Dxb-Dme info

[Jack330]

Any info on what happened a few days ago to ek134 or 132 during approach at DME ? Rumors say aircraft at 500ft 8 miles out.

[aslan1982]

check flight radar for ek131 on the 10th. whole story there for you

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/ek131#eceac34

[SandmanDXB]

Looks like things get a bit interesting from 17:53utc!

Probably a terrain escape manoeuvre, followed by a second approach that led to a go around, finally a landing off the third one. Was the weather that bad in Moscow recently?

Presume the guys are off the roster...

[bidabon]

clear.... as mud !
Could anybody explain pliz ?

[Jack330]

All I know is that the guys are grounded pending investigation but if anyone has more technical details it would be easier to understand what exactly happened.

[aslan1982]

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/UAE131/history/20170910/1250Z/OMDB/UUDD/tracklog


for more info - check time stamp 0953

doesnt say how far they are from the runway but they are not established on the loc yet due heading. not pretty. I guess it would have been dark. But still nice weather

UUDD 101900Z 21003MPS 170V230 CAVOK 14/11 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG

UUDD 101800Z 18004MPS CAVOK 15/11 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG

UUDD 101700Z 19003MPS 9999 FEW040 15/12 Q1016 R88/010095 NOSIG

[Jack330]

Let's wait for more info...

[falconeasydriver]

They were probably composing an ASR about noise cancelling headsets, or coming up with a good excuse for loss of comms in Chinese airspace.
FWIW, I'm joking but from the outside looking in, I'd be surprised to learn if this was anything else than self inflicted in terms of training, resilience and culture.

[White Knight]

FWIW, I'm joking

Don't know how 'training, resilience or culture' caused this one falcon but it's not going to be a joke for the two guys involved!

[Jack330]

This is serious stuff ! Close to CFIT ! It's not going to end well and as usual, it will be well hidden to the public, just like the 777 f...k up

[SOPS]

That was very close to being a big smoking hole in the ground!

[aussiefarmer]

Well not surprised within a company that selects trainers for how good they will be at being management puppets many with the minimum experience on the left seat (months sometimes) and an airline that upgrades people based on age??? instead of capabilities, experience and performance. Run through the law of fear and punishment, EK is past the downhill spiral now basically in a deep flat stall.

[White Knight]

A big 'gotcha' into UUDD is dialing the QFE into the altimeter rather than QNH. Not saying it happened here but it has caught out other crews previously!

[White Knight]

with the minimum experience on the left seat (months sometimes)

Agree with you 100%. Some of the rubbish these guys spout is worrying!

[SOPS]

Well not surprised within a company that selects trainers for how good they will be at being management puppets many with the minimum experience on the left seat (months sometimes) and an airline that upgrades people based on age??? instead of capabilities, experience and performance. Run through the law of fear and punishment, EK is past the downhill spiral now basically in a deep flat stall.

...Run through the law of fear and punishment......

I don't know what the crew did...but I feel very sorry for them...I have a feeling they may be in a world of hurt.

[Marcellus Wallace]

Don't know the full story yet, but I think its pretty early to blame Training as the cause. What happened to distance x 3 and all the pilot **** that we're supposed to do all the time? Were there other holes in the Swiss Cheese that affected that?

[Jack330]

Same pilot sh..t that they didn't do when they destroyed the 777 for no reason.... Poor passengers, if they only knew

[5star]

very odd series of events...
surely go ahead and blame those 'stupid pilots' ...

I wonder what the skippers workload was before the event...this, combined with possible massive inexperince in the rhs these days... (not an issue these days, right?).
As a tractor driver, I am surprised however that in situations like this one didn' t trigger some sort of alarm in the 380 before they were so low, given all the extra wistles and bells in the cockpit...

[SOPS]

Do pilot shti? Do pilot shti? That is part of the problem. You are not allowed to do pilot stuff in EK. You have to recite endless SOPs and follow them regardless, if you don't, the fear and punishment clause will take over. If the boys on the 777 had used some common sense, and done a bit of pilot stuff, they would have landed safely, taxied in with a perfect aircraft and gone home.
But the fear and punishment clause in their heads was stronger than the common sense/do pilot stuff, and we all know the result.

[fliion]

What's with the overconfidence & defensiveness of some of the junior Trainer's/FO's/cadets these days?

Is that a "millennial pilot" thing?

[Jack330]

I agree with SOPS

[777-200LR]

SOPS you're talking BS. If SOPS were followed, EMW wouldn't have been a write off. Half the guys think the Co notam RAAS long landing after touchdown came as a result of EK521, it was there the morning the flight departed TRV. Part of "doing pilot stuff" is knowing your aircraft, and absolute least when in doubt; PITCH & POWER

[I Claudius]

A reasonable balanced view from SOPS,
without resorting to put downs.

[Marcellus Wallace]

It's not possible because the Training Department only taught them SOP compliance and not Pitch+Power = Performance....apparently

But yes, agreed the fear makes people do silly things...Bird on engine comes to mind.

[Monarch Man]

SOPS you're talking BS. If SOPS were followed, EMW wouldn't have been a write off. Half the guys think the Co notam RAAS long landing after touchdown came as a result of EK521, it was there the morning the flight departed TRV. Part of "doing pilot stuff" is knowing your aircraft, and absolute least when in doubt; PITCH & POWER

200LR back up the blame game for a second there fella, what SOPs is saying is spot on, moreover its eminently sensible and safe.
I too have had a RAAS event that was on the face of it valid, but to me it was spurious, I elected to continue the landing, filed the paperwork and registered my concern with fleet/safety/Boeing technical pilots. Long story short, very few people where aware that RAAS referenced itself from the start rather than the end of the runway when the "policy" was written and I was vindicated along with others in suggesting that this is a tool, not a catch all.
Yet again unfortunately it's another case of unaccountable individuals embracing immature technology and making policy decisions at no risk to themselves whilst undermining the very experience and professionalism of the individuals who up until this managed to not over-run a runway.
This leads me back to what SOPs said, 200LR you must surely appreciate that procedures are there as a baseline, the piloting bit overrides all of that, and that piloting bit is presently being taught by an increasing number of "wood for the trees" trainers who themselves lack many of the key skills in areas of experience and airmanship that it will take a monumental effort to reverse, it's also clear to me that over reliance on technology is as much the culprit as is company culture, but the company at its core doesn't believe that either of these threats even exist.

[FLEX/MCT]

Skipper is a solid operator I've flown with on 330.

He was on a fairly punishing reserve roster with approximately 50 hours of back-of-the-clock flying (unfactored of course) in ten days at the time of the incident

Moscow is a tricky destination.

Nobody gets up in the morning and thinks "yeah lets screw up big time today!"

Let's not hang, draw and quarter them based on incomplete info, we can leave that to our illustrious "management".

Flex

[SOPS]

200 LR...we will have to agree to disagree. Many Captains and a huge amount of FOs approaching command, dread being called into the office, for a 'talk', especially with a certain DCPB, who used to live in a country surrounded by a wall, ( who interesntly likes livining in his cubicle in the office, and tell others how to fly, but not fly himself.) in my time in EK, I was 'lucky' , I was in the position that if I did something the Company deemed ' bad' or ' showing 'The Brand' in a bad light'...my family home in Australia or my family's future would not be under threat.
However, let's look at the case of the 777 first.
If the guys had in the back of their heads ' well if we land off this we might get a phone call that says...Hi guys, we saw you landed off a RAAS warning, we know that's no problem in Dubai...but be careful if you are landing in Newcastle...anyway have a good day, see you later mate'...they would have landed and gone home.

However, I will bet you a million dollars they had in the back of their heads the email they would recieve the next morning had they landed,

" what have you done? You have landed against a RAAS warning, you have been removed from the roster pending investigation. You have blatantly ignored Company procedures. Please be in the DCPB office tomorrow morning ( on your day off) for an interview with DCPB and several other heavies'

Well, we all know the result of that one...now let's talk about the A380 in Moscow.

None of us know what really happened yet.
However, if I had just nearly buried myself into the mud of 'The Beloved Mother Country ', I would already wishing my uniform pants were brown. But as I tried to do the second ( and perhaps third) approach, with in the back of my head...well that's it...the house is gone..the kids education is gone..how will I pay out the car loan...
And sitting next to me was a new boy FO ( and I have no idea about the FOs experience), however, if he is sitting there in the middle of the night thinking...I just moved my family here..WTF just happened? You really think that crew is in the correct frame of mind to land the aircraft? I would suggest they are so stressed out, they should be in bed with about three Valium.

Fear and punishment rule. Basic common sense and pilot shti has been thrown out the window...my take on it anyway.
And it's easy for me..I do it from the comfort of home, stay safe out there!

[Odins Raven]

There's nothing to suggest the EMW crew didn't know SOPs or tech stuff.

Getting startled and worrying about the correct decision to make is a human factors issue and easily blocks your brain from doing the right thing. Pressure from above affects people in different ways. I'm pretty sure anyone can get forget SOPs and tech knowledge at crucial times if under enough pressure... SOPs had it spot on about corporate culture.

[Kobus Dune]

Moscow is a very easy destination.

Some people create difficulty : how many times do you find the meters still displayed when getting in the cockpit at DME ? they figure it helps for gross error check during approach, when it's just adding confusion. You don't need meters there, it's not China ...

[Toledo]

Agree completely with SOPs & MM. Somebody else talking BS here.

[Trader]

The other issue is that we have all been flying max hours for 5 years or more now. 90-100 hours a month. Fleet doesn't see it that way..."Well, you had 42 days of leave so you don't fly 1000 EVERY month" (verbatim to me in the office).

The effects of that flying is manifesting itself now in terms of sickness and in terms of performance.

I agree that we have to be professionals, stay current and fly the damn airplane. The problem is that everything works AGAINST the pilots from doing so.

Worse, they don't see it!!! It is like the trainee pilot who screws up in the sim. If he see's his mistakes you can train him to not repeat him. The dangerous one is the pilot who does NOT see where they erred.

That is EK management - head in the sand. Blame the pilots and hope for the best.

[speed2height]

It's not possible because the Training Department only taught them SOP compliance and not Pitch+Power = Performance....apparently

But yes, agreed the fear makes people do silly things...Bird on engine comes to mind.

To think that a Training Department in an International Airline would have to train Pitch +Power = Performance is a BIG concern. At what point in a pilots career should this be learned, I suggest PPL not post ATPL type Rating or recurrent training.

[777-200LR]

SOPS if you're frame of mind coming to work is how you described then maybe this isn't the place for you. I mean no disrespect but I've been here 10 years and not once have I thought about the things you have mentioned during an approach or go around. Someone here mentioned that under pressure anyone can forget an SOP or tech knowledge but your job is to keep cool under the gun that's why they pay you the pocket money. You have taken the command out of the captain; which is making a decision, living with it and most of all; able to walk away from it.

Speed2height, said it spot on. This is a big boys airline, if you need spoon feeding, again I'll say it, this might not be the place for you.

[BigGeordie]

10 years ago nee joiners didn't need 'spoon feeding'. They had a lot of experience before they came to Dubai. The recruits have changed, the airline hasn't.

[donpizmeov]

https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19930818-0

Seems this fatigue thing has been known about for a while.

[fliion]

I talked to one of the guys in the flight deck of that flight. It was the late 90's back in US when we spoke- he had some years to reflect. The way he described the fatigue was powerful - scary - he said they were essentially incapacitated by it.

Funnily enough because of his honesty & humility he was hired by the FAA as an inspector and passed on his experiences to those who followed, his insight was valued and used to help the next generation learn and improve.

Different time different place.

The Complacency email today was another groan moment in a long line of primitive man mgt that is embedded in the culture here. Yes it was polite and well written but...

One cannot help but feel it's anothr "lazy pilots" moment - which ATC referred to us at that fateful meeting all those years ago that has changed fit ops since.

Moscow was a serious incident and the msg today unfortunately does not bode well for the poor guys caught in the crosshairs regardless of their errors or lack thereof.
Family lives upended - we hope not.

I looked up the opposite of COMPLACENCY the best the web could come up with was yahoo.answers => MOTIVATED

So the third/ninth floor needs to fight complacency by motivating.

You do not do that by:

Downgrading 330 skippers due seat number change
Reneging on the Freighter contract
Offering more money to those outside the property than on.
Flying pilots to the bone for 5 years with a mantra - don't like it leave
Discontinue Housing allowances for those planning to use it
Create a Punitive culture - final warning for operational errors over intentional misdeeds
Delay upgrade for 1 sim repeat - by two years
Neglect to write to the pilots and explain the current education allowance which has been done every July since mid noughties
Neglect to write the pay review letter
Let 100's of the most experienced pilots go without offering a lifestyle roster balance
Fail to keep up with inflation, in fact fall far behind.
Fail to back a skipper over a VIP customer.
Lowering minimums to a regional level

The list goes on.

Correcting the above will cost some money but infinitely less than the consequences if the complacency continues.

The echo that seems to be ringing throughout the halls lately - only a matter of time.

Signs of low morale and endemic complacency are to be found regularly.

Stop shoddy treatment of pilots, respect contracts - motivation will follow - it's called long term investing.

Red carpet @ HQ to MOL here a coupe of years ago - how ironic in today's world.

[Sciolistes]

Just look at Rostov. That is what I think that fatigue does to a crew.

[dubaigong]

The fatigue factor is most probably involved in the Rostov accident BUT far from being enough to fully explain the disaster...

[donpizmeov]

Nail on the head fliion.

[Flyboy010]

Moscow is a very easy destination.

Some people create difficulty : how many times do you find the meters still displayed when getting in the cockpit at DME ? they figure it helps for gross error check during approach, when it's just adding confusion. You don't need meters there, it's not China ...

I totally agree with u Kobus, it was a difficult airport when we first started but then it's far much easier now.

[SOPS]

Excellent post fliion, as Don said, nail on the head. 200LR, you are correct. I followed managements advice....I didn't like it...so I left. However, if you seriously believe that the fear culture does not affect a great many of the pilots in EK, either you have not read the hundreds of ' something nearly happened, but it didn't ASRs' ( bird on engine or was nearly unstable, but wasn't, are two examples that come to mind)either that, or you are living in a river in Egypt.

[Eau de Boeing]

Does it say something about fatigue that it took me a minute to get that one?

[glofish]

fliion

I do not always agree, but this was excellent.

Should be a sticky:D

[Sciolistes]

The fatigue factor is most probably involved in the Rostov accident BUT far from being enough to fully explain the disaster...

That is very true. There might have been a systems problem. Regardless, it is difficult to comprehend how 340kts, 50 deg nose down, full throttle into the ground can be anything other than cognitive dysfunction.

[Praise Jebus]

I had a relatively minor I incident that I believed warranted an ASR for the learning points involved. Flight Safety weren't that interested but my Fleet response was unexpected. I had narrowly avoided punishment apparently and was advised in colourful and expressive language not to be noticed again. I blew it off but on the very next flight the FO hand flew the departure and allowed speed to approach 260 below 5000. I intervened, and he corrected, however I was then preoccupied with wondering what bells just rang in an office somewhere. Sounds ridiculous and that is what I had said in the past to other "paranoid" colleagues. Thats what happens, my ability to function for the next 5 minutes was impared by what others have described as fear. I was surprised to be so easily effected in this way and particularly by a benign event as 260kts....at that point I fully understood the "fear factor".

[Divertnow]

I've heard (from management via a friend) that it was a screw up. There have been a few lately and you have to ask the questions how and why? Is it fatigue? Who knows but they must be worried at hq!

[SOPS]

Thank you for your honesty, PJ. You have just proved my point. The fear culture has perminated the flight deck at EK, and can make it dangerous. I say again..I really feel sorry for those guys in Moscow..fxxk knows what was going through their minds, as I said before, they were sitting there realising that they just went very close to burying themselves.

[Sciolistes]

I had a relatively minor I incident that I believed warranted an ASR for the learning points involved. Flight Safety weren't that interested but my Fleet response was unexpected. I had narrowly avoided punishment apparently and was advised in colourful and expressive language not to be noticed again. I blew it off but on the very next flight the FO hand flew the departure and allowed speed to approach 260 below 5000. I intervened, and he corrected, however I was then preoccupied with wondering what bells just rang in an office somewhere. Sounds ridiculous and that is what I had said in the past to other "paranoid" colleagues. Thats what happens, my ability to function for the next 5 minutes was impared by what others have described as fear. I was surprised to be so easily effected in this way and particularly by a benign event as 260kts....at that point I fully understood the "fear factor".

That awful culture of fear you describe is simply is not the case at the small sister airline across the runway. The safety department there, are ever reasonable and supportive. Perhaps your lot should take notes. Perhaps, the deeper concern is the uptake of safety recommendations across the wider operation.

[lekkeroujan]

" the FO hand flew the departure and allowed speed to approach 260 below 5000."


After reading the quote above, I thought to myself:

"Mav, you have the number of that truck driving school we saw on TV? Truck Masters, I think it was? I think I'm gonna need that..."

I can't believe what we have allowed our beloved profession to turn into!

[donpizmeov]

What PJ describes can be put as one of the root causes for a 777 being parked off piste sans landing gear. The Muppets on the third floor are directly responsible for many of the incidences that happen at this place. They use a HR disciplinary process to relieve themselves of any responsibility of man management. Most EK pilots have no idea what their chief pilot looks like, let alone the deputies, deputy deputy, and the deputy deputy deputy in waiting. They just see signature blockes on emails of warnings and accusation.
To have one of these muppets tell Divertnow all about the guilty bast@rds (hmmmm I wonder which one has a big mouth?) highlights how they have no clue of the responsibilities of their positions.
EK decided some years ago to cheap out and hire everyone with 2000hrs on a barbyjet rather than pay market rates and continue to hire pilots with experience. They cut training to bare minimum from what it was before. And relied on a modern fleet to protect it from this lack of experience they were embracing. All the time, those that did have some experience left for pastures mostly more Asian. The ratio of experienced to junior pilots tilted in a major way to the junior side. Management (sic) were warned of this at any meeting that they attended, but this was met with "If you don't like it leave!". And pilots have. We now have these 2000hr barbyjet pilots as TRI/TREs after only the minimum required time as a line pilot. These pilots have been dealt a tampered hand. At no time have these pilots been given an opportunity to learn the trade. They never had the chance to sit watch and learn from experienced pilots. How can they be expected to have the tools to fall back on when operating fatigued, back of the clock, or in new situations.
How can EK expect the incident rate not to increase? It is of their own doing.

[gearlever]

This is serious stuff ! Close to CFIT ! It's not going to end well and as usual, it will be well hidden to the public, just like the 777 f...k up

Too late....

Incident: Emirates A388 at Moscow on Sep 10th 2017, go around from about 400 feet AGL 8nm before runway (http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0)

[Reverserbucket]

To think that a Training Department in an International Airline would have to train Pitch +Power = Performance is a BIG concern. At what point in a pilots career should this be learned, I suggest PPL not post ATPL type Rating or recurrent training.
If you look at the standard leaving the ATO's I think you'll find that Pitch + Power = Perf is not something that's really taught any more - at least not in the early parts of the syllabus. Pitch and power considerations ought to be introduced very early on (even E of C) however I don't believe it is these days. Student pilots at large integrated schools are not taught to think for themselves any more either sadly.

[momo95]

If you look at the standard leaving the ATO's I think you'll find that Pitch + Power = Perf is not something that's really taught any more - at least not in the early parts of the syllabus. Pitch and power considerations ought to be introduced very early on (even E of C) however I don't believe it is these days. Student pilots at large integrated schools are not taught to think for themselves any more either sadly.Question bank is what the ATPLs are about, memorise and regurgitate without question. No time. I get over 90 in some tests and I'll be the first to admit I don't have a notion about most of the stuff. However I think this is a regulatory issue rather than the schools, we all know we're being taught the most irrelevant stuff whilst the relevant stuff is pushed to the side. Hopefully once fully finished the ground school I'll learn something relevant!

[glofish]

Well said don

You will however be regarded as an arrogant old f@rt, like me, tribute to the majority now being inexperienced young sopjunkies who know nothing more than ….. sops.
Basically it’s not their fault, they don’t even know that common aviation sense exists, have never seen nor experienced it. My latest 3 days of simjoy were a perfect reflection of that. EBT my @ss, only OMs and SOPs ad nauseam, the victim was common sense, all of that indictive of lack of experience and realism.
The reaction of management (and unfortunately even training) shows where the problem sits and that the cause is most probably lost. At least with the existing team. For some time I thought that the fish only rots from its head, but even if AAR would be sacked, the fish’s intestins have been infected that only a complete reset can help.
It won’t happen though, the big Zampanoes will continue to blame the lazy pilots who should only follow the holy grail of their pamphlets, then Emirates will be great again.

It is hard for all colleague pilots to accept this. I have said this many times before, there's little excuse for a f@ck-up like this one. All mentioned, like fatigue, low minimums for applications, bad or insufficient training are contributing factors and make the company accomplice for incidents or accidents. But basically the pilot is there to avoid such incidents.
We all know that every eager young pilot would take up any opportunity to upgrade himself, and didn’t we all overestimate ourselves when young and inexperienced? That’s when the more experienced instructors and the old farts on the line reigned us in. That’s when the recruiters told us to go on with where we were, learn a little more before aspiring higher. Today young and aspiring pilots are faced with their peers that left the same outfit yesterday, with only a few days more experience, who readily team up with the greedy beancounters who more than willingly believe these young (and most importantly cheap) gods with shiny almost new 4 stripes and a brand new star how good they are and their applying fraternity brothers just as much. No one left to guide, advise, teach and warn.

The early warning cycle is broken, only the books left.

[harry the cod]

Glo

If only the books were left! Even they've no longer, rapidly being replaced by tablets that are far from ideal. In the haste for administrative efficiency, the end user is all but forgotten. Knowledge of procedures and aircraft systems will deteriorate over the next few years....guaranteed! As well as that, we're expected to use a device, integral to the operation and management of the aircraft, without any formal training or checking in its understanding or application. I can't be the only one struggling with the nuances of this computer surely?

Harry

[Talparc]

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0




Somehow, in clear weather, they got within 400 ft of the ground without noticing it, or taking preventative action, and this was 8 miles from the airport! I suspect there were passengers on this flight that had better situational awareness than the pilots.

[GoreTex]

a few years ago you had the most experienced captains on the 380, now the least experienced

[White Knight]

Somehow, in clear weather, they got within 400 ft of the ground without noticing it

It's a fairly featureless terrain and covered in forest. In the dark you just won't see how high you are from the ground!

[my salami]

a few years ago you had the most experienced captains on the 380, now the least experienced

Yep, but that's balanced by the most experienced F/Os (formerly 330 Skipoers)

[glofish]

harry
If only the books were left! …. I can't be the only one struggling with the nuances of this computer surely?

Absolutely. They have created a hole of gigantic dimensions on this particular slice of cheese ….


my salami

Yep, but that's balanced by the most experienced F/Os (formerly 330 Skippers)

Bears the question why this one didn’t speak up?
With such a combination, they have created another huge hole …..

[White Knight]

my salami
Quote:
Yep, but that's balanced by the most experienced F/Os (formerly 330 Skippers)
Bears the question why this one didn’t speak up?
With such a combination, they have created another huge hole …..

The F/O in this case is not one of the ex 330 Captains...

[5star]

Don....spot on.
nothing will change however....It's like a cancer and its even spreading out....
you can see and feel the fear now also in some of the pursers. Not only the senior ones who are now kicked out automatically at the age of 50. Others have become so afraid of being reported or taking a wrong decision....

[JAYTO]

And the latest email to the training department. Effective immediately.
Spending the last how many years beating everyone with a stick and telling them if they don't like it they can leave. Only to see the experienced guys leave. How to fix the problem? Make the stick bigger.

J.

[DuneMentat]

Beatings will continue until morale improves

[Capn Rex Havoc]

morale :ugh:

[my salami]

The F/O in this case is not one of the ex 330 Captains...

You obviously didn't get my sarcasm....

[jack schidt]

Some very interesting points written by the crusty "old boy" crew.

Aviation is a dangerous business, great rewards come from great risk. Sadly it appears that companies seek greater rewards and are willing to take greater risks to achieve those greater rewards. Anyone ever heard something similar to this before > it takes a smoking hole to eventually force change after management denial is finally awoken? In aviation, pilots have warned management for decades of erosion in safety and it always falls on deaf ears. It appears that only the accountants voices can be heard by those who get huge annual bonuses.

The last few years has seen a change in the recruitment requirements, training cutbacks and forced EPT operation, even though almost every pilot thinks it is inadequate for the task. These are just a few changes that have happened to the detriment of Flying Safely.

As a crusty old captain myself, I am heading towards hanging up my wings in a few years. I will admit though that my shoulders are wide enough to do the "right thing" in the cockpit, even though the external pressures can often weigh heavier on the mind while trying to fly safely.

I have no doubt that there are plenty of companies who are on course for a hull loss as the evidence is mounting that the current direction to safety is certainly not the right direction. We live in times where "certain" Pilots barely fly and refuse to fly certain routes (USA for e.g.) and yet feel that their superior position is righteous enough to pass judgement on those that do. In the Middle East there is so much sand that even those up on higher floors can still bury their heads in it.

Fly safe, be suspicious and aware at all times below MSA.


Jack

[White Knight]

Quote:
Originally Posted by White Knight View Post
The F/O in this case is not one of the ex 330 Captains...
You obviously didn't get my sarcasm....

I got your sarcasm. I was replying to glofish, not you. Try rereading:rolleyes:

[SOPS]

So, I'm glad it's not just me that thinks the fear culture is making things unsafe.

[what_goes_up]

So, I'm glad it's not just me that thinks the fear culture is making things unsafe.
No, you are not. But imho has nothing to do with this specific case. This was just a major fcuk up...

[SOPS]

WGU..I agree that the first approach appears ( and as we don't yet know all the facts, I will say appears) to be a super big cluster fcuk, but I'm willing to bet that the reason they failed to land off the second approach was a combination of ' the startle factor' from the first approach AND the thoughts in their head about what was about to happen to them, when they got back to Dubai. BTW, does anyone know if they operated back to Dubai?

[fliion]

And the latest email to the training department. Effective immediately.
Spending the last how many years beating everyone with a stick and telling them if they don't like it they can leave. Only to see the experienced guys leave. How to fix the problem? Make the stick bigger.

J.

Let me take a wild guess...

More CHECKING by the
T-R-A-I-N-I-N-G dept

[BANANASBANANAS]

And the latest email to the training department. Effective immediately.
Spending the last how many years beating everyone with a stick and telling them if they don't like it they can leave. Only to see the experienced guys leave. How to fix the problem? Make the stick bigger.

J.

I have just read that email. If the author really believes what he has written then my respect for him has gone the same way as our safety record - collapsed!

At a time when empathy, understanding and support are needed they have, instead, chosen to increase the fear factor and use a bigger stick. Isn't that one of the main causal factors of the various incidents and accidents recently? It is like trying to put out a fire by throwing more petrol at it.

This will not end well and is, imho, the worst possible way to deal with the very issues that experienced line operators have been warning of for years. We need to be pulling together not increasing the division between the Checking department and the line pilots.

Before the Checking department decides to conduct no notice line checks on crews, perhaps it should first take a long, hard, inwards look and address the culture of fear that is perceived by the vast majority of line pilots.

It might then ask itself why so many experienced Checkers have left and are continuing to leave the Checking dept, why experienced line Captains with solid wide body TRAINING experience on their resumes are not applying for the Checking positions and why (with no disrespect towards the new Checkers) the vast majority of new Checkers have little time in the LHS with EK and are applying only because they think it will look good on their resumes and aid their departure to pastures new.

This is a bad situation and the email from SVPFT will make things worse.

[gearlever]

What about EK-131 on 12. and 13. of Sep?

[Dropp the Pilot]

Like Amos, I am not a prophet nor the son of a prophet but I can tell you what the next development will be:

An FCI prohibiting capturing a glideslope from above. In cases where you find yourself above the glidepath you will be required to ask ATC for vectors back around beneath it.

There. Problem fixed, EK management style.

[Big Enos Burdette]

Like Amos, I am not a prophet nor the son of a prophet but I can tell you what the next development will be:

An FCI prohibiting capturing a glideslope from above. In cases where you find yourself above the glidepath you will be required to ask ATC for vectors back around beneath it.

There. Problem fixed, EK management style.
And making sure the correct runway (L/R) is in the FMC.

[glofish]

.... and they advertise for new trainers! Nice timing.

But just have a look at the minimum conditions: Appalling and QED.

[I Claudius]

Jack,
I had a little chuckle when you reminded us, to be suspicious.
I recall being berated by a TRI on my command training for, wait for it,,,,
being," over suspiciousa ". ( no typo )

I had him question ATC about an incomplete departure clearance and on the third attempt, DAR ground came back with the correct clearance.

That lovely chap is now a 777 standards TRE!
The basics have long been lost at EK.

[aussiefarmer]

The current trend of events will not be reversed unless training and fleet management do an exercise of introspection and recognise the toxic fear culture and deep organisational issues that contributed to it.

It is appalling that no "leader" took managerial responsibility of 521 by doing the right thing: leaving their job to a more capable individual. And it is particularly worrying how their blindness only lets them take action to continue on the wrong path.

Main problem is that they don't even know or want to recognise there is a problem.

More beatings it is.

[Mango]

Check out "the acid test" in rumours and news.

[harry the cod]

Glo

The reason the requirements are so low is simple. The incentive to join the EK training department is minimal.

The role of trainer in any reputable Company is a role usually reserved for the most dedicated and able individuals. It's a position to aspire to and one in which the remuneration and benefits reflects the expertise that's being provided. Airlines recognise the fact that training provides the basic building blocks of operational knowledge and thus promote a culture of pride within the role. Unfortunately, EK is different.

Although we still have some excellent individuals, we have also lost a large number due to the short sightedness of fearful and incompetent managers. This shortage reflects on the often brutal EK training rosters which eventually leads to discontent and frustration amongst those undertaking such an important role. Their only option is to resign, putting further strain on an already broken system. To fix it, the Company accepts a policy of employing temporary trainers, at the very time we should be retaining the experienced ones. 'Captains', who effectively will have been in the left seat for only 6 months and may never have previously held a command, can now apply for a star to add to their shiny four stripes. With the challenge of a variety of training duties to undertake and prepare for, the most inexperienced trainers will now be setting the bar for those they instruct. In some cases, this will be very low time recruits off turboprops. Because they are part time, they will invariably be less current than the full time instructors and thus, ironically, their knowledge and exposure to training events will be reduced. You only have to see the FDM playbacks on the current RTGS day to see how wrong this policy is.

Now, combine these threats with the current climate which I believe is getting worse rather than better. Not one pilot, hand on heart, would want to compromise safety. We know that some individuals are not suitable for a command but we must also realise that many are, especially if they're afforded the quality of training and encouragement that's often promised but rarely delivered. There simply must be more emphasis on training rather than checking, especially with lower experience levels compared to say ten years ago. We were always being assured that the standards have remained the same but I beg to differ. Why are we now seeing an increasing number of events and why the necessity for the big stick approach? We operate to many challenging airfields, with little or no continuity and cover all the major Continents throughout the World. We have an exhaustive set of procedures, sometimes vague and confusing, occasionally contradictory and quite often, difficult to access. As a pilot, EK is a challenging airline to work for.

If EK focused more on it's core business rather than spending millions on sporting advertising and PR, we might not be in this situation. Decent rosters with little to no restrictions with a reduction in hours to acceptable levels, especially given the challenge of our flight timings and range of FDP's. Yearly increments and salary rises in line with inflation. Perhaps most importantly, a management culture of support rather than punishment and the occasional phone call, rather than a day off meeting for a pointless interview after which a pre written warning letter is produced. Perhaps then not only would we retain a larger number of pilots, thus improving experience levels, but we might also recruit a higher calibre to begin with. Just culture? Far from it in reality. Despite the wonderful and reassuring support from Gary Chapman and Tim Clark that's printed all over the company premises, the real culture is what goes on in the offices.

Unless the Company takes ownership of some of these causal factors, the number of serious events will only increase. You can not ignore fatigue. You can not ignore fear (whether real or perceived) and you can not ignore a demotivated and disengaged workforce. Management MUST take some responsibility for this increasing debacle we face. Failure to do so is not only naive, it's also downright negligent!

Harry

[Jetkopite]

Spot on Harry well said, I think you covered pretty much everything wrong with this place.

[Old King Coal]

harry, well said. :D

The fact that any f**kwit can now go and buy themselves a TRI and start selling themselves off as a 'Trainer' shows just how corrupted the whole Training Regime has now become. E.g. Last year I sacked one Captain after he failed his Final Line Check, wherein the guy wasn't just incompetent, he was downright f'ing dangerous, albeit that he had a TRI (which he'd paid for himself, via a certain Lithuanian TRO (https://www.baatraining.com/for-pilots/qualification-courses/tri/)) stamped within his license.

Regarding the incident in DME, one would have hoped that the good old fashioned airmanship check of the Radio Altimeter(s) versus the Primary Altimeter(s) (and / or Radio Altimeter versus distance to go... topography not withstanding) might have provided a clue that something wasn't quite right ?!.... but then it should be remembered that we're talking here about Emirates, an airline where airmanship is seemingly a dirty word, with an over reliance on the 'automatics', and where it's evidently assumed that so long as you always get the SOP's exactly right then nothing can ever go wrong, can it?! :ugh:

Incident: Emirates A388 at Moscow on Sep 10th 2017, go around from about 400 feet AGL 8nm before runway (http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a)

An Emirates Airbus A380-800, registration A6-EEZ performing flight EK-131 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Moscow Domodedovo (Russia), was positioning for an approach to Domodedovo's runway 14R about to intercept the extended runway center line about 8nm before the runway threshold when the aircraft descended to about 400 feet AGL, initiated a go around climbing straight ahead and crossing through the localizer to safe altitude. The aircraft subsequently positioned for another approach to runway 14R, aligned with the extended runway center line but did not initiate the final descent and joined the missed approach procedure as result. The aircraft positioned again for an approach to runway 14R and landed without further incident on runway 14R about 35 minutes after the first go around (from 400 feet AGL).

Position and Altitude data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder suggest the aircraft was tracking about 190 degrees magnetic when the aircraft initiated the go around at about 1000 feet MSL about 8nm before the runway threshold, which translates to about 400 feet AGL with the aerodrome elevation at 180 meters/592 feet MSL.

[flying willy]

I never write anything, only read the posts. But Harry, your description of the current 'crisis' EK is in at the moment is excellent.

[gearlever]

What about EK-131 on 12. and 13. of Sep?

[Divertnow]

Don & Harry (and others), your posts hit the nail on the head.
There have been several alarming events and an accident in the past 18-24 months. The email I saw today addresses this with changes in the training dept. Indeed, the trend cannot be ignored and It's beginning to look really ugly but the company seem ever reluctant to acknowledge other key issues that are clearly affecting safety.
Not inspired.

[GoreTex]

my Salami, good one and you are spot on.
flew on EK as a pax a few months ago and saw the TRE who did my upgrade 2002 in the right hand seat, how such an experienced guy ends up in the right hand seat is beyond me, his captain just had a few hours command time hahaha

[givemewings]

Gore, he probably pi$$ed off another VVVVIP customer who was doing something questionable.... :hmm:

[SOPS]

Harry, I have to say, I don't always agree with you, but your last post is 100 % spot on.

[nolimitholdem]

And it's eroding the reputation of EK pilots who've moved on! :mad:

EK pilots have traditionally been highly regarded and coveted as hires post-Pit. And for the most part still are. But it gets harder to say with any professional pride your previous job was EK when incidents like this one and the B777 crash reveal the airline to have some serious shortcomings like any other.

Of course anyone who's worked there knows this, but it's starting to get around...for a company obsessed with brand reputation they sure don't have a clue how to maintain it.

[ruserious]

Lot of good posts here, I even agree totally with Glo, who knew that was possible ;-)
But as all of us who have been here a while know, they will just slap another procedural or policy Band Aid on any perceived problem and carry on regardless.
the dogs bark, but the caravan goes on

[Old King Coal]

Is it true that they landed (eventually) with less than 4 tons of fuel onboard (and that they made no mayday call; what with that apparently being less than Final Reserve fuel for an A380) ?

[donpizmeov]

Is it true that they landed (eventually) with less than 4 tons of fuel onboard (and that they made no mayday call; what with that apparently being less than Final Reserve fuel for an A380) ?


Don't you love anonymous forums where you can make damning accusations like this and not be held responsible for it? If you don't know the facts don't spread ****e

[Old King Coal]

According to the radar trace (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFE7ULh69Bc), from the lateral point of initiating the first go-around (and of which, btw, it doesn't look like they flew the one that is published, or even close - be that either the ILS or RNAV - for R14R) until the time of being back at that same lateral point on the approach (but by then having then completed 2 go-arounds) looks to have taken approximately 33 minutes... that's a long time, at low altitude, in a big jet, and that's why one might be tempted to wonder just how much fuel they would still have had onboard once they'd landed?... hopefully more than enough.

[White Knight]

From what I recall OKC I've always had EFHK as the filed Alternate whenever I've taken a 380 to UUDD...

[Old King Coal]

White, well let's hope that that's the case here too, i.e. enough fuel onboard at the start of the approach to divert to an airport over 1 hour away (http://www.gcmap.com/mapui?P=UUDD-EFHK). :ok:

Aside: Note to self, I must stop working for airlines that expect one to arrive with only fumes in the tanks (you can see how it colours my thinking?!)

[White Knight]

And just to confirm OKC (having checked our 380 airport authorisation tables) none of the other Moscow airports are open to our 380 ops!

So EFHK is pretty much the standard fair weather alternate; otherwise we're filing further into Europe or Scandinavia.

[Old King Coal]

Uhm, I did wonder why that alternate was sooooooo far away... all rather obvious now, hindsight is a wonderful thing. Cheers Whitey. :ok:

[BigGeordie]

The fair weather alternate is often UUEE, even for the A380. Have a look at GABI.

[Old King Coal]

Uhm, so which one is it guys?

White Knight: "From what I recall I've always had EFHK as the filed Alternate whenever I've taken a 380 to UUDD... and just to confirm (having checked our 380 airport authorisation tables) none of the other Moscow airports are open to our 380 ops! So EFHK is pretty much the standard fair weather alternate; otherwise we're filing further into Europe or Scandinavia."

Versus:

BigGeordie: "The fair weather alternate is often UUEE, even for the A380. Have a look at GABI."

It's pretty self-evident that there's a f'ing big difference between distance (and ergo the fuel required) between UUDD to EFHK (508 Nm) versus UUDD to UUEE (38 Nm). And if you'd like to visualise it then click in this link (http://www.gcmap.com/mapui?P=UUDD-EFHK%0D%0AUUDD-UUEE&MS=wls&DU=nm&SG=400&SU=kts). If what you both say is correct, then it begs the question as to why Ops are filling for a 380 to use airfields (as alternates) that are not within the airport authorisation tables (maybe perhaps only for use in an emergency only, but does that cover a diversion) ?

One would suggest that if the crew of EK-131 on the 10th Sept had fuel for EFHK then what happened at UUDD would be no issue, fuel wise... whereas if all they had was fuel for one of the other Moscow airports (plus perhaps a little bit of wife&kids fuel) ?... then a +33 minute low level jaunt with 2 go-arounds might have painted them into something of a fuel corner, though one does hope not.

[donpizmeov]

Uhm, so which one is it guys?

White Knight: "From what I recall I've always had EFHK as the filed Alternate whenever I've taken a 380 to UUDD... and just to confirm (having checked our 380 airport authorisation tables) none of the other Moscow airports are open to our 380 ops! So EFHK is pretty much the standard fair weather alternate; otherwise we're filing further into Europe or Scandinavia."

Versus:

BigGeordie: "The fair weather alternate is often UUEE, even for the A380. Have a look at GABI."

It's pretty self-evident that there's a f'ing big difference between distance (and ergo the fuel required) between UUDD to EFHK (508 Nm) versus UUDD to UUEE (38 Nm). And if you'd like to visualise it then click in this link (http://www.gcmap.com/mapui?P=UUDD-EFHK%0D%0AUUDD-UUEE&MS=wls&DU=nm&SG=400&SU=kts). If what you both say is correct, then it begs the question as to why Ops are filling for a 380 to use airfields (as alternates) that are not within the airport authorisation tables (maybe perhaps only for use in an emergency only, but does that cover a diversion) ?

One would suggest that if the crew of EK-131 on the 10th Sept had fuel for EFHK then what happened at UUDD would be no issue, fuel wise... whereas if all they had was fuel for one of the other Moscow airports (plus perhaps a little bit of wife&kids fuel) ?... then a +33 minute low level jaunt with 2 go-arounds might have painted them into something of a fuel corner, though one does hope not.

OKC. As you already know, when something goes bad for you in this region, you are on your own. No support from anyone. You are treated as guilty until something can be proven otherwise. The stress and distress this causes is huge. The landing fuel did not cause this issue. Your speculation is not going reveal the cause of what happened. But it is rubbing salt into the wound of an already beaten down fellow aviator. Final reserve would have been between 3.8t and 4.1t. So even if your morbid fascination is correct, and I haven't checked, he would have still had final reserve.

[Panther 88]

Now that I've moved on, let me see if I can analyze where a lot of this fear culture originates. The days of Manchester are long gone, but why is there still a fear culture? Warning letters are not given out like five or six years ago....still the fear.

Captains whether they realize it or not are mentors on most every flight. So they impart some of this fear to their first officers. But why the fear amongst the captains. From what I saw, this starts about a year or two prior to one's upgrade. Life changes quite a bit when you hit the left seat at EK. But prior to the upgrade you get little warnings, don't screw up a check or PPC, don't take too much sick time, stay out of the office, on and on....because if you do, your upgrade will be delayed a year or two. So do you think this paranoia just disappears after a successful upgrade? And the circle continues.

Know of several instances where captain's decisions were based on their copilots convincing them that the captain's decision may delay their upgrade if called into the office.

And really, EK does nothing to quell those anxieties. When using the old FORDEC decision making model, Facts, Options, Risks.....those risks can include the paranoia of what will be the response from the office. The truth of the matter is whatever the reality truly is, the pilot in question's perception, is his/her reality.

The dealings I had with the 3rd floor were always fairly positive. But I was one of the old grizzled captains. So perhaps their perception of me was...he just made a little mistake. But a newly minted captain of limited experience, there might be a little different outcome.

Finally, as a trainer, the upgrade candidates I saw were almost to a man/woman, outstanding. But I cannot say that about the new first officers. I do remember one former 737 captain on his third line training flight who could not do the takeoff review, try as he might. But how did he get that far in the first place?

Well since moving on, I still have a vested interest in what happens at EK because of the incredible friends I made there, well and also I get staff travel benefits so.......Allow me the pleasure to comment once and awhile here. It was getting kind of boring the reading, but that's not a bad thing. Hasta la Vista...

[JAARule]

One cannot help but feel it's anothr "lazy pilots" moment - which ATC referred to us at that fateful meeting all those years ago that has changed fit ops since.

Us? I didn't think you were around back then, fli. A bit disingenuous....

[White Knight]

The fair weather alternate is often UUEE, even for the A380


A little more digging into the RAIG on the EPT does indeed show UUEE as an A1 Alternate so my bad!:p

However only UUDD is shown as viable on the alphabetical listing in 1.5.6.33 even though all of the other D, A, AA and CA airfields are shown there! So there is a disparity in the information depending on which part of RAIG 1.5.6 you look at!

Bring back the books

[Emma Royds]

After reading the emails from HA and especially MM, they appear to fail to grasp that even a competent operator can still stumble at EK. The relationship between the employer and the employee here is rare in the industry, due to the palpable influence that EK has on our lives outside of work. Whilst what happened at DME is significant, we all know that an event which is insignificant in comparison, can still merit a visit to the third floor.

This level of influence is seldom seen in most other carriers. Discontent with where you are living in company accommodation or battling to get compensated for a medical bill or seeing your family no longer happy in Dubai, with no viable part time alternative available, are all challenges that link back to the company. There will be many others as well. It could simply be a case of not getting leave when you want it or missing an important family event, which are challenges that would be more common in other operators, yet are still relevant.

I think it is fair to say that when we go to work, none of us wish to perform poorly and no one puts on their uniform with having this objective in mind. Take a competent operator who is tired and flying when their body wants to sleep and is feeling strain from issues in their life outside of work, which EK still has an overbearing input on. The potential result is you now have a competent yet now demotivated pilot and it is this demotivation and tiredness that can bring them a step closer to a line event.

With the ethnicity of the new Flight Ops postholder, I feel we are now farther away than we have been for a number of years from witnessing a Mea Culpa moment in the context of the company, which is needed before we see the relationship reset between the pilot work force and the company.

[SOPS]

Excellent post Emma. It should be a sticky.:D:D

[falconeasydriver]

With the ethnicity of the new Flight Ops postholder, I feel we are now farther away than we have been for a number of years from witnessing a Mea Culpa moment in the context of the company, which is needed before we see the relationship reset between the pilot work force and the company.

Carefull Emma, next thing you'll be taken out to the desert and "disappeared" Habibi :ugh:

[fliion]

Us? I didn't think you were around back then, fli. A bit disingenuous....


Wrong JAARule

My annual pay review post references from May 2008 - which is when I started keeping records - hired well before then.

Now do you remember when ATC took on the FltOps & ENG'g position?

Nice try - now keep your eye on the ball and stop looking for shyte because myself and others have called you to task for your usual negative drivel.

[Jack330]

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-emirates-airlines/uae-investigating-emirates-a380-serious-incident-in-moscow-idUSKCN1BW1WA

[WB1900]

and don't forget
years ago - to be preceise back in 2013 and 2104 it had been a requirement to be on the 330/340 - before that 700 hours in 340 - to be eligible to go on 380 and be promoted


today guys with NO wide body expirence get their upgrade in half the time than a former 340 FO having barely 2500 hours in the company.
not to say that the former 330/340 exceeding almost the 4000 number in here and getting nothing than the excuse of being delayed because of the missing 380 hours. thanksfully those (in-expirenced) FO are getting promoted over the senior FOs will join the training sooner or later and telling all of us how to fly.
at the point where a requirement became a punishment the wheels started to fall off.#

[WB1900]

for all of u who believe more checking and more pressure will solve the problem


How many airlines in Europe had a hull loss or came evidently close to it in the last 10 years.
they all changed in a way that common sense of a pilot is the most important item to a safe operation. not one near accident can be connected to fear.
even further that these company count on training not on checking and more checking if something goes overboard. and if so they try to learn from it.
try to get a flight data readout in a europe company - they will give it to you without any questions because u had a suspicion.
EK will punish u just for asking and they will take every effort to find something to blame u instead of taking it as an effort to improve and clarifing a suspicion.
sofar while other airlines indentified proplem EK is creating them.
lets name it
Melbourne, Moscau, Seychells all of near disaster
EK521 - disaster
given the fact the time frame of these events is narrowing dramatically, as the releases of more and more threats against pilots are. just given the fact that the time inbetween events is narrowing, should provide a wakeup call to those are responsible. it is not benefitting to avoid them if a phsycho doctor makes assements over human error sources - communicates them in SEP, CRM courses, and encouraging pilots to write reports, which will never be acknowledged to be incorporated.
as we can see and using our too much emphasized term of "Root Cause Analysis" will should be able to identify the biggest threat in this company. and i also blame those Aussis which still not talk enough for a flight and still want level 4 knowledge questions in the tec quiz


Airbus and Boeing are aware of the situation of technology resiliance - they have installed international workshops with airlines and authorities and try to find new ways of training and SOPs to incorporate new technologies with pilot skills.


i am quite shure that safety has a breaking point over capitalism and personal professionalism will not be endless to cover it.


there is enough room to endanger your career which must not happen while the gear is up.
dear collegues stay safe

[Dropp the Pilot]

Seychelles? Do tell

[momo95]

This is all very concerning. Have we gotten to the bottom of the matter yet? We need to know the cause of this near disaster so that we can learn and not make the same mistake ourselves.

[Old King Coal]

wrt Lets not forget that every day an EK583 departs from Dhaka and a FZ583 lands in Dhaka after a short while. it is shocking that in the same group of companies the same call sign has been carefully selected while flying in a unique corridor where the 2 ATC don't talk to each other and 2 different clearances are given simultaneously on 2 different frequencies.

And what drives that is greed by both companies, wherein the EK Commercial Department are hoping that - via the way the search engines work - they might pickup some FZ pax looking for 583 to Dhaka and likewise the FZ Commercial Department are playing the same game... and damn the consequences wrt flight safety and callsign confusion, just so long as they might get a few more bums on the seats within their respective aircraft. Loads of other airlines do this too... and it's bloody disgraceful ! :mad:

[PositiveRate876]

Looks like this one is getting swept under the rug.

[SOPS]

Looks like this one is getting swept under the rug.

Tell that to the crew involved with it.

[PositiveRate876]

Tell that to the crew involved with it.


Someone has to be held liable. And you know it's not anyone on floors 3-9.

[Talparc]

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=199901



https://www.bea.aero/en/investigation-reports/notified-events/detail/event/approche-sous-le-plan-alarme-egpws-approche-interrompue/

[Kobus Dune]

Finally, as a trainer, the upgrade candidates I saw were almost to a man/woman, outstanding. But I cannot say that about the new first officers.

Difficult to follow. So were they good or bad ? because upgrade candidates are usually F/O, aren't they ?

I do remember one former 737 captain on his third line training flight who could not do the takeoff review, try as he might. But how did he get that far in the first place?...

And you are proud of that ? if you judge the captain potential of a candidate by his ability to produce a verbatim, no surprise that we get so many incidents from new captains who gave excellent repeats of calls and that sort of things, but are so much behind in term of technical understanding of flight (and I'm not talking about technical knowledge of systems, such as oil temperature at which the pump overheat caption will illuminate..)
We have so many pilots now who are perfect narrators of calls, are brilliantly up-to-date with the latest changes of them, are computers experts for everything related to crew apps and EPT... but are miserable when it's time to operate controls, understand AOA or perform a simple mental calculation, so scared they are of their own shadow...
I also disagree with the colleague saying " trainers are not here to spoon feed the trainees" Well, I have been a trainer for years - and for me a type-rating (also called a conversion course here) is the opportunity to learn the aircraft, how it flies (maybe, probably differently from the previous types the trainee has flown) what could be the pitfalls - otherwide, when would be the opportunity to learn it ? and it was my pleasure to teach. Problem is that so many trainers lack the real academic and technical knowledge ... checking calls in their latest versions, any moron can do it ...
We will have to be patient to know more, as always. Like JoBurg and others, it will be issued once half of the pilots will have forgotten about it.
But once again, DME is an easy destination, just have to stick to a very simple SOP regarding QNH and feet /meters... I've seen F/O selecting meters (not required) and when challenged, giving me the answer " it's for gross calculation, situation awareness " - looking great, but pitifully wrong ...

[harry the cod]

KD

I agree with a lot in that well written and common sense post but one genuine question. Why would selecting meters be frowned upon? Perhaps I'm missing something but I always have it set when operating through Chinese airspace. Charts are the first referral, meters selection is a reminder to verbalise my RT in meters, not Flight level and as a gross error check.

Harry

[what_goes_up]

KD

I agree with a lot in that well written and common sense post but one genuine question. Why would selecting meters be frowned upon? Perhaps I'm missing something but I always have it set when operating through Chinese airspace. Charts are the first referral, meters selection is a reminder to verbalise my RT in meters, not Flight level and as a gross error check.

Harry
Harry
Because in China you get meters/QNH as opposed to Russia where it is meters/QFE. So you have to re-calculate feet/QNH with a table which is Airport/RWY specific.

[what_goes_up]

Ah yes. Change the PAMs. Thats the answer!
No, it's not the answer. But it's a tool to help justify a sub par grading in monitoring skills and thus helping to re-train. This was nearly impossible with the old word picture and thus pilots with deficiencies in that aspect passed without properly being noticed.

[Odins Raven]

KD

I agree with a lot in that well written and common sense post but one genuine question. Why would selecting meters be frowned upon? Perhaps I'm missing something but I always have it set when operating through Chinese airspace. Charts are the first referral, meters selection is a reminder to verbalise my RT in meters, not Flight level and as a gross error check.

Harry

Possibly you've not been to DME before but I guess this is where the crew could have been caught out.

Ouch.

[Dualinput]

Agreed DME is not a difficult destination at all. But one can screw up on QNH/QFE and get high/low on approach, what beats me is how does one end up 400' agl at 7+ miles...:rolleyes::confused:

[what_goes_up]

Yet more checkings, beatings and time off the line re-training. This might be addressing a grading issue, but the mistakes made are resuling from many other more obvious factors.
How about the company addresses the real problems for once?
So you'd rather not have those individuals re-trained before they fly your family around? That is a real problem. But I admit, there are many others in managerial abilities. But re-training (helping) those colleagues that have a deficiency is a step in the right direction. But first they have to be uncovered.

[BANANASBANANAS]

So you'd rather not have those individuals re-trained before they fly your family around? That is a real problem. But I admit, there are many others in managerial abilities. But re-training (helping) those colleagues that have a deficiency is a step in the right direction. But first they have to be uncovered.

If there really are so many 'sub par' individuals flying the line, surely we must first look at the system that has assessed, recruited, trained, checked, managed, moulded and endorsed them, shouldn't we?

Route Cause Analysis - it doesn't just apply to simulator checks.

[what_goes_up]

If there really are so many 'sub par' individuals flying the line, surely we must first look at the system that has assessed, recruited, trained, checked, managed, moulded and endorsed them, shouldn't we?

Route Cause Analysis - it doesn't just apply to simulator checks.
Too late...

[my salami]

If there really are so many 'sub par' individuals flying the line, surely we must first look at the system that has assessed, recruited, trained, checked, managed, moulded and endorsed them, shouldn't we?

Route Cause Analysis - it doesn't just apply to simulator checks.

And that brings us back to where the letter says..
"What did we do wrong"?

[Praise Jebus]

Bananas you're correct, this event and the others the email refers to happened under the author's watch. If you consider that the assertion made by what-goes-up to be true re the new PAM, then we should ground the Fleet and recheck all of us for monitoring skills. If a trainer can't determine poor monitoring skills without a PAM specifically reflecting that behaviour then its the trainer who needs the retraining. Support requires effective monitoring doesn't it? The PAM change is white wash....

[BANANASBANANAS]

And that brings us back to where the letter says..
"What did we do wrong"?

Agreed. But that is merely an internal question for the checking department. And where a positive cultural change is required, we now appear to be moving in the wrong direction again and there is no indication of recruitment, HR, Fleet etc revisiting their selection criteria, style of management etc, etc, etc. They all contribute to the gaping holes in the swiss cheese and should feel professionally obligated to take a long hard look in the mirror, ask themselves how much they contribute to the safety threats and be open and willing to change.

Emirates has made a deliberate decision to lower the recruitment experience bar rather than pay the going rate for experience. It has done the same with the 'pay as you train' trainers contracts, is driving experience out of the company and is now only beginning to experience the high cost of its cost cutting.

[harry the cod]

What goes up

Thanks, not been to DME for a long time and thought they were now working QNH. Better re read all this thread from the start me thinks!

One of the problems I see here in EK is the need to pigeon hole everything into something that can be defined or graded. It may 'standardise' training and perhaps make grading easy but for some less experienced trainers, it may detract from the real goal. This should be to encourage basic airmanship and awareness and promote the crews ability to operate big picture into a multitude of challenging and complex environments that our variable route network provides. it's almost impossible to expect individuals to know the books, or should I say the EPT, backwards. Yet these minor debriefing points, especially if noted on the report, will have consequences, especially for those approaching command as their focus will now be detail driven.

They say the devils in the detail and to some extent, I agree. All professional pilots should be well prepared and have good basic knowledge of systems and procedures, however it's the big picture and common sense stuff that will ultimately save the day.

Harry

[donpizmeov]

And that's the rub Monarch. EK has to either pay up or shut up. They are letting experience walk out the door, and don't care. They know the package they offer is no longer competitive, so they lower the entry requirements. By trying to save a few dollars they are offering a training package only a newbie would be interested in, so those experienced fellas left are not being tapped to share their wealth of experience. The outcome of this penny pinching are events such as this.
The fix is achievable, however those with the purse strings need to take responsibility.

[White Knight]

Rest assured that a 400hr hero has no business line training at EK

Seconded! Especially if this is their first command!!!!

[ruserious]

This should be to encourage basic airmanship and awareness and promote the crews ability to operate big picture into a multitude of challenging and complex environments that our variable route network provides.
Yep, spot on, standardisation has rapidly becoming lobotomisation, were it is more important to nail standard calls and techniques than to have any usable awareness. If I had a $ for every radio call I have had interrupted by a 'clear right side' or completely unimportant MSDU status message, I would happily be able to give up next years profit share ;p

[glofish]

..... or when getting one of a multitude of 1000' descents in the Desdi hold and constantly hearing the Pavlovs':

"FL 190 descending FL 180"

but he missed the "keep outbound heading" call .....

[BigGeordie]

Well a frozen ATPL is now enough to do the selection, are long as it is unfrozen before you sign the contract.

They don't seem to be learning very fast.

[Jack D]

Don't cadets have a frozen ATPL ?

[harry the cod]

Jack D

Indeed they do, but they also have oodles and oodles of training that supports that frozen ATPL, such as 120 minimum sectors. Most cadets in other airlines get around 60 so by the time our young cadets join the ranks, they're fairly efficient, certainly in the procedures, calls and general operation of the machine.

It's when you have the '400 hour trainer' added to the mix that the package becomes diluted. And this is where Don's post is spot on. This Company has the solution but doesn't wish to pay for it. As well as the debacle of low experience and pay as you go trainers, we also have other flawed policies. Short of current rated Airbus candidates, we're now pursuing Boeing type rated new entrants onto the A380. When asked why not reduce the risk by offering the position to current EK B777 pilots familiar with the SOP's and route network, the answer was a resounding no due to the requirement for two separate type ratings and the inherent cost increase. I'm sure that's the big frustration amongst us all, knowing that they have solutions but choose not to adopt them due cost. Far easier to blame a 'minority' and change policies that effects us all without really addressing the concern at hand. It's a token gesture by an SVP to placate those above and although it may remove a small amount of dead wood, it's like fitting an ashtray to a convertible sports car. Mostly useless.

Well, they say you can't have your cake and eat it. Maybe someone needs to tell EK that.

Harry

[Jack D]

Do you think " fairly proficient " is good enough ? Never mind good knowledge of procedures or calls .. that is of secondary importance initially in the big scheme of things . Oodles of training I agree . Spare a thought for the trainers who sit in during those 120 sectors , now if the trainer is only "fairly proficient" as well ...

[Jack D]

120 sectors ... that's more than good + massive amounts of simulator etc , they should be at the very least fairly competent , and some are it's a big step after all , but just try the old 3 x table test ( no calculators allowed ) when you next feel like undergoing a sense of amazement .. but not in a good way . I think they struggle for good applicants as well these days , always exceptions of course .

[harry the cod]

Well, if your expecting the 200 hour cadet to be as proficient as an experienced F/O with 8 years under his/her belt, then you may need to be more realistic in your expectations. We all started somewhere right?

As for the last point, exactly right, which is why as an airline, we need to invest in the foundations before building the house. The foundations are the trainers.

Edited to add, as our posts crossed. See that you agree it's a big ask, which it is. I'm also in agreement that some of the basics are lost, especially when you see these guys adding the CFP times using their phones....and still get it wrong! Generally though, I'm mostly impressed with their performance by the time they're released to the line. As for standards, perhaps the airline should consider opening up the scheme to non nationals. Maybe would encourage and facilitate a few pilots to remain longer if their siblings were to get a go!

Harry

[Jack D]

Some good points H , but comparing apples to apples and I don't mean to denigrate the cadets in any way, but the average 40 - 60 sector EU cadet is generally far ahead in terms of proficiency , or at least used to be when selection was extremely rigorous ; possibly now less so with ptf schemes . .? I do know that the t & c,s of cadets in training at EK are excellent , they even draw a salary and good for them . The cost is high and they are very Labour intensive . Anyway , onwards & upwards , the new training academy might open the door for non nationals & siblings , I hope it does , but they will be paying for the privilege one way or another .
Apologies all round for the thread drift .
.

[fatbus]

Standby for more of the same events, below average pilots unable to deal with rapidly changing environments. Yes it can happen to any and all of us , but the overall lack of airmanship with rear it's ugly head. Now it's Captains of the magenta line!

[Mach.888]

It's very simple.
They are now reaping the high cost of their own cost cuttings.

[Fuel-Off]

I'm rather tired of the 'children of the magenta line' rhetoric. What would you have us (my generation - millennials) do? Get some time on a DC-10? L-1011? No, no they're all retired. Ahh...F27? No, they're mostly all decommissioned too. Oh, the legendary 727? Wait, they're pretty much banned anywhere because those JT8Ds scream too loudly. Or would you prefer us to get some time on the Sud Caravelle? Nope, they're all out of the sky too.

So really, our generation is a result of those aircraft being sent to the scrap heap and having nothing really to cut our teeth on unless it actually has a magenta line. Personally, I would have loved to have flown a 707 or 747SP and do some REAL heavy flying. But valves, mechanical linkages, ducts and IRUs are being replaced with microswitches, FADEC, Fly-by-wire and of course that much belied magenta line.

On the line, impart us with the knowledge of your yesteryears. Everyone loves a good war story so long as we can learn from it. Granted, some Millennials are rather sensitive to constructive criticism, but honestly that is only a few. Don't forget, you guys started from somewhere too. Yes, FOs on the line are expected to demonstrate a degree of proficiency so when the situation turns to the proverbial, everyone gets to go home safely, and line captains aren't exactly expected to 'train' on every flight. But guidance isn't such a bad thing. Whether you like it or not, you're role models for the next generation of captains.

As for instagramming in the flight deck, tell them! It's your flight deck. Like most pilots, we like to chronicle our experiences throughout our careers. The previous generation had Polaroids, scrapbooks and the like. Our platform is a little bit more instantaneous (and a whole lot more public) which can catch a few off guard when they are asked to explain themselves to Fleet. I for one have been shown photos of FOs who have taken some snaps in delightful places such as Dubai, Kabul, India to name a few, ALL of which photography is strictly prohibited. So it's only a matter of time before they go to Floor Number 3. For what it's worth, I don't have an instagrammy account thingy.

Just a small bit of perspective from this lowly child of the magenta line. Take it or leave it, but this bitter picking on the new generation of pilots is wrong - and too easy. Harry has hit the nail on the head. Primary foundation lies in the trainers.

The real enemy is the one who sits on Floor Number 9...

Fuel-Off :ok:

[Odins Raven]

I'm rather tired of the 'children of the magenta line' rhetoric. What would you have us (my generation - millennials) do? Get some time on a DC-10? L-1011? No, no they're all retired. Ahh...F27? No, they're mostly all decommissioned too. Oh, the legendary 727? Wait, they're pretty much banned anywhere because those JT8Ds scream too loudly. Or would you prefer us to get some time on the Sud Caravelle? Nope, they're all out of the sky too.

So really, our generation is a result of those aircraft being sent to the scrap heap and having nothing really to cut our teeth on unless it actually has a magenta line. Personally, I would have loved to have flown a 707 or 747SP and do some REAL heavy flying. But valves, mechanical linkages, ducts and IRUs are being replaced with microswitches, FADEC, Fly-by-wire and of course that much belied magenta line.

On the line, impart us with the knowledge of your yesteryears. Everyone loves a good war story so long as we can learn from it. Granted, some Millennials are rather sensitive to constructive criticism, but honestly that is only a few. Don't forget, you guys started from somewhere too. Yes, FOs on the line are expected to demonstrate a degree of proficiency so when the situation turns to the proverbial, everyone gets to go home safely, and line captains aren't exactly expected to 'train' on every flight. But guidance isn't such a bad thing. Whether you like it or not, you're role models for the next generation of captains.

As for instagramming in the flight deck, tell them! It's your flight deck. Like most pilots, we like to chronicle our experiences through our careers. The previous generation had Polaroids, scrapbooks and the like. Our platform is a little bit more instantaneous (and a whole lot more public) which can catch a few off guard when they are asked to explain themselves to Fleet. I for one have been shown photos of FOs who have taken some snaps in delightful places such as Dubai, Kabul, India to name a few, ALL of which photography is strictly prohibited. So it's only a matter of time before they go to Floor Number 3. For what it's worth, I don't have an instagrammy account thingy.

Just a small bit of perspective from this lowly child of the magenta line. Take it or leave it, but this bitter picking on the new generation of pilots is wrong - and too easy. Harry has hit the nail on the head. Primary foundation lies in the trainers.

The real enemy is the one who sits on Floor Number 9...

Fuel-Off :ok:

You make an excellent point, respectfully and tactfully.

We, as an industry, are responsible for breeding the non-lateral-thinking magenta line ethos. It seemed to be the way to go until we realised human error exists in automation, because it's designed by humans.

The brain may have its resident pathogens in it's fallibility, but it also has the tools required to THINK instead of COMPLY when the situation requires it.

We all have the voice to change things if we can overcome both our apathy and our reluctance to take responsibility for our industry practices. Is it really always someone else's job to work these things out? We are highly intelligent and highly skilled individuals who command respect and the general public often listens to us.

However, most unfortunately Dubai and the Middle East is NOT the platform from which to start this revolution - as hard as Dr Nick does try to.

[BANANASBANANAS]

I'm rather tired of the 'children of the magenta line' rhetoric. What would you have us (my generation - millennials) do? Get some time on a DC-10? L-1011? No, no they're all retired. Ahh...F27? No, they're mostly all decommissioned too. Oh, the legendary 727? Wait, they're pretty much banned anywhere because those JT8Ds scream too loudly. Or would you prefer us to get some time on the Sud Caravelle? Nope, they're all out of the sky too.

So really, our generation is a result of those aircraft being sent to the scrap heap and having nothing really to cut our teeth on unless it actually has a magenta line. Personally, I would have loved to have flown a 707 or 747SP and do some REAL heavy flying. But valves, mechanical linkages, ducts and IRUs are being replaced with microswitches, FADEC, Fly-by-wire and of course that much belied magenta line.

On the line, impart us with the knowledge of your yesteryears. Everyone loves a good war story so long as we can learn from it. Granted, some Millennials are rather sensitive to constructive criticism, but honestly that is only a few. Don't forget, you guys started from somewhere too. Yes, FOs on the line are expected to demonstrate a degree of proficiency so when the situation turns to the proverbial, everyone gets to go home safely, and line captains aren't exactly expected to 'train' on every flight. But guidance isn't such a bad thing. Whether you like it or not, you're role models for the next generation of captains.

As for instagramming in the flight deck, tell them! It's your flight deck. Like most pilots, we like to chronicle our experiences through our careers. The previous generation had Polaroids, scrapbooks and the like. Our platform is a little bit more instantaneous (and a whole lot more public) which can catch a few off guard when they are asked to explain themselves to Fleet. I for one have been shown photos of FOs who have taken some snaps in delightful places such as Dubai, Kabul, India to name a few, ALL of which photography is strictly prohibited. So it's only a matter of time before they go to Floor Number 3. For what it's worth, I don't have an instagrammy account thingy.

Just a small bit of perspective from this lowly child of the magenta line. Take it or leave it, but this bitter picking on the new generation of pilots is wrong - and too easy. Harry has hit the nail on the head. Primary foundation lies in the trainers.

The real enemy is the one who sits on Floor Number 9...

Fuel-Off :ok:

Fair comment as far as you go Fuel Off. I don't think any hairy old git like me is actually blaming Millennials for being children of the magenta line. But it is a fact that the current generation of F/Os (and more and more newly minted Captains) have never had the advantage of flying clockwork gauges on steam driven aircraft. This is generally not an issue when things go exactly to plan, but these experience gaps can translate into safety threats when resilience and lateral thinking may be required in such benign scenarios as weather deviation, diversion, go around etc. Factor in the further lowering of the recruitment experience bar, loss of experience in the left seat and in the checking department, some unforgiving destinations, brutal rostering, big stick emails from the checking department, poor morale and pressure on all departments to cut costs, and the perfect flight safety storm is just about fully developed.

[Jack D]

Fuel off .. I liked your post ! if only everyone had your willingness to pick up a few tips from the older geezers . Good for you .

[EchoKilla]

I'm rather tired of the 'children of the magenta line' rhetoric. What would you have us (my generation - millennials) do? Get some time on a DC-10? L-1011? No, no they're all retired. Ahh...F27? No, they're mostly all decommissioned too. Oh, the legendary 727? Wait, they're pretty much banned anywhere because those JT8Ds scream too loudly. Or would you prefer us to get some time on the Sud Caravelle? Nope, they're all out of the sky too.

So really, our generation is a result of those aircraft being sent to the scrap heap and having nothing really to cut our teeth on unless it actually has a magenta line. Personally, I would have loved to have flown a 707 or 747SP and do some REAL heavy flying. But valves, mechanical linkages, ducts and IRUs are being replaced with microswitches, FADEC, Fly-by-wire and of course that much belied magenta line.

On the line, impart us with the knowledge of your yesteryears. Everyone loves a good war story so long as we can learn from it. Granted, some Millennials are rather sensitive to constructive criticism, but honestly that is only a few. Don't forget, you guys started from somewhere too. Yes, FOs on the line are expected to demonstrate a degree of proficiency so when the situation turns to the proverbial, everyone gets to go home safely, and line captains aren't exactly expected to 'train' on every flight. But guidance isn't such a bad thing. Whether you like it or not, you're role models for the next generation of captains.

As for instagramming in the flight deck, tell them! It's your flight deck. Like most pilots, we like to chronicle our experiences through our careers. The previous generation had Polaroids, scrapbooks and the like. Our platform is a little bit more instantaneous (and a whole lot more public) which can catch a few off guard when they are asked to explain themselves to Fleet. I for one have been shown photos of FOs who have taken some snaps in delightful places such as Dubai, Kabul, India to name a few, ALL of which photography is strictly prohibited. So it's only a matter of time before they go to Floor Number 3. For what it's worth, I don't have an instagrammy account thingy.

Just a small bit of perspective from this lowly child of the magenta line. Take it or leave it, but this bitter picking on the new generation of pilots is wrong - and too easy. Harry has hit the nail on the head. Primary foundation lies in the trainers.

The real enemy is the one who sits on Floor Number 9...

Fuel-Off :ok:

Well said! Fire half of costa brigade, anyone pick up the LIS incident that just popped up few hours back??!

[Neektu]

"anyone pick up the LIS incident that just popped up few hours back??"

What is that all about?

[glofish]

Fuel-Off

Good post. But not everything is lost if, as you demonstrate.

It does not need old equipment to get more proficient. It only takes a look through the magenta/FD. Take the last incident down in India ....
What has been demonstrated is being lost if something shows an unexpected and apparently wrong turn and a desperate attempt to regain the FDs quickly, with a wrong switching and then a religiously following of the two bars almost leading to a stall.
When the magenta does not look right, pick a pitch and heading, check power and fly the big jet like a Cessna (or for that matter a MFS). Let your buddy sort out the electronics and then continue.

It's not rocket science and there's no excuse to stall things with magenta lines.
Pitch, heading and power are and were the same on a Cessna, Caravelle and in a 787/350.
And both will stall if pulling too much for too long!

Your attitude is good start!

[Big Enos Burdette]

"anyone pick up the LIS incident that just popped up few hours back??"

What is that all about?
777 low enough to blow some roof tiles off a house and damage cars.

[The Outlaw]

777 low enough to blow some roof tiles off a house and damage cars.

Who's 777?

Or do we already know that?:hmm:

[kipper the dog]

Or do we already know that?

Well going by the current trend at EK for hedge hopping on approach, shouldn't be too hard to work it out!

[The Outlaw]

This is all I could find. I guess it would warrant an ASR if his approach was bad but from what I can see he was "on the numbers", "thrust above idle, proper attitude, and "in the landing configuration"!

Porn played on TV screens at Lisbon Airport as tourists arrive | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/travel/video-1223358/Porn-played-TV-screens-Lisbon-Airport-tourists-arrive.html)

[slowjet]

Fuel Off : splendid post. Solution is easy but expensive and the bean counters just cannot get past the accounts book. Solution is selection, proper cadet training of basics, build up of the automatics to show that they ease your life and constant reminders that when they go wrong,think back to basics and fly the beast. With autopilot off, autothrust off, the sidesticks are still connected to FCC's and the dummy thrust levers are still not throttles but a few idents to help you get from idle to T/O ,CLB, TOGA etc. Still, click click. So, you are not really flying the beast even then . But, that is the commercial world. Being fooled by the automatics into thinking that you are flying the aircraft can still get you out of horrible auto/messes . Basic pilot skills to fall back on always sorts out the most complex auto situations.


Not too far from MOL's dream of having pilotless aircraft. The welcome on board robot speech reminds pax that it is a fully automatic flight and there are no pilots.It advises," Sit back, relax. Nothing can go wrong (hic) Nothing can go wrong (hic) Nothing can go wrong ...........................".

[BigGeordie]

This all goes back to TCAS and the mantra of using the highest level of automation at all times.

We reap what the management sow.

[ruserious]

Actually it came very much from one level up from TCAS, supported by 2 levels below

[Jack D]

A thr/ inop what are you talking
About ? It's s non event even for the newer generation of pilots , I hope !
I take your point on commercial interests , but whatever next , autopilot failure in cruise .. shock horror ! I'm not sure where this took place of course but , manual handling training is now de riigeur even in direct mode or equivalent .. aaarggh we,re all going to die ...

[Jack D]

In fact the Mel is set by the manufacturer not the airline . That isn't the point you are making I think .
The automation argument has been raging for a very long time & will continue to do so , as for Mel items you are not obliged to accept the a/c even if dispatch is allowed , of course questions will be asked but it's finally the commanders choice but the reasoning should be sound . Did you mean 1 Rad altimeter ? Surely not ?

[Musician]

Forwarded from a spotter friend who watches YouTube.
That should be EK55 to Düsseldorf, arriving 11:31z on runway 23L, with a variable 20G32kt crosswind (max. certified crosswind is 40kt for the A380-800).

Metar:
EDDL 051150Z 30020G32KT 270V330 9999 VCSH SCT030TCU SCT270 16/09 Q1009 NOSIG
EDDL 051120Z 29020G33KT 270V330 9999 FEW016 SCT026 BKN260 15/09 Q1009 NOSIG

I'm not sure how that is ontopic here.

[Visual Procedures]

Upgrade training..

Every landing you walk away from.. Good.

and the aircraft is usable for the next flight.. Excellent.

That'll be a 5 :D

[gearlever]

Beautiful paint job.

[FIRESYSOK]

This is an airplane not a bicycle! Debrief complete.

[Dropp the Pilot]

What's all the yawing in aid of? Is this an Airbus technique - "in crosswinds, make repeated and random jabs at the controls in various axes to give the illusion that you as the pilot are directing the aircraft"

[Craggenmore]

There was oodles of experience on board that flight deck which is why it didn’t vacate at taxiway Grass!

[White Knight]

What's all the yawing in aid of? Is this an Airbus technique - "in crosswinds, make repeated and random jabs at the controls in various axes to give the illusion that you as the pilot are directing the aircraft"

It's the 'Magenta Line' technique apparently:rolleyes::hmm:

[QCM]

Before pulling conclusions guys wait for investigations to be completed! Why not a sudden unexpected violent gust? Give them a chance come on this is a pilot forum not a Court!

[Musician]

There's a dedicated PPRuNe thread for this A380 crosswind landing (http://www.pprune.org/spectators-balcony-spotters-corner/600390-unbelievable-a380-landing.html) in Spotter's Corner.

[Monarch Man]

Its fairly obvious that whilst there was a significant crosswind component and it was gusty, there was a large rudder input to reduce the crab angle that exceeded what was actually required, its an elementary handling mistake, which if im guessing comes back to basic skills and capacity issues. Unless of course someone can explain to me why a transport aircraft is rudder limited below its xwind limitation, in which instance they would have been blown to the downwind side of the runway and not over corrected to the upwind side.
It happens when the PF stomps on the rudder.

[maggot]

It's the 'Magenta Line' technique apparently:rolleyes::hmm:

Green Line

[glofish]

Very revealing .... pio on a pos ....

[J.L.Seagull]

I have a question for those who know the A380 flight control system well enough.

There seems to be a lot of rudder movement well before the flare and touchdown. Is this just normal turn coordination from the EFCS, or do you think it's someone stomping on the pedals?

[Eau de Boeing]

V good glowie, an over-controlled crosswind landing for a guy with very little experience in that seat.

Lucky nobody captured the tractor heading bug uber-faff on film isn't it?

[White Knight]

Is this just normal turn coordination from the EFCS, or do you think it's someone stomping on the pedals?

No and Yes.....................

[Capn Rex Havoc]

Is this just normal turn coordination from the EFCS, or do you think it's someone stomping on the pedals?

Yes and No .....................

[Pugilistic Animus]

In fact the Mel is set by the manufacturer not the airline . That isn't the point you are making I think .
The automation argument has been raging for a very long time & will continue to do so , as for Mel items you are not obliged to accept the a/c even if dispatch is allowed , of course questions will be asked but it's finally the commanders choice but the reasoning should be sound . Did you mean 1 Rad altimeter ? Surely not ?
​​​​​​
Not quite, OEM has MMEL or a master MEL but individual MELs are decided upon by the operator and basically becomes the equivalent of an STC

[Buckshot]

Interesting decision by ATSB in Aus to abandon the MDA investigation in MEL from 2016 given the other incidents at DME and JFK - all A380

On May 6th 2020 the ATSB reported they have aborted the investigation reasoning "Based on a review of the available evidence, the ATSB considered it was unlikely that further investigation would identify any systemic safety issues. Additionally, the ATSB strives to use its limited resources for maximum safety benefit, and considers that in this case, due to proactive safety action by the operator and air services provider, the ongoing risk is minimal. Consequently, the ATSB has discontinued this investigation."

https://www.avherald.com/h?article=49b54d9c&opt=0

[Capn Rex Havoc]

Different events to DME and JFK. The LIDO chart (EK uses Lido) allows you to go to 2000 ft. So, I don't really see it as an error from a pilot perspective. Plus EK stopped all 380 RNP AR approaches. Case closed.