Airbus choose data streaming to replace black boxes

[John Marsh]

UK Guardian:
European plane maker Airbus is to install technology built by British firm Inmarsat that will render the black box virtually obsolete and could prevent air disasters.

Inmarsat, the satellite company that helped Malaysia Airlines pinpoint the likely flight path of the downed MH370 airliner, said the technology was a “gamechanger” for airline safety.

It beams flight information via a satellite to an airline’s control centre within seconds, capturing real-time data about what is happening onboard the plane.

This is particularly important if an aeroplane crashes into the sea, because signals sent by a flight recorder, or black box, typically stop within weeks as its batteries run down.

This leaves investigators unable to access crucial data about the cause of an accident, as in the case of MH370, whose black box has yet to be found.

Inmarsat said the new technology – called SwiftBroadband-Safety (SB-S) and dubbed the “black box in the cloud” – could prevent a crash by speeding up communication between the cockpit and the ground in the event of a mechanical problem or terrorist incident.

Airbus will fit SB-S technology in A320 single-aisle planes and A330 wide-body aircraft from 2018 if it gets regulatory approval....https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/30/uk-satellite-firm-inmarsat-helped-track-mh370-fit-sbs-on-airbus-jets

[DaveReidUK]

Airbus choose data streaming to replace black boxes

The suggestion that real-time data streaming means the end of the onboard FDR and CVR is somewhat fanciful. Inmarsat certainly aren't claiming that.

SwiftBroadband Safety takes flight for first time - Inmarsat (http://www.inmarsat.com/news/swiftbroadband-safety-takes-flight-firs-time/)

[underfire]

The system for set up for Hawaiian is also used to send/receive inflight weather data.

[Metro man]

It will have to run in parallel for a number of years until it reliability is proven, then it probably will take over. Similar to how cloud storage is replacing individuals physical storage media.

[captplaystation]

I am (as anyone who knows me, and my "phones" ) a bit Jurassic, so am totally unwilling to trust, for example, my photo library to anyones "cloud" (clouds can evaporate right ? ) I possess an impressively expensive collection of Memory Cards.

Surely this idea is best seen as an addition to proven technology (the proven technology being, I would imagine, fairly cheap/trouble free ) No doubt the new system would help to bring some alleviation from MEL/ CDL requirements, but , nonetheless, would be best (in my opinion ) viewed (in the short term at least ) as an enhancement rather than replacement.

[skridlov]

I am (as anyone who knows me, and my "phones" ) a bit Jurassic, so am totally unwilling to trust, for example, my photo library to anyones "cloud" (clouds can evaporate right ? ) I possess an impressively expensive collection of Memory Cards.

Surely this idea is best seen as an addition to proven technology (the proven technology being, I would imagine, fairly cheap/trouble free ) No doubt the new system would help to bring some alleviation from MEL/ CDL requirements, but , nonetheless, would be best (in my opinion ) viewed (in the short term at least ) as an enhancement rather than replacement.
You sure have a lot of faith in flash memory. It's certainly to be preferred, in general, to single disc-based (or, heaven help us, tape-) data storage but inferior to distributed storage methods (such as local RAID arrays) which nowadays can be configured from solid-state drives. As for cloud storage this can be distributed over a vast spectrum of locations and made massively fault-tolerant. I'd have thought the key vulnerability would have been in transmission, not data storage.

[The Ancient Geek]

I'd have thought the key vulnerability would have been in transmission, not data storage.

The main problems are security and privacy. Anything that you allow into the cloud should be regarded as being placed in the public domain and open for analysis for the advertising industry, law enforcement, etc. Nobody is giving you free storage out of kindness, you are not the customer, you are the product.
You are also trusting the storage provider to stay in business and continue their existing product strategy forever.

[Metro man]

It could be like digital speed cameras, where the ticket can be in the post before you finish your journey. The chief pilot could be looking at your approach and landing before the engines are shutdown.

[NSEU]

Airbus choose data streaming to replace black boxes

So if Satcom fails (or perhaps during periods of strong sunspot activity), there are no recording facilities? All aircraft grounded?

Usually the CVR and DFDR are on different busses, so there is some redundancy in this respect.

[notapilot15]

Perfect tabloid spin.

MH370 is not yet found, so no browny points to Inmarsat.

Inmarsat charges arm and a leg, no airline will be willing to pay $100k for installation and monthly subscription charges. SpaceX and others will not just let Inmarsat eat the cake. India has similar satellites, may want to provide free or cheaper rates for their airlines.

Technically this is a incomplete and inferior solution ie., there are million ways to loose satellite connection. They cannot even provide good internet connection, now want to replace black boxes.

Bottom line a crashing plane cannot maintain satellite connection.

[underfire]

the feed will be thru the IFE systems, forget anything single source, it will not evolve.

looking at the recent incidents, the 'black box' system has not performed, and most have been damaged where significant repair has been required and data lost., or as with MH370, the entire ac is lost.
It is obvious that the current system simply does ot work, and had been reliant on statistical data that supposed ac really do not catastrophically crash, nor land in water..as they say "Fix It".
Military ac has a system that ejects, likely as a lesson learned.

Aside from that, the data rates through the IFE systems are a significant evolution in many respects, and are already in use.
Much of the article appears to be an IMMARSAT advertisement.

[Wanabee,Gunnabee,Am]

..and how many times do we get "DATALINK STANDBY" or the ATSU unit isn't working. Is that then a no-go MEL item?

Why not have both. We have redundancy in most other systems.

[FlyingStone]

It could be like digital speed cameras, where the ticket can be in the post before you finish your journey. The chief pilot could be looking at your approach and landing before the engines are shutdown.

Some airines are already using automated uplink of data from QAR via 3G network (obviously only on the ground). Not sure if it's active before engine shutdown though :O

[Intruder]

Inmarsat said the new technology – called SwiftBroadband-Safety (SB-S) and dubbed the “black box in the cloud” – could prevent a crash by speeding up communication between the cockpit and the ground in the event of a mechanical problem or terrorist incident.
Hmmm... What communication does Inmarsat think will be enhanced in the case of a terrorist incident? How many terrorists (or Captains of victim airplanes) have attempted ANY communication that would be "speeded up" by this system?

I will admit that there may be SOME benefit in locating an airplane that has already crashed, and in analyzing causes of a crash. However, any "prevention" of a crash would be limited to measures implemented that were ONLY detectable by the system.

Take the case of AF447, for example. How many crashes were there between the time of that crash and the time the FDR and CVR were found? How many were caused by pilots who froze on the controls after a high-altitude stall? How many would have been prevented if we knew that earlier? Has AF changed their training, or has Airbus changed their control laws as a result?

[DaveReidUK]

Inmarsat said the new technology – called SwiftBroadband-Safety (SB-S) and dubbed the “black box in the cloud” – could prevent a crash by speeding up communication between the cockpit and the ground in the event of a mechanical problem or terrorist incident. Hmmm... What communication does Inmarsat think will be enhanced in the case of a terrorist incident? How many terrorists (or Captains of victim airplanes) have attempted ANY communication that would be "speeded up" by this system?

Again, Inmarsat didn't make that claim.

Don't believe everything you read in the newspapers. :O

[LeadSled]

Folks,
Should do wonders for Inmarsat's cash flow.
Or am I just being cynical??
Tootle pip!!

[cattletruck]

It's inevitable that constant connectivity becomes the norm. I know some of QF's fleet have sensors installed that collect atmospheric data and automatically transmit it to the MET office.

[Methersgate]

LeadSled is indeed being too cynical; Inmarsat are hardly a "tech start up". They have occasional holes in their cash flow when a satellite launch goes haywire, but that's about it. The global deep sea shipping industry is a captive customer and a pretty satisfied one.

[Ian W]

So if Satcom fails (or perhaps during periods of strong sunspot activity), there are no recording facilities? All aircraft grounded?

Usually the CVR and DFDR are on different busses, so there is some redundancy in this respect.

I think it is more the problem of maintaining contact with a geostationary satellite. Once the aircraft suffers a LOC and starts rapid changes of vector - as in the recent LOC events, the SATCOM link may be broken as the antenna ceases to track the satellite, and the data may cease to be transmitted. So rather as in the EgyptAir 804 crash, there would be information up to the event but possibly nothing afterward which often gives the information on the reason for the LOC/crash.

Instead of patching different areas - this one looks at access to information - others finding the DFDR/CVR in deep water - making recorders more survivable etc etc. I would suggest that a formal systems analysis is carried out from scratch: what is required, how can that be captured/stored in a secure only accessible after an incident way, how and who would access that data etc. The capabilities of modern technology are significantly ahead of the regulations and standards currently in place. Do a formal design of what could be done instead. Connection oriented comms to a secure data storage in 'escrow' by a trusted 3rd party are completely feasible - possibly backed up by multiple self-powered small survivable onboard recording devices.

[tdracer]

At best, this would be something of a 'proof of concept' - the FDR and CVR would still be required as I don't see the feds changing the regulations anytime soon. Any attempt at obtained an "ELOS" (Equivalent Level of Safety) for at satellite based system to allow removal of the FDR and CVR would get laughed out of the office.
Before the regulators would even consider changing the regulations, or even an ELOS, you'd need tens, no hundreds of millions of operational hours, plus a significant number of actual crash events where it's demonstrated that the satellite based system provided better (or at least as good as) information than the conventional FDR/CVR systems, and NO events where the satellite system didn't provide equivalent data.:ugh:
Maybe in a couple decades...:rolleyes:

[PJ2]

Inmarsat's comments, specifically the Chief of Flight Safety's, seem a tad naïve. I wonder if they really know about flight data analysis, the investigative process and flight safety work.

Privacy, confidentiality and assurances of data security seem to have been brushed aside in favour of "exciting new technologies that can prevent crashes". I've seen/heard this before. So far, this is just so much marketing hype.

In terms of tracking & locating technology, it has existed for some time - we have been using it to follow our aircraft locally and around the world. It is real-time interrogation using web-based interfaces with user-selected 30" to 10' polling periods. I have no idea why tracking is such an issue; we've been doing it for at least six years now; we know where our aircraft are all the time. And, for a price, it can do parameter/event monitoring say, for high-acceleration events for example, so that maintenance can meet the aircraft based upon data not crew reports, etc. It isn't an entire DFDR process but it could be sufficient for initial explanations and certainly LKPs.

In terms of retro-fitting for deployable recorders and/or streaming data, I would argue against the concept, and against an industry-wide, regulatory requirement.

All recorders in recent over-water accidents have been recovered and read with perhaps one exception, the Asiana B744 freighter loss over the Korean Straits.

Acknowledging that, like all human activities, aviation works on risk probabilities, the design and engineering manufacturer's groups of the industry work on the basis of what an acceptable failure rate of mission-critical elements/components is; the certification standard is, as some here will know already, 10^-9.

We can reasonably consider that the loss of MH370 is such an event to which the same standard may be applied, and that the "normal" pattern is the historical one in which in all cases, above exception noted, the recorders have been recovered and accidents understood.

The argument for deployable recorders & datastreaming is essentially an economic one only, and that is a different arena than the case for flight safety. Such standards (for flight safety), are borne by the industry and ICAO member countries when/where accidents occur, and yes, it is expensive but also extremely rare.

I think the case for deployable recorders/data-streaming has not been demonstrated against this accepted standard. I think what we are seeing is a bandwagon response, not flight safety work.

If we are to invest significant funds and the ensuing subsequent certification/regulatory work at all in changing the way aircraft recordings are done, it would be reasonable to focus on power sources for both the data and voice recorders.

Public cries for instant sources of data do not demonstrate the flight safety case for such capability, they demonstrate a willingness to engage in media and political arugments. But with recent information regarding MR804, we may again be faced with a loss of power to the recorders and loss of data which inhibits understanding of the accident.

Ensuring that recorders have uninterruptible sources of power is a flight safety case, and as such is demonstrable.

Factors which are necessary to consider are not limited to electrical system auto-responses to load-shedding and/or damage to wiring through fire or mechanical processes etc., but also loss of electrical power through the intentional use of emergency electrical configuration drills which are intended to remove all power from normal AC & DC busses during smoke of unknown origin emergency drills.

[notapilot15]

If this is about just fair weather level flight tracking, Panasonic already announced their IFE system will be able to do that.

Of course you can mount antennae around the fuselage or make entire fuselage as phased array to make this work most of the time, it would cost a fortune.

And with Brexit, why would an EU consortium promote Inmarsat. There are cheaper options out there.

[Shift1986]

I wonder if it would be possible to turn it off from inside the plane

[Ian W]

At best, this would be something of a 'proof of concept' - the FDR and CVR would still be required as I don't see the feds changing the regulations anytime soon. Any attempt at obtained an "ELOS" (Equivalent Level of Safety) for at satellite based system to allow removal of the FDR and CVR would get laughed out of the office.
Before the regulators would even consider changing the regulations, or even an ELOS, you'd need tens, no hundreds of millions of operational hours, plus a significant number of actual crash events where it's demonstrated that the satellite based system provided better (or at least as good as) information than the conventional FDR/CVR systems, and NO events where the satellite system didn't provide equivalent data.:ugh:
Maybe in a couple decades...:rolleyes:

DFDR and CVR are not flight safety critical despite what marketers at INMARSAT and media reporters might say. However, they are the subject of mandatory regulation. It is unlikely that the regulation can be met by offboard recording devices with a tenuous communications link to the aircraft. In consequence, the 'cloud' recording will be a fashionable adjunct to the existing systems. As I said before, with geostationary systems requiring the aircraft antenna to maintain its link to the satellite by motoring to point toward it is extremely unlikely that contact would be maintained in all but the gentlest of emergencies. A LOC incident would almost certainly lead to immediate disconnection. This means that the requirement to record all stages of an emergency cannot be met by INMARSAT. This is not opinion it is unquestionable. Therefore, we are left with the INMARSAT marketing department achieving another coup.
It might be possible with the correct antenna array to maintain contact with a LEO satellite system using omnidirectional antennae and cellular style technology. But even there that would have to be proved. As a test an aerobatic aircraft should be fitted with the proposed systems then depart normal straight and level flight and carry out a series of extreme maneuvers from height down to sea level. Assess whether the satellite link worked. This should be extremely simple to do. It should be done before any expenditure by any party.

[vapilot2004]

INMARSAT's IP station addressing scheme overcomes the satellite transponder limitation - allowing for a dramatic increase in the number of uplink users as well as improved data bandwidth - both requirements for any industry-wide satellite streaming system.

However, the proposed ICAO guidance only suggests the need for transmission of data recorder information for aircraft in distress. This would seem to fit the current and near-future state of tech with the number of commercial aircraft in service.

I would imagine traditional local recording DFDR and CVR's would still be installed and used in parallel with SATCOM streaming per the proposed ICAO "distress" standard.

[Sorry Dog]

I'm not sure I understand. I didn't see anything in the article that says that Inmarsat's technology replaces local data and voice logging with wireless connection
I mean to suggest that would be like saying cloud based storage can totally replace RAM and hard drive.


I'm assuming Inmarsat's product goal is something that integrates voice and data logging with satellite connections which could have some definite benefits... and some extra costs and maybe some unintended consequences.

The use of the words in the Guardian article like "obsolete" and "game changer" to describe this seem more like marketing types running amok.

I mean why should an airline want this?

...and I'm afraid of the real answer....

[ExXB]

At a risk of putting a cat amongst the pigeons CVR should stand for Cockpit Video Recording.

Many people now work under constant video surveillance, and with the proper safeguards, a Video is going to give far more information in the event ...

[GHOTI]

What would a video recording of, say, AF 447 told us that the voice recorder did not?

[Alain67]

GHOTI, do you think that video recording has been imagined to be useful for one accident only ? It might well give more info in other cases.
BTW, I'm not at all an expert in any aviation domain, and therefore I won't comment on the pro and cons of this video idea ; it's just that your focus on AF447 seems a rather weak argument to me.

[crablab]

A satellite up-link would certainly complement the existing Black Boxes and whilst I doubt it will replace them (connections drop out etc.) it would certainly allow a) greater accuracy in wreckage finding b) access to some/all data without *having* to retrieve the boxes c) recording of additional parameters such as video (as ExXB suggested). Many planes now have cameras in the tail, on the belly (A380, A350...) they might be able to provide additional data or show an object (drone!?) that happened to be ingested into an engine, for example.