Another reason not to fly Asiana

[Oval3Holer]

Incident: Asiana A388 over Pacific on Sep 27th 2016, cargo smoke indication (http://avherald.com/h?article=49ea07fc&opt=0)

Incident: Asiana A388 over Pacific on Sep 27th 2016, cargo smoke indication

By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Sep 28th 2016 20:54Z, last updated Wednesday, Sep 28th 2016 20:54Z
An Asiana Airbus A380-800, registration HL7626 performing flight OZ-201 from Los Angeles,CA (USA) to Seoul (South Korea) with 353 people on board, was enroute at FL360 about 710nm southsoutheast of Anchorage,AK (USA), 820nm west of Vancouver,BC (Canada) and 1460nm northnorthwest of Los Angeles when the crew received a cargo smoke indication. The crew decided to turn around and return to Los Angeles for a safe landing about 3:40 hours later and about 7 hours after departure.

The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground for 12.5 hours, then departed again and is estimated to reach Seoul with a delay of 19.5 hours.

The airline declined to comment.

Asiana (OZ) #201 ? 27-Sep-2016 ? KLAX - ICN / RKSI ? FlightAware (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/AAR201/history/20160927/1910Z/KLAX/RKSI)

[Jet Jockey A4]

We don't know all the details yet but wouldn't you want to divert to the closest suitable airport?

[The Ancient Geek]

Simple probable explanation :-
Smoke warning does not always indicate real smoke. it could just be a detector fault.
If an inspection does not find smoke ask base for advice and go where the engineering facilities and spare parts are available.

[BuzzBox]

If an inspection does not find smoke ask base for advice and go where the engineering facilities and spare parts are available.

It may have been a detector fault, but how on earth is the crew going to 'inspect' the cargo compartment(s) to check for 'real smoke'? If you have no way of verifying the indication is false, then wouldn't it be prudent to divert to the nearest suitable airport?

[oicur12.again]

The only false fire warning is the one you find out about after landing, until then, they are all real.

[RatherBeFlying]

Not much difference between Anchorage and Vancouver in flying time.

Continuing back to LAX, there's several bolt holes available if the situation worsens.

How much trust do we want to place in the cargo fire suppression system?

[Check Airman]

Acknowledging the fact that very little is known right now, I'd certainly have preferred to land in ANC, even if I'd never been there before. Assuming the wx was ok, not having facilities to deal with an A380 (I don't think there's and A380 service to ANC) would be the least of my concerns.

At the same time, do we know for sure that ANC was in their nav database? Quite frustratingly, I fly by many long, suitable runways every day that aren't in my database. I have to pull out my chart to know they're down there.

[Oval3Holer]

That's where we are today in the airline world: can't lower the flaps, put down the gear, nor move the thrust levers and the control column (or sidestick) to fly the aircraft to a landing on a runway unless the airport is in the database.

Sad.

[Airbubba]

At the same time, do we know for sure that ANC was in their nav database? Quite frustratingly, I fly by many long, suitable runways every day that aren't in my database. I have to pull out my chart to know they're down there.

Flying the NOPAC how could PANC not be in the database? And, OZ has flown into Anchorage from the gitgo. An A380 pax load would sure help the Captain Cook with occupancy this time of year.

But I agree, those legacy Pegasus FMS's with 6 megabytes of memory and limited databases should be long gone in airline ops by now. The wifi in the cabin has gone through more upgrades than the boxes in the cockpit in many cases. Hopefully this isn't problem on the A380, maybe they have 16 megabytes of memory in the boxes by now. ;)

And all those military fields should be shown for emergency purposes, like, say, a cargo fire. :eek:

[autoflight]

If there is no clearly identifiable reason to divert to LAX it is obvious that a closer airfield should be chosen. It would be drawing a long bow to say that land ASAP or land at the nearest suitable airfield meant fly to LAX.

If the ECAM procedure stopped the warning, this means a higher probability that there was a fire and what capability is there to have multiple attempts at the procedure? If ECAM procedure did not stop the warning I would have to assume worst case.

Cargo fire or smoke in cabin are a couple of really serious problems and I would not be surprised if some Asiana Sky Gods had never seriously had a long look at what they would actually do.

My company would be informed of captain decision and a very convincing case would be needed to fly an additional 700nm.

In the past, observed Asiana weak points were:

inadequate airfield data base and failure of crews to research missing airfields
no timely updating jepps
no timely updating operating manuals
not always responding to documented legitimate safety concerns of crew

[stilton]

If he was concerned enough to turn around he should have put it down at the first suitable.

[ACMS]

Yep.

1/ the A380 would have had PANC in the FM data base.
2/ smoke warning, LAND ASAP in Red on the ECAM, yes Red for a reason!!

The mind boggles....

[Huck]

Bring back smoke tubes....

[Alpine Flyer]

At the same time, do we know for sure that ANC was in their nav database? Quite frustratingly, I fly by many long, suitable runways every day that aren't in my database. I have to pull out my chart to know they're down there.

Regulations should require Airlines to put ALL airports suitable for the equipment at least into the Electronic Flight Bag Database. With Nav providers charging for their manuals by the airport, there seems to be a strong bias for airlines to economize by just putting in enough airports to cover erneute alternate requirements.

It's quite frustrating to know there are airports beneath you that would suffice for an emergency landing but having NO information at all about them on the (electronic) books.

Having them in the FMS would be even better, and all FMS should be required to have a "closest airports" function.

[ACMS]

They do have that function.......

I would be willing to bet you that the A380 would have PANC airport data all complete in its database.

If not then they could easily have created a RUNWAY in the database PANC06 ( for e.g. ) filled in all the required data fields then changed the destination to PANC06, off they go.

They would have ANC VOR waypoint Lat Long ( the VOR would be in the database and probably the ILS as well ) and they could track direct, then manually tune the ILS ( unless the ILS is in the database already ) and VOR for a conventional landing after radar vectors

We fly to a few Airports that don't have the ILS in the FM due system problems, it doesn't stop us landing using the ILS.

What happened to good old fashioned VOR and/or ILS tuning if required?

[Eau de Boeing]

I fly the A380 and it is in our database.

it's LAND ASAP (In red for a reason)

[ACMS]

Just go back and edit your post to make the writing RED like I did above. :ok:

Looks better!!

[felixthecat]

It took them another 1460nm and 3:40 to land when there were closer airfields ?!? ......geeze I wouldn't want to have been on that flight

[chimbu warrior]

The only false fire warning is the one you find out about after landing, until then, they are all real.

100% correct.

[zlin77]

Maybe they contacted Asiana Operations Control on the Sat Phone and were directed where to go........decision making is not a strong thing in many Asian Cultures and if someone else makes the decision then they cannot loose face if this proves to be wrong.......

[Basil]

Bring back smoke tubes....
That takes me back to Merchant Navy days.

[SeenItAll]

Maybe the ILS at all airfields closer than LAX (like SFO) was down. We know that has presented OZ with a problem in the past.

[Snyggapa]

It's a good job that there is not an airfield with code ASAP otherwise it could have been a long diversion..

[notapilot15]

Well, as long as there are no Samsung phones/tablets in the cargo hold they should be fine. Another possibility is some exotic fruit,vegetable or food product setting off the sensor.

[cwatters]

An Apple perhaps? I'll get my coat on the way out.

[efatnas]

I guess he has four engines and ETOPS is a relative thing, but a few minutes into it he probably thought he wasn't on fire because he was still alive and made his way back to a place he knew he had service. Staring over three hours at a fire indication is an acquired taste but they are hard to get rid off if the sensors are activated. Know nothing about Airbuses, but I assume part of his checklist is turning the fans off. I would have done the same thing. Would hate to have to explain why I went ETOPS with a fire indication, the next day at the chief pilot's office.

[jumbojet]

If 'local crew' they will do what ops tells them to do! Its in the DNA. No discussion.

[4468]

efatnas

ETOPS twinjets have been required since 1985 to carry sufficient fire suppressant to protect the airplane continuously throughout a maximum-duration diversion. In contrast, although all jetliners have cargo fire suppression systems, airplanes with more than two engines have not previously had to meet this requirement that further protects passengers, crews, and airplanes on extended air routes.

Not familiar with A380.

[Huck]

I'd have pointed it at PANC and prepared for ditching. I'm not dying for this business.

[ElectroVlasic]

Reading this thread, all that is going through my head is UPS Flight 6 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UPS_Airlines_Flight_6). If it's me, I'm going to the nearest suitable and sorting it all out on the ground.

[efatnas]

4468
Aha…. didn't know that. They got to have something down there. What's the point of having a smoke detector if you can't do anything about the smoke. I'm not sure just because you have more then two engines you are excluded from long range requirements if you go ETOPS, meaning certain distances from a pad.

[tdracer]

The ETOPS requirements for fire suppression now apply to all passenger jets, regardless of the number of engines. In fact, nearly all the ETOPS requirements except engine reliability apply to passenger quads. It's been that way since around 2010 IIRC.
Freighters with more than two engines are exempt from all the ETOPS requirements (I know, don't shoot the messenger here...)

[gtseraf]

going slightly off topic here, the 767 BCF freighters have no fire extinguishers in the lower cargo holds. They have the same method to fight fires as applied to the main deck fire. Depressurise, descend to 25000' and hope like hell it works out.

For carriage of certain lithium batteries, the recommended procedure is "land immediately", which, if you're over water means ditch the damn thing.

Lovely.

As far as for ANY fire warning, pax or freight aircraft, I'm landing as soon as possible, even if the fire warning has gone out, as there is NO WAY for me to determine if the fire is indeed extinguished or not.

[flyhardmo]

https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20110728-0

And you'd think they would learn after one of their own crashed due to a fire in 2011.

[gtseraf]

Lithium batteries on board with a fire.

Boeing could not confirm the safety of Lithium battery transport, yet many operators still carry them.

Dollars worth more than lives!

[Sailvi767]

Why does Asiana state they have a Captain onboard. Sounds like they just have copilots who receive all needed inflight direction from the company. They will save money flying without Captains!

[cooperplace]

Well, as long as there are no Samsung phones/tablets in the cargo hold they should be fine. Another possibility is some exotic fruit,vegetable or food product setting off the sensor.

presumably you're joking? pilots in the air shouldn't get into speculation about what may/may not be setting off a smoke alarm; it should simply be treated as a possible fire

[Right Way Up]

It's a good job that there is not an airfield with code ASAP otherwise it could have been a long diversion..

Brilliant ;)

[ExSp33db1rd]

Departed Singapore Northbound with a 747 freighter, just past Kuala Lumpur got a main deck fire warning, but no sign of smoke or distress observed having sent a spare crew member down to the cargo deck with a fire extinguisher. Turned back towards Kuala Lumpur but then realised that we had to spend time dumping fuel down to landing weight anyway, so continued back to Singapore and started dumping. As we landed the fire warning light went out.

Previous flight had been full of Durians, the heavy, cloying vapour had fooled the sensors, but of course we didn't know that.

But I agree, one doesn't always know, and each case is different, he could have held over ANC to get down to landing weight if that was a problem, but one is never really very far from a "suitable " airport twixt LAX and ANC.

[Check Airman]

The ETOPS requirements for fire suppression now apply to all passenger jets, regardless of the number of engines. In fact, nearly all the ETOPS requirements except engine reliability apply to passenger quads. It's been that way since around 2010 IIRC.

tdracer,

Is that all pax jets, or all newly certified pax jets? Our NB Airbii only have one bottle, with one shot, for two cargo compartments. I'm told that the probability of detecting smoke in both compartments on one flight is very low.

[White Knight]

he could have held over ANC to get down to landing weight if that was a problem, but one is never really very far from a "suitable " airport twixt LAX and ANC.

It's not a problem with the 380. You can even land at up to 60 tonnes over MLW and get a deferral on the overweight landing inspection (subject to certain conditions such as having to land symmetrically on the mains and having a touchdown ROD of less than -360 fpm).

And the cargo fire suppression system is supposed to give up to 4 hours protection; however I personally will land ASAP with ANY fire or smoke warning...

[Flying_Dutch]

Any smoke or fire warning should be consider valid unless confirmed otherwise ....
How fast it can go ...
Read below:
UPS FLIGHT 6
ACCIDENT SYNOPSIS:
On September 3rd 2010, a Boeing 747-44AF departed Dubai International Airport [DXB] on a scheduled international cargo flight [SCAT-IC] to Cologne [CGN], Germany.
Twenty two minutes into the flight, at approximately 32,000 feet, the crew advised Bahrain Area East Air Traffic Control [BAE-C ] that there was an indication of an on- board fire on the Forward Main Deck and declared an emergency.
Bahrain Air Traffic Control advised that Doha International Airport [DOH] was 'at your ten o'clock and one hundred miles, is that close enough?', the Captain elected to return to DXB (approximately 180 NM), configured the aircraft for the return to Dubai and obtained clearance for the turn back and descent.
A cargo on the main cargo deck had ignited at some point after departure. Less than three minutes after the first warning to the crew, the fire resulted in severe damage to flight control systems and caused the upper deck and cockpit to fill with continuous smoke.
The crew then advised Bahrain East Area Control [BAE-C] that the cockpit was ‘full of smoke' and that they ‘could not see the radios', at around the same time the crew experienced pitch control anomalies during the turn back and descent to ten thousand feet.
The smoke did not abate during the emergency impairing the ability of the crew to safely operate the aircraft for the duration of the flight back to DXB.
On the descent to ten thousand feet the captains supplemental oxygen supply abruptly ceased to function without any audible or visual warning to the crew five minutes and thirty seconds after the first audible warning. This resulted in the Captain leaving his position. The Captain left his seat and did not return to his position for the duration of the flight due to incapacitation from toxic gases.
The First Officer[F.O], now the Pilot Flying [PF] could not view outside of the cockpit, the primary flight displays, or the audio control panel to retune to the UAE frequencies. Due to the consistent and contiguous smoke in the cockpit all communication between the destination [DXB] and the crew was routed through relay aircraft in VHF range of the emergency aircraft and BAE-C.
BAE-C then relayed the information to the Emirates Area Control Center (EACC) in the UAE via landline, who then contacted Dubai ATC via landline.
As the aircraft approached the aerodrome in Dubai, it stepped down in altitude, the aircraft approached DXB runway 12 left (RWY 12L), then overflew the northern perimeter of the airport at 4500 ft at around 340 kts . The PF could not view the Primary Flight Displays [PFD] or the view outside the cockpit.
The PF was advised Shajah International Airport [SHJ] was available at 10 nm. This required a left hand turn, the aircraft overflew DXB heading East, reduced speed, entering a shallow descending right-hand turn to the south of the airport before loss of control in flight and an uncontrolled descent into terrain, nine nautical miles south west of Dubai International Airport.
There were no survivors.

CAUSES:
1. A large fire developed in palletized cargo on the main deck at or near pallet positions 4 or 5, in Fire Zone 3, consisting of consignments of mixed cargo including a significant number of lithium type batteries and other combustible materials. The fire escalated rapidly into a catastrophic uncontained fire.
2. The large, uncontained cargo fire, that originated in the main cargo deck caused the cargo compartment liners to fail under combined thermal and mechanical loads. 3. Heat from the fire resulted in the system/component failure or malfunction of the truss assemblies and control cables, directly affecting the control cable tension and elevator function required for the safe operation of the aircraft when in manual control.
4. The uncontained cargo fire directly affected the independent critical systems necessary for crew survivability. Heat from the fire exposed the supplementary oxygen system to extreme thermal loading, sufficient to generate a failure. This resulted in the oxygen supply disruption leading to the abrupt failure of the Captain’s oxygen supply and the incapacitation of the captain.
5. The progressive failure of the cargo compartment liner increased the area available for the smoke and fire penetration into the fuselage crown area.
6. The rate and volume of the continuous toxic smoke, contiguous with the cockpit and supernumerary habitable area, resulted in inadequate visibility in the cockpit, obscuring the view of the primary flight displays, audio control panels and the view outside the cockpit which prevented all normal cockpit functioning.
7. The shutdown of PACK 1 for unknown reasons resulted in loss of conditioned airflow to the upper deck causing the Electronic Equipment Cooling [EEC] system to reconfigure to "closed loop mode". The absence of a positive pressure differential contributed to the hazardous quantities of smoke and fumes entering the cockpit and upper deck, simultaneously obscuring the crew’s view and creating a toxic environment.
8. The fire detection methodology of detecting smoke sampling as an indicator of a fire is inadequate as pallet smoke masking can delay the time it takes for a smoke detection system to detect a fire originating within a cargo container or a pallet with a rain cover.

[Johnny F@rt Pants]

he could have held over ANC to get down to landing weight if that was a problem,

Do people not remember Swissair off the coast of Newfoundland!!

Don't know Airbus at all, but I'm sure the A380 will have a fuel dumping facility. In which case these guys had plenty of time en-route to the nearest airport to dump sufficient fuel to reach their MLW. Having said that, better to be on the ground overweight with a bent undercarriage than in a smoking hole.

It makes me wonder how some airlines are still permitted to operate to areas that take safety and the decisions made by the crew to that effect more seriously.

[faheel]

exsp33db1rd

I had a similar experience in a 777

Departed Singapore for Ams...about 150 nm North of KL got a cargo fire warning,turned around and headed back to
KL ,landed about 40 tonnes over max landing weight..permitted to do that in an emergency..smoothest landing I ever did in a 777:)

We had a fire warning prior to departure and engineers reracked the card,I was pretty sure it was a false warning but I fired the bottles and was sure as hell not overflying a suitable airport.

Treat every warning as a real one,as far as I am concerned I would rather be on the ground asap.

[Johnny F@rt Pants]

Faheel, I'll get onboard your aeroplane any day.

[tdracer]

tdracer,

Is that all pax jets, or all newly certified pax jets? Our NB Airbii only have one bottle, with one shot, for two cargo compartments. I'm told that the probability of detecting smoke in both compartments on one flight is very low.
Going from 10 year old memory here (as an engine guy it doesn't really affect me, and I'm too lazy to go research it :E). But what I recall is that all passenger aircraft manufactured after a specific date had to comply, and the existing fleet would have to be upgraded by a later date. I'm reasonably sure the new-build date passed a few years back, I really don't recall what the retrofit date was. For all practical purposes it only affects the 747, A380, and A340. Note also that even twins don't need to comply if they're not used for ETOPS.
If you're really interested, go research the FAA Part 25 "Appendix K" regulations.

[efatnas]

Thread was something like another reason not to fly Asiana... Lot's of talk about fires and lets go to the nearest pad ridiculing the captain's decision. I'm trying to find out exactly why? He has smoke not heat sensors in the cargo compartment. The average hull loss is 16 minutes into noticing there is a problem, with Swissair right in the middle of the graph. He is two hours from Anchorage or Vancouver and three and a half from LAX. There is no doubt if he would have had a fire, blows the bottles and it's still burning, he would have to ditch. I guess he didn't care to fly with a fire light on for 3.5 instead of 2 hours. He is supposed to be protected for 4 hours, meaning there is zero O2 in the cargo hold after he blows the bottles.

[autoflight]

efatnas,

Thread drift apologies but:

Very few sky gods consider continuing actual smoke / fire or warnings.

Even if heading for the nearest suitable (or perhaps unsuitable by normal standards) airfield, based on past cases, continued flight might be not possible or sufficient evidence that this situation could soon exist.

I only know one pilot who would do the necessary drills and be in a position to ditch or force land in a few minutes. Not something that one could really be ready for at FL350. Maybe 500 ft, already configured, while proceeding towards somewhere more comfortable and deciding if continuing is really an option.

[Check Airman]

tdracer,

Thanks! Will go look it up.

[JammedStab]

Here is a strictly devil's advocate scenario to garner opinions.

After seeing the examples of Swissair, Valuejet, Asiana 747, UPS, and several others where the smoke became obvious within minutes and the aircraft crashed not that many minutes later, what if you are over the ocean(or some other remote area) and get a fire warning, follow the procedure and divert. Then 90 minutes or so later as you approach your technically suitable but very remote airport, there has not been one hint of any unusual smell anywhere in the aircraft. Is there really any chance of a fire?

With your large amount of remaining fuel, you hold for a while at about 10 miles final in order to be ready for an immediate landing in case an unusual smell occures, but there is still no hint of fire except that warning light. Then after discussion with company, you decide that it is a false warning(as most are) and proceed to a more suitable(and operationally convenient) airport a few hours away.

[Sqwak7700]

Stop overthinking this. In the UPS Dubai crash from cargo fire, the flight controls where no longer effective just 2 minutes after the first fire warning.

2 minutes.

If you have a fire warning that you can not confirm, get the plane on the ground. Don't overthink it. Boeing doesn't want you to overthink it. They go as far as telling you to ditch or make an off-airport crash landing if it is bad enough.

[efatnas]

UPS Dubai crash happened 27 minutes after the initial warning. He decided for some reason to go back to Dubai instead of getting it on the ground in Doha or better Al Adid. If you on fire its almost always better to look for a military base; they have better fire crews and many times the latest equipment. In my airline, a smoke sensor in the cargo compartment was activated by somebody smoking a cigarette in the bathroom I'm told. It's hard to believe, but never the less word around the camp fire. What I do agree with on this thread is that the Asiana Captain probably did what dispatch told him to do. If based on the UPS scenario, he should have gone to PANC; difference to the UPS Captain, he knew he had a fire and decided to go 220 miles I seem to recall; furthermore his mask wasn't working. Go figure...

[neilki]

Direct from my QRH

CAUTION:
Dependent upon the severity of the situation, the flight crew should expedite the landing. the crew should also consider an overweight landing, tailwind landing, ditching or a forced off-airport landing.

How severe is it? We could read the UPS or Swissair CVR transcript. It was very 'Severe' -Long before they realized..
I doubt Asiana lost many customers from PPRune; but it sounds like a serious evaluation of their company culture may be in order.
My first instinct is head for the nearest airport, then consider suitability. The aircraft becomes incidental and only exists to protect the pax & crew when the machine thinks it's on fire, or you believe it is...

[JammedStab]

Direct from my QRH

CAUTION:
Dependent upon the severity of the situation, the flight crew should expedite the landing. the crew should also consider an overweight landing, tailwind landing, ditching or a forced off-airport landing.

How severe is it? We could read the UPS or Swissair CVR transcript. It was very 'Severe' -Long before they realized..
I doubt Asiana lost many customers from PPRune; but it sounds like a serious evaluation of their company culture may be in order.
My first instinct is head for the nearest airport, then consider suitability. The aircraft becomes incidental and only exists to protect the pax & crew when the machine thinks it's on fire, or you believe it is...
In fact, if you look at Swissair, UPS(747 and DC-8), FedEx, Asiana(747), Nationair, Air Canada, Varig, Pan Am, SAA, Saudia...you will find that they all knew within minutes that there was an actual fire on board and things went quickly downhill.

But playing the devils advocate again and looking at the remote oceanic scenario in a widebody jet, you divert to the nearest suitable airport which is a remote island that is perhaps 90 minutes away with the smoke/fire light remaining illuminated after all that time with not a hint of unusual smell and the reality that false warnings do happen and not infrequently on a variety of aircraft types.

Will you land immediately or consider heading further away to a more convenient airport perhaps after another hour of loitering around your nearby remote island with still no hint of anything unusual.

[Huck]

what if you are over the ocean(or some other remote area) and get a fire warning, follow the procedure and divert. Then 90 minutes or so later as you approach your technically suitable but very remote airport, there has not been one hint of any unusual smell anywhere in the aircraft. Is there really any chance of a fire?

This exact scenario happened at Emirates in a 777 about two years ago, on L888 over the Himalaya.

They diverted to Urumqi. Opened up the aft bulk cargo bay and there were scorch marks all over the ceiling. Battery fire started in a passenger's bag.

Also - there are legal ramifications for not taking the first suitable, in the US at least. I know a crew that was overhead airport A at FL250 when they lost an engine in a turboprop. They descended and landed at airport B about 20 miles away. They were violated for not landing at A.

[JammedStab]

(a) Thanks for your input and story about the fire warning.

(b) I find the turboprop story difficult to believe. Here is what Boeing says in their FCTM...
"A suitable airport is defined by the operating authority for the operator based on guidance material but, in general, must have adequate facilities and meet certain minimum weather and field conditions. If required to divert to the nearest suitable airport, the guidance material typically specifies that the pilot should select the nearest suitable airport “in point of time” or “in terms of time.” In selecting the nearest suitable airport, the pilot-in-command should consider the suitability of nearby airports in terms of facilities and weather and their proximity to the airplane position. The pilot-in-command may determine, based on the nature of the situation and an examination of the relevant factors, that the safest course of action is to divert to a more distant airport than the nearest airport. For example, there is not necessarily a requirement to spiral down to the airport nearest the airplane's present position if, in the judgment of the pilot-in-command, it would require equal or less time to continue to another nearby airport.

[Huck]

That's great, but it wasn't a Boeing, it was an Embraer Brasilia.

And it didn't help that airport B was the company's maintenance base......

The bottom line: there better be a safety-related reason to return to LAX over PANC.

[RAT 5]

I know a crew that was overhead airport A at FL250 when they lost an engine in a turboprop. They descended and landed at airport B about 20 miles away. They were violated for not landing at A.

Ah, the dreaded auto-rotation vertical deathly dive/spin in a fixed wing a/c, rather than a relaxed glide with time to plan and set up for a familiar airfield within glide range. An interesting debate in front of the aviation-wise judge.

[JammedStab]

That's great, but it wasn't a Boeing, it was an Embraer Brasilia.

And it didn't help that airport B was the company's maintenance base......

The bottom line: there better be a safety-related reason to return to LAX over PANC.
Huck, if you had fully read and understood my post, you would see that the information from the Boeing FCTM refers to is what they call Guidance Material. I don't know exactly what this guidance material is, but I think that it is safe to assume that it comes from the FAA. It has nothing to do with Boeing or Embraer.

Once again, I have difficulty believing that someone going 25 miles to an airport from FL250 is not going to a nearest suitable airport in time. I suspect that there is more to the story. But, you never know what a regulating authority might do. They tried to ground Bob Hoover many years back.

[EW73]

Just noticed this post, and "faheel" .... been to Kuwait have we?

[CurtainTwitcher]

Cross posted from the Air Lingus cargo fire thread (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/585641-aer-lingus-flight-ei120-fire-luggage-hold.html), just a reminder of what a cargo fire actually looks like.


http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2016/10/12/19/39561CE200000578-3834852-image-a-3_1476296115933.jpg


What is even more remarkable it the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 return kit (http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/12/technology/samsung-fireproof-box/) with heat resistant gloves and thermal-insulated fireproof boxes, and other similar items are flying with us all the time, both in the cabin and holds on most if not all flights.

[ironbutt57]

was a highloader on fire, not the cargo

[CurtainTwitcher]

I stand corrected ironbutt, the original article didn't mention the source, but assume makes an ass out of you and me.

[Perwazee]

The Ancient Greek: "Simple probable explanation :-
Smoke warning does not always indicate real smoke. it could just be a detector fault.
If an inspection does not find smoke ask base for advice and go where the engineering facilities and spare parts are available."

Greek, if you're an airline pilot, please ensure to make a 'Gate Announcement' about your Pprunne Moniker, each and every time, so if one day I happen to be scheduled to fly on your flight, I will ensure I won't! Un-freakin'-believable!