Really Hard Landing 3.5g

[JammedStab]

Did they get a proper inspection prior to the return flight.

Accident: Germania A321 at Fuerteventura on Jul 16th 2016, hard landing at +3.5G (http://avherald.com/h?article=49d65d9d)

[Fly26]

3.5g and the plane flew back on schedule....what about a tech log entry and inspection. Plus what on earth was going on with the walk around after.........

Cracking decision making..... :ugh:

[Chesty Morgan]

It isn't always obvious to pilots if a heavy landing has occurred. This is due to the de-rotation affecting the amount of 'g' felt forward of the centre of gravity.

Still...

[langleybaston]

I don't understand "de-rotation" please.

Is this no rotation, reduced rotation, or rotation in the opposite sense?

[mustangsally]

I have not seen a g meter since the old flying fighter days. I stand corrected there was one in a Pitts that I flew years ago.


The rotation effect? I think, I need to wave the Red Bull flag here.


A hard landing is a hard landing and needs to be entered in the log, with the data to include landing weight and other conditions. The item needs to be cleared by the tech's. First the tech does a quick visual of the gear and fuselage. If further inspection is needed, panels start coming off.


Many moons ago, operating DC-9's we had one airframe that had some nice wavy creases just forward of the engine mounts. Research showed it was several years old and had been cleared.


Some where on the web is a short video of a DC-9 or maybe MD-9 on a text flight that after touch down the airframe breaks aft of the wing.


I think there will be some retraining of this crew.

[Chesty Morgan]

Rotation in the opposite sense - pitching down.

[mustangsally]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIsbSz03WdU

[ImageGear]

The SLF sitting on the main spar would have known all about it. Wouldn't be surprised if compressed discs were treated. Been there, (KBOS, night approach, 33L over water), had the treatment :()

[safelife]

Germania says it was inspected after the landing, no damages found, inspected again after return flight, QAR data taken, no damage found, also say 3.5G is not confirmed by QAR data.
Touchdown apparently happened while rejecting the landing.
Aircraft will get a new landing gear now which would have been due in winter anyway.

[Mr @ Spotty M]

It is obvious on an Airbus, you get an automatic Load 15 report, which tells you that you have just F***** up your landing. :=
Aircraft should not depart until that Load 15 report has been verified. :{

[BEagle]

There is no question that the pilots would have known that they'd had a heavy landing - the de-rotation idea is nonsense.

Too much simulator time worrying about headshrinker horse**** CRM and not enough real aircraft handling, plus the current attitude of throw it on, brake hard and get off the RW fast, rather than the 'BOAC' landings required from RAF air transport pilots of the past - and which we taught our students.

Apart from 'line training' U/T pilot landings, the worst CAT landings I've experienced as a passenger were in the earlier times of the A321 when it was clear that the Airbus figures for Vref were too low. I spoke with a colleague who told me why - and that in his company they normally add at least 5 knots to the Airbus figures for the A321, which improved things significantly.

Smooth landings seem to be a thing of the past, but no amount of routine 'firm' landings could insulate pilots from knowing when they've had a very heavy landing.

[flyhardmo]

Only after landing in Dusseldorf substantial damage to the landing gear as well as creases in the fuselage, indicative of substantial structural damage, were found.

I can't imagine how that landing would not be obvious to the pilots.

[Chesty Morgan]

Beagle, they may suspect but they won't know. Suspicion would be enough for me to book it, but not for everybody.

The de-rotation thing is not an idea nor is it nonsense.

By the way it's hard landing not "heavy".

[lomapaseo]

The de-rotation thing is not an idea nor is it nonsense.


Memo to self: don't sit over the landing gear

It helps to sit far forward or far back as the flex of the fuselage greatly diminishes the G's felt there

[sleeper]

According the youtube link there were seven aboard te dc9 with the broken off tail, of which one had a broken ankle, no deaths.

[sleeper]

Ok if you don't believe youtube, here is a short report. No fatalities.

https://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/look.php?report_key=169

[A4]

They all died? Really? In my experience, most hard landings come as a result of flaring too little / too late. A float can be moderated by easing back pressure on the column/sidestick - tweaking AOA - .....NOT PUSHING! I do find it hard to believe that they didn't think 3.5G was "firm". I've experienced 1.8 which was very noticeable.........

[IcePack]

If memory serves me correctly. This https://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/look.php?report_key=489 was "only" 2.8g

[gonebutnotforgotten]

For those sceptics who doubt the 'derotation' theory, please refer to http://www.ukfsc.co.uk/files/FOCUS%20-%20Past%20Issues/Focus%2064.pdf for a fuller explanation of the centre of percussion and its effect on the perception of any landing (that link takes you to a pdf of the whole issue 64 of the UKFSC Focus magazine, the relevant article is on page 4). Really good landings feel good everywhere, but some bad ones feel OK at the front but even worse at the far back. Never dismiss the cabin crew's opinions, they are often better placed to judge. The article also explains why the effect is more evident the faster you are relative to Vref. Sad but true.

[DaveReidUK]

Aircraft will get a new landing gear now which would have been due in winter anyway.

Hmmm. Germania taking a leaf out of THY's Book of Disingenuous Excuses ?

Aircraft was reportedly out of service for almost 7 weeks - those skin repairs can be tricky ...

[Station Zero]

Reference the Load 15 report, be careful if your expecting it a it can be switched off in the ACMS software.

I was working for a carrier that was having a number of hard landings that were being picked up by the FDM program but not reported in the Tech Log and on investigating we asked why they were not written up. The flight crew response was that there was no printed Load 15 report. With a little digging the auto print function had been turned off so the crew were expecting something they were never going to get.

So if you think its hard write it up and let engineering do the rest.

[fox niner]

At my outfit an acars printout is generated whenever a landing of more than (i believe) 2G is made. That certainly makes you aware of the severity of the "landing" that you just made.
Also, the printout is automatically sent to the maintenance guys at home base. So there is no way that you would be able to keep it quiet and pretend that 3.5G wouldnt warrant an inspection.

[Piltdown Man]

I think the "when and what" are known. The "who, why, where and how" need a little more work. Again we are not provided with enough information to suggest wrong doing on anyone's part. So I'll not suggest that we string up the crew just yet nor is retraining necessarily required. What needs to be discovered with some urgency is how this aircraft was able to depart and why this went unreported. It suggests, but I have little evidence, that Germania's Ops. Control was not working well that day.

PM

[Loose rivets]

Although the total mass well forward of CofG is not that great, it still has to be accelerated from its touchdown angle. I think that would make a significant difference to the pilot's perception of the feel, however, seeing the concrete coming up to getcha after the wheels have touched should be a clue.

It's strange how these things happen. One FO I routinely flew with did everything beautifully - until one day he didn't. In the last 50', with the speed correct, he suddenly flew at the ground. I was pulling probably within one second, and just managed to skate it on more or less flat.

There was just no explanation how a seemingly competent young man could, not just allow this to happen, but seem to actively cause it to happen.

[mustangsally]

Many moons ago, I was a panel monkey on a 72. The Captain or it could have been the Co-Captain dropped one in on 18 in DCA. As we turn off the runway the cockpit door opens and this huge bra with broken straps lands on my table. Those were the days......

[Basil]

this huge bra with broken straps lands on my table
Ha! The stuff of the classic Figment cartoon :ok:

[Loose rivets]

Okay, I know this is the serious thread, but this has to go in here - though it'll be only moments before it's kicked out.

I'd always wondered where her bra had gone.


http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v703/walnaze/Flying/BiiiigHat.jpg (http://smg.photobucket.com/user/walnaze/media/Flying/BiiiigHat.jpg.html)

[FA10]

mustangsally, you made my day! :))

[anotheruser]

BTW, there is also a little longer video of the DC-9 accident on youtube:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=COsT6DqkTDc

[Stanwell]

Don't you just love dry Tower wit?
Some years back, a Thai 743 'dropped one in' on arrival at YSSY.
The word from the tower was simply .. "Thai xxx, when you've put your teeth back in, ...."
We cracked up.

[parkfell]

When an A320 had its heavy landing at KOS 5/7/2007, the initial G 3.15 first bounce, 2.75 on the landing. Substantial damage, and maintenance action carried out by engineers being flown out, before flying again. AAIB report gives full details.
Just how was it, that the initial visual inspection failed to reveal any damage???

[Dan_Brown]

I was in the cockpit of a heavy 4 engine jet, just before the main wheels touched, the stick shaker rattled. The pilot was an ex WW2 pathfinder, on the mosquito. He had the skills to do this at will. Now that was a pilot, not a driver.

[SpamCanDriver]

There is just absolutely no way in hell that if the landing was really 3.5g the pilots wouldn't have felt it.

Doesn't matter if they were sat 800m forward of the wheels on duck feather pillows :}

The worst I've ever felt was 1.8g on a 777 & I can tell you there was no way we didn't feel it. Amazingly the cockpit door failed closed until all the pax disembarked :p

[Huck]

I watched from the jumpseat of a Gemini MD-11 jumpseat as a captain made the hardest landing I'd ever seen. It was in Campinas Brazil.

We congratulated ourselves on surviving as we slowed to taxi speed. Then the tower said, "Geemeenee, notify your maintenance, you left a piece of the plane on the runway...."

It was one of the "canoes" - the fiberglass flap track covers.....

[stilton]

' I was in the cockpit of a heavy 4 engine jet, just before the main wheels touched, the stick shaker rattled. The pilot was an ex WW2 pathfinder, on the mosquito. He had the skills to do this at will. Now that was a pilot, not a driver.'


No, that was a guy who got way too slow, if you're activating the stick shaker just before touch down on a four engine jet you're doing it WRONG.

[Airbubba]

I was in the cockpit of a heavy 4 engine jet, just before the main wheels touched, the stick shaker rattled. The pilot was an ex WW2 pathfinder, on the mosquito. He had the skills to do this at will. Now that was a pilot, not a driver.

No, that was a guy who got way too slow, if you're activating the stick shaker just before touch down on a four engine jet you're doing it WRONG.

I remember years ago similar idiots would pull the throttles back to idle on downwind and do a power off approach in the 727 'managing energy'.

They were local heroes and legends in their own mind. Thank God those fools are long gone. :D

[Needle Knocker]

Her comment was, "There goes the boob job."


Hope this was written up so maintenance can do the correct visual inspection ...

[JammedStab]

I remember a marginal director of flight ops decided to be a 727 captain. Didn't have much experience to begin with. Landed so hard, a door warning annunciator light illuminated. On the return leg, he tried to taxi with the ground guy still having his headset plugged in. For other reason, he was let go from the airline(but not the first time he was let go from an airline) :):):)

[Dan_Brown]

Stilton

Correct, he was doing it wrong but he always got a good landing from it.

The person who pulled off the 3.5 g landing "did it right" and still smashed the aircraft. Who would you rather have flying you?

[Chesty Morgan]

Anyone else.

Smooth doesn't equate to good either.

[Nightstop]

If the thrust levers are still in the CLB detent after a bounced landing the Ground Spoilers will deploy fully and result in a very hard second touchdown. SOP is an immediate TOGA + 10 in this situation.

[FlightDetent]

NSTP: on an Airbus (since you're using the lingo) it would be a very unconvential thing to have TLs in CLB after a bounce (non-autoland). Would the trust not come up automatically to maintain VLS as the spoliers extend?

[silverstrata]

'g' is not the best way of determining a hard landing. The limits actually depend on weight, vertical descent rate, and vertical accelleration.

http://essi.easa.europa.eu/ecast/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/AIGOIN-Characterising-hard-landings.pdf

A hard landing requiring a check is often considered to be over 450 ft/min, but that does not mean much if you are well under MLW. Normal certification limit is 600 ft/ min at MLW, without airframe deformation (equating to 2.5g, I think ??).

But since most pilots cannot tell a 2g from a 3g landing, it is difficult to know when to report. And even the aircraft g-meters do not tell the truth. When Boeing fitted more accurate additional g-meters they showed much less g than the max g. (I think these g readings are in addition to normal 1 g.)

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_14/conditional_fig1.html

The rule of thumb used to be that if the rubber jungle did not come down, she was good to fly.... ;-)

[Nightstop]

@FlightDetent, True very unconventional but I've seen it done :sad: .The Thrust Levers are in the CL detent until the RETARD prompt, at which time you should be moving the levers to IDLE, if you don't and you bounce the SEC logic will deploy the ground spoilers fully and down you go :{

[ImageGear]

My Post 8 and

...if the rubber jungle did not come down, she was good to fly

In our case (744) most of the rubber jungle came down, many ceiling panels, and luggage flew out of lockers which had burst open. People complained of sore necks, knees, backs and other parts.

People were demanding that the cabin crew have an announcement made from the flight deck. The response brought back from the flight deck was:

"It would not be British to comment on the operation of the aircraft". Cue considerable anger and ire directed against the Company, the cabin crew and the flight deck crew. With my very limited knowledge of the aircraft I suggested that the Captain be advised that a check of the airframe would not be out of order.

Nothing heard.

The flight continued to Philly, some people left the flight, it departed on schedule and arrived safely.

In hindsight I should have got off with my family too. :eek:

[DaveReidUK]

Normal certification limit is 600 ft/ min at MLW, without airframe deformation (equating to 2.5g, I think ??)

The relationship between descent rate and g isn't as straightforward as that - it's basically a function of the bits that squash and bounce (tyres, oleos, etc)..

[langleybaston]

and there was me thinking that g was an acceleration [or a negative acceleration]. Its units are "distance per time per time" ie a rate of change.

Surely when landing the value of g is derived by the change from final descent rate to zero in the time for the squashy bits to squash?

[DaveReidUK]

You got it in one.

[fokker1000]

A bit late on the round out (flair) Hoskins…

Any pilot reading this post who says they haven't ever planted it are lying or haven't been flying long enough… IMHO.. Nobody is infallible.

Altho, the wrinkling of the fuselage skin aft of the reg mark might well require a touch of body filler.

Nobody hurt I'm very glad to say.

Out of interest, I did what I considered a very firm landing a few years ago into a Greek island. landing distance/wind/weather was not a factor, I was just very tired, and the RADALT CALLOUT didn't call out! Glad to say the FO shouted out!

Late flair, and not too bad, but enough to make me ask the FMGC about a load 15.

[lomapaseo]

Surely when landing the value of g is derived by the change from final descent rate to zero in the time for the squashy bits to squash?
langleybaston is offline Report Post

true true but if your've still got some descending in you after the first set of squash bits (think gear) are squashed then the second bit like passengers are not going to fare as easily

[Max Angle]

I remember reading a story years ago about a US heavy jet crew who hammered it in good and proper at a local airport, after taxing off the runway they came across a small homebuilt being taxied out. "Hey, that's a funny looking airplane, d'ya build it yourself?" they transmitted. "I did" came the reply "and if you do a few more landings like that I'll have enough bits for another one"

[fokker1000]

Oh Gawd!

Sorry OK465. I have now spent more hours in the air than my old South East London Comprehensive School thirty+ years ago.

[INNflight]

I always include that bit about flaring in the approach briefing.

Since we all know men can't multi-task, I ask my colleague whether he prefers me to flare or de-crab, since I can't do both at once.

Good for a few giggles usually. Until I :mad: it up and they think I did it on purpose. :sad:

[rog747]

'' and the less safe, though most economic, decision was made to make the return flight with passengers. ''

says it all really.......

[DaveReidUK]

Actually the report doesn't just say that. It's even more blunt:

"The decision made after the event to continue to operate the airplane with passengers was risky and unsafe"

[FlightDetent]

TRI does not know how to pull REP15. MCC does not know how to interpret it. Hmmmm, 2x.

There's not much what the individual pilot can learn from this report, which is a huge organizational elephant and actually poses more questions than answers.

Except this one: "the bus" needs to be flow THROUGH 50 FT with proper pitch (2-3 deg) and stick released. Other than that, i.e. any active lateral input at the 50 stab trim freeze gate and your're for an unexpected ride in the flare.

With a heavy A321 and a nose-down input, it is one of those experiences that you try hard for the rest of your life to make sure once was enough.

[Dan Winterland]

There is no question that the pilots would have known that they'd had a heavy landing

Not always in the A320 series. Being fairly experienced in the FDAP of this type, they do seem to throw up a lot of spurious hard landing reports. The accelerometers are designed to work in flight and are over sensitive to shocks transmitted through the airframe on touchdown. I experienced this myself earlier this year when asked to submit a report for a 2.01g landing. We had no idea that the landing was hard. The explanation was that it was a rough runway (Hanoi - I blame the Americans!) and we touched down on a block paved runway on a ridge which transferred a jolt through the airframe. The touchdown v/s was was pretty normal.

However, in this Germania case - it clearly was a hard landing with that level of damage.

[Less Hair]

BTW: Germania had one lemon A321. Don't now if it is this one. The one I mean was acquired second hand from Tunisia IIRC. Lot's of pains with repairs and cancelled flights when it was "new". (Before that incident)

[DaveReidUK]

Two of Germania's A321s were previously with Nouvelair Tunisie. but this wasn't one of those - it had been formerly with Air France, Air Canada and CSA.

[Less Hair]

Thanks for clarifying.

[Prober]

The report also says (Para 1.17)
“The operator acknowledged that its Airbus crews were generally not well trained on manual approaches due to the routine practice of using automatic systems.”:(
“The operator prohibited flying manually with manual thrust in visual approaches during supervised flights, starting in the week after the event (22 July 2016).”
That pretty well says it all, not only about their practices but about how they deal with a problem. Sweep that lot under the carpet! Now that I am retired and have more time on my hands, if I do have to go to the “abroad” I will seriously consider going by sea.

[RAT 5]

“The operator acknowledged that its Airbus crews were generally not well trained on manual approaches due to the routine practice of using automatic systems.”
“The operator prohibited flying manually with manual thrust in visual approaches during supervised flights, starting in the week after the event (22 July 2016).”

There is an argument that the operator was 'contributory negligent' in having a philosophy that diluted the skills of its employees to be 'fit for purpose' when called upon. What part of 'piloting' don't they understand?

[TowerDog]

. Contributing to the incident is the fact that the maneuver was performed without automatic systems to control the airplane’s attitude/flight path or thrust.

In other words, the pilots were not expected to be able to control the airplane’s attitude/flight path or thrust?

Pretty sad if this is the future of commercial flying: No training or talent needed, just push the Auto button and go flying :(

Glad I got to experience DC-3s, DC-8s and 747 Classics, we did the airplane attitude/flight path and thrust manually and took pride in it.

[cessnapete]

RAT5
Unfortunately it’s not just small Airbus operators mandating these SOPs.
Apart from the B744, British Airways SOP bans manual control of thrust management on all fleets,at all times during route flying.

[RAT 5]

Pretty sad if this is the future of commercial flying: No training or talent needed, just push the Auto button and go flying

Except the bi-annual competency check includes the mandatory items that are supposedly meant for us to demonstrate that we are competent to 'save the day' when the unlikely scenario of the mandatory item occurs. How are we supposed to do that if we are not allowed to remain sharp in the basics on a daily basis? This mob are not the only ones to semi-handcuff their flight crews. How can an XAA authorise such philosophies when it is abundantly obvious that when called upon to 'save the day' in a realistic scenario the pilots will be found wanting; and the pax very miffed that they didn't get what they paid for, and in blind faith assumed was included in the ticket?
IMHO there is a 'getting away with it so far' attitude creeping into the industry. When there is a smoking hole the investigators go at it to find the case of the crash. That is often a technical or human error or a combination. It's not often they go deeper into why the humans failed and how to prevent repetition. They did with the tail coming off the Airbus in USA. That was tracked to the airline's training dept and rectified. I'm not so sure that would work if the training was shown to be approved, satisfactory etc. but the lack of currency was a root cause due to philosophy; and it was that which contributed to the crash.

[Denti]

RAT5
Unfortunately it’s not just small Airbus operators mandating these SOPs.
Apart from the B744, British Airways SOP bans manual control of thrust management on all fleets,at all times during route flying.

You must be joking! Which safety conscious operator would mandate such a thing?

I know Germania, as germans bottom feeder, isn't safety conscious and never was, but Big Airlines?

[Vessbot]

Operators who think they're safety-conscious do. Every individual flight is safer with automation, so to ensure safety what's one to do? Mandate automation, of course!

Buy they are for some reason blind to the safety implication of automation on every flight, where the "pilot" can't maintain his/her skills, or even develop them in the first place.

It's two sides of a coin, and true safety consciousness is based on both of them. Naive safety consciousness is based only on the one representing individual flights. It's an honest mistake.

[Sailvi767]

RAT5
Unfortunately it’s not just small Airbus operators mandating these SOPs.
Apart from the B744, British Airways SOP bans manual control of thrust management on all fleets,at all times during route flying.

So if they have a autothrottle problem they cancel instead of MEL it and go?

[wiggy]

The subject of Big Airways and manual thrust (or not) was thrashed to death in a very recent thread yet again recently.

RAT speaketh the truth .. on those fleets equipped with full time auto throttle /thrust at BA the use of manual thrust on the line is forbidden....if the system is bust, it is DDG'd and get on with it...I now add my usual disclaimer about not shooting etc.

[RAT 5]

Hey Guys; slow down. I haven't put BA in the spotlight over thrust. My comments are, and have been for years, over the demise of basic piloting skills by the many. There is a humorous argument that some operators advertising for 'pilots' should be shamed for misrepresentation.

[cappt]

The report also says (Para 1.17)
“The operator acknowledged that its Airbus crews were generally not well trained on manual approaches due to the routine practice of using automatic systems.”:(
“The operator prohibited flying manually with manual thrust in visual approaches during supervised flights, starting in the week after the event (22 July 2016).”
That pretty well says it all, not only about their practices but about how they deal with a problem. Sweep that lot under the carpet! Now that I am retired and have more time on my hands, if I do have to go to the “abroad” I will seriously consider going by sea.

Unbelievable, this is what's it's come to, prohibit manual flight because, well, we're not good at it.

[Check Airman]

RAT5
Unfortunately it’s not just small Airbus operators mandating these SOPs.
Apart from the B744, British Airways SOP bans manual control of thrust management on all fleets,at all times during route flying.

That's surprising. Didn't they almost crash an A319 recently, partly due to the crew's over-reliance on automation?

[RAT 5]

It's a sad destructive attitude, but I can understand it from a bean-counter's point of view. I flew for outfits where they had some scary visual approaches performed by a .001% of their crews. Solution? Discourage visual approaches for 100% or introduce 'gates' and use of automation that make ripping visual approaches so boring and unsatisfying that no-one bothers anymore.

[cessnapete]

That's surprising. Didn't they almost crash an A319 recently, partly due to the crew's over-reliance on automation?

That’s correct. Lost an engine due take off with cowling unlatched. Very poor power management by handling pilot with single engine manual thrust.

[IcePack]

AB(FBW) were not really designed to be flown in manual thrust. Just look at the amount of throttle movement available compared to say a 757. Thrust control in a AB has to be done with finess. Hence practice is essential.

[maggot]

Serious? The buses fly very well and indeed better with manual thrust. I've found the levers to be smooth and precise, far better than the 737s & 767s I've previously flown.

[Check Airman]

I won't say that I wouldn't like a bit more movement of the thrust levers, but to say they weren't designed for manual thrust is just wrong. The 320 series is a joy to fly with all the automation off.

[IcePack]

Yes agreed it is, but going back to the early 90’s I can remember the AB trainers telling us this fact, when we all wanted a/p off a/t off. We were instructed to to “always” keep the a/t on. This was also because of the variable target speed. (Ground speed mini)

[thunderbird7]

Beagle, they may suspect but they won't know. Suspicion would be enough for me to book it, but not for everybody.

The de-rotation thing is not an idea nor is it nonsense.

By the way it's hard landing not "heavy".

Rubbish. If you think youve done a hard landing, you probably havent. When you have done a hard landing... you know!

[EGPFlyer]

The report says that manual thrust is not allowed for supervised flights (ie line training) on visual approaches. It’s not a blanket ban on manual thrust

[Check Airman]

Yes agreed it is, but going back to the early 90’s I can remember the AB trainers telling us this fact, when we all wanted a/p off a/t off. We were instructed to to “always” keep the a/t on. This was also because of the variable target speed. (Ground speed mini)

Your information is coming straight from the horse's mouth. That same horse also said you couldn't stall the plane.

I've had the AT off on windy days where GS mini has adjusted the speed all the way down final. I didn't find it particularly difficult. I'm scanning the ASI anyway- if I'm now a few kt behind the new Vapp, add a bit more power.

I think we sometimes confuse what automation can do with what it must do.

[Nil further]

G/S mini is one of those lovely ideas that is great in theory on an average day (like so much of the Airbus)

G/S mini, autothrust on ,is a real pig on a really windy day ,manual thrust Vls +15 sorted .
Ride through it all with sensible power setting ,land piece of cake .

There’s nothing more terrifying than watching the magenta line children haul the aeroplane around the sky frantically chasing the flight director whilst the auto thrust and g/s mini all operate slightly out of phase with each other and the so called pilot wrestling the stick around

[Centaurus]

watching the magenta line children haul the aeroplane around the sky frantically chasing the flight director

People forget that over the years the flight director has become an over-rated instrument and is really nothing more than an aid to navigation. It is not the be-all and end-all of flying the aeroplane, despite the fact that many pilots are unable to fly accurately without it.

[Dan_Brown]

Goodness gracious me. Depending on the surface conditions, if the approach is stabilized, all the P/F has to do is close the throttles when the A/C touches down and a reasonable landing should ensure.

[Skittles]

Those suggesting they might not know it's 3.5g have their head in the clouds.

Worst I've done (and been party to) is 1.7g, and I thought I'd snapped the wings off. I can't imagine how 3.5g must feel.

[RAD_ALT_ALIVE]

Skittles - couldn't agree with you more! I remember sheepishly following my Captain to the fleet manager's office (voluntarily) many years ago because we thought we'd done a REALLY hard landing. He had the data interrogated - surprisingly it was only a 1.4G landing! I was dumbfounded then (as I am now) how some pilots fail to notice a 'true' hard landing.

The FD conversation on this thread is also interesting. I found that only after I'd flown a large Boeing did I truly understand how to fly a FD on final - and it was this; never slavishly follow the FD! Instead take the 'hint' that it's giving, i.e. if it shows a 'fly up' command, just a gentle pitch correction TOWARD it is sufficient to see it immediately come back down towards commanded pitch.

While a line instructor, it was something that I tried very hard to instill in new Airbus pilots. As an examiner, I tried to encourage the adoption of same in those who showed a tendency to pitch inappropriately (by simply following the FD like their lives depended on it).

As for autothrust - I think the AB certainly does a great job of maintaining speed on 90% of approaches. It's when the 10% of flights encounter seriously gusty conditions that I believe manual thrust comes into its own. Sadly there are an ever-increasing number of airlines who mandate autothrust ON unless it fails - so it becomes harder to fly the aircraft smoothly in those conditions.

What to do, what to do?

[maggot]

I think of the FDs as suggestion bars

And I'm a big advocate for manual thrust on the bus, time and a place etc.
Particularly given the response of the a330s ATHR system

[exeng]

The aircraft was planted by the F/O and we had an ACARS reading of 2.1G. Subsequently the Engineers determined that it was only 1.7G because the aircraft looked at the difference between the positive and negative 'G' - apparently.

During the taxi in I was in shock to be honest, as was the F/O. The poor F/O was actually in tears at the gate.

I had thought that there must be damage although a post flight walkround revealed nothing to me. We nightstopped for the Engineer to do inspections which revealed nothing amiss.

Anyway, how any crew could think that 3.5G is nothing to worry about is beyond me.

By the way I was dragged into the office and given a dressing down about allowing an F/O to carry out a night landing off an NPA. Maybe they were correct, although it had never happened before or since.

[Check Airman]

I suggest whoever called you into the office never travel on an airline based on the west coast of the Atlantic. Being a copilot at that company must be a very boring job.

[scifi]

From an engineering point of view, I suspect that if you load a 'plane up to twice its weight, to simulate 2G, then the MLG would be fully compressed. Any further loading beyond that will result in the shock going straight into the airframe, as the shock absorbers are beyond their working range.


Also because the CofG is in front of the MLG, the landing impact will cause the front of the aircraft to drop (lessening the G in the cockpit area.) and cause the rear of the plane to rise, increasing the G forces on the tail. All this rather begs the question of where do you put the Accelerometer to record the forces, or maybe use several of them and take the highest reading.

I think for certification reasons all aerobatic airplanes must have both a 5 point seat harness, and a recording G meter. This will have moving needles for +ve and -ve G, and is fitted into the instrument panel.

[KiloB]

I’m sure I remember that back in the day, “crush tape” was fitted to the base of the MLG struts. If it was crushed, it was a heavy landing and inspection was required. (Simples!)

[AviatorDave]

RAT5
Unfortunately it’s not just small Airbus operators mandating these SOPs.
Apart from the B744, British Airways SOP bans manual control of thrust management on all fleets,at all times during route flying.

Although I don‘t doubt your words, I am quite surprised to learn that a reputable airline with a heritage such as BA comes up with that kind of SOP.
Never understood the rationale behind crippling pilot skills when all interest should be in keeping those skills sharp.

[Onceapilot]

scifi

Think you will find that the wings are still carrying a lot of the load in a normal but high ROD landing. Modern airliner struts do not just bottom-out except in extreme overload, they get very stiff in the latter part of their range to avoid destructive structural failure from a high ROD touchdown, esp below normal MLW, although progressive overload damages will occur with the severity of overstress. The "question" of measuring loadings and their interpretation, has also been long understood for airliners.
Cheers

[costalpilot]

my airline was the first NA carrier to fly the 320 and the 747-400, and, back in the day, the more we got of each, the more the airline's training dept (unofficially, as I remember it) encouraged the occasional use of manual thrust. (so as to maintain FLYING skills). But the airline didnt mandate either, unless required--obviously.

I cant imagine why manual thrust should be prohibited in line training? so, the first time I get to do it is, unsupervised?

how about, say, landing in sfo, lets try it there the first time.

[vapilot2004]

Generally, our rear quarters are calibrated on the safe side of the G meter. On transport aircraft, it is very common for the pilots to note a hard landing before the accelerometers tell their story - i.e., maintenance nearly always has log entries of perceived hard landings that were within parameters rather than the other way round.

[Onceapilot]

I would agree. However, the danger lies in the unchecked actual overstress. The further operation of this aircraft before being properly heavy landing checked is a criminal act IMO.

[Arfur Dent]

Clue to a serious "event" is that the "rubber jungle" deploys.

[TURIN]

Reading a Load 15 report is a notoriously dark art.
Airbus, in its wisdom, made it hellishly complicated.
Interpreting the report is tricky due to the multiple combinations of parameteters and the timings of events. The touchdown point is often difficult to judge from a bunch of digits.

It isn't just all about G loading either. In fact Vertical Acceleration coupled with pitch/roll angle play as big a part if not greater in some cases.

Most airlines I have worked with leave it to the Captain to determine if a Hard Landing has occurred (a heavy or overweight landing is a completely different animal) however, when an automatic report pops out of the printer we usually get a call just to make sure.

In this case I do wonder what was uppermost in the minds of the crew....:suspect:

[DaveReidUK]

It isn't just all about G loading either. In fact Verical Acceleration and pitch/roll angle play as big a part if not greater in some cases.

It's not only G loading, it's vertical acceleration as well ?

[TURIN]

Changed it now. Does it make more sense? It's late and i've had gin.

[wiedehopf]

vertical acceleration and g-loading is one and the same. 1g=9.81 m/s^2

you probably meant sink rate?
that gives a good picture of kinetical energy absorbed by the system.