SAR S-92 Missing Ireland

[Mitchaa]

4 crew on board

https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0314/859533-coastguard-mayo-incident/

[Brom]

One found alive but condition reported as critical, three still missing.

https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0314/859533-coastguard-mayo-incident/

[Just a spotter]

RTÉ is reporting that wreckage has been located near the last know location of the aircraft.

'Hopes fading' for missing Coast Guard crew (http://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0314/859533-coastguard-mayo-incident/)

JAS

[Heathrow Harry]

From BBC

One of four crew members from a missing coastguard helicopter has been rescued off the west coast of the Republic of Ireland.

The man is understood to be in a critical condition.

Those on board lost contact at about 01:00 local time on Tuesday.
Debris has been spotted in the water and a search by helicopters, an Aer Corps plane and local fishing boats is focusing six miles to the west of Black Sod in County Mayo.
The aircraft was providing cover for another coastguard helicopter on a mission when contact was lost.

'Rescue family' hit hard

The Irish coastguard's Sligo-based helicopter had been responding to a distress call from a crewman in need of medical attention on a UK fishing vessel.
A second coastguard helicopter from Dublin, R116, had been assisting in the operation, about 150km west of Eagle Island, when it went missing.
Conditions were described as good when the two pilots, a winch man and a winch operator lost contact on their final approach to a refuelling depot.
Declan Geoghegan from the Irish Coast Guard said the accident had hit the "rescue family" hard.
Image copyright Google Image caption Both helicopters refuelled at Blacksod "The Shannon-based helicopter spotted some debris in the water and the latest we have is that one crew member has been recovered in a critical condition," Mr Geoghegan told BBC Radio Foyle.
"We don't know what happened and obviously there will be an air accident investigation into it.
"We'll continue to search for the missing crew members until such time as we have recovered them and the flight recorder."
The Irish Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport expressed concern for the missing crew and their families.
"As the search for the Dublin-based helicopter R116 is currently under way I would like to express my sincere support and sympathies for all those involved," said Shane Ross.

[Just a spotter]

The Irish Times provides a little more background on known events and reporting that Eugene Clonan, Acting Director of the Irish Coast Guard is pessimistic, hopefully that's premature.

Coast Guard ?not holding out much hope? as search continues for missing helicopter (http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/coast-guard-not-holding-out-much-hope-as-search-continues-for-missing-helicopter-1.3009721)

JAS

[Jwscud]

Thoughts with all connected to the operation and very much hoping that daylight brings more good news. Have seen and heard these guys on the radio many times when operating around Ireland.

[El Bunto]

Callsigns are assigned to bases rather than the individual airframes, Rescue 116 being for Dublin and appears to have been most recently used by EI-ICR. Departed Dublin around 23:10 last night.

Air Corps CASA has left the scene and Rescue 115 has landed at Mayo hospital.

[212man]

Air Corps CASA has left the scene and Rescue 115 has landed at Mayo hospital.

Do you have any FR24 (or similar) links? Would be interested to see the final flight path information of 116.

[Just a spotter]

The Irish Times has picked up on the S92 tail rotor check in Jan. All 5 Irish Coast Guard machines were checked.

Helicopter involved in Mayo search operation checked for safety in January (http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/helicopter-involved-in-mayo-search-operation-checked-for-safety-in-january-1.3009777)

JAS

[Lude-og]

Do you have any FR24 (or similar) links? Would be interested to see the final flight path information of 116.

Apologies if I am wrong with the details but this is what I have taken from the statements released so far:

It's my understanding that 116 went straight west offshore direct from Dublin to provide top cover for 118 and was on the way back to Blacksod to refuel but never made it.

I have a screenshot from flight radar showing both Helis at 00:43am but don't know how to post it.

[TipCap]

As a former DCP of the SAR Flight in Shannon in the early 90's (S61N days), I send my heartfelt sympathies to all who are involved with this terrible accident.

It is something we lived with but always hoped it never happened.

TC

[terminus mos]

Mitchaa


I understand the only safeguard in place is a bearing energy monitoring tool in the HUMS system.

Not exactly. HUMS download after each flight. Max 6 hours between downloads. 10 flying hour boroscope inspection. Some aircraft now getting temperature sensors on the bearing.

[KernowHeli]

Here is the location that they are currently searching.

MarineTraffic: Global Ship Tracking Intelligence | AIS Marine Traffic (http://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/centerx:-10.3/centery:54.1/zoom:12)

Here is Rescue 116 AIS profile, from which its last position and flight path can be found:
Vessel details for: SAR 250002899 (SAR Aircraft) - MMSI 250002899, Call Sign Registered in Ireland | AIS Marine Traffic (http://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:290916/mmsi:250002899/imo:0/vessel:SAR_250002899)

[212man]

You can find out it's radar track here, although doesn't show you much with last data at 00:22 this morning across land. (Open on PC for a flight track, doesn't appear to work on mobile device)

It looks like the data does not relate to the accident aircraft and so maybe the registration is incorrect.

[elro]

The below link is the atc of the accident aircraft lifting from Dublin. At 3m48s the captain takes departure instructions and states the aircraft is 'heavy with fuel' or something to that effect.
http://archive-server.liveatc.net/eidw/EIDW3-Twr-118600-Mar-13-2017-2300Z.mp3

[gribbs]

Terrible news; I was the base trainer in Shannon for several years in the early days on the '61 and this is devastating. Could we perhaps spare the guesswork and speculation until at least the names have been officially released? Thoughts are with those who have to continue SAR today.

[El Bunto]

Air Corps CASA 253 has re-launched from Baldonnel, perhaps after a crew-change. Heading NW apparently for Achill Island area.

[Duracell2000]

Can't say I am particularly looking forward to flying the S-92 over the next few days. Thoughts and prayers with the families - fingers crossed for some good news.
Would be good to get some information on what may have caused this, although with the aircraft in the water it will take some time.

[mickjoebill]

The Sligo helicopter was sent to do the pick up of the injured crew while the Dublin crew was there to follow as a backup and keep communications as a safety measure.

Could someone flesh out the benefits and risk matrix on having a second helicopter involved?

Mickjoebill

[mickjoebill]

The below link is the atc of the accident aircraft lifting from Dublin. At 3m48s the captain takes departure instructions and states the aircraft is 'heavy with fuel' or something to that effect.
http://archive-server.liveatc.net/eidw/EIDW3-Twr-118600-Mar-13-2017-2300Z.mp3

He clarifies his preference of departure runway with the comment;

"We are quite heavy here with fuel"

Mickjoebill

[Swiss Cheese]

Weather was poor at Blacksod last night. 116 had made contact for a refuel at the lighthouse. 116 apparently terminated the first approach and was in the process of attempting a second approach when contact was lost.

[jimf671]

AIS shows it heading out beyond Black Rock before turning around and heading roughly back toward Blacksod before the signal disappears around Black Rock.

There was ADS-B and it shows the aircraft crossing the country and crossing the Ballycroy hills at 3500 feet. However, there does not appear to be ADS-B coverage at low level in the area of the accident, so things like altitude just prior to the accident is not available.

[El Bunto]

There was ADS-B and it shows the aircraft crossing the country and crossing the Ballycroy hills at 3500 feet. The CHC / ICG S92s are Mode-S only, the positions on FR24 / Planeplotter etc are MLAT guesstimates. At the time of introduciton there was no certified ADS-B transponder for the '92.

However they do broadcast GPS-derived position on AIS, which is not considered a safety-of-flight system.

[SASless]

Folks....immediately speculating the Tail Rotor Bearing issue played a role in this is exceedingly premature and does not needs to be a part of this thread yet.

How about holding such comments and limiting such speculation to known facts like weather, mission issues, and most importantly status of the people on board the aircraft!

Is not the welfare of the crew, passengers if any, their families and friends the most important thing right now?

[Mee3]

It is interesting to see someones head has a 180 turn when comes to his soft spot.

[Apate]

My understanding of the Tail Rotor issue is that it results in effectively a 'fixed pitch' situation. It does not result in complete loss of tail rotor thrust.

Whilst this needs to be managed by the crew, it seems unlikely to be "potentially catastrophic".

Worst case being for it to happen approaching the hover over a helideck! (sound familiar?)

My thoughts are with those affected by this tragedy.

[Apate]

Weather reports are difficult to come by, but Shannon reports 24 hours. It is not on the coast and some distance away, but does offer some indication of the kind of weather that might have been experienced:

METAR EINN 140430Z 25014KT 6000 -DZ SCT005 BKN007 11/11 Q1029
TEMPO 3000 BKN005=

[ODEN]

Does anyone know if they operate with NVD?

[Just a spotter]

Sad news

Coast Guard member rescued from helicopter crash dies (http://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0314/859533-coastguard-mayo-incident/)

Ar dheis Dé go raibh a hanam


JAS

[S92Head]

Thoughts are with all the crews/families at this tough time. Sad sad day in Ireland

[Oldsarbouy]

SAR crews are a widespread but still a family community and the tragic loss of this crew will be felt by all. I was lucky in seeing out my 25 years on SAR with only minor incidents to look back on but I will never forget the comeraderie nor the friends who were taken from us. Sincere condolences to the families of those dedicated aircrew lost doing a vital job they all enjoyed.
I hope the investigation has an early result as it must be very worrying to those still flying in the role but in the S92 in particular and should stop any further unhelpful conjecture.

[oscardog177]

Crewmember who was pulled out of sea has now passed away. Also named in the press. RIP

[206Fan]

RIP DF. I remember her on the tv with the Waterford base on the 61s!

[ec155]

Very, very sad news.
I remember Dara arriving in Aberdeen some 20 years ago to accumulate S61 time flying offshore, before returning to SAR in Ireland.
A lovely, friendly and obviously very capable lady to achieve the position and status she had reached.
Thoughts are with her family, the other crew members still missing and their respective families.
God Bless.

[ectoraige]

Very sad news, the Coast Guard lost a volunteer member last September too. Thoughts with the families and colleagues of the crew.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Dara flew as my copilot at Shannon 20 years ago. A lovely lass and very capable. A sad loss for all.

G.

[yoland]

RIP Dara. A real lady and a true professional.

[albatross]

Sad news indeed.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Very sad news. RIP, and thoughts with those who remain.


Could someone flesh out the benefits and risk matrix on having a second helicopter involved?
Can't give you a matrix, but top cover is always nice to have when well out to sea for the reasons given. I think I'm right in saying that the RN used to send a chase aircraft routinely when the 1sts aircraft was heading out to sea. RAF SAR tended to use the Nimrod for long range jobs because it could get there quickly, pinpoint the vessel's location, drop stores a/r and stay on scene for ever. The risk in SAR is normally with the aircraft doing the winching (specifically, the winchman) so the top cover aircraft isn't generally exposed to any unusual risk.

[El Bunto]

Top-cover for deep-water ICG ops is normally provided by an Air Corps CASA, for example: IAC CASA top-cover (http://www.military.ie/press-office/news-and-events/single-view/article/18th-february-2015-air-corps-casa-conducts-search-and-rescue-top-cover-mission/?cHash=cf89397905d05746b5a53686ac54f497)

I don't know why that wasn't the case last night unless it wasn't just top-cover but also SAR assistance. Edit: apparently this is a touchy subject, fixed-wing top-cover is less frequent than desired. When one heli accordingly has to support another it is technically Mutual Assistance in CHC / ICG lingo.

What particularly puzzles me is why the Dublin heli 116 was dispatched across the entire width of Ireland, thereby needing to refuel before proceeding on station, instead of the Sligo unit 118 which could have been on station far faster and then be back-filled by Dublin.

[Thomas coupling]

Tragic news.

RIP the crew of Rescue 116.

[N4565L]

LE Eithne just entering search area.

[500 Fan]

A tough few days for the Irish rotor community. RIP, brave crew members of R116.

500 Fan.

[fjrmurph]

RIP
the crew of that flight, thoughts are with family and friends

[[email protected]]

Very sad news - RIP.

I am sure I met Dara on a liaison visit to Waterford from Chivenor a few years ago - a great loss to the SAR community.

[Cows getting bigger]

Bu&&er. :(

[tottigol]

Sad day for all.
I get sadder for any new crash that involves guys and gals putting their lives on the line for others.
Be the accident human error or catastrophic failure it saddens me.
May their memory live long in our hearts.

[9Aplus]

RIP for the whole crew.
Sincere condolences to all related and local SAR community
Hope we can find out, what went so wrong so quickly...

[newfieboy]

RIP Dara,
Lovely Lady and true professional. We will miss you.

[ayroplain]

What particularly puzzles me is why the Dublin heli 116 was dispatched across the entire width of Ireland, thereby needing to refuel before proceeding on station, instead of the Sligo unit 118 which could have been on station far faster and then be back-filled by Dublin.
118 was already gone out to the incident. 116 was then sent to support.

A friend of mine has told me that, during an interview on Irish TV, it was stated that none of 18 beacons (4 on crew) emitted any signal on entering the water.

[jimf671]

Full crew named. (http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/three-missing-crew-members-from-rescue-116-named-as-tributes-pour-in-for-mumofone-captain-dara-fitzpatrick-35531659.html)

[KNIEVEL77]

My heart goes out to all of the families, colleagues and friends.
You are all in my thoughts..

[Una Due Tfc]

Imagine how many people are alive today because of the actions of these 4 crew over the years.

RIP

[Consol]

A very sad day in Irish aviation. RIP Dara and deepest sympathies to her family. Holding onto hope for the others. Many people are alive today thanks to them. Flying is never just a job.

[juice]

118 was already gone out to the incident. 116 was then sent to support.

A friend of mine has told me that, during an interview on Irish TV, it was stated that none of 18 beacons (4 on crew) emitted any signal on entering the water.

Irish Times:
'There had been no satellite alerts, no signals, no mayday. Last communication from Rescue 116, at 12.45am, was brief and to the point. It was, “landing in Blacksod”.'

Link
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/coast-guard-crash-it-was-poor-visibility-as-there-was-constant-rain-1.3010740

[Outwest]

Met Dara in Stavanger a few years ago at the 61 sim, impressed me as a very knowledgeable and professional pilot........RIP and my condolences to her family.

[oleary]

My deepest condolences to all the families.

I have fond memories of a visit with the Shannon gang in January 1996.

Jerry O'Leary Cutler
ex Okie 61 guy

[electric69]

beyond sadness and lost for words. RIP

[El Bunto]

118 was already gone out to the incident. 116 was then sent to support. Thank you - the initial reports were that 115 from Shannon had conducted the lift from the ship.

So the question still stands, why remove east-coast SAR cover instead of using Shannon for top-cover? I'm not criticising, I'm just perplexed. There is a spare 92 at Shannon, too, though presumably would need crew. If there had been a north-coast incident the same night then the closest SAR cover would have been Waterford... ( CHC / ICG also cover NI waters under an extension to the contract ).

Perhaps it's time the ICG revisited its proposal for organic fixed-wing top-cover, they were looking at Cessna 406s a few years ago but didn't have the funding in place.

[Lude-og]

Thank you - the initial reports were that 115 from Shannon had conducted the lift from the ship.

So the question still stands, why remove east-coast SAR cover instead of using Shannon for top-cover? I'm not criticising, I'm just perplexed. There is a spare 92 at Shannon, too, though presumably would need crew.

Hey EB, I haven't seen any news reports indicating that 115 was involved in the initial shout.

Regarding your question it would be fair to assume that they knew what they were doing in terms of what assets to mobilize for the particular situation that arose that night.

I would also assume that 115 at Shannon was still available to cover the west coast and 117 at Waterford was still available to cover the east coast while 118 and 116 were engaged in the operation.

RIP to the brave souls who were lost and Condolences to everybody involved, a terrible tragedy.

[helicrazi]

Really winds me up when we get the armchair experts on here criticising how things are done / assets are mobilised.

You really think you know better with the limited information you have?

People like this spouting off helps no one, including the friends and family of those involved, especially when the press quote these armchair experts as they have been known to do.

Wind your neck in

Nuff said.

Rip to the crew, true heroes to the end, very sad day indeed

[Al-bert]

:ugh: If there had been a north-coast incident the same night then the closest SAR cover would have been Waterford...

Prestwick, Caernarfon.....SAR is international! RIP guys.

Ex 22 & 202 Sqn's RAF

[inputshaft]

Absolutely shocked by this. Rest In Peace guys.

Peter Bell

Ex RAF SAR, ex CHC, S92 Capt

And I agree with the comments above. "Perplexed" at the deployment of assets is hardly a relevant point at this time.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

So the question still stands, why remove east-coast SAR cover instead of using Shannon for top-cover? I'm not criticising, I'm just perplexed. There is a spare 92 at Shannon, too, though presumably would need crew. If there had been a north-coast incident the same night then the closest SAR cover would have been Waterford... ( CHC / ICG also cover NI waters under an extension to the contract ).


Possible reasons include:

Shannon aircraft already on other tasking
Shannon aircraft or crew u/s
Poor weather at Shannon meaning that the Dublin crew had an easier time getting to the scene

Ireland isn't a big country so getting Waterford up the east coast wouldn't cause excessive delay (notwithstanding the ability of British SAR assets to join in, as already mentioned). Let's face it, as soon as Humberside get a job or go u/s, there is nothing on the British east coast between Inverness and Lydd! This is not a dig at Bristow, merely a relevant comparison.

[Viper 7]

Condolences from across the pond in Nfld. We've lost buddies on SAR ops too and it is a hard hit.


Pete Savage
ex RCAF JRCC SMC and SAR plt

[Jemy]

Condolences to my former colleagues and their families in Dublin.

Ex S-61 SAR Dublin

[Meester proach]

Saw her on the documentary.
Absolute tradegy

[yorrik]

So sorry to hear the news.Flew with most of the crew at one time or another when I was flying SAR 10-12 years ago.Heart felt condolences to the families and all their friends. Eric Pashley

[justanotherflyer]

Capt. Fitzpatrick: a delightful lady to meet, a talented leader, an inspiring and professional aviator to her fingertips, committed 100% to her vocation as a rescue pilot.

The many hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals whose lives were saved by her and her fellow crew-members over the years, will feel a special sorrow at this very sad loss.

Profound condolences to the families and friends of the Rescue 116 crew.

[Thunderbirdsix]

Irish Marine Survey ship "Celtic Voyager" is currently scanning the seabed they are using multi-beam echo sounders to search for the wreckage of the Coast Guard helicopter, if they locate the wreckage they will bring in the larger sister ship "Celtic Explorer" which has a large crane and a remote sub, the Naval ships "LE Eithne" and "LE Roisin" are scanning the area with their equipment, the search is being concentrated near Blackrock Lighthouse. Irish Air Corps Casa and AW139 Helicopter also involved.


Some info here
LATEST: I owe my life to Dara Fitzpatrick and her crew, says cardiac arrest survivor | Irish Examiner (http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/latest-i-owe-my-life-to-dara-fitzpatrick-and-her-crew-says-cardiac-arrest-survivor-781614.html)

[Guarded.Don]

Last AIS position recorded at 00:46 (N54.06736º, W10.3229º) is over Black Rock, an islet with light house & helipad, located 17km west of Blacksod helipad. The Irish Times newspaper reported that a last brief voice message declared "landing in Blacksod", but no attribution for the reception of the voice message.

Can any contributor confirm if the S-92A equipped with data/voice recorders incorporating an Underwater Locator Beacon?

RV Celtic Voyager is currently sailing parallel tracks to the west and north of Black Rock at a speed that's probably too fast for side scan sonar tows so it may be trying to detact a ULB transmission or us using its MBES for a bathymetry survey before launching a SSS towfish to locate wreckage on the seafloor. Unfortunately, it looks like the Marine Instiute/GSI 'INFORMAR' bathymetry data doesn't include data for this specific area around the Black Rock islet.

I'll suggest that search coordination is confident of an impact area within 2km west/north west of Black Rock, currently being surveyed by Celtic Voyager, while LE Eithe, LE Róisín, and the RNLI lifeboats search for drifted surface debris.

I hope responders will bring a positive resolution in the search for the three still missing crew members and, in time, their aircraft.

[fisbangwollop]

Rescue 116 search update

The main wreckage of Rescue 116 including the black box flight recorders have been discovered close to Blackrock Island off the County Mayo coast.

The wreckage is scattered in water 60 metres from the island and close to 200ft cliffs

The location is 9 nm from the Blacksod Lighthouse refuelling depot that rescue 116 was destined for when all contact was lost early Tuesday morning.

The LÉ Eithne has been appointed the on-scene coordinator for the ongoing search and rescue operation for the three Coast Guard crew members still missing. Naval vessel and divers remain on the scene and the Irish Lights vessel Granuaille which has heavy lifting capabilities is en-route to the area.

[electrotor]

Granuaile currently south of Dublin. ETA Blacksod Bay / Mar 17, 06:00.

[smc33]

If they have located the black box off blackrock why does it also look like they concentrating a search off the blacksod light house?

[212man]

If they have located the black box off blackrock why does it also look like they concentrating a search off the blacksod light house?
Is that a serious question? What might be floating and moving with tides and wind and would be desirable to find? Here's a clue - there are three of them!

[malabo]

Condolences to the deceased. Tragic that a relatively straightforward cross-country run to a station refuel would end like this.

Always looking at the benefit and alignment of modern technology for rescue purposes. As far as I know, most helicopters these days are satellite tracked, typically pinging every 2 minutes with an accuracy of 60'. With the benefit of AIS near shorelines of developed countries the frequency is more like 2-10 seconds and an accuracy of 6'. Some media have commented on lack of a rescue signal, PLB's require activation and the circumstances may not have lent themselves to that. CPI should be automatic but predictably it once again failed. For their burden of cost, installation and weight, I'd be more heartened to hear of a single ditching where they actually worked as advertised.

CVR/FDR have a sonic pinger that will transmit for about 30 days underwater. Hope the proximity to Blackrock is only a coincidence.

[smc33]

Is that a serious question? What might be floating and moving with tides and wind and would be desirable to find? Here's a clue - there are three of them!
Yes it was, I'm well aware of floating debris but on AIS they seem to be concentrating in an area away from the main wreckage. And I'm aware there are three missing!

[212man]

Well, two days since the accident and with a prevailing westerly wind, I doubt very much they will be close to the accident site!

[rjsquirrel]

There might be a tragic story building here.

The pinger as reported in the press is just off Blackrock Light (BBC News).

The traces of AIS flight path as shown on line show a circle of Blackrock.

The Last AIS position recorded at 00:46 was N54.06736º, W10.3229º, which is just next to Blackrock, in the surf.

The wreckage as reported by fisbangwollop, has been found is just off the island (60 meters). This is unconfirmed by any news source.

Blackrock is located atop a 300 foot cliff, Blacksod is just about at sea level.

[Non-Driver]

There might be a tragic story building here.

Don't think there's any "might" about the outcome.

Let's keep the surmises from the circumstantial evidence to ourselves for now, even if ultimately our own hypotheses are proved correct. There is nothing to immediately gain in a wider safety context if its not attributable to an S92 design/manufacturing flaw which the recorders will help verify for the investigators.

[minimaman]

"There had been no satellite alerts, no signals, no Mayday. The last communication from Rescue 116, at 12.45am, was brief and to the point. It was “landing in Blacksod”

However at 12.46am one minute later the last AIS position is 13km away from Backsod lighthouse helipad and 60 metres from blackrock lighthouse .As others have stated blackrock LH is on a large rock in the sea with 300ft elevation while blacksod is at sealevel.Given the last radiocall "landing at blacksod" was made 1 minute before the final position beside blackrock island it would seem highly probable that a landing was attempted at blackrock. Depending on the approach maybe only one lighthouse was visible?Would there be evidence of a contact on blackrock island ?it is such a sad story given these great people risk there lives to save others rip bravest ones.

[HeliComparator]

Why do so many people feel empowered to tell other people what they should post on this forum? It is a recurring theme every time there is an accident. People are allowed to post what they think is right and relevant, so (self righteous) people: give others the courtesy to be allowed to post what they want to post. Nobody likes a control freak.

Anyway, all accidents are sad and unfortunate, surely it goes without saying? I didn't know any of the people involved but why would it make a difference if I did?

[[email protected]]

Anyway, all accidents are sad and unfortunate, surely it goes without saying? I didn't know any of the people involved but why would it make a difference if I did?because you might care a bit more...............

[Hedski]

Because even if theories are proved correct it is deeply unpleasant for anyone connected to have to hear such opinion until the factual un-opinionated report is released. An AW139 crew who visited the scene seem to think differently, providing an armchair opinion that has now reached as far as Aberdeen!!! People in glass houses in this case.

[jimf671]

In conditions of darkness and drizzle with low broken cloud (assuming EINN METAR relates), is a let down over a large area of sea before turning to approach Blacksod from the west not a more likely scenario than landing at Black Rock?

[heliporto]

My deepest condolences to the families, absolutely shocked by this
At the Spanish maritime SAR we all feel like we lost a member of our family
God bless for all the lifes you saved, RIP brothers

[Safeway]

One lighthouse is at sea level, the other at around 300 feet are they not? They shot one or two missed approaches in order to get in to refuel. What was their fuel status? ( pressure building with multiple missed approaches?) The weather had a cloud base of 500 feet. Figuring it would have been dark. Were they wearing NVD's? Clearly something has gone wrong and it would seem from this thread many are speculating but without focusing on causal factors and sound theories. There are many things to probably learn from this accident. Hopefully the Flight recorder will quickly be recovered and shed light on what actually happened. An S&R S92 should have auto hover & NVD's I presume. RIP to the crew. Always hard on their families & loved ones. Hopefully CHC will support the families financially for the years ahead.

[Scattercat]

My very sincere condolences.

A question if I may from downunder .... does this operation use NVIS? If not, is this well proven technology on the table for the future there? Like all technologies, they have limitations, but I almost never fly at night without them now.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

HC people feel compelled to control posts because they fail to separate the emotion from the technical performance of machine and crews. Like you said, the tragedy is obvious and a given. However the event has happened.

What immediatly matters now, to everyone flying in the front or the back of an S92 is; is it an aircraft problem OR a crew problem.

Given the information already available I suspect the answer on this one might be a little sooner than later. However that is just an opinion. The evidence so far could just be circumstantial.

I knew both pilots. It does not change the desire to know what caused it.

[[email protected]]

The sudden nature of the accident would point to either a CFIT or a Mechanical break up. What about fuel? It left heavy and was needing a refuel shortly before the crash, someone could work out the burn rate between the time periods and rule that one out surely? CFIT? What could go wrong for the aircraft to fly itself into the water? Mechanical break up? MGB? TGB?

Just my 2 cents worth You made your point well but then went into random speculation which helps no-one

[212man]

In conditions of darkness and drizzle with low broken cloud (assuming EINN METAR relates), is a let down over a large area of sea before turning to approach Blacksod from the west not a more likely scenario than landing at Black Rock?y
That was my interpretation - the ais track looks like an ARA. However, it raises more questions than answers!

[juice]

Irish Examiner
"Update 7.40am: It has emerged the Air Corps was initially asked to provide top cover for the mission missing helicopter Rescue 116 was sent on.

The Defence Forces confirmed to Newstalk Breakfast they could not provide an aircraft outside of normal hours, due to a loss of experienced personnel.

At 10.06pm on Monday night the Irish Air Corps received a request from the coast guard to provide top cover for a long range medical evacuation off the west coast.

They replied that it was not possible to provide fixed wing aircraft cover outside of normal hours.

They have confirmed to Newstalk Breakfast that this is because of a loss of experienced personnel among both air crew and air traffic control.

The Rescue 116 helicopter was subsequently sent to provide top cover for the mission.

The Defence Forces say at 1.45am they then received an emergency request to conduct a search for the helicopter, which had gone missing.

They initiated a recall plan and were able to provide a Casa aircraft to assist in the search and rescue operation."


http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/latest-air-corps-was-initially-asked-to-provide-top-cover-for-rescue-116-mission-781772.html

[norunway]

Could members please keep theories and speculation to a minimum. Family members are awaiting the return of their loved ones, inaccurate reporting of on going circumstances, and inaccurate theories is not making the current situation any easier. As we know press are reading what is being posted, so we kindly ask that it be kept to a minimum at this time.

[El Bunto]

At 10.06pm on Monday night the Irish Air Corps received a request from the coast guard to provide top cover for a long range medical evacuation off the west coast. They replied that it was not possible to provide fixed wing aircraft cover outside of normal hours. To be fair to the Air Corps, though, SAR and top-cover are not funded or 'primary missions' and thus are flown as-available. It doesn't appear that ICG compensates them for any missions flown, and certainly it isn't deducted from CHC's budget, so crews and aircraft aren't dedicated on stand-by.

Before this incident I had assumed that SAR was a tasking but the CASAs are primarily for maritime surveillance, medevac and personnel transport.

The Air Corps even sent the LJ45 once for top-cover, since the aircraft and crew happened to be available at Baldonnel that day.

[jeepys]

Very sad indeed.

The other pilot, Mark Duffy, was he also a captain?
The press is all over Capt. Dara but there were three other crew in the helicopter to remember, one of them the other pilot who may have been running the show.
With regards to the few previous threads families may be looking at all reports, websites etc for answers. Not very nice for families of the rest of the crew hearing all about one of the pilots.
I am sure there are people on here who knew the other crew members.

[Fullofexcuses01]

Very sad indeed.

The other pilot, Mark Duffy, was he also a captain?
The press is all over Capt. Dara but there were three other crew in the helicopter to remember, one of them the other pilot who may have been running the show.
With regards to the few previous threads families may be looking at all reports, websites etc for answers. Not very nice for families of the rest of the crew hearing all about one of the pilots.
I am sure there are people on here who knew the other crew members.

Mark was also a captain.

[212man]

The other pilot, Mark Duffy, was he also a captain?
the press are reporting that he was the Chief Pilot.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Norunway. I agree with Mitchaa. I also understand your point though. However, on this forum you will get professional opinions from Pilots, Rear Crew and Engineers who do this stuff every day. Sometimes we are not as professional in our postings as we maybe should be. Then you get others.

I have to say that over the years the "RIPs" and "Very Sads" are small consolation to those individuals who operate and maintain similar/identical types. We know the risks and the platitudes served on these forums are meaningless to us.

However, for family members and loved ones the clinical, technical descriptions, opinions and "Swags" may, or may not provide some comfort/explanation. That is the power of the internet.

What we, as a professional body of people, should not do, is apportion blame. Even when it may seem that "Pilot" or "Engineer" errors appears or is confirmed as the root cause. We should, and mostly do, look deeper. Why/How can that error be made? and most importantly, "Am I capable of the same error".

We are all stakeholders in these situations. Some are looking for explanations or reasons why an event occurs. Some are simply interested in whether it was "Aircraft" or "Human". Some are looking for news column inches.

Having said all of that, I have found over the last few years that many posters, of the professional type, add great value to understanding the details of such events. There is a lot more good than bad on PPRUNE.

You cannot suppress it. You cannot control it (unless you are a MOD). However, you should take what value you can and disregard the rest.

DB

[roundwego]

Very sad indeed.

The other pilot, Mark Duffy, was he also a captain?
The press is all over Capt. Dara but there were three other crew in the helicopter to remember, one of them the other pilot who may have been running the show.
With regards to the few previous threads families may be looking at all reports, websites etc for answers. Not very nice for families of the rest of the crew hearing all about one of the pilots.
I am sure there are people on here who knew the other crew members.

Unfortunately the circumstances regarding her rescue, subsequent death and no doubt, her gender played a big part in the amount of press cover she received. Also, there were plenty of archive photos etc which the press love to use to fill column/inches.

Every member of the crew play an important part in such operations and jeepys is correct to remind us not to, unintentionally, play down the loss of them.

Both pilots may have been captains by rank but the question of who was commander by role for this task has yet to be answered. The press seldom understand the distinction.

[cpt mayhem]

Can I ask does the S92 have a TAWS system.

[HeliComparator]

Post number 17 has the ATC transcript recording with the voice of a male on the radio from rescue 116. Would this indicate who was commander or not? Not that it's really relevant.
No. Either pilot, and possibly the rear crew, could be on the radio. The commander may or may not be the pilot flying.

[212man]

Can I ask does the S92 have a TAWS system

Yes - Honeywell EGPWS MK XXII

Post number 17 has the ATC transcript recording with the voice of a male on the radio from rescue 116. Would this indicate who was commander or not? Not that it's really relevant.

Typically that would indicate he was acting as co-pilot

[maxwelg2]

Who is we norunway? Are you part of the PPRUNE moderation team?

I fail to see your point, this is in the public domain and questions are being asked in the industry. Should we just have this thread as a meaningless condolence thread and cut out all the aviation talk? How is that helpful? Is the S92 at risk is what's on most people's minds?

Sorry but I disagree with you, this is no different to any other accident thread, all thoughts should be welcomed. No one reading will take any of the discussions as fact, more of a deeper insight into possible reasons and the thought processes behind them.

Like I said above, if it were one of my family, I'd be searching for answers now, not in 2yrs time when the accident report is released. Perhaps that's just me.

I do think it's wrong of you though to force the self righteous card. It's the internet, it's a public discussion forum, it's actually a rumour network going by the name.

Let people post what they want within reason and with no censorship, we are all adults. My son flys in an S92 every 3wks, am I worried that there may be an issue? Of course I am.

Well said Mitchaa, as a PAX who originally came across this forum looking for information after CGR491 just over 8 years ago I find the majority of the posters on here great sources of additional points of view from an experienced knowledge base.

I next fly in a S-92A on Monday, as always I trust the pilots, who trust the AMEs, who trust the manufacturer to reduce the risk of rotary flight to as low as practically possible. The "recent" TRPCS bearing assembly issue is just another example of where can never drop our guard and always remain vigilant.

When tragic events such as 491 or 116 happen we all have a right to access to as much information as possible to determine whether or not we wish to continue accepting the inherent risks of helo flying. I've personally been accepting that risk for over 25 years and have no intentions to deviate from that.

I can tell you that it still grieves me to how 491 happened, but myself and my friends and collleagues who lost family members take some comfort in knowing that valuable lessons were learned and that the loss of life was not completely in vain. I kept that thought in my mind as we attended the 8th memorial service and the candles were lit by the family members for all 17 souls that were lost that day.

I'm sure that the friends and family of 116 will take comfort in knowing that they are all in our thoughts and prayers within our small community who use and rely on this AC type to not only save lives but also to make a living in our chosen industry, no matter what the root cause(s) emerge from the following investigation. It is human nature to ask the question "why" at this stage in the ongoing investigation.

Max

[Just a spotter]

There's been speculation as to why an Irish Air Corps fixed wing aircraft wasn't despatched to provide top cover for Sligo crew.

The Defence Forces has said a request was made, but Baldonnel was unable to provide support.

From The Irish Times

Defence Forces staff shortage led to Rescue 116 being deployed (http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/defence-forces-staff-shortage-led-to-rescue-116-being-deployed-1.3012970)

JAS

[[email protected]]

A night letdown over water in poor weather is a straightforward process which the crew will have practiced many times, They have a forward looking radar to check the area is clear of obstacles and they will let down to a predetermined height and engage the Trans Down mode for the autopilot - this will take them from a specified height (I don't know what their SOPS are) to a defined Rad Alt height over the water - hopefully VMC beneath the weather.

There will be several cross checks to make sure the AP is performing correctly as well as height and speed calls and crosschecks between the pilots and the rearcrew won't be twiddling their thumbs while this is going on either - possibly using the FLIR and or/monitoring the radar.

The crew will have also discussed the actions if they don't get visual.

It should be a pretty automated process unless the crew elect to manually fly the cyclic program in order to manoeuvre to keep clear of radar contacts or if a part of the AP system fails.

For CFIT to occur in this process would be unlikely unless they thought they were visual under the weather and disengaged the AP letdown modes - even then they would probably still retain the Rad Alt hold - in trying to transfer from instruments to NVD it is possible they lost visual references but this is the sort of thing they train for.

Once established in an overwater hover with everything coupled, they would discuss how to get to the LS and use the AP systems to achieve this.

With 2 pilots and a fully serviceable AP with all the bells and whistles, disorientation leading to CFIT is unlikely but not impossible.

There are many system failures, especially at crucial stages of flight low level over the water which could overwhelm the crew who are already working quite hard and are probably a little fatigued since it was 01:30 and any major catastrophic failure would be impossible to recover from at such low altitude in poor conditions.

We will eventually discover the sequence of events and possibly the cause or causes of the accident but not until the CVFDR is recovered and analysed.

Yes, it is 'just' another accident but when those who are required to fly in conditions when most would stop in order to rescue others and are killed in the course of their duties, it is doubly tragic.

[212man]

http://i202.photobucket.com/albums/aa50/S92ctc/Flight%20route.png (http://s202.photobucket.com/user/S92ctc/media/Flight%20route.png.html)

http://i202.photobucket.com/albums/aa50/S92ctc/Approach%20to%20Black%20Rock.png

http://i202.photobucket.com/albums/aa50/S92ctc/Final%20position.png

http://i202.photobucket.com/albums/aa50/S92ctc/Black%20rock.png

[500 Fan]

Warning: Rant ahead.

Can the first hole in the cheese be assigned to the fact that the Air Corps were unable to provide fixed-wing top cover for the original Rescue 118 SAR mission?

As with the police force here, the Defense Forces have been consistently underfunded and under-resourced. For the Gardai, that has reulted in two policemen being shot dead in recent years and for the SAR crews (Air Corps and now CHC) has also directly or indirectly resulted in two SAR helicopter accidents with the loss of eight crewmen and women.

If the IAC Casa had provided top cover as requested, the R116 crew would in all likelihood be alive today. The inability of the IAC to launch a fixed-wing as requested is down to low staffing levels within the Casa squadron and the ATC unit at Baldonnell, apparently. If wages are too poor to retain skilled personnel, that needs to be examined. Baldonnel should not be a training school for Ryanair or other operators who can lure well-trained personnel away with ease. Ultimately, responsibility lies with our esteemed elected representatives in government. They fail to resource organisations like the Air Corps, then stupidly wonder why people die in accidents like this. The air accident investigation report more than likely won't highlight the inability of a so-called modern air arm to answer a request for fixed-wing top cover but it is the event that sets the ball rolling and ultimately leads the crew of R116 to the west coast.

The Taoiseach apparently has commented that the staff shortages within the Air Corps are "well known".:ugh: It makes the blood boil.

500 Fan.

[malabo]

500 Fan - your rant is a total red herring. Tasking was appropriate and as Crab points out should have been a doddle for an experienced SAR crew in a new sophisticated S92. 1.5 hour flight, lots of fuel, even for an alternate if required. Something doesn't look quite right on 212man's track picture, but maybe if someone pulls the speed data from AIS it would provide more info. Operator already would have his own sat-tracking info including altitudes, gear position, and communications with dispatch. In an incident like this the operator (especially one with a recent experience) follows a strict control of information protocol to assist investigators in unbiased analysis, and to safeguard reputation.

I see non-professionals on this thread reference "bravery" and "heroism". Two words that have absolutely no place in a civilian SAR operation. It is a profession, and the operator and supervising authority won't tolerate any action that hints of those words. We can leave that to media fodder.

[212man]

Something doesn't look quite right on 212man's track picture

Can you elaborate? Unfortunately the data seems time limited and no longer viewable, but the flight was about 1:55 I recall, with a groundspeed en-route commensurate with a moderate westerly headwind. During the teardrop manoeuvre, the groundspeed was around 70 kts into wind, and 90 kts downwind - as shown in the last data point next to the rock.

Just registered for free and now see 3 days of history, so it departed at 22:05 UTC and final record at 23:45 - so 1:40 flight.

[henra]

Can the first hole in the cheese be assigned to the fact that the Air Corps were unable to provide fixed-wing top cover for the original Rescue 118 SAR mission?


Why would this be a hole in the Cheese (apart from the fact that a Helicopter that doesn't fly won't crash)?

Providing Top cover isn't exactly something that would be considered 'High Risk' operation. At least beyond the fact that at night over unlit sea (apart from the Lighthouses) is always a somewhat increased risk environment. But for such an experienced crew and capable machine that shouldn't be anywhere near High Risk.
Doesn't rule out CFIT but it is not a natural conclusion given the circumstances.

[212man]

Providing Top cover isn't exactly something that would be considered 'High Risk' operation. At least beyond the fact that at night over unlit sea (apart from the Lighthouses) is always a somewhat increased risk environment. But for such an experienced crew and capable machine that shouldn't be anywhere near High Risk.
Doesn't rule out CFIT but it is not a natural conclusion given the circumstances.

But, it hadn't got to that stage in the mission - it was planning to refuel at Blacksod before proceeding on task, any reference to 'top cover' is largely irrelevant in the specific context of the accident scenario (outside of discussion about the aircraft being airborne at all).

[500 Fan]

"outside of discussion about the aircraft being airborne at all"

This is what I refer to when I mentioned the lack of IAC top cover previously. It has nothing to do with the mechanics of the accident but it is a contributing factor towards why R116 was launched in the first place.



Update re Blackrock Island: An "area of interest" has been identified on Blackrock by the AAIU.

500 Fan.

[[email protected]]

I'm not sure why they elected to make their final approach downwind - if it was a moderate Westerly it would be well within the capabilities of the aircraft but it would make more sense to approach into wind with a slower groundspeed if conditions were poor,

Without knowing the heights and speeds from the data points it is difficult to know but perhaps their Westerly track to the rock which then diverged slightly North was an aborted approach due to a technical issue which forced them to go around, deal with the problem and then make a quick approach downwind to get visual.

As for top-cover - it is better to have a helicopter that can rescue you than a fixed wing that can only provide comms, I did the first long range job 250nm W from Castletown Bere after the demise of the Nimrod and we had a Fisheries protection Cessna for top cover - it gives you a warm and fuzzy feeling knowing you are not out there alone but if something goes wrong they cant really help you.

[212man]

My post was responding to Henra

[albatross]

Quick question: What would an average empty mass of a SAR 92 compared to an "offshore standard 92" and do they have aux fuel tanks fitted?
Never flew a SAR 92 and the last 92 I flew we could fuel to 7000lbs of fuel ( we had some long legs 280-90NM from shore and sometimes our alternate was a long way away if our departure point was below alternate limits) Seldom used more than 6000-6500. Pax/bag load at those fuel numbers was to say the least "considerably reduced".
Just curious.

[cncpc]

I'm not sure why they elected to make their final approach downwind - if it was a moderate Westerly it would be well within the capabilities of the aircraft but it would make more sense to approach into wind with a slower groundspeed if conditions were poor,

Without knowing the heights and speeds from the data points it is difficult to know but perhaps their Westerly track to the rock which then diverged slightly North was an aborted approach due to a technical issue which forced them to go around, deal with the problem and then make a quick approach downwind to get visual.

As for top-cover - it is better to have a helicopter that can rescue you than a fixed wing that can only provide comms, I did the first long range job 250nm W from Castletown Bere after the demise of the Nimrod and we had a Fisheries protection Cessna for top cover - it gives you a warm and fuzzy feeling knowing you are not out there alone but if something goes wrong they cant really help you.
Crab, I appreciate your insights into this accident, especially your technical inputs.

In your last post above, are you thinking "final approach" was meant to be to the Blackrock Light helipad? The report is that at almost the exact spot of the last position, someone transmitted "Landing at Blacksod".

In reply to an earlier post, I see someone saying that Blackrock Light doesn't show any signs of a strike, nor does the rock. The Times is now saying the investigors are going back to Blackrock to investigage "something of interest" or something like that.

[Misformonkey]

Could members please keep theories and speculation to a minimum. Family members are awaiting the return of their loved ones, inaccurate reporting of on going circumstances, and inaccurate theories is not making the current situation any easier. As we know press are reading what is being posted, so we kindly ask that it be kept to a minimum at this time.

Close the thread, close the site.... This is a forum for people to air their views. When Portland lynx went down with a friend on board I used these forums, don't try to control people, moderators do that if they think people are going outside of what is a reasonable post. If the press quote an Internet forum as an SME they'd lose credibility.

[albatross]

One would hope that folks would not enter into unhelpful and needless speculations nor push their personal agenda.
Some however will.
If you think this is bad check the rumours and news thread. Over there if an airliner (big jet thingy) crashes the wreckage has not stopped bouncing before 300 experts ( EXPERT : an EX is a has been and a SPERT Is a drip under pressure ) have decided what caused it and it all goes downhill from there.
Let us all refrain from such activities.
Having said that there are some who post legitimate facts and knowledge and they should be commended for doing so.
As pilots or crew we all want to know ASAP what happened and why so we can avoid accidents whatever the reasons.

[cncpc]

The Irish Times is now saying wreckage has been found on Blackrock.

Pieces of wreckage have been found by the Air Accident Investigation Unit (http://www.irishtimes.com/search/search-7.1213540?tag_organisation=Air%20Accident%20Investigation%20 Unit&article=true) (AAIU) on Blackrock (http://www.irishtimes.com/search/search-7.1213540?tag_location=Blackrock&article=true) lighthouse, the last known position of the helicopter, some 13km west of the Mullet peninsula.

[The SAR RC]

To answer an earlier question, I believe SAR in Ireland started using Night Vision Goggles about three or four years ago. Whether Irish SAR pilots would routinely have them lowered at this stage of flight is open to question. Some may have done, some may not. I don't think either of these pilots had a military background so flying offshore or close to the shore with their goggles lowered may not have seemed like the natural thing to do. Either way there should still have been FLIR and moving map back up from the rearcrew so the theory that Blackrock HLS could have been mistaken for Blacksod HLS seems a little far fetched.

[[email protected]]

cncpc - what is puzzling is that they chose to letdown to Black Rock in the first place - it is about 10Nm from the Blacksod refuel site (unless they have moved it).

It wouldn't be unusual for the rearcrew to transmit to the CG that they were landing even if they were a few minutes out.

I can only presume the intention was to let down to the area of Black Rock to get visual underneath the weather and then fly low level into the bay for Blacksod.

I can also only presume that their nav kit was telling them where they actually were as opposed to where they thought they were but I still find it odd that they made a downwind approach to the area of the rock.

We know they were going to Blacksod for refuel but it seems an odd way of going about it. One problem might be a mass of radar contacts in the bay that prevented a better letdown profile - if the bay is anything like the Castletown Bere area, there are hundreds of buoys and fish farms - not actually a hazard unless your SOP is not to overfly a radar contact which then maes life more difficult.

[rjsquirrel]

Looking carefully, their path shows a bee-line for Blackrock from takeoff. And their last call said they thought they were approaching Blacksod. One possible explanation of this whole thing is ghastly, that they set 300 foot tall Blackrock as the navigation destination instead of sea level Blacksod.

[minimaman]

1920
As can be seen from the picture above, the AIS flight route appears to show
blackrock being the intended destination from a long distance off.This flightpath
appears not consistent with any approach to blacksod LH. Is it possible that the incorrect
LH /was programmed into the navigation system at EIDW given their very similar names ie blackrock instead of blacksod?
Expecting a sealevel letdown west of the intended blacksod lighthouse but with 300ft cliffs there at the actual position of blackrock lighthouse instead. Could this explain the debris found at blackrock?It sounds simple but the map and AIS data is very clear.Why would 2 nearby lighthouses have such similar names surely they should have more unique identifiers?

[Red5ive]

CHC statement
Honoring Our Rescue 116 Crew
Honoring Our Rescue 116 Crew | CHC (http://www.chcheli.com/node/71)

[500 Fan]

Looking carefully, their path shows a bee-line for Blackrock from takeoff. And their last call said they thought they were approaching Blacksod. One possible explanation of this whole thing is ghastly, that they set 300 foot tall Blackrock as the navigation destination instead of sea level Blacksod.
According to the press, Dara Fitzpatrick has been based at Shannon, Waterford and Dublin, with possibly the greater portion of her service being at the two east coast bases. As a result, would she have flown to and landed at Blacksod all that often during her career? And the same goes for the other R116 crew members? How often do the east coast crews venture over onto the western seaboard given that there are two machines based on the west coast and are (generally) readily available to support each other?

[megan]

Crab, or anyone else with the knowledge, presumably Blacksod does not have a formal approach, so how would one make an approach in dirty weather, what limits apply?

Thanks from the unknowing.

[cncpc]

Crab, or anyone else with the knowledge, presumably Blacksod does not have a formal approach, so how would one make an approach in dirty weather, what limits apply?

Thanks from the unknowing.
I would be surprised if the ICG has not had "company" GPS approaches designed for each helipad it would use. These aircraft have to operate in very poor weather, and an instrument approach would seem to be mandatory at those heliport/lighthouse combos.

I would think it would take a series of events before an "approach" thought to be at Blacksod became the Blacksod approach at Blackrock. If that were the case, Blackrock light is likely above Blacksod minimums.

Nobody has denied the Blacksod destination story, but as a poster says above, that may be protocol for any number of good reasons. If something was not right in the boxes, it was not right on liftoff from Dublin. The aircraft flew to the co-ordinates of Blackrock but there are a number of scenarios as to how that might have happened. If it was programmed as a GoTo Direct, and canned approaches aren't used, then you have a single wrong waypoint and approach plates for Blacksod on the clip.

Surely there is a control center somewhere that is always in comms with these machines, and surely someone must have thought What the...watching this aircraft if it wasn't going where it was supposed to?

[jimf671]

There's only one Blacksod, which can't be said about Black Rock.

[buzz66]

Looks to me like Blackrock was entered into the FMS instead of Blacksod.
The last call was "Landing at Blacksod"
EGPWS doesn't give much warning on a near vertical Cliff.

RIP.....Thoughts are with Fam & Friends

[fisbangwollop]

It is hard to believe that this could be CFIT with a bloody great lighthouse showing its bright beam every few seconds (assuming of course it was working).....I am pretty sure even if they had decended below the level of the light and vis was poor the loom of the light would be visible.

[[email protected]]

Before the Irish CG got the 92s, any long range jobs were given to the RAF at Valley or Chivenor because we had the better range,

There were only 2 refuel sites on the West coast - Castletown Bere and BlackSOD - I can think of no reason to add another on top of a 300' rock.

We used to organise periodic recces for our crews of the most likely refuel sites, Blacksod for Valley and Castletown for Chivenor so I would think that the Irish crew would at least have had a working knowledge of the sites, it's not like any of them were newbies.

I don't know the CHC SOPs so they may have had a preplanned letdown and a home-grown plate for an IMC approach to the Blacksod area - otherwise it would be similar to how I described it earlier with a combination of radar clearances and the SAR modes of the autopilot to transition down safely beneath the weather.

It is possible they got down on the Westerly track and then turned downwind to transit to the refuel site at low level but I still can't believe they flew into the rock without realising it was there.

[Non-PC Plod]

Crab, let me run this possibility by you, and see what you think.
Initial approach on Westerly heading was an attempt to get in visually. Finals checklist includes item "Radar-stby".
This approach - lost visual, go around. Go around checklist does not include include item "radar-on". Second, ARA-style approach conducted with radar at stby, and SA is lost as a result.
I have seen similar in OGP sim training.

[Outwest]

Well unless something has changed recently, CHC Finals check ( from memory by PNF) that included Radar-STBY was only after visual with the landing site. So if they never seen the landing site they would still have the radar on in the GA.

[cncpc]

From what I can see, that light is not manned, it's some sort of automatic acetylene thing, or was at the time of the article I read. That house is not habitable, there is no slate on the roof on the other side. No sign of fuel tanks there.

If this is a misprogramming of the FMS waypoint for Blacksod, with the waypoint named Blacksod, but carrying coordinates of Blackrock, it may have been there for some time. This machine may never have gone to Blacksod before that night and the error wouldn't have been noticed.

The story of two missed approaches at Blacksod doesn't stand up. A poster above has a good insight when he/she says that they may have tried for the visual westbound, missed and came back the other way.

[Thunderbirdsix]

Irish Lights said the light was working as it's monitored from Dublin,their ship "Granuaile" which has a large platform and heavy lifting crane and has the capability to stay on station has arrived at the crash area but weather is very poor until Sunday at least, there will be a minutes silence before Ireland play England in the Rugby match to remember the brave crew of Rescue 116

[tistisnot]

Plod

Surely the radar is memory items short finals .... no drama with wow standby mode. How can you contemplate ARA / coastal approach without radar until visual identified?

[[email protected]]

NonPCPlod - I think your question has been answered - unless the CG use a SAR helo in a completely different manner to how we used to use ours, the radar would stay on throughout the whole procedure, up to and including any transit below weather to the refuel site.

A simple FMS faff might explain how they ended up initially going towards Blackrock instead of Blacksod but once in the area with all the mapping it should have been blindingly obvious that the terrain was nothing like what they should have been expecting, from even the most cursory glance at a map or a LS directory - big rock in the middle of the sea vs LS at the end of a narrow inlet.

I would emphasise that this happened at 01:30 ish, a poor time physiologically to be flying anyway even if you have been rostered to do so. But, when you have been dragged out of your warm bed in the middle of the night, it can be doubly disorientating and make normal mental processes much more demanding.

[212man]

EGPWS doesn't give much warning on a near vertical Cliff.

As a generic statement it's clearly nonsense, as the 'E' means Enhanced and reflects the fact that there is a look ahead function using a terrain/obstacle database. Normally there should be cautions and alerts from about 30 seconds onwards.

However, the look ahead envelope reduces below 100 kias and is inhibited at 70 kias, which is pretty much the speed they were doing, judging by their groundspeed. Also, if Low Alt mode is used, the envelope further reduces and there is also a Terrain Inhibit function inherent in the MK XXII EGPWS but which is not available in the standard S92 - I can't help wondering if it is available in the SAR machines, as there would be good reason for it.

I don't buy the claims that the waypoint entry was a mistake - it looks like a clear cut cloud break procedure using the westerly-most obstacle as a reference.

[minimaman]

Is there any scenario where you would route towards blackrock to make an approach towards blacksod?Surely such an obstacle would be avoided with far safer approaches further north available.It appears that the heli tracked directly to blackrock instead of the intended blacksod .Upon seeing the lighthouse one could believe they were already at blacksod especially at night however blackrock is treacherous with its 300ft cliffs and nothing like blacksod.For whatever reason the heli was navigating directly towards blackrock for some time before breaking the irish coast (see AIS data attached).It would appear either blackrock was programmed into the fms from EIDW essentially a typo(unlikely with such highly experienced and capable pilots) or the fms was faulty and as CNPC stated may have had blackrock coordinates in a waypoint called blacksod.If the crew believed they were at blacksod lighthouse but were actually at blackrock lighthouse, at night they would both look the same afterall a lighthouse is a lighthouse but with vastly different surroundings and approaches required.


1921

[[email protected]]

Why would you choose the Westerly obstacle as a reference? The FMS/AP can do a letdown to anywhere (as I understand it) - just press the button and it does a target let down pattern to the hover. Doing it 10Nm away from your intended landing site doesn't make much sense.

[Fareastdriver]

I am reminded by a CFIT in China in the late 90s. This was flying towards the coast, VFR, in a low cloudbase and flew into the steeply rising coastline. The radar was on and from the CVR the crew, being aware of the coastline, had commenced to backtrack towards the sea. From the wreckage the radar was assessed as being on and the tilt was selected at least 5 degrees up.

Flying with the radar tilted is common to avoid ground returns that interfere with returns from cloud formations especially over land. The upwards tilt will mask obstacles directly in front at and below the same height. For example, using the 1/60 rule 1 degree tilt up will hide a 1 foot obstacle 60ft in front; a 100ft obstacle 6,000ft in front. 5 degrees nose up will mask the same obstacle at 1,200ft or under a 1/4 mile. Most radars, when selected to 5 miles or greater, will not define at a 1/4 mile as it will be lost in scanner base scatter. It means that you can fly at a 300ft cliff at 200ft and not be aware of it.

After this event in China we kept the radar at horizontal or lower when operating VFR or at low level. However we still had it cranked up for high level transits to avoid ground returns especially across hilly terrain.

I am not familiar with the S92’s radar or the actions required with it in different procedures but it’s a thought.

[minimaman]

Yes crab this crew were too experienced to deliberately approach blacksod via such an obstacle and unnecessarily indirect route when time was of the essence.This is a VTOL aircracft afterall.It appears that the approach they actually made was for blackrock Lighthouse and that for whatever navigation system reason they were not at Blacksod.Its late at night ur under time pressure you believe ur at the correct destination the fms says you are and you spot a lighthouse outside this confirms you have arrived and the letdown begins.At night a lighthouse is a lighthouse .

[212man]

Why would you choose the Westerly obstacle as a reference? The FMS/AP can do a letdown to anywhere (as I understand it) - just press the button and it does a target let down pattern to the hover. Doing it 10Nm away from your intended landing site doesn't make much sense.

I'm not suggesting it's the optimal method, but given the length of time they operated with S61s it would make sense as a 'legacy technique'. It would be mirroring the standard method of conducting an offshore ARA to a multi-platform field when your destination is in the centre. With the terrain alerts inhibited and the radar tilted up slightly to reduce the sea clutter, and at 10nm or 25nm to give a good view of the bay, it starts to become a little more plausible.

[henra]

Its late at night ur under time pressure you believe ur at the correct destination the fms says you are and you spot a lighthouse outside this confirms you have arrived and the letdown begins.At night a lighthouse is a lighthouse .


Even if this may be right the Lighthouse is about the highest point of Blackrock. This means they would have had to sink below lighthouse level. Which wouldn't have been a good idea at Blacksod either, the latter one being pretty much at Sealevel.
Even if the track might indicate that the FMS sent them to Black Rock instead of Blacksod it doesn't fully explain why they possibly collided with terrain and definitely collided with the water.

[SASless]

Question: Did the Crew have to manually input the coordinates into the FMS or was it already there?

If they had to manually input the data....what was the source of the data?

Was the Black Rock and Blacksod data next to one another?

What is the SOP used by the Crew when manually inputting such data?

If it is preset in the FMS.....what was there?

Again....could Black Rock have been selected in error some how but the crew have thought it being Blacksod?

Second question: Black Rock is a small bit of land surrounded all around by water where Blacksod is on the shore of a large peninsula.....thus Radar returns would have appeared much different prior to beginning the Approach to Land.

Question: As the approach was being made....as MDA was reached....if Alt Hold was being used....what height above the water would the aircraft be at on the final leg of the approach?

If the weather was such the Black Rock Light House was in cloud....would the crew have been able to see it visually?

Question: What was the weather at Black Rock at the time of the accident?

[minimaman]

The terrain differences for an approach from the west are very hazardous if you were expecting flat terrain ie blacksod from your chart and you flew heading east towards blackrock lighthouse,in particular its westerley side is very unforgiving.The 2 approaches from the west are illustrated to click on below for comparison.However would the EGPWS not have warned the crew or is it too steep?

1922

[triskele]

At night a lighthouse is a lighthouse ....but at night a lighthouse has a characteristic signature from the light, and is far more visible than day. Both were sector lights, b'rock 360 degrees and B'sod dark between 018 and 189 degrees, which is the landward sector. Both flash white and red over their sectors as follows..
B'sod red 189 to 210, white 210 to 018, flash 2, 7.5 sec
B'rock red 212 to 276, white 276 to 212, flash, 12 sec.
No one familiar with maritime could confuse these.

[212man]

However would the EGPWS not have warned the crew or is it too steep?



Did you see my post above?

[tu154]

The offshore fit in the S92 is a Honeywell Primus system which includes 2 ground mapping modes, generally used for ARA type approaches. Generally no faffing with tilt during an approach, it's done automatically.
The SAR fit also has a moving map type display from what I've seen in photographs.
I fly offshore in crew change so not sure what modes they would have been using, but find it hard to believe they didn't know where they were with the kit fitted.

[SASless]

Are helicopter Pilots that familiar with light house light codes?

How long would the crew have to visually ID the light house signal that night?

I would suggest the Crew would use other means on-board the aircraft to ID the light house.

[minimaman]

yes i see it now 212man thank you so basically the EGPWS is less effective at lower speeds in particular its enhanced or forward facing function

[minimaman]

mitchaa I think too much is being drawn into this as I can't see anything to point to a navigation error? Unless someone can point to some proof?

This AIS data of the approach appears to show navigation directly to blackrock island.The route taken dosent appear to be useful for a blacksod approach .click to see map below

1923

[AnglianAV8R]

@ Mitchaa
The talk of possible mix up is due to suggestions they made a transmission stating "landing at Blacksod" and within one minute their position was actually tracked to the immediate vicinity of blackrock.
One of the reports concerning debris being described as found at Blackrock lighthouse attributes a comment to a investigation official to the effect that the debris may have washed up there. So, it must actually have been found at sea level, rather than 300 ft above s/l at the lighthouse.

[212man]

With the Helideck on the far western edge of the blackrock island surely it's a standard approach coming in from the West? You have a great big lighthouse in front of the helideck coming straight at it from the east. As said previously though, seems a very strange place for a refuelling point, where does it get a fresh regular fuel supply to fuel helicopters from?

Where is the talk of getting mixed up with blacksod originating from?

I'm not actually sure there is any evidence of debris actually on the blackrock island by the lighthouse 300ft up, all it says is close to blackrock island in the reports. Go back a couple of days, the rescue vessels were searching an area of sea a good few nm off of the island. Debris may have of course been swept there since.

I think too much is being drawn into this as I can't see anything to point to a navigation error? Unless someone can point to some proof?

Not saying this is a mechanical failure or a CFIT, we don't know yet but if you remember the Norwegian crash last year, the head departed and the debris field was spread far and wide as result, we don't know at this point where the aircraft has broken up. Likely as it impacted the water (or cliffs if it turns out there is actual debris on the actual +300ft island) but it could equally have broken up in the air, we do not know at this stage.
I'm not sure what you are saying. There is no refuelling at Blackrock, it's at Blacksod which is where the crew were intending to land, and announced that they were shortly before contact was lost. However, they were clearly using Blackrock as a navigational reference for some purpose, and I suggest that the last recorded groundspeed and proximity to the rock from the AIS indicates they were not trying to land on it. Similarly, that position indicates that the wreckage did not 'drift there' from another location.

[birmingham]

Blackrock is only 12m West of Blacksod, is a potential landmark (lighthouse)/waypoint, hazard (300' cliff) and has a helipad; so is likely to have featured in some way in the approach - but I, like most of us here, have no facts to offer. The crew on the other hand were both highly experienced and presumably knew both these locations/approaches well from many years of practical flying. According to this report they had been there six days earlier

http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/coast-guard-tragedy-helicopter-crew-had-completed-similar-mission-six-days-earlier-445271.html

I don't think there is enough information yet to support any theories as to why this happened - there are just too many possibilities and hardly any evidence. It will become clearer in the next days and weeks but, for now this tragedy is simply unexplained.

[goosl]

This article confirms part of the wreckage found on Black rock, but also states no significant impact marks on the island or lighthouse.

In 'hostile conditions', searchers find section of Coast Guard helicopter on Black Rock (http://www.thejournal.ie/black-rock-helicopter-search-3292965-Mar2017/)

[jimf671]

What were the regulatory requirements for this flight since it was not directly lifesaving flight but top cover? Would this affect the way such an approach was planned and executed? Crab has told us a bit about how a RAF SAR Force aircraft would have handled approach to Blacksod but this was a civilian aircraft and was this regarded as SAR flight?

[Democritus]

In respect of the wreckage found on Blackrock by the accident investigators, PPRuNers may find this interview with Jurgen Whyte, Chief Inspector of the Air Accident Investigation Unit who landed on Blackrock of interest. The relevant piece from last night's RTE 'Prime Time' programme starts at 17:30 with the interview starting at 20:00 and lasting just over 4 minutes.

Prime Time - Thursday 16 March 2017 - RTÉ Player (http://www.rte.ie/player/gb/show/prime-time-30003251/10700795/)

[Loquatious]

Even though similarity of waypoint names, callsigns and such-like are recognized as threats in aviation, I don’t see it as plausible that a crew would physically misidentify the two locations whether seen on a map, radar or terrain-mapping mode.

However, unfamiliarity, mindset and the time of day are ever-present threats, perhaps some of these played a part.

Whether it was the intent or not, the track towards the location of Blackrock was established early in the flight. Then at about the correct distance for an ARA, an offset is followed by a further turn to the right for what looks like a go around.

The trace shows that the aircraft continues for some 3 nm and turns left roughly parallel to the GA track but slowly turning more easterly. At approx. 2nm away it turns towards the landing site at Blackrock but with what intent?

The track as depicted does not suggest to me that this was a westerly let down for an approach to Blacksod. If it was, then perhaps the plan changed when the aircraft made for Blackrock after the turn left onto a southeasterly heading. With no altitude data to assist, the picture is particularly unclear.

During the approach and go around there would be good reason to have had the radar on for the entire time, if not in WXR mode then in GMAP. It would be usual to optimize the WXR display with gain and tilt adjustments. With WXR or GMAP modes selected and even Terrain display, there should have been ample overview available unless marred by some significant malfunction.

Regarding the unattributed call of landing at Blacksod. I understand it was given at around the apex of the turn. Other than to overcome possible challenges with comms at low altitude, wasn’t it a tad early with well over 5 minutes flight time to go to Blacksod or was it a part of a clipped call made under duress with a slip of the tongue regards location?

Only time will tell.

[[email protected]]

Birmingham - it was the same unit a few days earlier but that doesn't mean it was the same crew.

it seems reasonably clear that the aircraft went into the water rather than the rock since Dara survived the crash, suggesting an impact that allowed her to escape but caused bad enough injuries for her not to survive subsequently. The other crew members may still be in the wreckage having been incapacitated by the impact. If they had hit land, there would be a lot of wreckage available and no survivors.

Loquatious - not unusual t get tha call out early so it doesn't distract from the letdown process.

[HeliComparator]

What were the regulatory requirements for this flight since it was not directly lifesaving flight but top cover? Would this affect the way such an approach was planned and executed? Crab has told us a bit about how a RAF SAR Force aircraft would have handled approach to Blacksod but this was a civilian aircraft and was this regarded as SAR flight?
I think this is a very good question and I was thinking along similar lines. All this talk of letting down using the SAR modes, radar to avoid obstacles, perhaps NVGs, is all very well when saving lives but when I was CTC on the L2 fleet I did detect an element whereby this mode of flying became normal to the crews. That sort of flying is significantly more dangerous than conventional public transport IFR flying. So if you are coming to grab me out of the sea/off a mountain, I'll be delighted that you are operating more dangerously than if I was on the way back from the 40s, but if this becomes routine and the distinction between real life saving flights and other stuff is blurred, the prolonged high risk ops is only going to end in tears. Of course I speak from the experience of the G-JSAR ditching with a bunch of unseated "passengers" in the back, flown home from a platform with no significant danger - just a power cut - as a SAR flight, when of course it was nothing of the sort. I'm not a SAR pilot but I wonder if it is an occupational hazard to lose the distinction in risk levels between a life saving SAR flight and more routine stuff such as providing top cover after a while.

[noooby]

I find the interview with Jurgen posted above by Democritus very interesting. He doesn't say there are no impact marks on the island, he says there are no significant impact marks on the island. The interviewer asks about wreckage that is on the island that could not have come from being washed up. The pinger has been located approx 60 metres offshore from the island.

I'm not saying they hit the island. There are other scenarios that would allow for wreckage to be on the island above the water line, one of which would be CFIT into the water close to shore with wreckage being scattered, but I do find his comments interesting.

That island must be one of the most inhospitable places on earth! Searching those cliffs for evidence and wreckage will take a good amount of time and will be treacherous!

[Al-bert]

HC I think this is a very good question and I was thinking along similar lines. All this talk of letting down using the SAR modes, radar to avoid obstacles, perhaps NVGs, is all very well when saving lives but when I was CTC on the L2 fleet I did detect an element whereby this mode of flying became normal to the crews. That sort of flying is significantly more dangerous than conventional public transport IFR flying.

That is precisely why SAR was a professional specialism in my time in the RAF (1970-99). We practiced for it every shift. It was not an 'add on' to 'conventional public transport IFR flying'. I know of NO RAF CFIT during my twenty two years of RAFSAR.

[[email protected]]

HC - technically they were on a call out so normal SAR rules would have applied - just because a SAR letdown is different to an ARA doesn't make it less safe. SAR crews are more aware than most of risk levels and keeping them appropriate to the task in hand - your suggestion that high risk is the norm couldn't be further from the truth. Don't forget it was an OG crew on a 'low-risk' flight that put a serviceable aircraft into the water at Sumburgh through poor crew arousal and cross-cockpit monitoring. High workload keeps your focus and concentration levels up.

Nooby - I have heard a suggestion that a vital part of the TR assembly was one of the items of wreckage found at Black Rock - I sincerely hope not.

[212man]

What were the regulatory requirements for this flight since it was not directly lifesaving flight but top cover?

Surely it's irrelevant what the specific role of an aircraft is in a rescue? They are all on 'rescue' callsigns and all part of the same team, so in the same regulatory framework. I think HC's comments allude to a different issue.

Nooby - I have heard a suggestion that a vital part of the TR assembly was one of the items of wreckage found at Black Rock - I sincerely hope not.

Well I'd rather it was found and can be counted or discounted as an area of concern, rather than be a missing piece on the sea bed.

[[email protected]]

HC's comments seem to allude to risk-taking being the norm in SAR - his statement that he isn't a SAR pilot amplifies his lack of knowledge of SAROps. No-one flys 'more dangerously' on a job, any extra risks are assessed and mitigated by whatever means possible - if that means saying 'No' because the risks are too high then that is what happens.

[SASless]

I am led to believe it was the TRGB amongst other parts (nothing beyond that said) that was found well above the water's edge.

If that information is correct....the presence of the gearbox is useful and in time we shall learn how it most probably got there.

At this time I can think of a couple ways it might have but none have any other evidence to support one over the others based upon any information in the public domain at this time.

What I will take from this (if true) is whatever happened did so in very close proximity to where the gearbox was found.

[500 Fan]

HC

That is precisely why SAR was a professional specialism in my time in the RAF (1970-99). We practiced for it every shift. It was not an 'add on' to 'conventional public transport IFR flying'. I know of NO RAF CFIT during my twenty two years of RAFSAR.
SAR was their professional specialism. Dara Fitzpatrick had 20 years as a SAR pilot and Mark Duffy wasn't new to the game either.

[Same again]

I know of NO RAF CFIT during my twenty two years of RAFSAR.

Retirement seems to be clouding your memory old boy. I seem to remember quite a number of RAF CFIT's in the years between 1970 and 1999. Why do the same retired 'experts' always have to introduce the same infantile remarks regarding the standards and professionalism of civilian SAR?

What do you think we practice every shift? Tiddlywinks?

[Concentric]

The lighthouse may be unmanned but the rock is not entirely 'uninhabited'. That may have been a factor, directly or indirectly.

[rotorspeed]

As Crab and one or two others have posted, it seems very strange for the aircraft to have been anywhere near Blackrock lighthouse. It is 10nm further on from Blacksod and there was pretty much flat sea in between. Why on earth would you want to go to a 300ft elevation rock to let down? Doing a let down over the sea say 2nm east of Blacksod, into wind, would have been far more logical, assuming poor weather. So it seems to me hard not to believe they misprogrammed the FMS and thought Blackrock was Blacksod. But then why didn't they see from the moving map that they were approaching a rock 10 miles off the coast and not the eastern side of a mainland peninsular? A £700 iPad with a moving map programme (as many of us use as back up) would have made that obvious.

[malabo]

I'm sure they had iPads on board, use and capability guided by SOP. In any case they have Euronav mapping available on the big screens, again subject to SOP guidance.

https://flyinginireland.com/2015/03/irish-coast-guard-enhancing-capabilities/

[Aquila1]

Something that is possibly of significance is that Black Rock does not appear on Ordnance Survey 1:50,000 mapping data. Whether this is an error or otherwise I do not know. But it certainly seems to be an anomaly since other islets, large rocks etc do appear. Even many small rocks that are entirely submerged at high tide appear, never mind a large rock with a lighthouse and structures on top.

I imagine 1:50,000 OSI mapping is one of the layers available for a moving map display in addition to nautical charts etc in this context. Hopefully, this anomaly is not of any relevance but it is certainly concerning in any case.

[HeliComparator]

HC's comments seem to allude to risk-taking being the norm in SAR - his statement that he isn't a SAR pilot amplifies his lack of knowledge of SAROps. No-one flys 'more dangerously' on a job, any extra risks are assessed and mitigated by whatever means possible - if that means saying 'No' because the risks are too high then that is what happens.

You can be quite thick sometimes. You conflate "risk taking" with "risk". The former has connotations of recklessness. The latter accepts that there is no such thing as "safe" or "unsafe", it is all shades of grey in between.

If you are really saying that flying an ILS into an airport (preferably coupled!) carries the same risk as transing down at night to 40' over the sea with big rocks in the vicinity, then you are a fool. But hopefully you don't really think that (God help us if you do!).

Everyone else will realise that the transing down thing carries a higher risk than an ILS to an airport simply because there are more things to go wrong, you are closer to hard stuff, and quite simply, safety margins are narrower. You could call it "more dangerous" or "less safe" as you wish. Same difference although I'll grant you that the former sounds worse to the uninitiated.

So in summary, SAR flying can legitimately carry greater risk than CAT IFR. The greater risk is entirely justified when lives are to be saved (though not, of course, to the point of seriously endangering the crew). But my point is that I suspect SAR crews become dulled to this greater level of risk (justified when lives are to be saved) and accept it for all their routine flying - at least, routinely operating with narrower safety margins than an IFR CAT flight, even when it is not really justified.

Your problem I suspect Crabbie, is that you don't understand the concept of safety margin. Safety margins are required when the crew cock up, in other words so they can make a mistake (which all humans do) and get away with it with only an erosion of safety margin as the consequence.

Of course if you are a SAR god, you never make a mistake and so safety margins are inappropriate.

[SASless]

HC and Crab.....put down the Handbags....please.

We have had this fuss before numerous times....entertaining as it is....it does not advance the discussion about what might have happened to cause the loss of four good people.

When these tragedies occur it is hoped we can have a polite discussion about the underlying issues and in an ideal world....all learn something from it so perhaps some of us might be in a better position to ward off a repeat of what happened to this crew.

We cannot bring them back....but we can certainly lessen the pain of their loss by extracting valuable lessons learned from their tragic loss.

I have said before....If it were me that was the topic of discussion under similar circumstances, hopefully if I made mistakes they could be assessed and analyzed with the hope some good... no matter how slight would come from that discussion.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

HC you know I am your number 1 Fan, however, as I am sure mr CRAB will explain, SAROPS normally has two sets and of limits. 1 for training and tooling about, and a second, more liberal set of limits for SAR Live Missions.

i think at this stage there is just not enough information to make any sense of what happened.

[HeliComparator]

HC you know I am your number 1 Fan, however, as I am sure mr CRAB will explain, SAROPS normally has two sets and of limits. 1 for training and tooling about, and a second, more liberal set of limits for SAR Live Missions.

i think at this stage there is just not enough information to make any sense of what happened.
Sure, I understand there are 2 sets of limits. My point is that I question whether the 2 sets of limits are always appropriately applied. They weren't in the case of G-JSAR (although it wasn't relevant to the cause of the accident). I would question whether an aircraft providing "top cover" should be operating to rescue limits. Surely it is mostly a "nice to have" thing now that we have satphones etc, and doesn't justify a higher risk factor than normal tooling around.

I also question whether the "tooling around" limits don't have significantly lower safety margins than CAT IFR, and I also suspect (but can't prove) that crews quite like operating to SAR limits and generally seek justification for doing so, rather than having a predisposition for using the "tooling around" limits unless there is a clear need not to.

[Light Buffet]

The AAIU found “significant”pieces of the helicopter close to the lighthouse on a high plateau on Thursday evening,but has said there is no sign of any surface damage due to impact on the rock or markings on the lighthouse which is 83metres above sea level.

As reported in the Irish Times today.

[Al-bert]

SAR was their professional specialism. Dara Fitzpatrick had 20 years as a SAR pilot and Mark Duffy wasn't new to the game either.

I don't doubt that, nor their competence Mr 500fan - my remark wasn't aimed at them - but I doubt they had the luxury of 4hrs training per shift nor in depth NVG practice as did the military.

I seem to remember quite a number of RAF CFIT's in the years between 1970 and 1999 Please enlighten me Same Again? There were a number of crashes certainly due to mechanical failure and in one case stonefall during a winching but my memory must be clouded, as you say!

infantile remarks regarding the standards and professionalism of civilian SAR?

Same Again.
I wasn't for one minute'dissing you' or your colleagues young fellar/lady. Some of my ex colleagues are civilian sar pilots, and rear crew, and I hold them in the highest regard BUT I am yet to be convinced that an over-reliance on automation is necessarily a good thing and that civilian training hours are as generous as the ones that we enjoyed. Furthermore, I rather liked having a RADOP with a search radar. I spent eight years flying on the west Ireland patch btw - Yogi Whyte was a mate fwiw and I personally had the 'pleasure' of demo'ing the SK's night capability to the Irish Govt, after the IAC got the Dauphin (which wasn't the answer to their problem) and before the S61 got hired, so, try Uckers rather than Tiddlywinks!

[SASless]

In the thread about MILSAR to CIVSAR (whatever the title was...) Crab raised issues about how Standards, Levels of Training, and other effects of the shifting of Deck Chairs (sorry.....Recliners) would have upon Operations.

He did note the On-Shift Training that was done as SOP.

When filtered for Tone....he did offer valuable content....in that thread.

HC also raises good questions about Crew Attitudes and Mindset....but does so from a Non-SAR Background.

My memory of the UK Air Regulations tells me when it comes to "Life Saving Flights" even the CAA granted a great deal of discretion to the Captain of an Aircraft and I know for a fact how it was interpreted at the small Helicopter Firm I worked for....and how many nice Watches they handed out when our Crews did something beyond normal acceptable standards of flying.

So I can see both sides of the argument going on....and both sides have valid views.

Finding the happy mix is the quest....only sticking one's neck out as far as is reasonable as it does no one any good to crash during the process of a SAR Mission.

[Red5ive]

Items from the helicopter have been retrieved from the shore as far north as Annagh Head.

The weather is due to moderate on Sunday evening,

The AAIU found “significant”pieces of the helicopter close to the lighthouse on a high plateau on Thursday evening,but has said there is no sign of any surface damage due to impact on the rock or markings on the lighthouse which is 83metres above sea level.Bad weather hampers search for helicopter flight recorder (http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/bad-weather-hampers-search-for-helicopter-flight-recorder-1.3014647)

Irish Lights ship Granuaile is now docked in Galway. So also are the Celtic Voyager and Celtic Explorer.

RTE report from a couple of hours ago
https://twitter.com/patmcgrath/status/842794771156553728

If you select one of the historic map layers, it will give you names of headlands and bays not on other maps
http://map.geohive.ie/mapviewer.html

The Annagh Head referenced above must be more than 10nm north of crash.

[HeliComparator]

HC ....does so from a Non-SAR Background.


Sort of, yes and no. As I mentioned, I was Chief Trainer on the L2 fleet - that "fleet" consisting only of G-JSAR. I had a conflict with some of the pilots: My feeling was that first of all, they had to be licenced pilots with an IR. That meant they had to pass an OPC and LPC, do procedural IFR airfield approaches, do CAT/Group A arrivals and departures. THEN, they could be SAR pilots by adding on the SAR training. But in some cases, all the first bit was somewhat resented. They just wanted to wazz around at 200' with things dangling. Given the choice when returning to base from a training sortie in poor weather, some would prefer to scrape in at 200' every time, rather than fly an ILS. Thus they routinely operated with lower safety margins than necessary, and when it came to OPC time they struggled to perform "normal pilot" stuff due to lack of practice.

Of course I realise I am taking on the SAR boys club here, but someone has to do it!

[Loos059]

Please enlighten me Same Again? There were a number of crashes certainly due to mechanical failure and in one case stonefall during a winching but my memory must be clouded, as you say!

Albert, standing here outside the fray, I offer this observation in a spirit of wanting to help. (On PpruNe? That alone will get me shot down!). But it seems to me you are talking about SAR CFITs, although your words said RAF CFITs. Just think of the FJ CFITs in that period, and you'll see why you are at cross purposes with Same Again.

[Una Due Tfc]

The winchman and winch operator are both ex military, would have done SAR on Dauphins for the Aer Corps back in the day.

[Al-bert]

it does no one any good to crash during the process of a SAR Mission

I'll drink to that SAS! I always tried hard not to...

[Al-bert]

The winchman and winch operator are both ex military, would have done SAR on Dauphins for the Aer Corps back in the day.

UNA - please do not for one minute think that I'm dis respecting the crew of 116. We just don't know, yet, what caused them to crash. My thoughts - I operated for eight years from Brawdy, our 'bread and butter' were west of Ireland jobs, often at max range and night, before the Dauphin came in and again when they had problems with the trans down . It was pre S61 at Shannon (initially), pre SK at Valley and Chivenor, pre Crab even! I am as keen as anyone to find out what went wrong - once SAR always SAR I guess - although Same Again might correct me.

[Red5ive]

The search has been narrowed to a 100 metre by 80 metre section of the ocean around Blackrock lighthouse, around 13km offshore from Blacksod, where the aircraft was intended to land to refuel moments before it vanished.

It is hoped if Sunday's tightly-managed operation to try and locate the helicopter is successful, then a "bigger window" will be available on Monday during which divers or remotely operated underwater vehicles will be deployed to the wreckage.
Mayo search operation stalled by poor weather (http://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0317/860503-mayo-helicopter-search/)

[Una Due Tfc]

UNA - please do not for one minute think that I'm dis respecting the crew of 116. We just don't know, yet, what caused them to crash. My thoughts - I operated for eight years from Brawdy, our 'bread and butter' were west of Ireland jobs, often at max range and night, before the Dauphin came in and again when they had problems with the trans down . It was pre S61 at Shannon (initially), pre SK at Valley and Chivenor, pre Crab even! I am as keen as anyone to find out what went wrong - once SAR always SAR I guess - although Same Again might correct me.

I didn't think you were, just adding info, there were questions asked about whether crew had military training.

[Same again]

some would prefer to scrape in at 200' every time, rather than fly an ILS.

HC, not every airfield is Aberdeen - or has an ILS. Of those that do some have higher minimums than 200'. I have landed at many hospitals but not one has an ILS approach. Any competent IR rated pilot can safely fly an ILS solo or monitor the helicopter doing so.

SAR operations often involve letting down to a vessel or cliffs in the pitch dark using auto-pilot SAR modes, search radar, FLIR and NVG as a combined 4 crew operation. Once the SAR Op is complete we still have to return to base or the hospital and, if the weather is below 'normal' limits, this will also involve a pre-determined and practiced Poor Visibility Approach again using SAR modes, search radar, FLIR and NVG.

We all maintain IFR approach currency but SAR night/low-vis approaches are much more difficult and carry higher risk. Therefore these are practiced more often and hence SAR crews who operate in the low-level environment prefer to practice in this environment, or, as you put it 'wazz around at 200 feet'

[Red5ive]

Image of Aer Corp AW139 on Blackrock helipad
https://www.rollingnews.ie/p/asset/90505720

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C7IaodqW4AIBDLD.jpg

[Al-bert]

I didn't think you were, just adding info, there were questions asked about whether crew had military training.

NVG (ANVIS and Nightbird) was one of the biggest changes to night capability and safety that I witnessed and enjoyed during my SH and SAR time. Do you know if the front enders would have been so equipped?

[Thunderbirdsix]

Irish Lights vessel "Granuaile" has arrived in Galway this Evening, she will load a submersible from the Marine Institute along with other equipment and is due to depart to the crash site tomorrow. The Church where Captain Dara Fitzpatrick is being taken to tomorrow morning is situated on a road that is numbered the R116 .That is its designated number and has always been that number.


Link: Specialist ship for Rescue 116 search to be kitted-out in Galway - Connacht Tribune (http://connachttribune.ie/specialist-ship-rescue-116-search-kitted-galway/)

[Una Due Tfc]

NVG (ANVIS and Nightbird) was one of the biggest changes to night capability and safety that I witnessed and enjoyed during my SH and SAR time. Do you know if the front enders would have been so equipped?

Just to clarify, I'm a civilian ATCO who works with ex military ATCOS who worked with these guys. According to a previous poster, CHC crews have had NVG for over 3 years.

[Al-bert]

:= Same again

We all maintain IFR approach currency but SAR night/low-vis approaches are much more difficult and carry higher risk. Therefore these are practiced more often and hence SAR crews who operate in the low-level environment prefer to practice in this environment, or, as you put it 'wazz around at 200 feet'
Same again is online now Report Post

HeliComp's chaps were merely ''tooling around at 200ft'' whereas you (and I) might wazz around :ok:

[SASless]

Am I right to assume the capability of the SeaKing Military Radar is far more capable than the Commercial Radar on the 92 andL2?

[jimf671]

Crab and HC, I didn't ask about the regulatory regime so that we could descend into classic pprune willy-waving. I asked in the hope that it might contribute to our understanding of the aircraft being out near Black Rock, and possibly on a long approach, if someone who understood the regulatory regime that applies to the Irish Coastguard contract were able to clarify what applies to flights of this nature.

On UK SAR, there is a distinction between SAR flight and non-SAR flight and the detail of that distinction continues to develop. I know that the Irish regime is different but I do not know the details.

[TipCap]

SASless

Am I right to assume the capability of the SeaKing Military Radar is far more capable than the Commercial Radar on the 92 andL2?

From what I remember, Mil SK radar not too good dead ahead due to fuselage being in the way but good at seeing where you have been (I was told that by an ex SK SAR guys. Never flew SK, just SAR Wessex and SAR S61N) :)

[Al-bert]

Am I right to assume the capability of the SeaKing Military Radar is far more capable than the Commercial Radar on the 92 andL2?

No idea SAS, never flew the 92 or L2. A lot depended on the RADOP as to how capable it really was.

Tip Cap - a lot of crap was talked about the SK 28deg blind arc dead ahead (some of it by me before I converted from Wessex!). In reality it was easily coped with by drift and procedures - not a real problem at all.

[Mark Six]

Are Blackrock and Blacksod already in the pre-loaded waypoints in the FMS data base or
do they need to be loaded manually? If pre-loaded what are the respective designators?

[helicrazi]

No idea SAS, never flew the 92 or L2. A lot depended on the RADOP as to how capable it really was.

L2 min range 0.3nm then useless

[HeliComparator]

HC, not every airfield is Aberdeen - or has an ILS. Of those that do some have higher minimums than 200'. I have landed at many hospitals but not one has an ILS approach. Any competent IR rated pilot can safely fly an ILS solo or monitor the helicopter doing so.

SAR operations often involve letting down to a vessel or cliffs in the pitch dark using auto-pilot SAR modes, search radar, FLIR and NVG as a combined 4 crew operation. Once the SAR Op is complete we still have to return to base or the hospital and, if the weather is below 'normal' limits, this will also involve a pre-determined and practiced Poor Visibility Approach again using SAR modes, search radar, FLIR and NVG.

We all maintain IFR approach currency but SAR night/low-vis approaches are much more difficult and carry higher risk. Therefore these are practiced more often and hence SAR crews who operate in the low-level environment prefer to practice in this environment, or, as you put it 'wazz around at 200 feet'

Don't specifically disagree with any of that except:

But when there is an ILS, why not take the safer option and do an ILS? (There was at the base I'm talking about).

Yes, the "SAR stuff" is more difficult and carries higher risk, and thus needs more training and practice time. But not 100% of the training and practice time.

"Any competent IR pilot ... ILS" etc - to be competent, you need to practice. Your dismissal of this point is exactly the problem I'm referring to.

[jimf671]

Just to clarify, I'm a civilian ATCO who works with ex military ATCOS who worked with these guys. According to a previous poster, CHC crews have had NVG for over 3 years.


The plan that was reported as being in place a couple of years ago was that full NVG was being introduced and would be operational across the fleet at some time during early 2016. Maybe somebody could confirm whether that plan was indeed completed.


(That doesn't mean there was no NVG before that. For instance, when this aircraft was at Sumburgh at Oscar Charlie, it was not flown on NVG though I believe goggles were available up the back for searching, as happened with Bristow on UK GAP-North until recently.)

[SASless]

Old days on the North Sea were pretty much done as low as required to maintain contact with the surface in the day.....and low enough at night to avoid ice in the Winter.

But then it was single pilot for a lot of us too.

Times change and technology improves!

[Ber Nooly]

Which navigation suite is installed in the S92? My SkyDemon does not show up Blackrock or the larger Duvillaun More island at all. Is it possible that it doesn't show up in the S92 too? ("An Fód Dubh" is Blacksod)

SkyDemon
http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/attachment.php?attachmentid=412048&d=1489711248

Ordance Survey
http://www.pprune.org/attachment.php?attachmentid=1924&stc=1&d=1489790424

[FC80]

HC - I understand your point and largely agree with you in relation to a predisposition for 'self-contained' let downs, flying around in marginal VMC, etc. on SAR but I'm not sure it's particularly relevant to this incident.

The average let down on SAR is usually as safe or even safer (especially at night) than the average ARA to an oil rig in my opinion, having done both.

With the advantages of NVG, FLIR, AIS and another couple of pairs of eyes and ears on the aircraft tuned in to what's going on, SA and indeed the visual sight picture are often significantly improved.

Of course, there are the awful, dark, foggy, stormy, [insert further terrifying adjectives here] approaches, scraping in to the significantly reduced mimima that SAR is granted which obviously - necessarily - expose the aircraft and crew to increased risk but these are the expection rather than the rule.

I think any implication that the crew here were pushing the limits or operating at an increased level of risk seems misplaced - an overwater letdown on what (as far as I can see) wasn't a particularly awful night weather wise is bread and butter for a qualified crew and a necessary part of the job.

[HeliComparator]

Old days on the North Sea were pretty much done as low as required to maintain contact with the surface in the day.....and low enough at night to avoid ice in the Winter.

But then it was single pilot for a lot of us too.

Times change and technology improves!

Times change and, mostly, expectations of safety improve. This is why N Sea aviators no longer go VFR when the conditions are too bad for IFR.

[HeliComparator]

HC - I understand your point and largely agree with you in relation to a predisposition for 'self-contained' let downs, flying around in marginal VMC, etc. on SAR but I'm not sure it's particularly relevant to this incident.

The average let down on SAR is usually as safe or even safer (especially at night) than the average ARA to an oil rig in my opinion, having done both.

With the advantages of NVG, FLIR, AIS and another couple of pairs of eyes and ears on the aircraft tuned in to what's going on, SA and indeed the visual sight picture are often significantly improved.

Of course, there are the awful, dark, foggy, stormy, [insert further terrifying adjectives here] approaches, scraping in to the significantly reduced mimima that SAR is granted which obviously - necessarily - expose the aircraft and crew to increased risk but these are the expection rather than the rule.

I think any implication that the crew here were pushing the limits or operating at an increased level of risk seems misplaced - an overwater letdown on what (as far as I can see) wasn't a particularly awful night weather wise is bread and butter for a qualified crew and a necessary part of the job.

Yes you are absolutely right, my points may well be completely irrelevant to this accident. However in the vacuum created by waiting for any concrete cause, we might as well talk generalities. If it does transpire that, for example, they mistakenly made an approach to the wrong place, then my contention is that it is time to challenge the whole paradigm of SAR Ops to ensure that safety margins are only slim when they absolutely need to be, and maximised at all other times, something I feel is not always the case at the moment. But be careful - just because something is "bread and butter" doesn't mean it is always the right thing to do.

[Ber Nooly]

This is the 1 am synop report for Belmullet, 30 m northeast of Blackrock. Overcast @ 300 ft, visibility 3 km.

AAXX 14011 03976 47130 /2210 10106 20099 30242 40254 55003 7818/ 88///
333 88/03==

Visibility: 3 km
Wind: 220 (SE) @ 10 m/s (19 kts)
Temp 10.6 °C, Dewpoint 9.9 °C
Sea level pressure: 1025.4 hPa
Pressure trend past 3 hours: almost no change
Weather: rain showers
Cloud: Overcast with base at 300 ft

At Mace Head, 80 km to the southeast, conditions were similar, with cloud Overcast at 400 ft, lowering to 200 ft by 2 am.

[Aquila1]

Which navigation suite is installed in the S92? My SkyDemon does not show up Blackrock or the larger Duvillaun More island at all. Is it possible that it doesn't show up in the S92 too?

SkyDemon
http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/attachment.php?attachmentid=412048&d=1489711248

Ordance Survey
http://www.pprune.org/attachment.php?attachmentid=1924&stc=1&d=1489790424

What's the source of that second Ordnance survey map? I ask because Black Rock is clearly shown on that map you have posted yet as per my last post, it or it's lighthouse doesn't appear at all on OSI mapping at 1:50,000 which seems to be very much an anomaly as far as I can see.

[jimf671]

So you've found an aviation mapping system that doesn't show Black Rock and a report of cloud base around the top of the lighthouse.

Makes me shudder.

[[email protected]]

Yes, very unpleasant conditions but well within the remit of a well-trained SAR crew - which these guys and gal were.

No - it's not Oil and Gas and it's very disappointing that HC chooses to tar all SAR crews with the same brush based on what went on in the N Sea many years ago - not mil or CG SAR btw! Move on and accept that just because it's not Oil and Gas doesn't make it dangerous, gash, unprofessional or 'just tooling around at 200''.

Have some respect that a professional crew somehow ended up dying in the course of their duties for reasons we can only speculate on - dissing the profession based on personal gripes really doesn't help anyone.

[FC80]

So you've found an aviation mapping system that doesn't show Black Rock and a report of cloud base around the top of the lighthouse.

Makes me shudder.

Regardless of that, radar and EGPWS should definitely have been painting Black Rock and I'd be very surprised if the observer's mapping system wasn't running approved VFR charting which would include these obstacles.

HC - it's a fine line to tread IMO. I totally agree that pointlessly pushing on VFR when the weather is marginal and IFR is the easier and safer option is very much an anachronism and should be avoided.

'Minimising risk' at one end of the spectrum to the extent that training is not regularly carried out close to operational limits and/or in weather close to operational limits will start to increase risk at the other end of the spectrum though. If crews are not current or comfortable doing that, then when that horrible approach right down to SAR mins comes along you are piling on extra stress and taking away capacity when it's needed most.

[SASless]

So you've found an aviation mapping system that doesn't show Black Rock and a report of cloud base around the top of the lighthouse.

Makes me shudder.

The crew routed to that location it appears from the Track....otherwise that would be a HUGE coincidence.

Radar would be showing the island clearly if the unit was working properly and tuned per SOP.

Perhaps Crab can tell us.....would Procedure require an Offset from the Target in a case like this if Blackrock Lifht House was the intended ( even if mistakenly) point of landing.....or would it be a straight head on approach?

[Ber Nooly]

What's the source of that second Ordnance survey map? I ask because Black Rock is clearly shown on that map you have posted yet as per my last post, it or it's lighthouse doesn't appear at all on OSI mapping at 1:50,000 which seems to be very much an anomaly as far as I can see.

It's from here

(http://map.geohive.ie/mapviewer.html)

Both are clearly shown on the paper 1:500,000 and 1:250,000 flight charts, but the crew would probably not have been using these I'm sure.

[Ber Nooly]

The crew routed to that location it appears from the Track....otherwise that would be a HUGE coincidence.

Radar would be showing the island clearly if the unit was working properly and tuned per SOP.

Perhaps Crab can tell us.....would Procedure require an Offset from the Target in a case like this if Blackrock Lifht House was the intended ( even if mistakenly) point of landing.....or would it be a straight head on approach?

That's been bugging me right from the off. An official from the Coast Guard said that it is standard procedure to pass Blacksod and aproach it from the west, however, I wondered why they would go so far west. 10 NM seems a lot. No one else seemed bothered by it so I thought it was just me. Their path seems more in line what I would imagine an arrival should look like, albeit to the wrong location.

[Offshore pilot]

Many theories. Within a few days the CVR / FDR hopefully will be recovered and answer the questions.

[Al-bert]

Helicrazi L2 min range 0.3nm then useless

with the SK3 (raw picture) we practiced to 150yds - moving and fixed targets.

[SASless]

Using an offset or target on the nose?

[cncpc]

NVG (ANVIS and Nightbird) was one of the biggest changes to night capability and safety that I witnessed and enjoyed during my SH and SAR time. Do you know if the front enders would have been so equipped?

Wouldn't that lighthouse light overpower NVDs?

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I am not familiar with the are but can anyone indicate a refuelling point at the nearest airport with ILS?

[ODEN]

Cant find any information that they refitted theire S92s to fly with NVD...
FLIR is standard but no one has confirmed they actually had NVD?
NVD is a big help and increased safety in an operation like this.

[Al-bert]

SAS Using an offset or target on the nose? Offset

cncpc Wouldn't that lighthouse light overpower NVDs? No

[Scattercat]

Cant find any information that they refitted their S92s to fly with NVD...
FLIR is standard but no one has confirmed they actually had NVD?
NVD is a big help and increased safety in an operation like this.

Which is why I asked the question back in post #93. I would be surprised if they were not using NVD on this type of mission, but maybe someone closer to this could answer.

[cncpc]

SAS Offset

cncpc No

Could you expand on that no?

[Al-bert]

CNCPC early marks of NVG would 'flare out' with bright lights, later models cope. By the time one was close enough to a light house for it to become a problem one would be 'off' goggles and using white light or even a combination of the two techniques. I don't know what civilian crews might do. It might be completely different with FLIR, which we didn't have in my time in the mil.

[[email protected]]

cncpc - yes a bright light will tend to shut down the goggles if you look straight at it. However, the light isn't pointing at you all the time, it is rotating, and you can look away if required.

If the cloudbase as reported was at 300' and the rock is 300' high, the lighthouse will have been in cloud anyway, significantly attenuating the strength of the beam.

SAS - in answer to an earlier question, yes, SAR crews will have a working knowledge of the lighthouse idents in their local area.

[HeliComparator]

I am not familiar with the are but can anyone indicate a refuelling point at the nearest airport with ILS?

If that is aimed at my point then I think you miss it a bit. I am not saying that they should have sought a refuelling airfield with ILS. I am not even referring specifically to the accident in this thread since obviously we have no idea what the cause was. I am questioning the concept of having to use "SAR limits" to provide "top cover" or for other activities that are not directly about saving lives and that perhaps, if the weather requires that, it might be better simply to dispense with the top cover in the light of modern communications. My feeling is that when top cover or other such things are tasked, no-one is really thinking that it may be a higher risk than normal aviation and properly considering whether the increased risk is justified. From the crews' point of view it's just "what they do" and are accustomed to the increased level of risk so they don't notice it.

[JulieAndrews]

Whilst we are covering the usual speculation, HC makes a valid point.
Top Cover at what cost?

[[email protected]]

tistisnot - I would love to but just note who started this anti-SAR crusade, again! and on a thread most unsuited to it.

I think I have tried to provide useful information for those not versed in SAR and I will continue to do so without further engaging with HC.

[Ber Nooly]

Captain Duffy was from a village called Blackrock, in Co. Louth.

Captain FitzPatrick will be laid to rest this morning in a cemetery on the R116 road in south Dublin.

RIP to all

[[email protected]]

Captain Duffy was from a village called Blackrock, in Co. Louth. what terrible irony....RIP all the crew.


Julie Top Cover at what cost? that is an argument based on 20/20 hindsight - there is significant risk to the rescue crew going out to the fishing vessel since they are out there by themselves with often patchy comms. In order to mitigate some of that risk, top cover provides comms relay and, in the case of it being provided by another SAR helicopter, a means of rescuing the rescuers or completing the rescue in the event of failure of systems on the primary rescue aircraft.

Therefore, it is highly efficient to utilise a second SAR aircraft for top-cover on a long -range job in the Atlantic.

The primary rescue isn't complete until the casualties are safe back on land and there are many things that can go wrong during that process. The aircraft can develop a fault requiring turnback, the conditions on scene can be so bad that the rescue just isn't possible or the aircraft reaches its time on scene and has to depart in order to make land, the winch could be damaged delivering the winchman or the winchman could be injured in the process of getting on the deck. For all of those reasons and many more - top cover by a SAR helo is very desireable and , as part of the overall mission, operating to the same limits and procedures (all trained for) is more than appropriate.

[HeliComparator]

what terrible irony....RIP all the crew.


Julie that is an argument based on 20/20 hindsight - there is significant risk to the rescue crew going out to the fishing vessel since they are out there by themselves with often patchy comms. In order to mitigate some of that risk, top cover provides comms relay and, in the case of it being provided by another SAR helicopter, a means of rescuing the rescuers or completing the rescue in the event of failure of systems on the primary rescue aircraft.

Therefore, it is highly efficient to utilise a second SAR aircraft for top-cover on a long -range job in the Atlantic.

The primary rescue isn't complete until the casualties are safe back on land and there are many things that can go wrong during that process. The aircraft can develop a fault requiring turnback, the conditions on scene can be so bad that the rescue just isn't possible or the aircraft reaches its time on scene and has to depart in order to make land, the winch could be damaged delivering the winchman or the winchman could be injured in the process of getting on the deck. For all of those reasons and many more - top cover by a SAR helo is very desireable and , as part of the overall mission, operating to the same limits and procedures (all trained for) is more than appropriate.

Thanks for the enhanced explanation. This debate is not a 20:20 hindsight one since we don't know why the accident happened, and as far as I'm concerned we are talking generalisations.

With the advent of satellite phones, surely the Comms thing isn't much of an issue these days? If top cover is provided by FW, most of your remaining points aren't relevant. If provided by SAR heli then they do mostly seem to be "nice to have"s. How often does a heli have to rtb mid-mission due to a technical issue? If time on scene exceeds endurance then surely this also applies to the top cover heli? The case for taking the enhanced risk with the second crews lives doesn't immediately seem easily justified to me, unless there are actual statistics showing the need, which I somehow doubt.

It is all a matter of opinion and acceptable level of risk, but I wonder if anyone considers just how necessary a second heli is vs the risk when tasking, or whether they just do what they have always done because that's how it's always been done.

[212man]

I'm sure they had iPads on board, use and capability guided by SOP. In any case they have Euronav mapping available on the big screens, again subject to SOP guidance.

https://flyinginireland.com/2015/03/irish-coast-guard-enhancing-capabilities/

Interesting article Malabo, with some good insights to the kit they have. Curious to see them using V/S mode to maintain Altitude?

[El Bunto]

. How often does a heli have to rtb mid-mission due to a technical issue? If time on scene exceeds endurance then surely this also applies to the top cover heli?

From another Irish forum, not sure how accurate, but apparently the actual terminology for one CHC heli supporting another is 'mutual support' rather than 'top-cover'. Which makes more sense; two aircraft with the same capabilities supporting each other and unfortunately thereby experiencing the same problems and challenges.

Very few SAR contracts, actually none that I've found, appear to require the contractor to implement fixed-wing top-cover ( manned or unmanned ). And no contractor is going to do so voluntarily without an increase in the contract award, so often the crews find no option but mutual support.

[John Eacott]

Mutual SAR is a tried and tested method of providing just that; SAR support for a helicopter on a long range SAR mission away from the likelihood of support if trouble is encountered.

Quite why HC is so determined to highjack this thread with questionable assertions against known experts is disappointing, and I trust that such sidetracks will cease.

[Apate]

The availability of NVD is a common question being asked. The Irish CG were going through an introduction process, but I am unsure how far into the program things had progressed.

It is quite likely that NVD was not in use.

[HeliComparator]

Mutual SAR is a tried and tested method of providing just that; SAR support for a helicopter on a long range SAR mission away from the likelihood of support if trouble is encountered.

Quite why HC is so determined to highjack this thread with questionable assertions against known experts is disappointing, and I trust that such sidetracks will cease.

Why would you "trust" that? The heli in question was providing "top cover" - terminology I picked up from the SAR folk on here - and so in what way is it irrelevant to discuss the risk balance of that concept? That all the SAR brigade gang up against any hint of outside comment or any outsider with the temerity to have an opinion just shows how insular and arrogant they (the ones on here) have become.

[[email protected]]

Apate - unless someone from CHC or Irish CG can answer that question we will have to wait and see.

However, although NVD would help once below the weather, they are of no use during the letdown process other than to spot when you are VMC below.

Even without NVD, the letdown process can still be performed, it is designed to be used in very low visibility day or night - hence the use of radar for clearances. Once established in the hover at the bottom, the AP is used in conjunction with the radar and any visual cues that may be available to close with the target, be that the land or a vessel/structure.

One safety element that would be briefed during the letdown would be the escape route in the even of malfunction - this could be to continue straight ahead and trans up if you aren't pointing at any obstacles or it could be a pre-briefed turn onto a specific heading.

Either way I find it difficult to believe that a crew would trans down pointing at the only obstacle for miles but, if they didn't know it was there (for whatever reasons), that might be what happened.

[[email protected]]

HC - We just prefer to deal with 'informed opinion' rather than wild-assed guessing from those with an axe to grind.

Remember, we have established that families read these pages and I for one won't help you criticise their loved ones professionalism.

[megan]

with the temerity to have an opinion just shows how insular and arrogant they (the ones on here) have becomeJust a reader on the thread, but couldn't let this pass without comment. Insular and arrogant heh? HC, you come across as the most opinionated, insular, arrogant, strident, know it all on this forum. Yes, I know you have experience, but how about a little humility. You're just one among equals.

[500 Fan]

The Flying Ireland article gives a good indication of the navigation equipment on-board the Irish S-92s.

It appears to indicate that the FMS system is identical across the fleet but is it possible there might be some small differences between the various aircraft in the fleet? Four aircraft came from the previous UK contract while one came direct from the factory in the USA (having been acquired specifically for the Irish operation).

Also, is the information stored in the FMS of each aircraft identical? If the aircraft are rotated around the various bases after coming in for maintenance, can there be different information stored in each FMS as the crews at a particular base add information to the system as best suited to their needs and the area of the country where they carry out the majority of their flying?

Say, for example, an S-92, having been based at Waterford for a considerable period of time, goes to Dublin for scheduled maintenance. It comes out of maintenance and is assigned to the Dublin SAR operation (R116). Its FMS may contain information optimized for work in the south eastern region of the country (having been inputted by the Waterford crews) and may lack many of the way-points that are programmed into the Shannon or Sligo-based machines by their respective crews. Could the crew of R116 have found themselves flying an unfamiliar aircraft (from an FMS point of view) towards an area they were not familiar with?

[Apate]

Just a reader on the thread, but couldn't let this pass without comment. Insular and arrogant heh? HC, you come across as the most opinionated, insular, arrogant, strident, know it all on this forum. Yes, I know you have experience, but how about a little humility. You're just one among equals.

Well said. :ok:

[Loquatious]

To comment on some aspects of earlier posts first:

Did the crew think that the fuel was at Blackrock? There would be plenty of reference material at the planning stage and in flight to indicate where the fuel was.

As regards a mistake in FMS planning; if that had been made initially, the crew would not have disregarded the fact that one was on an inlet and one was an island, this would have been apparent as they coast out.

Would the crew have considered the elements of the required letdown on the west coast either at the planning stage or latest in the cruise and then have briefed them in detail? Absolutely!

The flight to Black Rock would seem to have been planned from close to the outset, as a known point of approach offshore around which they would manoeuver and approach Blacksod from the SW.

The next few questions are an attempt to gain insight into the SAR perspective:

Would the aim have been to descend inbound Blackrock from the east to obtain visual contact with the surface at around 200ft and then proceed to turn back towards the fuel at Blacksod?

The transition to contact flying may or may not have been achieved but what would a SAR crew be expected to do if surface contact was either never achieved or subsequently lost?

What would the SOP be for this?

Do SAROPS procedures allow continuation IMC below MSA after such types of letdown?

Would a gradual turn towards the lighthouse at Blackrock to regain visual contact be the natural thing to do?

I note that a track from Blackrock to Blacksod passes close to another island, Duvillaun More. From a SAR point of view, would this be preferable to a left turn overhead Blackrock to establish on a NEly 9nm final for Blacksod?

I know there are many ways to skin a cat but I’m trying to get a SAR perspective, considering the additional technology and SAR flight limitations available whilst on ops.

[llamaman]

Not frequented Pprune for a while but I'm not surprised to see the usual egos locking horns! Personally, I think HC has every right to question the justification for, and risk aspects of providing top-cover on SAR missions. In the past, comms-relay was a big factor and that isn't such an issue with modern comms suites.

I know for a fact that, occasionally, the decision to launch a top-cover asset is made by someone who doesn't necessarily have experience as a SAR operator. The decision can be made because another asset is available so why not use it? Clearly, it's a great capability with which to enhance a long-range job and will always give the crews a warm fuzzy feeling.

Like any scenario where the boundaries of risk-taking are being explored, it often takes a tragic incident to question current practices and evolve safe operating procedures. If it was one of my loved ones that had been lost I would have no problem with people challenging the status quo.

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I don't know whether this is relevant because we do not know what they where attempting to do towards the later part of the flight. However, Weather Radar can be tricky to set up correctly to pick up obstacles on the surface of the sea, especially if a turn is involved at sufficient height that when the turn is complete the radar sweep is now looking over the top of the obstacles. Or in other words, the descent angle from the helicopter is too steep for the radar to sweep the flight trajectory.

I managed to "miss" the Miller Platform doing just this positioning for an ARA to the BRAE A. A knee trembler when I saw the Miller go by my window not to far below me.

I struggle to accept though that with a well trained crew like SAR, three of them navigating and looking at screens, in a high workload flight phase like the final positioning and descent, that they could end up making the same mistake I did.

If I was tasked with that let-down I would have used the BLACKROCK island as well for my IP and transition onward from there to the bay, but then again I am not sure how tight you can make a let down pattern in the BLACK SOD bay and I am not SAR.

Maybe Crab can let us know what the "standard" approach (excuse the pun) to a problem like this let-down in the bay would normally be for a SAR crew.

It seems very reasonable to me what they did in terms of the flight path, and maybe the close proximity of the wreckage to the island could just be a misleading red herring, in that they were doing a solid procedure and something went wrong as the got close to the island.

As an Aviator who has spent a long time over the sea, bored, lonely and eating mainly crap meals, I would not criticise the SAR Community for anything as they have always been my last hope should something go tits up with me chopper.!!

DB

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

I think challenging the strategies and protocols of the SAR community and further, suggesting that a top-cover (mutual support) helicopter should not be there because it is "taking a risk" is nonsense.

The principle of top-cover and mutual support is fairly easy to grasp if you consider that when these boys and girls are tasked on these long distance jobs is not because it is bright and sunny. Their ability to securely conduct their operation is supported by the top-cover asset for a whole host of reasons and not just because someone has or has not fitted a SAT Comm.

What this crew were doing should have been fairly routine for them and whatever has happened should not immediately start calling to question the solid mutual support protocols for other crews who are tasked in hideous conditions on a very long bungy.

If is was me bobbing about in the oggin, a long way from home, I would be very happy to know that the Rescue Helicopter has a solid support and communication via whatever means necessary as it comes to get me.

Sorry HC but this thread needs some balance to stay on topic and the SAR crews deserve more of our support than I think you are giving them right now. Play nice in the sandpit!

[Scattercat]

:ok::D:D:D

I think challenging the strategies and protocols of the SAR community and further, suggesting that a top-cover (mutual support) helicopter should not be there because it is "taking a risk" is nonsense.

The principle of top-cover and mutual support is fairly easy to grasp if you consider that when these boys and girls are tasked on these long distance jobs is not because it is bright and sunny. Their ability to securely conduct their operation is supported by the top-cover asset for a whole host of reasons and not just because someone has or has not fitted a SAT Comm.

What this crew were doing should have been fairly routine for them and whatever has happened should not immediately start calling to question the solid mutual support protocols for other crews who are tasked in hideous conditions on a very long bungy.

If is was me bobbing about in the oggin, a long way from home, I would be very happy to know that the Rescue Helicopter has a solid support and communication via whatever means necessary as it comes to get me.

Sorry HC but this thread needs some balance to stay on topic and the SAR crews deserve more of our support than I think you are giving them right now. Play nice in the sandpit!

[Galwayguy]

I am new here but I live in the West of Ireland.

The issue of Topcover appears to be that it's provided by the Irish Air Corps using fixed wing. I understand that this stems from not wanting to tie up another Helicopter & leave cover thin for the rest of the Island. Plus a fixed wing will have a longer range, & loiter ability.

There is probably some politics here. The IAC used to provide SAR. They wanted to continue but it would of needed a big investment, so the government decided to contract it out.

An illustration of the thin resources is it took 5 hours to get a fixed wing airborne after the incident. Another "unspoken" aspect is whether the other helicopter, on route back from rescuing a casualty, passed close to the site as there were reports of a strobe being seen.

[llamaman]

[QUOTE]I think challenging the strategies and protocols of the SAR community and further, suggesting that a top-cover (mutual support) helicopter should not be there because it is "taking a risk" is nonsense.[QUOTE]

I for one wasn't suggesting that a top-cover aircraft shouldn't have been there. My perspective, for what it's worth, is that it's healthy to occasionally challenge practices that have been routine for some time. The merits of a top-cover aircraft are obvious. The process whereby the decision to launch a second aircraft is made is what I feel merits consideration. This is by no means criticising an aviation community which demands the utmost respect, merely healthy debate.

[FC80]

The whole 'top cover isn't required due to SATCOM' is a bit of a non-argument in my opinion.

SATCOM is far from perfect and even the most modern systems can still suffer from delays, drop-outs, lack of clarity and all the other issues anyone who's used them much will know about.

In a hover at 50 feet hundreds of miles out to sea it's a much nicer option to have LOS VHF comms at the press of a button with someone sitting above you watching instead of -

'Engine failure, does anyone have the number for the ARCC handy?

0044... splosh.

Please hang up and try again' :hmm: