Almost a repeat of Tenerife at Shanghai!

[Super VC-10]

But this time with Airbuses. An A320 managed to climb over an A330 which was on the runway at Shanghai. Could so easily have been a repeat of Tenerife. :}

Incident: China Eastern A333 at Shanghai on Oct 11th 2016, runway incursion forces departure to rotate early and climb over A333 (http://avherald.com/h?article=49f37b96&opt=0)

[pattern_is_full]

I have a feeling this will turn into a hamsterwheel like Sully on the Hudson - did he make the correct choice or not? The (preliminary) numbers seem to show that there was time and distance for an abort, but the crew did not have that info available - it was purely a question of visual judgement for them.

My gut tells me I would have gone for the abort, with a diversion into the grass if necessary (as speed dropped). But I wasn't there, and I don't know that that would have been the better choice, in the final analysis.

In any case, kudos to the A322 crew for sharp reactions, and remembering that you have to firewall the levers, not just the TOGA button.

Not enough info yet to determine why the A333 crew missed the "Stop!" calls and didn't notice the 322 was rolling.

[Super VC-10]

The fact that there was no accident would suggest that the decision was correct. I wasn't there either and I'm not aircrew,so I'm not in a position to say whether or not aborting would also have been a correct choice.

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

<<The aircraft, that had been previously cleared to cross runway 36L, was instructed to stop and hold short of runway 36L but did not react to the stop instruction.>>

I suppose he had his reasons......

[DaveReidUK]

Several of the comments attributed to the media in the Avherald report seem to be a tad premature, pending any investigation:

"After the A330 crossed the hold short line tower called the A330 three times to stop, however, the crew did not listen." (well that's one of several possibilities)

"The CAAC are going to decide about punishments on Oct 17th." (so much for Just Culture)

[Octane]

Rotation was 17 knots below Vr, how would the aircraft have handled that, would it have "staggered" into flight? Sorry, novice question..

[HundredPercentPlease]

Octane,

If the t/o was an improved climb t/o, then V1/Vr could be around 155 knots. If the performance calcs were done using TOGA, then V1/Vr could be around 130.

So...

If you are at 130 knots on an improved climb t/o, there's nothing stopping you shoving the levers forwards and performing a normal rotation and unstick. You can even do it without using TOGA, but you may not clear obstacles if you then had an engine failure and left the thrust at FLEX. Or you could just yank the stick back promptly and over do the rotation, and the machine will give you TOGA itself.

No idea, of course, what happened in this case.

[A320ECAM]

If the A320 had rejected the takeoff instead of firewalling the throttles, the A330 would have been clear off the runway by the time the decelerating A320 would have reached the A330?

[HundredPercentPlease]

Who knows? Who cares? We are trained to be go-minded above 100 knots - the A320 Captain made a quick, sound decision (knowing about improved climb performance) based on what he could see, and it worked.

[peekay4]

If the A320 had rejected the takeoff instead of firewalling the throttles, the A330 would have been clear off the runway by the time the decelerating A320 would have reached the A330?
According to CAAC calculations had the A320 rejected takeoff it would have stopped 200 meters short of the H3 intersection where the A330 crossed.

[Piltdown Man]

PK - with due respect, I think that is called hindsight. What happened was outside the books and an outside the books solution was applied. The only thing that is going wrong is the CAAC getting out the big stick.

[Hotel Tango]

Yeah, I'm sure the crew had all the time in the world to calculate they could stop 200 meters short! :ugh::mad:

200 meters for God's sake. What sort of margin was that?!!!

[bradandwhitney]

Anyone else on here also under the impression that PVG ATC is even more "interesting" than typical chinese RT? Especially early morning when TWR still does CLR and GND while traffic is picking up continuously.
I remember a little language incident (wrong taxi clearance) whereafter a British accent came on the air saying something along the lines of "...you need to use proper english or someone will be seriously f...ed" (he did drop the f-bomb! - rightfully so it seems).

[peekay4]

PK - with due respect, I think that is called hindsight.
You're being presumptuous. No one is suggesting that the A320 pilots should have aborted. The CAAC calculated, if they HAD aborted, the A320 would have been able to stop in time. That is all.

Runway incursions are extremely serious and practically every CAA in the world will issue an enforcement action for the most severe incidents (so called "Class A" incursions -- those requiring extreme measures to avoid a collision).

In this case, it appears that an enforcement actions will be lodged at least against ATC personnel and possibly against the A330 pilots. The form of the action could be anything, starting with mandatory remedial training.

200 meters for God's sake. What sort of margin was that?!!!

A SkyWest / United Express CRJ had to abort takeoff at LAX a few years ago to avoid a G-V which crossed the runway despite a "hold short" instruction. They stopped within 100 meters from the G-V.

[neila83]

Several of the comments attributed to the media in the Avherald report seem to be a tad premature, pending any investigation:

"After the A330 crossed the hold short line tower called the A330 three times to stop, however, the crew did not listen." (well that's one of several possibilities)

"The CAAC are going to decide about punishments on Oct 17th." (so much for Just Culture)

There seems to be confusion amongst a lot of pilots that just culture means pilots can do absolutely anything and out any number of people in danger, and never, ever face punishment. It doesn't at all.

Pilots do not have immunity from the law. If they have been genuinely negligent they should be punished, just like a bus driver, or a train driver, or a truck driver who falls asleep and derails a train.

It does mean establishing a difference between negligence and genuine, understandable mistakes. And encouraging pilots to report incidents. There is nothing to suggest that a response against teh pilots here, would be incompatible with just culture.

I am sure you accept that in every other industry there are people not up to the job. There are surely some in aviation too. Perhaps occasionaly an indicent like this reveals who some of them are before it's too late...

[Dan Winterland]

In any case, kudos to the A322 crew for sharp reactions, and remembering that you have to firewall the levers, not just the TOGA button.


On FBW Airbus types, moving the TLs fully forward is the only way to select TOGA at any stage of the operation. Max thrust and correct flight modes in one easy action!

[oleary]

... to the 320 crew.

It is awesome easy for the armchair quarterbacks to tell us what we, "Should have done".

In a case like this the crew had to make a split second decision.

Good on ya guys and gals!

[DaveReidUK]

Pilots do not have immunity from the law. If they have been genuinely negligent they should be punished, just like a bus driver, or a train driver, or a truck driver who falls asleep and derails a train

Yes, of course Just Culture and blanket immunity from prosecution are two different things.

My point was that any finding that the crew were "genuinely negligent" isn't for the media to establish, and certainly not in the first few days after the incident.

Likewise, I'd be very surprised if the CAAC was anywhere close to reaching a view yet on culpability or otherwise (particularly given that the A330's CVR recording was reportedly not preserved).

So talking of "punishment" at this early stage is ridiculous.

[peekay4]

So talking of "punishment" at this early stage is ridiculous.
Not really. We're talking about the CAAC here (judge, jury & executioner). In China "punishments" are doled out swiftly, sometimes immediately after an incident.

E.g., just a few months ago when another China Eastern crew messed up an approach to Kangding (hitting the approach lights), the CAAC revoked the crew's pilot licenses for life, within a week of the incident, in part because they believed the crew tried to cover up what had happened.

If the CAAC believe that the A330 CVR had been deliberately erased, then I would not be surprised if similar action will be taken.

[framer]

I agree 100% with oleary.
The 320 Captain had to make a big decision in a short space of time with only the info from his/her eyeballs and no prior assessment. They did and nobody was killed.
Good work.

[Cows getting bigger]

On FBW Airbus types, moving the TLs fully forward is the only way to select TOGA at any stage of the operation. Max thrust and correct flight modes in one easy action!

So, is it really a case of full 'power' and pull back as hard as you can with the aircraft figuring out the rest?

[bbrown1664]

I would imagine a lot of the seat covers on the LHS of the A330 as well as seats 0A and 0B on the A320 needed their covers changing after that event.

[Piltdown Man]

I'm going to make a big assumption here. The A320 got airborne. Both cockpit members probably soiled their underwear shortly before, during and after the event. There would have been an exchange of radio calls and certainly a discussion between them. All the time the CVR would have been running. I'll bet they landed at wherever and the thought of popping the C/B for the CVR never went through their minds. After 30 minutes or two hours (the most likely CVR durations) the most pertinent data would have been over-written.

[4468]

So, is it really a case of full 'power' and pull back as hard as you can with the aircraft figuring out the rest?
I don't recall any protections active in ground mode. At that stage, it's pure aerodynamics. Full back stick at low speed, is likely to scrape the tail, and may or may not result in the a/c becoming airborne. Just like a Boeing.

But when airborne, with protections available, yes, that will absolutely do the trick!

As another poster pointed out, there are no TOGA buttons on an Airbus. There is only one way to 'self select' TOGA power. That is to firewall the thrust levers. (The a/c does of course have it's own method of selecting TOGA power, should certain airborne protections be triggered!)

[FullWings]

It’s an interesting scenario that I suspect quite a few of us have thought about away from the aeroplane. Many busy airfields regularly cross traffic over active runways so it’s something that is familiar but that rarely goes wrong in such a spectacular fashion.

If you’re on the runway, at what point do you recognise that someone is going to infringe rather than hold short, being used to aircraft doing the latter? There is a short window available for a very big decision and it has to be done mostly on feel because there is no time for any sort of calculation, especially as there isn’t much data to put into it at that instant.

An initial analysis shows that they *might* have been able to stop but there are a lot of inherent assumptions about the timing of the reject decision and how well the RTO would have been handled in the circumstances. Well over 100kts and coming up on V1 you are eating runway up at quite a rate. Steer onto the grass if you think you’re going to collide? Depends on what else is on the surrounding taxiways, as you’re effectively going to lose control at that point.

It’s a horrible decision to have to make but it needs to be made. Nothing was broken in this case so it was de-facto at least adequate. Optimal? Who can say, given the amount of variables at play...

[Una Due Tfc]

Lots of fields in that part of the world have those deep storm drains in the verges, go through one of those with enough momentum and anything could happen I would think...lose the gear, rupture a fuel tank.

Never worked TWR but it sounds like either the 330 crew didn't comply with a hold short instruction they read back, in which case they're in doo doo, or they didn't read it back, in which case they and the controller are both in doo doo.

Probably a stupid question but do you guys have SOPS to check left and right before crossing a runway? If the 320 saw the 330 then the 330 should have seen the 320 right? I mean you're going to notice a 320 near V1 right?

[FlightDetent]

Triple yes. :sad:

[Snyggapa]

On this occasion it looks like the A320 crew had two good options and chose one of them. CAAC calculated that they could have stopped in time, which was one option - and it is self evident that the option they took was also a good option.

Assuming 110 knots, that is 56 metres per second - that doesn't buy you much thinking time before your stopping margin just went negative - less than 4 seconds could have taken you from 2 good options to no good options.

Hats off to the quick actions of the crew

[OldLurker]

Almost a repeat of the outcome of Tenerife, but not of course a repeat of the circumstances. Lest we forget, at Tenerife there was no 'incursion'; the Pan Am 747 was backtracking on the runway with ATC clearance; the fog was so thick that the KL captain, when he initiated takeoff without clearance, couldn't see a 747 backtracking towards him. In the present incident the weather was CAVOK and everyone could see everyone else if they were looking; the A330 captain would only have had to glance out of the window.

[DaveReidUK]

I'm going to make a big assumption here. The A320 got airborne. Both cockpit members probably soiled their underwear shortly before, during and after the event. There would have been an exchange of radio calls and certainly a discussion between them. All the time the CVR would have been running. I'll bet they landed at wherever and the thought of popping the C/B for the CVR never went through their minds. After 30 minutes or two hours (the most likely CVR durations) the most pertinent data would have been over-written.

No, it was the A330's CVR that was overwritten. It had already landed and was taxying to the gate when the incident occurred.

[RAT 5]

It is awesome easy for the armchair quarterbacks to tell us what we, "Should have done".

And no-one has brought up the question of "why didn't they extend the flaps a little more?" ;) I guess Chuck Y was home that day.

For CAAC to publish their stopping calculation is of dubious value. Are they suggesting that stopping was OK, or that it was so close to disaster that GO as the correct decision? In what context were they saying they could have stopped 200m short? That is assuming no burst tyres or worn brakes; and assuming the WFT moment didn't case hesitation/disbelief which allowed 200m to disappear in a blink.

Good job; everyone lives to fight another day. Has anyone put the crews in touch with the lawyers at Dublin handling the ambulance case? :)

[Mac the Knife]

One of my first Chiefs told me, "As a surgeon you will have to learn to make quick decisions. And if they are correct then so much the better."

I suppose the point being "Don't dither!". For ANY decision is likely to be better than no decision.

Can't stand ditherers m'self.

Seems like this crew made the Go/No go decision in time - good for them.

[Huck]

Tell me again about the remotely-piloted airliners of the future.....

[RAT 5]

Tell me again about the remotely-piloted airliners of the future.....

That would be the one that would not have infringed the runway in the first place, either by remote control, or because it would not cross the stop bar, automatically; because nothing can go wrong.....go wrong......go wrong........

[kev2002]

Does anyone look out the window these days or is it common practise just to blindly do what we are told?

[Bedder believeit]

Many years ago - 1971 to be exact I was a student controller in Sydney tower when the following incident/accident took place: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19710129-1. between a TAA (Trans Australian Airlines) B727-100 and a Canadian Pacific Airlines (CPA) DC-8 62 occurred. Many years later (around 2010 I think) I was the Aerodrome Controller for RWY 07R at Hong Kong (CLK) International airport. I had just cleared an A330 for take-off from twy J1 and as the departing aircraft started it's takeoff roll, an inbound freighter B747 on TWY J5 was approaching the RWY J5 holding point at speed. Simultaneously the crosser called me and I said "Confirm holding short of RWY 07R" (as he Crossed the stop bar). My next transmission was to the now rolling A330, "Stop immediately, I say again Hold position". The A330 then had to vacate via J4 and taxi back to terminal due brake temps. As an extra result, the 8 odd aircraft awaiting departure on TWY's J and H were each delayed whilst a RWY inspection took place. So what can I say, but as a tower instructor for many years in HK, I endeavored to stress to my students to "look out the window"....I wonder how many do?
PS if my link to TAA/CPA doesn't work, you may like to Google the event. It's well worthwhile.Bedder believe me

[Super VC-10]

Bedder believeit - the report is well worth the read.

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24753/197101202.pdf

[JanetFlight]

bradandwhitney
Anyone else on here also under the impression that PVG ATC is even more "interesting" than typical chinese RT?
It wasnt PVG...it was SHA.

[YRP]

Does anyone look out the window these days or is it common practise just to blindly do what we are told?

That's kind of what I was wondering reading this, about the A330 crew. I was taught (in single engine stuff) to always look, never assume that crossing runway/taxiway is clear.

I don't mean that critically, wonder about the stuff I miss too, and had an interesting humbling example of that just this weekend.

Fortunately in this case at least two people were watching... good on 'em.

[Derfred]

Tell me again about the remotely-piloted airliners of the future.....

That would be the one that would not have infringed the runway in the first place, either by remote control, or because it would not cross the stop bar, automatically;

No, the A330 was cleared to cross. So it would have crossed the stop bar, automatically.

[autoflight]

Tower: "SBA maintain runway heading, climb to 4000 ft, cleared for takeoff"
SBA read back and commenced opening throttles
Unknown: "foxtrot"
SBA: "confirm we are cleared for takeoff"
Tower: Negative, hold your position

Turned out our clearance was cancelled and TFF (an F27) was cleared for takeoff opposite direction runway. Due to a large hump in the runway, limited vis from either end. The "foxtrot' was the last letter of TFF acknowledging takeoff clearance. We did not copy that because of reading back SBA (DC3) clearance.

In 1943, my father was bumped from a DC3 observation flight and the aircraft collided with another with no survivors. In 1970 I was again lucky (and vigilant) at the same place - the old Port Moresby airport.

Who out there in pprune land delay takeoff for a single "foxtrot"?

[RAT 5]

I was taught to always look, never assume that crossing runway/taxiway is clear.

I am always amazed, in the pedestrian world, to watch people waiting for the green light at the crossing and then step of the safety of the pavement into the danger area, where sharks lie in wait for the unwary, without looking. The green says you are cleared to cross, but is it safe? Surely they know of red-light jumpers. It sounds so easy to say, but observation of the real world suggests some guys just don't do it.

[reverserunlocked]

And no-one has brought up the question of "why didn't they extend the flaps a little more?"

I did wonder if the timely application of a further stage of flaps might get you in the air quicker and indeed posted the question, but the moderator deemed it inadmissible and it was quickly vanquished. No idea why, as the skipper pulled in a notch of flap in the BA 777 crash to stretch the glide so I don't see why the opposite might be useful in a situation like this.

Hence why I spend about 10 minutes a month browsing this site as opposed to hours each week, but that's a discussion for another day...

[Maxrev]

I did wonder if the timely application of a further stage of flaps might get you in the air quicker


It probably would, but by the time you'd spotted the threat, selected TOGA and puckered up your butt cheeks there probably wouldn't be time to do it, plus the flaps would need time to travel.

[readywhenreaching]

I find the thread title is problematic.

Hongqiao has nothing to with what happened in '77 at Los Rodeos except for an apparent ground conflict situation where ATC seemingly plays a role.

In '77 two aircraft followed each other in fog on the same runway after being imprisoned at Tenerife for hours. A bit different compared to this case..

[Super VC-10]

@readywhenreaching - it was almost a repeat of Tenerife insofar as there were two fully laden passenger aircraft which could so very easily have collided on a runway. Death toll here would likely have been very high. Fortunately, in this case, there was no collision. That last hole in the cheese didn't line up. A thread title is a bit like a newspaper headline, it's there to grab the attention of the reader.

[RAT 5]

You did of course note my 'smiley' that accompanied my flap comment. It was attached to the 'monday quarter-backing' comment of another poster. I do not expect every a/c to have an ace of the base sky god of the right stuff to be upfront.
They did a darned good job with what they had.

[Herod]

ace of the base sky god of the right stuff

I rather think he was/they were.

[mary meagher]

Rented clapped out C152, relying on the ceiling mounted speaker because no headset, three hour flight into Ann Arbor Michigan. Very tired. Permission to land, so did so, and taxied back to cross the end of the runway to fuel up and park. Brain dead by this time, I didn't hear/or understand that ATC had told me to hold short for a landing aircraft. However always have a good lookout, I saw the approaching aircraft and judged plenty of time to scoot across and get out of its way.

At the fuel depot I was informed that ATC wanted a word....

I apologised, told them I didn't have a headset and hadn't absorbed the hold short instruction, but that I had a jolly good lookout before crossing...and after a strict telling off was forgiven and decided hence to always fly with a headset.
But I still always have a jolly good lookout no matter what ATC tells me, you never know, do you?

[Basil]

Anyone else on here also under the impression that PVG ATC is even more "interesting" than typical chinese RT? Especially early morning when TWR still does CLR and GND while traffic is picking up continuously.
I remember a little language incident (wrong taxi clearance) whereafter a British accent came on the air saying something along the lines of "...you need to use proper english or someone will be seriously f...ed" (he did drop the f-bomb! - rightfully so it seems).
The only time I've said THE WORD on air was due runway incursion; story re-posted as food for thought:
Taking off from Malé, Maldives, circa 100kn, Luton van drove across in front of us. I observed that, if it maintained heading and speed, it would be well clear and continued t/o. It did and we missed.
Subsequent rethink suggested that, had it, for some reason, stopped on the runway, an instant abort would have meant we'd have hit it less hard.
My finding at the cerebral Board of Inquiry was that I should have rejected.

On another occasion I was considering rotating early due Alpha Jet entering runway with intention of taking off towards us. (He noticed and continued turn and cleared r/w)

[Ian W]

No, the A330 was cleared to cross. So it would have crossed the stop bar, automatically.

All UAS will be equipped with Detect And Avoid (DAA) systems which unlike flight crew do not make the assessment that cleared to cross means no danger as they are a separate safety system. The DAA would identify the potential collision and not cross the runway.

[peekay4]

China Eastern to Reward Captain for Preventing Collision at Airport


People's Daily Online | Oct. 17, 2016

China Eastern Airlines has announced plans to offer a reward
to the captain whose quick thinking recently helped to prevent a
collision between two planes at a Shanghai airport.

The captain, He Chao, was credited by China's Civil Aviation
Administration with "making a great contribution with his precise
and correct decision at a critical moment," Nanjing Daily reported.

The critical moment came on Oct. 11 when He's Airbus A320 jet,
carrying 147 passengers, was preparing to take off from the
Shanghai-Hongqiao International Airport.

...

China's Civil Aviation Administration suggested that the control
center be held accountable, in addition to the crew members of
the A330 who failed to maintain proper communication with the
controller, China Radio International reported.

The airline (sic), however, has yet to punish controllers, Nanjing Daily
reported.

Full article: China Eastern to Reward Captain for Preventing Collision at Airport (http://www.chinaaviationdaily.com/news/57/57119.html)

[PAXboy]

Bedder believeit. Thanks for the link, an absolutely fascinating read. Most interesting to see how use of CVR has progressed but the dogged investigators unearthed great information with voice matching. The report seems scrupulous in setting out the background of the operators and crews, then the sequence.

The collective mis-hearing of the key tx from the tower must be talked about to this day!

I note that the SYD tower did not record internal discussions between controllers, only the transmissions. Is this something that has changed around the world?

[Snyggapa]

Is it just me or does it feel like the number number of incidents where the "wrong breaker" was pulled, thus rendering the CVR useless is greater than one would statistically expect...

[India Four Two]

where the "wrong breaker" was pulled

I had exactly the same thought! Cynical, moi?

The Sydney report makes fascinating reading about an earlier era. Publishing the all of the crews' names. Flying with a inop FDR. Not reading back ATC instructions.

[costalpilot]

i was in atl in line for to in a moderate rain event (haha) when two delta dc 8's were on the same runway, one taking off, one landing, both pretty much in the same aspect, with their noses in the air. it was pretty erie.

then once in lauderdale we were holding in position for to when a cessna 150 landed over the top of us.


and thats all im going to share about similar events from my 34 year career.

[Wirbelsturm]

Whilst certainly advocating a constant and vigilant look out policy anyone who's ever operated out of Boston, JFK, Newark etc... especially at night, will know that it is commonplace to have an aircraft lined up on the departure runway as you cross.

The trick is to get yourself and your mucker to watch like a hawk to see if the bu**er is moving or not!!!

A very lucky bunch all told!

[EEngr]

Non pilot here with a question. From the Av Herald article link in the original post:

"the A320 crew had not yet been on frequency and therefore had not heard the crossing clearance.

There is a frequency switch somewhere between taxiing and takeoff clearance? Really? Or is this just bad reporting?

[T28B]

@EEngr: you will typically find a Ground control frequency at an airport that is a dedicated frequency to control ground movement. You will also have a tower frequency that governs take off and landing.


After you land, your switch to ground when directed by tower. (In my experience, usually "when clear of the active" which with multiple runway airports means you have to pay attention to what runway(s) are or are not active.)


The point of the different discrete frequencies is to avoid conflicting or confusing instructions for aircraft taking off and landing, versus those moving to and from the runway environment.

[PPL Hobbyist]

It seems to me that we have two conflicting reports here now:

The Herald says:
A China Eastern Airbus A330-300, registration B-6506 performing flight MU-5106 from Beijing to Shanghai Hongqiao (China) with 266 passengers, had landed on Hongqiao's runway 36R and was taxiing to the terminal needing to cross runway 36L. The aircraft, that had been previously cleared to cross runway 36L, was instructed to stop and hold short of runway 36L but did not react to the stop instruction.Then next thing I see, the CAD says:
All of a sudden, He's aircraft encountered another Airbus A330 cutting across its path.

The two planes, both owned by China Eastern Airlines, were found to have been simultaneously cleared for take-off by air traffic control.

The near-collision occurred as He sped up to take off, narrowly evading a head-on crash.

So the impression the reports give are: The A330 crew were in such a hurry that instead of dropping their packs off and refueling having just landed, they crossed runway 36R on Taxiway H3 in front of the A320, then taxied at one hell of a speed and turned onto 18R, commenced takeoff again WITH ATC clearance and caused a second near head on collision with the same A320. I gotta get me one of those A330s!!!! Must be capable of light speed.

Doesn't that just sound absolutely ridiculous? I would rather trust the Herald than some news paper.

I am just dying to know how a CVR recording from a modern plane that has just landed get over written. For me, most runways I land on are the gate and parking. Has it ever taken any of you 30 minutes (assuming this was a 30 minutes CVR) to reach your gate and shut the aircraft down? It just sounds suspicious to me that the whole recording was over written.

[peekay4]

I am just dying to know how a CVR recording from a modern plane that has just landed get over written.

On A330s the CVR will stop automatically 5 minutes after engine shut down.

The CVR contents can be erased (by pressing and holding the erase button), or it can be overwritten.

In this case it seems that the CVR was overwritten. Usually that means that the aircraft was allowed to be flown on the next flight segment without first preserving the CVR recording.

Sometimes CVRs get overwritten when the electrical system gets re-energized for some other reason (e.g., ground maintenance test), although there is a protection system that's supposed to shut down the CVR again within a few minutes if the engines are not operating.

In most jurisdictions, when there is a "reportable incident" then both the crew and the airline are responsible for preserving CVR and FDR data, usually in coordination with the jurisdiction's safety board.

The correct procedure to preserve the CVR is to pull the circuit breaker, until all data can be downloaded and secured.

[Bedder believeit]

Confusion "rains" sic (reigns) he said.

I get the impression from some of the posts here, that having access to the original post #1 quoting the "Aviation Herald", and the subsequent CAAC report, that two issues are evident. Firstly there seems some confusion between the use of the English masculine nominative singular word "he", and the surname title of the A320 captain, namely "He". Secondly, parts of the quoted CAAC report are somewhat limited by the "Chinglish" issue.... forgiveable... but there non the less.
Those looking at the Aerodrome Chart in post #1 for ZSSS Shanghai/Hongqiao may note that there are 4 nominated "Hot spots" (as shown as "HS1, HS2....etc). A "Hot spot" is a location on the airport where previous incidents or possible confusion has/may occur. I note that the place where this incident occurred is at "HS2". Possible confusion being that taxyway "H4" is not a straight line. A landing aircraft on RWY36R and vacating left on "H4" for parking at terminal West of the runway complex, would (could) be instructed to "vacate H4 left, then left on B, then right on H4, and hold short (or cross) RWY36L. Sounds like too much confusing bull**** to me. Me...ATC for 43 years

[slamer.]

Here's some technical analysis....

This crew and their passengers were mighty lucky on this one. Bit less wind, bit more weight ... etc etc ... Pulling the aircraft into the air was a gamble that paid off .... this time ...!!

[Hotel Tango]

Had the conditions been different, how do you know the crew would have taken the same decision slamer?

[akaSylvia]

the subsequent CAAC report

Do you mean the YouTube simulation or have I missed something?

[PPL Hobbyist]

I think you are missing something

[PPL Hobbyist]

Peekay4, Thanks for a damn great answer, but your damn great answer leads to more questions. This first one you may not be able to answer.

Why was the aircraft allowed to turn around and take off for it's next leg after an incident allowing the CVR to be over written (If that is the case)? In South Africa. you will be ordered to vacate the runway if you are on one, stop and shut down immediately.

Where is the CVR delete button? Is it easily accessible in the cockpit?

[peekay4]

Oversight + incompetence is the usual reason.

The CVR Erase button is typically in the cockpit on the overhead panel, next to the CVR Test button. The CVR will be "erased" if the button is held (usually for 2 seconds) while the aircraft is on ground and parking brake is set. The CVR cannot be erased while the aircraft is flying.

Some countries / jurisdictions do not allow CVR Erase functionality, so the button is either disabled or completely removed (factory option to not have the button). I don't know what the regs are in China.

Dirty little secret: by design CVR Erase is not a "secure erase". Meaning, it is possible for the authorities to use data recovery techniques to reconstruct the CVR recording, even if a pilot "erased" the CVR. Once the recording has been overwritten, however, recovery is no longer possible.

As an aside, on the A330 the CVR circuit breaker is not accessible from the cockpit (it is in the avionics bay).

[Yankee Whisky]

I agree. The PF knew his airspeed and capability to climb out before hitting the other aircraft. It is one of those split decisions that either make you a hero or a villain ! I am on the PF side in this case for the main reason that the probability of committing to the ability to stop was a consideration in weighing consequences.

[underfire]

THE licenses of two air traffic controllers were revoked and 13 air traffic control officials were punished for a near miss at Hongqiao airport last week, China’s civil aviation authority said yesterday.

A China Eastern Airlines passenger aircraft nearly crashed into another plane, owned by the same carrier, during its takeoff on last Tuesday.

He Chao, the captain of the China Eastern’s A320 aircraft, was granted a “first-class merit,” along with other rewards because he successfully defused the crisis, the Civil Aviation Administration of China announced on its official website.

“The air traffic controllers on the control tower were to blame for the ‘serious accident symptoms,’ who forgot the planes’ movements and gave wrong orders to the pilots,” the administration said.

The licenses of the controllers, who were manning the commanding and monitoring seats, were revoked — in one of the cases for life. The controller in the commanding seat was banned from ever undertaking any air traffic control jobs, the administration said.

Thirteen officials with the East China Air Traffic Management Bureau as well as the bureau’s air traffic control center and safety management department were either given Party warnings, serious warnings, had demerits recorded or faced losing their positions, the administration added.

According to a detailed operation record, the A320 moved out from the boarding bridge at 11:54am and entered 36L runway at 12:03am following orders from the air traffic control tower. The controller then gave permission to take off a minute later, and the aircraft began its maneuvering.

The A320 captain and copilot spotted the A330 was about to taxi across the runway when their aircraft’s speed had reached about 200 kilometers per hour. The copilot of A320 initially braked before the captain took over the controls and triggered maximum acceleration to fly over the A330.

http://www.shanghaidaily.com/metro/society/Airport-officials-lose-licenses-after-near-miss/shdaily.shtml

[Hotel Tango]

How I just hate this punishment punishment punishment culture! Re-training would be a much better solution.

[core_dump]

Yes, re-train a forgetful controller not to forget things. That sounds like a grand solution too.

[AtomKraft]

I remember another 'nearly a repeat of Tenerife' type incident. Was at CDG.

As we taxied out in LVPs, they cleared a AF 340 for T/O on 27L- in French. He came thundering past us.
Then they cleared a BA 757 who'd just landed on 27R to cross 27L- in English.

My finger hovered over the PTT switch, but then I thought what if I block a very important message???

The tower called 'Air France xxx,Stoppez decollage!' (stop your takeoff!) and the 340 crew did a high speed abort. The 757 was handed off to ground without another word.

A new controller came on freq, no doubt the other had gone for a change of swimwear...

When we took off, we saw the skidmarks and they were impressive, the ones on the runway !

Never heard another word about it.

[IcePack]

Some years ago again at CDG a shorts was hit by an aircraft taking off. Killed the First Officer. So I wonder if that ATC officer got banned for life.
In this Shanghai incident I find it "crass" to say forgetful controller it is just human error & putting people in fear of their jobs just causes stress so increasing the likely hood of more human error. The 330 crew should also have been looking out or did they forget too. Or was it foggy as was the case at CDG.

[Hotel Tango]

Yes, re-train a forgetful controller not to forget things. That sounds like a grand solution too.

:D :ugh::ugh::ugh:

You're not Trump by any chance?

[Una Due Tfc]

As we all know these massive punishments only encourage coverups. If I made an honest error, but "got away with it", I'd put my hand up to prevent my colleagues from falling into the same trap in future. If doing that would get me fired....I'd have to think twice wouldn't I?

[AtomKraft]

IcePack
Yes. I remember the Shorts sat on the ground for ages before getting scrapped. It was an Air Liberte DC-9 that hit them with its left wingtip. Chopped the poor FO to pieces.
It was another classic CDG 'dual language ops' incident. The DC-9 got his T/O clearance in French. The Shorts got his line up clearance in English. He was entering the runway using one of the high speed exits in reverse so to speak, so they'd have had to look backwards to see if the runway was clear.

After this accident, use of the 'high speeds' to line up was forbidden.

They've kept on with the dual language stuff though.....

[ATC Watcher]

There are 2 different issues here : ATC and the pilot reactions : The A320 crew reaction for me was very good : it prevented a collision. You had to be in his seat to pass any form of comment , distance left, , speed he had at the time , etc.. Good job.

For the A330 ,well, more difficult : were there red bars crossed ? what was Pilots visibility from his angle , or which frequency was he on , and which frequency was the order to stop given, step on/crossed transmissions ? etc.. lots of unknown to be able to comment seriously .

Now the apparent ATC error : ( I say apparent because we did not see any R/T transcript and analysis yet) but the Chinese CAA reactions seem to indicate it was the case. But we all know an incident such as this one rarely has a single cause.

Reading the various things posted so far , I cannot help thinking of the following scenario :
From a Western ATC point of view it would seem there should have been at least 4 controllers on duty in the TWR : one for each runway in use , one for ground and one supervisor. But we know that due staff shortages or in periods of low traffic, this is often reduced , the frequencies are collapsed sometimes down to a single controller , sometimes with the supervisor manning a control position , or coaching a trainee.
An indication as to how many controllers were on duty and who was doing what would help here.
Since the recent press release of the CAA indicating that a large number of management officials were disciplined as well , that would indicate to me that there might be a systemic management failure, where management allowed certain operations or position manning to take place that were not part of the procedures.
Just saying , having seen similar things many times before before . ( e.g Ueberlingen )

As to punishing everybody so harshly ( for life !!!) after such incident , this is totally unprofessional and absolutely contra productive for safety, as, knowing the consequences nobody there is going to report voluntary errors and incidents , and worse, nobody seeing an incident/error will report it knowing the consequences for his colleagues. We are back in the 1950's..:rolleyes:

[F-16GUY]

Noticed that the pilots of the aircraft crossing the runway was on ground frequency and therefore had no SA on the take-off clearance that was just issued on the tower frequency. This made me wonder how many pilots would actually listen in on other relevant frequencies (tower in this case) using one of the other radios on board, to gain SA on other traffic, especially when crossing runways controlled by other controllers on other frequencies.

My last experience where I wished for one more radio in my aircraft was when operating in and out of a middle eastern base where all coalition partners were using the local ground, tower and approach frequencies, while our US colleagues were operating on their own separate frequency. This was brought up several times during flight safety meetings as a severe SA degrading issue, especially since the local controllers were not very good at relaying the relevant traffic information. Therefore it would have been nice with one more radio (only have 2 in the F-16– one for ATC and one for in house between formation members) to be able to listen in and gain SA on other players in and around the field.

[Hotel Tango]

It might well have been procedures that were at fault, or procedures not adhered to. I know for a fact that at Amsterdam for instance an aircraft needing to cross an active runway is switched from GND to TWR to obtain the clearance to cross, and once clear is switched back to GND. Pretty sure that's standard procedure at most major airports.

[slamer.]

So the FO initially braked then the Capt elected to continue and some here think they weren't lucky...!!! Sounds like a shambles.

Classic Reason model stuff here. On a positive note, guess we know what's coming up in our sim recurrency in next 18 months.

[PJ2]

Peekay, minor point regarding "punishment", at least in a Just Culture, re:
In this case, it appears that an enforcement actions will be lodged at least against ATC personnel and possibly against the A330 pilots. The form of the action could be anything, starting with mandatory remedial training.
The carrier I work for (and many carriers I know), emphasize that training outside of the recurrent process, ("remedial"), is not considered punishment, it is considered proper corrective action which, in an accountable organization is a responsible action.

We don't know what went on in the cockpit of the A330 yet, and what we think should have happened doesn't explain the incident.

Punishment is, as you know, reserved for actions which are negligent, intentionally illegal or egregious.

Not 'lecturing' here by any means, as I know you know your stuff, but clarifying for others reading this who may not be operating in a Just Culture. The difference, which should be part of any SMS Manual and supported by both the airline's owner & its management, is an important one when trying to move from a blame-and-punish culture to a Just Culture.

[peekay4]

You're right PJ2, I was loose with my terminology.

In FAA & Canadian parlance anyway, "enforcement action" is indeed punitive. As you mention, airlines and authorities could instead require additional training without being punitive. From the regulator side often that's accomplished by issuing an "administrative" Letter of Correction, e.g., under FAR 13.11, which isn't considered a legal enforcement action.

Having said that -- when I wrote my original response, in the back of my mind is knowledge that CAAs around the world have been "cracking down" on runway incursions and there is sentiment among CAAs that punitive enforcement actions may indeed be an appropriate response for the most serious incursion events.

In part this has been done to "raise the profile" (visibility) of runway incursion violations, i.e., to "send a message" to pilots and ATC that certain violations will not be lightly tolerated. I don't necessarily agree with this approach, just reporting what the trend has been over the past decade.

[Just a spotter]

The US has had a couple of incidents where aircraft on intersecting runways have had one pass over the top of another during the 2000's.

June 9, 2005 in Boston between US Airways Flight 1170 (737) and Aer Lingus Flight 132 (A330), the pilots of US Air flight had to push forward on the control column to delay rotation as the EI had just taken off on the crossing runway.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SxRedCK_lWw

IIRC, the US Air crew received an award for their handing of the incident.

The following year in Chicago a landing Atlas cargo 747 had a departing Unitied 737 pass over it.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zBdtNVa8N0

Here's an NTSB list of incursions

http://www3.alpa.org/portals/alpa/runwaysafety/NTSBRunwaySafetyfactsheet.pdf

[SoFarFromHome]

I used to operate into this airport and it always required a great deal of attention.

ATC talk very quickly and get impatient when you tell them to "Say again slowly"

Actually this would often be rewarded with an even faster and LOUDER reply which was of no use to anyone requiring further clarification, and more wasted time. The whole place is frustrating.

Remember a colleague telling me they had been cleared to cross 36R once at H4, no mention of the A330 going past the window, and then having given it a reasonable margin....it had now passed in front of them, being shouted at by ATC to expedite, the A330 hasn't even vacated 36R yet so they couldnt have given the aircraft on final ( about 5 miles ) clearance to land yet anyway :ugh:

Regularly told to change frequency before the gear is even up and then followed by umpteen step climbs, 900M, 1200m, 1500m, is just asking for mistakes.

Not surprised this incident happened at all, ATC need to slow down, stop shouting and be civil

Someone said China was going to be all english speaking by the end of 2017, any truth in that?

:rolleyes:

[CEA330Driver]

No chance. They were supposed to go all English in the early 2000's - they tried for a few days as I recall then back to square one. There is just not enough incentive/disincentives to make it happen.

[Super VC-10]

Someone was paying attention at Helsinki though.

Incident: Finnair A321 at Helsinki on Oct 28th 2016, ATC operational error corrected by flight crew (http://avherald.com/h?article=4a01e949&opt=0)

[ATC Watcher]

Well , I would like to hear the R/T and actual instructions given to both aircraft before passing any form of judgement on this incident.

[haejangkuk]

So the FO initially braked then the Capt elected to continue and some here think they weren't lucky...!!! Sounds like a shambles.

Classic Reason model stuff here. On a positive note, guess we know what's coming up in our sim recurrency in next 18 months.

Jealous much? Non western pilot did a great job but all those trash waiting to pillory him.

If a western pilot had done the same you would be singing praises and waxing lyrical.

[Callicutt Kid]

ATC watcher.
Most likely R/T would be in Chinese mainland operators operating on home turf.
Don't know if google translate converts aviation mandarin

[ATC Watcher]

Callicutt Kid : I was talking about the Helsinki incident posted by Super VC10.

[CEA330Driver]

In my humble opinion while the outcome was successful, an incident like this, or any other for that matter, should be a learning opportunity and not made into a epic hero story or otherwise. There were two outcomes possible; one favourable and the other catastrophic. It does seem at this juncture that at the point the Captain made his decision, either stopping or going would have been favourable as basic physics would demonstrate. However, should the decision to 'GO' or 'STOP' have been delayed, then the trajectory of these outcomes looks very much different. That is, STOPPING would result in loss of fewer lives simply based on the speed of possible impact. I'm sure none of this is lost on anyone. But again, let's learn from this and NOT REWARD/PUNISH pilots for this decision. It could possibly bias decisions in the wrong direction if it ever happened again.

[readywhenreaching]

China Eastern Captain Awarded 3 Million Yuan for Averting Collision in Shanghai (http://www.chinaaviationdaily.com/news/57/57647.html)

China Eastern Airlines has offered a reward of 3 million yuan to the captain whose quick thinking helped to avert a ground collision between two passenger planes at Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport.
http://pic.carnoc.com/file/161103/16110312213194.jpg

[westhawk]

With an extra 400,000+ Euros in his pocket, the good captain may care just a little less about any second guessing of his actions.

Since each situation is unique regarding specific circumstances and timing, pilots will continue to make stop/go decisions based on their judgment regardless of whether or not they are rewarded or punished. It seems to me that the likely punishment for making the wrong decision would have been obvious in this case. I'm happy for him that it's a reward this time. I'm going to give the guy the benefit of any doubt by presuming that he might make the opposite decision next time if he feels the situation demands.

Enjoy your money and your life as reward for not crashing!

[Jet Jockey A4]

Well I hope he shares his new found fortune with his co-pilot!

Meanwhile Shanghai ATC gets raked over the coals by the CAAC...

Just shows how the old ways of this communist state still exist in this day and age.

CAAC Suspends Air Traffic Controllers for Near-Collision in Shanghai (http://www.chinaaviationdaily.com/news/57/57243.html)

[westhawk]

Meanwhile Shanghai ATC gets raked over the coals by the CAAC...

Yes that has all the signs of a familiar old refrain for many of us. "You were there when something bad happened, so you are guilty". The typical worker response to such an environment is that from then on, they will do only exactly what they are told to do. That attitude is not what we're looking for from people with responsibility for operational safety. Been there, done that, not a good management philosophy.

Well I hope he shares his new found fortune with his co-pilot!

Even if he wanted to stop?

[ATC Watcher]

The other danger with this hero/huge money reward is that some not-so sure guys in a similar situation in the future will try just that , to be a hero, and maybe try to imitate what is not imitable...Same effect as punishing : in both cases the total wrong thing to do if your aim is to improve safety..

As to sharing the money with his co-pilot, maybe he should better share it with the guy that trained him to evaluate the parameters and apply the best solution/decision .
Of Course a real " hero" would refuse the money arguing that he just did his job that day.:E

[slamer.]

And Sully could have made Teterboro .. apparently most here think he should have given it a go...!!

Everything about this thread disturbs me. Its like a time warp back to the 1960's.

[CEA330Driver]

Disturbing indeed. Unlike at Western airlines where a comprehensive analysis will be done, in China since the outcome was no loss of lives then the decision must have been sound. Lucky yes, correct questionable. It reminds me of the Air Transat accident where the Captain was made out a hero for his dead-stick landing in the Azores. It was only after the final report did they realize that while it was indeed a successful outcome with skill intermixed with pure luck that the situation could have been avoided in the first place with proper fuel monitoring from the crew. FWIW: Accelerating an aircraft into a moving object gives me the jitters in a big way!

[Jet Jockey A4]

@CEA330Driver...

avoided in the first place with proper fuel monitoring from the crew

No crew interaction there... Just a one man show on the captain's part.

[westhawk]

No information presented thus far confirms either choice as being more correct or "safer" than the other as a matter of policy. This was a decision made in real time by the PIC of that aircraft in the circumstances of that moment. Second-guessing is irrelevant. We don't know exactly what the PIC sensed or considered in making his decision. We only know the outcome. In this case, not colliding with the offending aircraft makes the outcome a success. Imagine the second guessing if it went the other way.

There is no guarantee that stopping would have been successful. Even if a performance model were to show the airplane could have been stopped prior to the intersection, factors such as tire or braking failures might still alter the outcome. Even a 5 mph impact with another jet could still result in a catastrophic outcome.

From the pilot's perspective this all unfolds rapidly. Within a very short time, a decision must be made and executed. Stop or go? The clock is ticking...Time's up, hope you made the right choice. Either way, you're committed to it now. I'm glad it worked out. I have no idea what the PIC of this flight knew or what prompted him to choose his course of action. Neither does anyone else. Except him...Maybe. We do know it worked. This time. And it's a good bet that's all that mattered to that pilot, in that moment.

Rewarding a successful outcome is better than the alternative. However punishment of the controllers without bothering to find out why is just plain ignorant. If the controllers erred as the result of willful negligence or misbehavior, then their firing might well be warranted. I find it doubtful that a proper investigation into this affair could have been completed in such a short time. More likely the knee-jerk response of a fearful quasi-military bureaucracy. Or perhaps government communication with media could be improved. Could it be that they might reconsider after completing a proper inquiry? Wishful thinking perhaps?

[Klauss]

Fully agree. What - if, calculated in an office environment, doesn´t count one bit in the real world.