Light AC down Dundee Scotland

[staplefordheli]

Ongoing search involving CG heli from Inverness for light AC on approach after contact lost at 12-00 BST 4 miles West of Dundee airport. Hilly and wooded terrain in the area being searched hampering the search efforts

[floppyjock]

Not a nice day to flying. Im in that area. Low cloud and rain all day so far.

[staplefordheli]

Also hampering the location and recovery efforts then. I am sure everything possible is being done


Update: unofficial source Police have located the light aircraft which failed to land at Dundee near to the village of Abernyte in Perthshire

[staplefordheli]

Believed to have been en route from Inverness with 2 persons


Light aircraft going to Dundee Airport found near Abernyte village | Dundee & Tayside | News (http://news.stv.tv/tayside/319316-light-aircraft-going-to-dundee-airport-found-near-abernyte-village/)

[clunk1001]

Weather was utterly attrocious. Just driving past the airport earlier was tretchrous enough - as a CPL/IR with 20 years flying in this area I wouldnt have gone anywhere near the sky today.

And it was forecast!

[NorthernChappie]

Weather still is dreadful and we are about 3 miles from Abernyte. Hope for a positive outcome but not looking good.

[mikeygd]

Sadly, it is now being reported that two males died.

[piperboy84]

Yes the girlfriend called and said she heard a chopper operating over the strip, she went outside to see as she could not believe it was operating in such bad weather, the wind had blown over all the planter pots and vis was really poor, I guess they were checking to see if he'd diverted. Shame R.I.P.

[fisbangwollop]

Another sad day in Scottish aviation. Scotland is one of the greatest places in the world to fly, but with rapidly changing weather and big lumps of Terra Firma is less forgiving than most other places. My thoughts are with the family and friends tonight of one of my customers :{

[maxred]

with rapidly changing weather and big lumps of Terra Firma is less forgiving than most other places. My

Yes, another tragedy, but with respect, today's dreadful weather was very well forecast.....and it was dreadful

[tomellis6680]

Is Abernyte on the final approach course for Dundee?

[piperboy84]

Anyone have the METARS?

[piperboy84]

Anyone know what the conditions were like at the departure ?

[Katamarino]

I'm not sure where all this horror about the weather is coming from. Winds are strong, sure, but straight down the runway, and the ceilings and visibility are well within limits. I'd have flown in that if I had somewhere to be. It's certainly not irresponsible for a current, competent pilot to be up in it.

[C_M_I]

The aircraft was a Beech 55 Baron and departed Inverness climbing to flight level 70. With the prevalent weather conditions I'd hazard a guess an IFR approach was being made into Dundee. The pilot, who was also a commercial pilot, had flown into Dundee on numerous occasions and had a lot of experience flying around the Highlands & Islands of Scotland in various aircraft types, both VFR and IFR, in much more adverse and severe weather conditions.

RIP Silverknapper

:(

[The Old Fat One]

^^

The "horror" about the weather is coming from aviation people who live here and would not have gone out in it for a walk in it let alone fly in it.

If the aircraft was equipped and the pilots were qualified, fair enough, buts let's wait and see hey. As the man above said...this weather was clearly forecast and consistent all day.

Meanwhile, RIP and thoughts with the families.

[tomellis6680]

Let's say the freezing level was adequate for his flight, I'm not sure why an IFR rated pilot would not 'go' in these conditions especially as the aircraft was twin engine and would appear to have all of the required equipment to complete that flight IFR.

[dont overfil]

Metform 214 forecast minus 2 at 2000ft.

Actual surface temp at EGPT 397ft (4 miles from crash site) Plus 5

D.O.

[Floppy Link]

…and it was so wild and pish that the Perth based air ambulance stayed in the hangar all day.

[maxred]

The wind at 14.00, at 3000 feet, was 110 at 62kts. Large frontal system moving through. there would have been a lot of rotor.
I cancelled my sailing yesterday, due to weather.

Flyable, of course, comfortable, probably not. Been there, done it, and for those who have not flown in the region, it can get pretty poor, like it was yesterday. Would I have done it, probably not, would have sat on the ground until it passed through, but that is my decision.

No one is getting excited about the weather, it may turn out not to be a factor in this incident, but........it may have been

[LinCh]

I almost never comment on pprune and I don’t participate in any “social media” at all, but I would like to forestall speculation about the competence or judgement of the pilot, by clarifying something of his experience.
I had the pleasure of recruiting and training this gentleman for his first commercial flying position, and, a couple of years later, mentoring, training and promoting him to his first multi-crew turboprop command. During his time with us, he flew mostly in the western islands off Scotland, the Faeroes, and Scandinavia, amongst some of the worst weather conditions I personally have flown in, where the winter gusts often exceed double those reported to pertain on the day of this tragic accident – and almost always with a strong cross-wind element.
We had faith in his competence to command our turboprop aircraft, its crew and passengers, and, more importantly, we had faith in his judgement in deciding when pressing on was inappropriate. I feel sure our faith was equalled by that of his later corporate clients (including a famous racing driver - by definition, someone who would recognise, but not tolerate, incompetence in a pilot if he saw it), as well as the international biz-av manufacturer who employed him full-time to demonstrate its new aircraft worldwide to corporate clients.

This is a terrible sad loss of a thoroughly competent, cheerful, ever smiley professional – my heart goes out to his partner and small children, who, although I had not seen him for a number of years, I know he truly adored.

I believe I also worked briefly with the other gentleman involved 20 years ago - also a man of great good cheer and warmth - and I would also like to express my condolences to the bereaved family in this case.

[dont overfil]

I noticed the BBC made reference to "puppy farms," approaches over the city (incorrect) etc then withdrew the comments later.

I hope the reporter got a slap.

D.O.

[sitigeltfel]

The aircraft was a Beech 55 Baron and departed Inverness climbing to flight level 70.

This report says (http://www.thecourier.co.uk/news/local/perth-kinross/perthshire-plane-crash-air-accident-investigators-probing-tragedy-that-claimed-two-lives-1.871850) it was a C172. :confused:

[Jonzarno]

My condolences to all those involved.


there would have been a lot of rotor.

That's an nteresting observation, especially as the accident site seems to be on the downwind side of the hills on the ILS approach track. (Based on the chart posted on the previous page)

Whether this has anything to do with the accident will have to wait for the report; but it's certainly food for thought!

[dont overfil]

This report says (http://www.thecourier.co.uk/news/local/perth-kinross/perthshire-plane-crash-air-accident-investigators-probing-tragedy-that-claimed-two-lives-1.871850) it was a C172. :confused:

It was a Baron 55. and despite suggestions on farsebook it was not "N" reg.

D.O.

[Capt_Stewart]

Solid IR A/C and experienced pilot best not to speculate

[Jetblu]

Very sad. Condolences to all affected. RIP Silverknapper and JJ.

Whilst the weather was not suited for your average VFR spam can with a vanilla ppl, it was most certainly very doable to an experienced pilot in a much capable aircraft as charlie kilo was.

If my memory serves me correctly, this is not the first time that this particular
approach has encountered problems on that high ground.

[C_M_I]

Eloquent and well put Linton. My sentiments exactly.

[Luke SkyToddler]

Light aircraft crash victims named - BBC News (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-tayside-central-32582722)

The pilots have been named

I want to echo Linton's sentiments about Andy's professionalism, I had the pleasure of sharing a cockpit with him many times over the years and he was an absolute first class operator.

I owe him a personal debt, as a raw rookie FO with less than a month in the Jetstream he saved my life, when I (the captain) was incapacitated in a severe food poisoning episode on the way to Benbecula in a dreadful windy rainy Scottish morning, probably not dissimilar to the one he was flying in on his final flight. He did a marvellous job that day, just like every other day of his flying career.

RIP Andy you were a great gentleman, a great laugh, a great pilot and a great guy.

[RodBrown]

Like LinCh, I do not subscribe to aviation gossip. Over 28 years as a Professional pilot, this is my first post on the Forum, and will probably be my last. My username is my real name. Nothing to hide.

Beautifully said LinCh!

I have lost two of my closest friends in this incident.

Andy (PIC) was a professional of the highest level. I flew with him in all sorts of aircraft, big and small. Bad weather and good. He was my best friend. I knew how he thought, and how he operated. The latter was to a very high standard indeed. I would be proud to be half the pilot that he was.

John (P2) was also also one of the special people in my life. I played a major part in teaching him to fly, and would like to say that he was a very competent Private Pilot.

Whilst I understand that some people post through lack of understanding/knowledge/experience, perhaps they could refrain until they have more facts at their disposal.

RIP, my friends.

'Over and Out' pprune

[The Old Fat One]

Don't make a judgement on other peoples abilities based on your experience levels. Bad form, wait for the AAIB report.

I believe you've miss read or miss understood my post - the bit in bold in nothing more than a repeat of what I said albeit using different words. I was merely clarifying the state of the weather as I live here. The weather at Dundee was horrid - that's just a plain simple fact. As others have suggested, what, if any part, it played will be determined by the experts who are paid to do this stuff.

As an ex-professional aviator (no longer) I never have, never would and never will speculate on the cause of an accident before the report - unlike many others on here. Please do not tar me with the same brush. QED, because I've no desire to be disrespectful either.

[maxred]

Whilst I understand that some people post through lack of understanding/knowledge/experience, perhaps they could refrain until they have more facts at their disposal.RIP, my friends.'Over and Out' PPRuNe

Rod, I get the emotion, I get the fact that these guys were evidently very competent aviators, but where in the previous posts did anyone speculate through lack of understanding,/knowledge/experience? I don't see it.

Some posters are only stating the fact that the weather was pretty horrific. It was, fact. It was also as, forecast, fact.

Obviously, as has been stated, it may, or not, be a factor. We all await the initial, and then, final report.

[RTN11]

Another tragedy associated with Dundee, such a shame. No disrespect to those above, but this is a rumour network, and speculation is a natural thing when so little information is available. The facts are that the weather was poor. Not impossible, but far from decent VMC.

I personally feel that speculation is a good thing, as it makes us all think outside the box as to what may or may not have contributed to this incident, which may just help one of us make a go/no go decision one day, or save our life in some other obscure manner unfathomable at this stage.

No one is disrespecting either pilot, simply discussing the weather that has been provided as the only fact at this stage.

[Genghis the Engineer]

So far as I can see, the published conditions were poor, but not so poor that a current CPL/IR in a Baron would decline.

I also understand that the crash site was 10 miles West of Dundee, where if I read the IAP correctly, the aircraft would be about 2200ft and the terrain is about at worst 1300ft.

Whatever happened, it was probably complex and will take somebody who has access to more information than us, to work it out. That will presumably be the AAIB.

G

[Cows getting bigger]

Flight checker was up that way today. I heard him on the airwaves about lunchtime.

[bookworm]

No one has posted the OPMET yet, so here it is.

TAF AMD EGPN 031034Z 0310/0318 09017KT 8000 -RA BKN012
TEMPO 0310/0316 10022G32KT 4000 RADZ BKN008
BECMG 0316/0318 VRB03KT 9999 NSW=

TAF EGPN 030859Z 0309/0318 09017KT 8000 -RA BKN018
TEMPO 0309/0316 10022G32KT 5000 RA BKN012
PROB30 TEMPO 0314/0318 BKN007
BECMG 0316/0318 VRB03KT 9999 NSW=


METAR EGPN 031320Z 08020G30KT 050V110 4000 +RA BKN007 OVC010 07/06 Q0994=

METAR EGPN 031250Z 09019KT 4000 +RA BKN006 OVC014 07/06 Q0995=

METAR EGPN 031220Z 09020KT 4500 +RA BKN007 OVC014 07/06 Q0995=

METAR EGPN 031150Z 09020G30KT 4500 RA BKN007 BKN014 07/06 Q0995=

METAR EGPN 031120Z 09022KT 5000 RA BKN009 BKN016 07/06 Q0996=

METAR EGPN 031050Z 09021G31KT 4000 RA BKN008 BKN016 07/06 Q0996=

METAR EGPN 031020Z 09021KT 060V130 5000 RA BKN009 BKN018 07/06 Q0997=

METAR EGPN 030950Z 09021KT 5000 RA BKN010 BKN018 06/06 Q0998=

METAR EGPN 030920Z 09021KT 5000 RA BKN013 BKN018 07/06 Q0998=

METAR EGPN 030850Z 09023KT 5000 RA BKN013 BKN018 06/05 Q0999=

[RTN11]

The weather was up, but has now disappeared, so whoever posted it must of changed their mind about contributing.

The low cloud shouldn't be too much of an issue with an ILS available, and as is often the way at Dundee, when the weather is bad you get an easterly wind, so it would have been a headwind for the only approach available.

I suspect the freezing level would have been below MSA, I'm sure it's one of these where there will be many contributing factors rather than one simple answer. No mention of a mayday call in any reports I've seen, but it's early days and reporting is very poor on these types of incidents, one report still talking about a twin engine cessna 172.

[Saab Dastard]

Dundee METAR:

SA 03/05/2015 12:50-> METAR EGPN 031250Z 09019KT 4000 +RA BKN006 OVC014 07/06 Q0995=

SA 03/05/2015 12:20-> METAR EGPN 031220Z 09020KT 4500 +RA BKN007 OVC014 07/06 Q0995=

SA 03/05/2015 11:50-> METAR EGPN 031150Z 09020G30KT 4500 RA BKN007 BKN014 07/06 Q0995=

SA 03/05/2015 11:20-> METAR EGPN 031120Z 09022KT 5000 RA BKN009 BKN016 07/06 Q0996=

SA 03/05/2015 10:50-> METAR EGPN 031050Z 09021G31KT 4000 RA BKN008 BKN016 07/06 Q0996=

SA 03/05/2015 10:20-> METAR EGPN 031020Z 09021KT 060V130 5000 RA BKN009 BKN018 07/06 Q0997=

SA 03/05/2015 09:50-> METAR EGPN 030950Z 09021KT 5000 RA BKN010 BKN018 06/06 Q0998=

SA 03/05/2015 09:20-> METAR EGPN 030920Z 09021KT 5000 RA BKN013 BKN018 07/06 Q0998=

SA 03/05/2015 08:50-> METAR EGPN 030850Z 09023KT 5000 RA BKN013 BKN018 06/05 Q0999=

SA 03/05/2015 08:20-> METAR EGPN 030820Z 09021KT 5000 RA BKN013 BKN016 06/05 Q0999=


Dundee TAF:

FC 03/05/2015 10:59-> TAF EGPN 031059Z 0312/0320 09017KT 8000 -RA BKN012
TEMPO 0312/0316 4000 RADZ BKN008
TEMPO 0312/0315 10022G32KT
BECMG 0316/0318 VRB03KT 9999 NSW=

FC 03/05/2015 10:34-> TAF AMD EGPN 031034Z 0310/0318 09017KT 8000 -RA BKN012
TEMPO 0310/0316 10022G32KT 4000 RADZ BKN008
BECMG 0316/0318 VRB03KT 9999 NSW=

FC 03/05/2015 08:59-> TAF EGPN 030859Z 0309/0318 09017KT 8000 -RA BKN018
TEMPO 0309/0316 10022G32KT 5000 RA BKN012
PROB30 TEMPO 0314/0318 BKN007
BECMG 0316/0318 VRB03KT 9999 NSW=


Inverness: Sunday morning

SA 03/05/2015 12:50-> METAR EGPE 031250Z 08013KT 9999 -RA FEW012 BKN022 06/03 Q0996=

SA 03/05/2015 12:20-> METAR EGPE 031220Z 09012KT 060V120 9999 -RA FEW012 BKN022 06/03 Q0997=

SA 03/05/2015 11:50-> METAR EGPE 031150Z 09015KT 9999 -RA FEW015 BKN026 06/03 Q0997=

SA 03/05/2015 11:20-> METAR EGPE 031120Z 09015KT 070V140 9999 -RA FEW015 BKN024 06/03 Q0998=

SA 03/05/2015 10:50-> METAR EGPE 031050Z 09016G27KT 9999 -RA FEW015 SCT025 BKN030 06/02 Q0998=


SA 03/05/2015 10:20-> METAR EGPE 031020Z 10017G29KT 9999 -RA FEW015 SCT025 BKN035 06/02 Q0998=

SA 03/05/2015 09:50-> METAR EGPE 030950Z 09012KT 9999 -RA FEW015 SCT023 BKN036 05/02 Q0999=

SA 03/05/2015 09:20-> METAR EGPE 030920Z 09013KT 9999 -RA FEW015 SCT023 BKN033 05/02 Q1000=

SA 03/05/2015 08:50-> METAR EGPE 030850Z 09013KT 9999 -RA FEW015 SCT020 BKN030 05/02 Q1000=

SA 03/05/2015 08:20-> METAR EGPE 030820Z 09014KT 9999 -RA FEW015 SCT020 BKN027

[Jetblu]

Nothing wrong with that. It's good to go.

[Johnm]

I'd have gone with a forecast like that so weather is not the issue per se.

[siftydog]

Andy was top dollar.
Lost a few top dollar mates over the years: structural failure, CFIT, the drive home....doesn't make it any easier.

We hang on by a thread. Don't bother looking for reason, it often isn't there.

[Littlest Hobo]

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/air-accident-monthly-bulletin-january-2016

[cats_five]

https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib-investigation-to-beech-95-b55-baron-g-rick

[Gertrude the Wombat]

First thought: "I would never do that, I always use the real DME box ..."


Second thought: "... but not on the aircraft with a G1000 and no real DME"


One to remember.

[piperboy84]

Couple of questions for IR experienced guys:

1. On a 530, if the Dundee ILS 09 approach was selected loaded and activated would the GpS automatically load the correct ground based radio nav ILS frequency to receive the ground based signal AND toggle/default the CDI button to display that the VOR NAV source was being displayed on the HSI ?

2. If the pilot decided decided not to rotate the obs knob on the HSI to the correct inbound course ( I understand this task is purely for reference only and had no effect on the needles) would the GPS give an indication the OBS was not rotated to the correct approach course listed in the procedure database?

[n5296s]

1. No
2. No

[alexbrett]

I can't say for certain as I don't use a 530, but based on a 430:

1. It depends - there is a setting for ILS CDI Autocapture on the AUX page, if set and using a loaded approach then it should switch, though often I find the auto switch will happen too late (you get GPS guidance as an overlay for the NDB outbound bit, but it seems in most cases it wants to establish you on the localiser track using GPS before switching), so have to do it manually anyway.

2. If you hit the OBS key that would suspend the approach - somewhere the display should indicate e.g. SUSP, but not anything more obvious than that. It's worth noting however that the AAIB report suggests the only way they could reproduce the flight path was to use a Direct to the NDB (and the OBS mode where the CDI indicates deviation from a specified track to/from the beacon, and the screen would show simple GPS distances), rather than loading the approach.

[n5296s]

I guess I should add that I've been flying approaches behind a 530 (not 530W) for 13 years. I don't claim to understand every wrinkle of the box, I doubt that anyone does, but I certainly know how it works for approaches.

There has to be more to it than in the report. If you set up an ILS but forget to switch from GPS mode, you won't get a glideslope needle. That in itself should be enough to wake you up. Why would be you be descending on the glideslope if you don't have one?

I doubt that there's a 530 user around who hasn't at some time tried to fly an ILS with the box still in GPS mode, but after a couple of times you kind of wake up to the risk. And, as I said, there is no glideslope indication if you do that.

To expand on #1... it does bring up the ILS frequency as the standby, but it doesn't actually switch to it. You have to do that yourself.

[SoFarFromHome]

I have flown with this box before and I have made the same mistake in failing to flip it from GPS to the ILS.

The report does state that in the absence of a GS, as indicated by the note on the chart the pilot may have elected to descend on a LOC only approach.

That wasn't the issue, it was using the wrong reference point for the distance, using the NDB ( GPS distance from the NDB )instead of the ILS DME, the descent was premature.

:(

[piperboy84]

the wrong reference point for the distance, using the NDB ( GPS distance from the NDB )instead of the ILS DME, the descent was premature.

Understand the distance measuring from the beacon instead of the ILS was the issue, but putting the distance thing aside, are they saying that in addition to flying to the beacon IAP (which is the correct procedure) he used the beacon for lateral guidance inbound also, so not only was he not using the Dme, he never had the Procedure loaded on the 530 or even tuned the ILS in on a nav radio with CDI (separate from the 530) essentially flying an ad hoc NDB approach using the published localiser approach step downs for GS guidance.

Essentially none of the components for the requested ILS DME 09 approach (localiser, glide slope , Dme) were used by the pilot to fly the approach ?

[n5296s]

Essentially none of the components for the requested ILS DME 09 approach (localiser, glide slope , Dme) were used by the pilot to fly the approach ?


That seems to about sum it up. The evidence suggests that the pilot had just selected "direct DND" on the 530, rather than entering the ILS as an approach, then forgotten that and taken the pseudo-DME reading from the 530 and used that as the distance from the localiser DME.

I don't know how Jepp/Garmin depict approaches in the UK, but in the US the obvious thing to do is select the ILS, then switch to NAV mode when established on the localizer inbound.

There are plenty of approaches like this in the US, not to mention much higher terrain, but I don't think anyone has ever said they are fundamentally unsafe. But it does help to select them correctly.

Could be that the "GPS is the devil's own handiwork" view of approach design, which seems to reign in the UK, makes people less familiar with doing approaches in a hybrid fashion like this. In the US 99% of pilots would use the GPS to fly to DND, rather than the ADF (because hardly any aircraft have one any more) - and this is explicitly approved by the FAA. But the report makes snooty remarks about this not being approved.

[Gertrude the Wombat]

report makes snooty remarks about this not being approved
Accident reports in the UK state facts about such things, not "snooty remarks". They then, when known and appropriate, go on to say whether or not the irregularity contributed to the incident.

[n5296s]

Accident reports in the UK state facts about such things, not "snooty remarks".

"Anecdotal evidence suggests this may encourage some pilots to use GPS navigation, even where its use is not approved."

Definitely registers on my snooty-o-meter.

[Weathergirly]

I think the AAIB have overlooked an important point. There is not even a mention of it in the report and I believe this type of accident will happen again if nothing is done. They talk about the Bowtie and error capture but yet they missed a fundamental latent error designed into the approach plate. We do not need to move NDB's or more regulation regarding GPS training, we need the Airports / designers of Airfield plates to ensure that the information is clear and unambiguous. I feel very sorry for the Pilot and passenger, families and loved ones because this could of happened to anyone of us. What I am talking about is how the distance between the DND NDB and the base turn is depicted. It shows a turn commencing at D8. Now is that from the NDB or the IDDE? I beleive the Pilot misinterpreted the plate and flew the 8 miles from the NDB. After very close examination in my front room drinking hot chocolate it becomes clear. Why not put the aid ident next to the dme range like they did years ago? A simple solution. The flight was 30 mins, it was IMC and no Automatics, Airfield plates need to be straightforward and in my opinion this one is not. Many other Airfields are very similar and when the holes in the cheese line up Aircraft bite. Hard.

[DB6]

Weathergirly, there is only one DME at Dundee, so D8 can only refer to that (i.e at the airfield). If the approach had been flown with sole reference to ground based aids - for which the approach plate is written - then the only ranges a DME could display would be the correct ones. The problem was essentially that there was a mix of GPS and ground based aids in use. The approach plate was not written for that.
What you also need to consider is that thousands of pilots over the years have flown that approach and not come to grief; it is not that approach that was at fault.
There is perhaps a deeper issue here - that of the widespread use of GPS but no requirement to be trained in its use - but that is not an approach design issue.

[dont overfil]

we need the Airports / designers of Airfield plates to ensure that the information is clear and unambiguous.


"Approach not available without DME IDDE."

[Weathergirly]

I appreciate your comments but I stand by what I said. The AAIB have assumed what the Pilot did without much evidence to back it up. In my opinion they should have considered what I have mentioned above. They didn't. It is so easy to make this mistake and it is my belief there is a high probability that the Pilot did just that. This Pilot had plenty of experience reading plates and in the majority of cases a distance range between 2 points (DND and Base Turn) is just that. It is not normally off a dme positioned elsewhere. I agree, making up your own approach is dangerous and substituting NAV AIDS is not a good idea. I just think in this case it is more likely that in this Pilots mind when he arrived at the DND he was thinking 8 miles then I make the right turn. It is without doubt a poor depiction that could easily be rectified. If nothing else comes from the recommendations made by the AAIB then a simple ammendment to the plate would ensure that this latent error won't be the cause of an accident in the future.

[dont overfil]

Weathergirly
Page 26 of the AAIB report makes 6 recommendations. They seem to have what you suggest covered. There is also a GNSS approach on it's way. I'll bet the delay to this is to do with the present position of the NDB.

[Fred Tesson]

Looking at the Jeppesen version of the plates dated Feb 2015 it's a bit clearer that it is 8D from the DME.

We don't know which plates the pilot was using, but still an easy mistake to make flying single pilot, and no auto pilot I would imagine.

Looking at the warnings regarding the LOC and GS indications, I think it says that they might not show at the north of the LOC when below GS, so why once the base turn was complete would you immediately convert to a LOC DME approach if you never saw a GS indication?

[piperboy84]

The report never mentioned the currency status of the pitot static, altimeter or VOT test, with the plane being out of annual, AP inop, no ferry permit and the pilots piston twin ticket lapsed and the LOC/GS gear not utilsed for the approach you'd have to wonder what else was deficient for the flight.

[Weathergirly]

If the powers that be implement the AAIB recommendations then I agree by default my concerns and the concerns of many others will be addressed. The issue then will be all the other Airfields with an NDB off the Airfield and only one dme. Liverpool RW 27 as an example - exactly the same latent error. Unlike Dundee, good radar, highly alert ATC ensuring no Aircraft overshoots into Manchester Airspace and no high ground to bite you.

[n5296s]

So the idea would be to spend a bunch of public money, and change a lot of approaches, with the confusion potential this has, because of one pilot who failed to set up the correct approach? It's all very sad and all that, but where do you stop? Airports can only have one approach because you might set up the wrong one?

[n5296s]

have some respect
Because he's dead you mean? It's very sad, condolences to the family and so on.

Let's suppose he'd survived the crash. People on here would have been all over him because he'd set up Direct DND and then tried to use that to fly an ILS. That what's the report says, or at least suggests as strongly as it dares, and is the only reasonable inference from the observed facts.

We've all done the wrong thing when under pressure, and for sure we've all forgotten to flip a frequency or the HSI mode. But there's a lot more to this than just not flipping a button. Yes, he COULD have been under such pressure that he set up completely the wrong approach and then failed to notice despite several "huh?" moments - of which never seeing the glideslope would certainly be one.

I'll happily redact "couldn't be bothered to" to "failed to" if it makes you happier. But it's still a very poor reason for making an expensive and disruptive change - which could well lead to another accident when someone is mentally flying the old approach.

[Weathergirly]

Not sure if my point is clear. In my opinion and many others is that the AAIB have not considered a valid point. The approach plate is ambiguous and I beleive the Pilot confidently tracked outbound 8 miles from the DND NDB to his base turn. Improving the approach plate would not require lots of public money, it would only be an ammendment of the DME frequency against the stated distance.
I understand that not all of you will agree but this small addition is a very small price to pay in the name of safety. The bowtie pyramid should of picked this up. After all, with no safety net at Dundee this accident could easily happen again.

[bingofuel]

Having looked at the UKAIS page for the Dundee ILS / LOC approach, whether the base turn was made at 8 nm from the NDB or as a dme range is not really the issue.
To me the issue is the descent starts inbound at either glideslope capture cross checked with 6.7 dme, or if a Localiser procedure at 6.7d which is a dme distance, so the dme should be tuned and used.
I can understand tracking inbound to the NDB using gps especially as it is on the coast and may have some errors but once at the beacon, surely you fly the procedure using the correct aids?
Of course we are assuming that there was a working ils receiver in the aeroplane!

Just my tuppence worth.

[Weathergirly]

Bingofuel. I'm sorry I have to disagree. It is highly likely that this Pilot was suckered into this fateful trap. Put yourself in the Pilots seat and imagine the situation. Southerly heading to the DND, IMC and workload relatively high. DND tuned into the ADF and a direct to DND tuned into the GPS. Counting down the miles to the DND with 1 mile to run quick check of distance outbound and track required to base turn. The plate says 8 miles, Heading 255 degrees. Begin your descent, moderate rain, blustery conditions still in IMC and the Aircraft being bufferted to the extent that you are focused on flying the Aircraft. Aviate - Navigate - Communicate. You turn the Aircraft inbound and in all of this forget that you are still calculating your distance from the DND and begin your descent early. You know what happens next. My point is if the ident was next to the 8d it is highly probable this would of been the error trap that the Pilot needed and would of realised as he approached the DND at the beginning of the approach.
In the AAIB conclusion they state that mistaking GPS distance from the DND with DME distances is a common error made by Pilots. To me it's a simple solution - Put the ident next to the D8. Make it obvious because what we have at the moment is a very poor depiction and anyone could of made this mistake. A Very sad event indeed.

[dont overfil]

He was a professional pilot and familiar with Dundee!!!!!!???

Why would he not use the correct procedure? I would guess the aircraft had a few unservicabilities.

The other thing that came to mind was written in one of the fora (?) recently was behavior described as "Normalisation of deviance."

[maxred]

Forgive me weathergirly, but would you commence your descent, without capture of the GS, or the LOC for that matter. Particularly when you were very aware of the high ground to the North, and that the procedure takes you over it, hence staying at 2200 until capture of at least one of them.

Sorry, this was classic spatial disorientation, with CFIT. Call it overload, call it what you like, but I feel this is what happened.

[piperboy84]

Sorry, this was classic spatial disorientation

I'd expect to see some kind of turning if it was spatial disorientation. It appears the flight path was pretty much a direct line for the beacon after turning inbound too the crash site. More like loss of situational awareness due to duff nav gear setup and/or bad interpretation of the plate

[maxred]

Sorry Piper, you are correct. Situational awareness, rather than spatial.

[fireflybob]

For me one of the lessons is don't mix and match GPS with an instrument approach which is based on "hard" radio aids.

I venture to suggest that if this a/c had not been equipped with GPS this accident would not have happened. That said I am of course aware that there are other threats associated with flying the "raw data" instrument approach.

It might have been better to fly the instrument approach from overhead DND using basic radio aids only with GPS as confirmation.

[quilmes]

The 8nm West features in these previous incidents

ASN Aircraft accident 11-NOV-1983 Cessna 310Q G-AZYI (http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=156444)

[piperboy84]

Interesting thing about the 310 crash and the additional ACCIDENT mentioned in the above link is both these accidents were early 80's and prior to GPS

[fireflybob]

Interesting thing about the 310 crash and the additional ACCIDENT mentioned in the above link is both these accidents were early 80's and prior to GPS

Correct me if I'm wrong but this was before provision of ILS/DME at Dundee so these a/c were flying NDB approach?