A new flight mode annunciation concept

[avionics_engineer]

Dear professional pilot community

Please have a look at my proposal for a new flight mode annunciation concept:

https://www.surveymonkey.co.uk/r/22NYTHV

I would be very grateful for your feedback.

Many thanks.

Best regards

avionics_engineer

[Pontius]

Interesting :ok:

[FullWings]

Yes. Quite thought provoking. I like the way it reduces the complexity of some modes down to basic indications, like altitude, speed, etc. so it’s more obvious that intervention may be required for the best outcome.

Another plus is that this is a small addition, rather than a complete re-working of a display. The original presentation is still there, just the important bits are highlighted. Early days but I think you might have something really worthwhile here...

[Cough]

I'm neutral. When the boxes move to their new homes during an FMA transition, your eyes are drawn towards them. Your eyes actually need to be drawn towards what is missing - In the example given its autothrust and the need for manual thrust control.

[Capt Scribble]

What you are suggesting is to lead the pilot's scan. In the old days this was done by practise and experience but now we have become lazy and reliant on the technology working as advertised. As has been suggested, rather than highlighting what is correct, maybe a flag can be annotated to parameters that are not normal (if such a thing can be worked out!).

[Denti]

I do not really see where the big difference is. We already get boxes around new modes, and any correctly trained pilot knows the implications of those boxes instantly. The effort should be on training, rather than even more visual cues in a system that already relies too heavily on one sensor channel of those three that are available to human beings (visual, audio and tactile).

As mentioned above, the example with the deactivated autothrust is rather interesting, the speed decay, the eyes are drawn to the new boxes without any prompting for the decaying speed. This is rather doing the opposite of what it should do if we have to direct the scan to start with.

[Pontius]

Your eyes actually need to be drawn towards what is missing - In the example given its autothrust and the need for manual thrust control.

I agree and wrote as such in the comments field. I suggested that there might be a red box to highlight the fact that airspeed (in this case) was reducing beyond a certain limit close to minimums. Of course, there exist other visual cues at the moment (even if they are ignored by Asiana) but as this is meant to be improving an existing system then why not draw more attention rather than just have the speed reducing past the hockey stick etc?

Another plus is that this is a small addition, rather than a complete re-working of a display. The original presentation is still there, just the important bits are highlighted


Yeah, I liked that too. Not trying to reinvent the wheel just add some chrome to it.

[Amadis of Gaul]

I like the idea, but not the execution. Particularly because the amount of clutter is increased even if some that clutter is arguably more helpful.

[FE Hoppy]

You've started with a 30 year old style of PFD and added some boxes mate. It makes no difference.

Go study proline fusion on big displays and HUD to see where the industry is at and work from there.

[framer]

In the old days this was done by practise and experience but now we have become lazy and reliant on the technology working as advertised.
Just a small point and you may well be aware of it anyway;
We haven't become lazy, we have become complacent. It seems like a pedantic point but it is very important because one is caused by a poor attitude and could be resolved at the recruitment stage, and the other is caused by evolutionary heuristics which need to be understood to solve the problem. When that small (large) point of difference became clear to me it completely changed how I viewed the problems the industry faces around maintaining pilot skills so I thought it worth mentioning as it may do the same for others.
Cheers

[Tinstaafl]

I think your flight mode awareness display is good but could be improved. Use the green box for currently active as you have suggested, but also add a limiting time flashing red box for a terminating parameter+flashing green box for a commencing parameter. After the time period the red box disappears and the flashing green box stops flashing.

eg IAS mode during descent to an altitude

During altitude capture as the primary parameter changes from IAS to ALT, the IAS green box would change to flashing red and the ALT box activates as flashing green, with an audio alert. After a second or two the IAS flashing red disappears and the ALT flashing green stops flashing.

[ACMS]

Nothing wrong with the way Boeing has been doing it for 30 years. IMHO.

If you think the Boeing AFDS is complicated don't go anywhere near the Airbus one.:sad:

[FullWings]

Not wishing to put words into the author’s mouth but I think the point of this exercise is to cut out a mental step or two when relating what is on the FMA to what the aircraft is going to do next, therefore freeing capacity.

On the 777 there are seven autothrottle modes (eight if you count blank), nine roll modes and ten pitch modes. That’s over seven hundred possible combinations. Granted, many of those are not likely or even possible but some have complex interactions and the effects of the same are not always immediately obvious, especially on a stormy night approach (or day CAVOK one) after 15hrs in the air. We have plenty of evidence for this...

...also add a limiting time flashing red box...

I think you have to be careful with that colour: it’s generally reserved for “warnings” that things that have gone wrong in a big way and need fixing NOW, like GPWS, fires, windshear, stalls, etc. If I was going to add more, it might be an amber “caution” box, although you already get that when the the airspeed gets too low and having amber when you’re not actually in a caution zone appears to be contrary to the overall design logic.

[Intruder]

The concept is actually a good one, given that a practical limitation is that a complete display overhaul will NOT be forthcoming on legacy airplane suites. As a modification to existing systems, it has merits.

Thinner boxes might reduce the appearance of clutter. A color or dashed-line code might even relate parameter to mode (e.g., magenta box or short dashed lines for roll mode).

[Uplinker]

The proposals seem to me to add complexity and clutter rather than reduce it. The basic piloting job is to scan the instruments. In a modern jet airliner, the various modes on the FMA and their interactions with flight parameters also must be understood, and the influence of each mode and mode change on the primary flight parameters must be constantly checked and understood.

For example; one must always understand who or what is controlling aircraft speed, and how this is being achieved. The pilot must scan the speed tape and the trend arrow often and be in no doubt about which system is controlling speed. So the primary visual check must be to the speed tape and trend arrow. If a green box is drawn around the speed, then I can see problems in that the tired/lazy/incompetant pilot will get used to just glancing to see if the green box is present without actually reading the speed and trend. If pilots get used to this, it will cause serious problems in the event of system failures and those times when manual flight is required.

Another example is the heading demonstration. If a pilot has to have a green box drawn around the heading bug to know which parameter "heading" will affect, then there is little hope for them.

If the FMA changes, a pilot must be able to assimilate the PFD themselves and know which parameter on the PFD the FMA change will affect, because systems knowledge and an understanding of how each system affects which PFD parameter is also important. The danger here is that pilots might get used to just checking to see three green boxes on the PFD without knowing or understanding which modes the aircraft systems are in.

No disrespect to the OP, but I am not sure that this is a useful advance to piloting.


(I am an Airbus pilot and I have to say that the Boeing FMA seems confusing compared to the Airbus one, but of course that is probably just because I am unfamiliar with it.)

[FullWings]

All valid points. However, we are where we are when it comes to (lack of) instruments scans and mode awareness in glass cockpits and until the design and/or training changes, that’s where we’re going to stay. Flight directors are not helping.

I don’t think there are any rules against making things easier if there are corresponding increases in safety and awareness. It’s all very well saying “pilots should...” and “constantly checked” and “know the systems” but we need to acknowledge the underlying reality that it is sometimes hard to keep the comprehension up at x-o’clock in the morning after long flight and a tiring run of duties. A little help goes a long way and it’s not a competition.

[Uplinker]

I don’t think there are any rules against making things easier if there are corresponding increases in safety and awareness. I

Agreed, systems such as TCAS come under this description.

However, pilots do need to understand and monitor their flight systems and modes. Dumbing down flight displays and not requiring a reasonable level of ability will lead us to a bad place - children of the magenta and all that.

If the FMA had not yet been invented, then this proposal might be worth considering, but it has, so the information is already there. I am comparing this to the Airbus PFD and FMA which seem to give all the information required in a very clear manner. Perhaps the Boeing version is more complicated and/or less understandable? I don't know.

[AndoniP]

I'm not an airline pilot at all, but the comment above about long sectors and fatigue made me think of this - would it help if the display gradually changed over the course of the flight for longer sectors? So after an exhausting 12-15 hour flight you'd get less information to deal with the longer the flight gets, giving the PF only the required information and not the supplementary, less important information? Just thinking out loud really.

[Uplinker]

a) All the information on the PrimaryFlightDisplay, and others, is important at any time of flight - especially during the approach to land after ~12 hours ! Trust me, manufacturers and airlines do not provide instrumentation that is not required !

A comparison might be a car suppressing some of its instrumentation, for example its anti skid or brake warning lights after it had been driven for more than say 4 hours?

b) It would be condoning fatigued pilots in charge of airliners, which is a definite no-no.

There is a very simple way to make sure that pilots do not get confused by PFD's: Proper selection, Proper training, and no fatigue.

[FE Hoppy]

Many EDS declutter non essential information but display it again in case of failures. Also may PFDs and I think all HUDs declutter in case of unusual attitude.

[safetypee]

The value of changing the FMA depends on the viewpoint.
A conventional view of automatic flight is that the aircraft's state is determined by using the basic instruments; if the flight path is not as required then the auto flight system should be adjusted (or disengaged) and the modes and selections cross checked with the crew's intention.
An alternative view reverses this, where the FMA is used to deduce what the automation is doing, or should be doing, with little reference to the basic instruments. Then the aircraft flight path is inferred from the annunciation. This often results in 'what is it doing now' and contributes to reduced awareness of attitude or speed.

Locating mode annunciation closer to the relevant instrument parameter is an interesting idea, but it might not direct attention to the associated instrument parameter as assumed.
If a pilot looks for a mode annunciation, s/he will 'see' that mode without necessarily being aware of the adjacent instrument display; vice versa, look for an instrument reading and not 'see' the annunciation.

Whilst many accident and incident reports cite 'failure to look at the FMA', such conclusions more often hide problems associated with lack of awareness of the aircraft state, poor instrument scan, the 'mantra' need follow SOPs and monitor everything, but with little thought of workload and the importance of understanding.

The proposal is interesting, but is it a solution seeking a problem?
What specific issue is it designed to address?

[framer]

a) All the information on the PrimaryFlightDisplay, and others, is important at any time of flight -
I don't agree with that. There comes a point when more information is not necessarily better and i think we have gone past that point in modern airliners. Just an opinion of course, no science to back it up :)

[Uplinker]

You have quoted me replying to #18 where a non pilot was asking about removing information after 12 or more hours of flying.

What information would you remove from a standard Airbus A320/321 PFD/ND/EWD/SD ?

What information would you remove from those displays in an A330 after 12 hours of flight - possibly as you were just starting your approach??

[avionics_engineer]

Ladies and Gents
Many thanks to those of you who completed or will complete the "surveymonkey" questions. You also made some very valid points here in the forum.
The modified display style was tested in an eye-tracking experiment and the main goal was to evaluate, if the number of "missed" mode transitions can be reduced. The analysis is ongoing. I am aware that the involved display is not the latest, but the point here is really the philosophy, not the "graphics". Obviously the proposed design has some drawbacks, such as drawing the attention "away" from a critical parameter under certain conditions. I agree that the best safety feature is a properly trained pilot, but at the same time we should not stop exploring new ideas from the engineering side.
Feel free to share the survey and many thanks again.
avionics_engineer

[agg_karan]

Why such a long Amber band below 180 KTS in the demo video?

[Dan Winterland]

I'm with the guys who talk about clutter. We need to reduce the information, not add to it. PFDs are getting more complex with information overload. Not only is this distracting, it's fatiguing. Engineers add more and more and add to the problems. If a pilot designed a flight information display from the outset - it would look different.

[Uplinker]

Possible thread creep, but relevant I hope:

On the Airbus, the only time the speed control part of the FMA is blank is when the autothrust is completely off - i.e., not active or armed. At all other times, it gives the status of the Autothrust; either Speed/Mach or Thrust Climb or Thrust Idle or MAN FLEX, TOGA etc.

I don't know Boeing but on the ? 777 PFD shown in this thread; during FLCH mode, the Autothrust 'speed' annunciation seemed to move over to the pitch box leaving the top left speed control box blank.

So I wonder is there a danger that since 777 pilots get used to seeing a blank box top left when the Autothrust is still operating, this might lead to some missing the clues when the Autothrust is actually off for real?

(For example we have seen from the SFO 777 crash that non movement of normally moving thrust levers is not necessarily a clue that the autothrust is not controlling speed?)

Could this be why the sort of additions proposed by the OP might be thought necessary?

(NB: I have not flown Boeing, but this is not an A vs B bashing at all, I am merely trying to understand the psychology and causes of some accidents).

[PEI_3721]

Uplinker, :ok:
The problem described is like negative inference, a very powerful bias and thus could be a significant issue in incidents and accidents.

[skkm]

I don't know Boeing but on the ? 777 PFD shown in this thread; during FLCH mode, the Autothrust 'speed' annunciation seemed to move over to the pitch box leaving the top left speed control box blank.

So I wonder is there a danger that since 777 pilots get used to seeing a blank box top left when the Autothrust is still operating, this might lead to some missing the clues when the Autothrust is actually off for real?


The SPD annunciation moves over to the vertical FMA box because the speed is now being controlled by pitch rather than the autothrottle.

I'm not really sure why in this video the autothrottle has been disconnected (Blank box) - if you're flying along and hit FLCH, you should get either THR or IDLE then HOLD depending if you're going up or down.

A blank left FMA box indicates exactly that – the autothrottle is NOT operating. If in a vertical mode other than FLCH SPD, however, the autothrottle, if armed, can still "wake up" and provide stall protection; this is what brought Asiana undone.

[Uplinker]

OK, thanks skkm. So like the Airbus, the Boeing FMA speed box will always display the Autothrust status, and only if it is inactive and unarmed, will the speed box ever be blank?

In that case I return to my personal opinion that this enhancement is not required and adds extra clutter.



The SPD annunciation moves over to the vertical FMA box because the speed is now being controlled by pitch rather than the autothrottle.


Yeah, I realised that, my point was that in the example the speed box was blank while the speed was being controlled, (by the elevators), leading to a potential negative as PEI3721 picked up.

:ok:

[skkm]

OK, thanks skkm. So like the Airbus, the Boeing FMA speed box will always display the Autothrust status, and only if it is inactive and unarmed, will the speed box ever be blank?

You will always have a mode displayed if the A/T is active.
If the A/T is disconnected, the FMA will always be blank. However, the A/T can (and usually is) still be armed in this case (by having the arm switches on the MCP on), and as such is able to perform its stall protection "wake up" function depending on vertical mode. There is no indication other than the position of the arm switches of this status.

The only time in normal operations that you'd see the left FMA blank is a manual thrust landing.

I realised that, my point was that in the example the speed box was blank while the speed was being controlled, (by the elevators), leading to a potential negative as PEI3721 picked up.

:ok:

I think this is a difference in design philosophy, then? The left FMA box is not a speed mode indication; it's an autothrottle mode indication. As such, a blank left FMA ought be a warning sign that while the speed may be being managed by a vertical mode, there's no support from the A/T. As I mentioned above, it is not normal or expected to see a blank left FMA except in specific circumstances, so the inferred expectation bias shouldn't exist.

---
There is the opposite issue, though, which is the crux of the Asiana accident: while you have an indication in the left box (HOLD) whilst in a speed-on-elevator vertical FD mode, the autothrottle will not wake up to provide speed protection should you get slow in manual flight.