View Full Version : Automation dependency stripped of political correctness.
I think the major point from both accidents is being lost in the technical argument.
The major point is "Fly the Aircraft" Its very nice to know the various control law logic of the Airbus FBW system, just as it is with modern Boeings. However, when the Sh*t hits the fan, fly the plane. If you sit with full back stick in, you're in trouble! In any aircraft, not just modern ones. If you don't know what the biggest control surface on the aircraft is doing then, again, you're in trouble! All this is very easy to say sat behind a computer on a bright sunny day however.
As for fully automated aircraft, show me a computer that can think on its feet in rapidly changing and dynamic situations. A computer that can control multiple failures, passenger problems, ATC issues, weather, failures of unmonitored systems (e.g. tailpipe fire, galley fires). When you can show me that, I will gladly hand in my licence. I will also never step foot on an aircraft again.
Is automation dependancy an issue? Yes, it most certainly is. However, more training is required, not to get rid of the pilots all together.
I will leave you with one final thought. Could we ever design a computer to match the performance of Sullenberger and his crew? I don't mean the landing itself, but could we design a computer that would weigh up all the odds and then make that decision to land in the Hudson? A decision the undoubtedly saved the lives of all 155 people on board that aircraft. My answer would be probably, one day. But not in my lifetime, and probably not for many lifetimes to come.
Tourist
2nd Feb 2016, 11:35
I will leave you with one final thought. Could we ever design a computer to match the performance of Sullenberger and his crew? I don't mean the landing itself, but could we design a computer that would weigh up all the odds and then make that decision to land in the Hudson? A decision the undoubtedly saved the lives of all 155 people on board that aircraft. My answer would be probably, one day. But not in my lifetime, and probably not for many lifetimes to come.
If you had made the tiny effort to read previous posts/links etc you would have found that we have all the required capabilities in aircraft already.
The other thing to think about is that the "not in my lifetime" argument is not very clever.
I know a lady who is 101 years old.
Imagine what anybody's answer to future tech questions would have been when she was 20?
The pace of technological change is accelerating, not linear.
We went from dope and cloth to Concorde/Space Shuttle in half a lifetime.
Guesses are just that/
Chris Scott
2nd Feb 2016, 11:50
Quote from Jonty:
"I think the major point from both accidents is being lost in the technical argument."
Not by me:
"Having said that, the PF's apparent inattention to pitch - particularly during the departure from cruise alt and the unsustainable climb-sequence - would be unlikely in a pilot that had regularly practised flying the same a/c level at cruise altitude with the AP and FD (and preferably the ATHR) off."
Quote from Tourist:
"If you had made the tiny effort to read previous posts/links etc you would have found that we have all the required capabilities in aircraft already."
Well, fancy that! And presumably you have the links at your fingertips? So, unless you want to alienate newcomers who have too much of a life to wade through 250-plus posts (a high proportion of which you wrote), perhaps you would be so kind as to provide the ones relevant to your latest put-down? :mad:
Tourist
2nd Feb 2016, 12:20
So, unless you want to alienate newcomers who have too much of a life to wade through 250-plus posts (a high proportion of which you wrote), perhaps you would be so kind as to provide the ones relevant to your latest put-down? :mad:
Nope, he can read, or not read. If he cannot be bothered to do a tiny bit of googling, I hold out little hope that evidence will persuade him anyway.
As you point out, I have indeed made more than my fair share of the posts. Perhaps others who want to contribute could make a similar effort to research before posting?
Chris Scott
2nd Feb 2016, 13:14
Yes, Tourist, I've only got about half-way so far, but it's evident that you've been a tour-de-force. Admirable, although your hard work is no doubt encouraged by your pursuit of an interesting agenda; one that is not, however, instantly popular in a forum for professional pilots.
Unfortunately, you cannot expect everyone else to apply themselves with comparable enthusiasm. And remember: right or wrong you are the heretic here, and therefore the burden of proof lies with you; even if that involves boring and patient repetition of your arguments, and the evidence that you use to support them.
Most readers coming to this thread could be forgiven for assuming that the main subject under discussion will be the effects of CURRENT automation on the handling and management skills of the existing pilot force, and how they might be mitigated right now.
Your advocacy of the fully-autonomous airliner at some time in the near or more-distant future is no doubt worthy of a thread all of its own.
Chris
Tourist
2nd Feb 2016, 14:25
Yes, you are correct, and I apologise. Had a bad day which is no excuse but I have now recovered my equilibrium.:O
donpizmeov, Tourist, Chris Scott
There is no stall in normal law and in alternate law there is no alpha prot or alpha Max but only Vsw. So in alternate law the speed brakes don't go in automatically. Also in alternate 2 if aircraft is pitched with insufficient thrust even with stick neutral aircraft will keep trimming back to maintain 1G till it stalls. If SS is kept full back it can drive THS to full.
In these accidents the starting point is unnecessary, extreme and bizarre application of flight control in longitudinal axis. If pilots had the knowledge that at those altitudes in alternate law full back stick is fatal they needn't have to know much more about laws.
Tourist
2nd Feb 2016, 15:57
villas
All this discussion of Airbus flight controls entirely misses the point.
If you hold the controls fully back in a Boeing and indeed almost any other aircraft, you will stall. If you keep them fully back you will stay stalled. This is also true in an Airbus in direct law.
The fact that an Airbus sometimes/usually saves you from yourself and when in direct law does not is hardly an indictment of the entire system.
The starting point of these accidents is pilot incompetence not flight control laws. The reasons for the pilot incompetence are a bigger question, however the aircraft would not have crashed if the pilots had just done nothing.
donpizmeov
2nd Feb 2016, 16:17
Villas,
Stall warning comes from angle of attack, not airspeed. This is why it still works with unreliable airspeed. Your V sw is really alpha SW.
The spoilers do auto retract, and the THS does stop trimming. Been on the BUS since 2003, it's always been the same. The THS trim stops and makes you have to apply pressure on the stick to maintain attitude to warn you of the low speed. If you keep pulling on the stick you then hear Stall Stall. If you Release the pressure, the attitude lowers and you accelerate. Hmmm...Think this was done on purpose? Have you ever wondered why stowing the speed brake comes so far down the stall recovery items?
I have never flown a mini bus, perhaps they behave a little differently.
Tourist I have been in agreement with you all along and changes to flight control laws because of blunders of pilots is like throwing the baby out with bath water.
donpizmeov
I am aware that not only Vsw in alternate law but Valpha prot and Valpha Max also are AOA from ADRs averaged and shown as speed. However when in Alt2 when low speed stability is lost as in case of two ADR fail the pitch down will not occur. But when it is available it happens as quoted below from A330 manual. In Alternate law Speed brakes won't retract in A320.
LOW SPEED STABILITY
At low speed, a nose down demand is introduced in reference to IAS, instead of angle of attack, and alternate law changes to direct law
Stone_cold
2nd Feb 2016, 19:11
Vilas , care to provide a reference to In Alternate law Speed brakes won't retract in A320 .
Two points I would make. One, according to professor Winfield, who specialises in artificial intelligence, we're as far away from human level congnative thinking in computers as we are from faster than light space travel.
Two, why would you want autonomous airliners? Saftey? Or cost? As for Saftey, it's mathamaticly proven that if something can happen, it will. No matter how much redundancy you build into a system it can and will fail. Cost? The cost of the flight crew is about a pint of beer on every fight ticket. Hardly going to be noticed by most people.
So the question I ask is what's the point? Fully automated, autonomous airliners will still crash, will still kill people. The reduction in cost will be quickly reversed by the added cost of system redundancy. Which will also fail.
And no, Tourist, I didn't read your 250+ posts on the topic. I'm sure they are very well researched, and you obviously have a passion for a full automated airliner of the future. However the overall argument of why you would want to go down that route has not been made. They will still crash, and the cost savings are negligible, if any.
Automation dependency is a very real and dangerous threat. How you go about mitigating that threat is what we should be taking about. Not immersing ourselves in a far off fantasy.
CONF iture
2nd Feb 2016, 22:53
The fact that an Airbus sometimes/usually saves you from yourself and when in direct law does not is hardly an indictment of the entire system.
We can only wish it would have switched to direct law and leave that insidious auto trim operation out of the equation ...
Either way, if you hold the stick back you stay stalled. I'm glad you find the necessity to use both hands in the Boeing reassuring.
I find the possibility to settle the Airbus in a fully developed stall hands off consterning.
donpizmeov
3rd Feb 2016, 04:00
OK465,
We turned ADR 2 and 3 off to get them into ALTN law.
Stone_cold
Out of the speed brake inhibition conditions mentioned below in DSC-27-10-20 P 11/20 D only one is applicable in alternate law i.e. thrust lever above MCT. So just by dropping speed below Vls they will not retract unless thrust levers are advanced. Stall recovery procedure asks you to check they are retracted.
Speed brake extension is inhibited, if:
-SEC1 and SEC3 both have faults, or
-An elevator (L or R) has a fault, or
-Angle-of-attack protection is active, or
-Flaps are in configuration FULL, or
-Thrust levers above MCT position, or
-Alpha Floor activation.
If an inhibition occurs when the speed brakes are extended, they automatically retract and remain retracted until the inhibition condition disappears and the pilots reset the lever. (The speed brakes can be extended again, 10 s or more after the lever is reset).
Stone_cold
3rd Feb 2016, 06:52
Vilas ,
I am quite aware of the FCOM reference , hence my request . Your statement , without any qualification , said that the speedbrakes don't retract in alternate law . As you now state there is one case where the selecting TOGA( or above MCT ) will retract the speedbrakes , regardless of the current law .
Unreliable speed and GPWS recoveries also require one to check speedbrake retracted .
Vilas ,
I am quite aware of the FCOM reference , hence my request . Your statement , without any qualification , said that the speedbrakes don't retract in alternate law . As you now state there is one case where the selecting TOGA( or above MCT ) will retract the speedbrakes , regardless of the current law .
Unreliable speed and GPWS recoveries also require one to check speedbrake retracted . my post was related to Donpizmeov he hadn't referred to thrust lever position.
Have FBW a/c become too complicated for their own good? There is much talk about the pilot being detached from the a/c in modern automation, and hence the concern about automation dependancy. This discussion has focused on improving manual skills to counter this. In these latest threads it seems the detachment from the a/c could be because of over complication about what it is going to do and when. Surely it is 'too much' to have a pilot in a non-normal situation, with all the associated stresses, where the pilot is unsure of what flight control system will do what and with what limitations. Surely, in a non-normal scenario things should be as simple and as basic as possible.
I admit I am not an AB pilot. I apologise if I've missed something, but there does seem an unresolved debate amongst the AB crews about what is correct in these various scenarios.
Is that healthy, or have the design engineers, inadvertently, squeezed the pilot out of the loop at a time when they need to be 'on top of it all'? If that is true, my concern is it will get worse before it gets better. What is on the drawing board now that we, the pilots, have no idea about? I'm not sure manufacturer's test pilots are the best to judge what is the best design for the average line pilot.
RVF750
3rd Feb 2016, 09:00
Totally agree RAT5.
The thing about a Boeing is you can see clearly what the other guy is doing because your yolk moves too. Whatever mode it is in it will appear to behave like an airplane, pure and simple. Predictable and simple. Many of us like this.
KISS is a powerful safety aid.
The differing modes and laws in an AB complicate at a time when you need to keep it simple. This is undeniable. What's it doing now, what law is it in? Will it help or not? Discussions like this at critical edge of envelope times are not ideal.....
donpizmeov
3rd Feb 2016, 09:08
Vilas,
We were simulating at stall in level flight at 5000 feet. The levers were at idle. Auto trim worked until well into VLS but stopped well before Vsw (Alpha SW) on both the 380 and 330. The speed brakes auto retracted once we entered VLS in both the 380 and the 330. I don't know how else to explain it.
As I said, I have no clue if the mini buses behave differently.
donpizmeov
3rd Feb 2016, 09:12
RVF750,
Seeing the yoke move did not save Turkish (737 stall), Flash airlines (737 loss of control) nor Ethiopian (737 loss of control).
When the pilot is not up to the job, it does matter how simple it is.
The bus is just another aeroplane. But with better seats.
Tourist
3rd Feb 2016, 10:30
I think that it is probably correct to say that an Airbus is more tricky for the pilots once out of normal law than a Boeing is.
This is reasonable, because suddenly not only do you have a problem, but your aircraft suddenly changed a bit and all your natural responses are not quite right any more.
That is not the whole story though, is it.
Accident statistics show that Boeing and Airbus are each as safe as each other, which can only mean that whilst the systems in an Airbus are actually working, the Airbus is safer to offset the Boeing advantage once non-normal.
That would suggest that if you can make the automatics more reliable, the Airbus wold be the safest?
Since the Airbus systems are frankly archaic, that should not be too hard.
alf5071h
3rd Feb 2016, 11:51
AF447 has been, and continues to be debated with polarising views between man and machine.
Many posts reflect the difficulties in avoiding hindsight bias and the need for systems thinking, whereby complex interactions in accidents appear simpler to explain via individual contributors, and thus each becomes a basis for a solution. Often there is focus on the actual event, overlooking the hidden, latent precursors.
Life, aviation, and accidents are rarely simple. Accidents involve many contributing factors, each necessary, but where none in isolation may be sufficient to cause it.
A bold reversal of the latter is that no one factor will be assured of preventing future accident with the degree of certainty often stated.
We have a natural dislike of uncertainty and complexity, which can lead to inaccurate simplifications. Modern safety initiatives seek to manage this; the need to change the way we think about safety, the role of the human, what is error, operational expectations vs actually, and the ability to learn from accidents, incidents and events.
Such a change requires us to accept that nothing is certain, and how individually and collectively we might manage uncertainty. Rarely can we identify a single dominating (proven) factor in accidents; alternatively groups or patterns of contributions might indicate areas of interest according to viewpoint.
Safety improvements reside in what can be learnt and applied; a reactive start, seeking proactive improvement. This requires all management levels to be involved, regulator, operator, pilot.
Everyone should have something to learn - what if, why. Questions are easy to think of, but not so easy pose in context, with prior consideration of what is meaningful in operations. Also, a bottom up approach, where pilots question operators, operators question regulators, may be time consuming, and against the flow of safety management.
Alternatively, a top down approach could provide greater benefit where the regulator / operator consider what is ‘meaningful’ according the front line actors.
Safety in an industry often reflects its management – it regulation.
The thought examples in http://www.pprune.org/9242725-post116.html #116 do not seek agreement or otherwise – contributors or solutions – each depends on viewpoint, context, mind-set, but if they do relate to current operations then they could be the basis of safety improvement.
Each of us needs to challenge and provoke our beliefs, where these thoughts might collectively (all of us) provide some insight of what is required. The outcome might only require small, well-reasoned and affordable changes, spanning many subjects, but remembering that uncertainty reigns, it necessitates judgement.
What might we learn?
LlamaFarmer
3rd Feb 2016, 12:08
RVF750,
Seeing the yoke move did not save Turkish (737 stall), Flash airlines (737 loss of control) nor Ethiopian (737 loss of control).
When the pilot is not up to the job, it does matter how simple it is.
The bus is just another aeroplane. But with better seats.
There are numerous incidents where bus pilots have made dual inputs.
Yes there is the procedure to use sidestick priority until full handover of controls is complete, but in the heat of the moment, particularly if not particularly experienced on Airbus, it's not the most naturally intuitive.
With all the magic in an Airbus I don't see why they couldn't have linked controls so you can feel or see what is happening to the stick and so would prevent the control conflict.
donpizmeov
I am not trying to prove you wrong but I am trying to understand the protection. Speed brakes will retract if low speed stability is available but I am talking about alternate2 with low speed stability not available. I am quoting below from A330 FCOM which says same thing as A320:
SPEEDBRAKE CONTROL
The pilot controls the speed brakes with the speed brake control lever. The speed brakes involve
spoilers 1 to 6. Speed brake extension is inhibited, if:
‐ Maneuver Load Alleviation (MLA) is activated
‐ Angle-of-attack protection is active
‐ Low speed stability is active
‐ At least one thrust lever above MCT
‐ Alpha floor is activated.
If an inhibition occurs when the speed brakes are extended, they automatically retract and stay retracted until the inhibition condition disappears, and the pilot resets the lever.
donpizmeov
3rd Feb 2016, 14:33
This was demonstrated to me when I did my command a bit over a decade ago. Still works now.
When you apply speed brake you increase VLS and Vsw (alpha SW). By lowering the speed brake you get more lift quicker than taking flap. If they didn't auto retract, the getting rid of the speed brakes would be one of the first actions of the stall recovery. But it's not even considered until you are out of the stall and have added thrust. Have you ever why?
The point being also, that if you need to hold pressure on the stick to maintain attitude in ALTN law, you are at very low speed and should be doing something about it.
Have FBW a/c become too complicated, for their own good?. . .
I admit I am not an AB pilot. I apologise if I've missed something, but there does seem an unresolved debate amongst the AB crews about what is correct in these various scenarios. . . . All aircraft long ago became too complicated such that pilots could know everything about the aircraft. The L1011 was an exceedingly complex aircraft, very sophisticated for its time, particularly the -500. Whether it is good or not is another question, which I think may be answered in part by the accident rate since true automation was introduced in the mid-eighties, (B767, A320, etc.), which see below.
FBW of course is just another way of moving flight controls, with the additional requirement of feedback and the quality of "gain".
"Protections" are an entirely different matter, made possible by digital flight control. FBW and protections aren't separate but FBW itself (C*) is not "protection".
In the failure cases where various inputs for protections are no longer valid there has to be a way of maintaining pilot control over the aircraft.
This may seem like stating the obvious and perhaps it is, but sometimes the two can be conflated which can lead to incorrect conclusions. FBW itself, will still stall an aircraft just like any other design. How graceful the reversion is, is a matter of design, and obviously opinion! I can say that in the sim, such reversions are non-events.
The Airbus is a complicated aircraft and so is the B777, more particularly, the B787 which is FBW with protections. All this we know. The "nodes" of the discussion regarding the Airbus revolved around AF447, specifically Alternate Law behaviour, (not around the AirAsia accident however; pulling flight control CBs in-flight is strictly forbidden). The point has been made many times, that thirty-one other crews encountered a UAS event and wrote it up in the logbook. It simply isn't/wasn't an emergency. The ensuing at-length discussion generated by AF447 has however, highlighted the Airbus, in particular those extremely rare circumstances which, like other designs, occur as anticipated, with a rarity approaching 10^-9 or so. The millions of hours of successful, unremarkable flight, though silent, perhaps tells us that concern over autoflight systems (and the 'unresolved debate' matter), may be disproportionate to the reality. Everyone just gets on with flying the airplane they're on, A or B.
In response to your question/observation regarding unresolved debates, part of this is due to not knowing the aircraft well enough or at all, part of it has to do with mythology, prejudice & politics and part has to do with a genuine concern by those who really know their stuff and still have questions regarding some design features, (two of which have been mentioned in the thread - THS movement continuing during stall & silent stall warning with NCD). These aircraft, (present Boeing and Airbus) are all far too complex for any one person or the pilots themselves, to absorb and retain. Normal flight operations occurs 99%+ of the time for all types.
The statistical record, maintained by Boeing (http://www.boeing.com/assets/pdf/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf) since 1959, speaks to the question regarding complexity and competency - neither design (A/B) are "way out in front". However, the A319/A320/A321 series' hull-loss-fatal-accident rates is slightly lower that the equivalent-type, B737 rates, (per million departures).
Tourist
3rd Feb 2016, 18:10
FDMII
Thank you for an excellent informative post.
NorthernKestrel
4th Feb 2016, 08:25
A very interesting debate here on automation/autonomy from a Royal Aeronautical Society 150th anniversary event last month...
"This House believes there will be no need for pilots 40 years from now”
Royal Aeronautical Society | Podcast | Black Tie Debate (http://aerosociety.com/news/Podcast/4027/Black-Tie-Debate)
Some great speakers and stimulating discussion...
NorthernKestrel, many thanks for posting this!
Tourist, thank you for your kind response.
Tourist
10th Feb 2016, 13:24
and so it begins.....
Legal breakthrough for Google's self-driving car - BBC News (http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35539028)
Google's self-driving car system could soon be given the same legal definition as a human driver, paving the way for vehicles without steering wheels or pedals.
The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) - which sets rules and regulations on America's roads - shared its thoughts in a letter to Google made public this week.
Until now, any car without a human driver would not be considered roadworthy.
However, in light of technological advancements, the NHTSA has changed its perspective.
"If no human occupant of the vehicle can actually drive the vehicle, it is more reasonable to identify the driver as whatever (as opposed to whoever) is doing the driving," it said.
"In this instance, an item of motor vehicle equipment, the Self-Driving System, is actually driving the vehicle."
Google boost
It means Google's self-driving pod, which has no typical in-car controls, is one crucial step closer to being allowed on public roads.
With the NHTSA's blessing, the car now fits the key criteria required to pass the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards test.
Capn Bloggs
11th Feb 2016, 04:20
Until now, any car without a human driver would not be considered roadworthy.
Geez, ya don't say??
Drove down my street yesterday (one lane either side of CL). Parked cars on the left curb and a little further down on the right curb. Saw car coming in the distance (200m), opposite direction. He was just "ahead" of me "in the sequence" so I slowed down to a crawl to let him weave between the parked cars first.
Then I thought of the nerds who design driverless cars. How would they program their cars to handle that situation? :cool:
Tourist
11th Feb 2016, 04:31
Bloggs
Well, you managed.....:rolleyes:
Tourist
11th Feb 2016, 04:34
"Nerds" managed to design a spacecraft that flew to a comet which we didn't know what would look like or what would be made of and then landed on it without human input after 10 years in space.
I think they might manage that tricky dilemma.
Jonty
11th Feb 2016, 06:31
So "nerds" designed a machine to do nothing for 10 years, then land on a rock with absolutely nothing else around to hit, but that rock.
That machine then crashed into that rock, and humans had to intervene to move said machine so it would work. Even that intervention only lasted for a matter of hours before said machine ran out of power and died.
While not wanting to take away from the complexity and success of that mission, its hardly a ringing endorsement of computer automation.
Tourist, while undoubtedly fully autonomous airliners are possible at some point in the future, it's not going to be anytime soon. No matter how much you jump up and down about it. It seems most of the experts agree we are a long, long way from achieving that level of automation.
As for the Google car, they are squaring the circle of who are you going to sue when it all goes wrong and someone gets killed. In this case, it's now Google. Hardly a huge technological sptep forward.
Capn Bloggs
11th Feb 2016, 06:50
We better not mention the Mars landing err arrival. "Did you say inches, Sir?!" Go the nerds... :}
riff_raff
12th Feb 2016, 05:18
"We better not mention the Mars landing err arrival. "Did you say inches, Sir?!" Go the nerds..."
Every one of the spacecraft systems that successfully landed men on the lunar surface and returned them safely to Earth was designed using inches and pounds. The Viking probes that were first to safely land on the surface of Mars, as well as the rockets that launched them, were also designed using inches and pounds.
I just laugh every time I hear claims of how superior the metric system supposedly is. History proves otherwise. :ok:
Jonty
12th Feb 2016, 06:32
I think the point is, that even superhuman "nerds" who can supposedly design a computer to do anything, can also screwup over something as simple as which unit of measurement to use.
Not that one unit is better than another.
You should come to the UK where we use a mixture of everything, it's a right ball ache!
LlamaFarmer
12th Feb 2016, 07:54
"Nerds" managed to design a spacecraft that flew to a comet which we didn't know what would look like or what would be made of and then landed on it without human input after 10 years in space.
I think they might manage that tricky dilemma.
The road opposite mine is a main bus route. It is also a main residential road. Kerb to kerb it is less than 4 cars wide.
There is marked parking all along one kerb, and about 30% of the other kerb is double yellow, so 70% of it is full of cars.
As a result you can just about squeeze two cars past each other, but not a car and a bus.
The other day two buses came head to head with no room to let the other past, and within 20 seconds a big queue of cars formed behind both buses... I could see this happening about 300m away as I was walking to the shops.
By the time I walked past the buses a few minutes later there was a solid line of probably 80 cars behind them, and nobody was able to reverse backwards because there were cars constantly adding to this stream of queuing traffic.
By the time I was walking back past it half an hour later several police cars had shut the road at both ends to stop more cars joining, and had started turning traffic around in both directions behind the buses. Said to one of the cops as I was walking past how I was amazed it doesn't happen more often, and he said it was the third time this month that he had to come and sort it out (numerous other times where he wasn't the one to turn up and resolve it)
How would automated cars deal with a situation like that, how would they follow police instruction, or know to reverse backwards to allow more room for others to move back?
Capn Bloggs
12th Feb 2016, 08:06
I just laugh every time I hear claims of how superior the metric system supposedly is.
Missed the point. That particular stuffup was because the left hand used metric while the right hand thought they'd used imperial (or American Fine?). Hopefully the same mistake won't be made by the experts designing the Goooogle self-flying 'plane. ;)
riff_raff
14th Feb 2016, 01:09
Capn,
No, I didn't miss the point. I have worked on a couple NASA programs that involved working with engineering groups in Russia, Italy and Japan. There were different units of measure used, there were different engineering standards used, there were different material standards used, and there were different languages. Did not have the type of issue described on any of these projects.
While working with the Russians on one NASA program, every document we supplied to them was translated and converted to ISO. But the engineering documents we received from them were just copies of their originals that we had to translate and convert ourselves. NASA management did not completely trust the data supplied by the Russians, and I recall spending a couple weeks creating a digital analysis model from their documentation to verify its accuracy.