thing. I was responding to a question if you didn't notice.

Check Airman

2nd May 2018, 14:28

Not a thing. I was responding to a question if you didn't notice.

If nothing's stopping you from reaching over and moving the levers to the setting you want, what's the point (especially in a FBW Airbus) of keeping your hand on them?

tdracer

2nd May 2018, 20:53

It’s been discussed before and I will repeat myself but even if I agree that having auto throttle has its advantages, the way Airbus has designed its instruments, you really don’t need them.
From FCTM: « The Flight crew can easily and intuitively monitor the energy of the aircraft via current energy cues (speed, speed trend, engine parameters), and not via ambiguous thrust levers movement. »
And I could not agree more, in a glitch of an eye you know exactly what your engines are doing.:cool:
The displays tell you what the engines are doing.
With moving throttles, the throttle movement tells you what the engines are going to do. Many pilots like that information, particularly during final approach/landing. Not normally needed during climb/cruise.