American 763 takeoff incident, ORD

[akerosid]

Airliners.net reporting that a 763 suffered a tyre blowout on takeoff from ORD. Lots of smoke, but aircraft appears substantially intact; all evacuated safely.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Cv4R_z4UMAE7Itu.jpg:large

[Evey_Hammond]

"Intact"? https://www.rt.com/usa/364606-plane-fire-chicago/

[Eboy]

Live video:

WLS News Live Streaming Video | abc7chicago.com (http://abc7chicago.com/live/23381/)

[oldoberon]

and from the otherside

https://www.rt.com/usa/364606-plane-fire-chicago/

[oldoberon]

and from the otherside

Aircraft Reported "Down" at O'Hare Airport in Chicago - Breaking911 (http://breaking911.com/breaking-aircraft-reported-ohare-airport-chicago/)

[tdracer]

Another GE uncontained engine failure?
Without knowing the tail number, etc. I'd assume it's CF6-80C2 PMC (non-FADEC) - that makes up the majority of the American 767 fleet.

[aa73]

N345AN....2003 delivery, relatively young. The right wing is toast, outboard half of it melted to the ground

[akerosid]

Was operating AA 383, ORD-MIA; aborted takeoff.

Photo: N345AN (CN: 33084) Boeing 767-323(ER) by John Fitzpatrick Photoid:8242852 - JetPhotos.Net (http://www.jetphotos.net/photo/8242852)

There was some confusion as to whether this might be part of an airport fire drill, as suggested by some tweets; there was actually a fire drill ongoing when the incident occurred, but as the photos/footage show - definitely not a drill.

Has also been reported that FAA ordered a ground-stop, but airport still operating.

[lomapaseo]

Has also been reported that FAA ordered a ground-stop, but airport still operating.

Maybe it's just vernacular but doesn't the airport operator order the stop to permit land vehicles to operate freely and the tower passes it on?

After sorting it out an agreement is reached rather quickly on what runways and taxiways can accept traffic and the tower takes over

[TBSC]

@lomapaseo


The fire category of the airport might be decreased under the minimum needed for operation of large transport aircraft while the firefighters are occupied with the 767.

[Airbubba]

AA 383 Heavy cleared into position at N5 on 28R, then cleared for takeoff, left turn heading 220, wind 200 at 14.

AA 383 announces stopping on the runway. The tower says the right wing is on fire, AA 283 says send the trucks.

AA says they are evacuating.

More here starting at 00:27 into the recording, including reports of sparks on the takeoff roll from another aircraft:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kord/KORD-Tower-Center-Oct-28-2016-1930Z.mp3

[cactusbusdrvr]

Some info from ORD suggests that a tire or two blew during the abort and pieces penetrated the right inner fuel tank. That would cause the huge fire event on the right side. The question will be if it was a tire failure that was caused by an uncoontained engine failure or if it was an abort for what they thought was an engine issue but was in fact a blown tire. The sounds are very similar but the indications, of course, are not. I'm sure it will all come out in the investigation.

Kudos to the crew for getting the actual evacuation done quickly and safely. That's not easy with a raging fire going on next to you.

[smala01]

Now video trending on twitter

https://twitter.com/i/moments/792092267280564226

[giggitygiggity]

Seemingly another GE engine going pop. Apparently this had 2x GE CF6-80C2B6, for interest the BA 777 in LAS last year had 2x GE GE90-85B. As I understand, the GE90 was a complete redesign but did is it fundamentally a pretty similar power plant?

[sprite1]

I noticed the slide at door 2L has difficulty extending into position. Looks like due to the wind. At 14kts, I'd be concerned about its ability to extend at 35-40kts of wind which is the certificated demonstrated crosswind limit.

Also, anyone else notice the FedEx crash in FLL in the rt.com link above? Looks like a left gear failure on landing.

[Turbine D]

As I understand, the GE90 was a complete redesign but did is it fundamentally a pretty similar power plant?
Fundamentally very similar, both have a fan, compressor, combustor, HP turbine and LP turbine. Except one was designed in the early 1980s and the other in the early 1990s. One sports somewhere around 50,000lbs of thrust the other 85,000lbs of thrust. I think you will find the same with the RB-211 and the Trent engine series...

[tdracer]

As I understand, the GE90 was a complete redesign but did is it fundamentally a pretty similar power plant? No, GE90 is a clean sheet design compared to the CF6 - about all they have in common design wise is they are both two spool and made by GE.
There have been a number of issues with burst turbine discs on the CF6, but I don't recall the -80C2 variant being affected. The big problem has been with the CF6-50, with a few other well known events on the CF6-80A. Two -80A disc failures occurred during ground runs - one ground run failure resulted in the 767 burning to the ground :eek: (USAir IIRC).
But as noted, I don't recall any such issues with the CF6-80C2 (which was a major redesign of the -80A, not a whole lot in common)

[Cole Burner]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8CWPMVdkNN0

[Airbubba]

Some info from ORD suggests that a tire or two blew during the abort and pieces penetrated the right inner fuel tank. That would cause the huge fire event on the right side. The question will be if it was a tire failure that was caused by an uncoontained engine failure or if it was an abort for what they thought was an engine issue but was in fact a blown tire.

On some of the posted videos there are dark fabric looking things hanging off the right horizontal stab, perhaps remnants of a burst tire or two.

I was a pax on an MD-11 that had burst tires FOD the engine on a high speed reject years ago. Similar to the question above, I wondered if the tire burst came first or if the autobrakes caused the tire burst and the FOD occurred when the engine went into reverse.

I'm guessing a tire explosion can throw debris far enough in front to FOD the engine even with forward thrust at 100 knots. And, punch holes in the fuel tanks on the wing.

[tubby linton]

There were a number of failures with a C2A5 powered widebody airbus fleet in my airline.

[Godot64]

I noticed the slide at door 2L has difficulty extending into position. Looks like due to the wind. At 14kts, I'd be concerned about its ability to extend at 35-40kts of wind which is the certificated demonstrated crosswind limit.

Don't think it was just the wind blowing that slide around. One of the videos on Twitter has footage where you can hear what may be the port engine still operating as the slides deploy. As it shuts down, the out of place slide moves back into place.

[vapilot2004]

Some info from ORD suggests that a tire or two blew during the abort and pieces penetrated the right inner fuel tank.

Shades of Concorde if that were true. I will wait for more information. Sounds closer to an uncontained failure - perhaps another CF6 turbine disk?

[vapilot2004]

There have been a number of issues with burst turbine discs on the CF6, but I don't recall the -80C2 variant being affected. The big problem has been with the CF6-50, with a few other well known events on the CF6-80A. Two -80A disc failures occurred during ground runs - one ground run failure resulted in the 767 burning to the ground :eek: (USAir IIRC).
But as noted, I don't recall any such issues with the CF6-80C2 (which was a major redesign of the -80A, not a whole lot in common)

That was an American Airlines 767 at LAX. From what I know, there have been 4 HPT disk failures for the CF-6 until now. The turbine had about 50,000 hours on wing and was around 2/3 of the way into it's lifetime cycle limits. The other -80A threw its turbine disc on the ground during maintenance run ups in Philadelphia. That was a UAL bird and also sustained substantial damage. The third aircraft was Air New Zealand, headed from Brisbane to NZ. That failure occurred in flight at 11,000 feet and contacted the wing leading edge. They were very lucky. Fourth aircraft? Unknown at the top of my head.

[BobM2]

No, GE90 is a clean sheet design compared to the CF6 - about all they have in common design wise is they are both two spool and made by GE.
There have been a number of issues with burst turbine discs on the CF6, but I don't recall the -80C2 variant being affected. The big problem has been with the CF6-50, with a few other well known events on the CF6-80A. Two -80A disc failures occurred during ground runs - one ground run failure resulted in the 767 burning to the ground :eek: (USAir IIRC).
But as noted, I don't recall any such issues with the CF6-80C2 (which was a major redesign of the -80A, not a whole lot in common)
The USAir was an -80C2

[Turbine D]

Original posting by tdracer:
Two -80A disc failures occurred during ground runs - one ground run failure resulted in the 767 burning to the ground (USAir IIRC).
The other one I recall is this one at LAX:
An explosion that ripped apart the engine of an American Airlines 767 during a ground test at Los Angeles International Airport was far more dangerous than first reported, new details suggest.

The blast was strong enough to hurl an 18-inch chunk of metal disk more than half a mile -- across taxiways, service roads and two active runways. Airport workers found the piece two days later, not far from the airport's perimeter fence.

The pilots on the incoming flight reported a vibration they couldn’t quite figure out the source other than one of the engines. So rather than remove the suspected engine from the wing for examination, it was decided to attempt to duplicate the vibration on wing.

Workers were still trying to figure out what was wrong with the airplane when they pushed the throttle for both engines to high power, and one of them blew apart.

The explosion outside the American Airlines maintenance hangar on June 2 sparked a small fire that sent a column of dark smoke over the passenger terminals at LAX and drew most of the initial attention. The explosion -- officially an "uncontained engine failure" -- gutted the engine and blackened part of the airplane's fuselage. Part of the failed disk traversed through the fuselage doing substantial damage and into the other engine.

It also blasted pieces of the damaged engine onto a nearby runway -- and, in one case, clear across the southern airfield. The workers who found that piece half a mile away described it as a wedge of metal, 2 inches thick, and heavy.

The aircraft was written off as a total loss.

The problem were tiny cracks that had developed in the edges of the fir trees of the disk holding the stage 1 HPT blades. These cracks became apparent near the end of the life of the disks, but before removal from service.

http://i1166.photobucket.com/albums/q609/DaveK72/aa2_zps303l3yxj.jpg (http://s1166.photobucket.com/user/DaveK72/media/aa2_zps303l3yxj.jpg.html)

[Blade Master]

Do the first class passengers have to carry their own luggage down the slide or does the staff assist them?

[aterpster]

Turbine D:

That LAX incident told me that AAL pushes their maintenance to the max. Can you imagine this 767 half way between LAX and HNL?

[Airbubba]

A report that this was an uncontained 'fan disc' failure:

At Chicago O'Hare, American Airlines 767 catches fire on runway

By Steve Almasy, Jon Ostrower and Rene Marsh, CNN

Updated 10:11 PM ET, Fri October 28, 2016

(CNN)The right-side engine of an American Airlines Boeing 767 failed Friday during an attempted takeoff, sending debris as far as a half mile and passengers hurriedly down emergency slides onto a runway at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport.

Three sources familiar with the unfolding investigation told CNN the General Electric engine suffered an apparent "uncontained" failure.

The 161 terrified passengers and nine crew members scrambled to safety Friday afternoon after huge flames erupted on the right side of the plane.

The rare, but extremely serious, engine failure sent debris from the engine spewing across the south side of the expansive airfield. Part of the engine's fan disc were found a half mile away on a hangar used by UPS, two sources said.

At Chicago O'Hare, American 767 catches fire on runway - CNN.com (http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/28/us/ohare-aircraft-incident/index.html)

As in TurbineD's AA 767 news article posted above, the engine parts were flung a half mile away. :eek:

[Fonsini]

If that fan disc had let go 20 seconds later..........

Time to get auto lockouts fitted to the overhead bins, at a minimum for first class it seems.

[tdracer]

The USAir was an -80C2
You are correct, that was a CF6-80C2. I stand corrected...
GE has previously expressed concern regarding the use of PMA turbine blades (i.e. aftermarket blades). Their turbine disc life limits are based on the OEM blades - the PMA blades are typically a different material and significantly heavier than the OEM blades, which throws those turbine disc life limit analysis out the window...

BTW Turbine D, that was the other event I was thinking off (that picture of a partial disc embedded in the other engine is well seared in my memory, although I believe it bounced off the ground - it didn't go through the airplane). I didn't remember the aircraft being a write-off, but it was well used 767 so it probably didn't take all that much damage).

I treat early reports as highly suspect - more often than not they are incorrect, however if the report Airbubba quotes is correct of a fan disc failure, that's really scary. Off hand, I can't remember a fan disc failure since the Sioux City DC-10.

[Airbubba]

I treat early reports as highly suspect - more often than not they are incorrect, however if the report Airbubba quotes is correct of a fan disc failure, that's really scary. Off hand, I can't remember a fan disc failure since the Sioux City DC-10.

And, I may be reading too much into the report when they say fan disc parts were found half a mile away. It might still be a turbine disc failure causing an explosion that tore up the fan.

[CCA]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8CWPMVdkNN0

As said above regarding the slide at L2

You can hear the left engine is still running and it is shut down at 0:33.

You can also notice the cabin lighting is still on so electrical power is still applied.

[Mr Wuli]

The internal video shows MOST of the overhead lockers were closed and very few passengers carrying their hand luggage....I guess when its this obviously serious people understand the need to EVAC swiftly.

[lomapaseo]

I treat early reports as highly suspect - more often than not they are incorrect, however if the report Airbubba quotes is correct of a fan disc failure, that's really scary. Off hand, I can't remember a fan disc failure since the Sioux City DC-10.

Delta MD80 in Florida.

The GE fan blades are much bigger now days

obviously we need more info on this one

pics?

[Setpoint99]

According to Eric Horng (sic) of ABC 7 Eyewitness News TV in Chicago, passenger [Gary] "Schiavone said during the evacuation several passengers remarkably tried to grab their bags out of the overhead compartment. That almost caused people to fall in the aisle.”

[msbbarratt]

GE has previously expressed concern regarding the use of PMA turbine blades (i.e. aftermarket blades). Their turbine disc life limits are based on the OEM blades - the PMA blades are typically a different material and significantly heavier than the OEM blades, which throws those turbine disc life limit analysis out the window...
I am not a gas turbine engineer, but even I'd stop and think about it before swapping in heavier blades, given the RPM these things run at. It sounds, well, risky... I'm slightly surprised that the certification system would allow that to happen. It seems like a massive departure from the designer's intents, like disabling the overweight trip on a 3 ton elevator in a building and then putting 4 tonnes in it and pressing the button for the 100th floor.

Do a lot of airlines tinker in this way? Any way for the flying public to find out in advance of getting on board?

[cooperplace]

Great job by the crew and emergency services. The videos show a few people taking carry-ons out with them, altho' the inside video showed only 1 empty o/head locker. Lots of passengers loudly urging others to get off as quickly as possible. Lots getting off without luggage. Maybe passengers are starting to get the message?

[FullWings]

I was amused by the results of going down a slide while trying to film the process at the same time: “Aaarrrghh! Ouch! Thud! Ooofff!..."

[Ddraig Goch]

Loved that post Blade master:ok::ok:

[rog747]

as in EK and SQ 777 ground fires - the wind was again in most part here blowing the fire away from the fuselage

there is some bad smoke damage to the rear cabin Right hand side of this AA 767 but I cannot see a major breach or windows melted, the skin has been damaged - certainly lucky again otherwise Manchester would come back to haunt

[Jet Jockey A4]

For sure it is a write off... Glad everyone got off and only a few minor injuries... Well done to the crew.

http://i17.photobucket.com/albums/b79/mlab601/mlab601112/American%20383_zpsldoq6zgy.jpg

[Hotel Tango]

For sure it is a write off

Naah! New wing and off we go!

[old freightdog]

Listening to the ATC footage, it took quite a while till they ordered the Evac, but they did! Who was smarter, These AA guys or our SQ friends and their tripple recently? I see both rather simmilar, albight this fire sure seemed to have more punch!

[16024]

From the first post:

a 763 suffered a tyre blowout on takeoff from ORD. Lots of smoke, but aircraft appears substantially intact

Oh dear. Reminds me of this:

https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjk-bv42__PAhXiIMAKHX2iBZYQyCkIJzAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D8mdwAkWvWMw&usg=AFQjCNEBvHSU3o0a-_g8aJK0s-eFgBPRDA

Apologies to the OP. I know information kind of trickles in, but it tickled me.
It's OK to laugh as nobody was hurt...!

[bud leon]

Listening to the ATC footage, it took quite a while till they ordered the Evac, but they did! Who was smarter, These AA guys or our SQ friends and their tripple recently? I see both rather simmilar, albight this fire sure seemed to have more punch!

You can't tell the time between being stopped and when they ordered the evacuation. It's 1:50s between when they said they were stopping and when they told the tower they were evacuating.

No you can't compare the two fires. In the videos of this fire you can see intense flame reaching to 20 metres and the damage is substantial. I understand the SIA fire was extinguished in 5 minutes.

Clearly, if there was this kind of fire in the Singapore airlines fire you would expect the same kind of panic in the cabin and unless there were other safety reasons not to evacuate an evacuation more than likely would have occurred.

I still find it incomprehensible that people think the Singapore crew would let their passengers burn alive.

[vapilot2004]

GE has previously expressed concern regarding the use of PMA turbine blades (i.e. aftermarket blades). Their turbine disc life limits are based on the OEM blades - the PMA blades are typically a different material and significantly heavier than the OEM blades, which throws those turbine disc life limit analysis out the window...


This seems a bit odd. How could such inferior 'aftermarket' blades possibly be certified for use?

[sprite1]

I can't seem to quote.

Regarding the slide at door 2L, yes, after seeing that panicky guys evac video, you can hear the No.1 spooling down as he exits. That would put the time of the video of the 2L slide inflating earlier. In which case, hopefully the order to evacuate wasn't rushed or worse, given by the cabin crew without notifying the pilots.

Glad all on board are well, anyway.

Busy week for the NTSB!

[lomapaseo]

This seems a bit odd. How could such inferior 'aftermarket' blades possibly be certified for use?

after market stuff is viewed by the some as "if it looks like a duck and quacks likes a duck...."

Meanwhile we're getting off the track since we don't have any clues yet as to what part broke :)

I really doubt it has anything to do with these blades

[rog747]

causes?

Not sure yet as some conflicting info

Both NTSB and FAA and Ground sources indicated the fire was due to tire burst (from runway debris) causing debris to strike the wing fuel tanks etc but the airline made claims of un-contained engine failure

haven't seen a photo close up of No. 2 so cannot check state of damage but the engine looks quite intact here
https://d2lzghgvw1jtbn.cloudfront.net/event_updates/5/1371240672888522865_225470058.jpg

there is some bad smoke damage to the rear cabin Right hand side of this AA 767 but I cannot see a major breach or windows melted, the skin has been damaged - certainly lucky again with the wind blowing the fire away from fuselage as in SQ and EK accidents

the door 2L chute blowing around was due to ENG no.1 still running and was shut down during EVAC and chute was OK to use then

[golfyankeesierra]

Oh dear. Reminds me of this:

https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rc...aJK0s-eFgBPRDA

Apologies to the OP. I know information kind of trickles in, but it tickled me.
It's OK to laugh as nobody was hurt...!

Was thinking more about "The wing is not on fire" (https://youtu.be/Hh_shsRfXqk)

On a more serious note:
The photo of the burned aircraft is yet another good example to show the relevance of wind-direction during on ground fires...

[b1lanc]

Avherald reporting another high speed rejected takeoff by a UAL 767 due to failure of the port engine. Barcelona.

[chaps1954]

Rog747 Glad that lessons were learnt that day

[number0009]

Interesting......

20 injured as American Airlines jet catches fire at Chicago's O'Hare airport - LA Times (http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-chicago-ohare-fire-20161028-story.html)A large rounded piece of metal believed to have come from the plane smashed through the roof of a UPS facility on the airport grounds and bounced off the floor, according to an airport worker. "It looks like a piece of a turbine disk from a jet engine," the worker said, adding it was too hot to touch.......

[Chronus]

There are conflicting reports about this incident.
FAA and NTSB reported tyre blow out.
Airline reported engine malfunction.
Gossip from Chicago suggested FOD from rwy caused tyre blow out and fragments penetrated fuel tank.
Perhaps the only reliable thing is that it happened during the t/o run. In which case commendation to crew for their fast and correct response.

[RatherBeFlying]

As opposed to the silence from Singapore investigating authority (and others who keep their cards close to to their vests) we can look forward to timely factual releases from the NTSB:ok:

[tdracer]

This seems a bit odd. How could such inferior 'aftermarket' blades possibly be certified for use?
All it really takes is for a DER to sign off that the parts are "functionally equivalent".
This may be a complete red herring for this accident, but maybe not. At best, PMA parts have been something of a dirty secret of the industry - for but many people (me included, and I was a DER) it's been an accident waiting to happen. The engine manufacturer (and airframe manufacturer) are required to perform exhaustive testing and analysis to prove that the various parts are airworthy before they can be certified. But under PMA, someone can 'reverse engineer' the part and make a Chinese copy, get a DER to sign off that it's 'functionally equivalent', and it becomes a perfectly legal, acceptable replacement part without having to perform all that troublesome cert testing. Since the PMA doesn't have all the overhead of testing, etc., they can significantly undercut the OEM on price.


For a long time, PMA was pretty much limited to 'consumables' - things like filters, seals, etc. Although even that can go wrong - back 10 or 15 years ago there was a big mess on the 737NG when a batch of PMA fuel filters started coming apart in service and thoroughly contaminating the fuel control system they were supposed to protect (I'm thinking there was an AD to get them out of service).
Now days it's extended to internal engine components - such as turbine blades (part of my DER recurrent training several years ago was how to certify PMA turbine blades :rolleyes:). A while back, as their market share sank, Pratt and Whitney started making PMA turbine blades for the CFM. Now, I suspect P&W PMA blades are fine, other PMA blade manufactures not so much

[vapilot2004]

Thank you, TD for your insight. I understand PMA parts don't even require extensive testing if they can show, strictly on paper, that their specs are the same as the OEM. This seems to be, at best, a questionable practice.

I recall a time when one of our engines came off wing for some unscheduled maintenance. The OEM refused to overhaul the engine with the non-OEM parts, despite the parts being fully compliant with the regulators. I believe there were filters and an IDG cooling assembly involved. The filters should have been a non-issue since they were being replaced as part of the maintenance, but it all got some squawks from the folks at the OEM maintenance facility.

This convinced our maintenance chief (exec) to never use non-OEM replacement parts again - at least on the engine cores. ACM bits and hydraulic fittings, two areas where you would think one would want maximum reliability, continue to be allowed to use the non-OEM, PMA approved bits. Go figure.

Back to this event: If a PMA turbine blade is heavier than the OEM, would it not be an issue for not only balance, but stress on the supporting disk?

[lomapaseo]

Back to this event: If a PMA turbine blade is heavier than the OEM, would it not be an issue for not only balance, but stress on the supporting disk?

Obviously yes and also significantly affect all sorts of fatigue limits requiring full up engine cert testing.

However it is a very big stretch to even imagine things going that far so lets wait for some more facts to develop.

[tdracer]

Back to this event: If a PMA turbine blade is heavier than the OEM, would it not be an issue for not only balance, but stress on the supporting disk? It's not uncommon for turbine blades - even OEM blades (and sometimes compressor blades) that there is a requirement to change them as a complete set - this is often the case when there is a change to the blade design to improve durability and/or performance. It's not just balance, it can be things like blade cooling (if they are not changed as a set the new blades my 'hog' cooling air meaning the old blades are not properly cooled, or visa-versa).

[bud leon]

As opposed to the silence from Singapore investigating authority (and others who keep their cards close to to their vests) we can look forward to timely factual releases from the NTSB

Except that there isn't silence. A brief interim report has been issued with interim safety recommendations, as is common practice. The report also indicates that they will be investigating other safety related aspects and it may well be evacuation decisions are one of them.

As the 16th busiest airport in the world Singapore has relatively few incidents (its configuration being one reason I imagine), and Singapore being so small has little domestic aviation. Singapore doesn't even rate on country aircraft incident statistics. Unless Singapore's AAIB employs expatriates I very much doubt it has the aircraft investigation experience that North America has.

[vapilot2004]

All makes perfect sense regarding PMA turbine blades. I hadn't considered the differences in through-blade cooling airflow - very much a critical concern in that part of the engine core. Thank you LomaP and TD. :ok:

I thought GE re-jiggered manufacturing and overhaul specs after the first couple of HPT disk failures and those changes were designed to mitigate these events - but my point may be moot as we really don't know what happened yet.

[b1lanc]

NTSB saying #2 stage high pressure turbine disk failed, confirming piece landing on UPS warehouse a half mile away and another piece a third of a mile away.

[B-HKD]

In addition to what tdracer already highlighted, with regards to PMA parts.

This article may be of some interest.

http://www.chromalloy.com/files/newspressrelease/c6d9b009-cbe8-e76a-f508-cc542415a369.pdf

Dated December 2009

"There are now more than 300,00 approved PMA parts, and the number grows each year by about 35,000"

"To give an example of how our prices compare to OEMs, you can pay $50-83 for a wheel seal, while our prices are $30-50. This adds up to a large saving for an airline using 500 seals each year"

[lomapaseo]

NTSB: Engine disk failed, sending pieces flying from plane at O'Hare - Chicago Tribune (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-ohare-plane-fire-engine-disk-failed-20161029-story.html)

....Examination of the engine revealed that the stage two disk of a high-pressure turbine failed, Lorenda Ward, a senior investigator for the NTSB, said in a news conference late Saturday afternoon at O'Hare....

[CONSO]

NTSB: Engine disk failed, sending pieces flying from plane at O'Hare - Chicago Tribune (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-ohare-plane-fire-engine-disk-failed-20161029-story.html)
'
One piece of the disk was found in a UPS warehouse 2,920 feet south of the plane and another piece was found about 0.3 miles north of the plane on airport property. About 90 percent of the disk has been found.
The disk pieces will be sent to Washington, D.C., for testing, officials said. The right engine — the one involved in Friday's accident — was made by General Electric. It will be removed, sent to GE and dismantled. Maintenance records will be reviewed as part of the investigation, Ward said."

[AmericanFlyer]

Maybe the tire failed because a piece of the engine sliced through it?

[crewmeal]

It still amazes me how stupid people would rather stand in a cabin filming an evacuation to be a star of YouTube instead of trying to save themselves from possible smoke inhalation. Is this the norm now?

8CWPMVdkNN0

[rog747]

crewmeal

be thankful that in this incident, plus the dynamic airways 767 fort Lauderdale fire, and both the EK and the SQ 777 incidents that the wind was blowing the fire AWAY from the fuselage each time
otherwise we could have been looking at 4 x Manchester B/Airtours scenarios

[Jet Jockey A4]

@ crewmeal... "It still amazes me how stupid people would rather stand in a cabin filming an evacuation to be a star of YouTube instead of trying to save themselves from possible smoke inhalation. Is this the norm now?"

To be fair to the person filming, he was waiting in line to get out, I do not believe he was just standing there filming.

You can hear some people yelling at others to get out (I presume some were trying to pull things out of the overhead bins). Even once outside the aircraft you can hear a woman calling someone a sick :mad:

[212man]

There doesn't appear to be much instruction from cabin crew at the door - I heard a brief mention of "sitting position" but other than that it wasn't obvious there was even a crew member there!

[glad rag]

Bet that was a rush!

[Machdiamond]

Forgetting to shut the engines down immediately after an evacuation command, with unusable slides and/or passengers blown the ground, seems to become a common occurrence.

Or maybe it is placed too far down in the evacuation checklist?

[Hotel Tango]

Going only from that evacuation video, my wife (ex cabin crew) remarked on the lack of commands from the cabin crew.

[anson harris]

Going only from that evacuation video, my wife (ex cabin crew) remarked on the lack of commands from the cabin crew.
Thought the same - obviously I wasn't there but there didn't seem to be an awful lot of taking control of the situation. Then again, the pax seem to be doing the sensible thing.

[expurser]

Going only from that evacuation video, my wife (ex cabin crew) remarked on the lack of commands from the cabin crew.

I thought the same too. I have done one (fairly uneventful) evacuation and I was shouting commands as loud as I could

[rog747]

cabin crew seemed very passive in videos - seems unusual - but all on board OK and off OK quickly and not too much hand baggage this time down the chutes -

[Lancelot de boyles]

With the mention of the engine remaining running, and slides being blown around, I wonder who initiated the evacuation- Flight deck or Cabin crew. (I can't quite bring myself to read back through the thread to see if it's mentioned.

I once had a conversation with one of the more seasoned number-ones, who took the view that if she started an evacuation without instruction from us on the flight deck, then her responsibility was to the greater passenger load as a whole, rather than the unfortunate first one down the slide and into a still running engine...

[WHBM]

cabin crew seemed very passive in videosIsn't it normal for cabin crew of US legacy carriers to disappear into the galley at doors closed and pass the time until doors open on arrival with reading magazines. Maybe they just didn't hear the evac command.

[rog747]

ATC recording says skipper announcing to tower we are evacuating about 2 mins or less after stopping

[cactusbusdrvr]

Forgetting to shut the engines down immediately after an evacuation command, with unusable slides and/or passengers blown the ground, seems to become a common occurrence.

Or maybe it is placed too far down in the evacuation checklist?

It's the second item after the checklist, after the parking brake is set. The evacuation command is the last item, as it should be. You need to evaluate the situation and not rush a checklist to be sure everything gets done.

This was most likely a cabin crew intimated evacuation, which they are entitled to do, but only if they cannot contact the flightdeck. The report will show the truth, but I would suspect that the flight attendants jumped the gun on the evacuation. It is fortunate that the flightdeck had already turn the fuel control switches off and the engine was winding down.

[Lancelot de boyles]

ATC recording says skipper announcing to tower we are evacuating about 2 mins or less after stopping


Ah, but is that because the aircraft was being evacuated, or because he had commanded an evacuation?

On a CRM course, not so very long ago, there was a robust discussion with some highly opinionated but otherwise limited experience cabin crew. The subject was the length of time from when an aborted takeoff occurred, to when the cabin were informed of the next action, beyond 'cabin crew at stations'.
So an exercise was run in a cabin trainer, to demonstrate how long it might be before word went from the flight deck to the cabin, beyond the 'at stations' announcement.

The outcome of this was some ruffled feathers among certain 'senior' cabin crew, who felt that they should be consulted immediately upon stopping, otherwise they would have to initiate an evacuation. Waiting even 30seconds being an eternity, and totally unacceptable in their opinion.


ps. Rog. Is that deepest darkest Darsit, or another one.

[Midland 331]

Anyone else, apart from me, having reflections on this event in the light of the British Airtours 737 event at Manchester in 1985?

This could have ended very differently.

Some of the survivors of the Manchester accident got to the over-wing exits by counting seat rows as they called along the floor.

As I watch the videos, I think, "where are the fire service?", never mind the skipper's decision.

[rog747]

as i mentioned above in my posts the wind was in their favour - not so in MAN sadly in 1985 - the wind played a major part in the early cabin breach

the wind also saved the recent SQ and EK 777 and Dynamic 767 incidents from being a cabin inferno and,or smoke nightmare

fire service arrived after about 3 mins or so after stopping and the EVAC had commenced - engines were not turned off before EVAC started

[rog747]

Ah, but is that because the aircraft was being evacuated, or because he had commanded an evacuation?

On a CRM course, not so very long ago, there was a robust discussion with some highly opinionated but otherwise limited experience cabin crew. The subject was the length of time from when an aborted takeoff occurred, to when the cabin were informed of the next action, beyond 'cabin crew at stations'.
So an exercise was run in a cabin trainer, to demonstrate how long it might be before word went from the flight deck to the cabin, beyond the 'at stations' announcement.

The outcome of this was some ruffled feathers among certain 'senior' cabin crew, who felt that they should be consulted immediately upon stopping, otherwise they would have to initiate an evacuation. Waiting even 30seconds being an eternity, and totally unacceptable in their opinion.


ps. Rog. Is that deepest darkest Darsit, or another one.
lol yes Dorset

The skipper told ATC he was doing an EVAC because they asked him what he was doing

have a listen to ATC feed its in an early post on here

[morbos]

Not just good luck with winds, these disc separation events have somewhat random outcomes, a cabin penetration is always on the cards. That 767 run up at lax was a tarmac bounce, Qantas 32's disc became 3 pieces in an instant but fortunately none into the cabin. Sometimes, not so lucky, delta 1288.

[barit1]

Physics says there will always be three pieces.

[lomapaseo]

only if its above it burst limits in either temp or speed ..... most are not

But some turbine disks ala the A380 are

and if 3 equal pieces they will go off in 3 equal directions. So having found one piece you know where the others have to be (Newtonian physics)

[Airbubba]

Physics says there will always be three pieces.

Can you cite a reference for that claim?

[surfman96]

Video of AA383 coming to a stop and inflation of the over-the-wing slide within ~ 20 seconds of stopping.

https://twitter.com/FlightAlerts777/status/792294272431185920

[DaveReidUK]

Physics says there will always be three pieces.

I'd love to read that proof too.

[cwatters]

and if 3 equal pieces they will go off in 3 equal directions. So having found one piece you know where the others have to be (Newtonian physics)

Presumably you arrive at that by applying conservation of momentum to the disc in isolation. Might be valid for a failure in the air but I don't think you can ignore the possibility of external forces, especially when the event involves impact with the ground.

[lomapaseo]

Physics says there will always be three pieces.

Can you cite a reference for that claim?

if one removes the word "always" then the answer lies in:

For flywheel shaped disks (High speed turbines) the stress field between radial stress and tangential stress is relatively equal over much of the disk (not the OD or ID) and at overstress conditions when the disk fractures the maximiun energy state of each piece released (in translation and rotation) occurs at 127 degrees of arc of the pie shaped released sections.

Wont happen if the disk fractures from a gross single defect condition at normal speeds (expect one very large, one moderate and several small)

[sprite1]

That video from Twitter will have to be reviewed in depth by the airlines regarding who sits at the over wing exits and how clearly and definitively they are briefed by the Cabin Crew that they are to only open it under instruction from the captain or cabin crew over the PA.

So often I see wholly unsuitable passengers (for example, foreign passengers not from the airlines' country, 5 foot nothing women that don't know how heavy 33lbs is, passengers sleeping as soon as they get on etc.) sitting by the over wing exits.

Referencing the Twitter video with the oh my god screamy guy from page 1, it was a good minute from the left over wing exits opening to him escaping through door 1L when the number 1 was spooling down. That is so dangerous.
Such a long time to have passengers on a wing and behind an idling engine with the exhaust blast and heat etc.

As the co-pilot was asking Tower if they saw anything, the slide was being blown.

To our US pilots/AA pilots, in AA, is there an early PA to passengers (within 5 seconds, say, of stopping) saying something like, 'Everything is fine, we're dealing with it, give us a sec', or is their SOP to deal with everything first in cockpit, talk to cabin crew, tower, etc and then deal with the passengers?

[West Coast]

Not AA but US carrier. Our protocol for an abort is for the FO to go back after control txfer if need be and keep the pax seated, then to the FA's to assess and wait for the Captain's command. None of that precludes them from initiating an evac if it meet their criteria.

[sprite1]

Thanks West Coast.

It's quite different to our SOP, European Legacy, so.

Do you/are you permitted to go further rearward than the forward galley? I'd be thinking you'd get blocked by pax if the captain ordered an evac after speaking with you and the FA's or the situation degraded while you were in the cabin.

Interesting, all the same.

Also, what is your airline's thinking, having you step out into the cabin to get info that way? Do they feel the inter-phone introduces too much of a chance for confusion?

Cheers.

[West Coast]

Sprite

It's not addressed in our documents, assuming you mean as a part of an evaluation to determine whether an evac is warranted. As is, we rely on the FA's evaluation if it isn't such as being in pieces.

Communication is completed via interphone as long as it's operable.

[sprite1]

Ok, cheers. Understood.

Poor guys up the front must've got an awful shock seeing the pax evacuate before they shut the engines down.

[surfman96]

A second video shows the forward and rear doors opening, slides deploying, and first passengers down the forward slide.

https://twitter.com/Donnahdanoosh/status/792091608451690496

Unfortunately, the Donnahdanoosh video doesn't appear to overlap the first FlightAlerts777 video (shows a/c stopping and over-wing slide deployment)

https://twitter.com/FlightAlerts777/...94272431185920

Added:

A third video shows what appears to be the first person down the rear door slide.

https://twitter.com/met_valpo/status/792100786364899329

[underfire]

In order to meet the required evac criteria, looks like the airlines will have to not allow carryon baggage...

[Mansfield]

In the cockpit, you have two guys trying to assess, communicate with the cabin, make a decision that almost inevitably results in some kind of injury, and execute a 10 to 12 step checklist in an orderly manner...

In the cabin, you have 7 FA's and a boatload of pax awaiting a decision when it is painfully obvious to all what the answer is...this kind of intense pressure bears totally on the cabin crew. Given the obvious next move, obvious even to your average low-information passenger...you know, with the right wing fully engulfed in flames...how long should they wait?

There is no right answer. Bottom line is everybody got out. It wasn't necessarily as pretty as we might wish, but it worked. Now we need to think about how we get the cockpit SA and the cabin SA into alignment a helluva lot quicker.

One way is through continual monitoring of the cabin interphone with an SOP that says the cabin can simply pickup the phone and start talking...without all the chimes and secret signals...thus aligning the cockpit SA more quickly to what is going on in the cabin.

I will simply note that such was the SOP at this particular cockpit crew's previous employer...but that is not the SOP at the current employer...

[RatherBeFlying]

Recently a number of airframes have been seriously damaged or written off by fire without losing any pax.

Going back a few decades shows a less benign record. Some of the reduced fatality count can be credited to improved design of fuel systems and structures. But some day there will be another major fuel system breach with the wind blowing the wrong way.

In that case the fatality count will be a function of delay in beginning evacuation.

I propose that RTO SOP include cabin crew at the rear stations as they are best positioned to observe the gear and wings. In case of any flames, the rear crew must have an open line to the cockpit.

Cabin crew training needs to include fire assessment and knowledge of fire propagation. They need to be able to distinguish between tire and brake fires that certification allows time for ARFF to get on the job and fuel fires that are being blown towards the the fuselage.

Report of a fuel fire should interrupt the cockpit checklists in favor of immediate shutdown for evacuation.

Admittedly fires can either die out on their own or rapidly develop into a major conflagration. We only ever know after the fact.

Elderly and fragile pax are usually the last in line for evacuation and most prone to injury going down the slides.

Once the able bodied are off, there might be time to reassess the fire danger, especially if ARFF is on the scene and getting the fire under control. But remember that most fatal fires have exacted their toll before ARFF is on the scene.

[Capn Bloggs]

Report of a fuel fire should interrupt the cockpit checklists in favor of immediate shutdown for evacuation.

What "cockpit checklists" are you doing if not the Evacuation checklist? You've aborted (probably because of an almighty bang as the disk let go). The only thing happening then is deciding what to do. If you decide to evacuate, you must do the Evacuation checklist, you can't just "shut down and bale out". If you think your Evac checklist has too many items, then get it changed.

[Kerosine]

For those on the bus, it may be useful to have a prioritised indication (master warning for example) of door opening in the event of an RTO.

Perhaps last item in the RTO memory actions, or first line of the EVAC checklist:

"If at any time warning DOOR CABIN/EMER EXIT OPEN....... eng 1 and 2 Master off" for example.

Admittedly this could get lost in the multitude of sensory inputs and tasks but it may help avoid someone ending up in the engine.

[Lancelot de boyles]

Somewhat akin to the engine-out go-around being generally well flown, while normal configuration go-around being frequently cocked up, due to emphasis or bias in training on certain manoeuvres, I personally find there is a big gap in the training, as a crew, around evacuations, assessments of problems, and what are the immediate concerns. Generally caused by limited training resources- money, time, facilities.

In previous companies, there have been a wide variety of ways of dealing with flight deck to cabin communications in non-normal events. Added to which, a flight deck crew that has never experienced a real ground situation, or something that might develop into an evacuation, tend to be minimalist. Telling the cabin to standby being sufficient, as per company SOP.
A crew that has been in a real situation tends to gather more info, sooner.

A difference between a simple 'at stations' PA, and following on with 'report' and getting the bigger picture from each individual crew member in the immediate aftermath, via interphone?

There have been a few occasions that I can remember, where an excitable member of the cabin crew has almost created a worse situation by taking a wrong action, or the right action too early. I'd suggest that starting an evacuation prior to shutting down the engines being an example of the latter.

Are we doing it right, or have we just been lucky?

[puff m'call]

Well done to the crew, I'm sure they did a great job in the evacuation.

[SeenItAll]

Not a pilot, but could someone explain why, after an RTO due to a major engine malfunction (presumably made aware to the flight crew both by cockpit indicators as well as external noise, vibration, etc.), remaining engine shutdown is not the first thing on their checklist after parking brake set? Is it because there are things like flaps down or spoiler restow that are needed to configure the plane for an evac? Or were these guys caught flatfooted by the severity of the situation and still thought there was no fire or other emergency situation?

[West Coast]

Caught flat footed? Do you have the background and
and a grasp of the details to assign blame?

[neilki]

The evacuation checklist is designed to ensure the outside of the aircraft is safe for passenger egress. Clearly; shutting down the engines is a vital part of that; however -the moment the generators trip offline everything goes black. We need to ensure everything else is ready before shutting power off...

[Ancient Mariner]

Ships with generators driven by the main engines will start the auxiliary generators when manoeuvring in confined waters. Depending solely on the main engine's generator is a big no-no and could literary leave you dead in the water.

[Porrohman]

The ability of the flight crew to rapidly assimilate exactly what's happening to their aircraft has been a factor in many incidents and accidents. Modern cockpits have many displays. Cameras are tiny and cheap nowadays. Is there a case for fitting external cameras to airliners, looking at the undercarriage, engines and perhaps control surfaces from different angles, with an ergonomic and efficient method of showing the flight crew what's happening outside? Would that be a benefit or a distraction during an emergency?

[Homebrew1]

Great idea I reckon. A camera on the vertical stab looking forward (like currently on 777/A340 family and newer), a camera on each wing sharklet/winglet looking inward at flight controls and one or two on the rear position light looking down at elevator stab. You would be able to determine things like if you had an engine fire or wing fire, condition of flight controls after malfunction or fire (calc of an abnormal Vref if flap burnt through), or which side to call exiting for an evacuation (yup the cabin crew should assess exits prior to pulling slides but it all helps). It would be an effect tool to help save lives at little cost.

[clark y]

On certain types, you can stick your head out the window.

[misd-agin]

That works on the ground and does nothing in flight.

[clark y]

It MAY help after you have come to a stop in a B737 or A320 on the runway. It costs nothing and may give you vital information quickly. As for cameras, they would be ideal. The problem is the certification and cost.

[mustafagander]

Seenitall

Be well aware that the aircraft manufacturers have paid much more than cursory attention to composing checklists. Perhaps we should trust them to have got it right?

[RAT 5]

The problem is the certification and cost.

Is that true considering the total cost of a single a/c. If it was designed in at manufacture and amortised over a world fleet lifetime, would it be that expensive. I wonder if the same thing was said about FDR's & CVR's. There are already outside viewing cameras, so the technology is there. F1 has much expertise, although at different speed & temperature. However, it would not be a go/no-go item, probably.

[SeenItAll]

I am not questioning the checklists, I am just interested is what these list give as to the order of tasks and their expected time to accomplish. What we know from the video is:

Plane was billowing fire and smoke from the RHS when it stopped.
The left overwing slide was blown roughly 20 seconds after the plane stopped.
It was at least 40 seconds after the plane stopped that the left rear slide was blown.
The LHS engine was still operating at that time with at least some significant rotational speed

Is this timeline indicative that: (a) all required checklists were performed immediately; or (b) there was some delay in executing the evac requirements.

As to the issue of not wanting to kill the engine because it supplies electrical power -- given that the plane was in take-off config, would not the APU have been operating? Please note that I am not saying that anything was done wrong. I don't know. I am just interested in understanding whether everything took place as expected in such a situation, or whether delays occurred that may indicate that there were on-board perceptions of the situation that are different from what we can see from the videos.

[Capn Bloggs]

What that is indicative of, Seeitall, is that the cabin crew (or a passenger) commenced the evacuation before the pilots commanded it.

[SeenItAll]

I understand that the evac may have started before the pilots commanded it. Indeed we do not yet know whether the pilots were even contemplating evacuation before it was forced from the cabin. But that is not my question. My question is only whether the 40+ second delay from stopping to engine spool down is: (a) representative of a situation on the flight deck where preparation for an evac was being performed as fast as possible given the checklists; or (b) representative of a situation that was not initially pointing to an immediate evac?

Another way to put it is as follows: what is the minimum time from a plane stopping to when an evac can begin (without running engines interfering with slides) assuming all the checklist items begun immediately and are executed without difficulty? Is this possible within 20 seconds? Or does it take 40+ seconds? If the former, it would appear that there was some delay in commencing or difficulty in performing the checklists. If the latter, then everything went as expected -- other than for the slides being deployed too soon.

Again, I don't what the correct answer is, and I certainly am unwilling to say that any mistakes are made. Because this incident is the subject of an NTSB investigation, we certainly will learn what actually occurred. But on PPRuNe, we always try to jump the gun and figure things out in advance of getting all of the facts.

[number0009]

however -the moment the generators trip offline everything goes black. We need to ensure everything else is ready before shutting power off...Standby/emergency power is still available after after gens go offline. This incident did occur in broad daylight, emergency exit lighting turns on automatically day or night.

If rear slide was deployed/being blown by #1 engine still running and passengerswere using wing slide while still running there was a clear lack of a coordinated evacuation. It should all come out in the investigation and will be interesting to read.

No intent to criticize, just adding info that may be helpful and thankful all were able to survive with only a few reported minor injuries.

[peekay4]

Another way to put it is as follows: what is the minimum time from a plane stopping to when an evac can begin (without running engines interfering with slides) assuming all the checklist items begun immediately and are executed without difficulty? Is this possible within 20 seconds? Or does it take 40+ seconds? If the former, it would appear that there was some delay in commencing or difficulty in performing the checklists.

There are many checklists. But if at any time the PIC feels that an immediate evac is required, then the Evacuation checklist can be executed in seconds. Typically set flaps / brakes / spoilers, check plane depressurized, cut engines and evac. That's it.

So any delay would not be because the Evacuation checklist is too long. However the pilots might not have felt or known that an immediate evac was necessary. They could have been going through a different checklist (e.g., Engine Fire checklist), communicating with cabin, ATC and fire crews, etc., etc.

[tdracer]

I don't think this is behind the AvWeek paywall:
Probe Continues Into American CF6 Failure | Commercial Aviation content from Aviation Week (http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/probe-continues-american-cf6-failure)


(NTSB) investigators, aided by GE, are analyzing remains from the 1998-built No.2 (right) engine, which the manufacturer describes as containing “very high-cycle discs.” The NTSB, which reported Oct. 29 that at that stage 90% of the disk had been recovered, is focusing on identifying potential faults with the metallurgy, machining and forging of the part, as well as the specific bill of materials of the failed engine.Apparently the first failure of a CF6 second stage turbine disc.

[Chronus]

In considering crew action the more important consideration than pax evacuation is the crew action in abandoning the t/o. Where precisely on the rwy did the aircraft came to a stop. That might give us an idea as to how soon after commencing the roll the failure occurred and the time involved in the decision. After all had the crew not acted promptly and correctly pax evacuation may well have been academic.

[mrdeux]

The left overwing slide was blown roughly 20 seconds after the plane stopped.

As the over wing exits are the small escape doors, it would almost certainly have been opened by a passenger.

[lomapaseo]

(NTSB) investigators, aided by GE, are analyzing remains from the 1998-built No.2 (right) engine, which the manufacturer describes as containing “very high-cycle discs.” The NTSB, which reported Oct. 29 that at that stage 90% of the disk had been recovered, is focusing on identifying potential faults with the metallurgy, machining and forging of the part, as well as the specific bill of materials of the failed engine.

It's not too soon to already know the answers to above , but the how and why take a lot longer and only then the what to do as a result follows.

[triploss]

As the over wing exits are the small escape doors, it would almost certainly have been opened by a passenger.
At least some 767-300s have cabin crew stationed by the overwing exits. I know that's the case on ANA (toilet in front of the first overwing, with 2 CC seats on the back wall/by the first door, divider between the exits, normal passenger seat aft of the second exit). Not too sure about the AA 763, seatmaps suggest this isn't the case there.

[MarkerInbound]

In considering crew action the more important consideration than pax evacuation is the crew action in abandoning the t/o. Where precisely on the rwy did the aircraft came to a stop. That might give us an idea as to how soon after commencing the roll the failure occurred and the time involved in the decision. After all had the crew not acted promptly and correctly pax evacuation may well have been academic.
Don't know where they stopped. UPS parks in the SE cargo ramp just about due south of the departure end of 15. I'm thinking a turbine wheel would travel perpendicular to the runway. ORD normally departs on 28R-10L. Either way the UPS ramp is abeam the midpoint of the runway. But ORD often also departs most traffic 10L at CC or 28R at EE unless the aircraft needs all 13,000 feet.

[Airbubba]

But ORD often also departs most traffic 10L at CC or 28R at EE unless the aircraft needs all 13,000 feet.

From earlier in the thread:

AA 383 Heavy cleared into position at N5 on 28R, then cleared for takeoff, left turn heading 220, wind 200 at 14.

More here starting at 00:27 into the recording, including reports of sparks on the takeoff roll from another aircraft:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kord/KORD-Tower-Center-Oct-28-2016-1930Z.mp3

Here's a current KORD runway diagram:

http://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/1611/00166ad.pdf#search=KORD

[Mansfield]

Clearly; shutting down the engines is a vital part of that; however -the moment the generators trip offline everything goes black. We need to ensure everything else is ready before shutting power off...

In about five steps, everything is going to go black anyway. What you need to do is make sure you have a power source hooked up to the PA so you can command the evacuation...

[20driver]

I am in a SWA exit row seat about 2 times per week. I get the briefing which always includes " no crew member will be here to assist you" . No where do they say "wait till the crew orders the emergency exits opened" or anything to that effect. The passengers are referred to the emergency card which says check for fire or smoke before opening the exit.

So the passenger adjacent to the over wing exit is not expecting a command, simply to check for the presence of fire and smoke. So maybe it is not surprising the exit was opened before the engine was shut down.

Next flight I will listen to see if they say when to open the exit.

[RetiredBA/BY]

I recently flew pax on a BA 787, first time on a 78. Looking at the escape plan, there appeared to be no overwing exits. Anyone know why ?

[rog747]

all wide bodies in recent years have only large doors type 1 exits often big enough for double lane slides
as so did older DC10 and Tristar and A300 types

even the A321 does not have exit windows but only 8 full doors

the 767-200 and 300 were unique in having variants with only 2 or 4 over wing exits of the same size as 707-737 types -
But most other 767-300 versions have 8 full doors and no window hatches such as Britannia and BA's 767-300's

[gcal]

Unless the config has changed recently AA 767-300s don't have a crew member by the over wing exits.

[rog747]

its a long walk from door 1 back to door 2 on a 767-300 of AA

there are 2 pairs of overwing exits on the AA 763 versions which we saw used on this incident which lead to a large slide going off down the back of the wing

are there any crew seated in any centre area galleys? (not sure if they have them)

on other versions of 763 such as those with BA and Thomson there are no over wing exits but have main doors at 1 and 2 ahead of the wing and emer exit door 3 and a main door 4 aft of the wing

[Ian W]

They may be seated forward of the center galley but not close to the overwing exits see https://www.seatguru.com/airlines/American_Airlines/American_Airlines_Boeing_767-300.php

[poorjohn]

As SLF scum I prefer an exit-row seat and thus have heard a bag of 'briefings'. Almost all are two steps: "Tell me you're willing and able" and "Look at the pretty pictures on the safety card". Exactly 1.0 times an FA took a moment to explain how to operate the door. I'm pretty sure that was a European carrier. Here in the colonies we don't want to even briefly entertain thoughts that accidents do happen.

I doubt that most amateur door-sitters even realize that there will come a very persuasive "Evacuate! Evacuate!" call when the moment arrives.

[rcsa]

Well I travel eight times a month at least on a variety of African carriers - Kenya Airways, SAA, Ethiopian, Arik, Air Zimbabwe... I'm 6'4 (1m.94 for the non-english speakers) and so I always ask for, and usually get, a window exit seat. In almost every case I get a comprehensive briefing, asking if I am prepared to open the door if necessary, explaining fire, smoke, debris problems, shown how the door works (pull this lever, hold here, twist and turn, it's quite heavy, are you comfortable with this?)

[jugofpropwash]

Right, wrong or otherwise, I suspect that about one second after somebody on the left side of the plane looks out the window and yells, "Fire!" that the person on the right hand side is going to be reaching to pull the window exit.

[rog747]

then on a W/B 763 with window exits there should be a CC seated there?

[NWA SLF]

I believe those over wing exits are locked through an electric circuit and can only be opened once the flight deck (or cabin crew?) removes power to the lock, or power is disrupted (crash). So is it not part of the process that for the over wing exits to be opened the crew had to activate the de-lock device? (or when the LH engine was shut down power to the lock was automatically disrupted). Am I missing something or is it possible to open the over wing exit under some other method?

[DaveReidUK]

Designed by Mr Murphy, no doubt.

I stand to be corrected, but I can't see something like that ever getting certificated.

[Chronus]

Listening to ATC recordings link provided by Airbubba, T/O clearance issued at 01:05 and stopping on rwy call at 01:49 would suggest a/c was 44 seconds in t/o roll when event occurred. I would have thought this was in the very nick of time, just a few seconds before V1. These guys were really switched on.
Another important factor in the outcome must be the fact that somehow, no fragments penetrated the cabin.

[nicolai]

At least some 767-300s have cabin crew stationed by the overwing exits. I know that's the case on ANA (toilet in front of the first overwing, with 2 CC seats on the back wall/by the first door, divider between the exits, normal passenger seat aft of the second exit). Not too sure about the AA 763, seatmaps suggest this isn't the case there.

AA's 763 have two passenger-operated doors each side over the wing, and a crew-operated door front and rear on each side of the wing. On the AA 763 seat rows 20 and 21 are the exit rows and the passenger sitting there may have to operate the door. I have sat in those seats many times.

The nearest crew are on jump seats that fold out into the aisle at row 17 (crew rest seats). They might be able to get to the wing exit in front of the seated passenger, but might also have a hard time manoeuvring the door without dropping it (on the pax in the seat!).

[archae86]

...on a variety of African carriers ...I get a comprehensive briefing, asking if I am prepared to open the door if necessary, explaining fire, smoke, debris problems, shown how the door works (pull this lever, hold here, twist and turn, it's quite heavy, are you comfortable with this?)

What if anything do they say about the decision to initiate? In particular, do they sternly advise you to await orders?

[peekay4]

I believe those over wing exits are locked through an electric circuit and can only be opened once the flight deck (or cabin crew?) removes power to the lock, or power is disrupted (crash). So is it not part of the process that for the over wing exits to be opened the crew had to activate the de-lock device?
Emergency doors requiring a flight lock will automatically unlock depending on the aircraft state -- e.g., air/ground mode, throttle position, engine thrust, etc. -- without crew intervention.

[lomapaseo]

Emergency doors requiring a flight lock

Why would you want a flight lock?

It's just another system to fail at an inopportune time in a survivable prang

[vs69]

If your exit is of the non plug type like a jumbo upper deck for instance then the flight lock stops the handle being moved with weight off wheels. Just a basic solenoid that engages in the handle and usually fails in a way so as not to inhibit door opening. Can't vouch for the 767.

[peekay4]

Why would you want a flight lock?
Not all emergency doors are of plug-type. It would be disastrous if someone opened a non-plug door mid-flight, so fail-safe locks are required to secure them.

FAR 23.807 - Emergency Exits
(d)(2) A means must be provided to lock each emergency exit and to safeguard against its opening in flight, either inadvertently by persons or as a result of mechanical failure. In addition, a means for direct visual inspection of the locking mechanism must be provided to determine that each emergency exit for which the initial opening movement is outward is fully locked.

[rcsa]

Recently (twice last weekend, Harare to Nairobi, Nairobi to Lagos), on Kenya Airways 'When you hear the command 'evacuate' - then check outside to make sure there is no fire and it's safe to go. If if it isn't, try to stop other people opening the door'. Briefing delivered carefully, clearly and with eye contact.

Not bad, in fact. Not bad at all.

[oldshoremore2]

It seems to me that the essence of the problem is speedy suppression of fire emanating from ruptured tanks. No fire - no problem with evacuation.
So, when building runways why not have a couple of well-indicated pads spaced out at each end under which are truly massive supression foam generators which can be triggered from the tower as to half a pad or a full pad of upwardly directed foam spray. They are always part of the runway, just a different colour
Aircraft in trouble aims for pads: commander calls tower for jets: fire suppressed: measured evac: possible hull saved: pads paid for many times over.
Or is it too simple an idea, like cheap external cameras that someone has to be paid millions to come up with!

[Airbubba]

But do American B-763 overwing doors have a flight lock?

I know there are some unusual door configs on 767's and some B-767-300's don't have overwing exits at all. Obviously N345AN has the overwing exits.

Also, some 737's have the flight lock on the wing exits, others do not, is that right?

[Longtimer]

To view the graphics goto:
http://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/pr20161104.aspx
NTSB Press Release
National Transportation Safety Board Office of Public Affairs

NTSB Issues Investigative Update on Uncontained Engine Failure Accident Involving a Wide Body Jetliner
11/4/2016
​
As part of its ongoing investigation of an Oct. 28, 2016, uncontained engine failure on American Airlines flight 383, the National Transportation Safety Board issued an investigative update Friday.

The uncontained failure of a GE CF6-80C2B6 engine occurred on a Boeing 767-300 (N345AN) during the take-off roll at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. An emergency evacuation of the 161 passengers and nine crewmembers onboard was conducted.

Initial findings include the following:

According to witness statements from airport personnel, video evidence, flight data recorder (FDR) data and GPS data, the accident flight started its takeoff roll on runway 28R at the intersection with taxiway N5.

The airplane experienced an uncontained failure of the right engine about 6,550 feet from runway 28R threshold, and came to a full stop about 9,225 feet from runway 28R threshold.

Airport overview with disk fragment locations
Preliminary FDR data show that the right engine failure occurred at an airspeed of about 128 knots with the engine operating at takeoff power.

Approximately two seconds after the engine failure, at an airspeed of about 134 knots, the left and right engine throttle lever angles decreased rapidly. Coincident with the throttle movement, brake pressure rose in a manner consistent with maximum autobrake application; the auto speedbrakes were extended.

The aircraft rapidly decelerated, coming to a stop about 25 seconds after the throttle reduction.

As a result of the uncontained engine failure, a fuel leak resulted in a pool fire under the right wing.

Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting personnel began applying foam within 2 minutes 51 seconds of being notified of the emergency.

The right engine stage 2 high pressure turbine disk fractured into at least 4 pieces (locations A, B, C, and D on figure). One piece went through the inboard section of the right wing, over the fuselage and into a UPS warehouse facility (location A).
Recovered stage 2 HPT disk pieces
Recovered stage 2 HPT disk pieces

The majority of the stage 2 disk was recovered and sent to the NTSB laboratory in Washington, DC for examination. One of the fractures exhibited features consistent with fatigue cracking initiating at an internal inclusion near the forward side of the hub’s inner bore.

Engine and wing debris were found in the area around the gouge mark on the runway.

Fatigue crack location on a disk fracture surface
Fatigue crack location on a disk fracture surface


3-D imaging of the damage to the right wing has been completed.

All members of the cabin crew has been interviewed.

The disk had 10,984 cycles and had a life limit of 15,000 cycles. Review of the engine maintenance and manufacturing records and processes are ongoing.

Daily progress meetings are being held and the final documentation and examination of the airplane and engine continues in Chicago; the on-scene team plans to finish work by this weekend.

NTSB Senior Air Safety Investigator Lorenda Ward, the Investigator-in-Charge, is leading a team with expertise in the areas of airworthiness, powerplants, structures, survival factors, maintenance records, flight recorders and metallurgy. The flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder were transported to the NTSB Recorder Laboratory where the information from each was downloaded.

Parties to the investigation include the Federal Aviation Administration, American Airlines, Allied Pilots Association, The Boeing Company, General Electric Engines, the Transport Workers Union of America and the Association of Professional Flight Attendants.

Ongoing metallurgical examinations of the disk will focus on detailed characterization of the inclusion and the fracture surfaces.

The accident docket, containing factual group reports and other investigation-related material, will be opened at a future date. Additional information will be released as warranted.
Related Press Releases
November 04, 2016

[number0009]

A few photos if aircraft damage:
The Engine Took Out A 767 ? AA Flight 383-Photos - Flying Lessons (http://blog.seattlepi.com/flyinglessons/2016/11/02/the-engine-took-out-a-767-aa-flight-383-photos/)

[lomapaseo]

The fractured pieces are typical of a gross defect even if a major piece was missing. The largest piece typically bounces off the runway (more spin than outward movement).

Very surprising after 50 years of commercial manufacture experience to have a metallugical defect escape of that size. Equally surprising that it wasn't detected during routine overhauls in the shop. After all the crack must have many engine cycles visible in the striations.

The only good news is that the combinations are very rare throughout the many years of service experience with all like engine models (GE, RR P&W)

Of course there is some question remaining about the pedigree of this manufacturing process and other parts made at the same time.

Let's see what airworthiness actions come out immediately

[jugofpropwash]

If your exit is of the non plug type like a jumbo upper deck for instance then the flight lock stops the handle being moved with weight off wheels. Just a basic solenoid that engages in the handle and usually fails in a way so as not to inhibit door opening. Can't vouch for the 767.
Weight off wheels? Does that mean that in the event of failed gear/a belly landing, that the exits won't open? If so, that doesn't seem like a good idea.

[Maxmotor]

But do American B-763 overwing doors have a flight lock?

I know there are some unusual door configs on 767's and some B-767-300's don't have overwing exits at all. Obviously N345AN has the overwing exits.

Also, some 737's have the flight lock on the wing exits, others do not, is that right?
The 738 locks & unlocks the overwing exits via engine throttle position.Classic 737s have no lock mechanism.

[vs69]

Jugofpropwash; From looking at the basic schematic in the manual it looks like air ground sense is the only deciding factor. But yes valid point!

[Mansfield]

The applicable rule regarding emergency exits is FAR 25.783. I have attached the relevant excerpts from Advisory Circular 25.783-1A below. Two thoughts come to mind: first, the design and certification engineering folks are pretty thorough in their work. Ergo, they are not going to hand you an emergency exit that cannot be opened in an emergency, or one that depends solely on the pilots surviving long enough to retard the throttles. Second, anybody who thinks that regulators don't have a sense of humor need only read the second sentence in paragraph b. (1) below.

The 737 overwing exits at my operator require 3 of the 4 entry/service doors closed, at least one engine running, and air/ground logic is in the air or both throttles are advanced. If any of these conditions is not met, or if DC power fails, the overwing exits unlock.

AC 25.783 excerpt:

b. In addition, design precautions must be taken to minimize the possibility for a person to open a door intentionally during flight. If these precautions include the use of auxiliary devices, those devices and their controlling systems must be designed so that--

• no single failure will prevent more than one exit from being opened [§ 25.783(b)(1)]; and

• failures that would prevent opening of the exit after landing are improbable [§ 25.783(b)(2)].

(1) The intentional opening of a door by people on board while the airplane is in flight should be considered. This rule is intended to protect the airplane and passengers, but not necessarily the person who intentionally tries to open the door. Suitable design precautions should therefore be taken; however, the precautions should not compromise the ability to open an emergency exit in an emergency evacuation. In this context, single failures include hardware failures as well as maintenance and logical (e.g., software) errors. Note that certain maintenance or logical errors may have the potential to affect more than one door.

(2) The applicant should consider the following precautions:

(a) Doors in pressurized compartments. It should not normally be possible to open the door when the compartment differential pressure is above 2 psi. The ability to open the door will depend on the door operating mechanism and the handle design, location, and operating force. Operating forces in excess of 300 pounds should be considered sufficient to prevent the door from being opened. During approach, takeoff, and landing, when compartment differential pressure is lower, intentional opening may be possible; however, these phases are brief and all passengers are expected to be seated with seat belts fastened.

(b) Doors that cannot meet the guidance of paragraph 9b(2)(a) of this AC, and Doors in non-pressurized airplanes. The use of auxiliary devices (for example, a speed-activated or barometrically-activated means) to safeguard the door from opening should be considered. The need for such auxiliary devices should depend upon the consequences to the airplane and other occupants if the door is opened in flight.

(c) Auxiliary devices installed on emergency exits. The failure of an auxiliary device should normally result in an unsecured position of the device. Failures of the device that would prevent opening of the exit after landing should be improbable.

[TURIN]

Just for info. On the B777 and B787 the door flight locks engage at or above IAS of 80knots and disengage at IAS below 80knots.
I think. It could be TAS or CAS I forget.
Not sure about B767.

[nicolai]

The 738 locks & unlocks the overwing exits via engine throttle position.Classic 737s have no lock mechanism.

The 737-800 and -900 have outwards opening doors operated by a handle, the others have plug doors that must be removed from the frame inwards and are a plug-type door. So perhaps they don't need a lock, as the airframe is pressurised enough to make it impossible to remove them in flight?

[YRP]

Is this really true that the 747 upper deck and 737-800/900 have non-plug type emergency exit doors?

That seems surprising. Plug type is such a nice engineering solution: open-able exactly when you want it to be, not when you don't.

Ok, maybe with the exception of not-depressurizing on the ground, a la Saudi. But still, the best engineering designs are those that passively give the results. Anything that needs active operation/sensors/logic always has extra failure modes.

I guess the plug door has issues in a next-to-seat exit, however I recall old safety cards that showed the over-wing door coming inside the plane and the passenger having to throw it out the window or the like. That looked like plug type operation.

[oceancrosser]

Just for info. On the B777 and B787 the door flight locks engage at or above IAS of 80knots and disengage at IAS below 80knots.
I think. It could be TAS or CAS I forget.
Not sure about B767.

B767 Doors and exits are plug type.

[nicolai]

Is this really true that the 747 upper deck and 737-800/900 have non-plug type emergency exit doors?

That seems surprising. Plug type is such a nice engineering solution: open-able exactly when you want it to be, not when you don't.

Ok, maybe with the exception of not-depressurizing on the ground, a la Saudi. But still, the best engineering designs are those that passively give the results. Anything that needs active operation/sensors/logic always has extra failure modes.

I guess the plug door has issues in a next-to-seat exit, however I recall old safety cards that showed the over-wing door coming inside the plane and the passenger having to throw it out the window or the like. That looked like plug type operation.

I think a plug-type door that the passenger had to hold, for the 747, would be impossibly heavy.

On the 737-800 the wing exit change was required by the FAA to approve the increase in passenger capacity to ensure that evacuation could be fast enough, that's why it's a (gas, I presume) powered door and not a manually-removed plug door.

[lomapaseo]

I think a plug-type door that the passenger had to hold, for the 747, would be impossibly heavy.


Why? with the same size passengers to fit through them

[underfire]

Aircraft Exit profiles, a bit dated, but hey, its Canada! https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/publications/tp12296-schedulea-section2-5545.htm

[CodyBlade]

incidents that the wind was blowing the fire AWAY from the fuselage each time

err...Common to tokf/land into wind.

[edmundronald]

So one could assume that front door evac is safer.

[ZFT]

As long as the engines are shut down!

[DaveReidUK]

be thankful that in this incident, plus the dynamic airways 767 fort Lauderdale fire, and both the EK and the SQ 777 incidents that the wind was blowing the fire AWAY from the fuselage each time err...Common to tokf/land into wind.

The OP's point was that the bits that usually go up in flames first are the engines and/or wing.

It can clearly make a big difference to the outcome depending on whether the aircraft comes to a stop with the fire upwind or downwind of the fuselage. :ugh:

[nicolai]

Why??? with the same size passengers to fit through them

As currently designed the door is large, bigger than the other doors in fact, because of the fuselage curvatures.Here's an example picture. (http://www.airteamimages.com/pics/147/147815_800.jpg)

I don't know if a smaller door could be designed and still attach to the airframe structural members in a reasonable way (maybe tdracer knows). However certainly a door for the the current aperture for that doorway can't be anything the passenger could try to hold, I might guess it weighs over 80kg!

There has also got to be a (large, long) slide somewhere, at the moment it is on the inside in a bustle on the door and while it could be in the fuselage somewhere like the 767, there might not be that much space for it.

[triploss]

On the 747-400 it's in the lower part of the door (plenty of space thanks to curvature):
http://www.simtechmanufacturing.com/slideshows/747upper6.jpg
Compare with video of inflation where you can see that portion of the door being left behind when the door opens:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZSQ8x2LeP18

(747-8 has by far the coolest slides though: The Upper Deck : Photo (http://747upperdeck.tumblr.com/image/15311197222) )

[ehwatezedoing]

err...Common to tokf/land into wind.

How about a reject and stop with a 15 to 20kts crosswind coming from the burning side....

[lomapaseo]

nicolai

Sorry for the misunderstanding but I thought we were talking about non-plug type overwing exits

Tis hard to keep up :)

[tdracer]

Sorry, I'm an engine guy - things like exit doors are pretty far removed from my area of expertise...

[20driver]

Just got off a 737-700. I was seated in the exit row per SOP.
No mention in the brief of when to open the exit, just there would be no crew there.
Over the door, which opens up and out on a hinge, there were pictures of checking for fire etc. Looking at the door, I'd say a a substantial number of passengers would never be able to use it in an efficient manner. They have to step up and then fit through. Not happening for some of the larger or more elderly passengers.

[NSEU]

Is this really true that the 747 upper deck and 737-800/900 have non-plug type emergency exit doors?

That seems surprising. Plug type is such a nice engineering solution: open-able exactly when you want it to be, not when you don't.

Compare with video of inflation where you can see that portion of the door being left behind when the door opens:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZSQ8x2LeP18

Just to clarify, fuselage skin part of the door rotates outwards/upwards. Only the slide assembly falls outside (like the main cabin doors).

The 747-400 upper deck door security relies on large pins sitting in L shaped-slots (plus the electronic system locking the door handle in flight). The locking system can be inoperative for flight as long as the door is guarded by the flight attendant when cabin/external differential pressures are low. With larger differential pressures, the door latching mechanism is loaded up with greater mechanical forces (making it impossible to open the door).

[Maxmotor]

I think a plug-type door that the passenger had to hold, for the 747, would be impossibly heavy.

On the 737-800 the wing exit change was required by the FAA to approve the increase in passenger capacity to ensure that evacuation could be fast enough, that's why it's a (gas, I presume) powered door and not a manually-removed plug door.
The door is spring loaded along with a snubber and counter balance actuator.

[aa777888]

https://airwaysmag.com/industry/ntsb-american-airlines-engine-failure-attributable-fatigue/

[peekay4]

FedEx grounds one plane over GE engine part concern


REUTERS - Mon Nov 7, 2016 - FedEx Corp is grounding one of its planes temporarily that has an engine General Electric Co flagged after a passenger jet erupted in flames last month, a spokesman for the cargo airline told Reuters on Monday.

Engine-maker GE on Friday alerted airlines about a small number of parts under investigation following American Airlines Flight 383, which caught fire on Oct. 28. The parts were made from the same lot of alloy as a turbine disk used by American, which GE subsequently discovered had a "material anomaly."

While U.S. investigators have yet to assign blame for the non-fatal incident, they have found what appeared to be fatigue cracking where the disk had an anomaly. Experts have said the disk's corrupted material may indicate a manufacturing defect, either by the parts or metal maker.

In a statement, FedEx spokesman Chris Allen said the company was notified that an engine in one MD11 aircraft was affected.

More from: FedEx grounds one plane over GE engine part concern | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicago-airplane-fedex-exclusive-idUSKBN13305D)

[YRP]

The 747-400 upper deck door security relies on large pins sitting in L shaped-slots (plus the electronic system locking the door handle in flight). The locking system can be inoperative for flight as long as the door is guarded by the flight attendant when cabin/external differential pressures are low. With larger differential pressures, the door latching mechanism is loaded up with greater mechanical forces (making it impossible to open the door).


Thanks NSEU. That makes sense, learned something new. That is a clever design if it can't be plug type, using the air pressure to hold the locking pins, nice "passive" system to achieve the desired result.

[bud leon]

RatherBeFlying Going back a few decades shows a less benign record. Some of the reduced fatality count can be credited to improved design of fuel systems and structures. But some day there will be another major fuel system breach with the wind blowing the wrong way.

In that case the fatality count will be a function of delay in beginning evacuation.

No it's a function of evacuating safely being fully informed of the outside conditions. The last thing you want to do is open the exits when that allows ingress of smoke and fire into the cabin, or if the passengers will exit into the pool fire. Those things will kill passengers more quickly.

This a complex area. For example wind speed has a significant impact on heat flux and heat location. Winds increase mixing and therefore increase the heat. Interestingly research has shown that in low to moderate winds heat is greatest on the windward side of the aircraft, in high winds heat is greater on the leeward side.

When you keep the doors closed, the increased cabin pressure actually assists in keeping combustion products out.

The important barriers are time to extinguish and heat resistant materials. Evacuation will not always be safer.

[nicolai]

The door is spring loaded along with a snubber and counter balance actuator.

Interesting, thanks! Does that make it easier to close and reset the mechanism if the door is opened without need, or for access to the wing surface?

Just to clarify, fuselage skin part of the door rotates outwards/upwards. Only the slide assembly falls outside (like the main cabin doors).

The 747-400 upper deck door security relies on large pins sitting in L shaped-slots (plus the electronic system locking the door handle in flight). The locking system can be inoperative for flight as long as the door is guarded by the flight attendant when cabin/external differential pressures are low. With larger differential pressures, the door latching mechanism is loaded up with greater mechanical forces (making it impossible to open the door).

Is this design common to a lot of doors? Certainly A320-series main doors I've seen seem similar, the door moves inwards then down to align pins in slots as you describe. Therefore it's an outward opening door with most of the inherent safety benefits of a plug door.

[thcrozier]

Interesting views

[RatherBeFlying]

No it's a function of evacuating safely being fully informed of the outside conditions. The last thing you want to do is open the exits when that allows ingress of smoke and fire into the cabin, or if the passengers will exit into the pool fire. Those things will kill passengers more quickly.

This a complex area. For example wind speed has a significant impact on heat flux and heat location. Winds increase mixing and therefore increase the heat. Interestingly research has shown that in low to moderate winds heat is greatest on the windward side of the aircraft, in high winds heat is greater on the leeward side.

When you keep the doors closed, the increased cabin pressure actually assists in keeping combustion products out.

The important barriers are time to extinguish and heat resistant materials. Evacuation will not always be safer. Aluminum is not heat resistant as the recently posted photos show. That kind of heat adjacent to the fuselage can breach it in seconds. Remember that fire increases exponentially and adventitiously. Seconds count.

I was in an older building where a minor basement fire reached an electrical supply shaft. The fourth floor was rapidly engulfed. Most fortunately the people in these units had self evacuated at the first sign of smoke.

[twochai]

A classic uncontained structural failure of an HP turbine disk:

http://http://news.aviation-safety.net/2016/11/04/5528/

This is bound to cause problems in the fleet.

[sb_sfo]

This link will work better:
ASN NewsNTSB: Engine fragments in Chicago Boeing 767 takeoff accident found 900 m away - ASN News (http://news.aviation-safety.net/2016/11/04/5528/)

[Maxmotor]

Interesting, thanks! Does that make it easier to close and reset the mechanism if the door is opened without need, or for access to the wing surface?



Is this design common to a lot of doors? Certainly A320-series main doors I've seen seem similar, the door moves inwards then down to align pins in slots as you describe. Therefore it's an outward opening door with most of the inherent safety benefits of a plug door.
It takes a bit of an effort to close a 737NG over wing exit as you pull it down it is wanting to spring back up.While you pull down on a lanyard strap at the bottom you engage the release handle at the top and it doesn't always reset first go.

[Zeffy]

NTSB Docket (https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=60058&CFID=1162339&CFTOKEN=3b2ad8e5a9b13897-F1C836F4-F78C-90A7-555B28897F98613B)

[Airbubba]

As always, some good reading in the accident docket.

From the CVR, sounds like the FO maybe pushed the override button to unlatch the right fire handle a couple of times but didn't immediately twist the handle after pulling it. The handle would have been unlatched anyway in this situation since they had a fire warning. The captain caught the error, good crosscheck.

They never got to the first item on the Engine Fire, Severe Damage or Separation checklist but on the ground the fire handles and fuel cutoffs are all that mattered in this case and they are on the evac checklist. Still, I'm sure the feds will gig them for not following the challenge and response cadence of the emergency checklists more closely while on fire.

Over the years the number of memory items on the engine fire and evac checklists has dropped to zero on the Boeing twins. Will some of the memory items come back for a more rapid shutdown and evac perhaps? Would it have made a difference in this case?

The flight attendant interviews seem to repeatedly ask why they didn't bring their flashlight off the aircraft for a daytime fire evac. :confused: A couple of questions involved the service dog, er, I meant to say the emotional support animal that apparently was evacuated successfully.

[Airbubba]

The NTSB report is published here:

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1801.pdf

Looks like American did still have memory items on the Engine Fire/Severe Damage checklist after all. The NTSB wants to see a separate checklist for engine fires on the ground as with Airbus and Embraer aircraft.

[sherburn2LA]

I too frequently occupy a 737 exit row. As said several times above cabin crew usually any stress opening the door and nobody will be here to help. Partly because I am a PPL smartarse and partly because I think it is relevant I sometimes say out loud for others to hear - don't open the door if there is fire outside.

The point about waiting because the engines might still be running I had not really thought about but I am sure it is something that should be on the card and which most people would easily grasp. Probably would not make much difference in a panic situation but might give some cause to think twice in a lesser emergency.

[golfyankeesierra]

The NTSB report is published here:

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/AAR1801.pdf
Thanks Airbubba, interesting reading. As always, some valuable lessons.

Looks like American did still have memory items on the Engine Fire/Severe Damage checklist after all. The NTSB wants to see a separate checklist for engine fires on the ground as with Airbus and Embraer aircraft.
Interesting, but according the report the difference between on-ground and inflight is no 30 sec waiting time after halon release on ground and a direction to evacuation procedure at the end of the checklist. But wouldn’t that be obvious? Aren’t there any other differences between onground and inflight? Don’t recall the separate procedure on ground when I flew AB...

[topgas]

SLF here. The report says that at the time the autobrakes activated, "the airplane’s airspeed was 134 knots, which was also the calculated takeoff decision speed (V1)".

My understanding is (after a quick internet search) that "V1 is the speed by which a pilot must have decided to abort if they are going to stop on the runway". The report states that there was about 3775 feet of runway remaining from the point at which the airplane finally stopped. Does that suggest that V1 could have been higher and the plane still stop on the runway?

[Avenger]

topgas, in simple terms V1 is "decision speed", when take off performance is "balanced field" the distance from brake released to decision to stop, including approx 2 secs decision making is the same as the distance from decision to go until lift off. In non tech terms Accelerate stop distance = Accelerate go distance. In the real world, the trust available for a given weight usually results in an additional "stop margin" and thus we reduce the thrust to save engine life and in certain conditions, potential control problems if an engine fails ( wet/ contaminated runways etc). The answer to your question is that in performance terms if you can go, you can stop, thus if V1 was higher there would be no issues provided the crew acted in a timely manner. The auto brakes automatically activate after the thrust levers are retarded and reverse selected, but this time for "essential actions" is built into the performance tools.

[sleeper]

Also on longer runways and mediumsize jets, v1 an vr usually are the same. In that case there will be more runway available than needed for stopping.

[Ian W]

I too frequently occupy a 737 exit row. As said several times above cabin crew usually any stress opening the door and nobody will be here to help. Partly because I am a PPL smartarse and partly because I think it is relevant I sometimes say out loud for others to hear - don't open the door if there is fire outside.


This is an issue I have raised before, these days SLF around 4 flights a week. Almost all pax in window seats immediately close the blinds - that is if the flight attendants on the previous flight haven't asked for them to be closed as the aircraft approaches the gate 'to keep the aircraft cool.'

In consequence it is almost always like riding in a freighter with no view out at all. In an emergency, especially one where the aircraft hit something and is distorted so blinds are jammed it may not be possible to see if there is a hazard that side of the aircraft.

BY all means as soon as the aircraft is airborne close the blinds but it seems to be that the pax are less safe if they and the FAs have no idea what is going on outside the aircraft.

[RatherBeFlying]

A long quote from the NTSB report was removed discussing the many RTO accidents where miscommunication between flight and cabin crew impeded evacuation and/or resulted in chutes coming down while one or more engines were still running.

The NTSB remains concerned that: Lessons are not being learned.

Give section 2.3.2.2 a careful read.

So far we have been lucky.

The common theme is that after a reject, flight crews remain unaware of serious fire and smoke situations for an unacceptable period.

Interphones get fumbled. Door Open annunciations on the EICAS roll off the display.

Admittedly there are some high priority messages in a reject situation, but Door Open needs to be prominently displayed as: EVACUATE IN PROGRESS.

A software update could fix that.

[jack11111]

At least one FA (lead FA) should wear a portable intercom, much like the units police and fire wear. They would not have to make their way back to a attendant intercom to advise cockpit of fire or such. Could be outside and still talk to the pilots.

[ph-sbe]

I find section 2.3.4, regarding passengers bringing their luggage, shameful. I quote:

In one case, a flight attendant tried to take a bag away from a passenger who did not follow the instruction to evacuate without baggage, but the flight attendant realized that the struggle over the bag was prolonging the evacuation and allowed the passenger to take the bag. In another case, a passenger came to the left overwing exit with a bag and evacuated with it despite being instructed to leave the bag behind.

If these incidents do not warrant criminal charges for interfering with flight crew, then I don't know what does.

[pilot9249]

I find section 2.3.4, regarding passengers bringing their luggage, shameful. I quote:



If these incidents do not warrant criminal charges for interfering with flight crew, then I don't know what does.

Can't believe a prosecution would either succeed or serve any purpose.

[Capt Fathom]

Can't believe a prosecution would either succeed or serve any purpose.
Yes it should. The actions of just one selfish passenger getting their hand luggage could result in the death or serious injury of another passenger doing the right thing and trying to get themselves out of a burning aircraft.

[procede]

No, it should not. You cannot expect people to be rational in such a situation and should design for that.

[WHBM]

The actions of just one selfish passenger getting their hand luggage could result in the death ....
But it never, in many evacs, ever has done. That's just hyperbole.

If hand luggage, particularly the modern oversized Wheeled Wonders, was such a hazard, then carriers should prevent it being carried on in the first place (as they all did a generation and more ago), and require it be put in the hold. It's been a wholly commercial decision to allow such large items in the cabin. As a study by Boeing some years ago into forward/rearward seating safety showed, the greater hazard in a sudden deceleration is not forward-facing (belted) pax being thrown forward, but rearward-facing (belted) pax being hit full in the face by large loose items flying forward.

[Two's in]

It's really odd isn't it; passengers get charged an arm and a leg for by airlines for checking any kind of baggage whatsoever, the airlines still insist on losing, damaging or generally mishandling checked bags on a regular basis, the long lines for bag check or bag drop completely invalidate the convenience of online check in and yet these morons still take their bags with them into the cabin.

Completely inexplicable.

[aterpster]

Yes it should. The actions of just one selfish passenger getting their hand luggage could result in the death or serious injury of another passenger doing the right thing and trying to get themselves out of a burning aircraft.

Probably impossible to get a jury to convict.