EC225 crash near Bergen, Norway April 2016 [Archive]

SFIM

29th Apr 2016, 10:48

Helicopter crashes off Norwegian coast (http://mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSKCN0XQ15K)

OSLO (Reuters) - A helicopter with 13 people on board has crashed off the west coast of Norway, rescue services and media reported on Friday.

Several people could be seen in the ocean, while the helicopter was on a small island, an eyewitness told news channel TV2.

TV2 images showed plumes of smoke rising from the site.

"Helicopter crash: Emergency services at the scene. Extent of damage unknown," the regional fire brigade said on Twitter.

Quoting local police, newspaper Verdens Gang said the helicopter had 13 people on board.

The area just west of Bergen, Norway's second largest city, sees frequent helicopter traffic to and from offshore oil installations.

(Reporting by Terje Solsvik and Stine Jacobsen)

compressor stall

29th Apr 2016, 11:05

Eyewitness reports on nrk saying he looked up after hearing a strange noise then saw the rotor departing left and the chopper body dive over to the right.

TowerDog

29th Apr 2016, 11:08

Some reports says no survivors, other sources say some survivors in water.
Rotor blades came off in the air, then a violent explosion according to eye witness.
13 SOB.

GearDownThreeGreen

29th Apr 2016, 11:15

An EC225 has crashed on an island a few NM west of Bergen, Norway at 1150 CEST. The helicopter was inbound Bergen from the oil drilling rig "Gullfaks B". The initial reports from the police state no survivors recovered so far. Number of pax not confirmed, but the local news claims 11 + 2 crew.

Eye witnesses report of the main rotor coming off in mid air, others claim the entire helicopter was spinning uncontrollably before it impacted the ground and exploded quite violently on the small island of Turøy just west of Bergen airport.

TipCap

29th Apr 2016, 11:20

Very sad to hear this news. Not sure if there are any survivors. Even though I worked for the opposition for most of my 40 years + flying, I did contract for CHC. My thoughts are with you all who are affected by this terrible accident
TC

TylerMonkey

29th Apr 2016, 11:23

Helicopter carrying at least 14 crashes off Norway's west coast - World - CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/norway-bergen-helicopter-crash-1.3558619)

Shows track

compressor stall

29th Apr 2016, 11:42

13 on board. No survivors. Norwegian authorities reported on way from gulfaks B to Bergen

tasspook

29th Apr 2016, 11:42

Norway helicopter crash: Fatalities feared after chopper with 14 on board is "totally destroyed" in smash - Mirror Online (http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/norway-helicopter-crash-fatalities-feared-7860307)

Not good.

FleurDeLys

29th Apr 2016, 11:50

Scarily reminiscent of 85N, albeit a 225 rather than L2. Horrendous. Sympathies and condolences to all involved and affected.

SE210

29th Apr 2016, 12:11

Sounds like G-REDL.

Super Puma, where the rotor gear box failed causing the rotor to detach.

gulliBell

29th Apr 2016, 12:15

...and they were almost home.

If the rotor comes off in flight there won't be any survivors, simple as that.

TODALADA

29th Apr 2016, 12:39

Info from Flightrdar 24 suggest LN-OJF is the chopper.

TowerDog

29th Apr 2016, 12:47

Eye witness reported hearing a loud bang, or explosion, then pieces of the rotor came flying though the air, (some folks had to run so as to not get hit) then the helicopter came down on a rock, then rolled or fell into the water.
Some witness reported the rotor blades hit the ground after the helicopter came down.

Pure speculation: Could a big bird have caused this kind of damage, or a drone-collision?

electrotor

29th Apr 2016, 12:50

TowerDog - in danger of jumping on the bandwagon. Heathrow was more than likely a plastic bag.

Helikopterstyrt ved Bergen (http://live.tv2.no/helikopterstyrtet?_ga=1.184782889.1053966637.1461933469)

TV Aftenbladet - Aftenbladet.no (http://www.aftenbladet.no/tv/#!/video/101232/direkte-helikopterstyrt)

Capt. Inop

29th Apr 2016, 12:56

Could a big bird have caused this kind of damage, or a drone-collision?

Well it might be possible.

I think that catastrophic gearbox failure is more likely in this case. And it has happened before with pretty much the same result.

Flugplatz

29th Apr 2016, 13:08

How high would it have been flying on an rig-flight? assume well above those powerlines?

Flug

TowerDog

29th Apr 2016, 13:11

. Well it might be possible.

I think that catastrophic gearbox failure is more likely in this case. And it has happened before with pretty much the same result.

Well, the EC.225 Super Pumas are now grounded by Statoil. (The owner and operator of the oil rigs on the Norwegian side of the North Sea.)

GearDownThreeGreen

29th Apr 2016, 13:17

11 confirmed causalties so far and still no sign of the missing two. The fuselage is resting 6 meters below the surface but the main rotor has separated and is located on a nearby island.

Very grim indeed...

derek_j_spence

29th Apr 2016, 13:21

How high would it have been flying on an rig-flight? assume well above those powerlines?

Flug
At this distance from it's destination, the chopper would barely have started it's descent and so would have been a few thousand feet above any power lines.
Everything is speculation right now but I would think the cause will be found to be related to the EC225 and not any external factors.

Shot Nancy

29th Apr 2016, 13:23

Oh how quickly the non-rotorheads ask stupid questions.
Lets just wait and see shall we.
Requiescat in pace

TowerDog

29th Apr 2016, 13:43

An eyewitness on the ground looked up just as the rotor was separating and said he saw flames or a fire on top of the helicopter.

Cloud surfer

29th Apr 2016, 13:45

Probably a red herring, but near-collision (50-100m) with a drone at 5,000' south of the airport last week.

Bergensavisen - Drone var 50?100 meter unna Widerøe-fly (http://www.ba.no/nyheter/bergen-lufthavn-flesland/innenriks/drone-var-50-100-meter-unna-wideroe-fly/s/5-8-334879)

The helicopter was at 3,500 and 150kts when it entered into a rapid descend according to FlightRadar24.

birmingham

29th Apr 2016, 13:58

Is any pax ever going to get in a 225 again?

Whether this will turn out to be another gearbox issue or something entirely unrelated we simply cannot say yet. What we can predict is that the Super Puma's reputation in the oil business is probably beyond repair

susier

29th Apr 2016, 13:58

derek_j_spence

29th Apr 2016, 14:10

Is any pax ever going to get in a 225 again?
johni. We have no choice when we are sent offshore. It's a case of get on the chopper or lose your job.

It's quite strange because most offshore guys hate the pumas and prefer the S92s but I have talked with pilots on here before and they find the EC225s better than S92s (i believe because of the flight systems). When we are in Pumas, we are packed in like sardines and have very little room to move, unlike the S92s, which are more like a bus, they just feel a lot safer from a passenger's perspective.

birmingham

29th Apr 2016, 14:19

johni. We have no choice when we are sent offshore. It's a case of get on the chopper or lose your job.

It's quite strange because most offshore guys hate the pumas and prefer the S92s but I have talked with pilots on here before and they find the EC225s better than S92s (i believe because of the flight systems). When we are in Pumas, we are packed in like sardines and have very little room to move, unlike the S92s, which are more like a bus, they just feel a lot safer from a passenger's perspective.

Yes and perspective or perception is critical. With the history of problems Statoil will now worry about putting people back on an aircraft which fairly or otherwise is perceived to be unsafe. It will be much less risky from a PR point of view to simply change the aircraft type they use.

Unusual Attitude

29th Apr 2016, 14:21

According to the FR24 data I saw, a gradual descent began at 09:51 UTC, from 3250ft and at 09:54, at approx 2225ft the speed dropped rapidly from around 140kts to 64kts within a few seconds.

At this point radar data appears to end.

I'm sorry I don't have more detailed data. This is just from ordinary playback/graph thus may be inaccurate.

Link: https://www.flightradar24.com/data/a...ln-ojf#98ee4bc

Looks like a stable descent from 3000'** to 2000'** probably under ATC instruction given the range to the airport. About 1 min after levelling out something catastrophic happens with a 10deg yaw to the right, and rapid loss of altitude and airspeed, given the eye witness reports of the loss of main rotor and the fact it was found 300-500m from the rest of the wreckage the crew wouldn't have stood a chance.

RIP

** =I'm assuming the ALT given on FR24 wont reflect QNH/QFE

zorab64

29th Apr 2016, 14:21

speed dropped rapidly from around 140kts to 64kts within a few seconds.
. . . which, if the blades or XMSN separate at 140kts, would tie in with a rapid reduction in forward flight and a possibly short continuation of transponder/radar returns (depending on electrics lost) as forward speed translates quickly into vertical. It doesn't bear thinking about.

Another sad day - thoughts are with the families.

z

lvgra

29th Apr 2016, 14:27

Grounded by Petrobras on Brazil, too...

GearDownThreeGreen

29th Apr 2016, 14:35

http://g.api.no/obscura/API/dynamic/r1/ece5/tr_480_295_l_f/0000/berg/2016/4/29/16/rotor.jpg?chk=90D67A

The entire rotor is located in one piece minus one blade it seems. Don't know when that blade has come off.

TowerDog

29th Apr 2016, 14:40

And now grounded by the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authorities. (Avinor)

GearDownThreeGreen

29th Apr 2016, 14:45

And now grounded by the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authorities. (Avinor)

Avinor is not Norwegian CAA... "Luftfartstilsynet" is the CAA

birmingham

29th Apr 2016, 14:52

The Luftfartstilsynet ban applies to the EC225LP and is until further notice.

Aser

29th Apr 2016, 14:52

Sad day :(
but good and quick reaction by Norway :ok:
http://www.luftfartstilsynet.no/incoming/SAFETY_DIRECTIVE_-_Airbus_Helicopters_EC225LP_-_Limitation_of_operations/BINARY/SAFETY%20DIRECTIVE%20-%20Airbus%20Helicopters%20EC225LP%20-%20Limitation%20of%20operations

TowerDog

29th Apr 2016, 15:02

. Avinor is not Norwegian CAA... "Luftfartstilsynet" is the CAA

You Sir are correct. I mixed 'em up.
My bad.

Capt. Inop

29th Apr 2016, 15:30

Better picture of the main rotor:

http://bt.mnocdn.no/incoming/article3588200.ece/ALTERNATES/w1440c169/rotor3.jpg?updated=290420161509

Ground flight

29th Apr 2016, 15:30

RIP and condolences to all the families and friends, thoughts also go out to the CHC SAR aircrafts searching the scene, not easy knowing its one of your own

S76Heavy

29th Apr 2016, 15:35

Yikes! That is the whole rotor head come off.. There but for the grace of God..wishing the berieved much strength and courage in dealing with their loss and the aftermath of this crash.

TorqueOfTheDevil

29th Apr 2016, 15:38

Very sad news. RIP fellow Rotorheads and pax.

dipperm0

29th Apr 2016, 15:43

My condoleances to the family and relatives.

This accident reminds me 20 years ago, when an Alouette 2 lost its main rotor while on final. Inquiry reveals that the accident was caused by a human error who used the wrong nut to secure the rotor hub on the rotor mast - The Al 2 and 3 rotor hub to mast attachment were using similar but not identical nut.

D0

jimf671

29th Apr 2016, 16:15

Is any pax ever going to get in a 225 again?

A very sad day. My heart goes out to all of those who have lost loved ones in this tragic accident.

Before the nutters and Super Puma haters get going, does anyone know of a similarly large/heavy type that has had 200+ in service across 12 years and 400000 flight hours before a fatal accident occurred? My recollection is that the history of other types in this class is somewhat different. On that basis, I would happily get in an EC225 tomorrow.

.

handysnaks

29th Apr 2016, 16:23

Jim, the various types of chinook are still going strong, just not offshore!�� Perception confidence and passenger power are everything!

birmingham

29th Apr 2016, 16:24

very true, Cougar 91 etc and I am sure the risk of flying in either type is in reality very low. Problem in the oil industry is perception and even if this accident is completely unrelated to the previous issues (it is way too early to form opinions on that) it is undeniable that the reaction to previous incidents have given this type a bit of a reputation

jemax

29th Apr 2016, 16:25

That's understood, but that picture of the departed entire head is very, very sobering and quite shocking

My deepest condolences to all effected by this tragedy

212man

29th Apr 2016, 16:31

The problem is that this isn't the first fatal accident in the 225. And I don't think main gear box problems are something new to this helicopter. Or am I wrong?
What other fatal 225 accident has there been?

Daylite

29th Apr 2016, 16:34

Sad to say but have just seen footage of the entire rotor head flying through the air having departed the aircraft in flight!
Local news footage here in Norway has eye witness footage.
So similar to the Bond puma it seems.

TwoStep

29th Apr 2016, 16:39

Only loss I am aware of is the French Air Force EC725 loss in Burkina Faso. Otherwise this is the first fatal commercial loss of a 225.

jimf671

29th Apr 2016, 16:45

What other fatal 225 accident has there been?

An EC725 was shot down last year. I don't think that counts.

Apate

29th Apr 2016, 16:48

Given that the MGB is virtually identical to that fitted to the L2, the discussions talking about only looking at EC225 accident history is perhaps short sighted. At the end of the day the H225 is simply the latest Super Puma variant.

Daylite

29th Apr 2016, 16:51

Speaking with chc technical department, it now seems the gearbox in the aircraft was only changed yesterday.

birmingham

29th Apr 2016, 16:52

Not sure being too specific on model designations helps that much - if we must talk specific model numbers the 225LP in this tragic accident contained a number of design features specifically designed to prevent a recurrence in the problems that affeceted what the press, industry and Airbus call Super Pumas.
Thus it is possibly even worse that some form of gearbox/rotor failure seems to have occurred again. Unfortunately public perception can often be more powerful than raw facts and this brand is going to struggle now - whatever the reason for this tragedy turns out to be. Those of us who spend a lot of time in aircraft know that 100% safety isn't realistic, accidents will always happen and when something dramatic happens in a helicopter's main gearbox/ rotorhead the outcome will usually be bad. We also know these are still pretty safe forms of transport and despite the recent accidents have saved many more lives than they have taken - but you won't be hearing about that from the tabloids

Sir George Cayley

29th Apr 2016, 16:54

UK CAA have issued a Safety Directive which appears to ground the type except for SAR.

Sorry rubbish at links but I'm sure someone will provide.

SGC

Non-Driver

29th Apr 2016, 16:55

The very similar Bond accident was an L2 but the gearbox shaft faults covered the EC225 as well so both types were grounded. Part of the perception issue is they all share the same fundamental Super Puma Type Certificate so no matter how much rebranding goes on they're still linked as a series. From a pax point of view they all look pretty much the same too. The 332Mk1 does have a very good safety record overall. That doesn't stop evolutions having design or manufacturing flaws (not saying that is necessarily the case here), especially when you are pushing the performance up.

wrecker

29th Apr 2016, 16:58

Posted By UK CAA

29 April
201
6
Limitations of Operations Due to a Fatal Accident in Norway
on 29 April 2016
This Safety Directive contains mandatory
action that is required to restore an acceptable
level
of safety. It
is issued in accordance with
Article 15 of the Air Navigation Order
.
Recipients must ensure that this Directive is copied to all members of their staff who need to take
appropriate action or who may have an interest in the information
(including any ‘in
-
house’ or
contracted maintenance organisation and relevant outside contractors).
Applicability:
Aerodromes:
Not primarily affected
Air Traffic:
Not primarily affected
Airspace:
Not primarily affected
Airworthiness:
Not primarily affe
cted
Flight Operations:
All AOC Operators of
Airbus Helicopters
EC225
LP
h
elicopters
Licensed Personnel:
Not primarily affected
1
Introduction
1.1
This Safety Directive contains mandatory action that is required to establish an acceptable
level of safet
y.
It is issued in accordance with
R
egulation (EC) No
.
216/2008 A
rt
icle
14.1.
1.2
Recipients must ensure that this Directive is copied to all members of their staff who need to
take appropriate action or who may have an interest in the information, inclu
ding any “in
-
house” or contracted maintenance organi
s
ation and relevant outside contractors.
2
Compliance/Action to be Taken
2.1
The Civil Aviation Authority, in exercise of its powers under the Air Navigation Order (2009)
directs operators of any Airbus
Helicopters
EC225LP helicopter which is:
a)
registered in the United Kingdom or
b)
flying in the United kingdom or in the vicinity of an offshore installation
to comply with the requirements set out in paragraph 2.2
.
2.2
Operators must not conduc
t any public transport flight or a commercial air transport operation
with
an
Airbus Helicopters EC225LP

Non-Driver

29th Apr 2016, 17:00

Speaking with chc technical department, it now seems the gearbox in the aircraft was only changed yesterday.

That doesn't come as a surprise.

birmingham

29th Apr 2016, 17:02

also we need to bear in mind that there are many failure modes that can cause a catastrophic separation so while the result may be very similar to previous incidents the cause may turn out to be entirely unrelated to the previous shaft problem - only an investigation will tell us that

jimf671

29th Apr 2016, 17:26

Speaking with chc technical department, it now seems the gearbox in the aircraft was only changed yesterday.

That is consistent with the available flight history showing 5 short local flights 26th and 27th.

dipperm0

29th Apr 2016, 17:27

I just scrolled the AAIB website to check for the AS 332 to EC 225 LP family accident reports after 2000.
Found 5:
G-REDL crashed with rotor hub separation,
G-REDW and G-CHCN went down under controled ditching following MGB lubrication system fault,
G-WNSB and G-REDU crashed following loss of control or references.

Did I miss something ?

DO

Furia

29th Apr 2016, 17:28

In 2009 a Super Puma lose the main rotor while inflight.
I do not know if this is related to this very accident but worth remembering
Report on North Sea Super Puma tragedy reveals 'catastrophic failure' of helicopter's main rotor (http://www.scotsman.com/news/report-on-north-sea-super-puma-tragedy-reveals-catastrophic-failure-of-helicopter-s-main-rotor-1-1033899)

RIP

cpt

29th Apr 2016, 17:28

What strikes me is that it looks like there has been no apparent warning of a main rotor or MGB failure. Since the L2 gear boxes failures, early detection systems improvment (like position of chip detectors) seem to cover all aspects of a catastrophic MGB or main rotor failure (... sorry for beiing inacurate, but althought not qualified on type my company operates a number of them)
If there had been such a warning, I suppose the procedure would have been to reduce the power and/or descend to a "minimum safe altitude" ... In this case, the initial descend seems to be rather ATC related.

The Sultan

29th Apr 2016, 18:32

Mitchaa

If they left one or more oil jets blocked degradation could be quick with no chip warnings.

The Sultan

G0ULI

29th Apr 2016, 18:35

The whole load of the helicopter is suspended from the rotor head by the outer casing of the gearbox. This design was hailed as a huge advance that saved significant amounts of weight, improved payload capability and fuel economy and simplified some maintenance tasks. The only problem with this design is that the gearbox casing represents a single point of failure with no redundancy.

GearDownThreeGreen

29th Apr 2016, 18:46

Her flyr rotoren på egen hånd etter helikopterstyrten (http://www.tv2.no/v/1039640/)

Don't know if this video is working outside Norway.

It is a private video of the rotor 'flying by itself' after detaching from the rest. Scary and shocking.

Super VC-10

29th Apr 2016, 18:53

Video working for me (UK).

rog747

29th Apr 2016, 19:12

the BBC just showed the video of the whole rotor descending/rotating slowly to the ground after the helicopter had crashed

Cybernethic

29th Apr 2016, 19:30

Do you have the link of this video?

GearDownThreeGreen

29th Apr 2016, 19:41

Do you have the link of this video?

It's in post #67

SE210

29th Apr 2016, 19:45

I would expect the PUMA to be equipped with HUMS - Healt and Usage Monitoring System. Accelerometers that will discover non standard vibrations before things get serious.

helicrazi

29th Apr 2016, 19:48

Chip detectors to detect vibrations? Surely by definition even you can figure out what chip detectors actually detect??? :ugh:

Cybernethic

29th Apr 2016, 19:49

I don't know why, but I didn't succed to open it...

500guy

29th Apr 2016, 20:07

"A new gearbox is unlikely to fail, a newly installed recently overhauled gearbox is unlikely to fail."

not so. The majority of component failures come in the first 25% of component life since new or overhaul, followed by the last 25%. The middle 50% is the least likely to fail. That's why they run all components on the US presidential helicopter for 25% of its life on one of the other aircraft before installing it on the presidents aircraft. At 75% they pull it and scrap it. Sorry I don't have a source, (wish I did) but I've heard it several times and it aligns with what I have witnessed. A good friend of mine lost the C47 on his 407 last year with 80 hours TSN on the engine. #1 bearing was incorrectly pressed.

SE210

29th Apr 2016, 20:48

You are right - not chip detectors, but accelerometers.

jimf671

29th Apr 2016, 21:00

Super VC-10

29th Apr 2016, 21:01

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Tur%C3%B8y_helicopter_crash

lowfat

29th Apr 2016, 21:06

You might want to read this statement about the Helicopter in questions maintenance before you offer any more theory's.

https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/north-sea/108268/doomed-helicopter-gearbox-rotor-head-replaced-year/

Never let the facts get in the way of a good old lynching .

noooby

29th Apr 2016, 21:18

Exactly lowfat. I don't know where the rest of you come from, but yesterday isn't January where I come from.

I just wish there was another photo of that MR Head taken from the side unobstructed by the blade. It looks like the swashplate drive link has broken off (Swashplate stayed connected to the servos?), but it also looks like the rotor shaft is still there, which is a worry.

And for those saying how this is the first civil fatal for the EC225, that is quite true, but let us not forget the two very close calls that were had when the machines ditched and it was later found that there was a 360 degree crack in the bevel gear shaft weld. G-REDW and G-CHCN I believe. Failure was imminent and possibly could have resulted in the MR Head departing the aircraft complete with MR Shaft.

A sad sad day. I hope that lessons are learned and this never happens again.

His dudeness

29th Apr 2016, 21:23

The majority of component failures come in the first 25% of component life since new or overhaul, followed by the last 25%.

My first captain always said: "airplanes are only dangerous when they go to mx and when they come out of mx"....

DaveReidUK

29th Apr 2016, 21:23

UK CAA have issued a Safety Directive which appears to ground the type except for SAR.

Sorry rubbish at links but I'm sure someone will provide.

http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/SD2016001%20Limitations%20of%20Operations%20Due%20to%20a%20F atal%20Accident%20in%20Norway.pdf

electrotor

29th Apr 2016, 21:25

GOULI you are totally wrong.
The whole load of the helicopter is suspended from the rotor head by the outer casing of the gearbox. This design was hailed as a huge advance that saved significant amounts of weight...

The MGB of the EC225, like the others in the Super Puma family, uses 3 suspension bars which transfer the whole load of the helicopter from the transmission deck directly to the top of the MGB casing. Sikorsky use the method you have described, which is why their MGBs are so heavy.
The attached illustration is from the EC225 Technical Data Manual.

JohnDixson

29th Apr 2016, 21:39

Jimf671 posted:

Quote:
Originally Posted by Daylite http://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/578298-ec225-crash-near-bergen-norway-3.html#post9360749)
Speaking with chc technical department, it now seems the gearbox in the aircraft was only changed yesterday.

That is consistent with the available flight history showing 5 short local flights 26th and 27th.

Depending on local procedures, then, it is possible that everything from the gearbox mounting structure upwards was removed and replaced. Most ops would take the blades off the head to begin with. Anyhow, in the midst of doing all the removal/replacement, there are opportunities for human error. Reason I mention that is that if it was a gearbox issue which initiated the action, one would assume there wouldn't be vibration problems after the re-install, so what were the 5 maintenance flights for? I made the assumption they were MTF's because Jimf671 wrote that they were short.

Anecdote re a local practice that I ran into at Ft Rucker one day. They had a UH-60A which had driven evryone a bit crazy re vibrations and it had been down awhile. I went down with a dynamics engineer to see if we could help. Put the vib gear on and got ready to fly. Our engineer pulled me aside and told me that all the pushrods had no safety wire on. Asked the civilian test pilot I was to fly with and he told me they always did that and only safetied the rods after they were done. Told him that my insurance agent forbade me to fly without safety wire on the pushrods. There is more to this particular story, but although this would be a long shot, its one of the variations that might have taken place here.

Innit

29th Apr 2016, 22:13

Speaking with chc technical department, it now seems the gearbox in the aircraft was only changed yesterday.

CHC are saying that it was changed in January:

http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-norway-crash-idUKKCN0XQ15K

malabo

29th Apr 2016, 22:15

Any ATC transcript?

G0ULI

29th Apr 2016, 22:21

electrotor
I stand corrected in my use of loose terminology. Perhaps it would have been more correct to state that the weight of the aircraft is primarily supported by the top bearing in the gearbox casing and as has been previously demonstrated, it is possible for the rotor shaft to pull through the bearing and depart given certain fault conditions.

This accident bears remarkable similarities to the G-REDL incident where the main rotor also departed from the helicopter. I would not be surprised if a similar failure mechanism was found. Height at which the incident occured is almost identical and apparently there was no warning before the main rotor broke away.

bille1319

29th Apr 2016, 23:02

I wonder did anyone monitor the last radio transmissions to see if the pilot issued a Mayday alert as was the case for G-REDL in 2009 when metal particles in the gearbox caused it to fail and shear the rotor head.

etudiant

30th Apr 2016, 00:22

Helicopters have some graceless failure modes.
Should there be a provision for an emergency parachute, such as offered on some light aircraft, or is that impracticable for this size vehicle?

What-ho Squiffy!

30th Apr 2016, 00:28

Blades all look attached, however if a blade failed in the driving region and separated...

jimf671

30th Apr 2016, 00:38

... so what were the 5 maintenance flights for? I made the assumption they were MTF's because Jimf671 wrote that they were short. ...

That was from flightradar24. There are some anomalies in the way that flightradar24 records flights but looking at the detail there is definitely a record of 3 short flights that are 13 to 16 minutes long and are circuitous around local fjord and nearby islands. The first is 1129h 26th, second 0643h 27th, third 1224h 27th. The first has a routine flight number and so may be a RTB after normal departure. No other flights are shown during that 25 hour period.

JohnDixson

30th Apr 2016, 02:13

Jim, with the gearbox change being accomplished in January, it looks like it's time to wait for the sharp eyes to look at what came down with the rotor head and how/where it failed structurally, as well as determining what, if anything, the main blades hit prior to the head separation. Time for the accident investigation pro's and the OEM design/test people to look at the evidence. Still would be of interest to know what the short flights were all about.

MLHeliwrench

30th Apr 2016, 03:03

jimf671

30th Apr 2016, 03:08

It is what it is and it's out there on a public website. What it means is for the professional head scratchers.

SEIFR

30th Apr 2016, 03:39

For what it is worth.

oD4jKBOIBwc

Non-PC Plod

30th Apr 2016, 04:23

ETUDIANT - Think about where you would mount the parachute on a light aeroplane ....- away from the rotating parts, so whether the chute is deliberately or inadvertently deployed, it can work without interference.
I cant think where you could mount a safety parachute on a helicopter where it is not going to cause a catastrophic failure if inadvertently deployed, and where it is going to be unimpeded by rotating parts if you want to deliberately deploy it (in all circumstances except complete detachment of the main rotor head, which remains an extremely rare occurrence)
So - chutes are a fairly impractical proposition for helicopters.

Checklist Charlie

30th Apr 2016, 04:51

How about under a suitable faired structure where the 'chinamans hat" is currently atop the jesus nut?

CC

roundwego

30th Apr 2016, 05:25

How about under a suitable faired structure where the 'chinamans hat" is currently atop the jesus nut?

CC

For F*cks sake! That is the stupidest post I have seen in a long time.

Checklist Charlie

30th Apr 2016, 05:40

Thanks for your informative input.

CC

Outwest

30th Apr 2016, 05:45

Having just watched the video above and I realize I'm asking for speculation, but seeing the video of the rotor head falling and the still pictures would we assume that it failed where the bevel gear is welded to the m/r shaft?

Pablo332

30th Apr 2016, 05:52

On the EC225 all lift forces are transmitted to the airframe via the bearing housing of the MRH mast not the MGB. 3 suspension bars transmit the lift forces from the mast to the airframe. One of the suspension bars can be clearly seen in the photograph of the detached MRH.

Outwest

30th Apr 2016, 06:03

OK, so which actual part would fail that would cause such a clean (relatively) break that would allow the entire rotor head and blades to depart seemingly undamaged.

Again....realizing that it would be speculation, but from someone who has knowledge of how the system is designed ( I'm not an EC/Airbus guy)

Vertical Freedom

30th Apr 2016, 06:20

Rest in Peace Passengers & Flight-Crew, another very sad day in the Rotory World

DaveReidUK

30th Apr 2016, 06:31

OK, so which actual part would fail that would cause such a clean (relatively) break that would allow the entire rotor head and blades to depart seemingly undamaged.

The fact that the main rotor has been recovered more or less intact should mean that the cause of the failure gets established pretty quickly. I wouldn't be surprised if we see an AD within the next few days.

KiwiNedNZ

30th Apr 2016, 06:31

Thoughts are with everyone at CHC - sad day for the industry, no matter where you are and what you do. :(

So is this the death knell for the 225 - or will operators continue to operate it even after past issues with it - or in fact is it even feasible to stop using the 225 with the amount operators have invested in it.

RVDT

30th Apr 2016, 06:34

3 suspension bars transmit the lift forces from the mast to the airframe. One of the suspension bars can be clearly seen in the photograph of the detached MRH

And there is no bolt in the end of it or deformation visible as to how it became detached? I would think that the bar would fail long before the bolt sheared unless the bolt is loose then without tension it would snap like a carrot or possibly it was not even there.
The other end is obviously still attached so part of the housing is possibly still attached to the mast. The visible end is the frame end as it is the forked one.

How long would a 225 fly with some of the flight loads through the flared housing?

Looks a little odd. But then again all will be revealed in due course. Just saying.

http://www.eurocopter.com/publications/img_wsw//rotorec225.jpg

Nescafe

30th Apr 2016, 06:37

I wouldn't be surprised if we see an AD within the next few days.

Really? It took months to fix the 225 and make it ready to go back to pax carrying flights last time.

DTD585

30th Apr 2016, 06:55

Just to clarify, the suspension bars are restrained by a pin which is safetied by two 'nappy pins'

Pablo332

30th Apr 2016, 07:24

One area of interest may be at the bolted joint between the MRH and MGB. The bolts of the MRH mast go into barrel nuts housed in the MGB. These barrel nuts have plastic blanks inserted at the same time to prevent oil leaks. Unfortunately its impossible to tell from the plastic blank if the barrel nut has been inserted upside down. Not sure if could be a factor but it’s been a Murphy for years on this installation.

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 07:26

A truly tragic accident. Horrifying video of the final moments and images that no aviator would ever wish to see. I only hope that this terrible event will provoke some serious, honest discussions about safety but the cynic in me knows otherwise.
How quickly everyone rushes to deflect blame and responsibility.
After the previous accidents involving the type I was sickened to learn that the HUMS had detected signs of impending failure in 2 or 3 flights prior to the accident. Why are operators so reluctant to use the data available to stop accidents like this happening? Why are the authorities so against forcing the operators to monitor and use the HUMS data? Why are the manufacturers trusted beyond logical reason and not forced to produce more useable safety monitoring? I couldn't believe that the authorities accepted returning the puma to service after the last grounding under the terms that they did - allowing aircraft to operate with a known defect in a critical component. What could possibly motivate such a decision, certainly not true safety.
All the corporate proclamations about safety being the primary concern ring very hollow after incidents like this. I fear that costs get in the way of true safety every time.
So will we see a repeat of the process from the other offshore accidents which does very little to prevent further accidents even though the causes are clearly identified? Sad, very sad.

Pablo332

30th Apr 2016, 07:30

How long would a 225 fly with some of the flight loads through the flared housing?

I think the massive change in cyclic pitch would be the problem.

Noiseboy

30th Apr 2016, 07:35

The suggestion of an RTB followed by a couple of airtests would fit with a gearbox chip light causing the RTB, oil drained and analysed followed by heavy hover and airtest to check for any further chips before sending it commercial again on close monitoring. Again similar to DL, and the way the French like to do things.

dipperm0

30th Apr 2016, 07:50

RVDT, thanks for the clear explanations.

As you mention it, the fact that the airframe end of the suspension bar looks undamaged questions about the missing bolt. Whatever the securing device for this bolt is - cotter pin, nut, caramel, the question is why is it missing ? Maintenance flaw or metal shear ?

And to be clear for readers, HUMS can not detect missing bolts or nuts

Flap 5

30th Apr 2016, 08:08

Having flown many thousands of hours in offshore helicopters some decades ago I was truly shocked to see the video evidence of this accident. The whole rotor head with intact blades separated from the gearbox and came down like a sycamore leaf. A structural failure of this magnitude is non survivable in a helicopter.

Also having been involved with the Puma accident in Sarawak in 1980 when the gearbox failed on 9M-SSC I don't recall the main rotor detaching like this. One or two blades detached through the shear deceleration forces and the captains door flying up into a blade when he released the door but otherwise the rotor head was still connected.

This looks like a failure of the rotor head itself (jesus nut?) for the whole rotor system to detach so cleanly.

Scuffers

30th Apr 2016, 08:08

just to be clear, are you suggesting the end we can see in the picture pointing up is actually the 'bottom' end of the rod that should be attached to the airframe?

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 08:10

dipperm0

30th Apr 2016, 08:47

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 09:11

It's my understanding HUMS picked up on the EC225 bevel failure in advance but due to the once per day download pattern used by the operator at that time, it went out on its afternoon flight and subsequently failed resulting in the ditch. Had the HUMS card been downloaded after its morning flight and before its afternoon flight, the impending failure was clear and would have been caught, the aircraft would never have departed. That's why the industry changed to more frequent after flight HUMS downloads in the aftermath.

If it's a gearbox failure this time around which to be honest, is more probable than probably not, I would expect the HUMS to come under close scrutiny. The difficulty the operators have is deciphering the data and what it actually means to the airworthiness of the helicopter, there are a lot of instrumentation defects for example so these need to be filtered out and it can be difficult to detect genuine mechanical failure modes. HUMS probably catches a lot that we are all unaware of because they get to it in time, it's only when failures happen, HUMS comes under scrutiny.
Agreed, so my point is why is the data not taken seriously enough? The manufacturers should be forced to produce a more user friendly interface for the technicians to be able to interrogate between flights. And the operators should be forced by the authorities to read HUMS between flights. The information is there to make flights safer but we are failing to use it to its full potential. I operate in Norway and am pretty sure the HUMS data is downloaded but couldn't possibly be properly interrogated in the short time between flights. In my opinion HUMS data should be looked at very closely after a MGB caution of any sort. Does it happen now? Doubt it....

SLF3

30th Apr 2016, 09:21

Go back to post 23 and the eye witness report of a fire before the separation. Any other evidence of this?

Unrelated question, does CHC have screens over the engine air intakes?

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 09:37

To Scuffers : yes,
To redhanded : not sure : if the bolt fits tigh, and has only one axis of motion I am not sure the HUMS could detect the movement of the bolt. More than that, if flight, under high lift, I hardly suspect the bolt from moving.

Years ago, flying Lynx, I encontered unusual vibrations in flight while collective down only. It turns out to be a missing part in the collective control chain, but under lift, there was no vibs.

HUMS picks up vibrations and frequencies that could NEVER be felt or heard by humans- that's the beauty of it. The problem is interrogating and deciphering all the data into something meaningful. Cue the authority to take a proactive role for a change.

Misformonkey

30th Apr 2016, 10:38

Go back to post 23 and the eye witness report of a fire before the separation. Any other evidence of this?

Unrelated question, does CHC have screens over the engine air intakes?
Older type of helicopters only have fire detection in the engine bays so a fire in the transmission compartment without detection is entirely possible. Planetary gear failure with MRH departure given previous history of transmission problems has got to be a suspect. Condolences to those affected.

PlasticCabDriver

30th Apr 2016, 10:42

To try and avoid a raft of posts along the lines of "I heard that...", the AAIB report on the 2012 225 ditchings details generally how the operators used their HUMS at the time, and then specifically how the HUMS was used on each of the affected aircraft.

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422fbaaed915d1374000833/2-2014_G-REDW_and_G-CHCN.pdf

The relevant sections start on page 45 at 1.11.4.4 G-REDW operator’s internal HUMS procedures.

PlasticCabDriver

30th Apr 2016, 11:00

For the second flight (CHCN), yes. For the first one (REDW) the HUMS was downloaded after the first flight, and according to the report, acted on iaw the AMM.

I just wanted to avoid the usual round of ill-informed posts (that's not directed at anyone) but we went round and round this buoy at the time and it got tedious.

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 11:04

The guidance to operators given in CAP 753 states that the period between the successful download and assessment of any primary VHM indicator, used for monitoring the engine and rotor drive system components, should not exceed 25 hours.

This just isn't good enough. what good is it to read the results of the HUMS analysis which warns of a problem AFTER an accident?!

For the second flight (CHCN), yes. For the first one (REDW) the HUMS was downloaded after the first flight, and according to the report, acted on iaw the AMM.

I just wanted to avoid the usual round of ill-informed posts (that's not directed at anyone) but we went round and round this buoy at the time and it got tedious.

Tedious??!! Maybe if something was done to take the data and procedures more seriously lives would have been saved.

G-REDW had numerous HUMS alerts warning of a problem in the main gear box in the hours leading up to the accident. It's just not acceptable to say that the proper engineering procedures were followed. The procedures are obviously flawed!

What happens if I pr

30th Apr 2016, 11:28

squib66

30th Apr 2016, 11:38

REDHANDED (13 posts in 5.5 years, half on this thread): Well done on your rapid learning!!!!:hmm:

At 08:26 you said:
Why are the authorities so against forcing the operators to monitor and use the HUMS data?

By 12:04 you have found the CAP that supports the UK regulation that requires HUMS (the Norwegian have a rule in the BSL too and EASA have published the rule to expand that across Europe):

The guidance to operators given in CAP 753 states that the period between the successful download and assessment of any primary VHM indicator, used for monitoring the engine and rotor drive system components, should not exceed 25 hours.

However that is the MEL limit not the guidance on how often to download*.

The CAA guidance earlier in that CAP is that HUMS should be downloaded ideally even during rotors running turnarounds.

Just for info, since the REDW incident, all oil and gas aircraft flying in the North Sea have to have a hums download and the data analysis before d next flight.

Though that was common practice with some operators before.

However, at this stage assumptions of what or might not have detected something and when are fantasy only.

but we went round and round this buoy at the time and it got tedious. ahmen

* OGP don't even quote that as they still refer to a CAP that was redundant when CAP753 was issued in 2006! OGP guidelines are only for daily downloads (and I'm sure they would oppose rotors running HUMS downloads, especially offshore).

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 11:41

Just for info, since the REDW incident, all oil and gas aircraft flying in the North Sea have to have a hums download and the data analysis before d next flight. this is a CRS requirement needing a signature from a qualified engineer.
Any HUMS issues between flights have to be logged and reported, delaying or stopping the next flight as necessary.
I know, but it's not stopping accidents happening. The alerts are only as good as the algorithms used to set them. We need more data inputs from the manufacturers and operators to enable better alert thresholds to be set so that warnings can be actioned in good time. I question the manufacturers current advice on how to act upon warnings from the HUMS. It was wrong wrt G-REDW

stacey_s

30th Apr 2016, 11:43

In the video it is interesting to see that there are only four blades still attached.

squib66

30th Apr 2016, 11:45

REDHANDED credit where credit is due, this point is sound.

The alerts are only as good as the algorithms used to set them. We need more data inputs from the manufacturers and operators to enable better alert thresholds to be set so that warnings can be actioned in good time.

Though there is no guarantee that every failure will be detectable.

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 11:49

REDHANDED (13 posts in 5.5 years, half on this thread): Well done on your rapid learning!!!!:hmm:

At 08:26 you said:

By 12:04 you have found the CAP that supports the UK regulation that requires HUMS (the Norwegian have a rule in the BSL too and EASA have published the rule to expand that across Europe):

However that is the MEL limit not the guidance on how often to download*.

The CAA guidance earlier in that CAP is that HUMS should be downloaded ideally even during rotors running turnarounds.

Though that was common practice with some operators before.

However, at this stage assumptions of what or might not have detected something and when are fantasy only.

ahmen

* OGP don't even quote that as they still refer to a CAP that was redundant when CAP753 was issued in 2006! OGP guidelines are only for daily downloads (and I'm sure they would oppose rotors running HUMS downloads, especially offshore).

Thanks, a prime example of why we aren't getting anywhere with safety! You think it's tedious to try and influence how we approach a subject that has potential to save lives?

farsouth

30th Apr 2016, 11:53

In the video it is interesting to see that there are only four blades still attached.

Not sure what video you are looking at, but the one of the rotor coming down appears (to me) to clearly show five blades.

PlasticCabDriver

30th Apr 2016, 11:58

Tedious??!! Maybe if something was done to take the data and procedures more seriously lives would have been saved.
No. What is tedious is the the ill- and misinformed coming on and spouting off without knowing some basic details. Again, I direct that comment at nobody in particular.

I thought I would provide a source document of some facts (notwithstanding that the ditchings happened 4 years ago and a lot has gone on since then, Mitchaa mentions it above) that we can all use as a starting point for our discussions rather than what somebody was told in the pub by his mate who works offshore.

squib66

30th Apr 2016, 11:59

Thanks, a prime example of why we aren't getting anywhere with safety! You think it's tedious to try and influence how we approach a subject that has potential to save lives?

No of course not!

Its just you are also firing a speculative blame out in all directions at the same time (including on 4 year-old accidents you had no prior comment on).

stacey_s

30th Apr 2016, 12:00

Paused the video in multiple places and I only see four, mind you ay 64 years old and 49 years in the industry may have made my eyes a bit knackered. :)

Codprawn

30th Apr 2016, 12:15

There is a very clear photo on page 2 of this post that shows the rotor on the ground. Some videos are clearer than others as well - looks like all blades intact to me but of course damage not clear.

ironbutt57

30th Apr 2016, 12:16

I count 5 as well

Max Contingency

30th Apr 2016, 12:32

Professional helicopter pilots buy a ticket in the Great Gearbox Lottery every time we fly.

We have all heard of rotor head separation before but I believe that this is the first time it has ever been captured on camera.

To see that rotor head, the size of a small house, rotating down without the rest of the aircraft sent a chill right down my spine.

Yes the passengers would have been terrified but only the pilots would have known the absolute finality of what was happening.

Made an entry in my diary, simply says: "Bugger" :(

Non-Driver

30th Apr 2016, 12:55

TylerMonkey

30th Apr 2016, 13:01

Freeze frame shows 5 blades in video at various stages. IMO

http://i86.servimg.com/u/f86/11/94/64/62/image10.png

http://imbo.vgtv.no/users/bt_/images/1e737a13ad1c0447a6b506d00fa1ac58.jpg?t[]=1800x1012q50

Apate

30th Apr 2016, 13:17

bikeface

30th Apr 2016, 13:20

condolences to all involved, another sad day.
on the subject of HUMS i'm glad to see my company checking after every flight. it takes 15mins to check.

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 13:28

Perhaps Redhanded would be well advised to educate himself where the industry is now with HUMS rather than look back at history and outdated CAA guidelines.
Safety Information | HeliOffshore (http://helioffshore.org/safety-information/)

I also see 5 blades on the video!
Always happy to educate myself, thanks for the link. While I do, Maybe you could enlighten us as to where the industry is wrt HUMS.

M609

30th Apr 2016, 13:28

Video of the recovery of the main body of the fuselage (http://www.bt.no/tv/#!/video/103115/her-heves-vraket)

High res image of the rotor head on the ground (http://imbo.vgtv.no/users/bt_/images/1e737a13ad1c0447a6b506d00fa1ac58.jpg?t[]=1800x1012q50)

jimf671

30th Apr 2016, 13:37

LN-OJF

Better picture of the main rotor:

http://bt.mnocdn.no/incoming/article3588200.ece/ALTERNATES/w1440c169/rotor3.jpg?updated=290420161509

G-REDL

235

newfieboy

30th Apr 2016, 13:39

Video is very chilling, doesn't bare thinking about. I knew two pilots killed through MR separation in two separate accidents.
RIP to the crew and Pax.

What happens if I pr

30th Apr 2016, 14:12

I know, but it's not stopping accidents happening. The alerts are only as good as the algorithms used to set them. We need more data inputs from the manufacturers and operators to enable better alert thresholds to be set so that warnings can be actioned in good time. I question the manufacturers current advice on how to act upon warnings from the HUMS. It was wrong wrt G-REDW

You have to remember that HUMS is a trending tool. Not a crystal ball.
If you have a rapid mechanical failure there is almost no chance of seeing a trend.

Winnie

30th Apr 2016, 14:12

In the picture, is that one of the transmission supports sticking up between blades?

(Edit)
Looking closer in the high rez images, the entire swash plate is visible in one, and indeed the transmission support is poking up in another....

RIP those involved. Have way too many friends in the Norwegian sector... Not ready to lose a single one...

stacey_s

30th Apr 2016, 14:42

YEP agree all roots are there, must be old age getting the better of the ole eyes

212man

30th Apr 2016, 14:42

Misformonkey

30th Apr 2016, 14:50

The swashplate and the main driveshaft are visible. If the MRH is fitted over the MRGB main drive shaft like the Sea King then that drive shaft has detached from the MRGB rather than the MRH detaching from MRGB. I.e. the pressure plate or upper securing nut. It is strange that there is no bolt evident on that support rod.

The Sultan

30th Apr 2016, 14:53

In the top photo in post #141 four blades look relatively intact. One blade (the one pointing "down" is only partially there (you can see more spar than afterbody and ever then the blade is short). A blade failure could easily rip the rotor, swashplate etc. out of the aircraft relatively intact. It is possible, if not probable, that this could have occurred in a fuselage strike, but that amount of blade loss would easily rip the "rotor et al" out of the aircraft. That kind of failure is generally proceeded with a "bang." As to HUMS there are multiple cases (Bristow 76 as an example) where there was almost no warning of a catastrophic blade failure.

The Sultan

lowfat

30th Apr 2016, 15:12

I have to agree that the likelyhood is all persons were alive on the way down the report from LN-OPG which crashed in 1997 from a similar height and cruise speed after an MGB input shaft sheared. states everyone died in collision with the water...
It makes chilling reading and although a 332L1
the construction of main components is similar if not identical. I suggest some of the keyboard warriors read the report to answer some of the questions being raised here.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helikopter_Service_Flight_451

PhilJ

30th Apr 2016, 15:25

Which picture are you seeing the swashplate in? I think I'm looking at the droop stop ring in the pictures above.

How Nice

30th Apr 2016, 15:39

Which picture are you seeing the swashplate in? I think I'm looking at the droop stop ring in the pictures above.
You can see it on Tylermonkey's post (#141)
Zoom in and you see the swashplate.
You can just make out the Pitch link attachment lugs.

henra

30th Apr 2016, 15:47

I'm pretty sure that anybody free falling 2000 ft would have a pretty good idea what happens next!

Especially when those whirly things above are suddenly missing it doesn't take a rocket scientist to foresee what's gonna happen next...

Poor guys....

dipperm0

30th Apr 2016, 15:48

From EC pilot training manual:

begin
MAIN ROTOR HUB integral with the rotor shaft supports the rotor components
ROTOR SHAFT driven by the MGB, supports the main rotor hub.
FLARED HOUSING : transmit the aerodynamic force from a rotating part
(rotor shaft) to a non-rotating part (fittings bolted on the fuselage) via 3 suspension bars.
The splined end of the rotor shaft engages in the MGB second stage planet gear cage
end

If the visible bar on the picture is a suspension bar, thus, this bar has gone loose from the fuselage while remaining attached on the flared housing that I presume is under the visible swashplate.

henra

30th Apr 2016, 15:52

In the top photo in post #141 four blades look relatively intact. One blade (the one pointing "down" is only partially there (you can see more spar than afterbody and ever then the blade is short). A blade failure could easily rip the rotor, swashplate etc. out of the aircraft relatively intact.

If you watch the video of the falling rotor you will see that all 5 blades are there and seem to have still their full length. The Rotor is drifting down in balance. So in this accident this probably wasn't the case.

Dairyground

30th Apr 2016, 16:06

on the subject of HUMS i'm glad to see my company checking after every flight. it takes 15mins to check.

I assume that HUMS recordings are digital rather than analogue. Would it not be possible to analyse them in real time, in flight, and have any alert raised immediately, giving the opportunity for a diversion or even a return to origin?

PhilJ

30th Apr 2016, 16:06

You can see it on Tylermonkey's post (#141)
Zoom in and you see the swashplate.
You can just make out the Pitch link attachment lugs.

I think what you can see is the droop stop ring and the lugs are the top of the scissor link. Compare it to the cad model on page 6 posted by RVDT.

The Sultan

30th Apr 2016, 16:21

Henra

I was next to a helicopter running on the ground which let go an integral piece of a blade that took off the outboard section of the blade. The transmission was snapped in half and the rotor, mast, swashplate seperated climbed 100 feet and then came down not 30 feet from the ship. It happened so fast the pilot reported no vibration. When in flight the rotor was stable as it rotated around its new cg.

The Sultan

How Nice

30th Apr 2016, 16:42

I think what you can see is the droop stop ring and the lugs are the top of the scissor link. Compare it to the cad model on page 6 posted by RVDT.
I'm not so sure. The lugs on the droop stop ring are 180 degrees apart and much closer to the centre line of the main shaft.
In the pic in post 140 you can see 2 lugs which wouldn't be possible from that angle if it were the droop stop ring.
You can also see the outer race of bolts which look like part of the rotating swashplate.

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 16:43

Not a good idea DairyGround, the biggest annoyance of any HUMS systems is false alerts caused by poor instrumentation. You could potentially leave a decision to ditch a helicopter in the North Sea to the pilot having to make that call only to find out that an accelerometer had lost a little torque and created a jump in the data. Only proper analysis and cross comparisons on a ground station would give you this info. Real time monitoring like they do on fixed wing has been talked about for years now but always dismissed due to the potential pitfalls. The crew already have enough to concentrate on, never mind hundreds of HUMS parameters to add to that.

Data link back to engineering control? They could analyze in real time without disturbing the cockpit.

PhilJ

30th Apr 2016, 16:53

I'm not so sure. The lugs on the droop stop ring are 180 degrees apart and much closer to the centre line of the main shaft.
In the pic in post 141 you can see 3 lugs which wouldn't be possible from that angle if it were the droop stop ring.
You can also see the outer race of bolts which look like part of the rotating swashplate.

See it now, I was looking at the wrong picture.

TylerMonkey

30th Apr 2016, 17:02

I lightened up the image some more . . .

http://i86.servimg.com/u/f86/11/94/64/62/hub310.jpg

http://imbo.vgtv.no/users/bt_/images/1e737a13ad1c0447a6b506d00fa1ac58.jpg?t[]=1800x1012q50

REDHANDED

30th Apr 2016, 17:09

Scuffers

30th Apr 2016, 17:41

OK, looking at the pictures etc.

If the vertical 'lift' loads are taken by the 3 rods, how does the gearbox failing cause the rotor head to break away?

What exactly is on the airframe end of the rods?

TylerMonkey

30th Apr 2016, 17:42

Are these 2 strut rods maybe the same component ?

http://i86.servimg.com/u/f86/11/94/64/62/hub7b10.jpg

http://i86.servimg.com/u/f86/11/94/64/62/hub910.jpg

helili

30th Apr 2016, 17:46

The separation point must be below the green bolts since we can se the suspension bar on the picture.

One strut rod by the red arrow(suspension bar),and one pitch link(with black tape) i think.

Pablo332

30th Apr 2016, 17:51

So if we can see the swashplate, the likely separation point is at the row of green bolts underneath. (where the struts attach)

Not very likely , not a lot going on here unless you install barrel nuts upside down.

Next MGB joint is to the ring gear of the epicyclic reduction gear, lots going on here.

After looking at the end of the suspension bar we can see with the pictures available Pin/washer and securing pins could be intact.

The MRB leading edge protective covering shows buckling approx. 1/3 from root which may have been caused by excessive bending of the spar due to excessive pitch.

212man

30th Apr 2016, 18:16

just hope I'm not sitting
In 6 months time reading an accident report stating that HUMS data indicated a trend 3 days before the accident.

It may well do, but that's not the same as suggesting HUMS should have a real time involvement in decision making.

Pablo332

30th Apr 2016, 18:57

Pablo, so you think the separation point is the row of bolts at the bottom of the diagram? (grey casing)

The ring gear has a bit of previous on this type of helicopter.

At the moment all is speculation.

Solentsurfer

30th Apr 2016, 19:15

Take a look at the AAIB report for G-AWAP lost in 1983 off Norfolk coast.

The report concludes that the accident was caused by the disengagement of the main rotor head retention bolt, with consequential detachment of the rotor, due to corrosion of the engaging threads between it and the mast.

Not to say this was the case but as an inspection engineer that regularly flew in G-AWAP and took an interest in her fate, I was struck by the recent video and the eyewitness reports of G-AWAP, a loud crack and a detached rotor landing away from the main wreck.

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422ed76e5274a1317000199/3-1985_G-AWAP.pdf

Pablo332

30th Apr 2016, 19:22

Am I right in saying that the material failure of the planet gear G –REDL is still unexplained by the manufacturer?

dipperm0

30th Apr 2016, 19:27

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/548ac196e5274a42900002d6/S5-2009_Eurocopter_AS332L2_Super_Puma__G-REDL_08-09.pdf

The initial examination of the wreckage, in conjunction
with radar, HUMS, CVFDR and witness data,
determined that a failure within the epicyclic reduction
gearbox module of the MRG resulted in the rupture of
the gearbox case. This allowed the main rotor head,
together with the upper section of the MRG, to separate
from the helicopter.

RayBanJockey

30th Apr 2016, 19:46

Does anyone have an illustration showing the lower attachment points of the strut rods?

Shaft109

30th Apr 2016, 20:26

Just a slight impostor here but reading this and other accidents the MGB sudden seizure tears the whole assembly out of the top?

If so is there any way of making a shear ring that would fail but leave the blades attached ?

I know it's a wild stab in the dark but there appears to be no redundancy if it fails.

Like the old safe life on fixed wing structures .

Hangarshuffle

30th Apr 2016, 21:14

donut king

30th Apr 2016, 21:34

Offshore workers feel let down-what is happening with this aircraft? For many people its stick or bust time.
Transit to and from offshore is becoming a gamble and in a professional environment it should not be thus.

Workplace health and safety. Your Union should be involved with your employer. Follow the reg's. I'm sure even the 225 pilots are concerned.

Jack Pot

30th Apr 2016, 22:07

VG.NO (Norwegian Newspaper) is now reporting that LN-OJF made a RTB on Tuesday, 16 minutes into a flight, due to a Warning Light (not specified). On Wednesday an engine part was changed and a short local test flight was made. The same Warning Light appeared once again (still not specified), and yet another engine part was changed. Another test flight was then performed. This time everything appeared to be OK. LN-OJF then performed six commercial flights on Thursday without remarks.

Pozidrive

30th Apr 2016, 22:32

Offshore workers feel let down-what is happening with this aircraft? For many people its stick or bust time.
Transit to and from offshore is becoming a gamble and in a professional environment it should not be thus.

The alternative is transfer by boat and lifting men on and off the rigs by crane. Would that be safer than helicopters? I doubt it.

How Nice

30th Apr 2016, 23:04

Its not impossible at this point. I don't work in Norway so I don't know what the environment it like there or the events leading to this situation. If it turns out the indications were there but missed I hope the CAAs involved investigate how poorly the helicopter industry trains engineers on HUMs at least as they all should get F grades on this subject. Not just CHC. Power point training on a computer or MAYBE actually getting a hums course but 10 years ago is not sufficient to keep anyone proficient. Maybe the signs were there but no one recognized them since the training was either non existent or sub par. As for checking the HUMs Data it is CHC wide to do this after every flight and signed for as a maintenance release before the next flight.
As this was a Statoil contract the HUMS data would have been checked between flights.
In fact after this was put into the Statoil contract (several years ago) CHC check all HUMS data between flights.

schrauber

30th Apr 2016, 23:55

Condolences to the families of the crew and passengers - so many people hurt & directly affected

Frightening footage! The forum with discussions and theories of the cause is interesting and some of you obviously have a high level of technical knowledge however regardless of what is determined as the cause and any potential flaws with the IHUMS or the procedure of downloading and interpreting the information, the damage is done and the confidence, whether warranted or not, seems to be lost in the EC25.

Any shortfalls in procedures should of course be addressed appropriately but especially in today's environment it wouldn't want to cost too much. Affordable safety in world of greed. Sorry a cynical view I know but some of you may share my view.

SLF3

1st May 2016, 00:13

There was an initial report of fire before the separation. Now statements that engine parts were changed in the days before the crash. Is there an escalation path from an engine 'issue' to separation of the rotor head?

gulliBell

1st May 2016, 01:07

I think if the MGB was undergoing the process of self destruction, with all that heat and oil, as soon as the case cracked it is quite feasible that oil ignition would be likely.

Altimus

1st May 2016, 01:54

Anyone who thinks HUMS data could be interpreted in real time has never seen the Data before. Please stop thinking HUMs is a magic tool to determine maintenance requirements. HUMs has always been and still is a maintenance TOOL. Not a determining factor nor reliable enough to make a decision such as ditching a Helicopter as some seem to think or those in suits want everyone to believe. Some HUMS indications are so vague it can take a LONG time to determine if the HUMs system or aircraft is faulty. Much longer than your typical out and back trip offshore helicopters take making real time impossible. Whatever failed on this Helicopter happened incredibly fast. Faster than even the Pilots onboard to realize something was wrong. HUMs=USELESS in that situation. If the data is still intact on the card then it may help investigators determine what failed easier.
A newbie on this site, but interested in rotorcraft safety for sometime.
I agree in principle that HUMS indications are generally vague, need to be analyzed in the right statistical context, and, from the operational perspective, can result in an unacceptably high false positive rate. As a result, they are generally not expected to be used on-line on-board at their current level of maturity.

However, I am reading the Aircraft Accident Report for G-REDW and G-HCN from 2/2014
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aar-2-2014-g-redw-and-g-chcn-10-may-2012
As a reminder, two ditchings in 2012 were caused by fatigue cracks in bevel gear vertical shaft. One of the findings of that report was that original finite element analysis (FEA) used for certification of EC225 underpredicted the stresses in the bevel gear vertical shaft by a factor of 3.8 (page 98). As a result, the estimated safety margin was reduced from 5.4 to 2.1 (page 152), which basically invalidated the original certification (for the safety margin under 3, FEA alone would not sufficient and fatigue test would be required).
At the same the relevant HUMS indicators, and MOD45 in particular seemed to provide an early warning, but only about two-to-four hours in advance (this is my interpretation rather than how it was stated in the report, but take a look at Figures 22 and 23 of the report).

So, one of the recommendations of that report has led to ASB No EC225-45A010 ‘Central Maintenance System – HUMS – M’ARMS MOD45 on-board monitoring system’, dated 8 July 2013. I quote: "The purpose of this ASB was to upgrade the MFDAU (Miscellaneous Flight Data Acquisition Unit) software to:
● Calculate the MOD-45 indicator in real time.
● Increase the acquisition rate.
● Display the MOD-45 indicator status on the HUMS Control Panel or (Man-Machine Interface)"
I tracked ASB No EC225-45A010 document to the most current AD No.: 2014-0078R1 from July 08, 2014. The best I could tell from this last document is that the recommendation was indeed implemented for some rotorcraft, but there was another option:
"after EASA AD 2014-0078 was issued, Airbus Helicopters redesigned the MGB bevel gear vertical shaft through modification MOD 0752525, which provides new nitrided shaft P/N 332A32-5109-00/01/05/06. This new shaft design eliminates a possibility of mechanical failure of the shaft. However incorporation of the new shaft requires to keep previous installation of a new MGB oil jet (MOD 0753021), and is incompatible with M’ARMS MOD45 monitoring function (MODs 0726994 and MOD 0728083) as initially required for EC 225 helicopters equipped with a VHM"

In summary, while it might be unwise to rely on HUMS for safety warnings on board, the Aircraft Accident Report has recommended to do just that. Two questions:
1. Is it possible from the evidence we have so far to rule out the possibility that this current accident was caused by bevel gear vertical shaft failure?
2. Was this specific rotorcraft equipped with M’ARMS MOD45 monitoring function or had a redesigned MGB bevel gear vertical shaft that "eliminates a possibility of mechanical failure of the shaft" (or neither)?

rotormech46

1st May 2016, 03:45

Does anyone else think that the "strut" poking up in the picture looks more like the control rod that connects to the MR servos than the gearbox support beams? It looks too thin, and wrong type of ends/bearing.

Brother

1st May 2016, 03:57

Altimus

2. Was this specific rotorcraft equipped with M’ARMS MOD45 monitoring function or had a redesigned MGB bevel gear vertical shaft that "eliminates a possibility of mechanical failure of the shaft" (or neither)?

All oil and gas contracted 225s are fitted with the redesigned bevel gear shaft.

riff_raff

1st May 2016, 06:07

From the pictures posted of the rotor remains, it appears the structural failure occurred in the upper section of the gearbox housing. All of the rotor system from the swashplate up separated from the airframe.

dipperm0

1st May 2016, 07:20

As Mitchaa said; "I'm a betting man " and I think this accident has nothing to do with MGB failure.

Watch out the G-REDL - MRH, mast with swashplate, flared housing with one suspension bar still attached to it - picture in post 145.

Do you see a difference between the end of the suspension bar on that picture and the one on picture in post 172 ?

While this suspension bar is supposed to be bolted to a fitting bolted on the fuselage, the one in post 172 looks un-damaged. I would really like to see the other face of this suspension bar.

rotorspeed

1st May 2016, 07:47

Hear what you say TenTon, but surely it's just a matter of time, albeit a few years, before HUMS info is indeed analysed - at least in part - in real time and cockpit warnings are provided for the most serious anomalies. But maybe this already happens to an extent? Also be interesting if the CVR picked up any observations from the most basic HUMS device - the crew - of any increase in vibration levels before failure.

ericferret

1st May 2016, 07:52

Aircraft have been flying since the 60's with a separated head/main gearbox i.e the Hughes 300/500 series. In the case of the 500 the gearbox is slung below the structure it drives a shaft through a hollow mast to the head which attaches to the shaft by bolts and to the mast by a nut.

In theory the main gearbox could fall out of the aircraft and the rotors and flying controls would operate normally. It is normal to remove a 500 gearbox without disturbing the rotor or flying controls.A gearbox seizure would result in the lower part of the drive shaft shearing at a shear point but the head and control would still remain functional attached to the mast.

However a failure of the mast or the thrust bearing in the head would still result in loss of the aircraft.

Engmonkey1

1st May 2016, 08:14

Mitchaa
It looks to me like the Suspension Bar pin is still installed and if you look really closely the airframe mounting has actually sheared and part of it is still attached between the forks.

Special 25

1st May 2016, 08:24

There are a number of single point failures on all helicopters - I would say that they are always well 'over-engineered' but the gearbox / rotorhead mounting design of the Puma family has always looked surprisingly weak, whilst history and shear number of hours flown has proven this as a very effective design.

As to live HUMS data, the problem has always been that the systems themselves are considerably more reliable than the sensors, micro-switches and telemetry of a HUMS set-up. Do we want to be flagging warning lights in the cockpit at the rate that engineers will see spikes on the HUMS print-out??

ericferret

1st May 2016, 08:25

Hi Mitchaa

I think the MD 902 is similar with the gearbox slung under a frame on top of the transmission deck.

Brother

1st May 2016, 08:37

To have that amount of "intact" evidence will hopefully help to determine the primary cause quickly.

There are only 2 primary cause possibilities in my opinion, another epicyclic module failure or maintenance error. Of course, if its epicyclic failure, there will be dozens of contributing factors to analyze, HUMS, monitoring, gear manufacture, just like REDL.

If its an MGB failure, I think the 225 is finished for offshore use. The Eurocopter re-branding to Airbus Helicopters to distance itself from the 2x NS ditching accidents may prove to tarnish more than polish the Airbus name. It will certainly advertise deep pockets for the lawyers who will represent the poor families affected by this tragedy.

If its a maintenance error, the 225 will survive. Whichever is the cause, the fallout will be very difficult to bear.

CHC could end up as being simple collateral damage caused by no revenue being generated by the 225. Oil and gas companies won't pay again for an extended grounding.

My positive thoughts are with everyone, I am genuinely very saddened by this.

The Bartender

1st May 2016, 08:48

Rotorhead recovered:
Bergensavisen - Det vil ta dager før de svarte boksene kan åpnes (http://www.ba.no/helikopterstyrten/ulykker/nyheter/skal-fjerne-rotoren-fra-terrenget/s/5-8-338845)

Pablo332

1st May 2016, 09:00

The Strut Rod in the picture is a suspension bar. The suspension bar is secured to the airframe with a Pin not a bolt and nut. The pin is secured with 2 nappy pins and a washer, from the resolution of the pictures I’m not sure these items are missing.

lowfat

1st May 2016, 09:12

that MGB shaft looks pretty intact in that underslung load shot..

The whole shaft has come out of the gearbox... Catastrophic engine or input shaft failure followed by MGB destruction? as in LN-OPG

http://www.aibn.no/ln_opg_eng_total-pdf?pid=Native-ContentFile-File&attach=1

L'aviateur

1st May 2016, 09:44

The alternative is transfer by boat and lifting men on and off the rigs by crane. Would that be safer than helicopters? I doubt it.
Pozidrive, the alternative desired isn't transfer by boat, but a different helicopter. People are spooked, and I do think oil workers and oil companies are concerned about the 225 and regardless of statistics, its going to take a lot to convince some people that this aircraft is safe. I am also sure that HSE Managers worldwide will be looking closely at the risks associated with this aircraft.
As for basket transfers, most companies consider this much more dangerous then any heli transfer.

helili

1st May 2016, 11:44

http://http://www.bt.no/nyheter/lokalt/--Sa-rotoren-i-luften-20-30-sekunder-etter-styrten-3588195.html#&gid=1&pid=1

If you zoom in, screenshot , and zoom once more, you can actually see tht the bolt is missing from the suspebnsion bar (airframe side). It looks like the pin is installed and that there is a fitting attached to it, but it is actually a peace of grass.

Special 25

1st May 2016, 11:51

Various reports state (and I can't swear to the accuracy, but I think I've seen it enough that it is confirmed) that the gearbox was changed on January 17th and the rotorhead on March 27th - 2 days before the accident.

I believe that apart from a couple of short maintenance flights, this was the first full passenger flight since the rotorhead change. I would imagine that will be the focus of the investigation right now.

The one witness statement that made me think possible gearbox failure / seizure was a comment that the in addition to the strange noise and a bang, the helicopter was seen to rotate in the air before an explosion, but this could be just about anything and may have been post rotor detachment.

Either way, witnesses on the ground seem to have been drawn to look up, film, look for the aircraft due to a strange noise, at least several seconds before the crash, so it suggests (in some ways similar to BND85N) that there was a short period of intense noise and gearbox stress before breakup.

Terrible tragedy. If this is an engineering / maintenance issue (and that is an 'if', the aircraft could be signed back to fly fairly quickly. Whether the passengers would accept it is another matter?

Beaucoup Movement

1st May 2016, 12:24

I'm sure he meant April instead of March Mitchaa! easily done...:ugh:

Special 25, I can't see the 225 flying again certainly not in the North Sea. Confidence is certainly at rock bottom & it took a long time for confidence to be built up again after the last accidents/controlled ditching's relating to gearbox issues in the North Sea (including L2) which wasn't that long ago as we all know. Far too many.

You just have to look back at the chinook crash in the late 80's just off Sumburgh. They were quickly taken out of service in the North Sea.

Talking of L2, I believe Bond have grounded them now too. Wise move.

After seeing that video of the rotor head assembly with blades spinning down to the ground certainly made me speechless. Very horrible & sad to see.

I feel for all the families involved & staff at CHC.. worrying times ahead

jimf671

1st May 2016, 12:25

Pozidrive, the alternative desired isn't transfer by boat, but a different helicopter. People are spooked, and I do think oil workers and oil companies are concerned about the 225 and regardless of statistics, its going to take a lot to convince some people that this aircraft is safe. I am also sure that HSE Managers worldwide will be looking closely at the risks associated with this aircraft.
As for basket transfers, most companies consider this much more dangerous then any heli transfer.

House of Commons - Offshore helicopter Safety - 2014
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmtran/289/289.pdf
(Page 11 for accident rates 1976-2013.)

- Super Puma variants accounted for 60% of the NS fleet:unsurprising that they are involved in more accidents
- Confidence rates in ALL models of large/heavy helicopter less than 50%.
- Why were these accidents all in the UK sector and none in Norway?

mostlylurking

1st May 2016, 12:32

There is no reason so far to believe that this accident is not a repeat of the G-REDL incident. I was not very satisfied with the report on this accident as it struck me as being complacent, that just to keep on doing the same things, but better was going to prevent the same thing happening again.
In the repotr it was said:-
"Safety Recommendation 2011-036 It is recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) re-evaluate the continued airworthiness of the main rotor gearbox fitted to the AS332 L2 and EC225 helicopters to ensure that it satisfies the requirements of Certification Specification (CS) 29.571 and EASA Notice of Proposed Amendment 2010-06."
Was this done?
The report contains the following passage:-
"Epicyclic gearbox spalling events on the AS332 L2 helicopter Data provided by the helicopter manufacturer indicated that between 2001 and 2009 there were nine recorded cases of planet gear spalling on the AS332 L2 (see Table 2). In addition, information provided by the operator showed that there had been seven events in 2010 on their fleet where magnetic particles had been found on the MGB magnetic chip detectors which had resulted in the removal of the gearbox for repair. The information provided by the manufacturer regarding the number of planet gear rejections due to spalling was incomplete. During the investigation anecdotal evidence was provided that indicated that overhaul facilities disposed of rejected gears without routing them for investigation."
This indicates to me a high level of complacency, the kind that brought down two NASA shuttles. Bearing spalling is not something you ever want to see in a gearbox, as it's progression is not predictable and often results in rolling elements being deposited into the gear mesh. At which point it is game over for the gearbox.

The Bartender

1st May 2016, 12:32

I'm sure he meant April instead of March Mitchaa! easily done...:ugh:

Actually, March is what is reported in the media, if so, the rotorhead has been in service for over a month, not two days.

henra

1st May 2016, 12:34

Special 25, I can't see the 225 flying again certainly not in the North Sea. Confidence is certainly at rock bottom & it took a long time for confidence to be built up again after the last accidents/controlled ditching's relating to gearbox issues in the North Sea (including L2) which wasn't that long ago as we all know.

If it wasn't due to a gross maintenance error that could have caused the same with any other type, I tend to agree.

jimf671

1st May 2016, 12:41

... ... During the investigation anecdotal evidence was provided that indicated that overhaul facilities disposed of rejected gears without routing them for investigation." ...

Not happy with that bit.

Democritus

1st May 2016, 12:42

I believe that apart from a couple of short maintenance flights, this was the first full passenger flight since the rotorhead change. I would imagine that will be the focus of the investigation right now.

According to FlightRadar24 there was an earlier flight (1hr47min - HKS240) carried out on the day of the accident to an offshore location in the same area as the accident flight: HKS 240 departed 0602, landed back at Bergen at 0749. HKS 241 then shown as having departed Bergen at 0911.

TylerMonkey

1st May 2016, 13:24

I believe that this rotor shot slung over the water dripping is not from the Norway event,
but from G-REDL ? Bit of confusion there ( at least to me ).

http://www.pprune.org/attachments/rotorheads/235d1462023392-ec225-crash-near-bergen-norway-redl_rotor2a.jpg

industry insider

1st May 2016, 13:37

Tyler

That's why it says G-REDL right below on the yellow background !!

Michaa

I am very close to the corpoate men in suits. I advise them for my pay cheque. If this is an MGB epicyclic failure like the REDL failure, it's au revoir to the H225 from me unless it has a whole new MGB design which is proven for a while. Without such a change, the risk would be intolerable.

TylerMonkey

1st May 2016, 13:43

As I said " at least to me ". Title is only on the second photo so my dyslexic brain did not join the dots automatically. Old age is a wunerful thing.

TylerMonkey

1st May 2016, 13:54

Yes, even a sadder event if it is a repeat.
Here is a blow up of the strut end but still very hard to see any pertinent detail.

http://i86.servimg.com/u/f86/11/94/64/62/hub4a10.jpg

9Aplus

1st May 2016, 13:57

If MGB design/production is to be blamed (again) than NH90 MGB
/ with civil cert. may be considered like one of quick patch up solution...
NH90 fleet have reached 100.000 f/h without known MGB issues.

Regarding HUMS that is for sure way to prevent or reduce such kind
of major structural failure but producers and operators must open the
data access to rest of the industry. Today's single board computers are
powerful enough to perform near real time computing and indication
of something major is about to go wrong.

RIP to all poor souls and sincere condolences to all involved.

SLF3

1st May 2016, 14:41

I work for one of the smaller oil companies. Our management fly on helicopters. They get good, independent, technical advice. Whether to use the 225 will be an informed risk based decision, not a decision based on sentiment. Most of us know the guys in our organisation who will make the recommendation and trust both their judgement and their moral compass. They are inherently conservative, because they want to sleep at night. If they decide we shouldn't use the 225 we won't. Money won't come into it.

I can't speak for every company operating on the UKCS and NOCS, but please don't assume they are all lead by immoral bean counters.

Clever Richard

1st May 2016, 14:52

Mitchaa,
How confident are you that there is enough spare capacity inthe North Sea to allow normal crew change operations to continue without the225? Whilst I have no specific knowledgein this regards, if there is, it implies that the helo operators have beenunder-utilising their assets. Would beinterested to hear your thoughts and those of anyone else in the know.

jimf671

1st May 2016, 14:54

ALTERNATIVES?

Fill in the blanks.

S-92 - ...
AW189 - ...
EC175 - ...
S-61 - ...
Mi-171 - ...
AW101 - ...
NH90 - ...

MoodyMan

1st May 2016, 14:56

aheoe26104

1st May 2016, 15:10

Interesting quote from the CHC thread. 50% of aircraft sitting without contract??

Still think everything is all rosy there Buddy!
I will be more than happy to revisit this conversation along with my original post and say "Boy did I tell you so"
My original prediction of MAX 2 years almost a year ago is going to turn out to be spot on.
It's simple basic 1 on 1 economics....It was never going to survive...no matter what

Here is my original post

Here are the Facts on CHC's Fiscal performance

85% of the Heli's are Leased
50% of the Heli's are NOT on Contract

Last Financial Year
1,650 Million total Income approx

Last Financial Year Expences (NOT ALL JUST THE BASICS)
109 Million P.A. in Administration (hangers on in Head Offices)
330 Million Crew Costs ( no change in the last 2 years)
1,100 Million in Leasing Costs (Heli's, building ETC)
145 Million Interest on Primary Debt.

Last Financial Year
190 Million NET LOSS

Look at the Interest on primary debt $145 Million.....so even if the Company has NO Debt it would still run at a loss.

That $600 Million CD & R bought as preferred Shares is just another Company Credit Card ....CD & R receive 8.5% Interest P.A. on the purchase Price....Take at look at the the last Quartely results and you will see the 10 Million in interest.
So what they have done is take the $600 Million dropped down the Primary Debt from around 1.5 Billion to 1.3 Billion...Spent god knows how much on new Machines, because no leasing Company will touch them....The end result is in reality the Primary Debt as I see it was about 1.45 Billion and it has now ballooned out to around 1.7 Billion. I haven't even mentioned the Senior Notes yet....I won't go into to much detail....But it goes like this... there is 100's of Millions in Senior Notes that the Company doesn't have to pay a cent on until the maturity of the Agreement.

If there was ever a Company that was insolvent this is it.

It's like this....If you had a Credit Card that got maxed out on,....Then you would get another one to pay the interest Bill on the first Card (Senior Notes) Then when the Second Card get maxed out you get a third Card ( CD & R $600 Million @ 8.5%) to pay the Interest on the Second.

That Moron Joan Hooper only ever Quoted EBITDAR and Cash Flow...No wonder she was sacked!

I give the Company 2 Years MAX before the Padlocks go on the Doors.
My best bet is G.E. will swoop in when it finally grinds to a halt.

If you want hours and hours of Fun Reading here are the 175 Pages of the FACTS (Form 10K)

If anyone things they can dig they way out of this Hole I'm all Ears!!

roscoe1

1st May 2016, 15:15

Does anyone know if the H215C1e transmission is the same p/n assembly as the H225? Aside from one less rotor blade on the hub are there other major differences ?

Clever Richard

1st May 2016, 15:25

Mitchaa,
Thanks for your response. All of your points seem sensible to me so it will be interesting to see what happens.

Margins

1st May 2016, 15:36

f MGB design/production is to be blamed (again) than NH90 MGB
/ with civil cert. may be considered like one of quick patch up solution...
NH90 fleet have reached 100.000 f/h without known MGB issues.

NH90 MGB is an AW design.

9Aplus

1st May 2016, 15:48

Yes, and approx 1/3 smaller in size...

OnePerRev

1st May 2016, 16:20

jimf671

1st May 2016, 16:47

And is 100000 flying hours not chicken feed by Super Puma standards? So where does that get us?

zalt

1st May 2016, 16:50

OnePerRev

On the matter of spin, you will no doubt remember your very last post:

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/456619-what-s-new-civil-tiltrotor-6.html#post8891952

In response to your question:

If the Blackhawk is so good, then why don't Sikorsky sell them to Civil Operators?

You said:

Late eighties they had that idea, the operators did not like the short ceiling (Hawk had to packup transportability reqt). Make it a "fat hawk" they all said.

It is now known as the S-92A.

Black Hawk experience was used in justification in the S-92A certification according to TSB-Canada in their report on another preventable accident.

OnePerRev

1st May 2016, 17:05

Not sure, but was it good enough to get those people home?
As aviation professionals across specialties and companies, we need to be thinking about the next hours more than the previous. The O&G experts can choose to interrogate the methodology and standards, many have. Super Puma can be safe I am sure, but after more is learned, appropriately it may require adjustments to the airworthiness limitations, be they replacement times, inspections, design improvements, etc. Not trying to jump the gun at all, we can't yet see what happened. As an industry, we should be prepared to learn from it though.

Harry the Hun

1st May 2016, 17:06

The NH-90 Main Transmission is nowhere close to the 225's in fit, form and function.

Milo C

1st May 2016, 17:07

Interesting how the positive Spin on accident statistics separate the new model from the predecessors, however the certification basis relies on this model being a variant, and certified to older standards.
The new standards would clearly make the main shaft a principle structural element, one that would require fatigue substantiation by testing. So the two ditchings would not have been a surprise that the finite element model incorrectly predicted the stresses. And how is the rest of the shaft? Sometimes if you simply make a part stronger where it failed, you just chase the failure somewhere else. Full scale fatigue testing based on measured loads would have prevented those issues. What else was missed in the design assumptions? The authorities should question any other PSE failure mode that was certified by Finite element.
Also, I may have misunderstood, but I recall the statement that AB increased quality inspections to one in every four, as this was an important part. How does one ask to fly on the inspected one?
-many predictions and speculations on this site, here is mine: The facts will show that this accident was preventable. Most are. Never easy to swallow that truth.

I think something like that happened to the 139 when AW reinforced the tail boom due to debonding. The stress was shifted back to the tail with the tragic known results. But AW solved that critical moment.

Will AH be able to skip this unprecedented situation an save the 225? After all it's basically a 30 year old tuned type.

What would it happen if we saw a video of a B737 falling down after a sudden break on both wings?

Furthermore, other OEMs and lessing companies are storaging helicopters from cancelled requests. They should be ready to deliver and willing to offer good deals to reduce their stocks and get a position in the market.

It shouldn't be so dramatic at this point to say goodbye to the 225.

If that happens. Only S92 or AW189 may take over controls.

spectral

1st May 2016, 17:11

ALTERNATIVES?

Fill in the blanks.

S-92 - ...a sheat and too expensive (impossible to take full fuel full pax) this is for this reason the 225 come back on fisrt place after the drop of oil barrel....

AW189 - ...the two of bristow was park and he don't use it (a sheat)

EC175 - ...certainly a alternative but limit to 14pax with "confort" but wait for svow certification

S-61 - ...a T-REX with a rotor

Mi-171 - ...WAHOOOUUUU

AW101 - ...A bad copy of NH-90 but why not why not 'depend of the price (a 225 is 23Meuros)

NH90 - ...Never certificate for civilian, you can buy 10 H175 with the price of 1 NH90

I read something about L2 (i don't know where) but Bond use 4 L2 for pax and 2 L2 for SAR... and i'm not surprised if the L2 return to flight during this week....

For the questions about the H215e the main gear box is the same of 332L1 or 332L2...

About the MGB of NH90 we don't talk about the same thing for the design and the size...

And for the return of 225 if this tragedy result of maintenance problem you see certainly again this aircraft in the sky of north sea because is certainly the more economic with the best performance...you can take off with full pax full fuel and with the additional tank (it was alone a this price).....Remember actually with the low price of barrel all the company search the services with Lowest cost....

OnePerRev

1st May 2016, 17:18

Zalt, very good digging...
All companies must rely on history to make design assumptions, S-92A no different, utilizing some very proven capability of the H-60. Of course, H-60 fatigue methodology exceeded commercial standards at the time.
You actually support the argument I am making. The Newfoundland tragedy was preventable on many levels, nuff said. What was done about it is a testament to the point about learning. The short solution was shown to be good enough, but further improvements were then made too, after re-evaluation of some of the assumptions.
To be clear, not bashing here.. it is a discussion about best industry practices, and always looking to improve.

zalt

1st May 2016, 17:28

To be clear, not bashing here.. it is a discussion about best industry practices, and always looking to improve. Roger that :ok:

Non-Driver

1st May 2016, 17:46

I must admit, I have wondered why the aviation industry has let the oil giants drive down costs so much. If we all stuck together and agreed not to drop prices pre 2014 levels then what are they going to do? Ferry everyone by boat and be done with helicopters or pay a little more for the helicopters?

Problem is the operators are the little guys between the OEM's and the Oil Giants, despite their apparent scale. They don't have the muscle to kick back enough against Airbus/EC, LM/Sikorsky, Leonardo/AW/ etc on the cost side and get squeezed by the big bad customers who commoditise the service.

You couldn't collude to fix prices in any way under Anti-Competitive legislation and the last time there became a duopoly in the NS to try to regain margin, the green 'n' yellow just sponsored the new Bond to come in and shake it up again. Same in the SNS with the smaller operators. There's always someone willing to do it for €x if the customer wants it.

PJ2

1st May 2016, 18:09

Mitchaa, re:I can point you to a ton more articles, we are lucky there hasn't been another piper Alpha, that's how bad things are getting out there. Available in July: Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674545236)

Earl Boebert
James M. Blossom
Foreword by Peter G. Neumannhttp://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674545236

Rigga

1st May 2016, 18:48

Well, for what it's worth (and my speculations are usually worth nothing) I see in the close-u rotor picture the intact and pin-less Load Stay as the main issue.
All the other breakages on the Hub Assy may be symptoms of a major control and torque disprution causing blades to clash and flail breaking pitch links and scissor links and the Hub Assy to wrench from the gearbox. As the Stay is obviously still connected to the Hub Assy and apparently 'straight', unlike the other assemblies, I believe this shows that this detached first. Possibly due to an unsecured lower pin moving out of the lugs.
In the picture of airlifting the recovered head, I believe the shaft is very apparent and the bell housing not fully apparent. I also believe the stress of taking the weight has sheared through the bell housing, perhaps ripping off under the bolted top flange.
Pure observation and speculation for which I am about to get heavily criticised....
My apologies to all involved in this tragedy for approaching this thread so coldly.

LastMinute

1st May 2016, 19:03

AIBN press release (http://www.aibn.no/About-us/Nyhetsarkiv/The-Helicopter-Accident-The-work-continues)

Pablo332

1st May 2016, 19:24

SLF3

1st May 2016, 19:48

Mitchaa,

That's one view. The fact right now is that just about every operator in the North Sea is losing money. The UKCS is one of the highest cost oil basins in the world. The average wage offshore is in excess of £60,000 a year: 1.5 times the UK average. Most people who think about it dispassionately, or who have worked internationally, find the UKCS cost base, work ethic, productivity and remuneration package (both onshore and offshore) a joke.

Over the last few years the UKCS, buffered by $100 oil, has not controlled its cost base. It has got fat (in many cases literally) and lazy. Safety (as a proxy for terms and conditions) has been a constant refrain. That now needs to change. The oil industry is not a registered charity with the likes of Wood Group employees as the primary beneficiary.

To survive, the UKCS has to take on the vested interests you seem to represent. If it doesn't, hone your decommissioning skills. There won't be anything else!

Greeny9

1st May 2016, 21:51

175 is 16 pax

ALTERNATIVES?

Fill in the blanks.

S-92 - ...a sheat and too expensive (impossible to take full fuel full pax) this is for this reason the 225 come back on fisrt place after the drop of oil barrel....

AW189 - ...the two of bristow was park and he don't use it (a sheat)

EC175 - ...certainly a alternative but limit to 14pax with "confort" but wait for svow certification

S-61 - ...a T-REX with a rotor

Mi-171 - ...WAHOOOUUUU

AW101 - ...A bad copy of NH-90 but why not why not 'depend of the price (a 225 is 23Meuros)

NH90 - ...Never certificate for civilian, you can buy 10 H175 with the price of 1 NH90

I read something about L2 (i don't know where) but Bond use 4 L2 for pax and 2 L2 for SAR... and i'm not surprised if the L2 return to flight during this week....

For the questions about the H215e the main gear box is the same of 332L1 or 332L2...

About the MGB of NH90 we don't talk about the same thing for the design and the size...

And for the return of 225 if this tragedy result of maintenance problem you see certainly again this aircraft in the sky of north sea because is certainly the more economic with the best performance...you can take off with full pax full fuel and with the additional tank (it was alone a this price).....Remember actually with the low price of barrel all the company search the services with Lowest cost....

budgie2007

1st May 2016, 22:10

SIN 3031-S-00

"Considering the additional information gathered during the last 48 hours, Airbus Helicopters’ decision, at this stage, is to not suspend flights of any nature for the EC225LP."

maeroda

1st May 2016, 22:11

I'm not sure operating in NS make mandatory to seat pax along emergency exits.

I think anything heavier then 12T and a DV of more than 22 is useless in OS.

AW189: are they in use for SAR, aren't they?
H175: as well as the 139, isn't too light to compete with a 9-10 ton class helicopter as the 225 is?

Spectral,

Why do you voice the AW189 to be a sheat (a merde en francois)??

And BTW if including the H175, why not the 139 (7 Ton) which is a well matured aircraft after 10+ years operational life and everybody flying and operating it is well use to his plus and minus?

Cheers

charlieDontSurf

1st May 2016, 22:44

That sounds like a engineering/tech related cause of the accident?
Why would they otherwise decide to not suspend flights in the 225 at this early stage after the accident?
I think it's strange to come with that kind of statement this early after such a disaster....
They must be 100% sure with that statement.

cteneto139

1st May 2016, 22:55

Airbus just has released a document releasing the aircraft for flight. Let us see what the Authorities will say about that...

OnePerRev

1st May 2016, 22:57

A way of stating confidence in the product without giving away any insight.

At this stage, people involved in the investigation have no doubt gotten a handle on what parts were present, missing, broken, etc.

The next questions are the hardest, establishing the "why", and the nature. Broken could be because it was weak by defect, fatigue, overload. But missing pieces tell a different story, and require different solution. In that sense, even if found to be 100% related to maintenance, it would not be unheard of to recommend a re-inspect to the existing criteria. Most operators would already be doing it on their own.

TipCap

1st May 2016, 22:57

I agree, CDS. Its a strange thing for Airbus to put out so early. I think something must have been found to make Airbus to put out that SIN so early

Impress to inflate

1st May 2016, 23:35

Mitchaa, a prefect post, your spot on with you comments, couldn't have said it better.

SLF3, I suggest you do A LOT more research and re-post your comment. I know for a fact that the UK isn't the highest cost base for offshore oil and gas, there's another part of the world were that price is at least twice and in some cases, three times the of the North Sea and it has a large oil and gas base. (A hint.....it's not Norway)

ITI

Pilot DAR

1st May 2016, 23:42

Referring only to the photos and drawings provided in this thread ('cause I know little about this type). The rod with the eye end can be seen projecting up behind the rotor blade. The eye end is obviously not connected to anything in the photo, and does not display damage [from separation].

The drawing, and photos in posts 200 & 212, show the transmission attaching rods, as they are installed. These rods show a connection from the top deck of the fuselage to the upper case of the transmission. They show that the eye end of the rod attaches to the transmission, while the fork end attaches to the deck.

If the photo of the rotor with the rod projecting up were showing us a disconnected transmission rod, the disconnection has happened at the transmission, because that's the end with the eye? If the rod had disconnected at the deck, we'd be seeing the fork end in the photo, if it were that rod?

If we are seeing the eye end of the transmission rod in the photo on the ground, that would mean that the rod got to that location with the transmission and deck, or there were two disconnects, and we are seeing only one end. But the chances that the rod disconnected at both ends, and then ended up there, seem extremely low to me. If that rod disconnected from the top of the transmission by force upon ground contact, having fallen with it, I would expect it to look much more damaged than it appears.

No speculation as to what happened on my part, just considering what appears to me in the photos. I would expect that the investigators have much more on this already, having more than we can see in the photo.

http://i86.servimg.com/u/f86/11/94/64/62/hub7b10.jpg

jimf671

1st May 2016, 23:49

ALTERNATIVES?

Fill in the blanks.

S-92 - ...a sheat and too expensive (impossible to take full fuel full pax) this is for this reason the 225 come back on fisrt place after the drop of oil barrel....

Doubts over MGB run-dry. Escape window sizes poor by modern standards. Noisiest thing in the sky (Captains' ears!). (Same fuel vs pax issue in SAR!)

AW189 - ...the two of bristow was park and he don't use it (a sheat)

Works for everyone except Bristow! Hmmm?

EC175 - ...certainly a alternative but limit to 14pax with "confort" but wait for svow certification

Some say too small but compared to what? ... 139? S-76?

S-61 - ...a T-REX with a rotor

Much loved around the O&G industry by all those who understand nothing about its performance!

Mi-171 - ...WAHOOOUUUU

AW101 - ...A bad copy of NH-90 but why not why not 'depend of the price (a 225 is 23Meuros)

NH90 - ...Never certificate for civilian, you can buy 10 H175 with the price of 1 NH90

I read something about L2 (i don't know where) but Bond use 4 L2 for pax and 2 L2 for SAR... and i'm not surprised if the L2 return to flight during this week....

For the questions about the H215e the main gear box is the same of 332L1 or 332L2...

About the MGB of NH90 we don't talk about the same thing for the design and the size...

And for the return of 225 if this tragedy result of maintenance problem you see certainly again this aircraft in the sky of north sea because is certainly the more economic with the best performance...you can take off with full pax full fuel and with the additional tank (it was alone a this price).....Remember actually with the low price of barrel all the company search the services with Lowest cost....

TylerMonkey

2nd May 2016, 01:15

I agree, the only possibility I can think of ( though hard to believe) is that the rod end we are seeing sticking up was attached until ground impact. The lower end (hidden) is the fork fitting and is jammed into the ground. The eye end punched out of its pin and clip assembly on impact. A straight sheer force from directly below might not deform the rod but hard to imagine all the variables lining up to produce this.
Neat that you noticed this ....

donut king

2nd May 2016, 04:05

Let's review that SIN. Only the 225LP is not grounded per Airbus. What about the 332 and 725?

Cyclic Hotline

2nd May 2016, 05:33

Who overhauled the components installed on this helicopter? Does Heli-One perform all this work for CHC, or is some of it performed by Airbus? Not that I suggest any particular relevance to this, just wondering?

Special 25

2nd May 2016, 05:44

"What about the 332 and 725?"

I think that AH statement on Friday only referred to the H225. Not sure if there was a later one.

The SIN does seem very unequivocal. But leaving aside deliberate sabotage or wilful misconduct, something that can go wrong, will go wrong. An engineering / maintenance error may likely still lead to some change either procedural or component design, to ensure there could never be a repetition.

At least it sounds as if we will be hearing more sooner rather than later. This uncertainly and speculation (by us as much as anyone) is doing no good to the industry or the shattered confidence of our passengers.

roundwego

2nd May 2016, 06:42

Airbus just has released a document releasing the aircraft for flight. Let us see what the Authorities will say about that...
The two Safety Information Notices regarding this accident issued by Airbus was distributed to operators of 332's and 225's, military and civil.

The first one carries no formal instruction to ground the aircraft. All it does is inform readers of the accident and "allies" Airbus with the decision to put all commercial 225 flights on hold. This cannot be construed as a technical grounding of the aircraft by Airbus.

The second SIN really says nothing more of any significance. My interpretation of it is that Airbus have so far found nothing which gives them any reason to suspend the Type Certificate of the aircraft for technical reasons but they "continue to stand by the decision of the Norwegian and UK authorities to put commercial EC225 flights on hold"

Over the last five years or so, there has been a subtle change in the oil and gas industry to move towards the military practice of grounding an aircraft type after an unexplained accident until such time the cause has been established and "cured". Civilian practice had always been (and still is in the fixed wing world) not to ground an aircraft until evidence has been found that there is an intrinsic airworthiness defect which is likely to affect other serial numbers of the same product.

Imagine the chaos in the air travel industry if Boing 737s were all grounded every time there was a fatal accident involving that type. It is only because of the high profile of the North Sea that the 225's have been grounded. Had this tragic accident happened to a EC 725 (a military version of the EC225) in Outer Mongolia, the North Sea 225s would still be flying.

Another consideration to take into account is the Contract conditions between the helicopter operator and the Oil & Gas customers. I suspect that if there is a mandatory grounding of the helicopter, the Customer may still be required to continue to pay any monthly standing charge. It is therefore in the helicopter operators' interest to persuade their aviation authority to ground the aircraft under these circumstances before the Customer has a chance to suspend the contract.

Irrespective of my thoughts on grounding protocols described above, my innermost thoughts are with the families of the deceased and those in the industry who have to deal with and live through the aftermath of this tragic accident. Very difficult times for you all.