HMS Sheffield -Declassified Report

[Heathrow Harry]

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/15/revealed-full-story-behind-sinking-of-falklands-warship-hms-sheffield

Declassified report into disaster reveals officers ‘mesmerised’ by sight of incoming missiles failed to raise alarm
(https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/15/revealed-full-story-behind-sinking-of-falklands-warship-hms-sheffield#img-1)Ian Cobain (https://www.theguardian.com/profile/iancobain)
Sunday 15 October 2017 22.00 BST Last modified on Sunday 15 October 2017 22.29 BST

The catalogue of errors and failings that ended in the sinking of a Royal Navy (https://www.theguardian.com/uk/royal-navy) destroyer during the Falklands war has been disclosed after being covered up for 35 years.

Twenty people died and 26 were injured when HMS Sheffield was hit by an Argentinian Exocet missile during the early days of the 1982 conflict. It was the first Royal Navy warship to have been lost since the second world war.

The report of the board of inquiry into the loss of the Sheffield, which has finally been declassified, reveals the full reasons why the ship was completely unprepared for the attack.
https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/91f88b0d6b51f8662d895b92e1d4f3c03d6e2fb8/0_165_2062_1237/master/2062.jpg?w=460&q=55&auto=format&usm=12&fit=max&
The board found that two officers were guilty of negligence, but they escaped courts martial and did not face disciplinary action, apparently in order to avoid undermining the euphoria that gripped much of the UK at the end of the war.

A heavily censored summary of the board’s findings was released by the Ministry of Defence (https://www.theguardian.com/uk/ministry-of-defence) in 2006, but the redaction concealed all the board’s key conclusions and criticisms, including the findings of negligence. Also hidden was the board’s warning that there were “critical deficiencies” in the firefighting equipment then aboard type 42 destroyers such as the Sheffield.
Marked “Secret – UK Eyes Bravo”, the full, uncensored report shows:


Some members of the crew were “bored and a little frustrated by inactivity” and the ship was “not fully prepared” for an attack.
The anti-air warfare officer had left the ship’s operations room and was having a coffee in the wardroom when the Argentinian navy launched the attack, while his assistant had left “to visit the heads” (relieve himself).
The radar on board the ship that could have detected incoming Super Étendard fighter aircraft had been blanked out by a transmission being made to another vessel.
When a nearby ship, HMS Glasgow, did spot the approaching aircraft, the principal warfare officer in the Sheffield’s ops room failed to react, “partly through inexperience, but more importantly from inadequacy”.
The anti-air warfare officer was recalled to the ops room, but did not believe the Sheffield was within range of Argentina’s Super Étendard aircraft that carried the missiles.
When the incoming missiles came into view, officers on the bridge were “mesmerised” by the sight and did not broadcast a warning to the ship’s company.

The board of inquiry found the anti-air warfare officer’s mistake was based on his reading of an intelligence assessment of the Argentinian threat, which had arrived on board in “a sizeable and daunting bundle” of paper that was difficult to comprehend.
https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/0fcd5dff58c9ca73181b3bbbca837a6968a696d8/0_0_2083_1250/2083.jpg?w=460&q=55&auto=format&usm=12&fit=max&
While the ship’s company were aware of the threat posed by Exocet missiles, some appear to have thought the Sheffield was beyond the range of the Super Étendard aircraft, because they were unaware the planes could refuel in mid-air. The board also concluded it was “unfortunate” that the Sheffield’s captain, the submariner Sam Salt (https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2009/dec/10/sam-salt-obituary), and his second-in-command, a helicopter officer, had “little or no relevant recent surface ship experience”.

In the event, nobody called the captain. His ship did not go to “action stations”, did not fire off any clouds of chaff in an attempt to deflect the Exocets, and did not turn towards the incoming missiles in order to narrow the Sheffield’s profile. Moreover, some of the ship’s weapons were unloaded and unmanned, and no attempt was made to shoot down the incoming missiles.
https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/d30a6847459d502a5e7fb1fb4cdce200f3c561b5/0_285_4096_2458/master/4096.jpg?w=300&q=55&auto=format&usm=12&fit=max& (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/oct/15/revealed-full-story-behind-sinking-of-falklands-warship-hms-sheffield#img-2)
One of the Exocets slammed into the Sheffield’s starboard side about 8ft (2.4 metres) above the waterline, ripping a hole 4ft high and 15ft long. It penetrated as far as the ship’s galley, where eight cooks are thought to have been killed instantly. Fire erupted within seconds and the ship filled with smoke. Twelve people were thought to have been overcome by fumes, including five who remained on duty in the Sheffield’s computer room until it was too late for them to attempt escape. Some of the wounded suffered serious burns.

The report says the firefighting efforts “lacked cohesion” and were “uncoordinated”, and that although the crew attempted to tackle the blazes, “it was not clear where the command of the ship was located”. The main pipe through which water was pumped for firefighting had been ruptured, while several pumps failed and forward escape hatches were found to be too narrow for people wearing breathing apparatus. The ship’s company were unable to bring the blaze under control and Salt gave the order to abandon it.

The Guardian understands that at the time the board’s findings were suppressed, the British government was attempting to sell type 42 destroyers.

In London on the evening of the attack, 4 May 1982, the defence secretary, John Nott, told the Commons that the Argentinian fighter had probably flown in under the navy’s radar. The next day, the French manufacturer of the Exocets, Aérospatiale, issued a statement describing its missile as infallible. Fleet Street newspapers informed their readers about this “awesome, space-age weapon”, and described it as “a missile that couldn’t miss”. In fact, it appears that later in the Falklands war, some were successfully deflected with chaff.

The fire on board the Sheffield burned for two days. Six days after the attack, according to the official account, the ship sank while being towed. The Guardian has learned that it may have been scuttled. Only one body was recovered from the vessel.

Reporting in July 1982 to the navy’s commander-in-chief, Adm John Fieldhouse, the board of inquiry said it had concluded that the Sheffield’s on-watch principal warfare officer in the ops room had been negligent for failing to react in line with standard doctrine and training. The board also found the anti-air warfare officer had been negligent because his “lengthy absence” from the ops room meant an important air-defence facility was not manned. The report notes that 12 minutes after impact, this officer was still insisting the ship had not been struck by a missile. However, Fieldhouse ruled that the two officers would not face any sanction. In September 1982 he informed the MoD – in a letter that has also been declassified – that although both men had “prima facie demonstrated negligence”, they would not face courts martial, disciplinary action or any form of formal administrative proceedings.
Instead, Fieldhouse decided, he or one of his staff officers would speak to each officer, to “ensure that each fully understands the situation”. The Guardian understands that one was subsequently promoted, reaching the rank of captain, and served in the Royal Navy for a further 20 years.


Woodward added that Fieldhouse had decided there should be no courts martial, “to avoid, he told me, the more doubtful cases creating the wrong atmosphere in the press and souring the general euphoria”.

Even two months after the attack, the board of inquiry was uncertain whether the Exocet’s warhead had detonated. Although crew members were convinced it had detonated, the board’s five members eventually concluded that it had not, and reported that the fire had been caused by the missile’s propellant, only 40% of which had been used during its flight. A fresh MoD reassessment made public in 2015 concluded that the warhead had exploded.

The officers and crew of the Sheffield were always aware there had been serious errors and failings before the sinking of the ship. In 2001, facing accusations of a cover-up, the MoD issued a statement confirming that the anti-air warfare officer had not been in the ops room before the attack warning, but insisted this was because he was not required and was “attending duties elsewhere”. Five years later, after a campaign by ex-service personnel, the MoD released the heavily redacted summary of the board’s report.

The full and unredacted report was cleared for release in 2012, but the MoD delayed its declassification until now.

[langleybaston]

Absolutely appalling catalogue of failings in a war zone. Do the Navy not have the equivalent of our old-style TACEVALs ......... at least to find out if a man wearing breathing apparatus could get through a hatch?

And now we are putting a lot of eggs in two new baskets. Let us hope [without much hope] that such painful lessons continue to be brought to the attention of those concerned.

[Heathrow Harry]

I was thinking of a firing squad TBH.................

[Pontius Navigator]

AFAIK, there was one crucial error. The disaster stemmed from that.

[tescoapp]

What happened to the officers?

I presume even if they did stay in they would be retired by now.

[oldgrubber]

Langley,
Prior to the Falklands we had, I fear, started to lose the skills learned the hard way during the war. Damage control and fire fighting skills had begun to be treated in an almost light hearted way during BOST and COST work ups, and getting one over the FOSTies by cheating was commonplace. After the Falklands I remember my next ISSC course prior to joining the Illustrious was a real education, with emphasis on how important these skills were and how things could have been different in the Falklands war in terms of minimising losses and potentially saving assets.
Now the FOSTies are treated with healthy respect and training carried out seriously. We learnt, trust me!

[tucumseh]

I'm not sure what the point of this article is. MoD named the AAWO in 2001 (and perhaps before), and he wrote to the press about his actions in 2006. There's nothing new here. Nor does the Guardian refer to a previous piece, which sheds different light on events.

https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/sep/26/falklands.world

I wonder who is pushing the journalit's buttons? What else is going on that MoD wants to divert attention from?

[2805662]

Is there a link to the report itself, rather than the (Guardian’s) report on the report?

[Heathrow Harry]

On the officers it states "that one was subsequently promoted, reaching the rank of captain, and served in the Royal Navy for a further 20 years."

the original report was redacted quite heavily apparently

Tuc - I think the point is the latest report is the real thing - the earlier versions were changed - and reading it I can understand why.

I believe a hard copy of the report is now available in the National Archives in Kew but haven't checked to see if there is a full e-copy available yet

According to another newspaper "The National Archives said the document was only available to view in person at kew"

There's an article in Conrad Waters Naval Review 2017 pg 181 which has a reference to the location of the pdf of the earlier report but when you type it in the Archives says not
found...... Pity they won't put it up so we can all read it TBH

[tucumseh]

As a mere greenie, one thing intrigues me. The AAWO states that the Super Etendard radar had similar characteristics to that of the Sea Harrier, so there were a lot of false alarms. I thought, perhaps wrongly, that this is why the latter had a war mode. May be irrelevant, but some years later RN SY suddenly switched on to this issue and jumped if it caught an aircraft using the wrong mode.

[Heathrow Harry]

http://www.histarmar.com.ar/Malvinas/Sciaroni/attackMay301982-Britishview.htm gives some exact references at Kew including:-

British official records:
Logs:
HMS Invincible ship log (ADM 53/189407); HMS Hermes ship log (ADM 53/189351); HMS Avenger ship log (ADM 53/190138) y HMS Exeter ship log (ADM 53/189189).

Records of Operations:
Exocet Attack, 25th May (PREM 19/650).
Operation Corporate – Analysis of Exocet firing 30 May 82 (DEFE 58/273).
Op Corporate Falklands Conflict, 820 Naval Air Squadron, HMS Invincible flight report (DEFE 69/838).
HMS Invincible Falklands Islands Campaign Diary (DEFE 69/844).
Op Corporate Falklands Conflict 801 Squadron Operational Diary (DEFE 69/1085).
An examination of Argentine air effort during the Falklands Campaign/Operational Research Branch report (DEFE 58/273).
Report of Captain Salt, Loss of HMS Sheffield, Board of Inquiry. Annex C (Naval Historic Branch).
South Atlantic Presentation Unit (82) 30 (Thatcher MSS -Churchill Archive Centre: THCR 2/6/2/163).
HMS Onyx, Report of Proceedings
HMS Valiant, Report of Proceedings (Naval Service FOI Coordination Cell – request 10-12-2010-101254-002)

All documents on the National Archives británicos (at Kew), unless contrary statement.

[Always a Sapper]

No Courts Martial could, either back then or now in this day and age inflict a greater punishment than knowing every waking day that you correctly or not bore some not inconsiderable responsibility in the events resulting in the deaths and injuries of your ship mates and subsequent loss of your ship. I imagine nights can, at times be a bit restless too.

I would not wish to be in their shoes with those thoughts.

All said and done though, we were at war and these things do happen. Hopefully lessons were learned and have been remembered.

RIP The Crew of HMS Sheffield, still on station and everyone else who sailed down in the task force and sadly stayed.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

A slightly more thoughtful discussion can be found here (https://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/yes-its-the-guardian.267692/).

And now we are putting a lot of eggs in two new baskets. Let us hope [without much hope] that such painful lessons continue to be brought to the attention of those concerned.

Yes - the need for things like organic AEW and carrierborne air defence was proven beyond doubt. Do you really think the RN did not study it at huge length?

[tezzer]

My old boss, in another Gov department was on the Sheffield that day, and had left the Ops room seconds before the attack. Whether he is one of the two people cited in the article or not, I don't know.


He died some years later, from a particularly aggressive Cancer, from diagnosis to dead in a fortnight. His funeral was held in a large church, packed to the doors with people from the 4 corners of the globe, a well respected man.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

What angers/upsets me with this thread and the Guardian article is the way they try to represent it as all being down to the failings of one or two men, as opposed to being the result of a series of events, including:

-No organic AEW
-Limited air defence assets
-Lack of experience in using aircraft as task force assets
-Type 42s having old 965 radar (excessive beamwidth = clutter and ground wave reflections - mentioned in the BOI report)
-The Argentines having two Type 42s of their own so they could develop tactics and techniques like lobe pecking
-South Atlantic weather playing havoc with radars and false returns

...and so on.

[glad rag]

Absolutely appalling catalogue of failings in a war zone. Do the Navy not have the equivalent of our old-style TACEVALs ......... at least to find out if a man wearing breathing apparatus could get through a hatch?

And now we are putting a lot of eggs in two new baskets. Let us hope [without much hope] that such painful lessons continue to be brought to the attention of those concerned.


Indeed, just think how things could have been with an angled flight deck and cat n trap...

[The Old Fat One]

What angers/upsets me with this thread and the Guardian article is the way they try to represent it as all being down to the failings of one or two men, as opposed to being the result of a series of events, including:

-No organic AEW
-Limited air defence assets
-Lack of experience in using aircraft as task force assets
-Type 42s having old 965 radar (excessive beamwidth = clutter and ground wave reflections - mentioned in the BOI report)
-The Argentines having two Type 42s of their own so they could develop tactics and techniques like lobe pecking
-South Atlantic weather playing havoc with radars and false returns

...and so on.

Good post. Those with their own agendas, and those that don't understand war, will ignore it. Such in the internet/media world.

[Jimlad1]

Indeed, just think how things could have been with an angled flight deck and cat n trap...

Given the weather states down there at the time would have prevented flying, probably worse.

[The Nip]

Just a comment about enquiries, BOIs etc.

If someone is going to ask a question, then don’t be upset\outraged if you don’t get the answer you want.

If there is a legal process/reason for holding these then they should be published publicly, to prevent rumours, lies and using today’s buzz word, fake news.

Taking into account OSA.

[Heathrow Harry]

WEBF - you are of course correct - the Type 42's were clearly vunerable - although I've never seen anyone suggest that there was anything said by anyone at the time they were despatched. And puttung them out as radar pickets was a fairly hairy decision given USN experience in WW2 in the Pacific.

However other ships were out there and weren't destroyed - it's clear there was a problem with the personnel (not just the two fingered in the report) on Sheffield - they never went to action stations, no-one called the cCaptain and the officers on the bridge were "mesmerised" and no action was taken to try and shoot it down.. etc etc

I really don't think it's "an agenda" to recognise that, in this case, there were serious failures by individuals and we really need to learn from these.

There are many other cases in the FI War that show what your average naval personnel (not just exceptional ones) acheived under fire.

[glad rag]

Given the weather states down there at the time would have prevented flying, probably worse.

Arr jimlad, quoted completely out of context of previous thst I was replying too..

But you knew that anyway..

[Marcantilan]

The new released files are here: Operation Corporate (Falkland Conflict): Board of Inquiry into the loss of HMS... | The National Archives (http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C16517022)

The "old" files are elsewhere. I don´t know what all the fuss is about. The "old" files, even redacted, were very critic.

Regards,

[Heathrow Harry]

Thanks for the reference - I'll take a look next time I'm down there

[orca]

I would advise at least a marching pace’s introspection before criticising anyone’s actions or omissions when looking at a set of circumstances you haven’t personally been in. Whilst I find some of the actions/ omissions of those at the scene surprising I’ve no idea how I would have reacted.

I clearly remember the first time I was shot at and it wouldn’t be too much of a stretch to describe the tracer as having a mesmerising quality.

Naturally I’m sure plenty of pprune lurkers have more than earnt an opinion on this - but I do find it a little objectionable when journalists take a disparaging view of those in combat when replacing the toner is as dangerous as it gets.

Don’t get me wrong - if you draw the Queen’s shilling certain things are expected of you and we do need to hold those who do to account. Just be sure you’re on solid ground before you cast the first stone.

The credit belongs to the man in the arena...of which there were many ‘down south’ of course.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

they never went to action stations, no-one called the Captain and the officers on the bridge were "mesmerised" and no action was taken to try and shoot it down.. etc etc


She had no means of splashing an Exocet at close range. Quoting myself from another forum:

Remember reports are written for an intended audience of people who understand the tactical, technical, and human aspects.

This is why others might have pointed out that the report needs to be seen in the wider context of a task group 8000 miles from home, operating in a part of the World where false radar returns due to atmospherics are an issue. Additionally, the intelligence on whether or not the Argentines had got the Super Eterndard/Exocet combination working was unclear.

I have my copy of One Hundred Days with me, Admiral Woodward comments that there had been a number of false alarms that day and the FAAWC was reluctant to expend chaff without good reason.

Somewhere in the BOI there is a note that the Exocet was not seen as it was lost the reflected ground wave from the 965 radar, this was due to the beamwidth. 965 was an old radar that was not fitted to later Type 42s. Likewise detecting the Exocet's own radar (apart from the problem of SCOT transmitting on I band) was that the Exocet would be silent until the last phase of flight. The sequence of the attacks was something like:

1. Aircraft take off from Argentina, and are refuelled in flight.
2. Aircraft approach task force at very low altitude to avoid radar detection. Exercises against Argentine Type 42s have been used to refine the tactics.
3. Aircraft pop up, briefly exposing themselves to detection by radar. They briefly turned on Agave radar to look for targets before returning to low level.
4. Aircraft pop up again, turn on their radars, and the heading/range information is fed to the Exocet, which is then fired. The aircraft return to the safety of low level for the flight home.
5. The Exocet heads towards the target in radar silence, until popping up and looking where it expects to find a target. The radar has a limited arc of view, and aims for the largest target it can see.

The point with chaff is that it has to present a larger target (Radar Cross Section) than the ship that fired it - that takes a finite time as the cloud blooms, and demands precise ship handling by the OOW, lest you steam into your own chaff cloud. If you see the incoming missile with the mark one eyeball - is there enough time?

I have no idea at what range the Exocet was seen, but lets assume it was 1 nm. The speed of Exocet is widely given as Mach 0.9, so if we assume Mach 1 is 720 kts that is approximately 650 kts. This suggests it would only have been seen in the last 5.5 seconds. Enough time to fire a full pattern and for it to bloom? With the missile that close, would the chaff cloud be within the Exocet radar's limited arc of view?

Also some of the comments seem to the think the OOW watched the missile from the time it was launched. Clearly not, and I think I read somewhere the slightly obvious conclusion that if the OOW had called Action Stations it would have resulted in people moving about and doors being open at the time of impact and the subsequent blast/fireball. This would have increased the damage sustained and the number of casualties.

The following occasions when chaff was used successfully differed in that the task group knew it was under attack and fired chaff in good time.

Another particularly nasty allegation is that members of the ship's company were calling home via satellite, which transmitted on I band, blanking out the radar from aircraft and missile. I believe that back in 1982, RN personnel aboard ship did not have telephone communications with home, and certainly not in a war zone. However, ships in a task group do need to communicate. One of the BOI reports includes a comment that Sheffield should have used a HF Task Group RATT circuit instead of SCOT.

However, HF was problematic in the South Atlantic, and the proceedings report from HMS Antrim mentions the difficulties with HF.

I think you might find all the posts on Page Seven (https://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/yes-its-the-guardian.267692/page-7) of that thread to be educational.

[Heathrow Harry]

Orca

Good point but taken literally would mean you could never comment on anything you've never experienced

We all expect bus drivers to be able to drive the bus, surgeons to operate sucessfully, teachers to teach........ the modern world depends on lots of people doing things properly even tho you have no idea that they are doing it or what it entails

I can't see any reason why we should exempt the military - tho appreciating that everyone can fail and that it was never deliberate or malicous

[Heathrow Harry]

"Another particularly nasty allegation is that members of the ship's company were calling home via satellite,"- a

I 've always understood it the comms problem that MAY have interfered with the radar was possibly from a nearby ship or by London calling it - that allegation sounds very nasty (CMA time at the Admiralty??) and probably wrong

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Harry

The allegation that a private phone call was being was originally made by a tabloid (Mirror?) against the Captain in the 1980s. Someone else made it on the linked ARRSE thread.

The BOI report refers to Sheffield transmitting on SCOT (using I band), which blotted out I band for the ESM recievers. Both the Agave radar of the Eterndards and the Exocet's own radar transmitted on I band. Although the ESM system would have been outside of the SCOT main beam, they would have been subject to interference from sidelobes. This would have been at a reduced power level, but still would have presented a signal that would have swamped that from a distant radar.

Recieving SATCOMM signals would not have caused this problem - and the use of SCOT was a serious failing. There were filters that should have been fitted to reduce interence, but she never got them.

The problem of the 965 radar being vulnerable to clutter was an entirely different problem, but due to the physical construction of the antenna and sea conditions, which made detecting low altitude targets difficult.

Additionally the false alarms meant the initial calls from HMS Glasgow were dismissed, although if she (Sheffield) had detected them using ESM..... However the Super Enterdards were fleeting targets, and the Exocet a very small one just above sea level, and she had no weapon likely to be able to shoot it down.

[The Old Fat One]

WEBF,

So much of what you post will resonate with people that served in the maritime environment and know their subject, as opposed to those that did not and do not.

I applaud your diligence and your perseverance.

I chuckled at this masterpiece of understatement...

HF was problematic in the South Atlantic

It was indeed, as it was in the med...and pretty much anywhere but the North Atlantic and even there it was sh1te twice a fkn day...;)

P1ss P00r comms...screwing the military since pontius was a pilot.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JEUChn0Jq8

[Marcantilan]

The May 4th attack was a textbook attack. The Argentine Navy fliers made few mistakes (really, just one, thinking HMS Sheffield was really an aircraft carrier) and the Royal Navy a lot of them.

In the second attack, the Argentine Navy fliers made very few mistakes, and the Royal Navy also few mistakes. A couple of Exocets, aimed to HMS Hermes, hit finally Atlantic Conveyor.

In the final Exocet attack, the Argentine Navy / Argentine Air Force made a good planned attack against the CVGB and missed HMS Avenger. The Royal Navy behaved very well in defense, hitting 2 A4 Skyhawks.

My point is the Royal Navy learnt the hard way. But learnt really very quickly.

[Herod]

I think one of the big mistakes was the assessment (by the Foreign Office?) of the Argentine military before the conflict began. Someone assessed the Army as ineffective, owing to the number of conscripts (probably correct), the Navy likewise (difficult to say, since they saw little action), and the same for the Air Force. Sadly for the UK forces, the assessment of the Air Force was wrong. They were good, a lot better than expected, and it took time to realise this and activate proper countermeasures.

Caveat. I had retired from the military at that time, so have no insider information.

[Heathrow Harry]

Herod - you're correct

The problem was there was really no proper knowledge of Argentinian capabilities - we were scraping up bits from our American friends. Intelligence had no interest or sources in S America generally (it was 1982 nad they had a lot of other worries)

The assesment was correct as far as it went - but it didn't address the possibility that, poor as the Argentinean Army was, it was good enough to stage a smash-and-grab raid before we woke up............ The Argentinean Army itself knew its limitations only too well but went along with the Navy in the belief that once they had the FI the British wouldn't respond.

Someone in BA really should have mentioned Pearl Harbour

[BEagle]

Herod wrote: Sadly for the UK forces, the assessment of the Air Force was wrong. They were good, a lot better than expected, and it took time to realise this and activate proper countermeasures.

Indeed. I recall the JARIC recce guide for Argentine aircraft issued at the time - it included gems such as the Catalina and Huanquero...:rolleyes:

[Heathrow Harry]

there is still a lot of very old kit in S America - Paraguay is probably the worst

the Navy has 4 River defence vessels that are minesweeper /corvette size.

Captain Cabral commisioned 1908 - yes 109 years old "still in excellent condition"
Paraguay commisioned 1931
Teniente Farina commissioned July 1939
Itiapu commisioned 1985

The Army still runs Shermans & Stewart tanks from 1945

The Airforce is the most modern with a small force of Tucanos

[glad rag]

WEBF, your previous was a clear and consise record of what HAPPENED, but not WHY.
IE why were the filters not fitted, why were there no close range active defence, why was such interference of critical systems habitually sanctioned?

[Bing]

IE why were the filters not fitted, why were there no close range active defence, why was such interference of critical systems habitually sanctioned?

££££££££££

[westernhero]

I'd have thought we should be grateful that the Argentinian Naval Air Arm was so small, because it was bloody effective.

5 Super Etendards using 5 missiles sank HMS Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor.

10 A-4Bs in service sank HMS Ardent and put an UXB on HMS Antelope ( not the one that sank her, it was an AF UXB which exploded as it was being dealt with ).

All for the cost of 3 planes shot down and 2 pilots killed. A very professional force.

A good job they didn't have the full complement of 14 Exocets on order when it all kicked off.

[KenV]

For me (being a USN guy rather an RN guy) it's interesting to compare the outcomes of the Sheffield Exocet incident (while in an active war) with the Stark Exocet incident (while not at war). Not only were the outcomes for the ships quite different (Stark was hit by two Exocets but made it to Bahrain under her own power and after temporary repairs there, made it to her home port in Mayport, Florida), but the outcomes for their officers was very different. Captain Brindel (CO of Stark) was relieved and forced to retire. Lt Moncrief (Tactical Action Officer of Stark) was forced to resign.

[glad rag]

Ken. As has been alluded to previously, it's very easy to find a scapegoat (or two) s..t flows downwards as they say...

[KenV]

Ken. As has been alluded to previously, it's very easy to find a scapegoat (or two) s..t flows downwards as they say...So the CO and Tactical Action Officer of Stark were completely innocent of any errors and were "scapegoats" and the real fault lay with higher ups not on board. Got it.

[melmothtw]

I'd have thought we should be grateful that the Argentinian Naval Air Arm was so small, because it was bloody effective.

I imagine Argentina shares similar thoughts about our naval air arm.

[Jimlad1]

For me (being a USN guy rather an RN guy) it's interesting to compare the outcomes of the Sheffield Exocet incident (while in an active war) with the Stark Exocet incident (while not at war). Not only were the outcomes for the ships quite different (Stark was hit by two Exocets but made it to Bahrain under her own power and after temporary repairs there, made it to her home port in Mayport, Florida), but the outcomes for their officers was very different. Captain Brindel (CO of Stark) was relieved and forced to retire. Lt Moncrief (Tactical Action Officer of Stark) was forced to resign.

With respect to STARK, there is a significant difference between being hit in a very localised body of water, with plentiful shore support locally, and being in deep ocean a long way from useful harbours and support.

I suspect lessons were learned in intervening period of 82-87 that helped.

[Heathrow Harry]

A lot of the decisions were taken a long time before as well - such as lack of close-in defences. We tend to forget just how quickly the whole war blew up and how soon people were put in harm's way.

The whole war was fought in the time it takes to circulate a draft change to a work order on new kit........................

[WE Branch Fanatic]

WEBF, your previous was a clear and consise record of what HAPPENED, but not WHY.
IE why were the filters not fitted, why were there no close range active defence, why was such interference of critical systems habitually sanctioned?

Three questions there mate.

Close range defences: The Type 42 was designed to defend against air threats with the Sea Dart missile, and as this was in the Cold War it was intended for use against Soviet high/medium altitude threats. Fitting Sea Wolf to the Type 42 as well would have been a non starter.

The Americans has only just developed Phalanx CIWS and priority was given to their own ships. We the UK got some it was sensibly fitted to the carriers first.

Filters: No idea - but were they filters for the ESM (how would they work without blocking I band?) or filters for the SCOT antenna, possibly reducing sidelobes? If it was the latter, this could mean a heavy piece of kit that would need fitting in a maintenance period, as opposed to something the ship could design/build/install herself.

Allowing interference: This is the exam question. Other ships had banned the use of SCOT during daylight hours. Somehow Sheffield had not. Signals need to be sent, and given HF was problematic (in recent years new technology has gone into HF systems) so the temptation to use SCOT was there - after all those nice Americans were allowing us to use their Communications Satellites.

A lot of the decisions were taken a long time before as well - such as lack of close-in defences. We tend to forget just how quickly the whole war blew up and how soon people were put in harm's way.

The whole war was fought in the time it takes to circulate a draft change to a work order on new kit........................

Given it was a sea skimming missile fired from a low flying aircraft, the most significant thing the task force lacked was Airborne Early Warning. Some Sea Kings were modified and became AEW2s in a a very short time.

[Just This Once...]

Pretty-much sums up the arrogance in the RN at the time. After years of dictating threat profiles to aggressor aircraft and ignoring 'leakers' who came in low or on mass was just the start of it.

Even facing a cold war adversary equipped with some rather nasty anti-surface weapons and adversary threat flight-profiles from the deck to nose-bleed level they stumbled into a real shooting war equipped with years of unrealistic lessons, self-deception and an ignorance of the threat. A modern navy task force getting hit by everything from dumb bombs delivered by a Hercules to an Exocet fired by an improvised land-based contraption. Thank heavens for poor bomb fusing. 3 other RN vessels had been hit by air attack in the days leading up to Sheffield, yet they were still not prepared.

The RN learned some terrible lessons but that knowledge has faded again. Watching a gun-only CIWS, top-tech in the 80's, being fitted to our latest carriers leaves me dumbfounded and the RN hoping that the next generation of anti-ship missiles will fly predictable flightpaths and somehow slow down enough for the bullets to get there in time.

Arrogance is cheap; keeping pace with the threat is expensive.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

But the Soviets did not fly low and they were considered THE threat. When they started to develop missiles fired by submarines that were low level, we developed Sea Wolf (unfortunately on the two Type 22s in the task group had it) and the Americans developed Phalanx.

It was a passing merchant vessel (nothing to do with the task force, or the UK) that got by bombs from an Argentine Hercules - fortunately not exploding. HMS Glamorgan, hit by the land based Exocet, had no means to detect or defeat the missile.

AEW is mentioned here (http://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/101103-hmmmm-why-does-story-sound-familliar.html#post1285888) on this old thread.

[ExGrunt]

JTO,

Watching a gun-only CIWS, top-tech in the 80's, being fitted to our latest carriers leaves me dumbfounded and the RN hoping that the next generation of anti-ship missiles will fly predictable flightpaths and somehow slow down enough for the bullets to get there in time.

In part I agree with you. I disagree with you antipathy towards guns. Guns do work (5 kills in FI), but you need LOTS of them. IJN Mushashi had one hundred and thirty 25 mm guns, but that was not enough to save her from being sunk by aircraft in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

I wonder if 3 CIWS will cope with an attack from 1,000+ cheap drones or multiple remotely piloted torpedoes.

EG

[Mogwi]

But the Soviets did not fly low and they were considered THE threat. When they started to develop missiles fired by submarines that were low level, we developed Sea Wolf (unfortunately on the two Type 22s in the task group had it) and the Americans developed Phalanx.

It was a passing merchant vessel (nothing to do with the task force, or the UK) that got by bombs from an Argentine Hercules - fortunately not exploding. HMS Glamorgan, hit by the land based Exocet, had no means to detect or defeat the missile.

AEW is mentioned here (http://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/101103-hmmmm-why-does-story-sound-familliar.html#post1285888) on this old thread.

Actually, British Wye was Herc-bombed on (?) 29th May when re-supplying the TF but not damaged. The well-named Hercules was the US tanker also hit and later scuttled (?insurance).

[Just This Once...]

But the Soviets did not fly low and they were considered THE threat.

Really? Did you expect them to hang-around in your weapon engagement zone?

The Soviets used low-level tactics just like everyone else. They also had reach, speed and stand-off capability. The RN faced formidable threats such as the Backfire / Kitchen capability (and the Blinder / Kitchen before that) as well as tactical air, but tried to convince itself that it wasn't.

The Backfire crews in particular saw themselves as worthy adversaries to the USN CBGs and honed their tactics to suit. In equal regard the USN respected, trained and equipped themselves to meet such threats.

If the RN had faced its chosen adversary with its 1982 capabilities it would have been rather more ugly. Fundamentally it had an unrealistic view on air threats and post '82 things had to change.

[Fonsini]

I recently finished reading the story of HMS Ardent - Through Fire and Water, a brave little ship with a fine company to be sure, but parts of it made painful reading. There is so much talk about tying a GPMG to railings to “improve the ship’s close range air defence”, one officer even opened up on an attacking A-4 with his 9mm Browning pistol, and WW2 era 20mm Oerlikons were in such demand that they were removed from sunken ships to be re-used. One paragraph describes how 60 round magazines were over charged with 65 or more rounds to only then read that the guns mysteriously started jamming, which is just poor weapons training. Seacat was universally referred to as Sea Mouse and regarded as utterly useless. The overall impression I got was of ships that were poorly equipped with outdated air defence equipment with a crew equipped and trained primarily for ASW missions. On the other hand everything was stacked against the RN, stationary ships in narrow inlets surrounded by rising terrain, it doesn’t get much worse than that.

I was just a sprog in sixth form college when all this was happening, but I remember how proud we all were of our armed forces and how they ultimately overcame all obstacles to secure victory. I wasn’t quite 18, just a few months short in fact, and regarded myself as far too young to be involved in all that sort of thing, I was just a kid after all - then I saw the story of HMS Argonaut and the 18 year old who was killed when an Argentine bomb hit and detonated a Sea Cat in the main missile magazine and it really hit home - there were young men my age dying down there.

So yes I’m sure there were many mistakes made on HMS Sheffield, and other ships too, and yes we also need to discuss and learn from those mistakes, but to me all those lads who served down there are heroes and the least we can do is to make sure that our armed forces have the very best equipment available, a lesson the MoD still seems to be struggling with.

[Heathrow Harry]

I think JtO has stated something we'd all rather not think about:-

"The RN faced formidable threats such as the Backfire / Kitchen capability (and the Blinder / Kitchen before that) as well as tactical air, but tried to convince itself that it wasn't."

We're all set up in some siutation and then we see a potential threat.

A logical analysis says it really IS a threat and worse we don't have the money/men/kit/doctrine/will to counter it.

In general people will not 'fess up but will tend to play down the threat or conjur up some (often unworkeable) counter-measure...........

I start to think about "the machine gun is a much over rated weapon"; day bombing Germany without LR fighter cover; "Malaya is covered in impenetrable forests"; "Germany will never invade Russia" etc etc etc

I hate to think what levels of wishful thinking still occur...... especialy in the UK MoD

[Ethel the Aardvark]

I remember being told that as the Sheffield was listing and evacuations were starting to be performed an unknown sailor started singing ‘always look on the. Right side of life’ to which the whole able company including the captain promptly joined in. Hopefully not an urban myth.
I had a mate who was on the Sir Galahad and was in charge of a blowpipe. He told me the A4 had dropped its bomb and was long gone before he could say “what the f@ck was that.
Another issue was a certain European freight company falling out of favour with the UK over an issue of transportation of fresh Exocets to Argentina during the crisis. I think they had a lucrative Hong Kong contract removed.

[Mac the Knife]

My bro' was out there. Apparently one of the jokes was:

"I spy with my little eye something beginning with E - a-a-and_you_have_3.5_seconds_to_ tell_me!"

Mac

:cool:

[Mogwi]

I remember being told that as the Sheffield was listing and evacuations were starting to be performed an unknown sailor started singing ‘always look on the. Right side of life’ to which the whole able company including the captain promptly joined in. Hopefully not an urban myth.
I had a mate who was on the Sir Galahad and was in charge of a blowpipe. He told me the A4 had dropped its bomb and was long gone before he could say “what the f@ck was that.
Another issue was a certain European freight company falling out of favour with the UK over an issue of transportation of fresh Exocets to Argentina during the crisis. I think they had a lucrative Hong Kong contract removed.

No, not an urban myth, it was a D (fighter controller) on loan from HERMES who started it!

[Not_a_boffin]

Really? Did you expect them to hang-around in your weapon engagement zone?

The Soviets used low-level tactics just like everyone else. They also had reach, speed and stand-off capability. The RN faced formidable threats such as the Backfire / Kitchen capability (and the Blinder / Kitchen before that) as well as tactical air, but tried to convince itself that it wasn't.

The Backfire crews in particular saw themselves as worthy adversaries to the USN CBGs and honed their tactics to suit. In equal regard the USN respected, trained and equipped themselves to meet such threats.

If the RN had faced its chosen adversary with its 1982 capabilities it would have been rather more ugly. Fundamentally it had an unrealistic view on air threats and post '82 things had to change.


To be fair, the best defence for a naval force against a high-speed bomber launching very long range stand-off missiles which (if my memory of the relevant threat manuals is correct) came in at either very high or moderate levels - certainly NOT sea-skimming a la AM39, is organic long range interceptors and AEW. Unfortunately, another service had suggested that it was more than capable of providing said effect.


That AEW / interceptor (and EW) combo is exactly what the USN CVBGs had at the time and exactly what the RN had been denuded of. The limitation of GWS30 was primarily the launcher / CoF capability, which budgets prevented addressing seriously. The USN had to develop AEGIS to address the same threat - some years after GWS30 was fielded.


That's not to say that low-level FBA were not a threat, but not in the open ocean which is primarily where the RN had been directed to plan to fight. The recognition of the threat is exactly why the GWS25 system had been developed. It's also fair to say that guided weapon systems are not exactly easy - or more pertinently quick or cheap - to design, develop and bring into service. I seem to remember fields full of Bloodhound 2 in East Anglia throughout most of the 80s, because we couldn't afford anything else.


Suggesting the RN had an arrogance because they didn't address exercise profiles flown by the RAF is a little bit like asking the RAF what it's current airfield defence (ground and air) capability is like. Not in the threat profile, so not funded and not exercised......


Was the RN over-optimistic? Almost certainly - the loss of institutional DC and fire-prevention measures in ship design are obvious. Whether it was caused by arrogance or choices made in budget reality may be a more finely-nuanced question.


I'm also interested to discover which three RN vessels had been hit prior to Sheffield. Doesn't tally with my recollections.

[Just This Once...]

I think you have reaffirmed the level of denial at the time regarding the threat profiles.

Again, Soviet tactics included low-level tactics for maritime attack and included everything from dumb-bombing (as per the Argentinian threat) to a range of stand-off weapons. Their tactics included cooperative profiles with data-links providing the targeting information from high-flyer to the launch aircraft skimming the waves on the attack run. Contemporary Soviet tactics manuals used simple graphics to outline the attack plans, so little knowledge of Russian is required to read them. Of course for shorter-range tactical aircraft low-level flying was the name of the game.

The ‘open-ocean only’ idea is laughable. The RN still had to transit the Soviet air threat area to get to and from ‘open ocean’. Of course, the RN had other tasks that required operating in the littoral threat area, facing a brace land, sea and air threats. With a NATO declared amphib role the RN, including the RM, was supposed to be able to operate in a Soviet air threat environment. The excuses regarding the ASW role in open ocean are just that - excuses. If the RN was genuinely prepared for amphibious ops on NATO’s northern flank it would have been better prepared for similar ops in the South Atlantic.

[Just This Once...]

- HMS ALACRITY, ARROW and GLAMORGAN on the Saturday before.

[Heathrow Harry]

"Suggesting the RN had an arrogance because they didn't address exercise profiles flown by the RAF is a little bit like asking the RAF what it's current airfield defence (ground and air) capability is like. Not in the threat profile, so not funded and not exercised......"

Agree totatlly - I've asked several times on PPrune why the UK has zero medium/long range ground-to-air missiles when most other countries have them..... but as you say no-one is interested in lfighting for the funding.......

[tucumseh]

but as you say no-one is interested in fighting for the funding.......

Precisely. This was my first HQ job, at least for FAA avionics. My very first task on joining in 1985 was to write and staff an Admiralty Board Submission for a upgrade programme. Two years later I gave my relief a handover, but he was out of a job within 6 months as the posts were all disbanded as part of the Hallifax Savings. They have NEVER been replaced. There were some around that did a small part of the task, but if you asked who did the table thumping at Screening meetings, you got a blank look.

[Not_a_boffin]

The ‘open-ocean only’ idea is laughable. The RN still had to transit the Soviet air threat area to get to and from ‘open ocean’. Of course, the RN had other tasks that required operating in the littoral threat area, facing a brace land, sea and air threats. With a NATO declared amphib role the RN, including the RM, was supposed to be able to operate in a Soviet air threat environment. The excuses regarding the ASW role in open ocean are just that - excuses. If the RN was genuinely prepared for amphibious ops on NATO’s northern flank it would have been better prepared for similar ops in the South Atlantic.


All of which conveniently ignores the fact that the best defence against air & missile attack for a naval force has always been (preferably organic) AEW and DCA fighters. Something which someone else had said they'd provide. But couldn't. And still can't.


I suspect that most western navies (and their systems at the time) would have struggled against that threat. It's not as if Tartar/SM1 or BPDMS Sparrow were any more capable against a LL threat.


It is entirely possible that procedures could and should have been better, but very difficult indeed to accelerate the kit.

[glad rag]

I seem to remember some less than complementary aircrew debriefs, over quite a few JMC's, in the big green potting shed..

[Just This Once...]

All of which conveniently ignores the fact that the best defence against air & missile attack for a naval force has always been (preferably organic) AEW and DCA fighters. Something which someone else had said they'd provide. But couldn't. And still can't.

I suspect that most western navies (and their systems at the time) would have struggled against that threat.

So we have gone from a vacuous ‘no low-level threat in NATO role’ argument, to saying that there was a threat but the responsibility to counter was with the RAF, before leaping to an argument to that most western navies would also have struggled.

Returning to the RAF notion, are you really saying we had RN ships bobbing about hundreds of miles or more from land expecting the RAF to provide a defensive CAP?

[Not_a_boffin]

Far from it. You don't come in at low level with a long range stand off missile - particularly ones with the flight profile of AS4/AS6. Which is why the USN based their fleet defence around F14+AIM54/E2/EA6 as the Outer Air Battle. LL threats would primarily be tacair and much shorter range weapons. Either way, the best counter to the threat is AEW and DCA (or are you disputing that?) - something that the RN had, but was then removed with the explicit promise that "someone else" would defend the fleet. That is indisputable fact. No credible Navy attempts to operate against a serious air threat without DCA of its own. Indeed Corporate only served to validate that tenet. So late 70s, early 80s, DCA was most definitely required to defend the amphibious force - and given that the RN had lost it's carriers, that could only come from two sources, USN CVBG or land-based air (be that Noggie, RAF from Lossie/Leuchars or USAF from Keflavik).


I note you haven't addressed the ability of other contemporary systems/navies to address that threat, probably because it denudes your argument that it was all down to RN arrogance.


Still, never mind.

[KenV]

With respect to STARK, there is a significant difference between being hit in a very localised body of water, with plentiful shore support locally, and being in deep ocean a long way from useful harbours and support.I'm certain there is a vast difference. Nevertheless, in one case the ship was abandoned/evacuated by her crew and taken under tow by another vessel. And in the other case the crew was able to control the damage, maintain power, and steam away under her own power. And in the case of the abandoned ship the senior officers were never punished or even censured in any way, while in the other case two senior officers were sacked. I personally don't see how the relative locations of the two incidents account for those differences.

[Heathrow Harry]

One was an "unfortunate incident" in a war we won - the other was a one off with no other news around it.... you can appreciate why there was a reluctance to spoil the narrative......

[Just This Once...]

I note you haven't addressed the ability of other contemporary systems/navies to address that threat, probably because it denudes your argument that it was all down to RN arrogance.

I am puzzled as to what capabilities you are referring to. If it is Soviet vessels then I can assure you that from the late '70s their surface vessels had become exceptionally prickly when it came to surface to air capability.

If you are pointing at the US Navy - well they had their 'gulp' moment regarding the threat posed by the Soviet aircraft at the turn of the '70s. Phalanx CIWS prototypes were being evaluated on land by 1972 and afloat by '73. By the Falklands the system had been in full production for a number of years. Their leap forward in integrated combat systems and associated radars & missiles was arguably even more significant.

Meanwhile we were producing Type 42s.

[Not_a_boffin]

Well aware of Soviet naval SAM capabilities, thanks. Used to have to do WEP to achieve useful Pk against them. That said, late 70s early 80s, they were only just bringing SAN7 into service. It's predecessors were SAN3 and SAN4 both of which were broadly equivalent to GWS30 in terms of technology (if not engagement envelope) and both of which suffered from the same launcher type / CoF restrictions. So highly unlikely to have been any more effective.


Likewise, the USN. In 1982, their state of the art AD ships were the SM1/SM2 fitted CGN - again with limited launcher and CoF. They didn't get SPY1 till 1983 and VLS a few years later. Incidentally, not necessarily particularly effective against sea-skimmers either.....


Nor were USN Phalanx fits particularly prevalent until the mid-80s. Just like GWS25 which was designed and fielded over a similar period, but a very different solution to the same problem.


The Sov philosophy of covering their ships with SAMs and guns like AK630 was also partly due to their recognition that they would be fighting at a disadvantage in terms of air cover. It also had the slightly unfortunate effect of making their ships very large (~8000te). Given that the RN is castigated every time it tries to buy "large ships" it is perhaps no wonder that we were still producing Type 42s. With their very highly regarded ADAWS C2 system and one of only four nations (IIRC) able to design and build Area AD naval SAM.


So, other than having similar SAM systems to the two superpowers of the time, but on much smaller ships on cost grounds and having to fight without a major component of capability (AEW), it was obviously all down to RN arrogance.

[Heathrow Harry]

Well Soviet ships may have been big butthey were covered in weapons - the RN ships had (comparitively) very few weapons at all.....................

Look at the T45 now -7000 tons full displacement, 48 Surface to air missiles, no Surface-to-surface missiles, 1 gun and 2 x Phalanx

Udaloy II (commisioned 1999) - 9000 ton max displacement
8 x SSM, 8 x SAM, Anti sub Missiles, 8x torpedos, 2x Anti sub mortars 2 Gun turret

Or the Gephard Frigates (2012) 2000 ton displacement 8 x SSM, 2x SAM, 4 torpedo, 1 gun, 1 Anti sub mortar, 48 mines

and our allies have

Forbin FDA class - (2011) 7000 ton max displacement 8 x SSM, 48 x SAM, 2 guns, 2 torpedo, 2 close in guns

[Jimlad1]

Well Soviet ships may have been big butthey were covered in weapons - the RN ships had (comparitively) very few weapons at all.....................

Look at the T45 now -7000 tons full displacement, 48 Surface to air missiles, no Surface-to-surface missiles, 1 gun and 2 x Phalanx

Udaloy II (commisioned 1999) - 9000 ton max displacement
8 x SSM, 8 x SAM, Anti sub Missiles, 8x torpedos, 2x Anti sub mortars 2 Gun turret

Or the Gephard Frigates (2012) 2000 ton displacement 8 x SSM, 2x SAM, 4 torpedo, 1 gun, 1 Anti sub mortar, 48 mines

and our allies have

Forbin FDA class - (2011) 7000 ton max displacement 8 x SSM, 48 x SAM, 2 guns, 2 torpedo, 2 close in guns

T45 has SSM, and close range guns. Different nations have different philopsophies. Just because it isnt in the shop window doesnt mean it is underarmed. Russians built on a 'fire one salvo before we lose it' approach. We build on a 'fight the long fight' approach.

[Heathrow Harry]

well 3 of the T45' s have Harpoon but only until next year when the system is going to be withdrawn................. and those systems were scabbed from the T22's.......

You have a point re the old Soviet Navy but we're not even as heavily armed as the French and Italian vessels and it's not new - the old County Class were seriously underarmed as well for their day....................

as for "built on a 'fire one salvo before we lose it' approach." sounds like Jackie Fisher "Hit first ! Hit hard !"

[KenV]

as for "built on a 'fire one salvo before we lose it' approach." sounds like Jackie Fisher "Hit first ! Hit hard !"I was required to memorize the following my Plebe year:

"Hit hard, hit fast, hit often." -ADM William "Bull" Halsey

[Fortissimo]

Well I think the RN losing its AD missiles is a good thing. This possibly inflammatory opinion is based on numerous JMC, TASMO and MACEX sorties where the aim of the game was to get through the gate without being (exercise) engaged by the people you were supposed to be supporting! Far too many such sorties went into the 'unsuccessful' bucket for this reason.


"Hit hard! Hit fast! Hit anything!" (RN Manual of Air Defence at Sea, 1980, Vol 2)

[Haraka]

Reminds we of the wonderful quote from a British comedy film which included illustrating a WW2 U.K.AAA battery:
" Two bob for every one you shoot down lads!!"
.
.
.
"Half a crown if it's German."

[Wander00]

Fortissimo - including , I believe, an AAC helicopter over Mt Pleasant

[glad rag]

I was required to memorize the following my Plebe year:

"Hit hard, hit fast, hit often." -ADM William "Bull" Halsey

Did it take much effort?

[BEagle]

Indeed, Fortissimo!

Roger Waitout and his cronies were never where they said they'd be, nor going in the briefed direction, nor able to recognise friendly traffic at the Gate! But they'd often invent yet another way of trying to confuse everyone about which of the handful of available frequencies would be in use...:D

On one JMC, the NATO AWACS crew told the fish-heads that the next time they were engaged by dark blue on blue, they'd RTB, fly an approach and return to the exercise area, leaving the boat people without any AEW for the entire period. Which got their attention!

[Navaleye]

A couple of points if I may.

Soviet ships always looked top heavy because of the need to duplicate just about everything due to the unreliability of their systems. They are still a decade behind the west in most cases in terms of sensors.

The T42s were designed specifically and exclusively to counter the Soviet threat from medium to high level. That is what the budget was spent on and for the most part it worked pretty well.

[TEEEJ]

well 3 of the T45' s have Harpoon but only until next year when the system is going to be withdrawn................. and those systems were scabbed from the T22's.......

Source: House of Commons Hansard; posted Oct 15, 2017)
Question Asked by Andrew Bowie
(MP for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine)
on: 14 September 2017
Ministry of Defence -- Antiship Missiles (n° 105167)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department has made of the effect of the Royal Navy's decision to withdraw the Harpoon anti-ship missile by the end of 2018 on the capabilities of the Royal Navy.

Answer:
Answered by: Harriett Baldwin on 10 October 2017

The Royal Navy continuously reviews the capabilities it requires. While work is in hand to consider options for the replacement of the Harpoon missile system, the Navy has decided to extend its service life beyond 2018.

Anti-ship Missiles: Written Question - 105167 (http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/187625/u_turn-as-royal-navy-will-extend-harpoon-after-2018.html)

The RN has deferred a decision to retire its Harpoon anti-ship missiles The move will partially alleviate a capability gap in RN anti-ship missile capabilities Boeing Harpoon heavy anti-ship missiles will remain in service on Royal Navy (RN) Type 23 frigates after the UK Ministry of Defence deferred a decision to retire the weapon in 2018 without replacement.

Speaking at the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) 2017 defence exhibition, held in London from 11-15 September, senior RN sources told Jane’s the sea-skimming GWS 60/Harpoon Block 1C missiles would remain in service at least until 2020. “There is work ongoing to look at options for longer extension in service,” said one source.

DSEI 2017: UK defers Harpoon retirement | Jane's 360 (http://www.janes.com/article/74044/dsei-2017-uk-defers-harpoon-retirement)

[MAINJAFAD]

A couple of points if I may.

Soviet ships always looked top heavy because of the need to duplicate just about everything due to the unreliability of their systems. They are still a decade behind the west in most cases in terms of sensors.

Not so much unreliability as lack of capability. The Soviet kit was a good 10 years behind the West, but having worked on some of it, I can say that it:-

A. Normally works when you switch it on 999 times out of 1000 and..

B. ...Has quite easy to use manual over-rides on everything which allow you to shoot a weapon off if the electo-mechanical computer has a fit due to ECM thanks to almost everything having a TV camera aiming system fitted (unlike Sea Wolf and its software driven sulks in 1982).

[glad rag]

A couple of points if I may.

Soviet ships always looked top heavy because of the need to duplicate just about everything due to the unreliability of their systems. They are still a decade behind the west in most cases in terms of sensors.

The T42s were designed specifically and exclusively to counter the Soviet threat from medium to high level. That is what the budget was spent on and for the most part it worked pretty well.

I think the point is it was built to a specification that ensured the Sovs would play the game. Good job they are sports and all that!!

:ugh:

[glad rag]

Harpoon was being withdrawn on safety grounds, how has this risk now been mitigated?

[Heathrow Harry]

Harpoon replacement

" “There is work ongoing to look at options for longer extension in service,”"

So that's fine then...............

[WE Branch Fanatic]

I am puzzled as to what capabilities you are referring to. If it is Soviet vessels then I can assure you that from the late '70s their surface vessels had become exceptionally prickly when it came to surface to air capability.

If you are pointing at the US Navy - well they had their 'gulp' moment regarding the threat posed by the Soviet aircraft at the turn of the '70s. Phalanx CIWS prototypes were being evaluated on land by 1972 and afloat by '73. By the Falklands the system had been in full production for a number of years. Their leap forward in integrated combat systems and associated radars & missiles was arguably even more significant.

Meanwhile we were producing Type 42s.

One of my University lecturers (ex RN) did say that the Type 42 design was criticised before they entered service - however:

Regarding Phalanx, I think you have your dates mixed up.

The prototype Phalanx was installed aboard USS KING (DLG-10/DDG-41) in 1973 for evaluation. Another prototype CIWS was used in tests conducted aboard ex-USS ALFRED A. CUNNINGHAM (DD-752). Several different kinds of missiles were fired at CUNNINGHAM; all were shot down. Full operational and evaluation trials were performed aboard USS BIGELOW (DD-942) in 1977. The evaluations included tests with high levels of jamming noise during which the unit succeeded in distinguishing small missile-like targets against nearby islands.Phalanx met and exceeded all maintenance and reliability requirements. The first production units of Phalanx were installed aboard USS CORAL SEA (CV-43) in 1980. Installation aboard noncombatant ships began in 1984.

The story of Phalanx CIWS (http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-103.htm)

[glad rag]

Phalanx, with the barrel stabilisation mods, the ballisticallly improved round and ir tracker combine to give giving superb moa accuracy and kill potential....