Light Aircraft Crash in Oxfordshire

[Whirlybird]

Man dies in Oxfordshire plane crash - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-oxfordshire-38629174) Anyone know anything?

[A and C]

The crash site is on the top of the Chiltern ridge very close to the M40, another scud running CFIT ?

[cats_five]

"BBC reporter Claire Hawke said there was "very thick fog" at the scene of the crash."

Quite possibly. :(

[piperboy84]

Poor man, it must be terrifying going down because of the weather or to be forced down in that weather. Damned shame.

[rans6andrew]

the viz in the photos on the BBC news webpage would suggest going home on the bus unless your IR is up to speed.

[Arfur Dent]

You wouldn't fly for fun on a day like today would you?:confused:

[x933]

Miserable day in Oxford today. Not a good day to go flying.

[foxmoth]

You wouldn't fly for fun on a day like today would you?
No, and I will be aurprised if he was. If not an IF qualified pilot in a suitably equiped aircraft then he should not have been up in the weather and I very much suspect, given the forecast and actual that he was so qualified and something went wrong, until the report is out or someone who knows the pilot well puts a comment I would leave it there!

[TooL8]

FYI. Chris at Turweston kindly posted the following information on FB. "For those that do not know, the pilot we lost was longtime Turweston resident Dave Norris who was flying Pa30 G-ATMT. :(

[22/04]

Very sad news. Dave was I believe either a current or past examiner and the PA 30 should have been up to job. We await the AAIB.

[India Four Two]

An observation that may or may not be related to this sad accident. The 326' "Stokenchurch Mast" is very close to the Reserve.

[Genghis the Engineer]

It is - and is well known for being hard to see in poor or marginal visibility. It seems likely that this was significant in the pilot's mind , whatever other problems were going on in the aeroplane at the time of the accident.

Of course, there is unlikely to be anything to indicate what was in the pilot's mind immediately prior to the accident - so the AAIB are likely to be unable to say much about that.

G

[Arfur Dent]

Highly qualified and able pilot operating in appalling weather in a fully IFR equipped aircraft. Normally there would be no need to stay "Vmc below" flying towards high ground and a 1000ft mast - in fog!!
There must be a lot more to this and, hopefully, the AAIB will be able to decipher what it is.
Sincere condolences.

[BoeingBoy]

operating in appalling weather in a fully IFR equipped aircraft

All due condolences of course but I could not help noticing that the aircraft does not display any de-icing equipment on any of the photos available online (including GINFO). One can only hope that icing did not play a part in events.

I am sure the AAIB will do their usual excellent job of deducing a cause and I add my sympathies to those who knew the pilot.

[Dr Jekyll]

The crash location appears to on the very edge of the Chilterns overlooking the low ground towards Oxford. For anyone who knows the M40 it's on the left at the start of the cutting as you head South towards Stokenchurch.

An obvious place for a CFIT in bad weather but a coincidence if it was icing.

[fireflybob]

I did a quick check - the outside air temperatures at Oxford and Cranfield around that time were about +8/9 deg C so I doubt airframe icing is a factor in this accident.

[RAT 5]

The a/c took off from Turweston, but what was the destination & purpose of the flight. I would assume a PA-30 was IFR equipped and it seems the pilot was IFR experienced. How far is the crash site from takeoff, and is it in the direction of the planned flight? If the weather was as bad as is reported one would assume an IFR flight was planned. I remember the SE performance on PA-30 was not great, but that was with 3 up. Solo should have been better. Still curious as to what might have happened. Over to you, AAIB.

[piperboy84]

IFR question for one of you folks that fly down south. Do NATS or the controlling authority for that area have "pre-canned" low level IFR routes between airfields in the Southeast of England similar to Tower en Route clearances in the US? and if so where could I find them.

[mary meagher]

In the US I have flown IFR over fog, and in cloud and ATC confirmed my destination was clear. In days before I was qualified for IFR I have been uncertain of my position at low level in lowering cloud near the Chilterns and the M40, with the top of the TV tower actually lost in the cloud. Benson was helpful, confirmed my position and once finding the M40 simply flew low along the road toward the East until Wycombe Air Park appeared on the right of the motorway. The Chilterns are well known for orographic cloud when the wind blows against those hills.

I am wondering if Dave Norris was receiving any help from controllers at Benson....or anywhere.

[22/04]

Mary I am not sure that Benson would have been able to provide a radar service especially on a Sunday - Brize and Farnborough would but I am not sure down to what level.

We don't have pre- canned low level IFR routes in here so far as I know except for departure from major airports -eg. the "Juliet" departure from Luton and possibly heli routes within the London CTR/CTA.

Some speculation on other forums about non-published IFR let downs into Chalgrove- these could be GPS based, or based on the WCO NDB or the CPT VOR/DME if you knew how to use them.

[ShyTorque]

We don't have pre- canned low level IFR routes in here so far as I know except for departure from major airports -eg. the "Juliet" departure from Luton and possibly heli routes within the London CTR/CTA.

There are definitely no IFR heli routes in the London area!

Radar units will sometimes be able to provide a radar service in Class G airspace (very often with limitations) but below MSA, terrain clearance is solely the pilot's responsibility and ATC will normally remind pilots of that fact.

[piperboy84]

There are definitely no IFR heli routes in the London area!

Radar units will sometimes be able to provide a radar service in Class G airspace (very often with limitations) but below MSA, terrain clearance is solely the pilot's responsibility and ATC will normally remind pilots of that fact.

Shytorque, I'm trying to figure out this unfortunate gentlemans options for making the flight in the conditions on the day where he left Turweston and headed south to an as yet unknown destination. Im assuming if it was on an IFR clearance this would involve climbing for airway M605 (8500) entering the bottom of the London TMA at 4500 over Thame. Or if it was flying IMC without being on a clearance, it would be staying above the MSA but below the TMA staying lower than 2500 if his destination was south of the Heathrow centerline on a basic service if one was available. Or thirdly staying low and trying to maintain VFR.

Would that be the totality of his options for the flight?

[ShyTorque]

PB24, basically, yes (although I'm not in a position to confirm your airway route) or alternatively, below the TMA it's possible to fly not below 1,000 ft above the tallest obstacle within 5nm of track, which is slightly less than 2400 feet in that area.

[RAT 5]

The mystery seems as to why he was so low. How far is the crash site from takeoff?

[India Four Two]

About 23 nm.

[piperboy84]

The mystery seems as to why he was so low. How far is the crash site from takeoff?

How do you know he was flying low prior to the accident?

[Genghis the Engineer]

Well he obviously was at the point of the accident, and I've not heard of any report of a mayday call - which an experienced pilot might reasonably have made if things had gone wrong and he had the height, and thus time, to make it.

None of which is more than circumstantial of course.

G

[Arfur Dent]

Destination was Chalgrove just a few miles West of the crash site. Literally about 25 miles from Turweston. 39 or so by road. Maybe doing some kind of cloudbreak technique using GPS onto a Westerly final? Who knows.

[Sillert,V.I.]

This is my part of the world and I've flown in the area many times. The mast isn't 1000' or anything like it; it's only a little over 300' AGL and tbh if low enough to worry about hitting it, I'd be equally worried about hitting one of the many trees along the ridge.

Would there be a METAR for Benson at the time of the accident? Low lying fog is notoriously patchy but I'd expect conditions to be similar to those at Chalgrove.

Not sure if they have automatic reporting/someone to take readings on a Sunday.

Without inferring anything specific, I'll repeat something I've posted before: descent below MSA in IMC whilst not on a published approach procedure has killed a lot of pilots, some highly experienced.

[alex90]

Without inferring anything specific, I'll repeat something I've posted before: descent below MSA in IMC whilst not on a published approach procedure has killed a lot of pilots, some highly experienced.

Which is why now, we are taught to use a "cloud-break" by doing an instrument approach at a nearby airport / aerodrome to descend at or below your MSA, and then if (and ONLY if) safe & legal (ie: 500' rule + glide clear), continue VFR low level to your original destination - otherwise either go-around to somewhere else, or commit to land on the approach.

**I am not implying that this was in any way the cause or part cause of the accident mentioned here - just a reply to the previous poster - I'll wait for the AAIB for the verdict**

[eckhard]

Without inferring anything specific in relation to this accident, I'll repeat something I've posted before: descent below MSA in IMC whilst not on a published approach procedure has killed a lot of pilots, some highly experienced.

Wise words indeed!

I wonder if the Benson ILS was radiating at the time? If so, it could have guided the aircraft to a point overhead Chalgrove at about 1000ft agl.

I too am very familiar with the area, having lived there for many years before moving to France. I agree with the remarks of others about fog, orographic cloud, etc.

I remember a Cessna 182 crashed in a nearby location in the 1990s on the way to Booker. Bad weather was, I believe, a factor.

Very sad.:(

[Sillert,V.I.]

The mystery seems as to why he was so low. How far is the crash site from takeoff?

A more relevant question is how far the crash site was from his intended destination.

[Arfur Dent]

About 5 nm.
Also when you fly past the Stokenchurch mast, you don't see too many similarly tall trees! It's about 330ft tall!!

[robin]

Sillert

The top of the tower is at 1100' + AMSL

[22/04]

Not commentating on this accident - we must wait for information. But many accidents have resulted from people who had "designed" instrument let downs themselves and had used them many many times before successfully.

Not sure what aids would be available at Benson but I would have though it would have been possible to set something up using the CPT VOR, WCO NDB and GPS.

[RAT 5]

Not commentating on this accident - we must wait for information. But many accidents have resulted from people who had "designed" instrument let downs themselves and had used them many many times before successfully.

Shades of Graham Hill at Elstree???

Mind you, I have done as suggested; let down on the ILS at LTN and followed the M1 to cut off to Elstree.

[piperboy84]

Shades of Graham Hill at Elstree???

If I remember correctly from reading Graham Hills accident report he did not "design" any ad hoc approach he just went for it, balls to the wall, and hoped for the best, unfortunately for him and his pax it didn't work out.

[robin]

Graham Hill came over the top of Barnet, apparently misidentified the lights of Borehamwood for Elstree and clipped the trees at Arkley Golf Course - I saw the wreckage the next day

It's been said previously, ATCOs at LTN were expecting him to divert to them, but 'pressonitis' got him

[fireflybob]

Graham Hill came over the top of Barnet, apparently misidentified the lights of Borehamwood for Elstree and clipped the trees at Arkley Golf Course - I saw the wreckage the next day

It's been said previously, ATCOs at LTN were expecting him to divert to them, but 'pressonitis' got him

I recall their cars were at Elstree and it was suggested this was one reason why they 'pressonitis'.

Re this accident for info here is wx at Benson around the time of the accident.

SA 15/01/2017 14:50->
METAR EGUB 151450Z AUTO 29007KT 9999 // BKN006/// BKN014///
08/08 Q1021=
SA 15/01/2017 13:50->
METAR EGUB 151350Z AUTO 29007KT 9999 // BKN008/// BKN015///
08/07 Q1021=

Cloud base on METARs are above aerodrome level and Benson is 203 ft AMSL so the cloud base there would be in the order of 800 to 900 ft QNH. From the information I have gleaned so far the accident site would have been about 800 ft amsl.

As has been said we will have to wait for AIB for any conclusions.

[RomeoTangoFoxtrotMike]

A more relevant question is how far the crash site was from his intended destination.
Turweston, approximate crash location, and the point just to the south-east is the Stokenchurch Mast.

https://i.imgsafe.org/fe2f759e41.png

Turweston, approximate crash location, and Chalgrove.

https://i.imgsafe.org/fe2fb5c1a0.png

Chalgrove, approximate crash location, and the Stokenchurch Mast.

https://i.imgsafe.org/fe6ad0e4f2.png

[Sir Niall Dementia]

I drove past the crash site at about 15:05. The weather was 8/8 clag to the deck. I was on my way back from work and had been surprised all day that the freezing level was well above the safety altitude in that area. Surface temp was around 7-8 degrees and I had 3 at 2 400'.

I fly that area most days and often find visibility/cloud base around the ridge area can be far lower than the Benson area due to orographic effect. I flew 4 ILS on Sunday in different parts of the country, and three of them within 30 miles of the crash site were to minimums.

SND

[22/04]

It's by the by but my AFE VFR guide shows 13/31 as the only active runway at Chalgrove yet we seem to assume 24 in this case?

[piperboy84]

Is the PA30 injected or carbbed? I'd expect something mechanical will come into play, highly doubtful a vastly experienced guy is going to try and make a short 23 mile hop into a field with no published approach with the fog down to the deck and high ground around it.

[fireflybob]

Is the PA30 injected or carbbed? I'd expect something mechanical will come into play, highly doubtful a vastly experienced guy is going to try and make a short 23 mile hop into a field with no published approach with the fog down to the deck and high ground around it.

Pretty sure it's fuel injected

[treadigraph]

It is injected - Lycoming IO-320.

[bookworm]

Without inferring anything specific, I'll repeat something I've posted before: descent below MSA in IMC whilst not on a published approach procedure has killed a lot of pilots, some highly experienced.

It would be interesting if you would list some. I think the circumstances are often misunderstood.

The Graham Hill accident (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f6a040f0b61342000593/14-1976_N6645Y.pdf) is a fairly good example. It is somewhat misleading to think of it as a homemade approach procedure.

It seems to have been standard practice to receive radar vectors on to final approach and dead reckon from there. Hill's Aztec was vectored to 4 miles and a height of about 1150 ft aal. There was an AOC holder authorised to operate into Elstree with an MDH of 550 ft and a visibility of 1750 m, apparently on that basis. Had Hill stuck to that MDH before positively identifying Elstree then the night would have ended differently.

I would wager that the majority of CFIT accidents on approach involve a loss of visual reference on the visual segment after leaving MDH (for example by misidentifying lights) rather than a collision with a known obstacle on the instrument segment. If you descend below the level of obstacles in your immediate vicinity without visual reference, the results are predictable. It doesn't really matter whether or not the approach is published. The key discipline is setting a minimum and sticking to it.

I guess we'll have to wait until the AAIB report to find out what really happened near Chalgrove that day.

[mm_flynn]

It would be interesting if you would list some.
I have the impression there have been several business jet accidents in Germany and IIRC a Jetprop in Austria that likely resulted from 'Visual' approaches to land in indisputably IMC conditions.

[JW411]

I find this accident completely perplexing. Anyone who flies in that part of the country is surely very, very aware of the Chilterns and, in particular, Stokenchurch mast? The latter is just so famous that I cannot believe that any local pilot cannot be aware of its existence.

What do I know about the area? I was posted in to Benson as a young sprog Argosy pilot in 1962. (My last Argosy flight from Benson was in 1971).

During that time I got involved in the Benson (Chilterns) Gliding Club in my spare time and ended up as the CFI. In fact, I completed the 5-hour duration part of my Silver 'C' in an Olympia 2b sailplane (RAFGSA 232) on Chinnor ridge on 06.09.64. During those five hours I just about got to know every tree!

In those days, we used to take a winch up to a field very close to the old Chinnor cement factory chimney and launch from there. In later days we would co-operate with the gliding club at Booker (I was a good friend of their CFI [NS] and the farmer, and we would aero-tow out of one of our friendly farmer's fields with a Super Cub.

So, why am I telling you this?

I am simply trying to tell you that, as someone who is intimately familiar with the crash site, I simply cannot imagine how he ended up where he was.

[piperboy84]

I am simply trying to tell you that, as someone who is intimately familiar with the crash site, I simply cannot imagine how he ended up where he was.

Perhaps the game plan was to fly south until 3 miles east abeam Chalgrove then a right turn onto final for the westerly runway or a modified base for the Northwesterly one but low viz prevented the turn pushing him into the higherground and lower bases.

I've driven down to London a few times many years ago and just past Oxford turn off there is a definitive break in the landscape that looks odd, where the highway has a dip then a climb into a densely forested area that's seems kind of out of place in comparison to what you have been driving thru till the dip. Is this the accident area?

[Sillert,V.I.]

I've driven down to London a few times many years ago and just past Oxford turn off there is a definitive break in the landscape that looks odd, where the highway has a dip then a climb into a densely forested area that's seems kind of out of place in comparison to what you have been driving thru till the dip. Is this the accident area?

Yes, that's the accident area. Although the mast is easily the highest point for miles around (and sets the MSA for the area), it's only just over 300' higher than the terrain surrounding it.

I'm inclined to agree with those that saying that, mechanical failure excepted, the pilot can't have been where he thought he was. I wonder what was being used for navigation at the time? Certainly wouldn't have been visual in the local Wx as reported by others.

Do birds fly in IMC? The ridge is home to hundreds (literally) of Red Kites; they weigh in around 1kg so could do some serious damage.

[Above The Clouds]

I find this accident completely perplexing. Anyone who flies in that part of the country is surely very, very aware of the Chilterns and, in particular, Stokenchurch mast?

Seems nobody on here has even considered the possibility of pilot incapacitation.

[robin]

Indeed

So many questions and 'wotifs'.

[terry holloway]

Indeed

So many questions and 'wotifs'.
Perhaps the AAIB should be disbanded and all accident investigion left to the speculating experts of PPrune!

[piperboy84]

Perhaps the AAIB should be disbanded and all accident investigion left to the speculating experts of PPRuNe!

Well that didn't take long, it normally takes till about page 5 before us annoying, insensitive speculative buggers are met with the equally annoying "let's leave it to the AAIB" chorus.

[Hadley Rille]

There's much to be learned by all from the detailed discussion of the possibilities by more experienced, knowledgeable and qualified pilots. Even if those things prove not to be the cause.

[Arfur Dent]

Terry my dear chap - nobody is trying to be the AAIB and most of us have made that very clear. Are we all expected to have no opinion for the next 12 months?
We have some excellent restrained theories and observations, all made with the greatest respect. What on earth is wrong with surmising?
We have a 25 mile flight in a twin engined aircraft flown by a highly qualified pilot in dreadful weather which ended up in disaster. Perhaps we should discuss with the aforementioned respect. It may stop the same thing happening somewhere else.

[RAT 5]

I know nothing of Chalgrove, but people talk of various runways. That suggests an airfield and perhaps someone to have been phoned before takeoff to ascertain the weather. If it was as bad as posters report it does seem an odd decision to make such a short flight if there was small chance of landing. Is there any kind of IFR let down for Chalgrove, and one wonders what the pressure of the flight was?

[piperboy84]

Is there any kind of IFR let down for Chalgrove,

I don't think there is a published Instrument Approach Procedure (can't see any plates for it in SkyDemon) for his destination field. As for an ad hoc homebrew procedure, others on here have suggested a nearby VOR and NDB could be used to fashion an approach but that carries enormous risks. And finally there is the option of utilizing another nearby fields published approach for cloud break then scud running back to Chalgrove. But based on the weather reports and terrain that also sounds like a very risky proposition.

[terry holloway]

I don't think there is a published Instrument Approach Procedure (can't see any plates for it in SkyDemon) for his destination field. As for an ad hoc homebrew procedure, others on here have suggested a nearby VOR and NDB could be used to fashion an approach but that carries enormous risks. And finally there is the option of utilizing another nearby fields published approach for cloud break then scud running back to Chalgrove. But based on the weather reports and terrain that also sounds like a very risky proposition.
I can confirm there is not. The UK AIP also shows it as VFR only. It's strictly PPR and the voice providing permission on the phone strongly stressed that point when I flew in there, as well as confirming the need to talk to Benson inbound.

[piperboy84]

I can confirm there is not. The UK AIP also shows it as VFR only. It's strictly PPR and the voice providing permission on the phone strongly stressed that point when I flew in there, as well as confirming the need to talk to Benson inbound.

If an emergency is declared would Benson accept an approach and landing from a GA aircraft, or would they provide a PAR/SAR or some kind of guidance into Chalgrove, again if an emergency was declared?

[oggers]

Good luck getting a response from Benson or the majority of military airfields on a Sunday afternoon. However, there is no reason why they could not provide a superb GCA if you could flush the duty ATCO out of the mess.

[Sillert,V.I.]

And like all UK Military airfields Benson have signed up to the Strasser scheme so in a genuine emergency will offer a free landing to any GA aircraft under 3tonnes not flying for hire or reward.

Even on a Sunday, I'd imagine a call on 121.5 would generate an appropriate response.

[piperboy84]

Good luck getting a response from Benson or the majority of military airfields on a Sunday afternoon. However, there is no reason why they could not provide a superb GCA if you could flush the duty ATCO out of the mess.

In that case I'd be self announcing and shooting I-BO if I unexpectedly hit bad weather and low minimums trying to get into Chalgrove.

[A and C]

Benson ATC operates when required, usually on a weekend they only have a TWR service to support UAS & AEF flying.

It is likely that with the appalling weather forcast it is most likely that Benson would have cancelled all UAS & AEF flying and so ATC would have shut up shop and gone home.

An ATC service and an ILS would have been available at Brize Norton.

[Cows getting bigger]

What's all this talk of diversion, Benson, Chalgrove etc? No one has ascertained where the aircraft was going but draw a straight line on a chart between Turweston and WOD NDB and you'll find the crash site. Those of us who often transit that area beneath the TMA often use WOD as a waypoint.

[airborne_artist]

I know nothing of Chalgrove, but people talk of various runways.

13/31 is the only licensed runway at Chalgrove. 06/24 and 18/36 are not licensed.

The entire site has been sold by the MoD to/transferred to the HCA with intent to sell it for housing development. Link (http://www.oxfordshireguardian.co.uk/oxfordshire-airfield-sold-as-part-of-a-225m-deal-for-housing/).

[Whopity]

13/31 is the only licensed runway at Chalgrove. 06/24 and 18/36 are not licensed.Why would a private GA flight require a licensed runway? The other runways do not have crosses prohibiting their use. The Licensing is for the airfield operator Martin Baker a company World famours for their own IFR let down systems! The licensing is also irrelevant to any military use of the airfield.
The entire site has been sold by the MoD It would not be the first time the MOD had attempted to sell land they may not own, Halton and Wittering come to mind!

[mary meagher]

Sillert asked that question. With thick fog in my garden, the birds are reluctant to fly. Those species that fly in flocks do a lot of squawking to each other, fly in more circles, and closer together when viz is poor. Of course they only have VFR, and a sense of the earth's magnetic fields. The Red Kites that frequent the Chilterns and now points west, are solitary in flight as a rule.

They certainly keep an eye on other air traffic, as we have shared thermals on many occasions.

[ShyTorque]

Is there evidence that the route flown was a straight line track? The M40 runs down that way and the accident appears to have occurred close to where it goes over the ridge.

[Sillert,V.I.]

No one has ascertained where the aircraft was going

I believe it was this post (http://www.pprune.org/private-flying/589611-light-aircraft-crash-oxfordshire-2.html#post9645378) that first mentioned Chalgrove as the intended destination. I get the impression that since then, we've all just assumed that information to be accurate.

I find it hard to accept that an experienced instrument rated pilot in an IFR-capable aircraft would have been navigating enroute by attempting to visually follow a ground feature in the Wx prevailing at the time.

[piperboy84]

I find it hard to accept that an experienced instrument rated pilot in an IFR-capable aircraft would have been navigating enroute by attempting to visually follow a ground feature in the Wx prevailing at the time

If Chalgrove was indeed his destination then I assume he wasn't flying on a clearance which leaves making the flight as you described as they only other option.

[fireflybob]

If Chalgrove was indeed his destination then I assume he wasn't flying on a clearance which leaves making the flight as you described as they only other option.

As he was outside controlled airspace then no clearance is required. In the UK you may fly IFR outside controlled airspace subject to pilot qualification.

So (and this is pure speculation) the pilot might have flown above safety altitude for the first portion of the flight and then performed some sort of cloud break procedure.

As has been stated previously this accident could be caused by many different factors - pilot incapacitation is a possibility, for example.

[piperboy84]

As he was outside controlled airspace then no clearance is required. In the UK you may fly IFR outside controlled airspace subject to pilot qualification.

So (and this is pure speculation) the pilot might have flown above safety altitude for the first portion of the flight and then performed some sort of cloud break procedure.

As has been stated previously this accident could be caused by many different factors - pilot incapacitation is a possibility, for example

Agreed, that is why incapacitation looks like the most likely option as the MSA for that sector is 1400 and the official & witness weather observations were from between clag to the deck to broken 800, so no matter which way you shake it he would have to have descended below MSA in IMC to get to the bases if indeed there were bases to be had.

[Sillert,V.I.]

As fireflybob says, you don't need a clearance to fly IFR in class G in the UK. You do still need some method of visually acquiring the runway environment, whether by means of an approved procedure (there is none for Chalgrove) or otherwise, and the pilot may have been attempting to do this when the accident occurred.

[piperboy84]

Yes well aware that instrument flying in uncontrolled airspace is legal, pretty much 100% of my IMC flying up here in Scotland is done that way. The hard part is making sure as best you can that you can get a transition to VFR (above MSA) at your destination. Hoping on getting a cloud break stretches the odds out a bit.

[tmmorris]

I suppose it's possible he was flying into Chalgrove, but in 12+ years of flying out of Benson I've never seen anyone there at all.

[A and C]

Like you Tim I doubt Chalgrove as a destination, scud running along the M40 towards Booker or White Waltham would fit the bill but I guess we will never know for sure but the AAIB will no doubt get as near the truth as posable.

[RAT 5]

Like you Tim I doubt Chalgrove as a destination

Did he not 'check out' at Turweston? In doing so is not the intention, number on board and endurance declared in that? or have procedures changed? Or is Turweston not a manned field?

[fireflybob]

Did he not 'check out' at Turweston? In doing so is not the intention, number on board and endurance declared in that? or have procedures changed? Or is Turweston not a manned field?

I believe under SERA "booking out" is no longer mandatory - in my opinion this is stupid but there was thread running on this a while ago with some people banging on about rights!

[Pittsextra]

I know there is a feeling amongst some that this site has perfect knowledge but perhaps those at the departure airfield know perfectly well the sortie to be flown but just choose not to say... Like most accidents... they are less indicators that there was no plan, just something happened that interfered with the same.

[flybymike]

I believe under SERA "booking out" is no longer mandatory - in my opinion this is stupid but there was thread running on this a while ago with some people banging on about rights!
Booking out has never been mandatory on a legislative basis.

[2 sheds]

Booking out has never been mandatory on a legislative basis.
Yes, it was!


2 s

[Chronus]

Was this Dave Norris, one time of Bournemouth Flying Club.

[ETOPS]

flybymike

You need to look up what happened after the "Bentine" accident many years ago. There was a famous comedian - Michael Bentine - whose son went missing in a Piper Cub out of Blackbushe. The wreck wasn't found for a considerable time and the rules for booking out were tightened thereafter...

[S-Works]

Club rules maybe but not legislation.

[ShyTorque]

A question for those who think that booking out has always been legally mandatory: How would a helicopter pilot departing from a farmer's field comply with such a requirement?

[tmmorris]

Hazy memory but wasn't the requirement for an airfield to maintain a movements book, rather than for a pilot to use it?

[Arfur Dent]

If you're going to "land away" you naturally tell someone at your Club what your intentions are - if only to ensure they don't declare you "missing" when you don't return after a reasonable time. In this situation, you're probably not asked whether you agree with "the plan" so you maintain a respectful (especially in this case) silence and hope for the best.

[piperboy84]

Many years ago before I had my own strip I kept my plane at a local airfield, returning from a flight I was contfronted by a FI from the school next door who gave me a bollocking for not signing out. I asked him why he thought I was obligated to do so. He responded that if authorities ever showed up to investigate illegalities like drug smuggling he was obligated to turn over all movement records. I got the impression it was more to do with this particular guy wanting to boss people around than a legal obligation he or I had to log all my movements. I politley explaned that if I was indeed planning on doing a bit smuggling he'd be the last person I'd share my plans with. Never heard any more from him.

[ShyTorque]

If you're going to "land away" you naturally tell someone at your Club what your intentions are - if only to ensure they don't declare you "missing" when you don't return after a reasonable time. In this situation, you're probably not asked whether you agree with "the plan" so you maintain a respectful (especially in this case) silence and hope for the best.

Arfur, Obviously it makes total sense for SAR purposes but that's not the same as a legal requirement.

[mary meagher]

Being at the bottom of the Chinnor Ridge, Chalgrove airfield used to be handy if your glider was too low to make it back to Booker. During the week we used to warn beginners to look out for Martin Baker's testing of ejector seats.
If you landed there on the weekend, there was no way out because nobody was looking after it! and surrounded with very high strong wire fence and locked gates. Our only way out was to phone for an airtow which meant nobody left on the ground to run with the wingtip, but we managed. Didn't have to worry about other traffic. Martin Baker didn't seem bothered.

Apparently they are planning to sell off some of the land for housing.

[flybymike]

A question for those who think that booking out has always been legally mandatory: How would a helicopter pilot departing from a farmer's field comply with such a requirement?

Or a fixed wing aircraft from a private strip.

Who are you going to tell? Where are you intending to go? Have you even made up your mind where you are going when you took off? Who cares anyway?

[flybymike]

flybymike

You need to look up what happened after the "Bentine" accident many years ago. There was a famous comedian - Michael Bentine - whose son went missing in a Piper Cub out of Blackbushe. The wreck wasn't found for a considerable time and the rules for booking out were tightened thereafter...

The whole world is familiar with the Bentine incident, but there has still never been a legislative requirement to book out.

[2 sheds]

The whole world is familiar with the Bentine incident, but there has still never been a legislative requirement to book out.
You can hardly expect younger people to know about Bentine. What is it about the ANO and RoA (as were) as quoted by LookingForAJob that you interpret as "never been a legislative requirement"?!


2 s

[NorthSouth]

Booking out by phone prior to flight is often a requirement at larger ATC-equipped airfields. At smaller GA fields the booking out provision - that several people here have identified in what used to be Rule 17(2) of the Rules of the Air - is normally done over the radio. I'm not overly familiar with AFISO procedures but certainly at Air-to-Ground airfields there's no requirement for the Radio Operator to log any of the information passed by pilots. So in the context of this accident I don't think there's any relevance to what the pilot may or may not have told Turweston before departing.

[flybymike]

2sheds.
The section highlighted in bold by LFAJ may be achieved over the radio before take off or arrival, without any formal "booking out" procedure. Many pilots bimble aimlessly with no specific destination or time en route in mind.

Thousands of flights take place to and from private strips or airfields where there may not even be a radio operator never mind any formal logging procedure.

[Fitter2]

The requirement only means that the airfield operator (if there is one) ha a log of arrivals and departures. The origin of the arrival, and destination of departure information is customary, but not a legal requirement under Rule 17 (2).

[S-Works]

Show us the legislation please.

[ShyTorque]

LFAJ,

It's impossible to "book in", or out if there is no book and no-one to keep one.

However, as far as helicopter landings go, the UK CAA do require an operator to keep a record of helicopter landings carried out under a written permission to be exempted from the 1,000 foot rule given by (sorry, purchased from) them with regard to a particular landing site in a congested area.

[fireflybob]

From CAP 694 "The UK Flight Planning Guide":-

Booking Out
Rule 17 of the Rules of the Air Regulations 2007 requires a pilot intending to make a flight to inform the Air Traffic Service Unit (ATSU) at the aerodrome of departure, an action known as "Booking Out". Filing an FPL constitutes compliance with this Rule. The action of "Booking Out", however, does not involve flight details being transmitted to any other ATSU.


Chapter 1 Page 4 para 5 (https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP%20694.pdf)

Ok this Rule no longer applies but this seems to confirm there was a requirement to book out.

[ShyTorque]

LFAJ, I agree that in the past it was a requirement and have complied with it many times. In fact I was once reported to the CAA for allegedly not doing "booking in or out" at a minor airfield. I had in fact done so, by literally making an entry in a movements log kept in the clubhouse in the absence of the AFISO who was not on the premises at the time. The company I worked for had also PPR'd my visit although it wasn't a mandatory requirement.

However, my initial post was deliberately meant to be a question, not a statement of fact.

[EGBTAM]

Hi Guys


Just to clear up a few points


Dave did book out with us at Turweston ,
He was going to Chalgrove on official Martin Baker business
He spent time with us in the tower before departing checking the weather
at the destinations he was intending to fly to and also the enroute weather
in between .
Such a shame we lost another top chap , he will be missed by a lot of people


Best regards CB

[9 lives]

requires a pilot intending to make a flight to inform the Air Traffic Service Unit (ATSU) at the aerodrome of departure,

From a standing start, not knowing UK regulations, and having never "booked out" in reading the quoted regulation, I would only feel obliged to inform the ATSU at the aerodrome of departure. If the aerodrome of departure had no ATSU, I would notify a responsible person of my choosing, and go.

As I drive my car, I fly my 'plane as a private matter. If I want a third party to know where I'm going, I'll file a flight plan. Otherwise, it's a flight itinerary with the private person of my choice. But, that's Canada for you....

[tmmorris]

Thanks EGBTAM, good to have what (I assume) is actual information for a change.

[Arfur Dent]

You had "actual information" about the destination 80 posts ago but you chose to disbelieve it! (I assume).

[212man]

Dave did book out with us at Turweston ,
He was going to Chalgrove on official Martin Baker business

Hard to imagine opting to fly in poor weather rather than take a 36 mile road trip!

[ANW]

As part of the granting of planning permission for various airstrips which have achieved planning consent, it has been stipulated in the operating Conditions by HM Government Planning Inspectorate in one case, and the appropriate Local Planning Authorities in the others, that an airfield movement log* must be maintained. Such a log to be available for inspection upon request.

The airfields are restricted to annual movement caps. In one case specific days of operation and restriction on times come into play. Hence the need to have a movement record for official purposes. That the Government Inspectorate made such a stipulation does suggest it is 'official'.

That such a Log is maintained has equal benefits when visits are made by the likes of Border Force/Police. Ask them to sign and date your log to record their visit. Can be a helpful reference in the future.

* we choose to record pilot name, runway used, inbound/outbound airfield/local flight. The authorities are primarily interested in date/time/aircraft reg+type to see if movement totals are being exceeded. The other details are for reference in the case of safety overdue, noise complaints etc.

[dsc810]

@212Man
re the 36 mile car journey option
Note the use by @EGBTAM in their post of the word "destinations" ie plural.
Suggesting to me anyway that Chalgrove was merely a stopping point off on a longer journey.

[runway30]

Interesting that it was described as official Martin-Baker business on a Sunday. Collecting a passenger, perhaps?

[9 lives]

[QUOTE]Martin-Baker business on a Sunday. Collecting a passenger, perhaps?[QUOTE]

'Might not have needed to land to do that there.... :p

[piperboy84]

Wherever the final destination was is really beside the point, the first leg from Turweston to Chalgrove (with no IAP available) is looking more and more like a very dicey proposition considering the weather reported and observed on the day regardless of the equipment being flown and the vast experience of the pilot. If it wasn't incapacitation then I'm afraid this accident may be joining the many other similar reports from investigation boards around the world as your bog standard CFIT or spatial disorientation while maneuvering to attain a visual approach in IMC conditions.

[runway30]

I think that whether or not this was the final destination is exactly the point. The decision to go or not go is entirely different if instead of jumping in the car, you have to disappoint passengers waiting to be picked up. Too many times we have seen the passenger on the ground become an influential part of the decision making process. There sometimes isn't as much discussion of the issues after the accident report is published so the question I pose is how do you ensure that pilots who are otherwise skilled and careful make a properly considered decision when there are people waiting for them on the ground?

I must empathise that I don't know the circumstances of this accident so this is an unconnected question at this point.

[tmmorris]

Thing is, Arfur, Chalgrove is a highly unlikely destination, especially on a Sunday; ground track is inconsistent with manoeuvring for a landing at Chalgrove; and you never know who people are on PPruNe. Much rubbish gets written as a result.

[Tagron]

From another forum, the purpose of the flight was to collect two pilots from Chalgrove, deliver them to Gamston whence they would ferry the Martin Baker KingAir back to its base at Chalgrove, the PA30 to return direct to Turweston.

[Pittsextra]

So would seem pretty well planned in so far as the intent, more so given the local weather was reasonably consistent and the return flight might suggest at least two crews would not accord with many views expressed here.

[runway30]

Was this a paid for charter? Was it undertaken under an AOC?

[runway30]

Company A owns the airfield
Company A also owns an aircraft operated under an AOC by Company B
Company B charters an aircraft owned by company C who do not hold an AOC in order to position a crew working for Company B crewed by a pilot who is employed by A,B or C?

Or have I got that wrong?

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Runway 30;

You are looking at the same pachyderm I am. I wonder if, or how much pressure there was to fly.

I was flying that day, but only because Ops tasked me to and the weather was ok if you like flying approaches to minimums. Given a choice (or a different means of earning a living) I'd have been at home watching tv.

SND

[tmmorris]

I think company A leases the airfield from the MOD, not that that is relevant.

[runway30]

Thanks tm, that's more accurate

[Chronus]

From another forum, the purpose of the flight was to collect two pilots from Chalgrove, deliver them to Gamston whence they would ferry the Martin Baker KingAir back to its base at Chalgrove, the PA30 to return direct to Turweston.
Sounds much a like a typical case of trying to avoid the inconvenience and time consuming job of shunting cars all over the place.
I would find it very hard, at this stage at least, to think the accident was due to any shortcomings on the part of the pilot. Yes, whether may have been a contributing factor, but given that the PA30 is almost of vintage years, I rather think that some sort of mechanical failure is more likely to have been the cause. Some press reports have it that a witness heard the aircraft low in the overhead with some sort of rough running engine noise.

[bellend]

friend of mine used to fly an old PA30 when he was doing his MEP and he said it was barely capable of level flight on a V1 cut let alone climbing out, dont know how true this was as i never had the chance to fly one but he was my PPL FI whos now on commercial jets so credible to me, I used to drool over the commanche before getting into the warrior until he told me to stay away from it!!

Makes me think the mechanical failure aspect must be a highly plausible factor before pilot error given the ac was heard overhead and in trouble (if that can be believed). The wx on the day was poor approaching the ridge, infact most days over the past month the ridge has been hiding within a wall of crud, I was up there on the morning of the accident and the cloud base started literally half way up Kingston Hill, the ridge and chicken **** alley (M40 cutting) was completely shrouded. Irrespective, anyone familiar with the local area knows its there so I really cant accept this was simply CFIT.

I walk the dogs regularly up there on the ridge as its such a beautiful place , had a look for the accident site last Sunday to get an idea of the ac track/impact but no obvious signs, there seemed to be quite a few people looking also, sad macabre way of life these days.

Does anyone know exactly where he came down?

will await the AAIB report, condolences to the family and friends of the pilot

[S-Works]

All of the PA30 I have flown have had marginal performance on one engine as is common in most light twins. I did an LPC on a guy once in one and on the EFATO it really was a case of the second engine just there to take us to the scene of the crash.

[Flying Palm Tree]

I don't recall any problems with the PA30 on one engine that a boot full of rudder wouldn't compensate for and I spent most training sorties under instruction flying on one engine. The only problem I ever had is when I once shut down the wrong engine in a turn.:eek:

[runway30]

I once had to reject take off in a PA34. They asked if I'd mind flying it back on one engine...................

[fireflybob]

I instructed on PA39s completing about 500 hours of training including many flying asymmetric and there was never a problem on one engine although, as is typical with many light twins of this ilk, the rate/angle of climb wasn't too sparkling.

I realise the PA30 may well be a different breed (I did a few hours on them also) but as far as I can recollect the only significant difference was that the props on the PA39 were "counter revolution" hence there was no critical engine which on the PA30 there is.

That said, from the evidence we have so far, it would seem that if this was an engine failure it happened in the cruise rather than just after take off. Assuming the engine failure was handled correctly and the prop feathered this would allow some time to declare an emergency etc.

[runway30]

Fireflybob, would you not turn towards your destination, away from the high ground in those circumstances?

[fireflybob]

Fireflybob, would you not turn towards your destination, away from the high ground in those circumstances?

We don't know all the circumstances, whether he was attempting to maintain VFR or had previously been flying IMC/IFR at a higher level. This is pure speculation but throw in an engine failure (and real ones are never like the ones we practice - e.g. it could have been a partial failure) and even the most proficient pilot can become overloaded.

If you had a control issue then maybe you can't turn?

As has been said before we'll have to see what the AIB come up with.

[bookworm]

All of the PA30 I have flown have had marginal performance on one engine as is common in most light twins. I did an LPC on a guy once in one and on the EFATO it really was a case of the second engine just there to take us to the scene of the crash.

FWIW, the POH OEI sea level climb rate of the 3725 lb PA30 (with tip tanks) is just 170 fpm at MTOW. However, if it is correct that the intention was to pick up two pilots and depart, then it's likely that the operating weight was (at least) 300 lb less, and one would expect a OEI sea level climb rate of 300 to 350 fpm.

[foxmoth]

But the POH figures will be for a new aircraft!

[JW411]

bookworm:

Are those figures from the POH Net or Gross?

[bookworm]

They are unfactored. Our 51 year old PA30 manages to achieve them, though.

[A le Ron]

They are unfactored. Our 51 year old PA30 manages to achieve them, though.

Ditto my PA 39

[m.Berger]

Foggy day, so thin air giving reduced power and roc. Plausible, especially with an elderly aircraft.

[piperboy84]

Foggy day, so thin air giving reduced power and roc

Does fog make for thin air, I never knew that, I would have thought the opposite, and my Lycoming seems to run better with a bit moisture in the air. Every days a school day.:ok:

[Council Van]

Foggy days in the UK, is that not associated with high pressure and low temp?

I would have thought that would lead to a decrease in density altitude as the effect of moisture is negligible.

When we are calculating take off performance on the shiney jet we do not input any information about the humidity, obviously Boeing do not consider the effect on performance to be worth worrying about.


Edited, I had been going to write an INCREASE IN DENSITY and then became distracted, thanks to thud105 below for pointing out my error.

[Thud105]

Surely high pressure and low temperature causes a REDUCTION in Density Altitude?

[wsmempson]

"Foggy day, so thin air"

LOL Too funny for words.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

"Foggy day, so thin air"

LOL Too funny for words.

Bit like you should never fly at night because there's no lift in black air!

SND

[3wheels]

"Foggy day, so thin air"

LOL Too funny for words.

Certainly would be if this wasn't such a tragic thread.
Probably just another speculator ...

[Sleeve Wing]

Got about 600 hrs. on the PA30/’39. I wouldn’t like to lose one in IMC ; even more so with high ambient pressure situation.
SE Climb speeds have got to be nailed to get any ROC at all. In a turn (away from the high ground), of course, more of a problem.
More than experience, luck’s got to be on your side too. Very sad.

[Council Van]

high ambient pressure increases the density of the atmosphere, The performance of your aircraft increases in high pressure.

[HolyMoley]

"Foggy day, so thin air"

LOL Too funny for words.
I don't get it. You don't think he's wrong do you?

WHY IS MOIST AIR LESS DENSE THAN DRY AIR AT SAME TEMPERATURE (http://www.theweatherprediction.com/habyhints/260/)

[m.Berger]

Thank you HolyMoley. At least somebody on here passed their met exam.

[piperboy84]

Would some weather smarty pants please clear up the issue of whether fog increases or decreases air density and also wing performance please.

[Capot]

Piperboy, I think someone just did. (See Holy Moley, above.)

As to wing performance, I'm not sure what performance parameters you have in mind. You may need the help of an aerodynamicist; I would guess, if asked to, that if every variable apart from air density is held constant, the greater the density the greater the lift generated by a wing would be, but what do I know.

I started to list all the other variables that need to be constant; AoA, airspeed, temperature, etc etc, but gave up.

Do gliders have a lower rate of descent in dry, therefore denser air? I think Council Van is saying they do, unless he's talking only about engine thrust in powered aircraft. I wouldn't know; the only gliders I've flown (T21, Swallow, ancient Blanik L-13) went downhill fast in any conditions......

[Council Van]

Any one have a degree in aerodynamics?

In a glider,

Moist air, less dense=less drag, less dense=less lift. Which has the biggest effect? I would guess the reduction in lift generated would be greater than the reduction in drag leading to an increase in rate of decent.

However it is 20 years since I did my ATPL written exams, 30 years since I studied A level physics and I do not have a degree in aerodynamics.

Interesting but the effect of moisture content of air on lift/drag is probably irrelevant in this unfortunate incident.

[m.Berger]

What may be relevant is that the low air density due to the high humidity in foggy conditions would reduce both engine power and rate of climb. In the event of an engine failure, A PA30 pilot might have found himself in trouble.
Being the close friend of a relative of the deceased, I am not inclined to speculate on the cause of the accident and have no axe to grind. The pilot and aircraft were competent in the weather conditions prevailing at that time.

[Chronus]

Foggy day, so thin air giving reduced power and roc. Plausible, especially with an elderly aircraft.
This piece of technical analysis seems to have brought forth a fountain of wisdom on meteorology. I`d rather thought of it more in the lines of Baldrick`s contribution to the discussion on the causes of the First World War. If I may rephrase it, it may also read : When its foggy, the air is thin and the engine does not get enough air to produce sufficient power to make the plane climb fast enough, so it crashes. I have for my sins flown light twins in fog. Had I known about this I would have used a hot air balloon instead.

[eckhard]

I find it difficult to believe that humidity had any part to play in the performance of the aircraft (carb ice and airframe/induction icing notwithstanding).

The difference in density between dry and saturated air is negligible at the temperatures pertaining for this accident. A measurable difference first occurs at about 25C. At 50C the difference in density is about 5%. At 65C it is about 10%.

For a good diagram and explanation, visit:

Density of Moist Humid Air (http://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/density-air-d_680.html)

[effortless]

As someone who doesn't have a degree in meteorology and who passed his met exams over forty years ago, I can say from experience, foggy days did affect lift adversely. It was counter intuitive for me but I couldn't argue with the affected handling. I didn't like flying in cloud either. It may have been psychological.

[RAT 5]

This topic has now drifted from an a/c crash to a met' lesson. Was the a/c SE? Let's wait & see after AAIB have had their say. Met' lessons elsewhere??

[piperboy84]

So if I'm reading this right, saturated air causing visible moisture (fog) has less density than non saturated but at the lower temperatures needed to create fog (100% saturation) the density becomes a lot less relevant?

[eckhard]

I think that sums it up pretty well.

[UV]

So if I'm reading this right, saturated air causing visible moisture (fog) has less density than non saturated ?

Of course moist air in the form of clouds is less dense.
Otherwise all the clouds would fall to the ground...
Next question please....

[piperboy84]

Next question please....

You are aware I was referring to ground fog right?

[UV]

Yes.......

[bookworm]

I find it difficult to believe that humidity had any part to play in the performance of the aircraft (carb ice and airframe/induction icing notwithstanding).

The difference in density between dry and saturated air is negligible at the temperatures pertaining for this accident. A measurable difference first occurs at about 25C. At 50C the difference in density is about 5%. At 65C it is about 10%.

Indeed, the effect of humidity is almost insignificant compared to the effect of temperature and pressure. From the Heathrow METARs, one would expect a temperature of about 8 or 9 degC, and a QNH around 1020 hPa. That leads me to believe that the density altitude at Chalgrove, 240 ft amsl, was more than 500 ft below sea level on the day.

[terry holloway]

Dave Norris 1952 – 2017

As many will be aware by now, long time member of the VAC Dave Norris was tragically killed in a flying accident in Oxfordshire on 15 January 2017

There will be a Memorial Service for Dave in his home village at St Faith Church, St Faith's Close, Newton Longville, Buckinghamshire, MK17 0AL at 13:00 on 10th February which VAC members may attend.

The service will be followed later in the afternoon by a private cremation.

To extend our condolences to his wife and family for their loss, the Vintage Aircraft Club will be sending a floral tribute on behalf of the Membership.

Peter Wright (VAC Chairman

[runway30]

Accident report to be published in the AAIB October bulletin.

[runway30]

CFIT following VFR into IMC

[runway30]

Reasons for 'Getthereitis' not explored by the AAIB but why was a commercial organisation using a PPL to position a crew or have I got it wrong and it was just 3 mates who were going to split the costs between them?

[John R81]

You can read the AAIB report here (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/59c283e540f0b65db9b9ead1/Piper_PA-30_Twin_Comanche_G-ATMT_10-17.pdf)


"
G-ATMT was operating below 1,000 ft in an area where the Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA1) was 2,200 ft. It was likely that the aircraft flew in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC2) below MSA for at least 1 minute 45 seconds before flying into some trees standing
on a ridge of high ground. The aircraft was extensively damaged and the pilot, the only person on board, was fatally injured."

[Chronus]

Reasons for 'Getthereitis' not explored by the AAIB but why was a commercial organisation using a PPL to position a crew or have I got it wrong and it was just 3 mates who were going to split the costs between them?

In a previous post I had enquired whether the pilot was of the Norris family of Bournemouth Flying Club and Anglo American Airmotive Ltd. The latter was taken over by Meridian. It was I think confirmed that he was. This being the case I had thought that Dave held a professional licence at some time during his long career in aviation. There may well have been good reasons why he had swapped it for a PPL. All that matters is that he was a competent and highly experienced aviator. It was just not his day and he paid the ultimate price for his bad day. Only those who have had such a day and are still with us know what it means, to have a bad day.
By the way why should AAIB be concerned about cost sharing for a flight that did not take place.

[fireflybob]

Interesting to note that the pilot had not done a lot of flying in the last 28/90 days:-

Last 90 days - 3 hours
Last 28 days - 0 hours

[mary meagher]

Weather unsuitable for VFR. Local airfields clear of cloud, but fog has a habit of leaning against this particular slope. All too easy to get lost and disoriented.

[airborne_artist]

Interesting to note that the pilot had not done a lot of flying in the last 28/90 days:-

Last 90 days - 3 hours
Last 28 days - 0 hours

It'd be interesting to see what he'd logged in the previous nine months. For a pilot with considerable experience and knowledge it's surprising that he wasn't able to assess his currency as being low, and too low perhaps for the conditions.

[Council Van]

All that matters is that he was a competent and highly experienced aviator. It was just not his day and he paid the ultimate price for his bad day. Only those who have had such a day and are still with us know what it means, to have a bad day.

Mmmmmmmmmmm!

Totally unavoidable accident as CFIT so often is.

He could have prevented this "not being his day".

[Chronus]

Mmmmmmmmmmm!

Totally unavoidable accident as CFIT so often is.

He could have prevented this "not being his day".

How, by staying in bed ?

Hindsight is well known to us all.

[pulse1]

I was very sad to read here that it was Dave Norris who died in this accident. The Norris brothers played a key role in getting me back into the air after a 20 year break. If it wasn't for them I probably wouldn't have enjoyed another 20 years of flying and still counting.

[Stuart Sutcliffe]

How, by staying in bed ?

Hindsight is well known to us all.
Steady on. Whilst Council Van may have 'meandered' a little with his wording, I believe his intent was that David Norris, an experienced pilot, qualified in Instrument flying, already having pushed his luck in going below MSA in poor weather, should have made an earlier decision to climb to safety.

That isn't hindsight, that is applying the knowledge and requirements that make up the responsibilities of holding an Instrument Rating. The accident is a tragedy, of course, but there seems nothing to suggest that it should have been inevitable. For a pilot with that experience and those qualifications, this was sadly, but easily, avoidable.

[runway30]

It'd be interesting to see what he'd logged in the previous nine months. For a pilot with considerable experience and knowledge it's surprising that he wasn't able to assess his currency as being low, and too low perhaps for the conditions.

"The pilot’s flying logbook contained no entries after 25 February 2016. The owner of the aircraft recalled that the pilot flew on 8 and 29 November 2016 for a combined total of 2 hours 35 minutes."

[runway30]

Steady on. Whilst Council Van may have 'meandered' a little with his wording, I believe his intent was that David Norris, an experienced pilot, qualified in Instrument flying, already having pushed his luck in going below MSA in poor weather, should have made an earlier decision to climb to safety.

That isn't hindsight, that is applying the knowledge and requirements that make up the responsibilities of holding an Instrument Rating. The accident is a tragedy, of course, but there seems nothing to suggest that it should have been inevitable. For a pilot with that experience and those qualifications, this was sadly, but easily, avoidable.

"The study argued that rules may be easy to apply when circumstances are clear-cut but more difficult to apply in marginal and uncertain circumstances where they might have the most benefit. In summarising their study, the authors commented:
‘The results suggest ... high uncertainty and dynamism constrain rule-based response, leading to rules becoming vulnerable, fragile or failing completely.’"

[India Four Two]

The thing I find really strange about this tragic accident is the aircraft’s track (Figure 1 in the report). The pilot tracked roughly south and ended up significantly east of Chalgrove and then for unknown reasons, turned left and not right.

The report mentions that there was a GPS on board and the Nav radio was tuned to the Daventry VOR. Turweston is very close to the radial that would allow a direct track to Chalgrove. It seems very odd that apparently neither of the available navigation devices was used.

[gonebutnotforgotten]

The thing I find really strange about this tragic accident is the aircraft’s track...

I42, exactly, and it seems strange to me that there is no discussion of the navigation errors in the AAIB report. There are plenty of words about not maintaining VMC etc, but not why he found himself where he did. As you say there was ample nav capability on board. Was there some Track-up/North-up confusion? If there was any investigation into how he normally used the aids on board, there is no sign of it, and if there wasn't, why not?

[Chronus]

CFIT accidents are mainly resultant from loss of SA.

I42`s comments about the track the aircraft took are curious. These can only lead us to speculation as to the reasons. The left turn could well have been intended to gain VMC and sight of the ground and position the aircraft at some instrument pre- computed fix for a visual straight- in finals approach.

[Meester proach]

No the first time this has happened in my local Chilterns.

I remember about the time i started instructing a WAC 182 went down on a ridge not far away from the one