Turkish A330 incident, Kathmandu

[Stone_cold]

Just as I advised Iceman earlier that indeed all 330 are not CAT D , I would caution against being dogmatic that all ARE CAT C . Airbus has a habit of doing different things for different operators and there are several higher landing weight versions ( 343, 342 ) ,engine & airframe combinations that may be certified CAT D .With AIrbus , you just never know . You can verify what you operate , Iceman says his are CAT D . I would leave it at that .

Regarding non normal configuration & circling minima , under PansOPS , as far as I know , there is no obligation to move up a category based on actual approach speed / configuration . The approach category criteria is based upon certified approach category ( Stall speed ratio in landing config at Max landing mass) . However maybe TERPS and your company apply different .

[johnpilot]

Chaps, Iceman and all.

Certification of an aircraft is final. The FAA and EASA have certified the airbus 330 as a Category C aircraft. This cannot change because an operator decides to classify it as a CAT D aircraft for operational reasons.

The airlines in the fragrant harbour have categorised the aircraft as CAT C for straight in approaches and CAT D for circle to land.

This is because the speed during the circle to land at max landing weight with Auto-Thrust ON is on the threshold of CAT D speeds, while airbus have certified it as CAT C even for circling to land because they don/t need to use the A/THR ON. (5 Kts makes all the difference).

The airline in question operates the aircraft as a CAT C aircraft. Standard practice for EASA compliant countries.

I trust this makes sense and clarifies the difference between certification category and operational classification by an airline. The link I provided earlier has the certification categories of all airbus aircraft.

Iceman I do fly the 330/340

[ACMS]

Ahhhhh me brain hurts..

Say what you will but our HK company OPS A manual stipulate we are to consider ALL of our Aircraft as CAT D for published minimas......End of story full stop.
Next

[de facto]

An operator via its own CAA approval has the right to INCREASE its aircraft category...ie from C to D...(as john wrote ,for operational classification only)
However crews arent allowed to reduce their minima to lower Category based on actual landing speed.
For example,your aircraft is CAT C but you land empty ,and get a lower Vref equal to CAT B then you cant use cat B minima.

[Stone_cold]

John , nothing is final in aviation and if one really wants to be pedantic then if it's in their OMA then it is certified .

Curious to know what speed you circle at with a 330 at max landing weight .
As you state strongly , the approach category is certified i.e fixed , so why change the category if you circle close to CAT D threshold . Seems you are in favour of changing from CAT C to D for "operational reasons " when it suits you .

Curiously enough , I know of at least one carrier which alters the max takeoff mass of their A321's depending on the sector it is flying to take advantage of the Landing fee's . Guess what , it miraculously loses 4 tons on these sectors with the flip of a placard in the cockpit , just saying ..with Airbus you get what you pay for .

BTW , follow the thread before you freak out !!!! I posted that link you claim in post 238 .

[aterpster]

This is what the FAA has to say about it:

5−4−7. Instrument Approach Procedures

a. Aircraft approach category means a grouping of aircraft based on a speed of VREF, if specified, or if VREF is not specified, 1.3 VSO at the maximum certified landing weight. VREF, VSO, and the maximum certified landing weight are those values as established for the aircraft by the certification authority of the country of registry. A pilot must use the minima corresponding to the category determined during certification or higher. Helicopters may use Category A minima. If it is necessary to operate at a speed in excess of the upper limit of the speed range for an aircraft’s category, the minimums for the higher category must be used. For example, an airplane which fits into Category B, but is circling to land at a speed of 145 knots, must use the approach Category D minimums. As an additional example, a Category A airplane (or helicopter) which is operating at 130 knots on a straight−in approach must use the approach Category C minimums.

[Stone_cold]

Can't disagree with you ATP . I know the FAA/Terps circling criteria is much more restrictive , (don't know the exact numbers as I don't need them ), hence perhaps the need to "up" it .

PansOps :
Circling Speed : CAT C 180 knots max ,
CAT D 205 knot max .
Circling radii : CAT C 4.20 nm
CAT D 5.28 nm .

Hence the point some are trying to make , different strokes ..

[LeadSled]

Folks,
Just to put the cat amongst the pigeons, I can nominate at least one major and well known airline that does, in fact, have approval to operate Cat. D aircraft to Cat. C PANS/OPS criteria in selected cases ---- with the obvious restriction being that Cat. C speeds must be flown.
I know this to be the case, because I worked for them for years, and have flown the procedures more times than I care to remember, sometimes twice a day.

[GF4RCE]

FO Cokebottle:
In short, the PIC may have had all these cards in their hand but due to the decision making processes, for what ever reason, discarded them one-by-one until there was nil other alternative/option other than to land in such weather conditions by conducting a Low Visibility Operation (LVO) autoland onto a runway that, as aterpster has pointed out, was NOTAM'ed with a displaced threshold, which is a lesser issue than that of the runway, itself, was not to the equipment/facility standard required to conduct such a landing in LVO conditions.

thats a big assumption to make considering you don't have the relevant data nor the aware of the dynamics within the cockpit at the time.....

the issue is more deep seeded than the crew disregarding ( if indeed that is remotely relevant in this case) all the items one by one as you simply put it.. may i suggests reading on james reasons work before you try to pin the issue at the sharp end. indeed there might be many valuable lessons in the form of "CRM and application of SOP, Rules and Procedures and how they are incorporated into the decision making process of pilots" but remember no occurrence or accident is a SINGULARITY but rather layers of failures that surpass common crm and decision making processes...

JammedStab:

Not sure I understand. I heard they held for quite a while due to poor weather. Did they hold for such a long time that they could no longer get to their alternate? Was their alternate New Delhi which has CAT III?
i dont think fuel was as issue from what i know, that flight had 22t of tankering fuel plus alternateS..
when THY plans for alternates, the diversion airfield(s) must have met conditions equal or above the next highest category of approach... e.g ILS CAT1 at dest then the alternate wx min for the alternates should at least NPA minima.... ..

[FO Cokebottle]

GF4RCE:

thats a big assumption to make considering you don't have the relevant data nor the aware of the dynamics within the cockpit at the time.....

Based on my experience in the airline industry and within the multicrew cockpit environment, I can well ascertain the dynamics.

Flying, at this level, is procedural and rule based, hence, the reasons for the plethora of theory examinations, countless hours of procedure training in simulators including company SOPs, the countless regulatory publications including but not limited to State AIPs, Aviation Acts, Aviation Orders and the most dominant document - the Company's OPS SPEC.

no occurrence or accident is a SINGULARITY but rather layers of failures that surpass common crm and decision making processes...


Please read my previous posts within the thread. The accident started back in LTBA - at Dispatch.

i dont think fuel was as issue from what i know, that flight had 22t of tankering fuel plus alternateS..
when THY plans for alternates, the diversion airfield(s) must have met conditions equal or above the next highest category of approach... e.g ILS CAT1 at dest then the alternate wx min for the alternates should at least NPA minima.... ..

This only makes this accident totally avoidable and unnecessary.

With 22 tonnes of "tankering full", due most likely to commercial reasons (far too expensive at VNKT), the PIC had the options to divert (even back to LTBA if so desired) or to hold for 3+ hours (with MDF still intact) until the fog burned off.

The standard Company SOP statement regarding the responsibilities of the PIC has a legal finality

the issue is more deep seeded than the crew disregarding
when THY plans for alternates, the diversion airfield(s)

One may infer that you work for THY.....?

In the end, if walks like a duck, quacks like a duck and looks like a duck - it's a duck!

[bangbounceboeing]

Any current pictures of the aircraft?

[fox niner]

What about a preliminary report? Normally a prelim should be published after one month. It has been two months ago since this accident.

[ATC Watcher]

Answer is most probably in the word " Normally " and setting your priorities. Been watching the news about Nepal recently ?

[ex TA customer]

Hello there,

As a passenger of this unfortunate flight, I am highly interested in the cause of the accident. I found some interesting content of the preliminary report.

Now I understand better why the crew acted totally untrained during the accident and left us alone after we finally escaped the plane (actually, they left the runway by bus just after the crash and have not taken care of us ever since). And now I understand why we have been ignored by TA in the months afterwards.:ugh:

My Republica - Carelessness of crew blamed for Turkish Airlines mishap (http://admin.myrepublica.com/economy/item/23288-carelessness-of-crew-blamed-for-turkish-airlines-mishap.html)

Turkish Airlines accident due to lack of coordination - Karobar National Economic Daily (http://www.karobardaily.com/2015/06/5607/)


Thank you all for the interesting information on this thread.

ex TA customer

[Takeoff53]

Mid April I was in KTM for a few days (and left only one day before the earthquake...).


When I arrived in KTM the engines where still fitted but three or four days later, they where gone.
Today I watched a YouTube video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7kzotoNVi8Q showing the Approach to RWY 02 out of a right Hand window. I recognised that the A330 is not parked anymore at the place wher it was in April. Has the aircraft been dismanteled or what happened to this almost brand new A330?

[jackcarls0n]

I was there last week. The A330 was still there. It was parked on the north east end of the airport near the helicopter parking apron. It had no engines and the plane was covered with protective layer!

The video on youtube is about 4 months old! So most likely before the incident!

[IcePack]

Did the crew have their A level & O level certificates with them ?
(They stop the interview process if you don't have them. 10g+ hrs on A330 is not as important)

[MartinAOA]

The final report has been released : http://www.tourism.gov.np/uploaded//TURKISH-AIRLINE-Final-Report-finalcopy.pdf

[cosmiccomet]

I don´t understand how in the hell they were keeping the autopilot up to 14 ft AGL in an RNAV APP...

[FlightDetent]

Excellent performance of the AP/FD and NAV systems!

[Mariner]

No mention of the remaining fuel in the report :ugh:
Which could have been a factor to press on.

[oliver2002]

So if the co-ordinates would have been entered correctly they would have gotten away with it... :eek:

[cosmiccomet]

As any Instrumental Approach at the MDA/DA without runway in sight the cockpit crew should perform a go around.
An RNAV (RNP) approach is still a NON Precision Approach and according to Airbus Limitations and Standarize Procedures, Pilots should disconnect the autopilot not lower than MDA-50 ft or the minimum autopilot use for an RNP approach is 250 ft AGL.
Even for a CAT II approach without autoland should be disconnected not below than 80 ft AGL.
Without CAT II/III displayed in the FMA the minimum autopilot disconnection altitude should be not below than 160 ft.

Unless the TK A330 is an special one....those are the limitations.

[ATC Watcher]

Not a bad report , the CVR transpript and fuel management are missing,but based on what I have heard on the grapewine they had more than sufficient fuel to divert to Delhi.
So if the co-ordinates would have been entered correctly they would have gotten away with it...

Probably, and that is what is sad with this all. You need an accident or a serious incident to discover and correct operations like theses...

because regardless of wrong data base and other contributing factors, , first time in KTM and going below MDA in zero visibility on a non precision APP , you need guts...

[EatMyShorts!]

...and that's why THY is so proud of their former military pilots, they have guts, they bring the planes down, no time-consuming diversions needed. Yeah, another airline to keep avoiding.

[bud leon]

Well I can't avoid THY, and I'm glad to see that they have implemented a number of actions in response to this incident.

[FlightDetent]

The TREND forecast in the recorded METARs in quite bad. NOSIG should be valid for 2 hours, and the at 0150 with an improvement NOSIG is given for 3000 meters. :suspect:


Well I can't avoid THY, and I'm glad to see that they have implemented a number of actions in response to this incident. Which do you mean?


FD.

[aterpster]

cosmiccomet:

An RNAV (RNP) approach is still a NON Precision Approach...

If that is the case, why does it have a DA instead of an MDA?

In the U.S. it is considered an approach with vertical guidance (APV), not a NPA, and with a DA, disconnect of autoflight below DA would depend upon the aircraft manufacturer's and the operators specified limitations.

[Capn Bloggs]

Aterpster, page 35 details the Airbus SOP for RNPs: AP off by Minimum minus 50ft. CC's interpretation is reasonable in this case, as Airbus obviously is treating an RNP as an NPA, even though it is technically a 3D approach. From my not-current Boeing 737 FCTM (never flew it), the AP and ATS are disconnected AT the DA on an RNP-AR (SAAAR) approach.

[aterpster]

Bloggs:

Aterpster, page 35 details the Airbus SOP for RNPs: AP off by Minimum minus 50ft. CC's interpretation is reasonable in this case, as Airbus obviously is treating an RNP as an NPA, even though it is technically a 3D approach. From my not-current Boeing 737 FCTM (never flew it), the AP and ATS are disconnected AT the DA on an RNP-AR (SAAAR) approach.

I work with RNP AR quite a bit, but I am not qualified to fly it, since I no longer fly. I don't know at what point various U.S. operators disconnect on an RNP AR. DA would seem reasonable. But, in the U.S. on all RNP AR approaches the DA-point is the MAP, just as with all approaches with a DA instead of a MDA. The fact that VNKT has the RNP AR MAP at the threshold makes no sense to me. Also, in the U.S., an RNP AR approach would be NOTAMed OTS by the FAA during a period where the threshold is displaced for construction. The FAA could issue a new RNP AR approach to account for the displaced threshold but they are not inclined to work nearly that fast. :)

The FAA does not consider RNP AR to be an NPA.

[ExDubai]

first time in KTM and going below MDA in zero visibility on a non precision APP , you need guts...
A couple of those ex military guys I've recently meet reminded on the movie Topgun

[Uplinker]

Yeah, that's just what you need in a passenger airliner - a pilot who takes risks.....

I don't understand the mentality: "I will literally risk my life and all my passenger's lives by flying below the minima for this procedure/approach. That will 'prove' that I am a very good pilot"

Erm, no, think again. If these people want thrills why don't they go and fly Pitts Specials on their days off?


I've always had a nagging feeling about RNAV approaches. We are taught to very carefully check the approaches and the tracks and distances of the waypoints in the database, and are led to believe that the coordinates are very carefully checked and verified by the database suppliers. I will certainly be checking even more carefully in future, but how can we guard against incorrect data? There is no ground based reference to double check our approach.

[sleeper]

If they had seen the runway at da/mda , even with the incorrect threshold, a normal landing would have followed. The cause is not the database fault, but the decission to continue well below minimum.

[aterpster]

Uplinker:

I've always had a nagging feeling about RNAV approaches. We are taught to very carefully check the approaches and the tracks and distances of the waypoints in the database, and are led to believe that the coordinates are very carefully checked and verified by the database suppliers. I will certainly be checking even more carefully in future, but how can we guard against incorrect data? There is no ground based reference to double check our approach.
The fault was with the state, not the database supplier. With any RNAV procedure, particularly RNP AR, if the source state procedure designers don't do their job, then the origin of the chain is contaminated. Nonetheless, had the crew had the required visual references at DA, this would have been a non-event.

Further, if the state had robust flight inspection, as many countries do, they would have flight inspected the modified procedure and have easily caught the erroneous data provided for the "temporary" displaced threshold.

All of this was probably done by the third-party designer of the original procedure. But, they weren't there for the jury-rigging done to account for the displaced threshold.

Even today, the procedure is not in compliance with ICAO DOC 9905, because the MAP is at the threshold instead of DA.

[Two's in]

Interesting comment in the report about the cabin crew telling the flight deck that a diversion to Delhi would be a "burden". Not that this crew needed any more encouragement to "press-on" apparently, but from a CRM perspective that's a very negative CC input at a critical time.

[slast]

If they had seen the runway at da/mda , even with the incorrect threshold, a normal landing would have followed.
I wonder if they had ever had formal training on the actual decision requirement at DA.

Before descending below the DA, the pilot making the landing should already have seen external cues sufficient to confirm that the aircraft was properly placed and going in the right direction for a safe landing. There is limited info in the report (absence of CVR transcript) but it seems possible that there was no decision making at all, they simply ploughed on with the A/P engaged expecting something to show up. One has to wonder if the PM was also head up and not monitoring instruments as he appears not to have noticed the Autopilot Disconnect message on his FMA for some 15 seconds or more.

ICAO DA definition: "A specified altitude or height in the precision approach or approach with vertical guidance at which a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been established..... The required visual reference means that section of the visual aids or of the approach area which should have been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position, in relation to the desired flight path."

[FlightDetent]

slast: thanks, I did not realize the wording had been this clear. FD.

[tubby linton]

The later busses are capable of a GLS autoland. Is this what he was tryimg to accomplish?

[ATC Watcher]

The later busses are capable of a GLS autoland

As far as I understood, this function is only possible with GPS augmentation , i.e EGNOS or WAAS. None of the 2 over Nepal.

[Capn Bloggs]

Interesting comment in the report about the cabin crew telling the flight deck that a diversion to Delhi would be a "burden". Not that this crew needed any more encouragement to "press-on" apparently, but from a CRM perspective that's a very negative CC input at a critical time.
It's just an interested party having an input. That's good CRM. Better that than a crew saying nothing for whatever reason. You could say that was a bad input, but what message would that send to the CC? "Depending on the situation (which you don't know about) your input is not wanted"...

Of course, it's up to the decision-maker, the person in Seat 0A, to consider all the inputs and act appropriately.

[aterpster]

ATC Watcher:

GLS needs SBAS and local augmentation. I believe the local augmentation equipment has to be within 25 miles.

[aterpster]

Bloggs:


Of course, it's up to the decision-maker, the person in Seat 0A, to consider the all the inputs and act appropriately.

In the interests of proper management of the entire crew if Seat 0A decides "no" he or she is obligated to be diplomatic with the CC member. Otherwise, future communications are compromised.

I know you know that, but for the lurkers.

[Capn Bloggs]

In the interests of proper management of the entire crew if Seat 0A decides "no" he or she is obligated to be diplomatic with the CC member. Otherwise, future communications are compromised.
Absolutely! The art of being a good leader...

At the risk of some thread driiifffttt...

GLS needs SBAS and local augmentation. I believe the local augmentation equipment has to be within 25 miles.
My understanding is that GLS (the "GBAS Landing System") uses normal GPS from the satellites and is augmented only by ground-based gear eg a/the LAAS, as you say, close to the airport.

[aterpster]

Capn Bloggs:
My understanding is that GLS (the "GBAS Landing System") uses normal GPS from the satellites and is augmented only by ground-based gear eg a/the LAAS, as you say, close to the airport.

You are correct. But, the original concept included WAAS, more or less. :ooh: From the FAA site:

Satellite Navigation - NAS Implementation

NAS Implementation - Procedures - Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) Landing System (GLS)

"GLS" is the acronym for Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) Landing System.

GLS was originally published as a placeholder for both Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and GBAS minima and marked as N/A since no minima was published.

As the concepts for GBAS and WAAS procedure publication have evolved, it was decided that GLS will now only be associated with GBAS and will be on a separate approach chart. For more information on GLS approach procedures, please refer to the AIM section 1-1-21 and section 5-4-5.

[CONSO]

]Final report on the INVESTIGATION OF RUNWAY EXCURSION ACCIDENT OF TURKISH AIRLINES TC-JOC, A330-303, AT TIA, KATHMANDU, NEPAL ON 4th MARCH 2015


http://www.tourism.gov.np/uploaded//...-finalcopy.pdf (http://www.tourism.gov.np/uploaded//TURKISH-AIRLINE-Final-Report-finalcopy.pdf)

Quote:
On March 4th 2015, Turkish Airlines Flight TK-726 experienced a runway excursion whilst landing at Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA) at 01:59 hrs. TK-726 was operating a scheduled passenger flight from Istanbul to Kathmandu with a total of 224 passengers with 11 crew members (2 Cockpit and 9 cabin crew). During landing the aircraft touched down towards the left edge of Runway 02 with the left hand main landing gear off the paved runway surface. The aircraft veered further to the left and came to a stop on the grass area between taxiway D and C. All passengers were evacuated safely after a brief period of time. There was no injury to passengers and crew. Fire did not occur at the time of accident.
Quote:
The probable cause of this accident is the decision of the flight crew to continue approach and landing below the minima with inadequate visual reference and not to perform a missed approach in accordance to the published approach procedure.
Quote:
The auto-pilots remained coupled to the aircraft until 14 ft AGL, when it was disconnected, a flare was attempted. The maximum vertical acceleration recorded on the flight data recorder was approximately 2.7 G. The aircraft pitch at touchdown was 1.8 degree nose up up which is lower than a normal flare attitude for other landings.

[TypeIV]

If interpreted the CVR excerpt correctly then they continued for appr. 24 seconds beyond the MDA until they started seeing the runway.

He said "Appearing" five seconds prior to disengaging the A/P, at which point the aircraft was already at 14'.

[PENKO]

What were they thinking?
Literally. Did they really think they could rely on the aircraft to get them on the runway in FINAL APP mode? Even if the runway threshold coordinates were correct, then still there are many ways in which you could end up in the wrong place:

-colder/warmer than standard temperature leading to under/overshoot of the threshold
-error in the reported/set QNH. 1011 in stead of 1012 is already a 30 feet difference over the threshold..
-any other database error, not uncommon in our present day databases, each year we get one or two interesting corrections per NOTAM

To bust minimums is bad enough, but to do it all the way to the deck, on a non-precision approach? What were they thinking?

[aterpster]

PENCO:

To bust minimums is bad enough, but to do it all the way to the deck, on a non-precision approach? What were they thinking?

Agree with all you said except I'll quibble on the NPA aspect. If it were an NPA, it would have an MDA rather than a DA.

As to the database, this entire effort was a fiasco, starting with Nepal's aviation authority. RNP AR approaches are in a separate category from all other database approach procedures. There are many additional hoops for both the state aviation authority and the operator to jump through as part of their RNP AR authorization. Neither Nepal nor THY management did much of that.

[PENKO]

aterpster, in my company (large European airline) we fly all non precision approaches in our network as continuous final descent approaches and as such we are provided with a 'DA' for these approaches. Technically we can't fly non precision to an MDA anymore. You might be right in what you say, but this is how it is in my company..(and probably in TA).

http://www.code7700.com/cdfa.html

[aterpster]

PENKO:

aterpster, in my company (large European airline) we fly all non precision approaches in our network as continuous final descent approaches and as such we are provided with a 'DA' for these approaches. Technically we can't fly non precision to an MDA anymore. You might be right in what you say, but this is how it is in my company..(and probably in TA).

I understand that. It is a related but different issue than DA appearing on an RNP AR procedure.

[FlightDetent]

Aterpster: until now I considered APVs to be a subset of non-precision approaches, as "electronic guidance in vertical plane" is not available so they cannot be PApchs. You repeatedly say something different and do not sound like a man who's not sure. Where do baroAPVs fit then?

regards, FD

PS: Ha, got it!http://i65.tinypic.com/15qdn53.png

[Capn Bloggs]

Forget the concepts of "Non-Precision" and "Precision". Because there are now approaches that are flown "similar" to an ILS eg LPV, GLS, Baro VNAV, RNP-AR ie they give proper, legalised vertical commands which you must follow (like you follow a GS), the old "precision" concept ie provision of a GlideSlope, has become muddied. That's why the system introduced 2D (2 dimensional, the old MDA-type approaches) and 3D (approaches flown with vertical guidance/commands ie 3 dimensional that include ILS and RNP-AR and indeed BaroVNAV. All 3D approaches are the same: follow the pitch commands down to the DA and then go around if not Visual.

FD, an "APV" is an APproach with Vertical Guidance", a 3D approach. Flown exactly like an ILS, but obviously not one, in the historical sense of the "precision" concept. The "BARO" part signifies the altimeter/QNH is being used to provide vertical commands, as opposed to a GLS, where I assume the GPS gear is used to provide the "glidepath" to follow. An RNP-AR would therefore be a type of Baro-VNAV, I suppose, which is of course an APV! :)

[aterpster]

Bloggs:

Forget the concepts of "Non-Precision" and "Precision". Because there are now approaches that are flown "similar" to an ILS eg LPV, GLS, Baro VNAV, RNP-AR ie they give proper, legalised vertical commands which you must follow (like you follow a GS), the old "precision" concept ie provision of a GlideSlope, has become muddied. That's why the system introduced 2D (2 dimensional, the old MDA-type approaches) and 3D (approaches flown with vertical guidance/commands ie 3 dimensional that include ILS and RNP-AR and indeed BaroVNAV. All 3D approaches are the same: follow the pitch commands down to the DA and then go around if not Visual.

FD, an "APV" is an APproach with Vertical Guidance", a 3D approach. Flown exactly like an ILS, but obviously not one, in the historical sense of the "precision" concept. The "BARO" part signifies the altimeter/QNH is being used to provide vertical commands, as opposed to a GLS, where I assume the GPS gear is used to provide the "glidepath" to follow. An RNP-AR would therefore be a type of Baro-VNAV, I suppose, which is of course an APV!

Good summary!

Having said that I think ICAO is full of it on LPV. It walks and quacks just like a CAT I ILS except LPV is always rock solid unlike some ILS facilities.

Further, the fact that the U.S. (perhaps other countries with SBAS as well) use the exact same obstacle clearance surfaces and lateral dimensions as used for CAT I ILS says legions.

[PENKO]

Thanks for the info gentlemen. To further simplify things, we fly all non-precision approaches as APV approaches to a DA. So even an NDB approach will have a DA in our charts. GPS or no GPS.

[peekay4]

To further simplify things, we fly all non-precision approaches as APV approaches to a DA.

Mmm... depending on the jurisdiction there may be legal differences between flying NPA using CDFA to a DDA, vs. flying an APV to a DA. They are not exactly equivalent, even if the procedures may be similar.

E.g., in most jurisdictions, when executing a go around you may go below the APV DA, but for an NPA you must ensure your DDA has sufficient buffer (usually 50 ft) to not go below the MDA.

[sarge75]

Criminal decision not to go around.

Criminal that it took 10 minutes to evacuate the plane.

Criminal that the airport was open. That said, to quote a CAAN official, "it doesn't matter because we are already on the black list"

[FlightDetent]

E.g., in most jurisdictions, when executing a go around you may go below the APV DA, but for an NPA you must ensure your DDA has sufficient buffer (usually 50 ft) to not go below the MDA.
Just for the record, EASA is not in the MOST bucket.

FD.

[No Fly Zone]

Please recall that I am NOT an expert with these types of approaches. In this case I read darn near everything in the hope of learning something, but I'm left hanging, wondering what happened to the common sense and basic safety that most apply to their flying? In short, when one reaches DA and ALL safe landing requirements are not met, Why the Heck not Go Around? Unless the airplane is already running on vapors, why not? Even prior, if the known conditions were that bad, why had the trip not already diverted elsewhere? A possible exception might include equally poor conditions at a diversion field and yes, the regions choices are limited. Still, responsible crews carry additional fuel for those events, do they not? Back to the principal landing attempt: unless the airplane was known to be on fire or in some other critical state, why the heck not Go Around and give the PF another chance to reach DA with everything properly aligned and aimed, including RWY alignment? Unless there are very good reasons for not doing so, how can this be called anything other than Very Poor Flying? Did I miss some critical piece of this puzzle? I'm not pointing fingers, but I am asking. Thanks.

[IcePack]

No Fly Zone, what you say is correct. However in the real world you do not know how behind locked doors the company react to go arounds or failure to "get in" even in responsible airlines they apply pressures. For instance if you divert to alternate I know some airlines will ask why you did not hang about & then declare a mayday when down to final reserv. Am not saying in this case anything like this happened but we do not know what pressures the crew were under in reality or what pressure they perceived.

[aterpster]

IcePack:
No Fly Zone, what you say is correct. However in the real world you do not know how behind locked doors the company react to go arounds or failure to "get in" even in responsible airlines they apply pressures. For instance if you divert to alternate I know some airlines will ask why you did not hang about & then declare a mayday when down to final reserv. Am not saying in this case anything like this happened but we do not know what pressures the crew were under in reality or what pressure they perceived.

The accident occurred on the second approach attempt. The first approach was correctly flown into a missed approach because of inadequate visual references. It is quite a "cross county" flight through the missed approach to the missed approach holding point, then back onto the MANRI RNP STAR to RATAN, then eventually back onto the approach procedure. From the MAP through the entire circuit back to the MAP again is 127.9 nautical miles. Plus there is the hold at the MAPh. All of this is probably flown at an average ground speed of 210-250 knots. Much of the approach path is restricted to a maximum of 170 KIAS.

So, there was time for the weather to get better, which is typical at VNKT as the morning progresses. But, it did not this particular morning. Also, at some point in the first missed approach, probably holding at the MAPh, a flight attendant was on the flight deck and advised the captain, "If they diverted to Delhi there would be a big burden." (approach chart in Post #22.)

[spin_doctor]

The report made interesting reading and does not reflect particularly well on anyone.

I would agree that the primary cause of the accident was the decision to continue below DA with no visual reference (although the crew appear to state that they did have visual reference but this is not backed up by either their actions or the CVR).

What stopped them from 'getting away with it' this time was the addition of incorrect data (offset threshold position) which meant they were not aligned with the runway centreline.

One of the recommendations in the report is for the operator to implement a process for validation of the nav database. This is particularly worrying since the approach was an RNP AR APCH. Approval to operate this type of procedure requires extra processes to be in place and approved by the regulator, one of which is a requirement to validate each and every version of the nav database, if necessary by flying the approaches in the sim (or VFR) prior to operational use. The fact that this process is recommended by the report suggests that this was not being done here, which means the operator should never have been approved for RNP AR as they do not meet the requirements.

[ATC Watcher]

Spin doctor : the operator should never have been approved for RNP AR as they do not meet the requirements.
Correct , and from what I have heard , it is not only the operator that did not meet the AR requirements .

What would be interesting to know is the reaction of the insurers, a brand new 330 is not cheap.

[aterpster]

Spin Doctor:

One of the recommendations in the report is for the operator to implement a process for validation of the nav database. This is particularly worrying since the approach was an RNP AR APCH.

Add the Nepal aviation authority to that list. A flight inspection was required. That did not happen nor was it discussed in the report.

Approval to operate this type of procedure requires extra processes to be in place and approved by the regulator, one of which is a requirement to validate each and every version of the nav database, if necessary by flying the approaches in the sim (or VFR) prior to operational use. The fact that this process is recommended by the report suggests that this was not being done here, which means the operator should never have been approved for RNP AR as they do not meet the requirements.

Agree in this case. But, if an RNP approach has not been changed, only the database needs to be verified, the "flyability" of the unchanged approaches need not be accomplished.

Also, Nepal's design is defective in that the MAP is at the threshold rather than the DA point. That is non-compliant with PANS-OPS. Nothing mentioned about that in the accident report, either.

THY and Nepal are akin to Frick and Frack.

[firstchoice7e7]

Will the A330 involved in this crash be repaired?

Nice pic in the following report

https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/investigative-report-indicates-attempt-to-cover-up-turkish-airlines-crash-landing/

[readywhenreaching]

repair ? looks like its being parted out. smells like a hull loss.

[Life empty]

Hi, I wonder if the FDR /CVR conversations of the Turkish Airlines A330 aircraft that left the runway during landing in Kathmandu on March 4 2015 have been published? Does anyone any information and on this? Thank you so much.

[MissChief]

Most unlikely.

[Life empty]

Most unlikely.
Thank you for your message. But there must be a way to find out.. :(

[ATC Watcher]

But there must be a way to find out.. :(
Unless you have access to insiders info I doubt it , because it is not mandatory to make CVR conversations public , There are some States ( Canada and New Zealand comes to mind) that even prohibit it. So if one of the investigating States , here Nepal or Turkey . opposed it , there is little you can do. I am not saying they did object, just giving you a plausible explanation .