Young ATPL F.O. 200Hrs TT on right seat.....

[markkal]

Self explanatory....Not so much how he handles the situation, but rather how he hands over the controls to his captain in total disbelief, in 2 years time this FO could well become a captain....

[javibi]

We have had 200 hours F/O for decades. 23 years ago I was one of them, as hundreds of others joining the majors at the time all over Europe. No dramatic increase of accidents came out of that, AFAIK. IMO, it is not a matter of increasing the TT requirements to join, it is a matter of what you train and how you train it.

[Akrapovic]

For a start they wouldn't be an ATPL.

Secondly, it's all too easy to blame age/hours/experience.

I saw numerous screw-ups in my time as a LoCo skipper, and trust me, the majority were by Senior FO's!

[FlightDetent]

Bangalore :). Why the smiley face? Recovered this time!

[Capn Bloggs]

UK investigators have reiterated the need to understand aircraft behaviour in various modes after the stall-protection system intervened on an EasyJet Airbus A320 during a visual approach to Paphos.
Pah! Wouldn't have happened in a real-pilot's machine, a Boeing! :}

[dontdoit]

Like the Turkish 737 which stalled and crashed on approach to AMS a few years ago; I'm almost sure that was a Boeing 737 and not an Airbus 737.

[FlyingStone]

Typical sensationalism from OP, every FO that makes a mistake has 200 hrs and this is the root of all evil...

From the AAIB report:

The co-pilot had 2,800 hours of experience on Airbus A320 series aircraft

[vrb03kt]

Quote from the AAIB investigation:

"The co-pilot had 2,800 hours of experience on Airbus A320"

[HeartyMeatballs]

Yes, or the 777 in SFO or the near catastrophe involving a 737 in Bournemouth. There's also Sharm, Rostov, Douala, Kazan and Perm which probably wouldn't have happened in an Airbus. If anyone thinks because they're in a Boeing that they're some how superior or somehow safer should maybe consider hanging up their hat and seeking pastures new as eventually you'll kill someone with that attitude.

Although this example involves a particular airline, it has happened several times before. AF at TLV - again a visual approach gone wrong culminating in alpha floor. U2 are also one of the biggest A32S operators in the world, fly an awful lot of flights every day and have more than their fair share of challenging places so they will likely have more incidents, but on a per 1000 flight basis are extremely low.

[olster]

This is the classic Airbus trap that has historically not been understood nor trained to understanding on conversion courses etc. The Airbus autothrust needs logically to be in 'speed' mode when flying a visual approach. This is achieved by turning both flight directors off. The A380 automation has recognised this potential trap by incorporating only 1 f/d. I am disappointed that after 25 years of airbus fbw operation this is still not properly understood. If I am going to apportion 'blame' I would cite training departments.

[Smokey Lomcevak]

I had exactly this situation recently. PM's F/D remained on, with subsequent speed decay in THR IDLE. Notably it was also due to distraction from the radio. All it takes is one missed call. The error was trapped, however, by the PM, performing his primary task of monitoring, and thrust was increased as PF corrected under Airbus golden rules.

My point is that it only takes one small break down in communication or procedure for this situation to arise. For it to result in protection activation and approach to stall, however, requires a lack of FMA awareness, sufficient monitoring from the NHP, and aircraft control from the PF.

For reference, FO with 1600hrs Airbus.

[VH-Cheer Up]

"The captain was startled by the decision" ... Well there's another problem, he forgot the person in the RHS is possibly trying to kill him!

[AerocatS2A]

Everyone keeps talking about particular traps that various types have and how you need to be trained to be aware of them. I think this is missing the larger point. As far as I'm aware every aircraft type is still capable of being flown with one hand on the yoke and the other on the thrust levers controlling attitude and power/thrust manually. What these incidents seem to show is a failure of the pilot flying to be a pilot flying. There is something fundamentally wrong when a pilot can sit and realise the speed is low but not take full manual control and fix it. The traps shouldn't matter, if it's not doing what you want it to be doing, remove the automation and fix it. The protections shouldn't matter, if it's not doing what you want it to be doing, remove the automation and fix it. If you get to a point where protections either kick in and save the day or don't kick in because they're not available in that particular mode then you have already gone way past the point of royally screwing things up. You should have never ever allowed the situation to develop to that point.

They're just aeroplanes. They're just big Cessna 172s with some extra engines, a bit more weight, a bit faster, and crucially, various levels of automation designed to help YOU, the pilot, FLY THE AEROPLANE.

I had a discussion with someone recently after they flew a visual approach using automation in an aeroplane that doesn't have very good automation. It was done with a lack of finesse and we started out with a VS that was a bit higher than necessary and consequently we got low on profile. Because the automation is poor in this type and you can't select an exact VS or easily change it once you've got it, there's a tendency to wait and see how things pan out for a lot longer than you should. I told him afterwards that if he'd been hand flying the approach he would have naturally adjusted the attitude and speed to stay on profile but that he'd become a little trapped by the automation. He knew it wasn't doing what he wanted, he knew we were getting low on profile but it seemed that disconnecting the automation was like admitting defeat, when it should just be a natural response to a level of automation being inappropriate for the current task.

If ever it's not doing what you want it to be doing, then remove the automation and fly the bloody aeroplane yourself! The automation is there to help you, not the other way around, whenever there is a time that you can do a better job than the automatics, get rid of them.

[markkal]

with all due respects, when the automatics are mishandled or go bollocks, I would not trust modern age pilots to handle any phase of flight manually.

Decades ago a/c had to be flown, experience was needed and average pilots were easy to spot, Today how can you sort out an inadequate pilot from an average one ? The training may have a bearing, but there are pilots who simply should not be sitting in a cockpit, they lack the basics and fear manual flying.

Fear which leads to panic, is the leprosy of aviation.

It is at the origin of so many accidents. Aviation has never been so safe thanks to computers, but does that justify loss of life due to mishandling of perfectly recoverable situations degenerating into disasters due to incompetence or lack of training of crews ?

This is a matter which will never be resolved, let's live with it...I fly the airlines twice a month, and wish nothing will ever go wrong, because if it does, it will be a lottery...

[olster]

No, they are not big Cessnas. The Airbus fbw family was designed to be operated by using the automation features for economic and efficiency reasons. The automation does come with 'traps' that have been misunderstood and / or poorly trained. If you are saying that Airbuses ( or Boeings!) can be flown in a similar fashion to a light aircraft - i.e. all automation, including A/T switched off for a e.g. visual approach, I agree. The reality is more complicated than the "it's just an airplane" brigade traditionalists would state. The situation in the incident under discussion is the classic, F/D not off, Open Descent and A/T on and a manually flown visual approach which leaves the A/T in 'IDLE'. This particular scenario caused a well documented crash in India with significant loss of life in the early days of the A320. It is essential that new converts to Airbus fbw types understand this in order to avoid these incidents. Manual flying: I am all for it for handling currency. However, is it 'halfway house' manual flying with A/T on or off? The operational and technical nuances need to be understood in order to fly an Airbus 'like a Cessna'. I still blame the training department because it is unacceptable that line pilots do not understand the automation features.

Cheers

[Roger Greendeck]

It's all about the training. If a person is well trained they can fly anything well and should be able to handle the unexpected. They don't need thousands of hours to achieve this. But if you try to cut corners by hiring and training inexperienced pilots and treating them like experienced pilots it doesn't end well.

[Gulf Julliet Papa]

Time for a title change I fear as the OP is likely to be 100% wrong...

Young ATPL F.O. - Speculative or is it known for fact?!? (it's not on the report)

200Hrs TT - Proved wrong

on right seat.... - Maybe the only correct thing in the title?

[Piltdown Man]

It is not the number of hours that count. It is the quality of those hours that makes the difference. It is an unfortunate fact of modern aviation life that too many companies make flying without the automatics and/or visual approaches too onerous. As a result, too many pilots are ending up with 10 hours of experience, thousands of times over. Their flying repertoire is so small that the merest hiccup floors them (and the aircraft). The solution is not rocket science but it will take time.

[Hand Solo]

I'm sure I'm not the only one thinking that poor monitoring by the captain had as much a part to play in this as the FO?

[markkal]

Absolutely right about young ATPL, 200 TT Golf Juliet papa,

But I may not be too far off, as after 2-3 years FO's become captains.....At least a few of them I know....No offense whatsoever, however I state a case which is often the norm in low cost airlines, given the rapid growth and shortage of pilots.

I know of students and instructors who should never had ended up in a cockpit of a commercial airliner, due to their lack of basic skills and fear of flying out of their restricted confort zone, though they are wizards at managing systems. I believe most, not all of them if they had invested in further training which in my view is the basis of profesionalism, they would have done much better, but for the big majority the minimum training to get the signature and stamp on the licence is the goal. Sad.
Likewise I know of some better students and instructors who failed the selections.

Go figure.

By the way I am an old chap, who got to fly and own the best aerobatic aircraft around, and had never had nothing to do with the airlines, so hold no grudge against nobody, It's just am not confident at current crews managing emergencies, should these ever happen, and I fly very very often with these airlines....

[Landflap]

Well said Roger Greendeck. Decades ago, I was part of the airline sponsored cadet schemes. Very highly selected and very highly trained. 200 hrs saw me in the RHS seat of turboprop airliner. Second in Command ! We were on the learning curve and a million thanks to some super Line Captains who were capable enough to continue our exposure to training.

Sorry, but these days, standards are much lower. There is no selection. Well, actually there is ; Who's got the fattest wallet ? Airline sponsorship ? Don't make me laugh. So-called "Cadets" PAY the airline !

The downward standard continues and burned out hulls will increase.

[AerocatS2A]

No, they are not big Cessnas. The Airbus fbw family was designed to be operated by using the automation features for economic and efficiency reasons. The automation does come with 'traps' that have been misunderstood and / or poorly trained. If you are saying that Airbuses ( or Boeings!) can be flown in a similar fashion to a light aircraft - i.e. all automation, including A/T switched off for a e.g. visual approach, I agree. The reality is more complicated than the "it's just an airplane" brigade traditionalists would state. The situation in the incident under discussion is the classic, F/D not off, Open Descent and A/T on and a manually flown visual approach which leaves the A/T in 'IDLE'. This particular scenario caused a well documented crash in India with significant loss of life in the early days of the A320. It is essential that new converts to Airbus fbw types understand this in order to avoid these incidents. Manual flying: I am all for it for handling currency. However, is it 'halfway house' manual flying with A/T on or off? The operational and technical nuances need to be understood in order to fly an Airbus 'like a Cessna'. I still blame the training department because it is unacceptable that line pilots do not understand the automation features.

Cheers
With respect, all that needs to be understood is how to turn the automatics off if they're not giving the result you want. Yes you should also know at what times the automatics are likely to give undesired results, the "traps" etc, but if ALL you know is how to disconnect all automatics and fly manually when required then you will be safe, if not the most knowledgable.

I'm not suggesting that if you can fly a Cessna you can fly a jet, I'm just saying that underneath every aeroplane, behind all of the automatics, is a machine that can be controlled via yoke and thrust levers or equivalent. If all you ever do is recognize that the automatics aren't giving you what you want and turn them off at the appropriate time, then you will never run into a situation like in the OP.

If you are hand flying an approach with what you believe to be an active autothrottle mode but the speed is decaying, DON'T sit and wait for the aeroplane to fix things, fix it yourself.

[Wirbelsturm]

200 hours will definitely see you in a Hawk and pretty close to the only seat in an F35 when we get them!

Training is key! :D

[RightHandMan]

I agree Hand Solo, I'm sub 1000 hours and able to handle radios and keep a scan going, especially if I was turning base on a visual approach. I would suspect a captain be able to do the same. However, I'll also admit to being capable of having a bad day, and I'm pretty sure that most of us are well able to make the odd mistake.

I guess there's a lot to be said for flying the Avro RJ, it generally has you dumped into raw data and manual flight before you can say, "what's it doing now?" So there's no doubt as to who's flying at that stage. :}

Do Airbus drivers ever fly without manual thrust? Bar when the airplane tells you to retard?

[HeartyMeatballs]

I can honestly say I don't know of a single person within the airline who have got their command after 2-3 years since initial training. People who have entered the airline having experience elsewhere yes, but certainly not those 2-3 years of of training. I would say 5+ years would be fair.

The idea that people simply pay their £100,000 to CTC join EasyJet and are captains within a couple of years just like that is obscene. The command process at the airline is long, with many hurdles, many chances to fail and lots of training and dedication involved. A command is earned on meritocracy at U2. It is not given as a rite of a passage. Not by a long shot. Anyone who suggest differently has no idea what they're talking about.

Its easy for the LCCbashers to blame the airlines. However Qantas at MEL recently (screwed up visual approach), AF447 and AF at TLV (similar to this incident at PFO), Korean at SFO, Turkish at AMS, Virgin Australia ATR, the Wideroe incident and Continental Express at Buffalo all happened to nonLCC airlines. Additionally, to my knowledge none of these involved cadets or P2F pilots.

[Capn Bloggs]

This is the classic Airbus trap that has historically not been understood nor trained to understanding on conversion courses etc. The Airbus autothrust needs logically to be in 'speed' mode when flying a visual approach. This is achieved by turning both flight directors off. The A380 automation has recognised this potential trap by incorporating only 1 f/d.
Why doesn't Airbus modify the little ones then?

[BigGeordie]

At some airlines turning off the autothrust will win you a trip into the office.

[olster]

I am on the same page as all contributors here including Aeroscat! I agree that the PM monitoring in this instance was below par. Airbus have replaced 2 F/D's with 1 on the A380 without fanfare as presumably to highlight this would admit a fault in their historically infallible machine. Also training departments with 'managers' egos larger than their experience levels insist that automation is used to the max including forbidding shock, horror not allowing auto thrust off ops. I would agree that with all automation switched off you can fly an Airbus like a light aircraft leaving out inertia and swept wing characteristics. However it is the auto thrust issue that makes this a little more complicated. It is essential to understand that in the mishandled incident reported the auto thrust was not in a Speed mode. One of the Airbus 'golden rules' is FMA adherence and a cursory glance would show that with auto thrust at Thrust Idle trouble lies ahead unless both F/D's are switched off - ergo Speed mode. It should be driven home that a visual approach, manually flown should start with "A/P off and F/D off / Bird on" followed by FMA confirmation. I have just finished a 3 year 'tour' as an SFI on a (very!) large Airbus and these academic scenarios were discussed at length. I have also had 5 years flying / training on the A340 where I saw this particular 'trap' occur more than once, fortunately 'trapped(!)' by vigilant monitoring.

It is easy to be wise after the event and I am certainly not the fount of all (Airbus) wisdom but after all these years it is disappointing that new pilots are not taught nor understand the automation intricacies on conversion courses. I have some sympathy in that the Airbus manufacturers course that I went through many years ago certainly did not highlight these automation quirks and indeed our instructor, good guy that he was, had never flown an Airbus. How does that work?

[SLFguy]

The website linked in the OP is the same one that headlined that the Flydubai crash was deliberate.

[172_driver]

How about this then: Incident: Easyjet A320 at Paphos on Jan 7th 2015, Alpha Floor Activation on approach (http://avherald.com/h?article=4835e8f2&opt=0)

It's an AAIB investigation apparently

[Capn Bloggs]

On the left downwind for runway 29 the aircraft passed abeam the threshold runway 29 at 3500 feet MSL, about 42 seconds later the first officer disconnected autopilot and started the base turn, the aircraft descending through 3100 feet at 165 KIAS, the standard operating procedure calls "autopilot off" and "flight directors off" were omitted however, the flight path director remained active. At the same time tower instructed revised go-around instructions, the aircraft should maintain runway heading and climb to 2000 feet, which were read back by the captain.
Now the truth comes out (if it is the truth). That is not the way you fly a visual circuit/pattern. Way too high turning base, no wonder the PM didn't notice the speed, we would have had his eyes on stalks wondering how they were going to get in at all. A TCAS during the GA as well! That all deserved a stiff drink! :)

[cessnapete]

As other contributors have, said it's the quality of training that counts, not flying hours. Makes the FAA 1500hr. ATP requirement meaninless.
BEA now BA, put 250 hour cadets straight into the RHS of Tridents/B737/B757 with no problems. Most are now retired or Captains with a great safety record.
Again with the correct training, a relative of mine was a Lockheed TriStar Capt with 1800hr. total, flying into war zones.
Modern SOPs inhabit the acquisition of manual skills. Even BA prohibit manual handling (other than BA B744 crews) during route flying, mandating Auto-thrust at all times.

[Greek God]

I personally use all off or all on and think combined use of automatics and manual flying is a distasteful recipe. So for me it's A/P off A/T off and my left and right hands are always coordinated - left back right forward & visa versa and thrust levers ALWAYS covered! And yes the Airbus does behave like a perfectly normal aeroplane believe it or not!! Alpha floor and speed protections are all still operable if heaven forbid they are required.
Read the BA engine cowls incident - not the best advert for their sops or crew coord and to prohibit use of manual thrust is (to me) crazy. Use it or lose it.

[cessnapete]

Yes the SE manual thrust handling by PF was indeed appalling in that BA incident, from the AAIB report.
Not surprising though, manual thrust use practised once every 12 months in the Sim!!
An accident waiting to happen.

[autobrake3]

Despite protestations to the contrary, the skill level required to fly basic visual approaches is woefully inadequate. If you've been through a sausage machine, cadet flight school you have had no opportunity to learn and practice the skills required to execute these fundamentals. Unfortunately, these poor foundations do indeed follow through into the right seat which is now accessible after only 3000 hours of letting the autopilot fly the aircraft. Executing a manually flown, autothrust and FD off approach should water off a ducks back for any pilot who has a stripe on his shoulder. It is now regarded as expensively superfluous and is no longer even a requirement during line training, this is a shocking state of affairs.

[ACA856]

I always 'assumed' at least for post steam gauge Boeing equipment (with the exception of takeoff thrust i.e. the A/T <only> managing EPR/N1), it's "all on or all off" as a rule? It seems that's an airline choice or SOP from what I'm reading here. Say it ain't so?

[Discorde]

For any particular airframe configuration the performance of an aircraft is determined by two factors: attitude and thrust settings. Do the latest EFIS attitude displays include engine thrust so you don't need to look away at the centre instrument panel to see what the engines are doing? (I've been retired 8 years so my tech knowledge is out of date.) Noting the displayed values would enable the pilot to assess likely performance. So pitch x degrees plus thrust y% would yield vertical flight path z.

So, you're driving your 767 down final approach with a pitch attitude of +1 or so. If the N1s are 60-65% you'll be following the GS at Vref plus a bit. If the N1s are not in this range your speed will be wrong. (Figures based on memory.)

[Chronus]

It wasn`t such a long time ago when whoever was in command was called the pilot. When anyone happened to ask who is in charge of the flight the reply would have been "the pilot", not the pilots. The young one next to him was the pilot`s assistant, an apprentice who like most was learning the job, every aspect of it. It took many years to become "the pilot".
Now that we have a captain, a first officer and a computer all trying to do the same job, if you ask the same question the reply would be "the computer and sometimes the pilots and always the pilots when anything goes wrong".

[ahmetdouas]

Depends on the airline! All the BA captains I have seen are at least 40 years old, some even much more than that. So they must have been flying for a while. And they are usually paired with very young first officers, some I have seen as young as their early 20's.

[Roger Greendeck]

All on or all off is not a standard Airbus concept. Auto thrust normally stays in for all phases of flight. And before any Boeing aficionados chime in, the 777 is the same (and I'm guessing the 787 is too). As most airlines encourage, or in some cases require, automation to be used if it's available (regardless of the experience level of the pilots) it is no longer front of mind to simply turn it off and continue manually. It's still deeply ingrained in my thought processes to turn it off, set the conditions I want, and then when I've got time turn the automation back on. But I've lost track of the number of times I've had sim instructors pushing 'try more automation changes first'.

If you're hand flying you're also taught not to make flight director changed yourself. In an aircraft where autothrust remains on when hand flying this leaves you in the invidious position of: not having full control of the aircraft, if the other pilot is distracted or busy not having any way to make the required changes, and not feeling comfortable taking the autothrust out.

[Capn Bloggs]

I always 'assumed' at least for post steam gauge Boeing equipment (with the exception of takeoff thrust i.e. the A/T <only> managing EPR/N1), it's "all on or all off" as a rule? It seems that's an airline choice or SOP from what I'm reading here. Say it ain't so?
Don't tar the rest of us with the 737 pitch-power coupling brush. In fact, some manufacturers recommend leaving the autothrottles engaged when hand-flying, as mentioned by Rojer. In my machine, it certainly does a better job than me when the conditions are bad.

[AerocatS2A]

Don't sell yourself short Bloggs, I've sat down the back of a B717 going in to Perth and I reckon manually controlled thrust would've given far fewer arse falling out of the sky feelings on approach.

[Capn Bloggs]

I reckon manually controlled thrust would've given far fewer arse falling out of the sky feelings on approach.
Ya gotta "stay on the slope", Cat. ;)

[CSman]

To all pilots young and old,try and fly your aircraft once a month Best way to land at Kai Tak turn FD And auto throttle OFF, Famous West Coast USA controllers used to expect PILOTS to sort out their problems,easy,fly your aircraft Don't ever forget you are Pilots
OLD Guy

[Check Airman]

Am I missing a link to some sort of incident from the OP?

[172_driver]

You are checkman.


Here: Incident: Easyjet A320 at Paphos on Jan 7th 2015, Alpha Floor Activation on approach (http://avherald.com/h?article=4835e8f2&opt=0)

[Denti]

All on or all off is not a standard Airbus concept. Auto thrust normally stays in for all phases of flight.

Indeed, that is the airbus philosophy, however it is not required. In my outfit 99% of all pilots fly most if not every approach in manual thrust, whenever they do fly in manual flight. And yes, flying without flight director and/or autopilot during a normal approach is nice training and actually quite a lot of fun, as well as being not an iota less safe than automatics on to 100ft AGL for a well trained pilot.

I guess it depends a lot on how you train your pilots and the philosophy of your company.

[excrab]

I have absolutely no knowledge of how the airbus is operated, as I fly the American competition. But recently I was flying with a 2000 hr F/O who told me that he had only one hour (yes really) on aircraft without glass cockpit. He had flown his trial lesson in a Cessna 150, then flown glass cockpit Cessna singles, glass cockpit piston twins, then the 737 NG. He was talking about the difficulty of his last OPC when given an FMC failure he had to fly a VOR hold (albeit still with Flight Director, FPV, Autopilot and Auto throttle).

This set me thinking about this incident.

At the last but one airline I flew for, a now defunct European charter operator, the absolute minimum experience for a captain was 5000 hrs, and most had far more. I used to fly with first officers who had been 737 captains previously but who could not be given a command because of this requirement, which was non-negotiable.

The reason that it was non-negotiable was because it was pure charter flying. If a charter came up to somewhere no one had been to, maybe with no approach aids or high terrain, or political issues, or anything else, you were expected to be able to take the crew and aircraft there, making full use of the experience of the F/O and the cabin crew, get the job done, and come home.

You were not expected to depart to a Greek Island, arriving after dark (based on the incident happening at 1523z at the beginning of January) and then elect to fly a visual approach, being handled by the pilot in the right hand seat who couldn't see what was happening because he was on the wrong side of the aeroplane, turning in the dark towards the terrain, not because you had to but because you wanted to play with some half assed non SOP "technique" that you had been shown in the sim instead of spending an extra 2 minutes going over the Pathos VOR and flying the procedural ILS.

Drawing circles around fixes on the runway threshold, and ninety degree abeam lines, and timing from abeam the threshold and all that other good stuff is primarily done because we have to train visual approaches in the simulator, but the visuals only go to ninety degrees and you cant actually see the runway until you are almost on finals. What happened to gear down and an intermediate flap setting abeam the threshold, turn finals after a couple of miles, about 500fpm descent on base then land flap once you see the papis and turn onto final, or something similar?

The problem now is that it doesn't happen anymore, and there is too much political correctness in the flight deck. Why have the F/O fly a visual approach if there is a left hand circuit, or the captain if it is right hand, unless it requires a Captains only landing? Unless you are circling by prescribed tracks (which for European pilots might mean places like Salzburg or Dubrovnik) then all you are really doing is flying a visual circuit, but most new pilots now have only flown five visual circuits in a transport size jet, or indeed none if they have flown a ten tonne turbo prop and done ZFT training.

In the "good old days", Dinosaurs like myself were still flying IFR around in the Northern European weather in ropy old piston twins with fixed card RBIs and CDIs when they had the experience levels this Captain had. We then flew turboprops and jets as F/O and (in my case) got into the left hand seat of a 60 tonne jet with maybe 10,000 hours. In the same AAIB bulletin as this incident there are three other airbus incidents (and they could just have easily been Boeing), two from EZ and one from small planet airlines. In those three incidents the PIC had over or just under 10000 hours with a minimum of 5000 on type, so why was the Captain in this incident a "safety management pilot", if that is true, with only 300 hours of experience on aircraft other than glass cockpit aircraft. At the risk of being politically incorrect what did he actually bring to that role? (and if he was a trained accident investigator with thousand of hours flying experience as a navigator in the air force I apologise, but I suspect he wasn't).

I guess this has been a long way around to the supporting the "airmanship" camp. The magenta line, the autopilot, the auto throttle, makes life safer, in the same way as years ago the RMI and HSI and flight director did. By the time you get to the left hand seat of an airliner you should not be prepared to experiment with a load of passengers on board. The job is not about having fun, or feeling good about yourself, it is about getting the passengers somewhere with no fuss and without frightening them. Learn new stuff in the sim, don't try it out on the line if you haven't done it before and it's not an SOP. If you think it should be an SOP tell talk to the chief pilot. Don't make stuff up as you go along.

[Check Airman]

You are checkman.


Here: Incident: Easyjet A320 at Paphos on Jan 7th 2015, Alpha Floor Activation on approach (http://avherald.com/h?article=4835e8f2&opt=0)

Thanks for the link.

[FlightDetent]

In light of what's written in the report, anybody care to comment on these two snapshots from CBT?

821

822

[evansb]

Oh how times have changed. To obtain a position as F.O. on a jet airliner back in the mid-1970's, the average time was around 2,000 hours...or so it seemed.

[Darren999]

Firstly, I have no expirence in larger Jets. I currently fly the Lear 31/45/60 series. With our company they encourage hand flying. You put the A/P and off when you wish. Hand flying ILS is encouraged, even down to mins. I appreciate that, we don't have auto throttle, it's just hands on flying. I personally would like to see more hand flying encouraged in the airlines so we as professional pilots keep our skills. As was mentioned, use it or loose...

[vilas]

This thread had been drifting sideways. Starting with Man(inexperience) then on to Machine(automation), Environment thankfully played no part in the incident mentioned. Bangalore in A320 and SFO in B777 were caused by very experienced pilots with thousands of hours in other jets undergoing command training with check captains as against Paphos flown by inexperienced FO under a captain. What is common in all three is that they all were flown by equally incompetent pilots. Saying it won't happen in 737 is a joke. Bangalore on approach the speed was 27kts. below Vapp, SFO it was 31kts. below Vapp. Not a single call, nudge, any recognition of it by anyone. It is not lack of knowledge of the system but lack of knowledge of simple mechanics of flying an approach that you don't fly an approach without monitoring your speed. Now about A320 flight control system and auto thrust. Airbus FBW aircraft maintains the flight path and auto trims you still can't fly it then perhaps you could have been better off as a doctor or a manager but outside the cockpit. Paphos incident happened not because of but despite the protection. 737 would have stalled in all three cases. You can fly 320 with or without auto thrust with or without automation. Flight controls and auto flight is the heart of the aircraft but it is not a rocket science. How much intelligence is required to know that you have to switch off both FDs to get ATHR in speed mode. It reflects on poor quality of training imparted. This is an ideal aircraft for 200 hrs. pilot because it demands very little skill. I have trained some experienced twin Otter and Dornier pilots whose IFR meant I follow river, VFR pilots. They fared very poorly as compared to 200hrs. guys. Their habits had hardened to throttle and stick and were unable to digest procedures and CRM.Thickness of log book in many cases shows how lucky rather than how good the individual was.

[olster]

Spot on vilas. How is it possible that type rated Airbus pilots do not know that to engage the a/t in speed mode the f/d's have to be switched off? Makes sense if you think logically. It is scandalous that the training schools are releasing type rated pilots without this (very!) basic automation understanding.

[sunbird123]

i think with all the recent crashes and incidents the common factor is training. Or really the lack of it.
Seems more training in hand flying and the use of autopilots and auto throttles should be mandated.I
t does not have to be in Full flight sims. FTDs would do just as well.
An extra 2 days each year hand flying in FTDs would reap great benefits and not cost too much.

[RAT 5]

Seems more training in hand flying and the use of autopilots and auto throttles should be mandated. It does not have to be in Full flight sims. FTDs would do just as well.
An extra 2 days each year hand flying in FTDs would reap great benefits and not cost too much.

But there are operators that would baulk at this 'mandated' element as they encourage their crews to do this every day online. Those airlines that discourage this heresy would ask why, what's the point? Sad days for some, happy for others.

[Mikehotel152]

This cockpit had 7500 hours of experience. Both pilots had thousands of hours on type. We're not talking about cadets here.

I'm a fairly inexperienced Captain myself, with not many more hours than the Captain of this particular flight. I can therefore empathise with the crew. Furthermore, I've flown with many co-pilots days out of line-training and a number of 'career' FOs with more hours on type than myself, and everything in between.

According to my personal experience, the great danger is not necessarily with inexperience per se. I've flown with many very new pilots who take their jobs seriously and make up for their inexperience with strict adherence to SOPs and a conscientious eagerness to learn. Because of the element of 'training' involved in such flights, incidents are rare even if the overall level of experience of experience might be a latent concern.

In my opinion, the bigger worry is with cockpits containing moderate levels of experience where the experience gradient is also shallow. It's those cockpits where an element of bravado or machismo comes into play. As a puerile reaction to strict SOPs and a consequence of over-confidence, these crews are more likely to push the boundaries or carry out procedures without the appropriate experience or preparation. With opportunities to hand-fly becoming rare, the 'visual' is quickly becoming the manoeuvre of choice to get your 'fix'. There's an element of complacency too. An assumption that the other pilot knows what they're doing. An unwillingness by the commander to interfere if something isn't quite right.

As for this incident, I don't think I would have planned a dusk/night hand-flown visual approach in conditions of strong gusty winds, clouds below 3000 feet and Cbs in the vicinity after a nearly 5 hour flight. But following what I said above, it doesn't surprise me one little bit that this crew tried it... and failed to perform it properly*.


*I may be doing them a disservice.

[Perrin]

Just remember if flying was hard engineers would do it.

Keep them up boys.
😁

[cessnapete]

If a crew cannot hand-fly an approach in the relatively normal conditions you describe in that part of the world, I would venture the opinion that they shouldn't be in a cockpit. OK you would probably choose to couple it up but, manually that shouldn't be too hard a task. Poor training??

[RAT 5]

There are airlines that have the experience of cowboy pilots, or pilots who thought they were **** hot. They screwed up. Solution? Increase training and enhance culture for better manual handling or restrict such behaviour.
Which is the better response?

[Mikehotel152]

Nope, it wasn't too hard a task. I'm sure if they did it again they'd not make the same mistakes.

However, surface wind of 310° at 19 kt, with gusts to 29 kt, cbs at 2,500 ft, TCUs at 3,500 ft etc. Relatively normal conditions in what sense? My airline doesn't allow hand flown visuals in such conditions.

Personally, yes, after a 5 hour flight into a fairly lax ATC environment with no radar coverage, I would do the procedural ILS in those conditions.

[RHS]

With regards training. The day the TRTOs became sausage factories tasked with churning out type rated candidates to airlines, was the day pilots started rocking up to line training with limited knowledge of the aircraft, but a nice shiny pair of sunglasses.

As with everything else in aviation, it's cost driven, until it causes a crash nobody cares. How tired were these pilots for instance? While we all get slaughtered by stupid EASA regs, then expect to perform perfectly a manual approach. Anyone who says they aren't more fatigued since EASA isn't a full time pilot.

[cessnapete]

Point taken, but in my airline you were trained and expected if required, to be able to handle the aircraft to the appropriate height and vis limits and in the max crosswind (FOs had 2/3 of the Capt X wind limit)
Also whoever was PF was able to call Stop and reject the takeoff. I believe some companies only allow the Capt that decision and he controls the thrust levers on all takeoffs.
Presumably because of not having the confidence in the training and competence of their pilots.

[Max Angle]

Presumably because of not having the confidence in the training and competence of their pilots. Or it may be because that is how Boeing and Airbus say it should be done, there are a few companies who think they know better however the vast majority of worlds airlines stick with the manufactures recommendation, rightly so in my opinion.

[Check Airman]

However, surface wind of 310° at 19 kt, with gusts to 29 kt, cbs at 2,500 ft, TCUs at 3,500 ft etc. Relatively normal conditions in what sense? My airline doesn't allow hand flown visuals in such conditions.

Why not? That's typical afternoon where I fly- perhaps a bit more wind.

[vilas]

Mikehotel152
However, surface wind of 310° at 19 kt, with gusts to 29 kt, cbs at 2,500 ft, TCUs at 3,500 ft etc. Relatively normal conditions in what sense? My airline doesn't allow hand flown visuals in such conditions.

What this incident has got to do with weather or all off and all on philosophy? The knowledge of both the pilot's of auto flight and flight controls system was not up to the required standard and the incident or accident would have happened even in clear skies like SFO or Bangalore.

[Mikehotel152]

cessnapete

This is the same mentality as I was referring to. Just because you're allowed or trained to be able to do something, doesn't mean it's always the safest option when engaged in the carriage of passengers.

To your second point: I honestly do not think someone with a few hundred hours experience will make the right go-no-go decision as assuredly as someone with thousands of hours. Again, what's safer?

Vilas

Yes, I take your point. My original point was a corollary to the criticism of the pilots' knowledge, but this incident highlighted an issue of poor airmanship nonetheless, and something I believe is an increasing concern: pilots with low experience of certain manoeuvres choosing the wrong option and then executing them badly.

[AerocatS2A]

Also whoever was PF was able to call Stop and reject the takeoff. I believe some companies only allow the Capt that decision and he controls the thrust levers on all takeoffs.
Presumably because of not having the confidence in the training and competence of their pilots.

The decision to stop is definitely a command decision in my opinion.

Ever heard of TORA? It's a model for how decision making should happen depending on how critical the decision is and the experience levels of the crew.

Together. A non-critical decision with an experienced crew member should be done together.

Offer. A non-critical decision with an inexperienced crew member should be offered to them so they may learn from it.

Refer. A critical decision with an experienced crew member, the captain should refer to the other crew member.

Alone. A critical decision with an inexperienced crew member. The captain makes the decision alone.

The first three assume time available to make the decision. The final method, "Alone", is not only dependant on the experience level of the other crew member but also the time available. A decision to abort is a critical decision and there is no time to make it together, or offer it to the other person, or refer to the other person, so it should be done alone.

There are very few times that a captain should make a decision entirely alone, but the decision to abort is definitely one of those times.

[4468]

There are very few times that a captain should make a decision entirely alone, but the decision to abort is definitely one of those times.

In my airline it "definitely" is NOT one of those.

Some 'STOP' calls are best made, more promptly by PM. That's not always the captain!

[BizJetJock]

The whole point of the takeoff emergency brief is that there is no time to make a decision at V1. Most airlines brief "we will stop for X, Y & Z, anything else we continue". To say that an F/O is intrinsically incapable of following the logic tree is nonsense. On the other hand in the sim I see plenty of captains who can't!!

[4468]

But BJJ

If the captain makes their "decision entirely alone", presumably you don't need to bother with a takeoff emergency brief?:}

What would you say? "I'll decide, using criteria I know. I'll close the thrust levers. I'll ensure auto brake is operating, or I'll apply max manual braking. I'll select my own reverse. I'll cancel reverse as we come to a halt. Then I'll set the park brake. You just watch and learn. Is that clear?"

[vilas]

4468
First action of rejection near V1 is either you did it or didn't. This one is not a community decision it simply cannot be, the only input from PM is or can be announcing the malfunction. Both Boeing and Airbus permit only the captain or CM1 to reject.I have trained pilots of 10 airlines but none of them permit copilot to do it. Even in type rating they are trained for seat oriented duties.

[Capn Bloggs]

I thought I had read it all...

[4468]

vilas

You may have trained pilots in 10 airlines. Clearly you haven't trained in mine.

Where did I say it was a community decision???

[vilas]

4468
If the captain makes their "decision entirely alone",
What does it mean? Off course rejecting take off is taken by captain alone and take off emergency briefing is informing the FO about exactly when and how he will execute it.
And I didn't talk about your airline but rather about other than your airline. It is a game not only between an airline and the manufacturer but passengers also come in when there is an accident. That is why most airlines don't want to go against manufacturer's recommendations. Good luck to your airline and happy take offs.

[Meikleour]

4468:
So, you are the crew of a heavy 4 jet executing a field length critical max weight take-off.
As co -pilot, you are probably (but not necessarily) the lesser experienced member of the crew on type with possibly minimal time on type. The captain, of course, bears all responsibility for the consequences of any actions on the flight deck and he also knows the consequences of any mishaps during a high speed abort (think a blown tyre for instance) and your airline thinks it is a good sound policy to devolve the critical decision making to the one crewmember who does not bear the responsibility!!? In pure risk management terms do you really think this is the best possible practice?

[3Greens]

Boeing only mandate in their sops that P1 only calls stop because they don't have copilots. They build test and deliver aircraft and have no interest in developing a first officers learning curve.
Some airlines follow manufacturers SOPS, some thankfully don't.

[Hotel Mode]

I sit in the rhs of the heaviest 4 jet. I have 12000 hrs, with 1500 on type and 8000 on the next smallest 4 jet. Anywhere else Id have been a Capt for years.

My airline has always allowed FO initiated RTOs, insisted on tillers on both sides etc and they also have had 200hr cadets for 50 years. There has not been a single incident as a result.

[4468]

Meiklour and vilas

Calm down!

The issue of 'experience' is a total red herring here. We brief for utterly unambiguous criteria. It HAS to be that way, because there is NO thinking time available to use 'experience'! My mother following those directions, would make the correct decision as often as I would. No experience/interpretation required! But the fact is, the PM is often in a better position to make an accurate AND TIMELY call, than the PF. The captain isn't always the PM!

The captain can make excellent use of his 'superior' experience AFTER the stop!!

I currently fly with people exactly like Hotel Mode in my rhs. Top guys! However, not very long ago, I was flying Toulouse's finest, with 200 hour pilots. They aren't idiots! They will make the correct call, as reliably as the old git in the lhs! (Me!)

Anything not fitting the strict criteria, I will call 'stop' or 'continue'. Such is the privilege of rank!

[Meikleour]

4468: Firstly - nobody is saying that there aren't experienced co-pilots around. Of course there are. The arguement is about risk mitigation. If you really feel that a system that POTENTIALLY puts the least experienced crewmember (and I know that this is not necessarily the case) in an executive position to command an action for which he is not responsible then that is your view. I suspect that a lawyer representing a passenger client might take a different view. If "experience" is a red herring then why not just have 200hr. captains? If you also believe that a pre-flight brief can cover all necessary situations then we have to differ.

[RAT 5]

nobody is saying that there aren't experienced co-pilots around. Of course there are. The arguement is about risk mitigation.

Interesting. To broaden this aspect somewhat; there was a discussion a few months ago about F/O landings in strong testing weather conditions or in NNC. The opinion was firmly divided about PF (F/O) staying PF or Captain taking over. This former was more the case in strong gusty x-winds, for various aesthetic reasons: there were even some advocating PF (F/O) remaining so for engine failure or flap/hydraulic NNC landings. IMHO the captain is expected to take responsibility and mitigate the perceived risk in anything untoward.
In the RTO case, for those who advocate F/O's calling STOP, it is likely, unless it is very well trained, that when the Captain is PF & oblivious to the reason, there might be a hesitation as the WTF question is asked. If this happens close to V1, the stop might occur some knots beyond.
The ability to call STOP might well be relevant if F/O is PF and feels the a/c is not quite right. It would be difficult to conduct a conference with the captain as you hurtle down the ever reducing stopping tarmac. The 'unsafe to fly' part of the RTO/takeoff brief might be more apparent to the F/O (PF) than the non-tactile captain.
A debatable topic and one I've never come across in any of my airlines.
The closest I got to it was an F/O can call Stop, but it was advisory. A STOP from the captain was mandatory and always executed from LHS. There are airlines, I believe (BA???????), where the F/O (PF) can execute the RTO from RHS. Is that correct?

[4468]

I'm perfectly satisfied that my employer selects, and then trains, all occupants in the RHS seat to make accurate decisions, according to a very small number of extremely strict criteria. A decision in which there is zero time for interpretation, or the use of experience.

Clearly others feel less happy about their empoyer's selection, training and/or the qualities of those sitting next to them. I couldn't possibly comment about that, but I suspect it is THAT which would attract the attention of any ambulance chasing lawyers.

Purely out of curiosity, which reasons for a stop call require 'experience'?

[AerocatS2A]

In my airline it "definitely" is NOT one of those.

Some 'STOP' calls are best made, more promptly by PM. That's not always the captain!

Hang on, in your airline does the FO make the stop decision when they are PF or PM? Or is it both?

Clearly others feel less happy about their empoyer's selection, training and/or the qualities of those sitting next to them. I couldn't possibly comment about that, but I suspect it is THAT which would attract the attention of any ambulance chasing lawyers.
I don't think it's about this. If the FO is to execute aborts then obviously they'd be trained to do so. It is more about who has ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight. If the FO is allowed to close the thrust levers and apply the brakes at V1 then they are de facto in command at that point because even if the captain disagreed there is no opportunity to over-ride the decision.

[Meikleour]

4468: I am more concerned about decisions to STOP which are not appropriate. How about a yaw caused by a tyre burst at high speed. You will be lucky to make a safe stop with less than all tyres working. How about flying through a large flock of birds causing multiple loud bangs which a less experienced crewmember might react badly to.
You seem reluctant to address the decision/responsibility issues her regardless of how good you consider your training regime. Aerocat2SA understands my point completely.

[JW411]

It will be interesting to see how long this one runs. It has been my experience in the past that trying to criticise BA procedures on pprune is as likely to succeed as trying to push butter up a badger's rear end with a red hot needle.

[4468]

Great. Now at least we have ACTUAL examples we can debate.
How about a yaw caused by a tyre burst at high speed. You will be lucky to make a safe stop with less than all tyres working. How about flying through a large flock of birds causing multiple loud bangs which a less experienced crewmember might react badly to.
So, a yaw caused by a burst tyre, is a fair case in point. I agree that a stop call may not be appropriate. I can also see that it might be easy to confuse a bang and swing from a tyre burst, with a bang and swing from a failed engine. One we would continue from, one we would stop! Easy to make the wrong call!

So here's the million dollar question: Who is best placed to determine the CAUSE of your 'bang and swing'?

A) The guy at the controls, attempting to correct the swing by looking out?

B) The PM who has been monitoring the engine instruments as you hurtle down the runway?

C) The captain, regardless of whether he is A) or B)?

I presume, regardless of opinions, EVERYONE accepts that B) is able to make the fastest decision?

For the avoidance of doubt, in most airlines B) would be the captain on only 50% of occasions?

[Meikleour]

JW411: That is so true!!!!

I have to declare a conflict of interest having flown for BA for 7 years before "getting time off for good behaviour" and leaving to enter the big wide world outside!
4468: ref. option B - are you now suggesting that a co-pilot in your airline could make a "CONTINUE" call? If so, that is the first operator I have come accross which tolerates that.

[4468]

meikleour

Not at all, only you have made the suggestion that a copilot can call continue. I have simply pointed out that a copilot may be better placed to make an accurate 'stop' call.

I'm heartened that you appear to agree.

Thanks

[Meikleour]

4468: No need to be heartened - because I do not agree with you!

If I read your post correctly, option B may be the co-pilot as PM so with the tyre burst scenario, in your world, he says "I say skipper, Old Man, I think the engines are OK" To which the captain says "thank you very much for your input , Young Man - in my experience I think the better course of action will be to continue". I guess this would mean that V1 was successfully passed!

[vilas]

4468
Who is best placed to determine the CAUSE of your 'bang and swing'?

ECAM. It will tell you if engine has failed. The co-pilot PM only calls engine fail without identifying which one at that stage. Captain PF decides and executes after saying STOP! If Co pilot is PF where he is not permitted to reject then the captain has thrust levers when he sees engine fail he calls STOP and executes. In your airline the co-pilot PF will do so. In any case the co-pilot doesn't call STOP. I will be surprised if it is otherwise. I had two rejects at low speed one in 747 as the thrust was being set engine failure with N1 stuck and over temp and in A300 with co pilots window opening. No one tells you to stop. You do it.

[4468]

Wow

You're going to wait until ECAM 'tells you' (whether??) the engine has failed? Where does that little gem appear in your emergency brief?:eek:

In my airline, if a copilot (who is monitoring the engine instruments as PM) identifies an engine failure. He/she will call STOP! Why on earth would he/she call "engine fail"???? Nobody has explained why he/she would not just call stop!

It's all clearly briefed. I fly with people who are well trained. There is (and has been!) absolutely no issue whatsoever! Maybe you fly with poorly trained F/Os? I guess I'm just lucky?

[Linktrained]

Potential Chief Pilot for a new airline LHS.
Our Flight Manager in RHS.
Runway not limiting.
"Engine fire warning" before V1

Potential Chief Pilot... Did nothing... Said nothing...
Our Flight Manager...closed the throttles and used the brakes.

Potential Chief Pilot was sent home.
(Some may have felt embarrassed for him or even pity. His new airline has good standards with someone else as their first Chief Pilot.)

At the time the Pilot in LHS should have initiated closing the throttles, to give a tactile indication of his intentions, just in case his words alone might be mistaken. He would have a hand just forward of the throttles until V1, ready if necessary, to reduce power.
LT

[vilas]

4468
You should be loyal to your pay check but it is abundantly clear that you don't follow manufacturer's SOP/recommendations. What I have written is the way airbus teaches and recommends. I can see some merit in FO PF allowed to reject take off but PNF ordering STOP is ridiculous. There are incidents where Airlines have changed airbus procedures and come to grief and one of them with good record and they changed back to Airbus procedure.Nobody can keep looking at instruments alone the PM needs to monitor the take off run as well. If PM did not monitor parameters ECAM will but a PM who did not notice runway excursion cannot be called well trained.STOP call is a decision and it cannot be done by PM. Except four abnormal situations ECAM warnings are supressed to prevent reject take off. What happens to that if PM is going to remember when to say stop. There is no justification other than your airline doesn't do that way.

[SYLT1960]

I retired in 1983, how times have changed, so many more things to go wrong and from what you guys are saying, they do seem to be going wrong!!! Even my car suffers from over complication, or is just my age? Just keep flying and contributing to my pension!!!!

[Willy Miller]

The safest method is, of course, to have captain monitored take offs in all cases. Capt monitors all parameters and can call an informed "stop" or "continue".
"stop" means "i have control" and captain stops the a/c as trained. "continue" means FO continues as they have been trained.
It is very simple and obvious but.....

This won't happen because pilots like to take off.

Sorry if this puts anyones noses out of joint.

:ok:

[RoyHudd]

What about a 3-crew operation, or a check pilot on the jump seat. Can they call "Stop"? If maybe, is that a seniority-based command for the bod on the jump-seat?

Many of us fly 3-crew ops, sometimes there is even a 4th pilot on the flight deck, and they may spot something seriously wrong before the others.

Surely this is a common-sense issue. Anyone who see sit, calls it. And the consequences of a "Stop" call are the same for all.

[4468]

Willy
The safest method is, of course, to have captain monitored take offs in all cases. Capt monitors all parameters and can call an informed "stop" or "co
Whilst some reasons for a 'stop' call are best confirmed by information inside the flight deck, other reasons for a 'stop' call can only be decided by looking outside the window.

I make no comment on the notion that a pilot controlling a yawing a/c during a high speed ground roll might have the capacity to look at the engine gauges, to decide whether or not to stop! Or may even delay the decision until ECAM senses and displays the failure. All (and ONLY!) because he/she doesn't trust the colleague sitting next to them!:confused:

It seems the captains of some airlines aren't as omnipotent as others!:rolleyes:

[vilas]

It is not some airlines captains but the maufacturer does't agree with you.

[4468]

Aircraft manufacturers, manufacture aircraft.

Aircraft operators, operate aircraft.

[J.O.]

I have seen several variations of SOP over the years in both Boeing and Airbus types and I have to say that in general terms, the ones who stuck to the guidance of the manufacturer were simpler, more effective and less prone to being peppered with distracting management "pet projects". Having FOs making reject decisions is one such project, IMO.

[vilas]

4468
Brave statement! but doesn't hold much water. Manufacturer builds aircrafts on a design philosophy and they need to be operated by procedures that are based on that. Operator who knows nothing about it cannot throw them to the winds. Yes there can be some regional necessities which require some variations. But they should be done after consultation with the manufacturer. Air Asia Indonesia crash was mainly due the captain trying to reset CBs not authorised by manufacturer. No line pilot however brilliant has the training to do things reserved for a test pilot.

[Denti]

@vilas, it is not helping to cite an accident where the crew in question deviated from any known SOP. That does not prove anything except that some pilots should not be on board an airplane.

However, having experienced several sets of SOPs over the years i do not agree that the OEM knows best. In fact, he cannot know in which environment with which kind of training system and with what kind of average experience level the airplane is operated. Therefore he has to propose a set of SOPs that covers all possible kind of environments, training schemes and experience leves. Which invariably comes down to cater for the lowest possible standard. Which especially in the case of the current set of airbus SOPs shows very much.

We switched to those SOPs about a year ago, and the safety case made by external auditors does show clearly that the OEM SOPs are not safer or better, they are just a lot cheaper, which is basically due to the outrageous fees airbus charges for documentation implementation if one uses the airbus flysmart apps. We used a silent cockpit approach, same as our biggest local competitor (lufthansa) with no checklist at all as long as the aircraft was in motion and no FMA callouts. And it worked exceptionally well. Well, being in business longer than airbus surely helps knowing how to operate aircraft.

On the boeing it was even more obvious that even the OEM can see some extremely different SOPs to fly an aircraft that has been in service since the 1960s. The change to the "new" set of 737 SOPs around the 2008/2009 timefrage was drastic indeed, but both worked quite fine.

[vilas]

Denti
I said airline should consult the manufacturer. I know airlines which have made some changes after taking airbus opinion. Especially not calling FMA issue I was surprised to know that Lufthansa does it because this particular thing airbus is fanatic about it and I know following company SOP has led to three incidents during GA which easily could have been accidents. You can read about Jet star incident after that they changed back to FMA first. In an airline conference airbus categorically supported that. Verbal or silent basically need to observe the FMA changes but in silent mode there is a chance of not monitoring. I feel silent monitoring may require higher experience level in the cockpit. Well if it works for you fine. I am expressing my opinion (about supporting airbus SOP). I know manufacturer's logic about FMA. Since you do it differently I am curios to know the advantage of doing silently.

[Zapator]

@Denti, vilas: Lufthansa changed to Airbus procedures in the meantime, including FMA callouts... I don't know the exact reason however, I guess it was an economical decision...

[Denti]

Yes, the reasons were the same as for us, to save some €uros. Pretty much at the same time too. Except, they don't let their FOs taxi the aircraft from what i hear.

[vilas]

Yes, the reasons were the same as for us, to save some €uros. Pretty much at the same time too. Except, they don't let their FOs taxi the aircraft from what i hear.
I didn'tunderstand economy aspect of following airbus SOP can you explain how does it work?

[Denti]

Generating and maintaining individuel company SOPs costs time and money, and it requires of course dedicated personnel for that as well. I believe at Lufty around 120 employees worked in the relevant department, over all their fleets. In our case that number was much lower of course.

If a company uses the airbus apps, in our case the flysmart suite, there is no way the airline can edit content themselves. It has to be done by airbus and distributed for each MSN individually, which can cost several millions a year as airbus charges extremely high premiums. Not to mention that the process is designed in the typical airbus way: time consuming, complicated and built with a lot of unnecessary but required work. Therefore keeping SOPs that are different from the OEM set is economically challenging.

[SYLT1960]

I am 84 years of age and spent a lifetime in aviation both militarily and civil. Experience was always of value but never the be all and end all. Flying had to be a passion not a job and if you were any good at it and not a danger to all and sundry it would become evident in the simulator. The ability to spot a problem, deal with it calmly and take over manually when necessary is a great asset. 90% of simulator training was manual flying with emergencies thrown in at regular intervals and I hope this still prevails. How many pilots fly their aircraft manually to keep their hand in, when flying on the line today? I shall look forward to hearing how, in this modern era, the complex systems of today, are dealt with when they malfunction.

[markkal]

By searching into emergency procedures manuals of course:*:confused::confused:

How someone can be expected to suddenly acquire the skills and capacity to be able to deal with emergencies when a/c are flown by computers in normal operations is something I fail to understand. Following a string of accidents in this respects regulators are pushing for Emergency UPRT training, will this suffice ?

This is not to say crews are no good, but manual skills are no longer exercised not only in aviation but wherever computers have replaced highly skilled labor