US F-15s and RAF tanker in near-miss over north Norfolk coast

[BEagle]

The BBC and local press have been reporting this: US F-15s and RAF tanker in near-miss over north Norfolk coast - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-norfolk-40703042)

The full report is here: http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uploadedFiles/Content/Standard_content/Airprox_report_files/2017/Airprox%20Report%202017002.pdf

However, another incident is also rather alarming and can be seen here: http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uploadedFiles/Content/Standard_content/Airprox_report_files/2017/New_assessed_reports/Airprox%20Report%202017026.pdf

The second report states: Members wondered whether recent flying rates were such that tanker crews were less often exposed to multiple concurrent receivers than was historically the case, and noted that other complex aviation tasks were often subject either to recency and currency requirements or had a limit to the maximum number of participants to prevent operator overload.

That must be rather worrying, surely?

[ORAC]

To hell with the pilots, what about the controllers?

I did two tours at Boulmer, one at Staxton and two at Neatishead controlling literally hundreds of hours of tanking on AAR5/6/8 with tanker cells of up to 4 tankers and up to 24 receivers either climbing towards, tanking with (and moving between tankers in the cell for dry/wet tanking) and departing on two separate frequencies (one cell, one transit). The even idea that FJ manoeuvring traffic would not be called when inside 20nm is incredible. Everyone knew that FJ traffic could turn 180 degrees in a sweep and change height by 10K+ when playing in the vertical. And all that without Mode C on most of the traffic.

But then I also did 8 ship USAF F4 intercepts off Great Yarmouth with one target and 7 fighters doing individual 135 degree intercepts with the target changing each run whilst coordinating with all the other military and civil traffic when Woodbridge/Bentwaters had about 200 F4s and Wattisham had a Lightning wing.

Standards and experience have obviously gone through the floor.

[Il Duce]

According to the Tegleraph, a "flight controller" at "Stanwick" was involved. Anyone give a clue to where that is exactly?

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

Standards and experience have obviously gone through the floor.

I left ATC in 2003. Standards were high, experience was pretty good but there just wasn't enough people to do all that was required. It was clear to me back then that we were getting asked to do more and more, with less and less.

I worked some of the busiest airspace around, and with a full team it worked like a charm, band-box just one position and it could go very wrong very quickly.

Reading some of the other airprox reports have a look at how many say the controllers on task were at capacity and having to multi-task.

[Pontius]

If two F15 pilots can't see a bloody great airliner on their all-singing, all-dancing radars then they shouldn't be allowed near a fighter and should be kicked off to the desert to fly drones. Never mind ATC didn't tell them about the tanker, what's wrong with looking out of the window, or did it 'come at them from a funny angle' (to quote Snatch).

[FantomZorbin]

Il Duce
Stanwick is to the east of Southampton - it's the replacement for West Drayton but with more whistles and bells and a moat!

[Onceapilot]

Interesting that the report on the Typhoon join near-miss fails to properly recognise the weakness in Voyager Tanker proceedures. After joining, control of the receiver is passed to the MSO! :eek: That is the problem!
Mind you, this report is just the deliberations of the airprox board. The responsibility for taking backward steps with UK AAR capability lays at the feet of some career thrusters within that sphere over the last ten years! :yuk:

OAP

[MPN11]

In the interests of accuracy, it's Swanwick.

Our control centres - NATS (http://www.nats.aero/about-us/what-we-do/our-control-centres/)

[BEagle]

Onceapilot, I agree with that view!

When I first started AAR, it was standard procedure for the 'operating pilot' to fly the tanker, talk to the receivers and to ATC/SOC all on the same radio frequency. That was fine, because AAR slots were generally 30 min and we rarely had more than a 4-ship in the slot.

As time went by, someone decided that AAR slots could be reduced to 20 min. That meant that the chance of receivers leaving with others joining and some still refuelling increased. Those of us with experience could still cope with all the radio chat, but it was harder for newcomers to learn the art than it had been for us 10 years earlier.

So the idea of a discrete 'boom' frequency was proposed - I wrote some SOPs which went to Staneval, but they never got round to putting them into effect. The idea was to operate as on a trail - pilot-flying dealt with the receivers on the 'boom' frequency and pilot-not-flying dealt with ATC/SOC. Inbound receivers would only be accepted when the pilot-flying was happy; all the RV call etc. would take place on the ATC/SOC frequency and the receivers would only be pushed to the boom frequency when they'd called 'visual'. Clearance to join the formation would only be given by the pilot-flying; he/she would also be the ONLY person responsible for moving receivers around the tanker and clearing them for contact/disconnect etc.

Another nation decided that they wanted the PF to use the ATC/SOC frequency, with the PNF controlling receiver movement on the boom frequency. I advised against this, but they insisted. Then they devolved receiver movement to their air refuelling officers once the receivers had reached echelon, or the 'observation' position as it became. They coped with this ONLY because their air refuelling officers were experienced fast-jet backseaters who were very familiar with formation control and had bags of spare capacity. But I still recommended that only the pilot at the controls should move receivers around the formation - I once witnessed a PF turning the aircraft just as a Tornado had been cleared for contact by the air refuelling officer, much to the Tornado crew's surprise. I explained in the debrief that this was precisely why only one pilot should fly the formation. But it's their train set and they cope fine due to the well above average quality of their air refuelling officers - whereas my proposed SOPs were for 3 'average' crew members!

We offered the RAF an opportunity to come and play with the full mission AAR desktop trainer to evaluate SOPs - but there was no money in the budget for such a thing....:rolleyes:

OAP, there's a fair bit in that report about datalink issues etc. But the SOP shouldn't require such things and, as they used to be, should be simple enough to work with the basic principles which the RAF AAR force developed through long experience.

[vascodegama]

OAP

Explain please how this incident has anything to do with the "problem " that you have identified.

[Onceapilot]

OAP

Explain please how this incident has anything to do with the "problem " that you have identified.

Hi VASCO,
After joining, control of the receiver is passed to the MSO!

OAP

[flighthappens]

In the first instance with the F-15's, why is the tanker sitting at such a low FL? Most modern aircraft with a modicum of performance can tank at least 10k above that height..

[Onceapilot]

SATCOS WB,

Yes, the highly polished Miliary radar services of the 80's and 90's did seem to wane somewhat. Seemed like it was a whole new crew by 2005. Overall, still generally got a great service though.:ok:

OAP

[Cows getting bigger]

Towline 8, Wash ATA and 323C has always been an 'interesting' mix.

As to the tanker procedures - it does seem rather slack compared with those CGB was taught a few decades back.

[BEagle]

flighthappens, ARA8 is limited to FL70-FL170 and airway Y70 is immediately to the south, with a base of FL175.

OAP at what point is the MSO given control of the receivers? Surely not before they've established in echelon / observation? Who clears the receivers to leave the formation?

[flighthappens]

Beagle, Ack, I am aware of the airway to the south.

I did not realise TL8 was capped. why is it capped given it is clear of controlled airspace? I'm guessing because of the lateral proximity?

[vascodegama]

OAP

The Rx were still talking to the pilots at the time! I would suggest that your concerns are out of place here. Yes BEags the transfer is at echelon left and the PF clears them to leave.

[Onceapilot]

Going back to the F15 Airprox, the incident shows how TCAS is no panacea for all Mil situations. A large aircraft cannot outmanoeuvre a fighter/bomber that maintains a collision flightpath while manoeuvring. Even if RA was enabled and followed, a manoeuvring FJ that happens to follow a dynamic path to collision cannot be avoided. TCAS can only assure a miss against steady flightpath traffic or compliant TCAS avoiding traffic. This should be fully understood. On the same basis, I think that active AAR block levels should normally be reserved for only co-ordinated Military traffic, as a Military restriction. It may be difficult to further restrict Civil traffic but, it is rare that civil conflictions occur and Mil radar should direct the Tanker to avoid laterally by a wide margin.

OAP

[Onceapilot]

OAP

The Rx were still talking to the pilots at the time! I would suggest that your concerns are out of place here.

Hi VASCO,
THE TYPHOON 5 PILOT reports that he gained visual with the tanker and all aircraft alongside,
began a visual join and switched across [from the join] to the boom frequency. During this process he
lost visual with the tanker as it entered cloud. He descended back to FL240 and ceased overtake
whilst maintaining 2.5nm radar trail. The pilot communicated this to the tanker on the boom frequency
which was acknowledged by the tanker crew, who stated they would commence a climb to FL270 in


Further,

Voyager crew consisted of military crew only and
comprised 2 pilots, the PF and PM, and a Mission Systems Officer (MSO). The PF task was to take
the receivers from the controlling agency on the ‘join frequency’, and bring them to the left wing, on
the ‘boom frequency’. The MSO’s task was then to cycle the receivers through the hoses and onto
the right wing, or to control the receivers should non-standard manoeuvering be required. The military
member concluded by stating that in this case there appeared to have been a break-down in
procedure whilst the tanker was climbing in intermittent IMC. Members also noted that although the
tanker organisation had taken a full part in the Occurrence Safety Investigation, it was disappointing
that military regulation had not been complied with and an Airprox DASOR had not been submitted.

Vasco, if you have different knowledge of the incident, we would all like to hear. :ok:

OAP

[BEagle]

vascodegama, what is the point in transferring receiver control to the MSO? I can see it for boom tankers where the boom operator communicates with the receiver he/she's plugging, but for probe and drogue why would a pilot flying a tanker transfer control of receiver formation movement around the aircraft to anyone else? It is bound to increase intercom activity, if only to avoid the scenario I mentioned earlier where one person cleared a receiver for contact and another decided to turn without seemingly being aware of the approaching receiver.

So what is the perceived benefit? Personally I consider that it increases risk.

The push to boom frequency should only be made, in my view, when a receiver confirms visual with the tanker. Once on the boom frequency it should be cleared to join by the PF. When AAR is complete, it should be pushed to the ATC/SOC frequency with the allocated squawk whilst in echelon right, then cleared to leave by the non-flying-pilot, who has probably also advised ATC/SOC that the receivers area about to leave the formation, thus improving the controller's SA as well as that of other receivers inbound to the tanker.

[vascodegama]

OAP

The rx was on the boom frequency but not actually joined echelon -therefore he was talking to the PF . Can't think of any other way of putting it sorry.

BEags

Not my idea I am afraid.

[flighthappens]

OAP

The rx was on the boom frequency but not actually joined echelon -therefore he was talking to the PF . Can't think of any other way of putting it sorry.

BEags

Not my idea I am afraid.

Alternatively the fighter maintains the control frequency on one radio (for SA on other traffic) and boom on another...

[BEagle]

Understood, vasco'.

But surely someone must have thought that it was a good idea? Otherwise why change the tried and tested ways of the past, which worked well?

Alternatively the fighter maintains the control frequency on one radio (for SA on other traffic) and boom on another...

Nope - one radio for communicating with people (whether tanker or ATC/SOC) outside the fighter formation and the back box for communicating with wingmen inside the fighter formation.

[flighthappens]

Understood, vasco'.

But surely someone must have thought that it was a good idea? Otherwise why change the tried and tested ways of the past, which worked well?



Nope - one radio for communicating with people (whether tanker or ATC/SOC) outside the fighter formation and the back box for communicating with wingmen inside the fighter formation.

If you need to chatter that much that you are obtrusive on the tanker you are probably doing it wrong. Besides, you can (almost) always use Mids voice....

[Just This Once...]

It's hard not to pass-up the opportunity to criticise the tanker dudes but I am finding it impossible to ignore Typhoon #5's really bad day. Even if the chap was completely tumbleweed he would have remembered that his formation alone was rather large, short of fuel, arriving out-of-sequence and fighting for the illusive VMC. On top of this he had the tanker to join and departing aircraft to consider.

At the point he found himself back in IMC trail, with no SA, talking to nobody but a tanker crew, I just wonder if any of the hairs on the back of his neck were actually serviceable.

[snippy]

....did the RAF A330 pilot manage to get a photo of the incident? 😱😱😱

[Onceapilot]

OAP

The rx was on the boom frequency but not actually joined echelon -therefore he was talking to the PF . Can't think of any other way of putting it sorry.




Vasco, that is not how the report is written....

THE TYPHOON 5 PILOT reports that he gained visual with the tanker and all aircraft alongside,
began a visual join and switched across [from the join] to the boom frequency. During this process he
lost visual with the tanker as it entered cloud. He descended back to FL240 and ceased overtake
whilst maintaining 2.5nm radar trail. The pilot communicated this to the tanker on the boom frequency
which was acknowledged by the tanker crew, who stated they would commence a climb to FL270 in

Now, this says Typhoon 5 was on boom freq (therefore with the MSO) or, do you know different?


OAP

[vascodegama]

OAP

It is not the act of switching to the boom frequency that transfers the control of the receiver ; it is when the rx reaches echelon left that the PF gives control to the MSO. This had not yet happened so I stand by my statement.Your quotation says he maintained 2.5 mile trail-this is very much still in pilot control territory.

[6foottanker]

....did the RAF A330 pilot manage to get a photo of the incident? 😱😱😱

Once I'd picked my coffee mug off the carpet, I took a snap of the TCAS for posterity. Just grabbed the camera from it's storage location by the side stick...

AARA 8 is capped at FL 160 as at the eastern end, just east of the CP is a segment of Dutch delegated airspace, base of FL175, so that drives the top of Area 8 as well as Y70 to the south. You can operate higher in coordination with Swanwick, but if the weather is nice, there is no need to get in the way (and Swanwick are already maxed out in this sector, hence the incident).

http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-8AA982CAD4D18E773CBEA101D0E8CCF3/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/Charts/ENR/AIRAC/EG_ENR_6_2_2_1_3_en_2017-05-25.pdf

[BEagle]

One does have to wonder WTF is going on these days...

Just tonight the lovely Geraldine announced another 'close encounter' of the military aircraft kind on the local TV news; details are at http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uploadedFiles/Content/Standard_content/Airprox_report_files/2017/New_assessed_reports/Airprox%20Report%202017029.pdf

The Brize Norton Director vectored the A400(B) into conflict with A400(A).

Contributory:

1. Lack of a formal handover resulted in subsequent assumptions and confusion.

2. The Approach controller’s workload was excessive.

Recommendation: HQ Air Command reviews ATC tasking with regard to current manning at Brize Norton.


:uhoh:

[Lonewolf_50]

@Beagle:
Back in the early 90's a friend of mine died when one P-3 flew into the other P-3, relieving on station, San Diego Op Area, fleet exercise. Two dozen fatalities. Two crews gone. The guys from our squadron who were on the SAR/recovery missions didn't find very much that was very big ...

[Dominator2]

Back to the original incident.
Mixing traffic operating IFR in VMC with high performance ac operating VFR in VNC is always fraught with difficulty. The fact that AAR 8 is so close to the Norfolk coast is also a factor. There is always a compromise in location of AAR tracks between convenience to receivers and safety.
There is no doubt that the F15 crews should have known AAR 8 was active, however, they were perfectly entitled to be there under see and avoid. Why 4 aircrew, two radars and interrogators failed to see the tanker is of concern?
I find it curious why the tanker pilot turned belly up to the Eagles and therefore losing sight? I’m not convinced that all pilots are trained on collision geometry and how to break a collision. Yes you may break your IRF bubble but at least moving the contacts in the windscreen will avoid metal coming together.
As to later comments in this thread concerning who has control on which frequency when conducting AAR amuses me. This argument has gone on for years and is still not resolved. Since the RAF operates throughout the world the general principle of all doing the same must prevail. I can recall numerous incidents in Bosnia, Kosovo and The Middle East where difference procedures in a multi-national coalition caused confusion. If a very experienced, strong willed individual has an opinion he should write a paper and send it to the appropriate regulating authorities.

[6foottanker]

There is no doubt that the F15 crews should have known AAR 8 was active, however, they were perfectly entitled to be there under see and avoid. Why 4 aircrew, two radars and interrogators failed to see the tanker is of concern?
I find it curious why the tanker pilot turned belly up to the Eagles and therefore losing sight? I’m not convinced that all pilots are trained on collision geometry and how to break a collision. Yes you may break your IRF bubble but at least moving the contacts in the windscreen will avoid metal coming together.
As to later comments in this thread concerning who has control on which frequency when conducting AAR amuses me. This argument has gone on for years and is still not resolved. Since the RAF operates throughout the world the general principle of all doing the same must prevail. I can recall numerous incidents in Bosnia, Kosovo and The Middle East where difference procedures in a multi-national coalition caused confusion. If a very experienced, strong willed individual has an opinion he should write a paper and send it to the appropriate regulating authorities.

Agreed that the F-15s should have awareness of the activity of Area 8, but the report failed to mention that the tankers have no awareness of the bookings for the Wash ATA either. A simple info exchange would solve that. But neither F-15s or tanker received any traffic information on each other from ATC, despite being under traffic information service. See and avoid was in play, and that, plus luck, is what ultimately stopped a collision.

As for why the tanker turned away, consider a pair that you are just visual with. They are in the 10 o'clock low, 5 miles climbing rapidly. TCAS then alerts you to the collision potential due to their rate of climb. Do you turn towards the rapidly blooming aircraft at your max 30 degrees angle of bank? Or away? Or just plough straight on. Tankers are not manoeuvrable especially when the closure is so fast. It takes 5 seconds to action a turn. They definitely can't 'break' to avoid! The tanker turn was initiated as the likely best course of action to avoid the F-15s, in self preservation. The tanker only had time to roll in before the encounter. Monitoring on TCAS and out the window (before the protagonist went under the nose) in the 10 seconds we had failed to mitigate any collision threat. Hence the 'luck' element alluded to in the report.

[Dominator2]

6foottanker,

You have kind of answered my point. Had the tanker turned left, even a little bit in the time allowed, the F15s would have crossed the nose further away. Its all to do with collision geometry and how to visually recognise and then break a collision.
I am an advocate of TCAS, however, sometimes there is too much reliance on it. Obviously, tanker pilots are used to operating with many "fast movers" operating near to them. There may be an assumption that ALL are visual with the Texaco but this is not always true. Being "heads out" on both sides of the cockpit is still of vital importance.

[6foottanker]

A turn south would have flown us into the lead (easterly) jet, and you are assuming both F-15s don't change track. They were requested to stop climb as they approached the tanker (and reduced climb rate) so the geometry was against us in each case. A turn away increases the tanker's relative profile to assist visual acquisition and also was auctioned to take the aircraft away from the perceived constant bearing (visually) of the climbing fast jets. However, due to the lack of available response time, the tanker would have been in the same bit of sky whatever they did, once the decision to manoeuvre was made.
But I agree about the TCAS diminishing lookout. Not a factor in this case though since they were seen by me before the TA call.

[tarantonight]

[QUOTE=Il Duce;9840837]According to the Tegleraph, a "flight controller" at "Stanwick" was involved. Anyone give a clue to where that is exactly?[/QUOTE

I think you'll find they were talking about Stan Wick who works at Netispaddock.

Wherever that is.

[Dominator2]

6foottanker, thanks for your reply. Can you tell me what is the maximum bank angle/G that the Voyager is cleared to. Whilst I understand how AT normally operates in Controlled Airspace, a tanker operating in Class G the pilot must be more willing, and able, to operate the ac to it's limits.

Many moons ago I had a similar conversation with Victor crews. Only when they were about to go to war were they interested in how to max perform their aircraft and their StanEval even developed a missile break!!

[Il Duce]

tarantonight
Oh, that Stan Wick. I thought he'd packed in flight controlling when West Draylon closed. I knew him when he first graduated from Shorbury, I think he got posted to St Athens followed by a tour at Waddingham. Anyhow, good to know he's still guiding the aircraft along the runway with his table tennis bats.

[Wyler]

A vital component here is currency.
I am now into my 35th year as an Air Defender and changes over the last 15 years has been dramatic. You can talk all all you like about process and procedure but you cannot teach experience. That comes from hands on practice, and lots of it. In the 80s I could look at a radar picture of the North Sea and it would be chocker with Mil activity. Today (literally), it's like 'Where'e Walt'.
Simulation is the drug of choice and I would say we are at, or close to, an 80/20 split in favour of simulation. Don't get me wrong, the new simulators are excellent but there is no substitute for the real thing.
In the 80s, as an instructor, I could get a student controller at least 2 live sorties a day. A mixture of control levels and a mixture of airspace activity to deal with. Today, 3 a week is considered good but they will do another 7 or so on the simulator so the spread sheet looks good. Once qualified they join a queue as the flying available goes to the students. Skill fade is quick, especially when you add in a 4 month tour in the Falklands not long after qualification. It is a vicious circle.
When it comes to active towlines, and we don't get that many anymore, they are active danger areas and should be treated as such. Irrespective of Radar Service requested in Class G airspace they should be coordinated and restrictions enforced. As a Tanker controller, once I had taken over the joining aircraft and they were 2 way with the Tanker, it was the Tanker Capt who had primacy. Have to admit I am out of the loop a little as to current procedures.
The RAF has shrunk beyond recognition and we are trying to do the same with less. One of the casualties is, and will always be, currency and experience. That is the same, I would say, no matter what your specialisation. The days that ORAC described are well and truly gone.

[Onceapilot]

6foottanker, thanks for your reply. Can you tell me what is the maximum bank angle/G that the Voyager is cleared to. Whilst I understand how AT normally operates in Controlled Airspace, a tanker operating in Class G the pilot must be more willing, and able, to operate the ac to it's limits.

Many moons ago I had a similar conversation with Victor crews. Only when they were about to go to war were they interested in how to max perform their aircraft and their StanEval even developed a missile break!!

Dominator, I don't think you will find anyone is likely to talk about specifics. However, you are right that crews should be able to use their aircraft within its limits. The fact is though, an airliner / tanker has very limited max manoeuvrability (in the realms of 50 degrees bank, 20 degrees pitch and +0.5 to +2.0 G). This is very little with which to try and negate a close-in confliction with a dynamic FJ. Coupled with limited flightdeck visibility, the only way to safely operate these large aircraft in the Military FJ environment is to control FJ activity around them.
BTW, the Victor "missile break" would, I think, be a misnomer.:)

OAP

[Dominator2]

Onceapilot,

BTW, the Victor "missile break" would, I think, be a misnomer.

I helped develop said manoeuvre for both the Victor and C130. Both ac, in the right hands, it was possible to roll to 110 AOB and as the nose drops to 10-20 deg below the horizon, roll out, IDLE and Speedbrake. If you really wanted to descend quickly lower Gear/Flap or open Bomb Bay Doors. The Victor deployed chaff at the appropriate time.
Designed to break a fighters radar lock and hopefully loose contact.
All possible but needed to be practiced!!

My original point was, to avoid a mid-air collision all pilots should be able to max turn their ac even be it 50AOB or 2G.

[MPN11]

As an ATCO, my only (filed) airmiss was between the Varsity I was conteolling and an energetically manoeuvring VFR F-100. The Biard agreed there was nothing I, or the Varsity, could have done to avoid the pesky fast-ish jet. IIRC they ended up at co-altitude at less than 1 mile.

[BEagle]

Just before GW1 became hot, we developed a profile for the VC10K to avoid a fighter being able to achieve a successful weapon lock.

The VC10K had very limited manoeuvre potential, so the initial action was to change speed and height to beam the threat signal. Idle thrust, 20° nose up pitch, turn to beam the threat. Then overbank to 45° AoB and 10° nose down pitch, stabilising in a 240KIAS, 45° AoB idle thrust descent. Select slats out and reduce to 210KIAS, then select flap to T/O 20° and reduce to 170KIAS, still in the 45° AoB spiral aiming to level in haze, cloud or at low level to deny the fighter any firing solution. Not an easy exercise, but we flew it in the simulator and it worked fine.

Fortunately air dominance was achieved before anyone needed to put the profile to the test.

Flight envelope protection will ensure that an A330 or Voyager can be taken to the protected limits fairly easily, but will protect the aircraft from any danger of overstress or structural failure. Whereas the Pegasus doesn't have such benefits and extreme manoeuvre is far more difficult to achieve without causing serious damage.

Our profile was based on a 'leaker' being detected by AWACS at BVR, not as the response to a short range tally sighting, as was the case in ARA8.

the Board agreed that the Voyager’s crew had had very few options for avoiding action due to manoeuvrability of his aircraft and the tracks of the F15, one passing in front and one behind; the Board concluded that his right-turn manoeuvre was probably the best he could achieve.

Indeed - and the Voyager pilot had but a spilt second to make that decision!

I still cannot understand how 4 pairs of eyes and 2 radars in a brace of Uncle Sam's superb Mud Hens couldn't see an aircraft as large as a Voyager in 10km+ visibility though.

[Dominator2]

I still cannot understand how 4 pairs of eyes and 2 radars in a brace of Uncle Sam's superb Mud Hens couldn't see an aircraft as large as a Voyager in 10km+ visibility though.

And that is the crux of the problem!!!

[F-16GUY]

I still cannot understand how 4 pairs of eyes and 2 radars in a brace of Uncle Sam's superb Mud Hens couldn't see an aircraft as large as a Voyager in 10km+ visibility though.

Are you sure it was Mud Hens? Could have been C models with only one set of eyes each. The Voyager might have been in the radars notch, giving the pilots a blank scope, and remember that if the planes are on collision course, there would not be any line of sight (no movement) on the canopy/windscreen.

I dont know what avionics package those F-15 have, but if equipped with link-16 and interrogators, they should have had fairly good SA on the voyager (surveillance picture and mode 3 reply). Might be that they were busy doing visual maneuvers and did not glance at their screens once in a while...

[BEagle]

From the report:

With 4 crew members able to conduct lookout from the 2 F15 aircraft, military members opined that they should have been able to visually sight the Voyager, despite its grey camouflage scheme, as they climbed towards it. In both these respects, Board members wondered if the F15 crews had become task focused and whether this may have been the reason that they missed or discounted the Voyager both visually and on their radars.

Which would indicate that the F-15s were indeed Mud Hens.

The likelihood of a Voyager NOT being seen on 'state of the art' radar is zero - unless it has a Klingon cloaking device activated.... The report states that the F-15 pilots were 'flying visually'; the field of view from an F-15 is excellent, so it remains a mystery as to how the F-15s didn't spot the Voyager in 10km plus visibility.

[Dominator2]

F-16GUY,

Having spent 41 years flying Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground in 2 seat ac there is absolutely NO acceptable reason why one or both F15s did not detect the Voyager both visually and on the array of electronic devices at their disposal. If I were their Wing Commander I would be asking serious questions.

Equally, if you are receiving a radar service you would hope to be told that the AAR track was active AND receive traffic information if it became a factor. As mentioned previously, is poor training, lack of currency, too much simulation or poor procedures the reason that the control (or lack of control) was so poor?

[Wyler]

All of the above.

[Flap62]

Voyager in the notch!! Seriously? Perhaps against a 1960s PD but against a C/E? Nah

[Dominator2]

Perhaps against a 1960s PD but against a C/E? Nah
Come on Flap, some of us operated with a High PRF radar until recently.

However, I agree, a F15E WSO should had seen the Voyager as soon as they turned North.

[F-16GUY]

Did not notice that it was an E model. With the Pulse Doppler APG-63 as in some of the C models it would have been possible to lose track of something the size of Exxon Valdez, should it be in the notch with no relative closure. Hence my comment.

Dominator,

With 41 years experience in FJ surly you to have experienced more then one incident where you did not se the other aircraft before it was way to close for comfort? I certainly have, both in training and in combat, and as always its a combination of pure work by the controlling agency and lack og SA/poor system management/visual lookout by the crew. It did happen back in the day and it still does happen today.

[Onceapilot]

With 41 years experience in FJ surly you to have experienced more then one incident where you did not se the other aircraft before it was way to close for comfort? I certainly have, both in training and in combat, and as always its a combination of pure work by the controlling agency and lack og SA/poor system management/visual lookout by the crew. It did happen back in the day and it still does happen today.

I agree, it happens! :oh: That is why I advocate mandatory Radar Control of AARA's for Military aircraft in routine AAR. For goodness' sake, FJ LL training is now pretty restricted due to proven limitations of "see and be seen!"

OAP

[F-16GUY]

Going back to the F15 Airprox, the incident shows how TCAS is no panacea for all Mil situations. A large aircraft cannot outmanoeuvre a fighter/bomber that maintains a collision flightpath while manoeuvring. Even if RA was enabled and followed, a manoeuvring FJ that happens to follow a dynamic path to collision cannot be avoided. TCAS can only assure a miss against steady flightpath traffic or compliant TCAS avoiding traffic. This should be fully understood. On the same basis, I think that active AAR block levels should normally be reserved for only co-ordinated Military traffic, as a Military restriction. It may be difficult to further restrict Civil traffic but, it is rare that civil conflictions occur and Mil radar should direct the Tanker to avoid laterally by a wide margin.

OAP

Onceapilot,

Have you changed your opinion on TCAS since the last time it was discussed in the "Crew ignored TCAS RA" thread or do you still think it should be followed blindly?


Despite this being a "rumours and news" page, the moderators have allowed stupid trolling posts that attempt to undermine the sound basis of TCAS SOP. Mods, please remove posts that advocate anything other than compliance with TCAS SOP. Thanks

[BEagle]

If Voyager AAR SOPS are the same as for other modern tankers, TCAS is selected to 'TA only' when within the AARA, otherwise it's in TA/RA. This is to stop 'nuisance RAs' being generated by receivers inbound to the tanker. Ignoring RAs is a total no-no under IFR even in VMC; you might think that you've spotted the intruder, but have you really? A culture of ignoring any RA is unacceptable.

Onceapilot, is that how you see it?

During an AARSAG, I was once perplexed to hear the USAF advocating use of TCAS as an RV aid. It must be remembered that azimuth TCAS information is unreliable and it should only be used in the vertical plane. If you need further 3-dimensional information on targets, data link is a help but remember that you will ONLY see traffic which has been put on the link and other traffic might still be about, which could possibly generate TCAS advisories even if not displayed on the data link display.

Radar control in an AARA isn't the real solution and isn't possible under SERA in Class G anyway. Civil aircraft would never accept the limitation, so perhaps it would be better to treat ARRAs as TRAs; only those military aircraft cleared to enter the TRA would be permitted to do so.

[Onceapilot]

Onceapilot,

Have you changed your opinion on TCAS since the last time it was discussed in the "Crew ignored TCAS RA" thread or do you still think it should be followed blindly?

F16GUY,

Where did I say " it should be followed blindly?"

You are misrepresenting my previous post and, misrepresenting an incident where TCAS RA was not followed.

Notwithstanding the fact that you have quoted my old post without any supporting facts or context about that other incident and, there is no link to the incidents in this present post, why are you Trolling this up?

OAP

[Onceapilot]

If Voyager AAR SOPS are the same as for other modern tankers, TCAS is selected to 'TA only' when within the AARA, otherwise it's in TA/RA. This is to stop 'nuisance RAs' being generated by receivers inbound to the tanker. Ignoring RAs is a total no-no under IFR even in VMC; you might think that you've spotted the intruder, but have you really? A culture of ignoring any RA is unacceptable.

Onceapilot, is that how you see it?




Yes Beag's. :ok:

OAP

[Onceapilot]

Radar control in an AARA isn't the real solution and isn't possible under SERA in Class G anyway. Civil aircraft would never accept the limitation, so perhaps it would be better to treat ARRAs as TRAs; only those military aircraft cleared to enter the TRA would be permitted to do so.

That might be a good way to do it. My opinion is that Mil traffic should be co-ordinated within active AARA for routine AAR. Cheers

OAP