Transavia (HV5068/TRA3K) emergency landing

[Aireps]

A Transavia B738 (flight HV5068 / TRA3K) made an emergency landing in high winds at Amsterdam Schiphol yesterday.

Its destination was Rotterdam - The Hague Airport, Netherlands, but it diverted to Amsterdam Schiphol, after a requested diversion to its alternate Eindhoven was refused by Eindhoven ATC, for reasons yet unknown.

Wind conditions at Eindhoven were far less extreme.

Flight track: HV5068 - Flights list - Flightradar24 (http://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/hv5068/#6e8e91c)

Details on the incident: Incident: Transavia B738 at Amsterdam on Jul 25th 2015, severe windshear on final and go around, pilot comment "scary", control problems, low fuel, no flaps (http://avherald.com/h?article=489d4c3f&opt=0)

Comms with TWR before, during and after the go-around at EHAM: https://youtu.be/F9LruOa-hzA

Final approach and landing: http://youtu.be/Nio38kxye-I

Filmed inside the cabin: Transavia: vliegtuig volgde noodlandingsprocedures | NOS (http://nos.nl/artikel/2049025-transavia-vliegtuig-volgde-noodlandingsprocedures.html) (cabin attendant repeating: "Head against the backrest in front of you!")

The aircraft is showing flaps up during landing. Is this normal procedure in high (cross)wind conditions? Could someone shed some light on this please?

Thanks.

[RAT 5]

It is quite extraordinary that an airport with 6 runways can be reduced to being almost a single runway when mother nature doesn't cooperate. The worst storm winds are NW and that is between the runway directions. With sever cross winds several runways are not an option.
There are not many runways aligned NW in the Benelux. RTM is 24; thus 300 is nasty. RW27 at AMS is better, but then the winds were stronger. EIN is RW22/04 so even worse; not a good choice of alternate. It would seem to me the EDDK Cologne with 32L/R would be the best fuel choice. As one correspondent on the story in AV said, extra fuel for diversion needs to be for a place where you have a solid guarantee to land. If destination is dodgy you must have an escape route or full tanks. No ideas about the flaps; F25/30 would be more normal for gusty X-winds. The landing seems to have been well controlled and RW27 is well long enough for the higher speed.
Yesterday was nasty for Benelux; choice of runways limited.

[cowabunga438]

Flaps up not standard.

Anything other than flaps,30 or 40 requires the use of the ground proximity flap inhibit switch.

I don't know why you would use flaps up. Landing distance is almost totally dependant on landing speed. The qrh, nor other manuals indicate that flaps up is a good idea in any situation other than the flaps not actually working.

[kcockayne]

Bloody good landing at high speed.
Congratulations.

[Capt. Inop]

The qrh, nor other manuals indicate that flaps up is a good idea in any situation other than the flaps not actually working.

Something that might have been the reason here?

[Edgington]

Transavia is saying there was no technical problem with the aircraft, that would suggest the crew decided to do a flapless landing.

Listening to the atc recordings it seems atc told them to expect vectors after being rejected by Eindhoven for a diversion. Sounds a bit like the crew did not choose to go Amsterdam, and after the Go-Around in AMS the pilot asks for a more suitable runway. Seems they were channelled into going for Schiphol and lost situational awareness.

[Capt. Inop]

Seems they were channelled into going for Schiphol and lost situational awareness

Well, at least they didn't forget the gear. :ok:

[RAT 5]

Transavia is saying there was no technical problem with the aircraft, that would suggest the crew decided to do a flapless landing.

That would suggest insider knowledge, or friend of a friend. It would be interesting to know the individual experience/qualifications of the 2 pilots and to hear the CVR prior to deciding this non-normal landing configuration. Was there a step cockpit experience gradient? It's not common these days in the LoCo's to have old fart RHS guys. Equally it's quite common not to have old farts in LHS, but I expect not too much in HV.

[plhought]

I'm a little lost on the lack of TR deployment as well.

Perhaps the wind shear experienced left some stains on the seats and they thought a flapless approach would allow them more energy to power out of it?

Or were they really that low on fuel that the pilots were planning for flameout?

Neat to see a high-speed landing like that but this one leaves me scratching me head a bit...

[Baja]

No flap landing: Giving the pilots the benefit of doubt, maybe they were concerned about low fuel and wanted less drag or a different deck angle to avoid seeing the fuel pickup becoming uncovered. Or .. the extra speed afforded more speed and thus greater rudder authority that he felt was needed. If any of this were the case, his decision was using his emergency authority. I have no way to know without talking to the Captain. Just trying to give some credit until we know otherwise.

[JanetFlight]

Does anyone knows or can explain why the absence of TR upon touchdown and was only activated on the last sector of the landing roll?

[greybeard]

The introduction of reverse may have been a thrust vector they did not want as it could pull them off the centre line.

OR being so thankful to be down and safe, didn't get it done.

My big windy days in Europe were in and out of Antwerp, NOT ANY FUN at all.

Well done to that and other crews caught out in all that weather

:D:ok:

[JammedStab]

Assuming no mechanical fault with the aircraft.....I guess doing a no flap landing will save fuel over flaps 30/40. Perhaps they were really low on fuel.

But would a flaps 1 landing be a better option to get the slats out. I don't think it would burn any more.

But why no thrust reversers on a landing that is very fast.

[RAT 5]

A higher approach speed would also reduce the drift angle, but I can't believe anyone would plan a flapless landing with that in mind. The real danger is that the a/c would tend to float. There was significant headwind and therefore an additive wind correction speed increment. This extra speed should be bled off to touchdown at Vref (+gust, perhaps). With no flap drag bleeding off the speed would be extremely difficult and thus floating would be a real danger. Equally, on a wet runway, you want the a/c to squat and break through the water to avoid hydroplaning. Reduced flaps will make this difficult. You could 'plant it' to break through the water ands it bounces due lack of drag. Hm! Making a difficult job even more so.
There must be more to this than meets the eye.

[fox niner]

I heard that the second approach (the first one in AMS) resulted in a go-around because of a windshear warning. Firewalled the engines, and they ended up with a speed of 250 kts. With flaps extended. Don't know what flap setting. They retracted the flaps, but upon re-extension, everything refused to come out. (FSEU sensed an asymmetry or similar? -my guess) Since by then they had a low fuel emergency, there was no more time to do a proper all flaps up checklist, they went in with everything retracted. They had another few warnings (windshear) (sinkrate)upon their third approach and set it down. Committed to land, therefore gave the "brace for impact" command.

[SOPS]

Ok, but why no thrust reverse?

[Aireps]

Below transcription of comms on the Discrete Emergency Frequency has surfaced. Source unknown, but it looks genuine to me.

TRA3K was handed off to the DEF by EHAM TWR, shortly after the go-around on EHAM RWY27.
Transavia 3K: We have er... Mayday, mayday, mayday, Transavia 3K, we have less than minimal fuel, and would like to return as soon as possible to Amsterdam to try it again.

ATC: Transavia 3K copy mayday cleared to two thousand.

Transavia 3K: Two thousand Transavia 3K. For your information, we had a very serious windshear at, I think about one thousand feet and we had trouble to control the aircraft. It was really severe.

ATC: [unreadable] right one eight zero.

Transavia 3K: Right one eight zero.

ATC: The speed is all yours [unreadable] and the only runway is two seven.

Transavia 3K: Ok, runway two seven, we'll do that, and eh was there any landing [unreadable]?

ATC: Affirm.

Transavia 3K: And we have another problem because our flaps are not working anymore due to the wind shear so we have to make a flapless landing.

ATC: [unreadable] no flaps. Do you need assistance on the runway?

Transavia 3K: Yes please.

[LLuCCiFeR]

Here's another YT link from AMS ATC:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9LruOa-hzA&feature=youtu.be

Sounds pretty chaotic in the cockpit, mixing up PTT buttons with the intercom, no real plan for a go-around, requesting that ATC give them vectors around weather instead of telling them what vectors you need by looking at your WX radar etc.

Oh, en then there is of course always the Air France 116T...not being able to keep his mouth shut, only concerned about lining up 27 and blocking the frequency when you OBVIOUSLY see and hear that another aircraft is in serious trouble. := :ugh:

[CaptainProp]

Air France.....same old same....

It does seem like flaps overspeed on GA and then no longer any flaps available. Never flew Boeing aircraft, do get slat / flap lock or similar after an overspeed?

CP

[Global_Global]

Sounds pretty chaotic in the cockpit, mixing up PTT buttons with the intercom, no real plan for a go-around, requesting that ATC give them vectors around weather instead of telling them what vectors you need by looking at your WX radar etc.

I guess you never had a SEVERE windshear, while low on fuel and ATC giving you go around instructions that are different than briefed Luciffer??? I think they did a great job as during a severe windshear the last thing I will be looking at is at the weather radar... Aviate, navigate, communicate sounds familiar?? Very easy to have an opinion from a desk while this crew had a sh!tty flight already with bad weather, sick pax, wrong diversion airport, etc... :hmm:

And the PTT.. again sh!t happens but if you hear the coaching and good CRM in such situation I can only compliment them :cool:

[the_stranger]

And the PTT.. again sh!t happens
I have mistaken the PTT switch with the intercom/pa switch while being parked in nice sunny windstill weather. I've had my share of windshears and they will shake you up a little every time, so mistaking a switch? Like you said, sh!t happens

[Una Due Tfc]

Tower still trying to hand them over when she reports she is in heavy winshear. Unless a separation loss is imminent just leave them alone for a minute

[LLuCCiFeR]

...and ATC giving you go around instructions that are different than briefed Luciffer??? Global Global, I think it's obvious who is the desk pilot here. ;)

ATC did NOT give them different go around instructions, but only gave them a heading after they requested to vectored around weather. Sorry, but that seems a bit strange to me, as normally you have a quick look on the WX radar once established on the approach, to see if the go around path is also clear of weather, and if not, tell (not ask!) ATC what you need in case of a go around. If you'd bothered to listen to the whole thing, then you can hear the KLM 958 doing exactly that: "in case of go around, we would like an early right turn." That's the only correct way to do it in my opinion, YOU tell ATC what you need because you have a WR radar. After all, AMS is not located in China, and Dutch ATC is usually excellent in providing any heading or any diversion around weather that you need!

As for the PTT buttons, I think it's beyond incredible, that Boeing still has these silly rocker switches on the yoke! They are a recipe for totally unnecessary additional workload (as you unfortunately see in this case), additional confusion and a loss of situational awareness between pilots and ATC. No, I'm definitely NOT blaming the crew, but add weather, low fuel and wind shear to that, and the recipe for disaster is complete! Completely insane that aircraft can be certified like that, only to save $10 on some wires and a decent switch! :ugh: :mad: The Airbus system (a toggle switch that can be firmly locked in intercom position) located on the central pedestal on the radio panel, whilst still having a PTT switch on the Side Stick, is a much better thought-out solution IMO.

[RAT 5]

......resulted in a go-around because of a windshear warning. Firewalled the engines, and they ended up with a speed of 250 kts. With flaps extended. Don't know what flap setting. They retracted the flaps, but upon re-extension, everything refused to come out.

Not sure in which topic, perhaps crunched landing by SWA, but there was some discussion about the lack of practice with all engine G/A and the subsequent cock ups when it is done. Here is another example of that, with some critical consequences. (what if they had been at a rwy that was too short for flapless?) Firstly I would hope, especially on a day like this, that the G/A procedure was reviewed AGAIN just before G/S capture; even touch drilled. That plus a suitable routing was planned. W/S at 1000' might require full power initially, but could then be adjusted as necessary: if it had been anticipated. If it was a W/S G/A from reasonable height and ground contact not a factor would you go F15? Now, with full power and TOGA the pitch bar is in speed and it could have been high. Imagine what the attitude would be. Then with lowish MAA the ALT ACQ comes very quickly and the subsequent push-over would be stomach churning. With A/T's in manual and you forget to pull back the levers it's easy to see how this scenario could develop. Sometimes power can be your friend, other times not. A calm cockpit can avoid many problems. Oh for more sim time to practice such scenarios. I wish, I wish. It should be an annual sim event, surely: a menage of G/A's.
For the technical guys: I suspect the overspeed is more critical for the LED's. If they do overspeed, with no damage, do they behave like this and lock out? If not, then the the ALT system might have been available. However, it's nice to have RW27 underneath you in such a landing config. Let us learn please.

[seasexsun]

AMS ATC is equipped with a wx radar I believe so they would probably be able to vector you out of the storm cells, in fact the ATC wx radar gives probably a better general view from above.

[space pig]

Hmm can't really see how some folks say they did a great job....


Tunnel vision, no clear diversion plan, huge max flap speed exceedance, no clear view how to circumnavigate TSRA, so nervous that she transmitted on ATC instead of intercom, letting the FO land in this kind of wx and then the remark after landing that "she had never saw this kind of wx in 25 years of flying" ?? what has she been doing in those 25 years ? this is not exceptional wx in many places in europe year round...
do not forget there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around....


I would say that this captain was not in command of the situation
and there is more to this one than meets the eye and I sincerely hope that this will be thoroughly investigated by the Dutch

[Aireps]

I've replayed the full comms recording of EHAM TWR on the afternoon of July 25. Between 11:20 UTC and 14:10 UTC, I counted 20 go-arounds on RWY27.

At around 12:15 UTC, the vast majority of approaching aircraft made a go-around because of windshear.

View EHAM traffic, starting at 11:30 UTC: http://www.flightradar24.com/2015-07-25/11:30/12x/52.3,4.74/12

There were single-runway operations on RWY27. PIREPs from aircraft on approach to RWY27 reported windshear of 20 knots at 200 ft and moderate turbulence. There were no windshear reports from aircraft departing from RWY27. Some aircraft cancelled take-off from RWY27 because gusting exceeded 50 kn (from 290 - 310 deg).

[Phileas Fogg]

Hmm can't really see how some folks say they did a great job....


Tunnel vision, no clear diversion plan, huge max flap speed exceedance, no clear view how to circumnavigate TSRA, so nervous that she transmitted on ATC instead of intercom, letting the FO land in this kind of wx and then the remark after landing that "she had never saw this kind of wx in 25 years of flying" ?? what has she been doing in those 25 years ? this is not exceptional wx in many places in europe year round...
do not forget there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around....


I would say that this captain was not in command of the situation
and there is more to this one than meets the eye and I sincerely hope that this will be thoroughly investigated by the Dutch

Never had a **** day in the office?

[PENKO]

One thing, the Transavia PR department deserves a big bonus at the end the year :)

'No danger whatsoever at any time'.

[Global_Global]

Never had a **** day in the office? My point exactly... :cool:

When I was instructing I have seen too many great crew totally **** up in the sim on the windshear exercise and have since a more humble approach to what you should have done.... With windshear you will f@ck up some day, I will f@ck up some day and let's make sure that we both appreciate that and do our best to avoid it. This flight had all the swiss cheese issues written all over it: confused diversion, low fuel, shaken about for a while in ****ty weather...how sharp would you be? Not how sharp should you have been.... So I am with the crew on this one. Could they have done better? absolutely. Can I understand that they did what they did: yep, absolutely!

there were dozens of other aircraft at the same time and same conditions and they all landed safely despite windshear and the occasional go around....
The one time I encountered SEVERE windshear was the scariest moment in my life and I was throwing every little bit of power at the aircraft and still going down at amazing rates per minute. Guess what: the aircraft before and one 5 minutes after us had zero issues! So pointless to compare it with other aircraft :oh: If you want something to compare: this was the heaviest summer storm in the Netherlands since 1901....:\

As for the PTT buttons, I think it's beyond incredible, that Boeing still has these silly rocker switches on the yoke! Now that is something we do agree on :ok: But let's face it Boeing got scr3w3d over by South West when they designing the NG and created the most outdated cockpit with the most outdated features to allow SW a common type rating. Even the 757 is more advanced imho... :hmm:

[LLuCCiFeR]

Now that is something we do agree on :ok: But let's face it Boeing got scr3w3d over by South West when they designing the NG and created the most outdated cockpit with the most outdated features to allow SW a common type rating. Even the 757 is more advanced imho... :hmm: Not really SW's fault, because as far as I know SW does not fly 744s, but those also have the same cheap @ss stupid rocker switches. Some 744s don't even have a PTT button on the glare shield, so you either have to reach down to the radio panel, and thus effectively not being able to use that arm for anything else and taking your eyes off the PFD and ND, or you have to use the PTT switch on the yoke with the possibility of interfering in the controls of the PF and/or forgetting to flick the switch back to intercom therefore risk confusion of not being audible on the intercom.

Especially on a mixed fleet it's a big problem even when things are running smoothly, with pilots constantly forgetting to flick the rocker switch back to intercom, or using the chrono button (same colour, same design as the PTT, roughly same location on the glare shield) when 'transmitting.'

And all that so that they can save a few $ for a PTT button and a little wire weighing maybe 100-200 grams...on an airplane that costs >$150 million and has a MTOW of close to 400 metric tons. :ugh: And the authorities approve this... :mad: :ugh:

[737aviator]

As for the PTT buttons, I think it's beyond incredible, that Boeing still has these silly rocker switches on the yoke! They are a recipe for totally unnecessary additional workload (as you unfortunately see in this case), additional confusion and a loss of situational awareness between pilots and ATC. No, I'm definitely NOT blaming the crew, but add weather, low fuel and wind shear to that, and the recipe for disaster is complete! Completely insane that aircraft can be certified like that, only to save $10 on some wires and a decent switch! The Airbus system (a toggle switch that can be firmly locked in intercom position) located on the central pedestal on the radio panel, whilst still having a PTT switch on the Side Stick, is a much better thought-out solution IMO.

Its entirely possible to have a 737 with a latching intercom system on the centre pedestal. All the ones belonging to Europes largest 737 operator have them anyway and I'm surprised that Transavia don't!

[JammedStab]

Some 744s don't even have a PTT button on the glare shield, so you either have to reach down to the radio panel, and thus effectively not being able to use that arm for anything else and taking your eyes off the PFD and ND, or you have to use the PTT switch on the yoke with the possibility of interfering in the controls of the PF.

Not a problem at all. When the clearances get more busy while on vectors, the one hand is already down by the PTT switch waiting to be used in immediate response to an ATC instruction(instead of the delayed response you get from some people) while the other hand writes down the clearance. Works from either seat if you can write with either hand.

[Centaurus]

With A/T's in manual and you forget to pull back the levers

Allowing for the fact it is only a hypothetical case, it is unbelievable any competent and qualified on type pilot would forget how to fly with manual throttles.:ugh:

Also, it will be most interesting to see the reason why an all flaps up landing was conducted; especially with approach and landing speeds around the 185 knots. That is a serious speed indeed and rarely practiced in the simulator.

If, according to reports, the captain elected to direct the co-pilot to conduct the all flaps up landing under such critical circumstances, it would indeed be a courageous decision (as Sir Humphrey would surely attest), that speaks volumes of the touching faith in the co-pilot's competency. In any case, unless there was a technical problem that prevented flaps and leading edge devices from not operating, there should be no reason that a normal Flap 30/40 should not be used up to the maximum crosswind component - whether windshear/turbulence was present or not. .

[RAT 5]

If, according to reports, the captain elected to direct the co-pilot to conduct ta he all flaps up landing under such critical circumstances, it would indeed be a courageous decision.

I apologise if I've missed it, but is this confirmed as true? There have been various criticisms of certain apparent command decisions, but this would be most serious one. The a/c had a handling problem = flapless; there was a landing distance problem = higher speed: On their own these should be a 'captain's landing' in any airline. Add the severe weather and it only enforces the fact the the 'accountable manger' = the 4 striper in LHS should take responsibility for completing the task. It's what we are trained & paid for. If it had not gone well, and the F/O was PF, I hate to think what the insurance company would make of it and the resultant court case brought by pax.
Is it true EIN refused them? Why? There, RW22, the X-wind would have been worse, unless the speed was much reduced. RTM & AMS were close to the storm. Weeze RW27 is the same distance as EIN and may have had less wind and a better direction. It is a well facilitated airport and HV have operated from there.
It was a day for lots of extra fuel in tanks on departure. I hope the F/O on the day learnt a powerful lesson before their own upgrade process. That's what the RHS apprenticeship is all about.

[seasexsun]

Rat5, FOs and captains have the exact same training in simulators and they both have equale practice on line (except in china:}). If the FO Is not crap in handling an aircraft then why wouldn't the captain let him fly? After all the pilot in command has to make some crucial decision at any time and in some difficult situation like this it is probably better to let the FO fly so the commander has a general view and is not focused in just one thing (speed and glide path-speed and glide path-speed and glide path). The captain can also take control at any time and he/she was probably damn ready to do so.

[Aireps]

Is it true EIN refused them? Why?Yes. While in the holding SE of EHRD, after their go-around there, they requested EHEH (EIN) as alternate. This was refused by Eindhoven ATC (the reason why, wasn't given to TRA3K, BTW)
Later, it emerged that there is a NOTAM in force saying that EHEH is unavailable as alternate for civil traffic, except (medical) emergencies. M0681/15 - EINDHOVEN AIRPORT (CIVIL) NOT AVBL AS ALTN, EXCEPT
(MEDICAL) EMERGENCIES. 08 APR 00:00 2015 UNTIL 31 DEC 23:00 2015.
CREATED: 07 APR 12:51 2015At the moment of their request to divert to EHEH, TRA3K hadn't declared an emergency.

The NOTAM was put in place for noise mitigation purposes in the Eindhoven area.

News item on this (Dutch): http://nos.nl/artikel/2049294-stormtoestel-transavia-werd-geweigerd-in-eindhoven.html

[MrSnuggles]

1) The 777 in LHR was flewn by the FO while Capt was making the brave move to rise the flaps. Both did an excellent job

2) In the same accident, the Capt made an EVACUATE over ATC comms instead of PA*.

**** happens. It's how you deal with it to get everyone down and alive that matters. This is true for many many occupations out there.


*Boeing design again? Never was in a 777.

[ATC Watcher]

RAT 5 :Is it true EIN refused them? Why?

It seems to be true, the local EIN newspapers published an audio f the conversations between the Captain and ATC. ( 2nd video at the bottom of article .
here : Transavia-toestel dat zaterdag op Schiphol noodlanding maakte, werd geweigerd op Eindhoven Airport (http://www.ed.nl/regio/eindhoven/transavia-toestel-hv5068-in-problemen-werd-geweigerd-op-eindhoven-airport-1.5114843?ref=vp-element.breaking_news)

Most of it is in Dutch unfortunately for some here, but from the audio, after go around in RTM it was ATC who suggested EIN, as wind there was "only" 260/ 19 Kts G 30 and vis > 10 Km , and there was holding in SPL , the controller then contacted EIN ( a military airbase) who for some unknown reason refused, the controller came back to the HV and said " this is becoming crazy, apparently EIN is refusing you " an then offers a better EAT for SPL then HV decided to divert to SPL . the whole audio gives a good indication of the situation from initial APP to RTM to final landing , and how she got trapped. I feel sorry for her, and seen the final landing/outcome , I think she did quite well and I am glad I was not in her shoes that day.

Now as usual the Capt Hindsinght(s) can enter the game .

[A4]

Sure, let the FO fly whilst you manage.....but when it comes to the landing in 99% of cases it should be the LHS that does it. You're in that seat through experience and are ultimately responsible. If it all went wrong on touchdown that's too late to intervene.

How would you justify your decision to let 2nd in Command carry out the most critical task? Could the Commander be sued personally under such circumstance through dereliction of duty?

@MrSnuggles - not really like for like. The BA 777 only presented its issue at about 400' on final - hardly a planned non normal landing. As situations go that's about as dynamic as it gets!

A4

PS Do we actually know for sure it was the FO who landed?

[MrSnuggles]

A4

PS Do we actually know for sure it was the FO who landed?

Not from any of my sources, no. Might just be a rumour.

Buuuuuut, we have some successful landings from FOs when manure hit the AC (like the aforementioned LHR 777) and we have some very unsuccessful landings from when Capt took over late in the landing sequence (Southwest noseplant comes to mind).

Hindsight is always the best thing, right?

[A4]

Of course - hindsight is 20/20! And I agree that there are a few instances of where the LHS has got it wrong. Looking at the TAF's and the Wx for the whole area, I would have carried 60 minutes extra - minimum. I don't say that with hindsight - that would have been my decision. I think occasionally people are a little simplistic in their planning. They assume they'll go-around and get vectored downwind for a second approach with 2 minutes......on a day like that?

SPL ATC are good (been there 100's of times over the last 20+ years) but they can't work miracles.

What about others on here? How much would you have carried.

A4

[the_stranger]

Sure, let the FO fly whilst you manage.....but when it comes to the landing in 99% of cases it should be the LHS that does it. You're in that seat through experience and are ultimately responsible.
You're responsible for a safe flight, which doesn't mean doing the landing.
Although at transavia it probably will not be the case, at airlines with multiple types of aircraft, it is very well possible that you might have more hours/overall experience, the FO might have a lot more hours on type.

It might be totally explainable to let a more experienced (on type) FO land in my opinion.

[MrSnuggles]

I found a video that might give you an idea what the Transavia crew had been facing for some time (and already tried to land in at another airport).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2J9CaIicsBA

Take a close look around 06:00 to 06:20 and you'll see some harrowing action.

BTW, the_stranger I kind of agree with you. Capt is there to make sure you (and I on occasion) get down and alive. If that means the FO needs to hold the yoke/stick so be it.

[RAT 5]

From the ATC youtube: the intercom calls in the G/A come from a female and advise speed and altitude need more control. All ATC calls on approach come from her. It would suggest she was PNF. About EIN's refusal: a declaration of a fuel emergency would shake them up and open many doors and runways. Heads would roll if you were still refused for some BS reason. Sometimes it's time to confirm who needs help and priority: usually it's the guy in the air not on the ground. I remember a BA flight into AMS when the wind was strong WSW and gusting. He was given 19L (old days). Firstly he was approaching that runway direct from London, and RW27 was not in use due noise allocation ratios. He asked if the wind was veering as it gusted. Affirmative from ATC. It was a strong nasty day. He asked for RW27. This was refused as not in use. He asked if it was closed as unserviceable or serviceable. Yes it was serviceable. He requested it again. Refused. He then said he refused 19L and said if he had to divert to BRS there would be a report and strong complaint made about AMS ATC and perhaps they would get the bill for the diversion. RW27 was opened. The captain retained and exercised responsibility for the safety of the a/c.
I once was an F/O on a biz-jet. We wanted to land at a remote airfield for our pax. It was a few seconds after official closure, but all facilities were present. ATC said we would have to divert unless an emergency was declared. Guess what happened. Local security inspected the a/c on arrival and we declared fuel load as the reason for emergency. They said we still had fuel in the tanks. We asked how much is enough and how much is too little for this a/c? Silence, and they left with a beer each for the onboard bar. Captain's call, but pax were happy.
Sometimes a bit of push is required to get what you need/want. I agree one is more serious than the other, but.......

[MrSnuggles]

RAT 5

You just summed up the most important part for most transportation professions. Understanding of your vehicle and confidence in that knowledge.

If more car drivers would adopt this simple sentence to heart, there would be fewer accidents right off the bat.

[Giolla]

What I do nog onderstand is why EIN refused landing whilst a mayday was issued.This was an extreme Barrow escape. Another thing I thoughtbto have de en is some short orange flashes at the location of the wheel-wells. Did they blow up thevtyres?

[ManaAdaSystem]

60 mins of extra fuel and an alternate outside the stormy area would have made the situation a lot less stressful.
I wonder what the Transavia fuel policy is.

[Skyjob]

Giolla, the emergency did not get declared until with AMS ATC already.

I'm supporting the crew on this one:
- Missed Approach RTM due "obvious reasons" aka winds;
- Holding in RTM awaiting ATC clearance to be allowed to proceed towards AMS;
- During hold EIN requested as holding delay meant lower fuel state;
- EIN declined flight diversion, holding time reduced by ATC for AMS diversion;
- Next approach is in AMS, worse weather then RTM and another Missed Approach, this time with severe windshear reported as reason;
- Due all the above getting into a low fuel state and having had a flap exceedance;
- Declared Emergency and Flaps Up landing.

As stated before, ****ty day in office, but rewards for crew to get it down after all that. Many episodes of Air Crash Investigation have less reasons not having made it safely down.

[RAT 5]

Giolla: I'm not sure a Mayday was called; a low fuel call was made to AMS ATC after the G/A. Slightly tongue in cheek: EIN is ostensively a transport military airbase paid for by the tax-payer. HV is a civil dutch airline and the pax are mostly dutch tax-payers. The military are there to defend and improve the security of its citizens from whom they receive their funds. By refusing a local civilian airliner in distress I wonder if they are fulfilling their side of the deal.
But, again, I wonder if they were given the full facts.

[Stan Woolley]

60 mins of extra fuel and an alternate outside the stormy area would have made the situation a lot less stressful.
I wonder what the Transavia fuel policy is.


It's probably the same as the vast majority of other airlines these days, which 'encourage' you to take the minimum legal amount.

There are days when this is ok and days when it definitely is not. I think too many Captains nowadays are scared of their managements, but my advice to them is 'take the amount that YOU feel happy taking, not what you think your manager wants' when the **** hits the fan you'll be held responsible, no-one else.

[SOPS]

Having had the pleasure, and I really mean that, of working for Transavia for 18 years, I can tell you what the fuel policy is. ......take as much as you like, as long as it's for a good reason.....and looking at the conditions, I think no one would have even questioned taking full tanks. In the 18 happy years I spent there, no one ever, not once, asked me about how much fuel I carried.

[DingerX]

There's some confusion on the facts.

1. The "so-called 'mayday' transcript" (post #17): I first saw this Monday afternoon on avherald). That person called it "Some transcript of the EHRD Approach ATC". Now it's come here as the "Discrete Emergency Frequency". I have seen no indication that this transcription is authentic, especially because what we do have is from EHAM tower up to the point that the controller instructs to tune to "126.675, the Discrete Frequency" (and not "right frequency" as the Youtube transcription has it). 126.675 won't show up on your plates, but the scanner crowd calls it the "Arrival BackUp / Discrete Frequency", as distinct from 120.875, the "Discrete Emergency Frequency", which is what this transcript is claiming to be. In any case, it ain't Rotterdam Approach. Also, the Captain shows a distinct preference for communicating anything half-complicated in Dutch. Finally, whatever they may have said, it looks like once the controller realized that the flight was low on fuel, having control problems, AND was unable to change frequencies, he treated it as an emergency, even if the flight crew didn't want to declare it.

As far as I know, there are three possible sources for such a transcript: A. The official ATC tapes, which have not been made available, nor which would likely have been leaked. To be honest, I wouldn't expect those tasked with making a transcription would be required to come in on a weekend to do it. B. The CVR, likewise. C. Other listeners on frequency.
In category C there's anyone in the area with €15 Euro USB dongle, but also two websites: ATCBOX and LiveATC. ATCBOX has practically all Schiphol frequencies (including 126.675, as well as 120.825 ), but does not (as far as I know) archive them, so someone would have to be listening to/tuning to them in real time. This being the internet, there are some who claim to have been doing exactly that, and to have heard no such calls. LiveAtc has archives - indeed, it is the source of the traffic posted on youtube and on ED.nl -, but it does not archive 126.675 at Schiphol.

So it's been posted under dodgy circumstances, with patently false attributions, and no clear path back to any reliable source. Unless someone tells me where it comes from and how it was made, I'm calling fake.


2. As stated, Eindhoven does not accept alternates, only emergencies. Transavia operates most of their flights out of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Eindhoven (with maybe a couple flights from Maastricht and Groningen), so the interest not to go to Brussels or Weeze (where other LoCos run, but not Transavia), or further afield.

3. The Dutch weather service issues a Summer Storm Warning once every five years or so. This was the worst such storm on record. It's not usual weather for the region, so plan accordingly.

[Good memories]

From what we know now, this flight may very well be used as a TR in the simulator. I certainly would come out with a wet back.

Imho the crew was very unlucky with the sequence of events. The Captain managed the emergency well. Te FO and PF made a very good flapless landing under adverse wx conditions and a lot of stress. I admire the way he arrested the sink rate just before touch down.

I also admire the way SPL ATC handled things , as they were close to losing their only operational runway, with lot's of inbound traffic.

Good Flying !

Good memories.

[space pig]

Lot's of folks seem to be 'admiring' the crew on their decisions. However I would like to point out a few 'minor things':


-It is generally known, and notamed, that EIN is not available as an alternate, except an emergency, so it was certainly not their planned alternate.
-So what was the alternate of this flight?most probably AMS,(convenient for company) but not a good one as the wx there was even worse than RTM
-If AMS was not the alternate,but let's say BRU, this means that they wasted fuel in the holding and made them becoming committed to land in either RTM or AMS due to less then minimum diversion fuel, that would be an even worse decison making than the previous option of having AMS as an alternate.


In the end they dug the hole themselves and they were fortunate it all worked out well in the end.


The decision which alternate to take and how much fuel is one which should not be taken lightly : a diversion is basically an emergency. You are committed to land. Therefore the wx has to be reasonable good,not marginal.
The decision to divert must be made on the ground or latest a 100 miles out, and you should stick to that. You should have a clear plan made what you do if you cannot land , how many approaches you can make , where to go and when to divert knowing exactly your 'bingo' fuel.


In 30 years of flying I have diverted many times but never had any stress while doing it as all was well worked out and planned and we stuck to it.


If you base your decisions on luck, taking a bad wx alternate-(but 'good' for your company) and just taking a lot of xtra fuel 'hoping' you will make it in, you are willingly risking the lives of your passengers and yourselves...

[ATC Watcher]

it was certainly not their planned alternate.
No it was not and was also not requested by the crew, if you lesten to the audio I poster earlier, it is ATC RTM who suggested EIN , giving the better wind /visbility situation there.

Lastly for the non professionals in here , it the crew and the crew only that can declare if a flight is in emergency , not ATC.

[RAT 5]

The FO and PF made a very good flapless landing under adverse wx conditions and a lot of stress.

I still say IMHO this is not the way it should have happened. Let F/O be PF so captain can manage the situation and communicate with all parties & agencies, but ultimately the captain should be responsible for the landing, both due weather & especially the non-normal configuration. Otherwise we may as well fly around with SFO's & F/O's. Who needs a captain?

[DingerX]

At least in the US, ATC, dispatch, and even an "Airline Representative" (=Management) can declare an emergency for an aircraft.

For example, here's a page (http://www.natca.org/archie2014.aspx?zone=Archie2014&pID=4185#p4185) with a transcript and a recording of a controller doing just that.

As for management-declared emergencies, I haven't been able to find any recordings, but that's no doubt due to the cabin crew's ability to keep the Champagne at the proper temperature. There's still some debate about whether improperly served nuts constitute an emergency.

Of course, I didn't say that Schiphol tower declared an emergency; just that he treated it "as an emergency", handing off to a discrete channel and stopping all arrivals and departures.

[ATC Watcher]

Thanks for that info Dinger X, I did not know that a controller could do this in the US, we definitively can't do that here. You can suggest it but it is always the PIC who declares it.

The US military also have strange rules for that, I had once a C141 declaring an emergency, it was very busy, took a lots of efforts to clear the airspace below him, but he just continued his flight to planned destination and refused to descend. After investigation he just lost one engine, and it is ( was at the time at least) mandatory for USAF to declare an emergency in this case.

All this shows once again that despite ICAO everybody still uses its own rules.

[ManaAdaSystem]

I still say IMHO this is not the way it should have happened. Let F/O be PF so captain can manage the situation and communicate with all parties & agencies, but ultimately the captain should be responsible for the landing, both due weather & especially the non-normal configuration. Otherwise we may as well fly around with SFO's & F/O's. Who needs a captain?

I am a captain. It does not mean I am a better pilot than all my copilots. Some of my copilots I trust to fly any non normal situation/configuration, others I don't. CRM.
I would personally have flown this landing myself. That way I could only blame myself if it turmed into an accident. I doesn't mean the captain in this situation made the wrong decision.
This was a very stressful situation with weather, go around, overspeed, low fuel and a non normal configuration to sort out on top of everything.

Slightly off topic; does the NG have a flap lock out feature if you overspeed the flap by a certain amount? I have never heard about this. You overspeed the flap, it allows you to retract to up, then shuts down?

[the_stranger]

I still say IMHO this is not the way it should have happened. Let F/O be PF so captain can manage the situation and communicate with all parties & agencies, but ultimately the captain should be responsible for the landing, both due weather & especially the non-normal configuration. Otherwise we may as well fly around with SFO's & F/O's. Who needs a captain?
I now fly on an airbus for a couple of years and recently flew with a captain doing his 2nd trip after linetraining, so he had about 6 flights "under his belt".

While I accept he has more experience in aviation, therefor is better to carry ultimate responsibility, do you really think he can handle the plane better?

The only reason there are captains is there needs to be a "boss" to make judgements and decide actions, when there is a difference of opinion. At least in "my" company, FO's (and even SFO's) are selected, trained and used exactly the same as capt's, with the sole difference the last is the deciding factor when there is a difference of opinions.

When I used to be captain on a previous type, I never had "big things" happen, but when the FO would have more experience/handling qualities, I would not have hesitated to let him fly the whole thing.

[wingview]

If the CO was a newbie I doubt he/she would have made the return flight anyway. Lots of them have years under their belt already and this kind of weather occurs more often in the autumn period so nothing new. It wasn't the wind that gave them problems it was the many wind shears on final and even close to the rwy itself.

From what I've heard they declared an emergency on the discrete channel but don't know how reliable that source is. About the fuel, they took extra fuel with them but the GA at EHRD and the holding time there gave them less opportunities and therefore EHAM was their last resort. If they didn't had to make the another GA at AMS this topic wouldn't even exist because not being low on fuel and not having a flap problem which probably occurred when raising them during the GA.

This was the know chain of events but with al the stress they had they made a beauty of a landing. Maybe mistakes have been made, they've solved them well!

[StuntPilot]

I do not think we know at this point who flew the successfull no flap landing. We know that a female pilot, thought to be the Capt, was handling comms and was PNF in Rotterdam and during the first approach and go around at Schiphol. There is no issue with a Capt letting an experienced FO with many hours on type fly a difficult approach. Whoever has flown it, the landing was clearly performed in a very skillful manner and thus by the right person. I do not think the PF/PNF decision is one that deserves criticism.

[RAT 5]

Many year ago, my first airline, had a clear captain's landing policy in their Ops manual. Many years later, and via a circuitous career route, I arrived at a fledgling airline, but with many years in existence of permanent survival. I was a TRE DEC. During a sim recurrency LOFT exercise with SFO as PF we had an engine failure on departure with no option for return, but a 150nm diversion to a not overly long 'suitable runway' in rainy low cloud with CAT 1. I let the SFO continue as PF while I completed QRH and completed all the necessary communications with all necessary and relevant agencies and parties. This was after deciding on our further course of action and choice of airfield.
I told the SFO to continue with the arrival set up and brief for a standard STAR & ILS to a familiar diversion field. I then said that after all management issues were completed I would become PF at FL100 and land the a/c. This caused a raised eyebrow and a hesitant question, why. "Because it's my responsibility."
The TRE was H.O.T. In the debrief he and the SFO asked about my decisions. The SFO was trained to the same standard and was capable. I suggested that they had 3 years experience & I had 25. I explained that IMHO I was responsible for a/c in such a scenario. The XAA, pax & insurance company would expect it. The H.O.T did admit they had never thought about the issue.
A few months later the Ops manual contained a list of Captain's only landings. It included any reason that affected thrust, handling or significant extension in landing distance. Captains should use good judgement regarding weather. The consideration of a G/A in non-normal configuration should also be a consideration.
Every airline I've flown with had X-wind landing limits for F/O's. They were all less than max demonstrated. Common was newbies 15kts and experienced F/O's 2/3rds of any runway limitations including gusts. Any more and it was the captain's.
I understand the thoughts about new captains on type relative to more type experienced on type F/O's. There are merits in it, but ultimately there will be the debate of final responsibility should anything go wrong. I do not know if that argument has been tested by any XAA or insurance company. Should there be any pax injury I wonder what compensation lawyers would do about such a question in their claim against the airline. Has that ever been tested?
The whole issue may not be quite so simple as many think.
However, in a single type airline with a seniority list and little expansion (i.e. no non-type DEC's) it is a given that the captain will have much more experience than any F/O. Thus any argument about experience needs to be relevant to the airline & incident involved.
Sully is not the answer to everything non-normal, but who here, if F/O was PF, would have allowed them to ditch the a/c and not taken over?
To those who think otherwise about this whole issue I guess we'll have to agree to disagree. But it is an interesting industry-wide debate topic. I suspect there will be very different opinions in different cultural areas.

[MrSnuggles]

I have noooo idea how the lawsuits regarding BA38 handled the fact that the FO was flying. Maybe that will clear things up a bit?

[ManaAdaSystem]

Every airline I've flown with had X-wind landing limits for F/O's. They were all less than max demonstrated. Common was newbies 15kts and experienced F/O's 2/3rds of any runway limitations including gusts.

Except for the newbie restriction, we have no x-wind restrictions for our experienced first officers. And rightly so. Our first officers are selected and trained to be captains. If I have a heart attack, should my first officer not be able to land if the x-wind is inside the recommended aircraft limit?
When he changes to the left seat, do you expect him to suddenly be able to perform max x-wind landings after years of not doing any?

[Stan Woolley]

I agree completely with Rat5.

I think (in general) that the guy who's signature is in the tech log should land the aeroplane in events such as these. I could be convinced to change my mind if I really believed I had good reason to let the other guy fly. For example if he was experienced and I was a brand new DECaptain on type.

I only flew as a co-pilot in an airline with a very long time to Command, and would have been amazed if the Captain had deferred to me in such a situation.

There is such a thing as lack of confidence even among Captains, as hard as it is for some here to accept.

[PENKO]

The practice of letting an FO land in limiting weather, especially dynamic weather as stormy crosswinds, is flawed in my opinion. In limiting weather the handling pilot must continually make a decision: can I continue to land or is this all getting too much?

If you hand over control to the FO, either because you lack experience on type or because the FO is a better handling pilot than you, you effectively hand over your command. Who is going to make that crucial split second go/no go decision?

If the captain is not comfortable with the weather, he should divert, even if the FO thinks he can get it in. Otherwise he is a effectively passenger on his own ship.


But then again, once we are in the mindset that 'our FO's are future captains' and that diverting to a stormy alternate with limited fuel is acceptable, well, then all bets are off.

[PENKO]

Our first officers are selected and trained to be captains.
Why don't you make all your co-pilots captains then, and rotate final responsibility each leg? Lower your salary, raise his..


When he changes to the left seat, do you expect him to suddenly be able to perform max x-wind landings after years of not doing any?

No, I expect him to build up his own comfort zone gradually. I expect him to divert if he's not comfortable with the weather.

[Mikehotel152]

PENKO, I don't think I agree. In many airlines it's an established principle that in poor weather the pilots conduct a monitored approach or autoland. Certainly in my airline, in both cases the Captain is the PM until minima. This gives the more experienced and ultimately responsibile pilot the luxury of an overall perspective on the unfolding scenario.

Furthermore, in high pressure stages of flight it is quite common for pilots to suffer tunnel vision. If the pilot battling the wind and rain is also the Captain, what chance has the FO of comprehending impending doom and, more importantly, alerting the Captain and ensuring a safe outcome?

But you're right in so far as any Captain who feels that he or she is personally incapable of completing a safe landing should be diverting rather than shirking responsibility and delogating the task to a colleague. Nevertheless, where a Captain is confident that either they or the FO could complete the safe landing, that's when handing over controls is reasonable.

I will usually choose to be PM on sectors to new destinations or where conditions are such that I will need to retain overall spatial awareness and coordinate the flight with ATC rather than concentrate on the flight path. However, where a landing is likely to be tricky and I either don't know or don't have complete faith in the FO, for the sake of the aircraft's safety, and because I will carry ultimate responsibility anyhow, I will take the controls at the outset or for the approach.

But there have to be occasions when inexperienced pilots are allowed to gain experience in tricky conditions and it's the Captain's judgment call on when this takes place. If you don't do this you may end with a situation where new Captains are flying approaches in bad weather for the first time when the person in the other seat is fresh from training and represents a fairly frail safety net.

Who knows the dynamics of that Transavia cockpit?

[PENKO]

Mikehotel, in what way do you disagree then?
:ok:


And more on topic, I am not saying that the FO should not have been PF on this day, I am purely reacting to the notion that the FO should be allowed to land in any weather condition or when the captain himself is not comfortable.

[FS-chick]

does the NG have a flap lock out feature if you overspeed the flap by a certain amount? I have never heard about this. You overspeed the flap, it allows you to retract to up, then shuts down?

No!
The NG does how ever have "Flap Load Relief" , retracting the flaps from 40->30 at trigger speed of 176 kias, and 30->25 at 163 (800-900)

[RAT 5]

In many airlines it's an established principle that in poor weather the pilots conduct a monitored approach or autoland.

I think you will find this is when the weather is close to minima and within autoland limits; and it is a excellent policy. I have used in many times, both in airlines where it was SOP and also where it was not but I deemed it the safest manner to execute a successful approach & landing. In this scenario it was not the case.
However, back to Apples & Apples. Poor weather that gives control issues and demands above average skill: captain's judgement if there is no SOP restriction. I would be hesitant to negate responsibility. A/c system failures that induce handling issues and incur extra landing distance. I would be very hesitant to negate responsibility. Add the 2 together and no way. The sim is the place to practice this not a live a/c with live pax on board.

[IcePack]

Didn't think there was/is any monitored approaches using Airbus SOP not sure about Boeing.

[Mikehotel152]

PENKO,

Generally, yes, it looks like we agree. :) However, I was specifically referring to your comment In limiting weather the handling pilot must continually make a decision: can I continue to land or is this all getting too much? and suggested that perhaps it's often better for the Captain to be PM in dynamic situations where the legal and practical merits of continuing an approach are best assessed by the more experienced pilot without the added burden of flying the plane.

RAT5,

By poor weather I was indeed referring to weather close to visibility limits. This was in the context of the general argument that it is preferable for the Captain to be pilot monitoring in certain situations. This wasn't one of them.

Sorry to confuse you lot! I should have been more clear.

[aa73]

PSEU the reason for the lockout of the TRs?