BA 777 on fire in Las Vegas [Archive] - Page 2

wiggy

10th Sep 2015, 04:59

Airbubba

Some airlines have the FO do the reject if he or she was the pilot flying and then hand the plane over to the PIC when stopped as seems the case with BA. Others have the captain always take control immediately when the reject is announced.

At BA can any of the flight deck crew members call a rejected takeoff?

At BA the captain can call "stop" for any reason if he/she sees fit, the co-pilot has a list of things he/she can call stop for, mainly but not exclusively the really critical stuff such as engine failures or any fires. Any extra pilots on the flight deck are usually briefed to call out anything abnormal they think the operating pilots have missed, but according to the Ops Manual are never supposed to use the "stop" word........ :oh:

Whoever is handling stops the aircraft, handover to the captain (if needed) is done after the parking brake is applied.

As for recall/memory items in the QRH ...yes you're right, much reduced and rationalised over the years (and yes, in our case the move has indeed been to junk legacy procedures and align with those published by Boeing/Airbus. ). FWIW the evac checklist is now meant to be a "read and do" if circumstances permit.

msbbarratt

10th Sep 2015, 06:08

D Bru quoted in post #188,

"This AD was prompted by cracks discovered on one HPCR 8-10 spool between the 9-10 stages in the weld joint. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane".

"Request
Two commenters, General Electric Company and The Boeing Company, requested that we remove the ''Unsafe Condition'' paragraph from the AD, and reword the Summary section to resemble the Summary section of AD 2002-04-11. The commenters stated that, by their analyses, cracks in the weld joint would not develop into an uncontained failure. The commenters stated that HPCR 8-10 stage spools, P/Ns 1844M90G01 and 1844M90G02, be inspected by an enhanced inspection, similar to those parts covered in AD 2002-04-11.

Answer
We do not agree. AD 2002-04-11 was issued because of additional focused inspection procedures that had been developed by the manufacturer. Because cracks were discovered on one HPCR 8-10 spool between the 9-10 stages in the weld joint, this unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. The unsafe condition could result in failure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane. We determined that this unsafe condition requires mandatory repetitive inspections for cracks. We did not change the AD." On the safe assumption that BA complied with this AD, and presuming that this incident is related to the aforementioned cracks, could this spell big trouble in the near future for the operators and GE?

After all, if the upcoming investigation finds that HPCR 8-10 has indeed failed and had been inspected as required one would have to conclude that the inspection regime is inadequate. Short of inspecting prior to each engine start, presumably the only other option is an actual design change / replacement before any further flights. Might that not result in a large number of grounded aircraft? Admittedly this is all wild speculation on my un-informed part...

ChrisVJ

10th Sep 2015, 06:39

This afternoon a sailboat burned in English Bay after a battery fire. It burned fast and furious and even after the fireboat arrived and dump a load of water on it it literally burned to the waterline.

In the Vegas pictures you can see they got the flames out just before they breached the fuselage in the wing root area.

Make one wonder slightly about the fire resistance of a 787.

Walnut

10th Sep 2015, 06:56

If this failure is indeed found to be caused by a crack in one of the combustion cans, a failure as highlighted by the current AD and the need for enhanced inspections, then this is very similar to the MAN 737 incident. That incident became a major tragedy as the application of reverse thrust put more fuel into an already failed engine. The blow torch effect of deflected gasses burnt through the fuselage.
Should consideration be given to the non application of reverse power in a STOP situation where it is obvious the a/c will stop on the paved surface. I suspect the 777 incident burnt at the wing root because of hot deflected gases from the reverse system

wiggy

10th Sep 2015, 07:01

Should consideration be given to the non application of reverse power in a STOP situation where it is obvious the a/c will stop on the paved surface. I suspect the 777 incident burnt at the wing root because of hot deflected gases from the reverse system

Problem is defining/appreciating in the heat of the moment "where it is obvious the a/c will stop on the paved surface.......", a rejected take-off is not really a manoeuvre where's there's a lot of time for analysis or finessing (IMHO because in the simulator that's been my experience but then again I'm a bear with a small brain)

If it helps though there's already a caveat in the 777 procedure that for the rejected take-off manoeuvre it's reverse idle only at lower speeds (possibly operator defined).

atpcliff

10th Sep 2015, 07:03

"Following an RTO, well-trained flight crew are educated to ensure the park brake is set, the reverser(s) is/are stowed and clear handover of control is given to the captain, if the FO was flying the aircraft (unsure in this instance who's sector it was)."

I have been trained by 3 U.S. airlines. All of them required the Capt to make the reject decision and conduct the reject. It is the FOs job to ensure positive transfer of control to the Capt, and then call the tower ASAPractical. So, transfer of control would have been completed well prior to the aircraft getting stopped, if completing this (U.S. standard?) procedure.

I just checked our Evac Checklist just to make sure: No mention of thrust reversers.

Our Cabin Crew can initiate an evacuation on their own, if necessary.

Most U.S.airlines don't have hats (mine doesn't)...one less thing to worry about during evac.

Re memory items: about a year ago my airline ended them. Instead of memory items we have a "Quick Reference Checklist" which has all of the former memory items on one card: We read off the card and perform the steps on the checklist.

It sounds like U.S. carriers do it differently than euro carriers.

AtomKraft

10th Sep 2015, 07:12

Walnut.
They won't permit a pilot to decide that 'it's obvious' that there will be enough runway to stop. That implies airmanship.

Otherwise, I think it's a good point.

wongsuzie

10th Sep 2015, 08:05

No one seems to have yet noted that the starboard engine was not shut down at the time the evacuation began. The engine exhaust can be seen to be blowing smoke behind the plane in those videos that are taken from the port side

There is no way this crew would have called an evac with left over engine still running.

highflyer40

10th Sep 2015, 08:13

This incident appears to have happened somewhere between 50-80KTS so reversers wouldn't have been used.

highflyer40

10th Sep 2015, 08:16

ATP - at BA either pilot can call stop. The pilot flying maintains control (whoever that may be) until stopped and parking brake set. Then the captain takes control.

wiggy

10th Sep 2015, 08:16

highflyer

This incident appears to have happened somewhere between 50-80KTS so reversers wouldn't have been used.

If operated i.a.w. the 777 SOPs/Ops Manual reverse idle (at the very least) will have been selected...

aox

10th Sep 2015, 08:48

I must say that it has been time consuming & painful to wade through 14 pages where 80% or so of the posts have been about cabin baggage, etc, while trying to weed out the technical information. Perhaps it is time for two separate threads?

Well, I'm going to risk adding to your annoyance by pointing out that this issue is being reported, so at least there are chances public awareness may tend to increase.

The fury over 'hand luggage' plane evacuees - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-34191035)

BA plane fire: Pilots condemn the passengers who carried baggage from burning aircraft - Americas - World - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ba-plane-fire-pilots-condemn-passengers-who-carried-baggage-from-burning-aircraft-10493667.html)

There will be some people for whom passenger behaviour in an emergency is a technical subject though.

Volume

10th Sep 2015, 09:39

it's worth mentioning again how the 787 might behave in this particular scenarioIt will behave better. A short and intensive fire is better contained/survived by gradually burning composites than by spontaniously melting aluminum. If a fire burns longer, toxic products from the hot inner surface may become a serious issue, but actual penetration resistance should still be higher.
If you want to be really safe, fly the A380 and sit in an area where the fuselage is made from Glare, it meets the criteria required for firewalls...

tatelyle

10th Sep 2015, 09:41

Looking at this enhanced image of the inboard cowl, I see damage, but I don't see any holes in it. Does anyone have a better image of the inboard cowl?

http://imageshack.com/a/img910/9426/6GUFIU.jpg

Basil

10th Sep 2015, 09:52

aox, Like the cartoon in your BBC link.

http://ichef-1.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/4C27/production/_85459491_cartoonplane.jpg

er, Chris, that's a transgender hostie doing the demo, right?

AirScrew

10th Sep 2015, 09:55

MrSnuggles

10th Sep 2015, 09:59

A picture from early in the sequence (linked from The Guardian). No slides deployed, no emergency vehicles yet, so probably just some few seconds after coming to a halt.

http://www.independent.co.uk/incoming/article10492553.ece/alternates/w1024/british-airways-3.jpg

1) The left engine is clearly visible.

2) Fire is most pronounced in the wing root area.

3) Wind is blowing into the cabin.

4) Smoke is hugging the airplane all around, at the wing root level.

I sure would prefer to be in a 777 if I ever was in an incident. That plane is a mean bugger in the best sense!

Biggles1957

10th Sep 2015, 10:55

Interesting quote from the captain reported by the NBC/BBC*:
Mr Henkey told NBC: "There was a loud bang and the aircraft sort of veered to the left. Because we had a third pilot he actually opened the door and went down into the cabin, saw how serious it was."
* British Airways fire pilot: 'I'm finished flying' - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34206347)

Volume

10th Sep 2015, 10:57

I see damage, but I don't see any holes in it. For composites it is always hard to tell the difference between severe heat/fire damage and real penetration. Once the resin has burned, the fibres are hanging down in rags...
Seems to be more fire on the wing than the engine.
How is the fuel pipe routed on a 777? Where are the pumps located? Could this have been a major fuel system leak instead of an engine fire?
What puzzles me most is not the inboard location of the fire (fuel will run down a penetrated lower wing skin and accumulate there) but the far forward location. For sure fuel does not flow uphill... Is the nose down attitude on ground enough to have fuel running down a lower wing skin running forward inside the wing to fuselage fairing?

The fuel tanks could have exploded? Most probably not, there was not enough oxygen available for that as the tanks have been well filled. Almost empty tanks may explode, not almost full ones.

typhoid

10th Sep 2015, 10:58

Should consideration be given to the non application of reverse power in a STOP situation where it is obvious the a/c will stop on the paved surface. I suspect the 777 incident burnt at the wing root because of hot deflected gases from the reverse system

Modern thrust reversers only reverse the bypass air, not the core flow. i.e. cold air that has not been used in combustion. This was not the case on the v low bypass 737 engine at MAN.

bnt

10th Sep 2015, 11:05

The pilot on this flight was literally one return trip away from retirement, so it's understandable that after this he's just decided "that'll do" (BBC News story (http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34206347)).

On the topic of cabin baggage: I'm flying DUB-BOS-JAX tomorrow, returning the same way 2 weeks later. I will have my wallet and essential docs in jacket pockets. The jacket will be in the overhead locker, and if I need to evacuate, I'll grab my jacket only. I understand the "grab nothing" concept, but compared to the hassle of being stuck in a foreign country with nothing but the clothes on my back, I'll risk extra second or three it takes to grab my jacket on the way out the door. I won't be obstructing anyone else in the process.

stagger

10th Sep 2015, 11:13

Here's an image I don't think has been posted yet.

Are those curved marks in the charred area at the bottom damage from debris penetration?

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/COe-lfVUEAEThuu.jpg:large

PhoenixDaCat

10th Sep 2015, 11:15

They're slating the pax who exited with luggage on the Jeremy Vine show on Radio 2 right now, so at least a few million people will be made aware of the issue now.

blue_ashy

10th Sep 2015, 11:18

After seeing better pictures, the fan turbine blades look fully intact but the cowling is completely ruined which seemingly points to a failure within the compressor and subsequent uncontained failure.

We can draw quite a few comparisons here to the AA 767-200 that burst into flames at LAX. ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 767-223ER N330AA Los Angeles International Airport, CA (LAX) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20060602-0)

It would be interesting if any recent engine related incidents related to surge, vibration etc had been reported on this aircraft.

golfyankeesierra

10th Sep 2015, 11:18

Did anyone post a metar yet?
The flames and smoke were engulfing the hull and that creates the same hazards as the BA Manchester accident.
Wonder whether it was a result of (high pressure) fuel spray in the direction of the plane or a crosswind.
We are trained to consider wind direction in case of fire after a RTO and frankly it is very hard to maneuver a heavy plane on a 45m wide runway into (or away from) the wind but the pictures again show how a fire on the wing easily eats at the airplane.

golfyankeesierra

10th Sep 2015, 11:26

Sorry, found it already on ASN. Takeoff reported to be at 1612Z so not much of a crosswind.
Still, next profcheck the wind will be on my mind more then before (when we usually get exactly the same scenario).

copy/paste from ASN (they only mixed up UTC/local):
15:56 UTC / 22:56 local time:
KLAS 082256Z 00000KT 10SM SCT130 SCT180 38/05 A2982 RMK AO2 SLP067 ACC SE T03830050
16:31 UTC / 23:31 local time:
KLAS 082331Z 34008KT 10SM FEW130 SCT180 39/05 A2981 RMK AO2 T03890050

Mapleflot

10th Sep 2015, 11:34

If the industry is enthusiastically encouraging pax to keep luggage with them - reinforced by financial penalty for checking-in hold luggage - we cannot then complain when they take their full permitted quota into the cabin with them.

On the other hand, putting that baggage in the hold... will probably mean more cheap bad quality consumer Lithium batteries ending up there where they can't be stomped on when necessary. Just something that crossed my mind. Maybe the stats on this are not that strong. But the huge increase in cabin baggage (and corresponding reduction in hold check-ins) seems to be simultaneous with the increase in cheap Lithium batteries being carried by all and sundry.

portmanteau

10th Sep 2015, 11:38

airscrew, we mustnt get into another once -in- a- blue moon knee-jerk must -do- something situ like two -pilots -on- the flight -deck. that said I am surprised nay staggered that BA allows 46kg repeat 46kg cabin baggage per adult and per child. am just wondering how you get such weight into one bag no bigger than 45x36x20 cm and another no bigger than 56x45x25 cm.

Sober Lark

10th Sep 2015, 11:39

Check out pictures of the evacuation of the Twin Towers and most are carrying briefcases / handbags etc. It seems to be a natural reaction and perhaps it can't be prevented?

glad rag

10th Sep 2015, 11:41

http://img903.imageshack.us/img903/879/FYQqWf.jpg[IMG]http://www.pprune.org/<a href=http://imageshack.com/i/p3FYQqWfj target=_blank>http://img903.imageshack.us/img903/879/FYQqWf.jpghttp://yfrog.com/p3FYQqWfj

Whew, that was a close call, I do hope the aircraft was evacuated before the fire broke through into the cargo/underfloor area...

bbrown1664

10th Sep 2015, 11:56

Check out pictures of the evacuation of the Twin Towers and most are carrying briefcases / handbags etc. It seems to be a natural reaction and perhaps it can't be prevented?

Many of the people evacuating there were still on their way into work so didn't stop to pick up their cases etc.

Another scenario to give to people would be Manchester. How many of the victims there would still be alive today of they had a few more seconds to get out the door? Many people died there because of smoke inhalation just seconds from the door. I am in no way saying that baggage was to blame on that one but pointing out a few seconds delay because a bozo (or 20) in front of you decide to go to the overhead to retrieve something can make all the difference.

If your that worried about your passport etc, keep them in your pocket. If you want to keep them in your jacket pocket you should make a choice. Leave the jacket on until after TO and then put it in the locker or leave it behind and get the hell off the aircraft without slowing anyone else down.

Final option for those that want to take their bags is to wait until EVERYONE else is off the plane before you go to the locker.

PAXboy

10th Sep 2015, 12:10

Whilst bean counters might like the revenue of baggage - the trend for large carry-ons started 25+ years before charging started in earnest.

Following the 1980s deregulation, carriers implemented Hub-and-Spoke. Many pax found that they made the Hub connection - but their bags did not. So they did the obvious thing and started carrying on ever more baggage.

Later, this was 'monetised' but only because the practise was already established. So the carriers did start this but not because of charging pax for baggage. History is all.

Walnut

10th Sep 2015, 12:36

Typhoid suggested that modern reverse systems only deflect the cold bypass air. I agree However the STOP actions will require the throttles being closed and then placed in the idle reverse position. This will ready the engine for a reverse power application if needed. I suspect a combustion chamber split on the inboard side of the engine causing a fire which was diverted into the fuselage by fortunately a low power steam of fan air. They were lucky, the 9 secs to stop the a/c plus a bit of thinking time before the fuel was cut off was enough to cause such major damage.

Volume

10th Sep 2015, 12:59

...and to make it looking more dramatic, the use the poorly aligned picture taken by a pax in panic, cut off the ground, so it looks like the aircraft is sitting on its nose with the NLG failed...
What a load of :mad:

etrang

10th Sep 2015, 13:23

BA are one of the few airlines that allow a 23kg cabin bag. Other "national carriers" allow 7kg.

Most carriers only allow 7kg cabin bags. If BA really does allow 23kg it should be passengers suing BA for endangering the pax, not the other way round.

KTF

10th Sep 2015, 13:28

Its here in black and white: Hand baggage allowances | Baggage essentials | British Airways (http://www.britishairways.com/en-gb/information/baggage-essentials/hand-baggage-allowances)

strake

10th Sep 2015, 13:52

There does appear to be quite some hysteria surrounding the baggage issue.
Firstly, apart from a couple of instances, in the published images the bags are small or laptop size. Secondly and this will ring true with any frequent airline traveler (as opposed to 'armchair experts'), there is no way that a group of passengers evacuating in an emergency are going to stand patiently while someone fumbles around in or indeed even attempts to open an overhead bin. The reality, as shown in all the reporting, is there were no problems. Flight crew, cabin crew and passengers all dealt with the emergency using training and common sense and walked away. The real issue is why the engine caused an uncontained explosion and fire. I guess we'll find out in about six months.

infrequentflyer789

10th Sep 2015, 13:54

Well, I'm going to risk adding to your annoyance by pointing out that this issue is being reported, so at least there are chances public awareness may tend to increase.

The opposite side of the story is also starting to get out, as it has in previous incidents: Passengers stranded after plane fire - Story | Southern Nevada - Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, Henderson, Boulder City | LasVegasNow | KLAS-TV (http://www.lasvegasnow.com/news/passengers-stranded-after-plane-fire)

Read that as "passengers who followed the rules stranded", because that is what it is. This isn't just an airline problem, it involves immigration, airports etc., trouble is that just allows everyone to disclaim responsibility for the problem (get incarcerated in immigration due to not having documents - not the airlines fault - if it is because your plane crashed, well that isn't immigration's fault...). Until the industry as a whole gets together to resolve the problem, the system will continue to effectively punish those who obey instructions and follow the rules (by failing to mitigate or compensate for the entirely predictable consequences of doing so), and reward those who don't. It doesn't take an expert in behavioural science to predict what people do as a result.

As an aside, as someone who is starting to need medication to stay alive, the medication issue is interesting. Guess where all the medical advice says to keep you vital meds if flying ? - yup, in your hand baggage. Not sure of the reasoning on that, I would have said "on your person" but I can see that it is getting to the point where all my meds plus (in future) testing kits and supplies, are not going to fit into any reasonable (non-impeding-evac) clothing/pockets so a small bag will be needed, but rules are rules and I don't think you can have one small bag for critical medication _and_ one cabin bag for your other stuff - it's only one bag, right?

I think the medical advice is maybe based on you're either in hospital, in which case you medical id bracelet/pendant/whatever should get you the right stuff, or you have your hand luggage. But that doesn't cover being evac-ed uninjured and then held in immigration for a couple of days without access to medication. In theory, I guess there should be someone official in immigration or wherever to get you the medication you need before you become an (avoidable) medical emergency. Question is, in event of evac am I going to bet my life on that, would you ?

Centaurus

10th Sep 2015, 13:54

However the STOP actions will require the throttles being closed and then placed in the idle reverse position. This will ready the engine for a reverse power application if needed.

I don't know about a 777 but a stop decision at high speed normally would assume full reverse especially on a wet runway where braking efficiency is less than on a dry surface.
If the cause of the abort was an engine fire warning, consideration should be made to not use reverse on that engine to minimise chances of the reverse plume spreading any fire to the fuselage. See report on the British Air Tours Boeing 737 disaster at Manchester, England in August 1985. In that accident the fire erupted from a severe fuel leak in the left wing caused by red hot shrapnel from an uncontained engine break up piercing the underside of the wing tank. The reverse thrust plume atomised the fuel causing a huge fire that breached the fuselage.

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/374.pdf

Also, the act of selecting idle reverse during an abort means the reverse is at ground idle instead of flight idle. In the 737 for example, flight idle drops to ground idle four seconds after touch down. That means a longer spin up time to get full reverse.
If the pilot decides brakes only deceleration is too slow for his liking, by the time he realise it and selects full reverse, it takes a relatively long time to wind up from ground idle reverse to full reverse. By then the speed is probably quite low where reverse is inefficient anyway.

Gridl0k

10th Sep 2015, 13:55

Final option for those that want to take their bags is to wait until EVERYONE else is off the plane before you go to the locker.

Heh, you've solved it. "Queue... or... get out of burning plane..." - the English are doomed.

STN Ramp Rat

10th Sep 2015, 13:56

I travelled on Ryanair this morning and paid special attention to the safety briefing. the actual safety briefing is helpfully uploaded to youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s8TejiY7Ehg

it says there are eight emergency exits and how to identify them, It also tells you that floor lighting will help guide you to the nearest exit.

it does not tell you that you cannot take your baggage with you in the event of an emergency. For aircrew and regular travellers this goes without saying but there are a lot of people out there that take two or less flights a year and may not realise this.

in the US (I think) the weight of the over wing exit door is placarded on the door, how many people would still say they were happy to operate the overwing exit and throw the door out of the fuselage if they knew it weighed 20Kgs? At the risk of being obvious, that's the equivalent of trying to throw a fully loaded suitcase out of the door whilst sitting down.

hopefully as a result of this the regulators might force airlines to move the safety demo from the marketing department, where is currently seems to be, back to the flight operations department where it should be.

maybe if it started with. 'Please listen to this Safety demonstration, in the event of an accident it might save your life' that would be a start. however the cynic in me says that no airline marketing department is voluntarily admit that they might kill you.

highflyer40

10th Sep 2015, 14:02

Where do you get anything about immigration? That article states they are "stranded" in a hotel. Some without even shoes... So guess immigration was quite good in this case. They let people with no passports into the city.

And they are hardly stranded, they will be reunited with their belongings within a day, their food is being paid for, and on their way in a day or so as BA arranges alternate flights for them.

golfyankeesierra

10th Sep 2015, 14:06

Can I ask, if the aircraft was turned so that the fire was downwind of the fuselage to avoid the same issues that arose in the Manchester Fire
Hi, I was wondering the same. As a pilot I am much more interested in that then in the whole cabin baggage discussion (can we move that to the cabin crew forum?).
I read some reports that the aircraft was turned 30 offset from the centerline, if true was that a deliberate action from the pilots or was it due to controllability problems?
The captain is being hailed as hero but in fact this exact scenario is probably the most standard scenario you get in the sim. High gross weight RTO due engine fire and followup (and sometimes with subsequent evac). We do this 4 times a year, two profchecks, one for the F/O one for the capt per session.

As I popsted before, the flames and smoke were engulfing the hull and that creates the same hazards as the BA Manchester accident.
Wonder whether it was a result of (high pressure) fuel spray in the direction of the plane or a crosswind.
We are trained to consider wind direction in case of fire after a RTO and frankly it is very hard to maneuver a heavy plane on a 45m wide runway into (or away from) the wind but the pictures again show how a fire on the wing easily eats at the airplane.

On my next profcheck the picture of this burning triple will be on my mind and I will take an extra second or so to confirm the wind again after stopping.

starling60

10th Sep 2015, 14:08

Just another thought for those criticising pax who take large amounts of luggage into the cabin. Many airlines now charge an additional fee - often substantial - for checking luggage into the hold. This system is rapidly educating customers to take as much as possible into the cabin with them free of charge. We increasingly see this as standard behaviour on all flights, regardless of the baggage policies offered by individual carriers.

If the industry is enthusiastically encouraging pax to keep luggage with them - reinforced by financial penalty for checking-in hold luggage - we cannot then complain when they take their full permitted quota into the cabin with them.

The industry must take the lead on this. It is a problem induced by the policies of airlines themselves, not customers. We can't blame a regular family for avoiding the expense of discretionary hold baggage charges. They WILL bring maximum cabin baggage instead if they can. It is just common sense.

Spot on!! Well done for pointing it out. Am not condoning taking a trolley from locker in an evacuation, that is plain mad but with regards to the general issue of overhead locker luggage you couldn't have pointed the issue out better.
Personal example: prior to start reading this post I booked a return flight for two with one of the well known "Low" (really?) cost carriers....5 days trip, would have been handy to have a case checked in but.... cost of that privilege is about half the price of tickets, result is we'll take hand luggage only making the most of no weight limitation (you guessed the carrier didn't you?).... Gone are the old days when all carriers allowed hold cases included in the cost of tickets so I totally agree with your point, it's the industry that has created the issue and it's up to the industry to sort it out, blaming irrational passengers, however condemnable their action serves no purpose, simply go back to reasonable charging for hold luggage and the problem may not be solved but surely be less of an issue? This said well done to the BA crew!

wiggy

10th Sep 2015, 14:18

G Y S

I will take an extra second or so to confirm the wind again after stopping.

After stopping....can I ask why?

Airbubba

10th Sep 2015, 14:42

As for recall/memory items in the QRH ...yes you're right, much reduced and rationalised over the years (and yes, in our case the move has indeed been to junk legacy procedures and align with those published by Boeing/Airbus. ). FWIW the evac checklist is now meant to be a "read and do" if circumstances permit.

Thanks for the feedback on BA procedures, I appreciate it. :ok:

LTNman

10th Sep 2015, 14:43

Film taken inside the aircraft by a passenger https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdKN9AehCFQ

xaf2fe

10th Sep 2015, 14:53

On my next profcheck the picture of this burning triple will be on my mind and I will take an extra second or so to confirm the wind again after stopping.

And then what are you going to do? Take some more valuable time to move the airplane again? :ugh:

Come on people. The wind in Las Vegas was nearly calm. The last wind I heard on the tower tape was 360/4. So after you verify the wind, release the brakes and turn the airplane 90 degrees to the left? Meanwhile the pax in 11A are getting their toes toasted

tubby linton

10th Sep 2015, 14:54

Wiggy the BA FBW fleet training video for an RTO with an evacuation shows the aircraft being stopped and then the nose moved through the tiller to mitigate the effects of wind.

golfyankeesierra

10th Sep 2015, 15:09

I will take an extra second or so to confirm the wind again after stopping.
After stopping....can I ask why?
Well, first of all, number one priority is stopping on the runway, and flying long haul, there isn't usually much left of it.
Secondly, it depends a little bit on the failure, what type, which engine.. a correct failure identification is critical, you must take the time for that (and do it with both pilots).

And then what are you going to do? Take some more valuable time to move the airplane again?
….
The last wind I heard on the tower tape was 360/4. So after you verify the wind, release the brakes and turn the airplane 90 degrees to the left?
And yes, something to consider (exactly what mr Boeing advises us to do), but it all depends on the situation.
Most of the time there is no room to turn on a 45m runway, and you want to be reachable for the fire trucks (which sometimes cannot leave the concrete)
Nobody gives you a guideline, it all comes to experience and for me, looking at that burning BA is a valuable addition to my experience! (which is 25+ years flying european and long haul). Next time it can be me.

It surprises me that only 4 kts crosswind has that effect on the direction of fire. Still wondering if there is something like a fuelspray directing the flames at the hull.

CaptainX

10th Sep 2015, 15:19

The wind in Manchester was light too.

wiggy

10th Sep 2015, 15:25

tubby

Wiggy the BA FBW fleet training video for an RTO with an evacuation shows the aircraft being stopped and then the nose moved through the tiller to mitigate the effects of wind.

Thanks, I'll check that out.

GYS

As I recall the Manchester report whilst there was mention of the ( detrimental) effect of crosswind there was also mention that the amount of time lost whilst the crew continued to a runway exit may also have had serious consequences. I think it would be very brave to stop and then move again just to get the fire more downwind but that's just MVHO and it's each to their own trainset...hopefully neither of us will have to put it to a practical test...

D Bru

10th Sep 2015, 15:27

http://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20150909b.aspx

"The National Transportation Safety Board today launched four investigators to Las Vegas to investigate the engine fire on a British Airways 777 that occurred yesterday.

The team is being led by Senior Investigator-in-Charge Lorenda Ward and includes engine, systems and fire specialists. She may request other investigators as needed during the course of the investigation.

The airplane, bound for London, aborted its takeoff."

overstress

10th Sep 2015, 15:32

my experience! (which is 25+ years flying european and long haul)

It surprises me that only 4 kts crosswind has that effect on the direction of fire.

I find those 2 statements incompatible.

Deep and fast

10th Sep 2015, 15:32

"Wind light and variable, cleared take off"
Ok so when you stop, which way to turn?
The wind given during the atc recording was north easterly 4/5 knots and it was stated in another post they may have turned 30degrees left. don't see an issue with the crew actions.

As for carry ons, there is a regulatory issue that is not being dealt with, from memory the bin in an A319 is 35kg and when I travel on a certain bag charging airline there is no way in hell that limit is being met in a large number of overhead lockers! And I almost always pay for a hold bag which was £42 last time I went to Moscow.

A large number SAFA checks are required when pax are on board to get a handle on this issue. A company cannot hide behind standard weights and it is the legal responsibility of the captain to accept the aircraft as safe for flight. If the bin limit is much higher then disregard.

Seems others have been concerned for some time.
http://airsafetygroup.org/sites/default/files/CAA2.pdf

susier

10th Sep 2015, 15:39

The wind in Manchester was light too.

Well, the aircraft involved at Manchester reached c.125kts as opposed to c.78kts and took far, far longer to stop.

I presume that had a bearing.

golfyankeesierra

10th Sep 2015, 15:42

Wiggy, I agree absolutely.
There will be much to learn from the report, especially in terms of survivability in such a major fire and as well the handbagage issues..
And in the meantime, situational awareness remains the key for a balanced decision.
I understand one of the pilots opened the cockpit door and took a look in the cabin after which he was aware of the urgency. Now hats of for that!:D

Trossie

10th Sep 2015, 15:45

I can honestly say that I would never consider taking my hand luggage. I have my passport and wallet with me and my shoes stay firmly on.
In an emergency I'd want to be able to travel quickly and would sort everything else out later.gcal is the sort of fellow passenger that I would like to fly with!

I like this suggestion too:
Final option for those that want to take their bags is to wait until EVERYONE else is off the plane before you go to the locker.However I would feel that this would be unfair on the Cabin Crew and the Captain who would have to wait for these morons before they can leave a potentially burning aircraft. But it would be a good way of isolating and thereby identifying those who should have legal action taken against them for endangering lives...

funfly

10th Sep 2015, 15:57

What a great thread this is, people sitting at home with their computers discussing what they would do if the found themselves in the middle of an aircraft on fire with 90 other passengers.

Me, I know what I should do.
I'm buggered if I know what I would actually do :ugh:

llondel

10th Sep 2015, 16:03

In the enhanced picture in this comment (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/567401-ba-777-fire-las-vegas-15.html#post9111956) is there a missing fan blade in the 3 o'clock position?

Edit: No it isn't, it's just a careful coincidence of shadow relative to the blade positioning. The Daily Mail version of the picture is much clearer.

Whip

10th Sep 2015, 16:50

Airbubba asked :-
At BA can any of the flight deck crew members call a rejected takeoff?

Either PH or PNH may call "Stop".
I can only recall that the general concensus concerning other crew members in the flightdeck was that they should just draw attention to any missed warning. (I can't remember any definitive answer in the Training Manual.)

Is there still a long laundry list of memory items at BA?
13 Checklists have memory items. Most of these have 1 or 2 lines
eg ABORTED ENGINE START
Fuel Control Switch ... Cutoff

There are 6 which are more complicated.
eg Windshear Go Around; Cabin Altitude & perhaps of more interest,
PASSENGER EVACUATION
- Captain's actions
Parking Brake ... Set
Fuel Control Switches (both) ... Off
Passenger Evacuation ... Initiate
----“This is an emergency. Evacuate. Evacuate. (Hazards at .... )”
---Evac Command Switch ... On
---ATC and/or Grd Crew ... Notify

For the benefit of those who are unfamiliar with Electronic Checklists and their contribution to improved flight safety, the following may be of interest. If the aircraft detects that a Warning or Caution checklist needs to be accomplished, it/they are listed (on B777: by the engine parameters on the central screen). If more than one, then in critical order.
If the checklist has memory items, they are called for and accomplished as I previously described and then PH will call (for this example) FIRE ENGINE LEFT CHECKLIST. PNH calls up the checklist on the central lower screen, which will automatically bring up the top priority checklist. The aircraft can sense which actions have been accomplished and these will be displayed in green writing. Anything in white is an action still required and will either turn green as soon as you have moved the switch or else need you to tick the box to turn it green. At the end is shown useful information (eg decreased crosswind limit; reduced landing flap).
Most importantly, at the very end, the (for this example) FIRE ENGINE LEFT CHECKLIST COMPLETED will only show highlighted when all items have been sensed or ticked off and this highlight is confirmed by both pilots.

Armchair_Ace

10th Sep 2015, 17:02

Some people would run into a burning aircraft to save their precious iPods / Pads.

JW411

10th Sep 2015, 17:07

With reference to hats and hi-viz jackets:

A colleague of mine ended up going off the end of a Boston runway at night in a DC-10 through absolutely no fault of his own. It was winter and it was snowing so as he came out of the flightdeck having completed the shutdown checks, he quickly donned his overcoat on the way out because it was bloody cold.

He then tried to get involved in the post-evacuation procedures but no one paid him any attention.

At one point, he was chucked into the back of an ambulance whilst trying to protest that he was the captain of the aircraft and was not hurt in the slightest. The enthusiastic ambulance crew assumed that he had received a head injury and was therefore not in a logical state of mind.

The problem was that he did not have his rank bars on his overcoat nor was he wearing a hi-viz jacket so, in the dark, once he put that coat on, no one could recognise that he was the captain.

Perhaps BA have learned a good lesson that some of the unpromising hysterics on this website have yet to learn.

Airbubba

10th Sep 2015, 17:23

13 Checklists have memory items. Most of these have 1 or 2 lines
eg ABORTED ENGINE START
Fuel Control Switch ... Cutoff

Wow, that's still a lot more memory items than we use.

I think a lot of this recent minimalist stuff comes from Boeing, our evac checklist has no memory items for example. Still, you are certainly expected to know what to do.

Thanks.

Mr Angry from Purley

10th Sep 2015, 17:46

and you may find authorities will only accept originals

Sierra

In the UK they will let a UK citizen back in with the passport number (i know from experience) :\

Great to see the cockpit crew came out with their hats. I hope the Captain takes one more opportunity to fly but if not have a happy retirement

stagger

10th Sep 2015, 17:51

CaptainX

10th Sep 2015, 17:52

With reference to the effect of wind, I strongly suggest you read this AAIB report;

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422efe840f0b61342000277/8-1988_G-BGJL.pdf

Section 2.6.1.2 Paragraph 4 explains the effect of a light crosswind on spreading an engine fire over and under the fuselage, exacerbating the problem. Turning the aircraft, if runway width permits for your type, should always be considered.

Susier, thank you for your input but I think you misunderstood me.

fokkerjet

10th Sep 2015, 18:03

NTSB Issues Update on the British Airways Engine Fire at Las Vegas
Sept. 10, 2015

As part of its ongoing investigation into Tuesday’s engine fire that occurred during takeoff of British Airways flight 2276, a Boeing 777, at McCarran International Airport (LAS), the NTSB today released the following investigative update.

NTSB investigators arrived on scene Wednesday morning local time to begin the on-scene investigation. The NTSB investigative team includes experts in powerplants, airplane systems, and fire. The following groups will be organized: powerplants, airworthiness (airplane structure, systems, and fire), flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder.

Parties to the NTSB investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), The Boeing Company, and GE Aviation. In accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13, the UK Air Accidents Investigations Branch (AAIB), as the State of the Operator, has appointed an accredited representative to assist the investigation. The UK accredited representative has initially appointed British Airways and the UK Civil Aviation Authority as technical advisors.

The following are the initial factual findings:

• British Airways flight 2276, a Boeing 777-200ER, equipped with two GE90-85B engines, registration G-VIIO, was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 129 and was enroute to London - Gatwick Airport (LGW), Horley, England.

• There were 157 passengers, including 1 lap child, and 13 crew members on board. There were several minor injuries as a result of the evacuation (mostly abrasions).

• The flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder and quick access recorder have arrived at the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory and are currently being downloaded.

• On Tuesday evening, the airplane was photographed and the runway debris documented by FAA and airport officials before airplane was towed to secluded area of the airport (in order to reopen the runway).

• Initial examination of the left engine revealed multiple breaches of the engine case in the area around the high pressure compressor.

• Examination of the material recovered from runway found several pieces of the high pressure compressor spool (approximately 7-8 inches in length).

• Initial examination of the airplane by NTSB revealed that the left engine and pylon, left fuselage structure and inboard left wing airplane were substantially damaged by the fire. This damage will be documented over the next several days.

The powerplants and airworthiness groups will continue documenting the airplane and engine over the next several days. It is anticipate that once the tooling is in place, the left engine will be removed and shipped to a facility to conduct a full teardown.

Basil

10th Sep 2015, 18:10

I'll risk extra second or three it takes to grab my jacket on the way out the door. I won't be obstructing anyone else in the process.
But, unless you are wearing your jacket, you will. Your CRIMINAL act could kill people.
The cabin crew have, with delegated authority from the Pilot in Command, told you that, in the event of an evacuation, you MUST take nothing with you.
Failure to comply is a breach of the Air Navigation Order and, therefore, a criminal offence.
I don't think some on here have much idea of the legal authority granted to the PiC. We don't throw it around but the CAA may choose to do so and you may go to jail.

Ian W

10th Sep 2015, 18:40

But, unless you are wearing your jacket, you will. Your CRIMINAL act could kill people.
The cabin crew have, with delegated authority from the Pilot in Command, told you that, in the event of an evacuation, you MUST take nothing with you.
Failure to comply is a breach of the Air Navigation Order and, therefore, a criminal offence.
I don't think some on here have much idea of the legal authority granted to the PiC. We don't throw it around but the CAA may choose to do so and you may go to jail.

I realize that I fly as SLF only around 4 times a week, but none of the safety briefings I have received mention bags and accoutrements during an emergency evacuation. That includes jokey right on videos and bored flight attendants reading them out. It may be that some airlines are different - BA has a cartoon video with a throw away line saying "take nothing with you" is that a legal order from a flight attendant?

These threats of drawing and quartering pax who have taken their bags - or in this case jacket - with them are like photo speed traps. They do not prevent the loss of safety they are punitive after the fact. This might provide some satisfaction for the armchair critics but it does not, and will not solve the problem.

What is needed is a standard evacuation pouch/money belt that pax should have with them at all times for emergency evacuation, to contain documents and some small items. They should be told - before any emergency arises - that apart from what they are wearing the pouch is all they are allowed to take from the aircraft in an emergency.

4468

10th Sep 2015, 19:01

Airbubba

"Wow, that's still a lot more memory items than we use."

As far as I'm aware, in recent years BA have re-aligned themselves with the equipment manufacturer's methods of operating. 'Back to Boeing' and similarly for Airbus.

So if you have fewer memory drills, perhaps it's because you are deviating from the manufacturer's recommendations? (Or you aren't flying Airbus/Boeing?)

pax britanica

10th Sep 2015, 19:40

from what I have seen on TV about FA training the emergency evac drill is avery noisy process with FA screaming and shouting evacuate . do this do that. Seems entirely sensible to me as confused /scared pax will from human nature respond to loud authoritative commands when they are in a state of shock.

Since people in shock or panic do not act rationally you could have a death sentence for taking bags with you and some people would still do it . So on top of mandatory changes to stupid policies and marketing to incentivise taking big bags on board lets have the usually last regulators mandate no carry-ons above a certain size and NO charging for hold baggage except traditional excess charges.
Couple that to improved safety briefings to de emphasise ditching (sorry -landing on water ) and prioritise on land evacs and not taking baggage etc mirrored in safety card or seat back slogans. ND finally crew evac training where I think they are dead right to yell at pax to 'bully' them into acting and moving to just ad Take no bags Take no bags. And I bet you would get a massive improvement -and it costs largely nothing and avoids the idea of prosecuting people who can just claim that
1)I was frightened and panicked
2 ) No one told me not to-or I didn't hear them.

PB

notsojumboanymore

10th Sep 2015, 19:42

Whip,
With respect, Emergency Evacuation is not a memory item on the B777 in BA.
Check your QRH Checklist Instructions. It is a reference checklist.

infrequentflyer789

10th Sep 2015, 20:01

Where do you get anything about immigration? That article states they are "stranded" in a hotel. Some without even shoes... So guess immigration was quite good in this case. They let people with no passports into the city.

I may not have made it clear that I was referring to other incidents as wwll as this one. See for instance this post in this thread http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/567401-ba-777-fire-las-vegas-5.html#post9110612

Note that this flight was outbound so immigration may have been less of an issue, but either way those pax aren't going anywhere until passports are returned or replaced, whilst those who took their bags could take another flight out immediately if they needed to.

tlbrown350

10th Sep 2015, 20:05

It surprises me that only 4 kts crosswind has that effect on the direction of fire. Still wondering if there is something like a fuelspray directing the flames at the hull.

Even light winds can be enough to direct fire on unobstructed/open airfields as past incidents have shown. It may not seem significant, but in a open environment it is.

archae86

10th Sep 2015, 20:07

from the NTSB investigative update as posted here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/567401-ba-777-fire-las-vegas-17.html#post9112427) by fokkerjet
...
• Initial examination of the left engine revealed multiple breaches of the engine case in the area around the high pressure compressor.

• Examination of the material recovered from runway found several pieces of the high pressure compressor spool (approximately 7-8 inches in length).
...

Here is a link to a detailed diagram of a GE90. The variant is the 115, so some details and proportions will differ from the accident flight. But nonprofessionals unfamiliar with basic turbofan structure designations may find it helpful.

http://lyle.smu.edu/propulsion/Pages/Images/turbofan2.jpe

As lomapaseo suggested above, I think the biggest outstanding question is how this failure resulted in the release of so much fuel.

Locked door

10th Sep 2015, 20:16

I'm not sure if it's been picked up on this thread or in the media, but that calm an authoritative voice on the radio is almost certainly not that of the captain.

There's a video floating around of the flight crew being ambushed by a news crew while climbing into a taxi. The SFO's accent seems familiar......

mcloaked

10th Sep 2015, 20:21

The latest NTSB initial findings are at:

http://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20150910.aspx

It might be worth checking the NTSB website for further news as this is from the investigators themselves, and is not speculation.

wiggy

10th Sep 2015, 20:25

that calm an authoritative voice on the radio is almost certainly not that of the captain.

Who said what and when on the radio when depends on who was doing the take-off, and there was almost certainly more than one voice.

If done according to script:

The Non-handler (so that could have been either the captain or the co-pilot) should have done the "stopping" call ...:D :D
The co-pilot should have made the "mayday" call. :D :D
The captain should have made the call to ATC that they were evacuating :D :D

That said the captain can operate outside the SOPs if he/she feels fit and I think they did ***** well to get them all done (probably a sim check "exceed" just for that ), I'm not fussed who did what on the R/T to be honest.

HeathrowAirport

10th Sep 2015, 20:26

IIO is a 275tonne MTOW model, one of only four. Whilst it was a light load, LAS is high and hot - presumably the 38*C/39*C temperature at time of incident meant a take-off quite close if not at full thrust.

lomapaseo

10th Sep 2015, 20:39

rom the NTSB investigative update as posted here by fokkerjet
Quote:
...
• Initial examination of the left engine revealed multiple breaches of the engine case in the area around the high pressure compressor.

• Examination of the material recovered from runway found several pieces of the high pressure compressor spool (approximately 7-8 inches in length).
...
Here is a link to a detailed diagram of a GE90. The variant is the 115, so some details and proportions will differ from the accident flight. But nonprofessionals unfamiliar with basic turbofan structure designations may find it helpful.

http://lyle.smu.edu/propulsion/Pages.../turbofan2.jpe

As lomapaseo suggested above, I think the biggest outstanding question is how this failure resulted in the release of so much fuel.

I'm mildly curious how the pieces ended up on the runway. They may not have even made it through the nacelle but only got as far as the bypass and gone out the fan discharge.

Nevertheless any unmitigated source of fuel inside the nacel or pylon may have to be looked for by the fire-safety group.

Without the fire this may not have been a biggie

mcloaked

10th Sep 2015, 20:52

There is an interesting AD at https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEQQFjAGahUKEwjb1cnNqu3HAhXDfRoKHWswApg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fad.easa.europa.eu%2Fblob%2F20111506.pdf%2FA D_US-2011-15-06_1&usg=AFQjCNGW5V6XlVD46RJiECGontXpGhklIA&bvm=bv.102022582,d.d2s

This refers to additional inspections on the type of engine that was installed on the aircraft in this discussion. Is it possible that even with the additional inspections that the failure mode described in this report could still have eventually occurred (i.e. uncontained engine failure at the high pressure compressor area).

oleostrut

10th Sep 2015, 20:59

"
• Examination of the material recovered from runway found several pieces of the high pressure compressor spool (approximately 7-8 inches in length)."

Some of the CF-6 family of engines have/had cracking problems in this area.

ILS27LEFT

10th Sep 2015, 21:00

I think this was an extremely serious incident that has proven that the following variables must all be present if we want to save lives:
- Well trained and experienced pilots
- Well trained and experienced cabin crew ( they are the evacuation execution experts)
- Well trained and experienced ATC personnel
- Well trained and experienced airport firemen
- A 3rd pilot helped to assess the real situation beyond cockpit based information. Each second is precious, his presence also made a significant difference in terms of speed to instigate evacuation.

Well trained and experienced professionals are not to be forgotten: this incident could have turned into a major disaster if the professionals above did not perform as expected. Professionals deserve good working conditions and decent pay, let's never forget this.
I was really impressed by the BA pilots' handling of this crisis, however I cannot ignore the excellent job done by the BA cabin crew and by the local ATC and fire services.
Just one of the above parties failing would have meant the loss of many lives. In a way this accident is a celebration of the high level professionalism needed in aviation from pilots & ATC to cabin crew & airport fire services.

tdracer

10th Sep 2015, 21:01

A "7-8 inch" length of compressor spool is going to have lots of energy and is unlikely to be stopped by a lightweight nacelle cowling (the compressor case is designed to contain blades, but not large parts of the compressor spool).

Pure speculation on my part, but I'd bet money that one of those spool pieces sliced open the fuel line feeding the main engine fuel pump. That line is a couple inches in diameter, and the center wing tank boost pumps would be pushing fuel out the resultant opening at ~70 psi. Between the several seconds necessary for the crew to recognize the problem and command the shutdown, plus another couple seconds for the spar valve to actually close, that has the potential to be a whole lotta fuel.
While the penetration of a wing tank is certainly possible, I tend to agree with other posters than had there been a major penetration of a wing tank, things would have been even worse.

LASJayhawk

10th Sep 2015, 21:04

HeathrowAirport

IIO is a 275tonne MTOW model, one of only four. Whilst it was a light load, LAS is high and hot - presumably the 38*C/39*C temperature at time of incident meant a take-off quite close if not at full thrust.

7Li s a long long runway, 14512' and a slight downhill grade to boot 1.1%

On_The_Top_Bunk

10th Sep 2015, 21:26

Design certification has to ensure that an engine will contain a "Blade off Event"

You cannot design for a disc failure especially at high RPM due to the high energies involved.

Locked door

10th Sep 2015, 21:28

Just to confirm Wiggy, the SOP for the (read and do) evac checklist is for the First Officer to make the final evacuating ATC call.

In this case it's the same voice on all VHF transmissions which makes perfect sense if the Captain was PF.

The media don't seem to have grasped that there were three highly trained pilots on the flight deck.

SeenItAll

10th Sep 2015, 21:34

Rather complete synopsis of findings so far from FlightGlobal.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/ntsb-detects-signs-of-uncontained-engine-failure-fro-416634/

wiggy

10th Sep 2015, 21:39

Just to confirm Wiggy, the SOP for the (read and do) evac checklist is for the First Officer to make the final evacuating ATC call.

Nope, the checklist says that the Captain makes the evacuating call to ATC/Ground....(but the captain can operate outside the SOPs if circumstances demand it).

The media don't seem to have grasped that there were three highly trained pilots on the flight deck.

Agreed, then again it's spares two of the guys the joys of having their Facebook stuff in the Daily Mail, so maybe they win :E

Airbubba

10th Sep 2015, 21:40

So if you have fewer memory drills, perhaps it's because you are deviating from the manufacturer's recommendations? (Or you aren't flying Airbus/Boeing?)

Does Boeing have 13 drills with memory items these days? I sure don't think so. :=

I remember years ago riding in the cockpit of a B-763 with some of our Deltoid friends. They had one of those long 'before takeoff' checklists including things like 'Gyros - Erect and aligned'. At the time the Boeing 'before takeoff' checklist had only one item (I hate it when those autothrottles just won't engage :cool:).

They explained that many of the items were put in to assure commonality with the DC-8 training. Of course, the Mighty Diesel Eights were long gone by then. Drop-rise, drop-rise (or at some places - double drop-rise :)).

Whip,
With respect, Emergency Evacuation is not a memory item on the B777 in BA.
Check your QRH Checklist Instructions. It is a reference checklist.

Yep, this is the transition I was talking about. I claim to have flown Boeings and Airbuses for the past three decades but I'm probably just another poser with a flight simulator in the basement. ;)

Years ago the evac checklist had maybe ten memory items and was sometimes hidden in some obscure tab for the amusement of the feds and sim instructors (places like 'Doors' or 'Aircraft General').

Then maybe it went down to two items like 'Parking Brake - Set', 'Tower - Notify'.

And now, as you say, a reference list with no memory items.

320goat

10th Sep 2015, 22:04

I think the 13 different CL memory items is not just in reference to QRH/ECL NNC but includes the manoeuvres too. TCAS, EGPWS, Windshear etc. of course I may be mistaken. Although having just counted we have 9 check lists that require memory items (if you count severe damage and fire as 2 separate check lists). On top of that there are 6 maneuvers to remember.

Emergency evacuation is on the back of the QRH, and has been mentioned before is generally a read and do. For our outfit item 5. is Advise the cabin to evacuate (Captain) and item 6. is Advise the tower (F/O)

With regards to hand luggage; I don't think you will ever stop everyone from taking their luggage off with them. I would be interested to see evacuation trials completed where 15-20% of passengers are instructed to take hand luggage to see what effect that has on the evacuation time.

Regards

DevX

10th Sep 2015, 22:20

SeenItAll, surely the report means HP Turbine, not HP compressor? In over 30 years of engine development test I've yet to see an uncontained HP compressor failure. In fact the only uncontained failures I've witnesed have from HP & IP turbine discs.

tiger9999187

10th Sep 2015, 22:27

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMZp8iP6isE

On board footage including the takeoff roll and footage of the failure itself (occurs at 36 seconds)

MrSnuggles

10th Sep 2015, 22:36

Enough about the luggage carriers.

People don't know how to behave. They don't get their own best sometimes. What everyone understands is money - so, nag the airlines to charge for cabin bags but not for hold bags. This will soon ease your trouble as the greens talk louder than any safety briefing ever will.

Medicines can be really time dependant and therefore you might consider allowing a pouch or bag big enough for various medicines. Some medicine, like those containing warfarin, is extremely time dependant and also person dependant. It can be literally life threatening to not take it at the correct time.

320goat

10th Sep 2015, 22:47

Possibly passengers perception of danger.

Having landed on water there was a much greater urgency to vacate the aircraft quickly, whereas I can only guess that a reject from around about 100kts and then stopping on the runway even with the fire and smoke seen from the left engine led to a lessor sense of urgency to vacate?

Regards

air pig

10th Sep 2015, 23:17

Medicines can be really time dependant and therefore you might consider allowing a pouch or bag big enough for various medicines. Some medicine, like those containing warfarin, is extremely time dependant and also person dependant. It can be literally life threatening to not take it at the correct time.

Totally agree and the same with insulin. I can get 28 day tablet supply into a bum bag type pouch without a problem.

b1lanc

10th Sep 2015, 23:32

=bratschewurst
I think even the most stunned folks standing on a wing in the middle of the Hudson realized they'd sink if they were holding any luggage if the plane went under - which again I'd guess most people realized was going to happen in short course.

lomapaseo

11th Sep 2015, 00:18

Rather complete synopsis of findings so far from FlightGlobal.

I view it as rather poor and misleading and not worthy of actioning.

There are going to be some new lessons learned in this latest event and the investigation to discover them is just beginning.

I don't view 7-8 inch long rim pieces as high energy relative to the stuff they have to get through to hole a wing or pressure vessel. Ignition at the engine metal case is a given in this type event so the persistence of the fuel must be addressed as well as the rotor failure itself.

barit1

11th Sep 2015, 01:26

DevX:SeenItAll, surely the report means HP Turbine, not HP compressor? In over 30 years of engine development test I've yet to see an uncontained HP compressor failure. In fact the only uncontained failures I've witnesed have from HP & IP turbine discs.

No, there is historical precedent for compressor disc or spool failures. Probably much less common than turbine disc episodes. And the previously cited AD raises the suspicion further in this case.

flyguyfl

11th Sep 2015, 01:36

The high pressure compressor case may not be capable of containing even 7-8 inch long pieces of the disk at near maximum RPM conditions. FAR requirements address blades and not rotors (standard and possibly integrated rotor). I can see a fuel line outside the effectiveness of the engine fire extinguishing system being breached by expulsion of these fragments through the case.

While not a commercial engine guy, just a military engine designer with some extensive knowledge of the adverse effects of ballistic impact on turbine engines, this is just an opinion.

barit1

11th Sep 2015, 01:38

lomapaseo:I'm mildly curious how the (HPC spool) pieces ended up on the runway. They may not have even made it through the nacelle but only got as far as the bypass and gone out the fan discharge.

No surprise at all. Titanium shrapnel pieces suddenly released from 1000G restraint, pulverize the compressor case and pass through the nacelle skin as if it were pasteboard.

Yes, the fuel spill is worrysome - but likely the big pipe from the spar valve to the engine fuel pump (on the AGB) was compromised.

Orestes

11th Sep 2015, 01:55

If it truly was an uncontained failure of a compressor spool, then it's very possible that a lot of the flames were due to engine lube oil from a ruptured gear box and/or lube oil reservoir. And, if it also took out the fuel/oil cooler, then even worse...lube oil and fuel all over the place.

Matt48

11th Sep 2015, 03:08

Wasn't the Sioux City DC10 accident a result of uncontained failure of the LP compressor disc.

tdracer

11th Sep 2015, 04:54

Wasn't the Sioux City DC10 accident a result of uncontained failure of the LP compressor disc. Sioux City was a fan disc, not a compressor disc. For purposes of rotor burst analysis, a 1/3 fan disc is assumed to have infinite energy - hence my earlier comment that it would go anywhere it wanted to. Nothing on the aircraft is going to stop it (or even slow it significantly).
While a compressor spool doesn't have the energy of a fan disc, a failed spool is effectively a burst rotor. As noted before, it's not going to be contained by the compressor case, at least not at high power. When we do uncontained burst analysis, there are certain assumptions that come into play. Blades and blade bits are considered 'low energy' - if they make it out of the engine case they won't penetrate 'protected' systems, however they can spread over a wider area (15 degree spread, vs. 5 degrees for high energy debris). Rotors and spools are considered 'high' energy, it's simply not practical to protect systems. Rather, systems are located to minimize (but not eliminate) the risk of catastrophic damage.

It really is an interesting question as to what would have happened had this failure occurred after V1 and they'd continued the takeoff. My gut feeling is it wouldn't have been catastrophic - assuming the fuel leak was from the engine fuel line (and not a wing penetration), most of the spilled fuel would have gone out the back. It would certainly have been exciting, and a return to land with a trans-Atlantic fuel load, but something a capable crew (which this one showed every sign of being) would have been able to handle.
Hopefully the final report will address those aspects of survivability had the failure occurred 30 seconds later.

msbbarratt

11th Sep 2015, 05:33

While a compressor spool doesn't have the energy of a fan disc, a failed spool is effectively a burst rotor.The HP compressor will be doing upwards of 10,000rpm, a whole lot faster than the fan which would be getting up to 2,500 rpm. The compressor has a smaller diameter, but has several stages on the same disk to save weight but increases the load on the disk, etc. Working it out is complicated.

Whatever it works out to be, I think one thing we can reasonably say right now is that the compressor disk in question is not strong enough; bits of it were on the tarmac which is exactly where they shouldn't be.

Another way of looking at it is that there's several tens of thousands of horsepower (tens of megawatts) going into the compressor. A good size power station turbine is only 500MW; these large turbofan engines are using the equivalent of a large fraction of your average power station just to run the compressor, never mind propelling the aircraft forwards.

When that goes significantly wrong there is going to be a one helluva bang. Of course the reason we're more used to the idea of turbine failures is that, whilst they're under a similar rotational load (same RPM), each turbine blade has a much, much higher aerodynamic load and runs very hot too.

Interestingly the RPM of these turbofans is far lower than the turbocharger on a car, which may get up to 100,000 RPM. Of the millions of those that have been made one or two must have broken up. They're a lot smaller and lighter, so keeping the bits inside is going to be much easier.

meekmok

11th Sep 2015, 06:51

"Parts of the engine's high pressure compressor were found on the runway"

British Airways fire investigators: Engine failed, pieces found on runway - CNN.com (http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/las-vegas-british-airways-fire-ntsb/index.html)

British Airways fire investigators: Engine failed, pieces found on runway

(CNN)The left engine of British Airlines Flight 2276, which burst into flames Tuesday at McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas, showed multiple breaches in the metal casing surrounding it and parts of the engine's high pressure compressor were found on the runway, according to an initial examination by aviation experts.
Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board said they don't know yet what caused the engine failure during takeoff shortly after 4 p.m. (7 p.m. ET) Tuesday.
But CNN has learned that the Federal Aviation Administration issued an airworthiness directive (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/e320fd22cf917da1862578cd0046bc80/$FILE/2011-15-06.pdf) in 2011 to airlines using this GE90-85B engine.
It warned of possible "uncontained engine failure," which means parts of the engine can break and fly out . The FAA mandated repetitive inspections of the high pressure compressor rotor spool for cracks.
The NTSB said it is too early to draw any conclusions, but the part of the plane's engine that was heavily damaged is the same part mentioned in the FAA's airworthiness directive.

A source close to the investigation said a physical inspection of the plane will be key in the case and may provide more clues than the black box, which can't tell investigators if a part of the engine broke off.

A thud, then an evacuation order

Jay Jennings was one of the 157 passengers, along with 13 crew members, on the London-bound jet when he heard a big thud as the flight was about to takeoff. He lifted his window shade and "just saw flames on the engine," he said.
For a few frenetic minutes, frightening plumes of black smoke engulfed the jetliner.

The plane stopped and sat for what felt like a minute, Jennings said. Then the captain came on the intercom and told the passengers there was an emergency and they needed to evacuate.
When one of the emergency doors opened, smoke poured in. "Not safe, not safe," someone said, Jennings recalled.

HeathrowAirport

11th Sep 2015, 07:52

From an engineers PoV, the compressor casing should have held. Many questions asked why so much fuel leaked and that's probably because the FMU was taken out in the process.

ChissayLuke

11th Sep 2015, 07:55

Whilst the result is a credit to all, the presence of the third pilot, allegedly being able to enter the cabin to assess the situation before reporting back to the Captain, the engines being invisible from the flight deck is interesting.

How many more seconds would have been taken if third pilot had not been present and able to do this?

southern duel

11th Sep 2015, 08:52

I was involved in a very similar incident at EGLL back in 1998. B777 G-VIIH aborted take off with a uncontained engine failure. This happened at 71 kts !! pretty similar to the current incident. There was no fire in this one

Metal from the turbine was was strewn all over the runway and all in very small pices.
The No 1 engine was a GE90-85BG04, serial no. 900158,

There is a AAIB report here

https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5422ff20e5274a1317000a1b/dft_avsafety_pdf_500368.pdf

Whip

11th Sep 2015, 09:07

I think the 13 different CL memory items is not just in reference to QRH/ECL NNC but includes the manoeuvres too. TCAS, EGPWS, Windshear etc.
Quite correct 320goat.
The checklists I revised after any time away from the flight deck were :
Aborted Engine Start; Dual Eng Fail/Stall; Eng Lim/Surge/Stall; Eng Svr Damage/Sep; Fire APU; Fire Engine Tailpipe; Fire Eng; Eng Autostart; Cabin Altitude; TCAS; Pull Up Go Around; Windshear Go Around & Passenger Evacuation as the other drills could be called from the Electronic Checklist.
Surprisingly, I don't recall any memory items for the various Smoke checklists.

And no airbubba, I don't have a simulator in the basement; my thrills since retirement are driving a team of horses, hence the monika "Whip".

adsyj

11th Sep 2015, 09:21

On the face of it appears job well done by all crew.

Happy no serious injuries.

Now most importantly when could the crew get together for a private debrief over a few cold ones and some umbrella drinks for the girls.

I'm guessing after the authorities Drug and alcohol test and get a few basics out of the way, they may all be able to get poolside and calm the nerves.

Anyone know how long the crew would be tied up.

flt001

11th Sep 2015, 09:57

BA 777 (MML) just did full stop on landing at LHR and met by fire crews. Now moving off 09L slowly.

Flightmech

11th Sep 2015, 10:06

BA 777 (MML) just did full stop on landing at LHR and met by fire crews. Now moving off 09L slowly.

Hydraulic loss/failure I believe. No biggy

D Bru

11th Sep 2015, 13:24

BA jet engine failure uncontained, pieces hit runway: investigators | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/us-britishairways-fire-lasvegas-idUSKCN0RB11S20150911?utm_source=twitter)

"Initial examination of the left engine revealed multiple breaches of the engine case in the area around the high pressure compressor," the NTSB said in a statement."

Re-stresses the interesting case of Boeing and GE to oppose FAA on insisting on its "unsafe condition" definition in AD 2011-15-06 concerning GE90-85B engines as mentioned in post #188.

If specific failure addressed in this AD would indeed prove to be the origin of the uncontained failure in this case, and of course indeed assuming that BA complied with the inspections pertaining from this AD, then GE and Boeing would have quite some explaining to do, as they in their comments to the FAA at the time ascertained that "....by their analyses, cracks in the weld joint would not develop into an uncontained failure." The FAA disagreed with this at the time and pursued the AD.

dxzh

11th Sep 2015, 13:33

Just to clarify, the AAIB bulletin for the 1998 incident (caused by the previous misassembly of the LPT module) noted that "there was no failure of the engine containment", although turbine debris was ejected out of the tailpipe onto the runway.

Teddy Robinson

11th Sep 2015, 13:37

I have a feeling that this will go into the textbooks as to how to deal with catastrophic failure between 80kts and V1.

Skipness One Echo

11th Sep 2015, 13:39

So it's not CAA mandated for G- operated airliners to have blinds up for landing even though in every flight I have been on they've insisted on it?
If it's not mandatory or company SOP I am a little surprised......

Teddy Robinson

11th Sep 2015, 14:13

air pig

11th Sep 2015, 15:29

From what I've been told by one of our company pilots, blinds are open so that firecrew can see inside.

albatross

11th Sep 2015, 15:48

Strangly enough I was in the USA last week and the cabin crew on all 4 flights asked pax to close the blinds before landing in order to help keep the cabin cool during the turnaround.
I thought it was not the best of plans.
I would understand if they had requested this after landing before arrival at the gate.
Delta Airlines.

PersonFromPorlock

11th Sep 2015, 16:48

How many more seconds would have been taken if third pilot had not been present and able to do this? Third pilots may not always be aboard, but FAs are. Wouldn't it make sense to brief them to eyeball obvious problems? It doesn't take a lot of stick time to report smoke and flames engulfing a wing. It might even be faster than waiting for a third pilot's report, when a third pilot was available.

Tourist

11th Sep 2015, 16:56

Third pilots may not always be aboard, but FAs are. Wouldn't it make sense to brief them to eyeball obvious problems? It doesn't take a lot of stick time to report smoke and flames engulfing a wing. It might even be faster than waiting for a third pilot's report, when a third pilot was available.

Why do you imagine this isn't already done?

Evacuating an aircraft is a big deal. You expect serious injuries from an evacuation.

If you have a spare pilot, then it is wise to use him just to confirm it is really necessary.

Ian W

11th Sep 2015, 16:57

when people actually listen to the safety brief they will know not to try and get the trolley bags before evacuation.
Cabin crew will also go down the cabin to ensure that tables are stowed, seats are upright, belts are fastened, earplugs to iphones etc. are out, and blinds are open.

What people do after that is basically down to whether they respect the cabin crew and the advice they were given.

There are plenty of travellers who think they know better, and the cc cannot be expected to police them all, all of the time.

I have listened to the safety briefs on the airlines that I fly on (around 4 times a week or so) and they never mention bags being left on evacuation. That is on both in the talked through safety briefs from the FA and jokey video safety briefs on the IFE. Just like the blinds up/down for takeoff and landing it seems to be airline specific. Even the BA flight briefing it was a single short throw away line in the cartoon video which spent far more time showing a cartoon FA giving a dropped cuddly toy back to a cartoon child.

Safety briefs need to be far more specific: E.g. "In an evacuation you must not take bags with you. Any important papers should be in your pockets"

OldLurker

11th Sep 2015, 17:56

Regarding the large number of people who took baggage down the slides: an experienced former CC member gave a credible, if politically incorrect, explanation on this evening's Today programme on BBC Radio 4.
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06950lr (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06950lr), drag the player forward to time 53:40.

PURPLE PITOT

11th Sep 2015, 18:05

They could just leave you to burn if you prefer.

Basil

11th Sep 2015, 18:07

BA has a cartoon video with a throw away line saying "take nothing with you" is that a legal order from a flight attendant?
That would have to be tested in court.

Bunky767

11th Sep 2015, 18:11

Take a deep breath before you read this, but Ian Simpson, chemtrail expert extraordinaire, has diagnosed the incident at LAS, I guess the air crash investigators can all go home now...

look-up.org.uk/ba-la-fire/

It will make you wince, it may make you cry with laughter, it may make you wonder when the definition of the word 'truth' was changed.

:{

eppy

11th Sep 2015, 19:39

Had this gone on a few seconds longer, there might well have been hull loss. And massive loss of life.

One small point. The hull is lost. The fuel was cut off, though there was probably a major leak from the 70psi main fuel pump line severed by the uncontained failure of the high pressure compressor. If you watch the video carefully, the fire had slightly subsided BEFORE the fire crew arrived. The cut-off of fuel had done its job.

Whether the cabin would have been penentrated without expedient evacuation and arrival of fire services is a moot point. However, I will agree with you that it was a close call in that most of those hospitalised were due to smoke inhalation. If you recall the BA disater from 30 years, it was indeed smoke inhalation that killed most of the souls on board.

In this respect, it was indeed a close call.

DaveReidUK

11th Sep 2015, 20:13

However, I will agree with you that it was a close call in that most of those hospitalised were due to smoke inhalation.

Other reports suggest that the majority of injuries sustained were abrasions resulting, typically, from the slide evacuation.

Alain67

11th Sep 2015, 20:30

Other reports suggest that the majority of injuries sustained were abrasions resulting, typically, from the slide evacuation.
I'm not sure these injuries are as serious as those caused by inhalation of smoke.

MzGuilty

11th Sep 2015, 20:56

Mr Optimistic, I don't think you understand what people are trying to explain to you. As former cabin crew with three airlines (including BA), the commands we practice for an evacuation drill include "get out, leave everything behind", yelled at the top of our voice, as we "gently" push people in the small of the back, down the slide. In our annual recurrent drills, some crew (sitting as passengers) are asked to take baggage to the door during the emergency evacuation, and within seconds there is a line of people that can't get out as the crew try to make the passenger leave the case behind. Leave the case by the door, the exit is blocked, do we tell the passenger to return the case to the overhead locker ten rows back?!

Many passengers find it impossible to obey the fasten seat belt sign, listen to the demo yada yada, and perhaps it is these same people who choose to ignore the yelled commands "get out, leave everything behind"

But I have to say, who knows what we would do in a panic. We may not react the way we think we would. Tossing the cases over the side of the slide isn't an option, as there may well be passengers under there, or emergency services. But taking cases away causes a line of blocked passengers in seconds.

Personally I think the crew did an amazing job, and I am just glad I retired with nothing more serious than helping out with a few faints and panic attacks.

Sailvi767

11th Sep 2015, 21:40

Bags are important. If a highly experienced flight crew values them as highly as this video shows how are you going to get meer passengers to leave them behind?
http://youtu.be/lvqEXbMVANM

No bags were harmed in the filming of this video!

4468

11th Sep 2015, 21:46

Airbubba
Does Boeing have 13 drills with memory items these days? I sure don't think so.
To be clear, I didn't mention a figure at all. I was commenting on a certain operator to whom you referred, that recently aligned itself with both A&B manufacturers' operations.

For the avoidance of doubt, that operator currently shows the following memory items for a (non ECL) large Boeing:

1) Aborted Eng Start/Eng Autostart (same single item drill)
2) Cabin Altitude
3) Eng Lim/Surge/Stall
4) Multiple Eng Fail/Stall
5) Fire Eng/Sev Damage/Sep
6) IAS Disagree

Along with the following manoeuvres

1) RTO
2) Stall
3) GPWS
4) Windshear
5) TCAS

I'm intrigued to know which of those items are non memory in your outfit? I too have over 3 decades on A & B. (And others!) Perhaps we have more in common than we realise?

So whip, that doesn't include Fire APU, Tailpipe Fire, or Pax Evac. All done with reference to checklists, and for very good reason, I would suggest?

evansb

11th Sep 2015, 22:02

A similar incident, with similar results:

http://i1047.photobucket.com/albums/b477/gumpjr_bucket/PWA501%20CYYC.jpg

PWA Flight 501 was a regularly scheduled flight that flew between Calgary, Alberta and Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. The aircraft caught fire during takeoff on March 22, 1984.

The Boeing 737 pushed back from the gate at Calgary International Airport at 7:35 AM and proceeded to take off north on runway 34 (16/34), carrying five crew members and 114 passengers. At 7:42 AM, a loud popping sound was heard 20 seconds into takeoff. The aircraft began to vibrate and veer (back) to the left, and a fire broke out in the rear of the aircraft. The pilot, Stan Fleming, managed to abort the take-off.

An emergency evacuation was ordered as the fire continued to roar. Five people were seriously injured and 22 suffered minor injuries, but no-one was killed. Although the CFR crew attended to the fire in very short order, the aircraft was destroyed by the fire.

The fire was attributed to a faulty compressor disc that blew apart, rupturing the fuel tanks. This incident was similar to the cause of the British Airtours Flight 28M disaster that claimed 55 lives in 1985.

alexb757

12th Sep 2015, 01:26

Yes, it was his last flight - he told me so himself still standing under the aircraft on the runway!

armchairpilot94116

12th Sep 2015, 04:05

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tY2HzWCvhw

China Airlines 738 fire in Okinawa. At least the Fire Services seem to have been quicker in Vegas.

And yes, people took their belongings then also.

Avionista

12th Sep 2015, 09:05

I have been reading the FAA AD designed to prevent the type of incident which occurred to the BA 777 at Las Vegas. I found the following parts of the document interesting:

Request

Two commenters, General Electric Company and The Boeing Company, requested that we remove the “UnsafeCondition” paragraph from the AD, and reword the Summary section to resemble the Summary section of AD 2002-04-11. The commenters stated that, by their analyses, cracks in the weld joint would not develop into an uncontained failure. The commenters stated that HPCR 8-10 stage spools, P/Ns 1844M90G01 and 1844M90G02, be inspected by an enhanced inspection, similar to those parts covered in AD 2002-04-11.

Answer

We do not agree. AD 2002-04-11 was issued because of additional focused inspection procedures that had been developed by the manufacturer. Because cracks were discovered on one HPCR 8-10 spool between the 9-10 stages in the weld joint, this unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. The unsafe condition could result in failure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane. We determined that this unsafe condition requires mandatory repetitive inspections for cracks. We did not change the AD.

Well done the FAA for 'sticking to its guns'.

Inspections of the HPCR 8-10 Stage Spool

(f)(1) At the next piece-part exposure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool after the effective date of this AD, perform a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) and eddy current inspection (ECI) of the weld joint between the 9-10 stages of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks.

(2) Thereafter, perform repetitive FPIs and ECIs of the weld joint between the 9-10 stages of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks at every piece-part exposure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool.

Presumably, this type of inspection can be performed only during major engine overhaul, with the engine removed from the aircraft? If so, will the authorities now need to consider more frequent engine overhauls?

What seems to be missing is any move to find a permanent fix for the problem such as a redesign/manufacture of a HP turbofan which does not have an inherent weakness.

juice

12th Sep 2015, 09:55

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/567401-ba-777-fire-las-vegas-22.html#post9114090

Avionista,

Thank you for researching this and summarising key detail. You pose a critical question. I hope it will be answered.

olasek

12th Sep 2015, 10:45

What seems to be missing is any move to find a permanent fix for the problem such as a redesign/manufacture of a HP turbofan which does not have an inherent weakness If it is missing it means it was irrelevant, namely design wasn't in question rather perhaps the flaw in manufacturing of random nature. I am not aware of any manufacturing process on this planet that would assure 100% fail free product.

Jetstream67

12th Sep 2015, 11:24

bateleur

12th Sep 2015, 11:41

In reply to iomapaseo:

I see no signs of shrapnel damage. As some said much earlier in this thread it doesn't look like an uncontained disk rotor. Nor do I see signs of extreme pressure release (some call this an explosion). Instead the pictures of the externals of the engine pod and wing go hand in hand with a persistent ground pool fire.

If you watch the video, the first thing the fire appliances do is direct their jets on to the ground beneath the wing.

Scuffers

12th Sep 2015, 12:06

I think that fail-safe might be a more productive route for turbines -- Think how car windscreens have evolved from big lethal broken shards through regularly shaped small bits to the current 'broken but still hanging together' approach

If you're suggesting that the engine casing should be able to retain any parts from a broken turbine breaking out, that's simply not feasible.

the speed/energy in these parts (especially at take-off power) is simply staggering, you would need something like several inches of Chobham armour backed with heavy armour plate.

Avionista

12th Sep 2015, 13:10

If it is missing it means it was irrelevant, namely design wasn't in question rather perhaps the flaw in manufacturing of random nature.

If the problem is a manufacturing flaw in a small number of HP turbofans, why does the AD require repetitive inspections, ad infinitum. Surely, the replacement of any components found to be defective would suffice. The FAA, perhaps, believes the problem could develop over time in any of these HP turbofans, hence their requirement for repeated EFI/ECI scans.

I agree that nothing man-made is ever 100% reliable, but vital components should strive for a MTBF well in excess of their expected lifecycle.

funfly

12th Sep 2015, 13:16

If you're suggesting that the engine casing should be able to retain any parts from a broken turbine breaking out, that's simply not feasible.

I recall video footage of the testing of RR engines where this very feature is demonstrated as a test that the engine has to pass before certification.

porterhouse

12th Sep 2015, 13:27

but vital components should strive for a MTBF well in excess of their expected lifecycle.
Yes, they do strive and there is no data that would indicate this doesn't apply to this part as well. Reliability of these engines is phenomenal by any standards and this includes MTBF.

flyingchanges

12th Sep 2015, 13:36

I recall video footage of the testing of RR engines where this very feature is demonstrated as a test that the engine has to pass before certification.

N1 only....

lomapaseo

12th Sep 2015, 13:38

Failsafe is extremely difficult to imagine without numbers relating to probabilities. Tis true that some parts of a machine such as wing spars are designed with lots of margin to long life with inspections and consideration of storm encounters, damage etc. But most parts can't meet this same requirement and still maintain the total aircraft weight low enough to get off the ground.

Instead mitigation against the consequences of their failing is considered in a probalistic hazard environment.

Things like redundancy/duplication, shielding etc. are considered at the aircraft system level.

If you want to get into this kind of discussion you have to be prepared to work with probabilities and even with that you are still left with some chance of what happened in this event.

We are waiting for the investigation to reveal the causal chain so that one or two of the links can be altered to minimize a future event. Don't for minute believe you can achieve zero engine disk failures, but you can minimize some specific identified cause based on new knowledge.

The message is always the reaction to what we learn and not blame.

pax2908

12th Sep 2015, 13:54

barit1

12th Sep 2015, 13:59

flyingchanges and funfly:
I recall video footage of the testing of RR engines where this very feature is demonstrated as a test that the engine has to pass before certification....
N1 only....

True it was N1, but the salient fact is that it's a BLADE (airfoil) deliberately released from the fan disk in the referenced video. All new engine models are required to endure this test; The containment for the relatively lightweight blade is established technology. But a DISC failure is several orders of magnitude worse, and containment quite impractical in a flying machine.

lomapaseo

12th Sep 2015, 14:42

For instance re. inspections mandated by this AD - who keeps track of the outcome of such inspections? Boeing and GE only? Assuming there is a trend (with enough statistics), are the reliability models revisited?

Inspection results are reported to the FAA and various models updated as needed. The FAA may update their AD based on any new findings.

At this point I have not seen any linkage between this event and an existing AD but I'm sure they are certainly looking at it quite closely.

Ka-2b Pilot

12th Sep 2015, 15:37

This type of failure is extremely rare but the investigators not only need to find the chain of events which likely caused it but also the following chain of events which caused a lot of fuel to leak out from somewhere, probably onto the ground where it then started to vaporise and subsequently ignited.
With all the videos and other evidence they collect from various sources it may be possible to determine where the fuel exited the aircraft and where the first ignition took place. All this is amongst the myriads of things they will have to look at before trying to determine what steps may need to be taken to minimise the chances of it happening again. These processes could take days, weeks or months, or longer. Then of course there will have to be cost and safety evaluations by various parties….
It has already been mentioned by some that the seat of the fire appeared to be below and not in the aircraft and one of my thoughts is that hot brakes could have ignited it or it could have been ignited by another fire already burning in or around the engine. It may of course be difficult to tell after all the damage caused by the fire(s).

dsc810

12th Sep 2015, 15:47

Many years ago I was told of an industrial turbine that had a disc failure probably operating in some third world country.
I was told the majority of the disc exited though the casing, out though the unit sound proofing canopy, across the site, though a fence, across a road, then it entered a house though the window 'climbed up' a rear wall, so now going vertically upwards, went through the ceilings, 1st floor and roof structure .......whereupon it finally ran out of energy

draglift

12th Sep 2015, 15:50

When you reject a takeoff and bring the aircraft to a halt the pilots are unable to see anything inboard of the wingtips without opening windows. They may or may not have received a left engine fire warning indication, it depends on whether the fire loop for that engine detected heat. If there was a rapidly expanding puddle of jet fuel on the tarmac that was burning and the flames were going on to the fuselage there would not be a fire indication.

I am sure the controllers were extremely busy coordinating fire services and go-arounds.However if the tower had a clear view of the aircraft would it not have been useful if the controller had told the aircraft that there was smoke and flames billowing from the left engine? Armed with that information the evacuation might have been initiated earlier.

I know that if I were to reject a takeoff, having informed ATC I was stopping I would be very grateful for any immediate feedback from ATC as to whether they could see any smoke, flames, inferno etc. Fortunately in the absence of any ATC info there was an extra flight crew member on hand to go back and see what the passengers and cabin crew could see.

If a passenger had panicked and opened door 2 left off their own bat there might have been a very different outcome. As it was what a great outcome and hats off to all concerned.

Airbubba

12th Sep 2015, 16:15

For the avoidance of doubt, that operator currently shows the following memory items for a (non ECL) large Boeing:

1) Aborted Eng Start/Eng Autostart (same single item drill)
2) Cabin Altitude
3) Eng Lim/Surge/Stall
4) Multiple Eng Fail/Stall
5) Fire Eng/Sev Damage/Sep
6) IAS Disagree

Thanks for sharing this. :ok:

Only the even numbers have memory items on the large Boeing where I work. :eek:

This can't be possible right? Surely I have that sim in the basement and am making this up. :confused:

I got the 13 items from Whip's earlier comment:

13 Checklists have memory items. Most of these have 1 or 2 lines
eg ABORTED ENGINE START
Fuel Control Switch ... Cutoff

I heartily congratulate Whip on his retirement and I think our latest reduction in memory items has been since his retirement.

Some of these lists would be called profiles and maneuvers for us, we are indeed expected to know them cold.

However, things that would at one time be considered just common sense troubleshooting, like cycling a transponder, have gradually found their way into a formal non-normal checklist in the AOM (and sometimes, but not always, also in the QRH). And now, Lord help you if you don't write it in the book (or type it on the screen), send a maintenance code and maybe file an ASAP report for CYA whenever anything happens.

Remember when airline manuals only came out every year or two with a few bulletins in between to save printing costs?

Now, with pubs on tablets, revisions seem to be slipstreamed into the manuals almost constantly. At least now you don't have to look at the changes to put the new pages in, right?

Apologies for talking shop so much on a professional pilots forum but these days with events like the BA LAS RTO how you did it is as important to the feds as what you did and how it turned out.

I hope I never see a high speed RTO in the plane (but I'm sure it will be on next year's sim training ;)) however if I do, hope my coworkers watch me and make sure that we all do it right.

DevX

12th Sep 2015, 16:16

Ka-2b pilot, kerosene's vapour is not flammable like petrol's is. ;)

dsc810, many years ago we had a reheated Spey let go of it's HP disc and it exited at 7-0-clock, chopped through the test cell's main fuel inlet pipe, hit the floor, ran up the test cell wall like a Catherine wheel, along the ceiling, down the opposite wall and buried itself into the substantial steel test cradle. The resulting fire was spectacular and the cell out of commission for weeks. And that's with a small engine. A modern large bypass engine's disc failure is a sight to behold! :eek:

mcloaked

12th Sep 2015, 16:24

DevX there is a good set of pictures of an HPT disc failure outcome at:

http://www.dauntless-soft.com/products/freebies/aaengine/.

Or a similar set of pictures is at http://criticaluncertainties.com/2011/01/22/the-american-airlines-boeing-767-223-rotor-burst/

DevX

12th Sep 2015, 16:31

Great pics, thanks. :ok:

Ka-2b Pilot

12th Sep 2015, 16:45

Porterhouse - see post 248, took a while to find it in all the c**p about baggage.

At DevX, Kerosene most definitely does vaporise and ignite, just at a much higher temperature (about 110 deg F) than petrol (-40F). If it didn't it wouldn't be used for fuel.

No Fly Zone

12th Sep 2015, 17:08

Quote: "If a passenger had panicked and opened door 2 left off their own bat there might have been a very different outcome."

I agree with you, but... Let's keep in mind that the cabin crew are well trained here! On such an aircraft, ALL regular doors are monitored/guarded by a crew member. Regardless of evacuation orders, they are trained to look out the window to assess any potential threat and Before popping their assigned door. If fire/smoke or other problems are noted, their job becomes one of keeping that door closed and directing SLC to another route.
The pix of this event suggest that opening L2 likely would have caused far more serious problems. That much I'm sure about.
What I do not know is how cabin crew monitors the Over-Wing exits in a similar event. In this case, popping the first Left Over-Wing hatch would have been almost as bad as opening L2. They do not have sufficient staff to monitor the Over-Wing pop (in or out) hatches and I do not know how they control their use. Does anyone out there know?
I think it is already obvious that this event demonstrates both extremely professional action by the BA crews, ATC, Fire Staff and others, as well as a significant measure of ordinary luck. Had the flight crew not noticed 'a problem' for an additional 20 seconds, this event would probably not be enjoying a happy ending. :D
The single item that continues to trouble me is the firm evidence the the IDIOT Passengers continue to haul their carry-on bags out with themselves. It is a stupid practice, very common and yes, I kow that I'm preaching to the choir.:{:ugh:

draglift

12th Sep 2015, 17:21

"What I do not know is how cabin crew monitors the Over-Wing exits in a similar event"

The 777-200 does not have over wing exits. Door 2 left is in front of the wing and door 3 L is behind the wing.

PersonFromPorlock

12th Sep 2015, 17:48

I see no signs of shrapnel damage. As some said much earlier in this thread it doesn't look like an uncontained disk rotor. Nor do I see signs of extreme pressure release (some call this an explosion). Instead the pictures of the externals of the engine pod and wing go hand in hand with a persistent ground pool fire. The photos I've seen of the engine are severely underexposed in the damaged area. Using Photoshop to bring up those areas, it's apparent that the cowling is shredded front-to-back (moreso at the back) at around the 7 o'clock position (viewed from the front), with torn metal sticking down, and that the rear edge of the cowling is missing from the inside of the pylon to roughly the 7 o'clock position (viewed from the rear). Whether this qualifies as 'shrapnel damage' I don't know, but it certainly looks chewed up.

smala01

12th Sep 2015, 17:49

As PAX sitting in the over wing exit seat over 100`s of flights - the only time i have ever been briefed to look for fire before opening the door was on Eastern Airways from LCY to IOM.

This should be a mandatory brief item.

Trash 'n' Navs

12th Sep 2015, 18:08

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/ntsb-detects-signs-of-uncontained-engine-failure-fro-416634/

Preliminary findings released by the US National Transportation Safety Board on 10 September indicated multiple breaches of the engine fan case in the region of the high-pressure compressor.

Several pieces of about 17.8-20.3cm (7-8in) in length from the high-pressure compressor spool were found on the runway, the NTSB says

DevX

12th Sep 2015, 18:18

Ka-2b pilot, you said, and I quote: ".....which caused a lot of fuel to leak out from somewhere, probably onto the ground where it then started to vaporise and subsequently ignited".
I was simply remarking that unlike petrol in that particular situation, kero would not ignite. ;)

vs69

12th Sep 2015, 18:35

The photo I've seen (not published elsewhere and I wont post as its not mine) was taken on the aft inbd side and shows all the px relief doors open and C duct material blown outwards consistent with an explosion/high velocity exit of high energy matter for the non daily mail readers... Very reminiscent of that AA 767 that lost hpt1 on eng runs.
Outstanding job by all concerned.

WHBM

12th Sep 2015, 18:53

Regarding having important items about your person, a typical piece of non-joined-up aviation procedure is that if you present yourself at security with the relevant items (passport, wallet with CCs, etc) in your pockets, at a number of stations, although not all (so it's not legislation) they will insist you take these off your person, and put them in your laptop bag, which is of course going up in the rack. We know about keys and phones but some places want all this off you as well. Dublin is particularly zealous in requiring this, there are many others. Now often I transfer them all back afterwards, but also can find the first time I need them that they have done the journey up in the rack.

Given the media reports of the subsequent treatment of the passengers from the accident flight at the hotel they were taken to in Las Vegas, which was, simplistically, no credit card = no service, no refreshments, no phone calls, nothing (a typical USA reaction to someone without a credit card, and probably also a standard Las Vegas reaction to anyone who has the temerity to check in without tipping the desk clerk US$20), let alone how you might anticipate be treated at immigration the next day on arrival with no passport, and given the eternity it takes bureaucracy nowadays to reissue passports, you can understand more why people would want these items with them.

Ka-2b Pilot

12th Sep 2015, 18:55

DevX, midday in the Nevada desert you suggest the surface temperature would not be 110ºF in the sun, which it would have been seconds before the aircraft cast its shadow. I think it is very possible. Surface temperature of runways in those conditions are often a lot higher than air temperature, often 50-60ºC, roughly 120-140ºF. At the time of the accident the air temperature was 39ºC, that is already 102ºF in the shade. The actual flash point of Jet-A fuel is 100ºF/38ºC.

dsc810

12th Sep 2015, 20:07

Story of a past crash - and guess what - the expensive laptop in the hand baggage left on the aircraft goes 'missing'
Well...now what a surprise... who'd have guessed it.
The Crash Landing of Southwest 345 | Nick Bradbury (http://nickbradbury.com/2013/07/28/the-crash-landing-of-southwest-345/)

Mr Optimistic

12th Sep 2015, 20:08

Mzguilty. Thank you for your reply. I am not arguing with anything you say, nor decrying the good job evidently done in this case. I am listening to what people say but I think others are not listening to me! Point I was trying to make is that it is all very well for us all to agree that the passengers acted selfishly in carrying their luggage, and acted clearly in contravention of instructions, nevertheless a hero went down the slide with a wheelie. Point is, should his action cause harm to another passenger, wouldn't that passenger have a complaint against the operator? Being incapacitated at the bottom of the slide could be a serious issue during a full evacuation.

If the instructions are clear but the staff member at the exit allowed contravention, then I reckon there is the risk of a claim.

So, yes, letting the guy go may well be for the greater good but you now have to argue in law against a passenger who was hurt in consequence of your actions.

Ultimate answer in my view is to shrink the overheads and restrict carry on but guess what, the safety is paramount mantra seems to stumble here against the convenience of passengers.

I hope they find the guy with the wheelie and make him eat it.

Retired DC9 driver

13th Sep 2015, 02:02

No_Fly_Zone wrote.

The pix of this event suggest that opening L2 likely would have caused far more serious problems. That much I'm sure about.
What I do not know is how cabin crew monitors the Over-Wing exits in a similar event. In this case, popping the first Left Over-Wing hatch would have been almost as bad as opening L2. They do not have sufficient staff to monitor the Over-Wing pop (in or out) hatches and I do not know how they control their use. Does anyone out there know?

I know at our Airline, the flight attendants come back and give the overwing exit row passengers a quick briefing on how to open this exit, and (sometimes ) advise them to check for fire first. Often it seems these passengers are just happy to find themselves with the extra leg room, and don't even listen to the briefing. Many seem to me to be incapable of opening/lifting the exit window, but F/As are reluctant to pull someone from one of these exit rows and find them another seat. .Some airlines even offer these rows to passengers for an upgrade price for more legroom.
In my opinion these rows should be offered to deadheading/retired crew first, who have trained in a smoke filled sim to pull the handle down, and throw the overwing exit out of the way. As I have, in mixed crew training with Flight Attendants. These are plug type doors, so you must pull the window exit in, which is counter intuitive.

Another safety issue that bothers me. I often find myself sitting far from the overwing exit rows, while untrained passengers sit there, possibly unable to open the over-wing exit in an emergency..

darobstacraw

13th Sep 2015, 02:23

lomapaseo

13th Sep 2015, 03:37

Just an observation from this thread, as all the cited disk failures have been in GE manufactured engines. Do the other manufacturers have a similar failure rate? or is this a peculiarity of GE's design and manufacturing processes that make their engines vulnerable to these types of failures?

Nothing statistically unique per hour flown when you include all fleets

Hopefully the problems are unique so all don't make the same mistakes.

I suspect the actual causal chain in this one relative to the fire will be unique.

ZFT

13th Sep 2015, 04:14

Another safety issue that bothers me. I often find myself sitting far from the overwing exit rows, while untrained passengers sit there, possibly unable to open the over-wing exit in an emergency..

Whilst I do not dispute what you state, if this really is an issue, then it's a regulatory matter, not an operational matter.

DevX

13th Sep 2015, 04:35

I'm well aware of the flash point of kero Ka-2b, but that's not to say that it's guaranteed to combust every time at that point. In my personal experience of engine failures conditions have to be ideal otherwise it's it's more likely that a flash over won't take place, therefore I still don't hold with your original theory.

framer

13th Sep 2015, 08:04

I half expected someone to produce a camping gaz & wok for mid-flight meal.

You joke but I have had it happen on a flight where I was operating as the First Officer.

Basil

13th Sep 2015, 09:52

. . . overwing exit row passengers . . .
In my opinion these rows should be offered to deadheading/retired crew first
Sounds good to me.

Haraka

13th Sep 2015, 16:41

Originally Posted by Retired DC9 driver
. . . overwing exit row passengers . . .
In my opinion these rows should be offered to deadheading/retired crew first
Over thirty years ago, being a frequent long haul flier in the defence industry ,ex military and married at the time to an ex-BA stewardess, I suggested a similar type of scheme .
The idea was for fit, regular, passengers from suitable backgrounds in industry to undergo a short course of airline ( e.g. B.A.) cabin training, including some "friend in the cabin" aspects for some situations, as well as being able to bodily assist in cabin evacuation.
Such individuals would be listed and identified on booking and discreetly seated by an exit, with the cabin crew being made aware of the fact during crew brief.
A poll of B.A. flight deck crew met with an enthusiastic response - provided said selected individuals abstained from alcohol during flight. Through my company into SBAC, there was a positive feedback with other companies expressing willingness to fund their participants through any such training.
Unfortunately B.A. , via a signed letter from Colin Marshall, thought such a scheme unnecessary since the airline had the fullest confidence in its current procedures - a near identical letter coming back from BALPA.
Funnily enough ,some time later on a B.A.TriStar flight back from New Delhi in rough weather, the cabin crew were very supportive of my volunteering to clamber around the cabin strapping in confused and frightened Indian passengers.
As a P.S. I do believe that it was then a policy, in some airlines at least, to preferentially seat passengers of a particular profile on certain flights, by escape exits in any event.

Sober Lark

13th Sep 2015, 17:51

Another safety issue that bothers me. I often find myself sitting far from the overwing exit rows, while untrained passengers sit there, possibly unable to open the over-wing exit in an emergency

https://encrypted-tbn3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcT-T884-hMLm3u7paVe04y_Bkew49gM1pW-F1skb5vGyFvZVIsIpg

alexb757

13th Sep 2015, 19:40

Some interesting posts and links here, some accurate, others not so much.
As one who was there, I'd like to share some aspects.

This was a low-speed/low-energy RTO, around 80kts IAS. Apparently, no prior warning or abnormal indication, just two "booms" followed by an immediate engine fire indication with both bottles fired, followed by the evac.

The aircraft was departing on RWY 7L from A8 intersection, which is standard for that airport configuration and for aircraft less than MGTOW, which this flight was (170 SOB).

When it came to a final stop, it was just west of A6, remaining on the RWY, left of center line and tire marks clearly visible as it decelerated. No tires blown; just one slightly deflated. No brake fire.

The main reason why the emergency services got there so quick and put out the fire in under two minutes was the location of the aircraft. It was immediately due south of the fire station crossing one, parallel taxiway, TWY B. Took about a minute to get there whereas the FAA-mandated response time is 3 minutes for the first fire truck to reach the mid-point of the emergency runway. It was less than half that time, so some luck also involved here.

Six out of a total of eight slides/doors were activated. The two NOT activated were L2 and L3 - for obvious reasons. The evacuation, when it was initiated was very quick, majority of injuries coming as a result of evacuating which seems to be common in incidents like this. The aircraft has NO over wing exits (windows).

ATC did not have to notify nor did the crew ask if there was fire or smoke - it was pretty obvious by everyone after a few moments and the fire trucks and other first responders were ALREADY on the way before any crash alarms sounded. Again, the fire station is in close proximity to that runway location, the visual impact unmistakeable, and the crew had fired both bottles with the engine fire handle still lit (hence the evacuation command).

Damage to the aircraft was concentrated to the #1 engine cowling, especially on the inboard side and underneath (Mainly smoke and fire damage), inboard leading edge of that wing, along the fuselage and some four to five windows scorched. Some of the fire went under and around and there is smoke/fire damage on the opposite side, although less intensive as you would expect from the source. Difficult to ascertain any evidence of penetration of the cowling. However, plenty of bent metal parts and pieces hanging down, still attached, again on the inboard part.

The debris field behind the aircraft depicted several engine parts including pieces of cowling, compressor or turbine blades or parts thereof, flanges, metal collars and small bolts.

Whatever the ultimate cause, the preliminary NTSB report, evidence at the scene and research of previous accidents with similar characteristics, all seem to point to a catastrophic failure of either compressor or turbine parts inside the #1 engine. As for the subsequent fire, my best guess is rupture of some fuel lines, a gearbox or the oil/fuel cooler. It is my understanding that no fuel tank was breached.

Investigation and engine tear down continuing with NTSB, AAIB, BA, GE, Boeing and FAA FSDO working in unison all week and likely in to next week also.

Lives were definitely saved, no question. Kudos to the crew, LAS ARFF and rescue units, ATCT and all the other agencies involved. It's not every day or even every year that you have an incident like this and everyone acted professionally and quickly, with the sole exception of a few passengers! Frankly, that part was not noticed in the immediate aftermath as there was a lot going on and the vast majority had already exited by then and well away from the aircraft. :ok:

suninmyeyes

13th Sep 2015, 20:26

Alexb757

Great post, thanks for the detail.

alexb757

13th Sep 2015, 20:36

Thanks, suninmyeyes......it sure was surreal watching it happen but our respective autopilots ( pun intended!) kicked in and we did what we are trained and expected to do. So glad it was a good outcome and I'm sure it will be fully followed up in what we can all learn from it and do differently next time.

Suzeman

13th Sep 2015, 20:45

I know that if I were to reject a takeoff, having informed ATC I was stopping I would be very grateful for any immediate feedback from ATC as to whether they could see any smoke, flames, inferno etc. Fortunately in the absence of any ATC info there was an extra flight crew member on hand to go back and see what the passengers and cabin crew could see.

https://clyp.it/jrvdzhrw

At 00:54 - Stopping message from BA2276 which crosses with ATC who have obviously seen what is going on and are already telling a Delta to go around. The DAL requires confirmation of go round instructions as the transmission is garbled by the cross with the stop message

At 01:09 - ATC transmission saying fire services on the way stepped on by BA 2276 reporting a fire and requesting fire services

01:17 - ATC confirm RFFS on the way

01:53 - aircraft reports evacuation.

02:01 - someone (RFFS?) cleared all the way down 7 Left

alexb757

13th Sep 2015, 23:10

A little more info to help explain.......and I've listened to the tapes, spoken to the ATCT supervisor on duty and was part of the "action" on the day.

First, and as you can imagine, the controller was VERY busy and kept her cool with at least two go-arounds in quick succession and a major incident developing. Also, being a dynamic situation, there is the inevitable stepping on transmissions.

By the time anyone could get a word in edgewise, both controller and pilots KNEW there was a fire, no question. Therefore, there was little point in taking up valuable R/T time with the obvious. In fact, the pilots did eventually call for fire services and the controller confirmed on the way. You are not going to get a picture perfect or textbook response every time to an emergency situation. They both did exceptional, in my opinion.

Cannot say for sure what the third pilot was saying/doing in the cabin prior to evacuation but in any event, one uses CRM (Crew Resource Management or whatever your airline calls it). An extra set of eyes and comms is always good.

The evacuation command would come at the end of the engine fire checklist, once it's established the fire is not out. That's why there's a "longish " gap.

The sequence of actions in any abnormal situation during the start of the takeoff roll is:

1. Stop aircraft.
2. Assess the situation.
3. Do the necessary drills per the checklist and verify all complete.
4. Make the evac decision - if required.
5. Make the PA call.
And get out using nearest exit........

Hopefully, this explains any or all gaps in R/T and what some have described as a long time to evacuate the aircraft. The crew were also VERY busy!

The almost indecipherable transmission near the end is the airport operations vehicle requesting approval to enter the runway. Like police and other emergency services vehicles, they all have vehicle call signs, big numbers on the side and roof and a full iComm radio set up with ATC and aircraft plus a lot more!

4468

14th Sep 2015, 07:25

I haven't read this entire thread, but if what alexb757 says is correct, then I'm staggered. Are there REALLY people suggesting that 60 secs is a 'long' time, to bring a 300 tonne jet, from 100mph to an unexpected stop, run methodically through the Fire Eng checklist. (to give the extinguishant a chance!) whilst running in parallel a continuous situational assessment. Before carefully and methodically reading through the Evacuation Checklist, and finally commanding an evacuation!

60 seconds to methodically, AND ACCURATELY run through that lot, seems remarkably swift to me. That's why there are so many professionals here, who believe the actions of the crew in an exceptional situation, saved many lives.

As was once said to me. Pilots (and in this case, crew too) don't get paid for what they do. They get paid for what they CAN do! And these most definitely drew heavily on their bank of experience and top quality training!

Well done all.

Volume

14th Sep 2015, 07:49

they never mention bags being left on evacuation.Well, they mention "all belongings" but people tend to interprete things differently these days... If they do not say "bags" explicitly, bags are fine. It is like (no)smoking and e-cigarettes...

Do the other manufacturers have a similar failure rate? or is this a peculiarity of GE's design and manufacturing processes that make their engines vulnerable to these types of failures?Basically the rate of uncontained failures is about the same, but as numbers are low, statistics are not very mature. Of course there are subtle differences, if you split your compressor in 3 (LP, IP, HP) each of them is smaller and hence stiffer, so critical speed (resonance of bending and rotation) or margin to critical speed is higher, hence more tolerance for cracks or manufacturing flaws. On the other hand your lubrication system gets more complicated if you have 3 spools, so that creates additional failure cases.
Compared to 50 years ago, jet engines are incredibly reliable.

Madbob

14th Sep 2015, 10:05

Suzeman

14th Sep 2015, 10:46

Thanks alexb757 for filling in a bit of background; in these situations there's always a lot going on that would not be obvious to people who weren't there. And as you say, in a dynamic situation there will inevitably be stepping on transmissions.

It looks to me to be a textbook example of how it should be done, so congratulations to crew, ATC, RFFS and other airport personnel.

ILS27LEFT

14th Sep 2015, 11:52

Thanks so much for your posts alexb757.
Training and experience are absolutely essential during any crisis situation, but alone these two factors are rarely sufficient if we look back and carefully analyse past serious aviation incidents.
Common sense can be very helpful but it is especially the ability to remain as calm as possible during extreme "crisis" pressure that can make the difference in between success and failure, simply because our brain does not function properly in "panic mode", whatever the experience and training, if we panic our assessment capabilities are seriously deteriorated.
This incident has shown how important is to remain calm under pressure, this concept applies to all parties involved.
This skill is reinforced through training and experience but there is also an element of "having the right person in the right job", this is why we must urgently stop the greedy aviation trend to indefinitely reduce costs (lower salaries, longer hours, etc) because the end result will be catastrophic.

No doubts that the very complex response to this incident was fantastic: pilots, cabin crew, atc and fire services all did an incredible job.
This is different from the Hudson river where the hero was basically only one.
I have learnt again that we need well trained and experienced people in aviation, we cannot make the mistake on focusing only on pilots, ATC and firemen are also essential, as it is the cabin crew staff, e.g. too often CC are seen as simple "cabin service" employees when the reality is that they are absolutely essential to achieve a successful evacuation which means saving many lives through a very quick escape.
Evacuations do not happen very often, but they do happen indeed, next time could be any of us either as passengers or on duty, this incident could have killed many people if mishandled hence we must continue to reiterate how important it is to establish good working conditions in aviation because this simply means good safety:mad:

aox

14th Sep 2015, 13:01

Where a hull loss (as here) is caused by the direct failure of an engine (admittedly not proven in this case) would the engine manufacturer/maintenance organisation be liable for the loss?

Here it would appear that the flight deck crew did all they could to deal with the emergency and to mitigate the damage, the AFS got there as fast as might be reasonably expected but still the fire penetrated the fuselage and cause what is likely to be damage beyond economic repair.

I suspect that there will be claims (and counter claims) between BA and GE to sort this one out; does anyone know what happens in reality? In motor insurance there is a "knock for knock" approach does the same apply to aviation?

A curious MB.

I don't know. I assume it will be a matter of some complicated negotiation between the companies and their insurers, and depending on the investigation report, whether liability is incurred by negligence or not.

Whatever they end up doing with that aircraft, even just the loss of use can be expensive. While talking to a loss adjuster some years ago I said this must be small beer compared to what you are used to. He mentioned a catering truck had driven into a nose leg at Heathrow. £7 million.

Dopsonj

14th Sep 2015, 15:07

Gizmodo US just posted this article;

The FAA Warned Boeing About the Flaw That Caused a 777 to Explode in Las Vegas (http://gizmodo.com/the-faa-warned-boeing-about-the-flaw-that-caused-a-777-1730504726)

Refering to this document;

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2415740-2011-15-06.html

Detailing an AD published in 2011 reference HPCR 8-10 stage spool for cracks.

sky9

14th Sep 2015, 15:18

How does this play out for ETOPS certification?

pax2908

14th Sep 2015, 15:45

@lomapaseo (#421), I am still curious, although indeed the matter which is the subject of that AD may or may not be related to this incident. I assume, in case of a positive result, it has to be fixed right away before returning it to service. Perhaps also some more extensive inspection is triggered? So in fact it would not (should not) be possible to learn how fast the cracks develop, from these inspections alone. And therefore, I do not see how to measure the effectiveness of this AD alone.

Bergerie1

14th Sep 2015, 16:00

alexb757
Thank you for your excellent post, it is good to have some facts and expert opinion from someone who was there instead of endless speculation by so many non-professionals.

lomapaseo

14th Sep 2015, 16:44

PAX2908

I assume, in case of a positive result, it has to be fixed right away before returning it to service. Perhaps also some more extensive inspection is triggered? So in fact it would not (should not) be possible to learn how fast the cracks develop, from these inspections alone.

In general (not necessarily this one) That is what they do. These material have lots of tolerance to damage if inspected often enough. Some damage is always assumed (escapes from manufacturing inspections) and even with those you ought to make to even the longest overhaul interval one can imagine. However if the damage occurs in service (lots of reasons) than one needs some updated assessments of where and how much to redo it's life expectancy between specialized inspections.

In the end the expectations as approved by the regulator may not be 100% but they historically have done a very good job at preventing loss of aircraft when taken into context with the ruggedness of the aircraft to an engine failure.

So standby by for updated actions in this regard and hopefully some other aircraft type or engine model will not repeat these lessons learned.

tdracer

14th Sep 2015, 17:34

How does this play out for ETOPS certification?
It shouldn't have any affect - the GE90 shutdown rate remains impressively low at 1 or 2 per million hours (which is much better than what's required for even 330 minute ETOPS).
Uncontained engine failures are always considered to be potentially catastrophic independent of any ETOPS considerations (recall the close call from the uncontained turbine burst on the Qantas A380, and it still had 3 engines running).
So the focus will be on what caused the uncontained failure, and how to prevent a future occurrence.

overstress

14th Sep 2015, 20:16

alexb747:

Cannot say for sure what the third pilot was saying/doing in the cabin prior to evacuation but in any event, one uses CRM (Crew Resource Management or whatever your airline calls it). An extra set of eyes and comms is always good.

The evacuation command would come at the end of the engine fire checklist, once it's established the fire is not out. That's why there's a "longish " gap.

The sequence of actions in any abnormal situation during the start of the takeoff roll is:

1. Stop aircraft.
2. Assess the situation.
3. Do the necessary drills per the checklist and verify all complete.
4. Make the evac decision - if required.
5. Make the PA call.
And get out using nearest exit........

Not quite.

The evacuation checklist supercedes all others. If the crew are commencing, say, a Fire engine checklist and it becomes clear to the Capt that an evacuation is necessary, he will immediately ask for the Evacuation checklist, he will not wait for FO to finish the Fire engine checklist. The evacuation command stops all other checklists.

r75

14th Sep 2015, 21:04

Having retired from looking after 77s and 74s it is refreshing to read such a factual reply from Alexb757 .I too agree with the comment about the time lag he speaks of,this crew were merely going through that check list.What comes over in this whole incident is how everybody just did their job without panicking and in an ordered way. Every person involved should be thanked on this one.Hopefully in years to come,the footage will be used in training videos.....textbook. I am not going to voice an opinion on the hand baggage,there are enough comments here already.

fdr

15th Sep 2015, 02:14

Doesn't count, failure before EEP.

alexb757

15th Sep 2015, 03:44

alexb747:

Not quite.

The evacuation checklist supercedes all others. If the crew are commencing, say, a Fire engine checklist and it becomes clear to the Capt that an evacuation is necessary, he will immediately ask for the Evacuation checklist, he will not wait for FO to finish the Fire engine checklist. The evacuation command stops all other checklists.

Yes, you could be right here. It's over 5 years since my last flight and check ride, so I'm doing this from memory. Plus, I've worked for 5 different airlines on 6 different aircraft! All slightly different SOPs.

According to my old 757 Emergency Evacuation checklist, there are several conditional statements.

After the Parking Brake is set, it states IF evac MAY be necessary, when aircraft comes to a stop, announce "Remain seated, Flight Attendants prepare".

Then,

If evac IS Necessary:

All Fire Switches.......Override & Pull
All Fire Switches(if required).....Rotate
Rotate engine fire switches in opposite directions.
Announce: " EVACUATE"
Then goes in to supplementary info.

I was not in the cockpit, nor do I have intimate knowledge of BA procedures. So, I was only making an educated guess for those that have no idea about emergency checklists.

The question is, of course, at what stage did the crew realize they had a fire and that fire was NOT out and evacuation imminent. Only the CA/FOs can answer that.

I suspect now they may have started the Engine Fire Checklist and perhaps switched to the Emergency Evacuation one early on.

Perhaps a BA 777 pilot can offer further info on this.

I also notice that a lot of engine fire/severe damage/separation (but not all) checklists assume you are in flight and have the rider "land at nearest suitable airport".

Of course, this was on the ground, fire was initially there and likely for at least a minute, it was not confirmed it was out, therefore an evacuation was the right call.

Be interested in others, still flying, take. And/or check airmen/training captains.

I'm still learning and wish to know, although my wings are now hung up. Thanks.

msbbarratt

15th Sep 2015, 06:33

Given that the AD related to the 8-10 compressor stages was published in 2011, hasn't there been plenty of time in which to redesign and fit replacement parts to eliminate the problem across the fleet?

Sure, doing so would have been expensive. However, if this had turned into a fatal accident, avoidance of that expense might now look negligent.

This raises questions as to how long a known and potentially (and in this case very nearly) fatal defect should be allowed to persist regardless of the perceived likelihood.

Now that this has happened, it is also worth questioning whether the industry has its priorities right. GE/Boeing were not in favour of the FAA's inspection regime, presumably because of the cost and inconvenience to their customers. Four years down the line the expense could have been billions in fines and compensation had the BA crew not succeeded in conducting a textbook evacuation. This sounds like penny pinching on a large scale, and the consequences might have been the lives of passengers.

Writing as a passenger, that doesn't look great to me. What would have looked great was a proactive replacement program in excess of the FAA's requirement starting 4 years ago. Writing as an engineer it is yet another example of big businesses failing to acknowledge and act on "unlikely" risks with a catastrophic outcome merely for the sake of small amounts of short term money.

GE/Boeing have just had a lucky escape; they may well end up carrying the can for this one. Thanks to the BA crew the can isn't so big. If the NTSB finds that it was indeed the 8-10 compressor that failed then that won't exactly help GE/Boeing in their sales campaigns...

stagger

15th Sep 2015, 07:20

Doesn't count, failure before EEP.

Are you suggesting that the IFSD rates used to underpin ETOPS certification for a particular operator depend only on IFSDs that occur during the periods of ETOPs flight itself?

HeathrowAirport

15th Sep 2015, 13:37

Despite what the planespotting websites say, G-VIIO has not been written off yet.

Damage isn't as bad as first thought, although not an official word it's likely to be repaired. Problem isn't the wingbox, as previously mentioned the fuel tank wasn't penetrated. Fuel leak source was engine #1. If wing spar isn't significantly damaged, a new engine, slats, composite panelling and a repaint etc will see her fly again.

According to the latest news. One 744 and 767 from our longhaul programmes will remain for an extra few years.

oldoberon

15th Sep 2015, 23:59

fix and sell to third world airline?

would anyone buy it?

What is frame number (asking for a friend)

Una Due Tfc

16th Sep 2015, 00:22

You would sell it for far less than you would spend getting it airworthy again. They have a large 772 fleet so take # 2, avionics, gear, brakes, apu, doors, hydraulics, rudder, spoilers, tabs, undamaged slats/flaps, panels, fuel lines, galleys, lavs etc out and use them for spares.

I know many of their 744s are self insured, not sure about the older triplers

Metro man

16th Sep 2015, 00:48

Up to the insurer, who have people employed to crunch the numbers in fix/write off cases. However the QANTAS B744 overrun in BKK was fixed even though it wasn't economic, in order to avoid the stigma of a hull loss.

Machinbird

16th Sep 2015, 01:22

Aircraft structural aluminum alloys are heat treated/aged metal.
If the wing box was heated excessively, the metal could lose strength without being holed.

The fuel on the other side of the panels acts to absorb heat from the metal and initially will limit the temperature rise, but when the fuel gets hot enough, there may be a loss of heat transfer as boiling of fuel begins and the metal can then begin to cook.

They will probably do hardness tests of the wing skin to evaluate its strength in the heat affected areas.

DaveReidUK

16th Sep 2015, 06:43

Damage isn't as bad as first thought, although not an official word it's likely to be repaired.

A 16-year-old -200 ?

I'd put money on it being towed to a remote corner of McCarran and quietly dismantled. Time will tell.

WindSheer

16th Sep 2015, 10:59

Having looked at the seriousness of the fire in this one, if that had happened on immediate climb out, I think the odds would have been against them getting back.

The way the crew dealt with this shows such positive traits in BA's CRM culture. Hats off to pilots and cabin crew :ok::ok:

barit1

16th Sep 2015, 14:15

One strategy: Jack up the nameplate, install a new airframe.

HeathrowAirport

16th Sep 2015, 15:27

Well when G-YMMM was w/o BA was left with only one spare covering LHR/LGW (based from LHR) 772 operations. Cost is irrelevant, the long-term impact of having an operation run ragged isn't cost efficient in the long-run.

What @Machinbird says, Boeing will Material test the aircraft. G-VIIO had a D Check in Cardiff last year, and B check end of last Year. According to The BA Source. But the problem isn't the wingbox, it's the wing-spar that was exposed in this case.

alexb757

16th Sep 2015, 18:10

Windsheer:

"Having looked at the seriousness of the fire in this one, if that had happened on immediate climb out, I think the odds would have been against them getting back.

The way the crew dealt with this shows such positive traits in BA's CRM culture. Hats off to pilots and cabin crew"

Whole heartedly agree with you first paragraph....

Great action from the crews, yes, but let's not forget the LAS ARFF and Airport Operations who also played a critical part in all this.

One of the key factors involved in a positive outcome for this incident was the runway being used (7L, intersection A8 - look at the airport diagram for KLAS/LAS). It is in close proximity to the fire station and that's why everyone was able to get on scene in about a minute - well inside the FAA-mandated time of three minutes. And the fire was extinguished in another 45 seconds. Where seconds matter, there is no doubt that location was a factor in the incident.

Footnote: GE engine now removed and en route to a GE facility. Airframe remains at the LAS cargo ramp............

tdracer

16th Sep 2015, 18:46

The event aircraft shows as over 84,500 hours and 12,700 cycles.
Given the residual value of the systems, avionics, and remaining engine it wouldn't take much of a repair bill to exceed the value of the airframe.

Bleve

16th Sep 2015, 20:37

Having looked at the seriousness of the fire in this one, if that had happened on immediate climb out, I think the odds would have been against them getting back.

They were stationary on the ground with a five knot prevailing wind from the left blowing the fire against the fuselage. Airborne the relative wind would have been ~150-200 knots blowing the fire aft along and through the engine. I doubt very much they would have had any fuselage damage at all. That's not to say they wouldn't have had a serious problem, just not the fuselage damage that resulted in this case.

misd-agin

16th Sep 2015, 23:11

Bleve - exactly

Metro man

17th Sep 2015, 01:29

QANTAS went through a period of uncontained engine failures a few years ago on its RR powered B744s. A modification was unable to be carried out as they had closed their RR engine shop and every other facility in the world was busy doing work for other airlines.

Aircraft were kept flying with a known risk, could it be something similar here ?

Machinbird

17th Sep 2015, 01:55

NTSB has published a picture of the left side of the failed engine following removal.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CPDFq0tVAAAlNfT.jpg:large

It would have been nice of them to show the other side so we can see the holes in the case and the fuel manifold and have something factual to talk about.:rolleyes:

anson harris

17th Sep 2015, 13:09

...have something factual to talk about

Don't let that stop you.

WindSheer

17th Sep 2015, 17:08

alexb757

Great action from the crews, yes, but let's not forget the LAS ARFF and Airport Operations who also played a critical part in all this.

Yes, but I think these are two separate things.

The fire service did a very good and prompt job, but it was ultimately the a/c crew that saved loss of life through the good decision to get everyone off when they did. Much more of a delay in that decision could have been disastrous through a smoke filled fuselage, regardless of whether fire crews were present.

Hats off to all!!!

mcloaked

17th Sep 2015, 19:01

Some comments that the engine on this aircraft sas not subject to the AD referred to earlier in this thread: Failed Engine Type On BA 777 Was Subject To 2011 AD | Aero-News Network (http://www.aero-news.net/aNNTicker.cfm?do=main.textpost&id=059a8eb0-44dd-49a1-aea3-5527ed7c503c)

lomapaseo

17th Sep 2015, 19:28

Some comments that the engine on this aircraft sas not subject to the AD referred to earlier in this thread: Failed Engine Type On BA 777 Was Subject To 2011 AD | Aero-News Network

Nevertheless this latest incident shows what can happen, whether it's the same cause or not might or might not be important.

It's not good to have yet another new problem requiring different fixes so that is the news to follow in the future.

neilki

17th Sep 2015, 21:01

@ILS27LEFT, I'm pretty sure there were a similar number of heroes in USAir 1549. An experienced captain, calm and methodical F/O, effective Cabin Crew, responsive and insightful ATC and both a coordinated and ad hoc emergency response comprising multiple agencies and selfless civilians in the middle of a city of 20 million people enduring a horrible snow storm..
This BA crew did a great job, clearly lessons from Airtours learned, but it's ironic that, in the age of LOFT and SBT this very scenario considered laughably simplistic and unlikely. How cheated (relieved) if in your next Sim ride you got an engine fire at 80KIAS in day VMC followed by a first class deadhead home and a book deal :-)
Funny aside; i was riding home in a UPS DC8 a few years ago and #2 let go at 500'.
On hearing the fire bell The F/O flying turned to the FE and said 'Why are you testing that NOW?'!
neilki.

stuckgear

18th Sep 2015, 21:35

Given the residual value of the systems, avionics, and remaining engine it wouldn't take much of a repair bill to exceed the value of the airframe.

BER is where it looks like it will be.

alexb757

19th Sep 2015, 02:49

For the next few days a group of Boeing engineers and BA reps evaluating the airfroame/hull then it's off to meetings with Lloyds to crunch the numbers.................:hmm:

DevX

19th Sep 2015, 20:55

I would have thought they wanted a meeting with GE. :}

Airbubba

20th Sep 2015, 15:38

BER is where it looks like it will be.

What is BER? Thanks.

eckhard

20th Sep 2015, 15:49

Beyond Economical Repair?

Airbubba

20th Sep 2015, 16:46

Beyond Economical Repair?

That's it. :ok:

It is a legal term I hadn't run across as a pilot. Well, now that I think about it, an insurance guy used that term years ago to tell me he was giving me a check for my car instead of fixing it.

Thanks again!

See: What does Beyond Economic Repair (BER) mean? (http://www.123.ie/customer-care/making-a-claim/i-have-a-claim/what-does-Beyond-Economic-Repair-mean)

stilton

21st Sep 2015, 07:51

No question this crew did an outstanding job.

Just curious why 1L and 4L were used ?

clipstone1

21st Sep 2015, 09:29

well having been with some people who arrange the insurance for IAG last week, they said this 777 was insured at about $30m, not a chance is that an economic repair, with a decent lifed GE coming in at over $20m alone.....

anartificialhorizon

21st Sep 2015, 17:02

What you have to be aware of in the number crunching for the purposes of whether it is deemed BER or not, is that the costs for the engine damage will almost certainly be excluded.

Much the same as, if the engine in your car breaks down (say due to a piston failure or overheat causing the block to crack), and you coast to a halt at the side of the road, running off into a ditch, your insurers will not pay to fix your engine. Only the resultant damage to the car itself.

Therefore, without knowing the extent of damage to fuselage, pylon, wing etc. you can probably take off something in the region of US$10 to 20 million from the repair costs for the engine, which will be for BA's (or possibly GE's) account. My feeling, this bird will certainly not fly again....

lomapaseo

21st Sep 2015, 17:36

boxmover

21st Sep 2015, 17:40

Have any 777 been broken for parts yet?

If mot then I would guess that would make the airframe of particular interest and value to the second hand parts industry.

DaveReidUK

21st Sep 2015, 18:43

Surely the main causal factor for the engine failure will play a part in the calculations or computations - yes.

No, it's completely irrelevant.

netstruggler

21st Sep 2015, 19:54

Don't some airlines rent the engines - paying by the operating hour?

No idea if that's the case here though.

lomapaseo

21st Sep 2015, 20:11

Surely the main causal factor for the engine failure will play a part in the calculations or computations - yes.

It's the unexpected consequences you insure for. The more unexpected the cheaper the insurance per coverage

Hypothetical example: FOD to blading is often absorbed by many (not all) airlines while wear induced part failure may not be insured by most.

The consequences of FOD or most blade failures may not be insured up to the aircraft level like pylons. At that level the insurance may kick in.

There is very little to do with blame other than behind the scene divvy up between multiple insurance risk takers in a consortium. In the end the insurance may go up for both the engine manufacturers (plural) as well as other aircraft manufacturers. It's often too difficult for the insurance carriers to redo risk based on one or two events.

Message:As a manufacturer show diligence and you pay a lower fee than your competitor (its hopefully a very small percentage of your total sales)