Australian Airbus go-around dark night IMC incident

[Centaurus]

Well written description of what went wrong and why. Must say that being a non Airbus pilot of a certain age all I could think was WTF:confused:

Investigation: AO-2015-048 - Descent below minimum permitted altitude involving an A319, VH-VCJ, near Melbourne Airport, Vic. on 15 May 2015 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2015/aair/ao-2015-048/)

[172_driver]

I wonder when, if ever, they will suggest more technical skill (instead of non-technical skill) to prevent incidents like this. In recent high profile accident reports there’s been lots of talk about mode confusion, lack of communication etc. Less about pitch+power to save the day.

I know none is immune to illusions, but the more you practice the less susceptible you’ll be.

[vilas]

In recent high profile accident reports there’s been lots of talk about mode confusion, lack of communication etc. Less about pitch+power to save the day. What will pitch+power do if you don't monitor your flight path. If descent is not what was intended then stop it. If speed is not going in the intended direction reverse it. Use of automation requires same amount of scan. Only you don't effect the changes but watch them happening. That is why look at FCU only to locate the button, then watch the FMA to see it happening. Do it any other way and one day you get caught. In this case not one or two but three wrong button were pushed. Playing piano.

[lederhosen]

This is a well written and very interesting report at several levels. The captain was a management pilot with a lot of experience, and there was another captain in the right hand seat. We all know two captains is not always an easy situation and being pilot monitoring from the wrong seat as a senior colleague completely loses the plot is a tricky situation.

Airbus has fundamentally changed flying and in normal operation the aircraft is a delight to fly. But when the unexpected occurs it can be a real handful. The lack of tactile feedback on the thrust levers and sidestick of the pilot monitoring are real issues.

Fortunately nothing worse happened than the management pilot (probably) writing himself a severe reprimand. But it is a classic example of where the man machine interface can go wrong,

[172_driver]

vilas,

I meant basic piloting when things don’t go as expected. Pushing buttons to reverse the situation didn’t go so well. I can imagine the helmet fire in the PF’s head as the aircraft’s automation brought him into dire straights. Yes, the pitch down was pilot induced but likely caused by the auto thrust that the none took control over.

Having been in a similar, but fortunately lot less hairy, situation the startle effect affects the PM too. I remember how I just wanted to say “disconnect” but somehow the words failed me. There is a time and place when restoring the automatics might help, this doesn’t seem to be one of those times.

[Meikleour]

When I first was trained by Airbus at the factory for the A330 in 1994 we were briefed by the senior line trainer that "you will all experience times when the automation will confuse you. The best solution is to ALWAYS disconnect everything - fly the aircraft manually to where you want it - and then, only then, re-engage the automatics."
It seems that this sage advice appears not to be pushed nowadays?