United Airlines warning letter to Pilots about safety

[skyhighfallguy]

wondering why this story isn't being followed on pprune. someone else might post the story, reported in the USA on major networks.

[206Fan]

United Airlines Officials Highlight 'Near-Misses' in Safety Message to Pilots - ABC News (http://abcnews.go.com/US/united-airlines-officials-highlight-misses-safety-message-pilots/story?id=29237744)

[sunbird123]

This letter could apply to all operations.

[haejangkuk]

What?!!!!! How can that be?

The best airlines, the bestest pilots. This must be a joke!:=

[Capn Bloggs]

Good on them. From an education perspective, it'd be good to get the details on the obviously serious incidents.

[Pozidrive]

Spot on Captn Bloggs.


Shouldn't everybody be doing this?

[PJ2]

It's what SMS and flight data monitoring is all about - very likely they saw these events in their data and they did something about it. It's a superb response. Having done this work for a long time now, I know that no carrier can reasonably believe that some of this doesn't apply to them. There are no such things as "skygods", (but there may be some pilots that believe in their own propaganda...).

When the cost is so enormous, UAL's actions come under the heading of "Lesson's for free" for all flight crews and not just UAL's.

[RetiredF4]

I'm at a loss what I should do with this action. Obviously it sells good when brought into the light of the public. Was that part of the plan, was it the plan or was it what is written down, a wake up call from the top to the bottom?

Next question is, shouldn't unsafe happenings, incident and accident reports be available to all the crews all over the industry and be part of a mandatory regualar briefing through the training and supervising departments? Shouldn't those departments make sure, that each crew member has been informed in reasonable time about those flight safety items to prevent such happenings in the future operations?

If I take this letter honest, do I have to conclude that such a system does not even exist about such happenings within an airline for their own happenings or does not work sufficiently or is not taken serious enough, that it has to be supplemented by some top notch guy to make his point clear via public adress?

[OldLurker]

Good for UA. What they're doing looks sensible and all airlines should follow, provided that what they do is not simply to publicise mistakes or actions that are "not in compliance" followed by downgrading or "re-training" the pilots involved, but to analyse why the incidents occurred and show how procedures or mind-sets can be changed so that others can avoid similar mistakes. Most of us, except of course the "sky-gods" (and their counterparts, the "ground-gods"?) will admit that we make mistakes sometimes and want to understand how we can avert them.

The UA memo mentions "the recent CFIT accident in Birmingham [in which] the approach and landing appeared normal to the pilots until right before impact." I suppose they mean the UPS crash in 2013? (at Birmingham, Alabama, not Birmingham, England.) In that case the NTSB said that the crew continued an unstabilized approach ... failed to monitor the altitude ... failed to properly configure the FMC ... FO's failure to make required call-outs ... captain's decision to change the approach strategy without communicating his change to the first officer ... and [yes, yes] flight crew fatigue.* Did that approach really appear normal to the pilots?

* Caveat: This is from the NTSB's press release, I haven't read its actual report.

[Lost in Saigon]

Here is the full memo:

Date: January 9, 2015

SAFETY ALERT: Significant safety concerns

Recent events in our operation have dictated that we communicate with all of you immediately. Over the past few weeks, our airline has experienced what we would categorize as major safety events and near-misses.

In Flight Operations we have seen two events in close proximity to terrain (one resulting in a GPWS pull-up maneuver), an Undesired Aircraft State on departure and a low fuel state on arrival after a deviation from a Sabre Flight Plan routing.

The common thread with all of these is that they are preventable. We must ask ourselves, “Do we have our priorities in line every time we put on our uniforms and strap into the airplane?” While the airline industry always seems to be in a state of flux, the one constant for all of us is that we are professional aviators with the common goal of flying our passengers and crew from point A to point B SAFELY.

Another common thread to some of these events is a lack of attention to disciplined Crew Resource Management. Every time we enter the cockpit with the intention of performing our pilot duties, we evaluate risk. Every pilot must be willing to speak up if safety is in question. In the same vein, every pilot must also accept the input of their fellow crewmembers on the flight deck. In most cases, one of the pilots recognizes an unsafe situation. In some cases, a pilot’s input is ignored. This is unacceptable.

The recent CFIT accident in Birmingham involving another carrier underscores how quickly things can unravel. The approach and landing appeared normal to the pilots until right before impact. Let’s not for a moment think something like that could not happen at United.

We are currently seeing a lot of movement in the pilot group, such as retirements, seat movements and new hires, that -- while welcome -- introduces significant risk to the operation. While no one ever shows up to work with the goal of intentionally making a mistake, we are human and mistakes happen. What we can control is how we conduct ourselves on each and every flight. If you have ever used the term “Standard Brief” before departure, you have not complied with an SOP. If you have ever exceeded Stabilized Approach Criteria intentionally and not executed a go-around, you are not in compliance.

We know this is a brutally honest message and the tendency may be to rationalize why compliance is not occurring in some areas. Bottom line: United is at a critical juncture in its history and we as aviators must adhere to the policies and procedures outlined in the Flight Manuals, FOM, WOM and ALPA Code of Ethics. Reviewing, understanding, and complying with the guidance in company manuals is imperative to returning ourselves, our fellow crewmembers and passengers to their families safely. This is our top priority and greatest responsibility, and we appreciate in advance your continued commitment and cooperation.

Fly safe.

Howard Attarian, Sr. Vice President Flight Operations

Michael Quiello, Vice President Corporate Safety

[Jet Jockey A4]

I see nothing wrong in that memo and in fact I give it a :ok:

[aterpster]

OldLurker:

The UA memo mentions "the recent CFIT accident in Birmingham [in which] the approach and landing appeared normal to the pilots until right before impact." I suppose they mean the UPS crash in 2013? (at Birmingham, Alabama, not Birmingham, England.) In that case the NTSB said that the crew continued an unstabilized approach ... failed to monitor the altitude ... failed to properly configure the FMC ... FO's failure to make required call-outs ... captain's decision to change the approach strategy without communicating his change to the first officer ... and [yes, yes] flight crew fatigue.* Did that approach really appear normal to the pilots?

Exactly. UAL glossed over the multiple errors of commission and omission during that UPS crash approaching Runway 18 at KBHM.

[Huck]

We get a memo like that about once every two years at my carrier.

FOQA has lifted the veil on just how dangerous our profession can be.

[skyhighfallguy]

well, to me, this means:

someone had a very high rate of descent on approach and a gpws alert, in other words a very unstablized approach.

it also sounds like someone took off with the flaps improperly set.

and IF SOMEONE WAS SMART AT A MAJOR TV NETWORK THEY WOULD FILE A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST and get the straight dope.

No one has mentioned that United and Continental merger may have ruffled some feathers in terms of seniority integration. IF anyone knows the method they finally used, maybe they can post it. But as many of you know, Continental used Scabs at one time. ( United used mgmt pilots to just fly a 747 round and round the pattern at ORD to make things look normal at one mid 80's strike)

I can also imagine that if seniority allowed United pilots to fly Continental MD80s there might be some less familiarity with this type .

I saw tom foreman on CNN try to explain a standard go around and he made it sound like a death defying catastrophic maneuver and Erin Burnett, the host like a dear caught in the headlights. It was awful. You can look it up on their website.

While it is important to reaffirm the CRM concept (which was needed at United many years ago, they coined the term I think), I think the tricks of commuter airlines have been brought to the big lines all in the name of money and it ain't pretty

HERE is a link to the CNN piece, I really ask the pilots here to comment on the piece.http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/politics/united-airlines-pilot-warning/index.html

[Jet Jockey A4]

LOL... US media at its best!

I did not know a "Go Around" could be so devastating to other traffic in the area. )-:

[WillFlyForCheese]

skyhallfallguy said:

and IF SOMEONE WAS SMART AT A MAJOR TV NETWORK THEY WOULD FILE A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST and get the straight dope.

File a FOIA with whom? FOIA is an "open government" law - and nothing whatsoever to do with private industry. Are you suggesting the media submit FOIA requests to the airlines?

[BARKINGMAD]

Retired F4;
Re your middle paragraph, yes we should be able to learn from others' errors, incidents and accidents.

So here in EASA controlled Britain, we still await the Accident Report on the HULL LOSS ACCIDENT, suffered by Ryr at Fiumicino, too many years ago, due multiple birdstrike and the May 2013 ACCIDENT to the cowling shedding Airbus out of Heathrow.

But answer came there none.

Maybe I'll get to read them before shuffling off this mortal coil due to excess inhalation of Organo-Phosphate vapours? Or a wayward bus will get me as my reactions get even slower? :)

[pattern_is_full]

@ oldlurker - well, let's just say the Birmingham approach looked normal enough to the pilots that they did not do anything to question it, correct it, or initiate a go-around.

As to the UA memo - I agree with its prime message. No flight is ever "just another day in the office." And it is dangerous, in and of itself, to slip into that mind-set.

That includes management, of course. Pay, rest, training, and "on-time" pressures also need to reflect the fact that it isn't just another job. If you invest for "just good enough, most of the time" - that's what you'll get.

[Towhee]

Inspector:

The airlines have spent the last 20+ years breaking the pilot unions and demoralizing the pilots, cutting anything good out of the career to save money or demoralize. They have also cut any training or safety expenses they could get away with. The result is a demoralized workforce, doing a job that requires extreme dedication and motivation. I've been involved in military and airline aviation for nearly 50 years, I spend a lot of time with pilots professionally and casually, and I've never been as concerned about their capabilities in the cockpit. I'm not alone, I'm hearing this from the older pilots almost constantly now.

Relations between pilots and airline management have always been harsh, with airline CEOs stating they will give only what they are forced to give by the unions. In 1981 Congress added Section 159a to the Railway Labor Act, effectively ending the ability of airline unions to influence the airlines or the airline industry. With the unions broken, and the FAA never really policing the industry, the airlines steadily drove down compensation, benefits, conditions, rest periods, days off, and safety. Morale followed.

With the long union contracts, it has taken decades. The airlines are where they said they would be: they will pay only what they are forced to pay, and now that happens only when there are no young people willing to enter the eight+ year pipeline to the pilot profession at below minimum wage. It has been over ten years since the profession was worth the cost and sacrifices. Young people stopped coming years ago, and the "new" (~ten years new) pilots are not nearly the caliber of the ones hired before them. Some are outstanding, but as a group, they are not the best and brightest that used to claw their way to airline cockpits. The old pilots have also lost some capabilities, from the days when they flew hard and trained hard.

Airline safety has peaked, it will never be the same reliable industry pilots and other airline workers made it. The major airlines will make heaps of money, as a pilot shortage means a shortage of low-cost airlines that keep ticket prices down. There are limits to capitalism, and this industry has reached and passed one. Taking away the right to strike gave this industry too much power, which they have used with reckless abandon.

While other industries reliant on specialized workers carefully manage the supply with recruiting and training, this industry has willfully destroyed the supply, to cripple their low-cost competition. The lack of pilots has begun to impact our nation's economy, and soon we will be looking at compromising safety further to "save" the airline industry. It will be the pilots we will turn to, asking them to give more, while blaming them for every incident they couldn't prevent.

[skyhighfallguy]

Dear WILLFLYFORCHEESE:

IF a pilot screwed up and had to do a GPWS escape maneuver he might have filed a report with the FAA or NASA OR other agency and received some protection/immunity. IF it was observed by ATC visually or on RADAR other documents might be available too!

SO, you might want to check out such things. I didn ' t think another pilot would have to understand the enormous amount of paperwork filed with one govt agency or another that has to happen to run an airline.

JETJOCKEYA4: thanks for confirming what I thought. ROTTEN work ON the ERIN BURNETT CNN SHOW and TOM FOREMAN really over did it.

IF he summed up brushing your teeth, he would have shown us how we could all poke our eyes out with deadly toothbrush induced eye surgery.

[glad rag]

Well I think the management should be applauded for "going out there" period.

[don't you just hate being the first guy on a new page]

[sunnySA]

I see nothing wrong in that memo and in fact I give it a :ok:

Same, same in Air Traffic Control, especially We are currently seeing a lot of movement in the pilot group, such as retirements, seat movements and new hires, that -- while welcome -- introduces significant risk to the operation.

Just replace "pilot group" to "air traffic control group". From my experience this significant risk isn't always acknowledged and managed.

[The Banjo]

A nicely balanced, yet brutally honest reminder from management.

The halfwit who leaked it should be sacked and banned from the industry :ugh:

[Longtimer]

I see nothing wrong with the letter becoming public. Perhaps it will act as a wakeup call for other carriers.

[racedo]

Are United Pilots not following their SOP's or is their an issue with their SOP's ?

[Spooky 2]

Well, you can bet your last dollar that somewhere there is a pilot who thinks they know or have a better way to do it:mad: I suspect that all of these procedures have been vetted by the Mfg, FAA, ALPA Safety and the combined training and standards organizations of both CAL and UAL. At the end of the day it doesn't matter if you have one pilot that thinks these new SOPs don't apply to them:ugh:

[Derfred]

Leaking...

I see something very wrong with the leak - that is, the author may think twice about issuing a similar memo in the future. It is a serious threat to a safety management system if management can't communicate with staff about safety related issues without confidentiality.

Would you self-report an incident if you thought your report would be leaked by management to the press?

It goes both ways.

If internal safety memos continue to be leaked, they will get the PR department to write them rather than the safety department.

[Airbubba]

We get a memo like that about once every two years at my carrier.

FOQA has lifted the veil on just how dangerous our profession can be.

Yep, these 'come to Jesus' letters are pretty common in the business in recent years. The usual FOQA complaints are that we do too many rejects and not enough go arounds.

As mentioned on other threads, I fly with some folks who seem to be doing everything but flying the plane while in the seat. They text while I'm taxiing and play games on the iPhone while descending though Chinese metric RVSM airspace as PF. And, if I say something about it, they pout and play 'I've got a secret' for the rest of the trip. :{

Illegal personal electronic devices are proliferating once more in the cockpit. Tablets play movies off of wifi hard drives with Bluetooth headphones and speakers. Unapproved GPS receivers are hacked to work with company tablets. Non-TSO headsets play tunes off the iPhone. NW 188 overflying MSP seemed to cut down on this unauthorized electronic stuff for a while but now it's back.

If we don't clean up our act and be more professional, the feds will do it for us after the next crash. := The NTSB has for years wanted airlines to audit non-accident CVR recordings to ensure SOP compliance. And cockpit cameras. Strictly confidential, non-disciplinary, for safety only etc., etc., etc...

[TriStar_drvr]

Spot on Bubba. I've experienced the same. It's disheartening.

[CDRW]

Yup Airbubba

I some times wonder if I am becoming an old fart like what I used to fly with 30 yrs ago -
No you can't text while taxying
No you can't make a call while taxying
No you can't watch a video in flight
No you can't have one ear plugged into your Itunes
Clearing the runway please don't lean down, get your phone turn it on.

[Chuck Canuck]

Airbubba...oops, that's like Korean Air pilots in the 80-90s! Eventhough the electronic gizmos ain't that advanced then but there were walkmans, colorful mags and Japanese mangas.:ugh:

[costalpilot]

"recent"...my post must be at least 10 characters.

[PJ2]

In any accident, a full report on the use and timings during the flight of all electronic devices belonging to the crew is standard procedure.

[Huck]

Our rule is - we turn the phones off when we get off the bus.

I haven't seen any gross violations in a while....

[Herod]

Airbubba and Trista_dvr. I assume you're both FOs, in which case you have my sympathy. Is there not a confidential reporting system you can use? Captains behaving like you say are not only unprofessional; they're dangerous.

[Airbubba]

Airbubba and Trista_dvr. I assume you're both FOs, in which case you have my sympathy.

I assume you're not a pilot if you don't know who taxis the aircraft at most airlines. ;)

[skyhighfallguy]

airbubba , not for a minute did I think you were the FO. Herod, airbubba has been around longer than danny.

[BBK]

Air bubba

First Officers taxying the aircraft? Next they'll be wanting landings too. Outrageous :E

Actually in my experience, in the UK, FOs taxying is SOP when it's their sector. Perhaps in your company and/or location it's different. It's all part of this wacky idea of developing the next generation of aviators. Role reversal I've heard it called.

As for the memo that started this thread I cannot fault it. I know nothing of the politics at United but I read it as an impassioned plea to the flight crew to do their jobs professionally. A former trainer said to me that "Fate is the hunter" should be required reading on a conversion course and I believe he was making a valid point about never letting your guard down. Be safe out there 'cos someone or something is going to try and spoil your day.

[framer]

I know nothing of the politics at United but I read it as an impassioned plea to the flight crew to do their jobs professionally.
I read it as a plea to "straighten up and fly right even though we have failed to establish a positive safety culture and have allowed you to bust SOP's for years, failed to reign in the outlying cowboys, failed to empower the disciplined amongst you, and watched as human nature did it's thing and a large majority of you bowed to the pressure exerted to get the job done"

[Huck]

I read it as a plea to "straighten up and fly right even though we have failed to establish a positive safety culture and have allowed you to bust SOP's for years, failed to reign in the outlying cowboys, failed to empower the disciplined amongst you, and watched as human nature did it's thing and a large majority of you bowed to the pressure exerted to get the job done"

You just described the management culture of the majority of american airlines....

[Herod]

Airbubba. 39 years as a professional pilot enough for you? OK, you're the captain. Why do you allow this behaviour?

[skyhighfallguy]

Lets all take a beat.

Most planes in air transport only have the tiller for ground taxiing on the left side. There are exceptions that I can think of. And the rudder pedals have limited nosewheel steering authority though it is not of great value in the area of the ramp (which some people call tarmac) or apron.

There are things a captain should not have to say to a copilot. For example:

Did you brush your teeth today?

Do you have on clean underpants?

IS TEXTING RIGHT NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN LOSING YOUR: 1. Life,
2. The lives of the passengers, crew and innocents on the ground? 3. JOB?


Some things we should take for granted, but no longer can.


I had one copilot once about 30 years ago. We were taking off from a short runway, max weight, difficult conditions and i had to remind him to put down his damn cup of coffee and concentrate on his duties.

I would never think that I would have to explain that operating the aircraft was more important than drinking a cup of coffee. BUT I DID HAVE TO REMIND HIM>

So, kind of upsets me that some dedication has been lost to little sketch phones?

[PJ2]

skyhighfallguy;

Same same...we were above 10 on a high downwind in a 340, the other two guys were yakking about windsurfing; I got fed up with the lack of professionalism and disconnected the autoflight system, took both FDs off, disconnected the autothrust and told the distracted F/O to get me a visual behind the '67 on short final...they didn't even know where the airport was let alone "our traffic".

Complete, utter silence,...until touchdown. Then one said on the taxi-in, "We've NEVER seen that done before", referring to the disconnect and handflying to touchdown. I said "I know - it's about time you guys started paying attention to your profession", and left it at that.

Who knows whether they actually did...but on mentioning something about standards to the occasional slacker, I've seen "the pout" before. It used to be that mentioning something drew a "thank you" as one was always trying to improve. Not so today, apparently, (now retired).

It's a shame tho'...in my opinion having seen enough of it, this kind of tolerance comes from the bureacracy of management where the politics of advancement and advantage seem to be more important than knowing about one's real job, which is ensuring a minimum standard of behaviour including an ethical standard and duty to those behind the cockpit door. The UAL 'pull-up-yer-socks' letter said it all and while it is again a shame to see such a note, it is for everyone, not just the UAL guys and gals.

[etudiant]

The UAL 'pull-up-yer-socks' letter said it all and while it is again a shame to see such a note, it is for everyone, not just the UAL guys and gals.


Spot on, but sadly the UAL corporate culture was very much 'us vs them', so this message may fall on deaf ears, unless things have improved in recent years.

[skyhighfallguy]

about 30 or more years ago, UNITED lead the way in two things.

ONE was CRM, mainly because they had screwed up so badly.

TWO was the idea that the pilot was no longer a pilot, but a manager of systems.


UNITED , look back at yourself. YOU NEED PILOTS and PEOPLE WHO DON'T TAKE NO CRAP and SPEAK UP WHEN SOMETHING AINT RIGHT.


BUT you have trained your little monkeyboys that they should do what they are told. DRAGNET THEME INSERT HERE>

[AirRabbit]

Hmmm … some very interesting comments from the group on Captain Attarian’s recently published Safety Alert. I, for one, perhaps one of the few here, happen to believe that Captain Attarian probably took painstaking efforts to be honest while at the same time not sounding overly accusative or overly negative. It’s for each reader to decide individually whether those goals were achieved … and despite, or in concert with, the individual comments found here, I sincerely believe it took a lot of courage and a huge amount of concern and care on Captain Attarian’s part to even attempt to write such comments. But, I believe his efforts should be applauded – certainly not criticized – even if they only generate an undercurrent of grumbles and a stirring of memories. At least that would be a start.

I’ve always been of the opinion that anyone who regularly sits behind the controls of an airplane during flight is merely one error … an error that goes unrecognized or “mis-recognized” or is inappropriately, insufficiently, or inaccurately corrected … one error short of one of those “there-but-for-the-Grace-of-God-go-I” sorts of catastrophic and/or disastrous airplane accidents.

Further, while I agree that it certainly is a “…nicely balanced, yet brutally honest reminder from management…” I DO NOT believe that the person who “leaked it” is anywhere near a “halfwit,” and most assuredly should NOT be sacked or banned from the industry. In fact if there were a way to take Captain Attarian’s letter and reduce its thoughts to a convenient slogan, I would advocate such a slogan being hung in a well-lighted and easy to read spot, strategically placed over every one of the world’s airline crew lounge/briefing room doorways out to the ramp. The biggest problem with such an effort is the almost unavoidable eventuality that reading and taking such a “slogan” to heart is quite likely to soon become merely another thing to “see” without “seeing” and therefore forfeiting it’s meaning as something of value and importance, and relegating it to the same complacency that such a slogan would attempt to guard against developing in the first place.

Therefore, it is likely to fall to the individual flight crew members to “do the right thing” And that, in my opinion, will require the world’s regulators, supported by, and in concert with, all the world’s airline management officials and pilots' representatives, to take major steps to ensure that what is included in initial and recurring training efforts, and what is included in regularly conducted proficiency reviews and evaluations, are those issues that continue to focus on basic knowledge and the skills required to apply that knowledge – each of which simply must be based on a correct and complete understanding of the airplane and its systems, and an exhaustive regimen of practicing the correct (and that is both procedurally correct and situationally correct) performance of those skills.

As I’ve pointed out previously, the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society has mounted numerous efforts to focus on just such goals. The most recent, I believe, has the very best focus to succeed in accomplishing just such a goal … the international effort to develop training and evaluation standards for pilots, instructors, and evaluators … to match the recently developed uniform standards developed for the involvement of flight training simulation devices. This effort should not be looked upon as a “once done – done forever” kind of effort. It should be a “living” and “breathing” effort, that is continually and regularly reviewed and examined – using the most recent memories and concerns, and being sure to specifically include all of the newest systems and equipment whose original design was to enhance or make easier the eventual operation of an airplane, into those deliberations and training/evaluation development efforts. Doing less than this level of effort would certainly qualify, in my not-so-humble opinion as the only thing professionals in this industry could do that could be described as “halfwit!”

And the "pro-active" efforts I have in mind do not include laying blame at anyone's door - as all of us in the industry have to accept our own part of whatever it is this industry does! We do not need to FIX BLAME ... we need to FIX PROBLEMS - and the best way I know to do that is to prepare our participants to maximum levels. We're all human ... and therefore prone to making mistakes - but perhaps if we all (that is ALL) work together - each one being invited to look over the shoulder of the other(s) to provide the best opportunity to prevent errors in thought or practice from developing - and, if (more likely, when) errors do develop, we will be able to recognize that error (those errors?) and take appropriate steps to correct them and avoid committing them in the future. Only through an ON-GOING series of efforts to review, evaluate, develop, and incorporate those things that we find necessary, will we reach the point that we're doing all we can. Anything LESS will be just that ... LESS.

[framer]

On a smaller scale....where does all this start?
Have any of you ever flown for an Airline that has a terrible safety culture and then flown with another which has a great safety culture? I bet many of you have. Why was one good and one bad?
Was it because one airline was very lucky with their recruitment drive while the other was very unlucky? Of course not. it was a direct result of the leadership within each airline in the preceding decade/year/month.
The Airline with the declining culture was most likely being 'managed' while the other was being lead by people/someone who could manipulate a group of people to guide their behaviours in a certain direction.
The leaders of our industry are responsible for creating and maintaining a positive safety culture within their respective airlines. How many are actively going about this? There are many ways to do it but first and foremost the pilot group needs to know what the expectation is and see the consequence of not meeting that expectation.
Undesirable behaviours need to be obviously challenged and desirable behaviours openly rewarded until the culture is moving in the direction needed. Then, the maintenance begins.
This is pretty basic stuff, successful leaders have been manipulating group behaviours for centuries. In our business people die if our leaders are not successful. Every six months the CAA/ FAA requires us to prove our skills and knowledge, maybe it's time that industry management were likewise tested.
In my mind, the fact that the letter had to be written means that United management have failed to create a positive safety culture and manage the change of new hires and seat changes. That is the same as someone saying to you " you have failed to keep your passengers and aircraft safe" .
Uncool.

[Huck]

You guys have to read the union response:



Dear Fellow Council 12 pilots,

By now you have seen letters from both Senior Vice President of Flight Operations Howard Attarian and ORD Chief Pilot Cal Janacek stating their concerns and suggesting that we, as pilots need to be safer and avoid the types of situations that are unfortunately becoming more prevalent at this company. Of course, we have all also seen recent media reports highlighting United’s safety problems.

Management stated that they want to be “brutally honest” with us. We also feel it is important to be brutally honest with you.

Safety starts with a strong positive safety culture, characterized by learning from mistakes, investigating facts, and addressing reporting and prevention in a non-punitive manner. This culture is currently lacking at United Airlines. This is the hard truth that we all face every day when we come to work.

The hard truth is that management is destroying the type of positive safety culture, which was once alive at this company. Management is embracing a culture in which economics and schedule is placed above safety, the science of flight, and the law.

Safety has one definition. Contributing factors to safety such as training level, a pilot’s personal level of experience, recent experiences in similar situations, proficiency, crew level of experience, and fatigue level are but a few.

A good safety culture embraces and supports the professionalism and experience of our pilots. It supports our pilots by providing them with robust training and a system that promotes the highest safety standard. It supports our pilots by “trusting them implicitly” just like VP Safety Mike Quiello has stated. What we actually experience on the line belies management’s public statements.

We once had a culture that empowered crews to confidently use these personal and subjective tools combined with robust training and positive support to make operational decisions, absent of impunity. In today’s culture, management uses safety as a weapon against us. We are threatened and intimidated when we make good sound judgments but strongly reminded in blunt communications to be safer.

We have seen a pattern of behavior from the ORD Chief Pilot Office. This pattern of behavior includes threats, intimidation, and outright bullying. We are also seeing an alarming increase of punishment (real and perceived) using the threat of re-training to “get a pilot’s mind right.”

Management brags about the safety culture and reminds us all of this in the recent communications. Unfortunately, management’s recent message is duplicitous and even offensive in nature based on their behavior.

Here is a list of some recent events and quotes, corroborated from individuals (pilots and others) involved in these events:

·Recently, after showing up on the flight deck to insert himself into an operational issue involving crew rest seats, the ORD Chief Pilot told a Captain, “don’t throw that safety **** at me” as the pilot sat in the cockpit and tried to explain the issue at hand.

·Recently, after a Captain determined that they were unable to safely operate an aircraft with a deferred APU (on an international flight covering hostile terrain with multiple and compounding deferrals). The pilot asked for the deferred APU to be repaired for the flight. The ORD Chief Pilot called this pilot at their hotel and aggressively counseled them for not operating the flight after they had raised safety concerns. After the pilot explained that the whole crew was in agreement on the decision to not operate the aircraft unless the APU was repaired, the Chief Pilot was quoted as saying, “You should have used CLR to get the other pilots to change their position.”

·Recently, a crew had a maintenance issue with an aircraft shortly after departure. The crew ran the appropriate checklist and spoke to TOMC and dispatch but they were unable to get the aircraft into the state that the checklist was supposed to get to. After confirming the checklist multiple times and determining that the problem was of an unknown and unsolvable nature, the crew elected to divert to a closer airport and subsequently continued the flight in another aircraft. They all agreed that a diversion was necessary. After the crew landed a mechanic and a management representative met the pilots and supported and complimented them on their decision to divert. The ORD Chief Pilot, despite objections from our safety committee, training committee, and MEC and LEC officers, sent this crew to remedial training. They were sent to training despite the fact that the FAR’s required them to terminate the flight early based on a malfunction of an unknown nature of a critical system. Even though the crew was dealt a bleed problem, the training curriculum that the Chief Pilot sent to the training center was a full LOFT, with many different scenarios that were not related in any way to the crew’s problem. The “training” curriculum, which was several pages in length, was reminiscent of an “appendix H” type rating check-ride. Fortunately, the instructors figured out that this was a witch-hunt, designed to intimidate and coerce this crew to succumb to economic and management pressure to complete the mission without interruption in the future. When the instructors learned of the nature of the crew’s problem on that particular flight, they produced the actual bleed line from that aircraft! The bleed line was split, wide open, which of course allowed super-heated air to escape, presenting a fire hazard. The crew’s decision to divert avoided what could have been a very bad situation for the safety of the flight. In the end, the instructors and the FAA were complimentary of the crew’s performance and solid decision-making.

·Recently, a Captain, who had less than 100 hours on the aircraft, objected to being ordered to fly as a relief First Officer, claiming that he didn’t feel safe flying in a seat that he wasn’t specifically trained for. The responses from the CPO were “your safety concern is not legitimate and I reject it,” and “you are putting your head in a noose if you don’t take the flight.”

·Recently, an Assistant Chief Pilot bullied a crew off of a flight during a pre-departure event that involved a passenger who was being deported. The passenger had been held in isolation the previous evening in the Kenosha County jail as a precaution as there was concern about exposure to the Ebola virus. The Captain was in the process of obtaining all possible information, as there was tremendous (and understandable) concern and angst from the flight attendants. Some of the flight attendants, who would have had direct contact with the passenger, were actually in tears as management was telling them that if they didn’t take the flight they would lose their jobs. The Captain was in the process of getting all available information to make a decision that would be in the best interest of the passengers and crew when the Assistant Chief Pilot, who was on the aircraft, gave them an ultimatum. The ultimatum was “go now, or get your belongings and leave the aircraft.” The crew was presented with the decision to rush and fly the flight with the situation unresolved or to leave the aircraft. They choose to leave the aircraft. The crew subsequently offered multiple times to take the flight after the issue was resolved and all crew members were comfortable with the situation, but were rejected by management. Absent interference from the CPO, this proactive Captain would have likely resolved the issue successfully.

·Recently a crew had an issue with crew rest seats (which was resolved prior to the cabin door being closed). Unbeknownst to the pilot or flight attendant crew, an Assistant Chief Pilot ordered the jetway pulled back up to the aircraft, burst into the cabin with no coordination, (or even making sure the emergency slide was disarmed as it wasn’t) and inserted themselves into this issue. Ultimately, the event distracted the crew to the point where a critical checklist was not properly run.

What do all of these events have in common?

·Pilot pushing, intimidation, and a lack of regard by management for a positive safety culture.

The ORD Chief Pilot, and other managers will argue that they support “genuine” safety concerns. The key word in this sentence is “genuine.” This is the cop-out that they use when they (the managers who fly hand picked trips and fly less in a year than most of us fly in a month) decide to insert themselves into YOUR decision-making processes. Your safety issues are only legitimate to them if it doesn’t interfere with economics. In the bathroom stalls at our training center, there used to be safety posters and propaganda. One that sticks out in our minds stated, “If you think safety is expensive, try an accident!”

How do you think the passengers would react if they heard a Chief Pilot use the words “don’t throw that safety **** at me” while in the cockpit counseling a crew?

The recent safety deviations that management has based their communications to us are real. They are a warning sign. Hopefully management will see it as a warning that the culture is broken. We need to see it as a warning to not succumb to threats and intimidation.

While we, as pilots, are always responsible for what happens on the aircraft, we are only one link in a chain. That chain should be anchored to a culture that supports safety, air science, and law over economic pressures. That chain should also be solidly anchored by robust training. This is something that is also lacking as the curriculums are being shortened with more (less expensive) computer-based training and less and less (expensive) instructor based training. There is also less and less CLR training and general safety training.

Remember the training, which was at least a full day, if not more, covering evacuation and human factors during emergencies? Remember when we used to study, as a learning tool, past accidents and incidents? Remember when we used to train, side by side, with the flight attendants as part of our safety training? This training is now condensed into a couple of hours and a few short, sterile videos. We are no longer trained on evacuation commands and such, but briefly taught how to open and close the doors. We are expected to teach ourselves how to operate and fly the airplanes - economics once again trumping safety.

As pilots, we ask for only one thing from our management; the positive support and tools we need to do our jobs. We used to be told that our decisions, no matter how conservative, would be supported if we acted in good faith. This is no longer the case. We look forward to the day where a safety culture returns to this property where once again management takes a positive approach to safety. Hopefully, it doesn’t take an accident to get us there.

Please continue to report safety issues and pilot pushing via the FSAP program and to us. We will continue to hold the line on your behalf!

Fraternally,

Eric, Carlos, and John

[Airbubba]

As pilots, we ask for only one thing from our management; the positive support and tools we need to do our jobs. We used to be told that our decisions, no matter how conservative, would be supported if we acted in good faith. This is no longer the case.

And, in the good old days, if you made a bad call, the chief pilot would suggest that next time you might want to do things a little differently. But, he would finish with 'that's just a suggestion, you were there, I wasn't, it was your call to make'.

Now, if you get some inflight maintenance problem you are supposed to get a kumbaya phone patch with maintenance, dispatch and a 'subject matter expert'. And, get this, if they tell you something wrong and you make an 'incorrect' decision, it's your fault because you trusted them. You're still hung out to dry by the feds since you are, of course, the PIC.

The old pilot and the dog joke about the future of flight deck automation has more truth than we realized in these times of blame and liability.

Fortunately, I don't think I have ever felt commercial pressure on a safety decision. I've had a coworker suggest we divert to a certain airport because he's a commuter and there are more jumpseats home there. Not exactly what I want on the CVR tape if it is ever pulled. :rolleyes:

I realize many of the senior folks here have a hard time grasping why the Sky God Captain act no longer plays well in the U.S. As noted in some of the posts above, CRM has evolved cockpit leadership into a more democratic rule by committee in these enlightened times. The captain is the 'facilitator', he or she (or perhaps neither, a couple are always in transition where I work) promotes active sharing of information and identification of threats. Or something like that.

Anyway, we can always make the customary excuses about how management is mean and we took a pay cut so we're not going to do anything extra. However, I would argue that some of us need to pay a little more attention to flying the plane and less to some video game on the iPhone when we are the PF. Or, it will bite us.

[framer]

From the looks of that Union letter it is even worse than I had initially imagined.
I had imagined a lack of leadership and positive control of the ' safety culture' . This looks like a concerted effort to accelerate the natural decline in personal discipline that occurs in said vacuum.
Who is at the helm? These types of rogue managers who don't understand how safety works long term and act in the interests of commercial profitability ( short term) only are put there by someone....they are hand picked. Who is driving the United ship and allowing this?
It's quite sad to see from an antipodean perspective as we have long held the US in high regard in this area.

[glofish]

Working in the ME we tend to think it's only their middle aged mentality that pulls the airline industry down. I must discover that in the good ol'States the trend backwards is similarly unstopped.

Brace for the next elections if the GOP muppet wins.

It's all a$$ covering bs, nothing to do with safety culture, as the quote of that quarter pounded UA manager proves.

They can then say:
"We told you so in our open letter, it was on one of the zillions recent memos, you should have followed the instructions of these latest 20 online learning courses (each 30')".

By that they give themselves absolution of having cut all the real time training and increasing the FTLs to the absolute maximum limit and lowering T&Cs to the lowest common denominator.

It's a WE TOLD YOU so from an ignorant, cosy and handsomely paid 9 to 5 armchair. :yuk:

[deadheader]

If the above truly reflects the union response to the memo, it is now a matter of public record why there is little option but to smash the unions. Clearly a little more dismantling is still required at UAL, lest we revisit 1970s incident rates too.

[Huck]

Smash who?

What?

On a pro pilot web board?

[aterpster]

deadheader:

If the above truly reflects the union response to the memo, it is now a matter of public record why there is little option but to smash the unions. Clearly a little more dismantling is still required at UAL, lest we revisit 1970s incident rates too.

The dismantling should start with their arrogant and hypocritical management.

[West Coast]

Labor deserves their share of the blame. More militant crews (usually L-UAL) will refuse aircraft for petty reasons, minor deferrals, etc but when called out will invoke the safety card. No one playing the game is as pure as the driven snow.

[PAXboy]

I'm a PAX of 49 years sitting.

PJ2 <extract>
... in my opinion having seen enough of it, this kind of tolerance comes from the bureacracy of management where the politics of advancement and advantage seem to be more important than knowing about one's real job, which is ensuring a minimum standard of behaviour including an ethical standard and duty to those behind the cockpit door
I have seen this in many walks of life but the kind where the chairs are already at ground level. In commerce, we no longer see a manager who has 'worked their way up'. When I took a Saturday job (aged 16) the manager of the department store told me that he had started by working Saturdays when he was 16. That no longer happens in ANY business. The univeristy is now seen as the golden steps and the only way to climb.

Huck quoted framer:
I read it as a plea to "straighten up and fly right even though we have failed to establish a positive safety culture and have allowed you to bust SOP's for years, failed to reign in the outlying cowboys, failed to empower the disciplined amongst you, and watched as human nature did it's thing and a large majority of you bowed to the pressure exerted to get the job done"Huck You just described the management culture of the majority of american airlines....

Unfortunately, framer just described the management culture of almost every company I have known during 35 years of a working life. (Mainly in telecommunications and IT and with American companies and having worked internationally.) Nowadays, everyone aims to do the minimum and get the maximum out of it.

One simple example. One of my managers told me to cut all the maintenance contracts on a particular type of equipment. They said, "They're reliable and it's cheaper just to fix it when it goes wrong." I know that is not a direct comparison and that IT equipment was safely on the ground when it failed but that attitude has continued. I was told that in 1989 by an American Vice President of the company.

Someone has mentioned Fear Is The Hunter, don't forget to tell the boy pilots to read: The Tombstone Imperative: The Truth about Air Safety by Andrew Weir because every thread like this in PPRuNe could be out of that book. I'll get back to my seat now and shut up.

[Intruder]

From the looks of that Union letter it is even worse than I had initially imagined.
I had imagined a lack of leadership and positive control of the ' safety culture' . This looks like a concerted effort to accelerate the natural decline in personal discipline that occurs in said vacuum.
Who is at the helm? These types of rogue managers who don't understand how safety works long term and act in the interests of commercial profitability ( short term) only are put there by someone....they are hand picked. Who is driving the United ship and allowing this?
The VP of Flight Ops is Howard Attarian, who used to be Duane Woerth's #2 at ALPA. Apparently, he has totally lost contact with his roots as a pilot...

[aterpster]

Intruder:

The VP of Flight Ops is Howard Attarian, who used to be Duane Woerth's #2 at ALPA. Apparently, he has totally lost contact with his roots as a pilot...

:mad: like him always forget their roots as a pilot. In fact, he tossed those roots out the door when he became Woerth's lackey.

[Huck]

I'll get back to my seat now and shut up.

Please don't!

[Willit Run]

SOP's are good thing......up to a point.

Our company has taken it just a bit too far.
For years, I have been saying the Air Force is constipated with rules.
Our company is now constipated with rules. The more rules you have, the easier it is to break them unknowingly and maybe get a violation of some sort.

Common sense has to prevail at some point.

[AirRabbit]

What is becoming evident in reading this thread is that the comments posted are taking the form of ‘alignment’ along very obvious lines … those of “management” and those of “workers.” It’s my opinion that as long as the participants are focused on defending and accusing – regardless of the side – the potential is that the separation of interests is going to be, and remain, the center of all attention.

The problem with this, beyond the hurt feelings and the explosive reaction that such disagreements often fuel, is that the issues of “safety” and “professionalism” and “competence” receive minimal attention and little or no direct or active “hands-on” actions to correct any “short-coming” or prevent any similar circumstance from developing in the future.

I contend that the time has long-passed since ALL of us in this industry must realize that each of us has our own defined experiences – and it is that combined grouping of experiences that must be brought to bear on ANY logical addressing of the multiple, collective circumstances that periodically combine in such a way as to present a unique and challenging scenario that sometimes develops into a problem – which then, sometimes, results in tragedy.

Pointing fingers and assigning blame does little or nothing to correct any knowledge or competence short-comings – and such emotional tendencies do not generate solutions, and, in fact, may well stand in the way of achieving a collective attitude toward ensuring that knowledge and competence can be increased to a level that might prevent the kinds of unwanted circumstances that seemingly generate the kinds of situations that all too regularly generate these kinds of finger pointing reactions.

It reminds me of the now-famous quote of Rodney King, when he said, “Can’t we all just get along?” If we can’t find a way to regularly “get along,” (and by that, I mean, work together to identify, and then completely correct - and then verify that correction - the short-comings in training, knowledge, and competency that might well exist – anywhere throughout the entire flight sequence … gate-to-gate) I’m afraid we’re doomed to continue to relive, over and over, the deterioration of circumstances that all too often result in yet another tragedy.

[framer]

I like your post AirRabbit but I need convincing that the mature and measured attitude you display will help in any way unless you yourself are the head of an airline.

the potential is that the separation of interests is going to be, and remain, the center of all attention.
At a core level there should be no separation of interests. After safety, we should all be concentrating on the commercial elements regardless of what role we play in the company. Problems arise when some within the company purport to be pursuing safety and then economy , in that order, but their actions prove otherwise.
It is true that a leadership has an influence on the way a group, (be it a nation, a sports team, or a company) behaves. Until we have an effective way of ensuring that the people responsible for developing and maintaining the cultures of our pilot groups are skilled at doing this, aviation safety will continue to flat line as it has since the nineties.

[AirRabbit]

Framer – sorry, I don’t think I would ever be able to convince you, or anyone else, that any single person’s “mature and measured attitude” (and, by the way, thanks for the compliment…) would do anything short of generating a severe headache for that “someone.” I believe it is going to take multiple persons – several in each of the major participant groups – and very likely at least that same number from each of the participant groups immediately adjacent to the “major” groups – that, all together, make up the aviation industry – to come together with a single goal in mind. THAT goal has to be the professional, competent, and safe operation of each separate airline.

If it were true that running an airline professionally, competently, and safely cannot be accomplished profitably … then, it must be true that eventually each venture into that business field will eventually falter … due to one of the following:
1) their spending profits on industry-leading salaries and esoteric (and costly) airplanes, airplane systems, marketing, and state-of-the-art training and terminal facilities, and similar focus on an old but outdated attitude of “buying the best to be the best;”
2) their “catering” to the “rich-n-famous” persons, and letting the average airline passenger fend for him/her-self;
3) their operating a schedule to and from destinations that appeal to the “frequent” business traveler and avoiding those destinations frequented by families and every-day citizens; and, perhaps most negative of all …
4) their developing a reputation for compromising the safety of their passengers … resulting in no one wanting to buy a ticket to take their chances on getting to their destination in one piece;

But THAT is not the story here. No – as it has been demonstrated far too many times in far too many different businesses, providing needed and wanted goods and/or services, provided in return for a fair and equitable price, treating customers like extended families or at least valued friends, and done so in an honest, proper, and professional manner … does not lead to anything but a successful business. And I would hasten to point out that a “successful” business is not one that necessarily garners all the publicity, generates interest by skyrocketing to the top of the stock market price-per-share listing, or one that allocates a sizeable portion of their operating expense to “advertising.” Most successful business provide their goods or services quietly and dependably, generating return customers on the basis of each customer’s own perceptions of value for cost – where that assessed value includes all kinds of individually important characteristics.

The best way – usually the only way – to assure that the service or product supplied will be received in that manner by customers is to do the job – build the product or offer the service – using the very best of every employee’s professional ability, using professional courtesy, professional competencies, following of all rules and regulations, being honest in the development of the character of every employee, ensuring that each employee knows his/her job, is trained to know what to do, when and how to do it, and provide honest and complete performance of those learned and practiced skills, from the first to the last effort, on every job.

However, in a business that is so subject to the times and the resulting developmental capabilities of systems and equipment, as is an airline operation, a major portion of the efforts describe here, are necessarily going to involve the use of modern equipment, modern capabilities, newer learned facts and capabilities, staying abreast of new and advanced equipment. Equally true is the vast expanse of fields of expertise that are all involved (deeply involved) in day-to-day operations. Regulatory authorities, management officials, prized professional employees – from several vastly different backgrounds and skill sets, valued providers of mundane and routine functions, and a critical dependence on other companies providing an equally professional and competent service or product.

This is the reason that I’ve recommended a regularly held review meeting of representatives of ALL of the aspects of an aviation operation – as I said in an earlier post in this thread … the international effort recently mounted by the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society to develop training and evaluation standards for pilots, instructors, and evaluators … to match the recently developed uniform standards developed for the involvement of flight training simulation devices … is an effort that may well be able to initiate and hopefully maintain an awareness by all participants of the efforts, the challenges, the failures, and the successes of each of those other participants.

As I’ve said, this effort should not be looked upon as a “once done – it’s done forever” kind of effort. It should be a “living” and “breathing” effort, that is continually and regularly reviewed and examined – using the most recent memories and concerns, and being sure to specifically include all of the newest systems and equipment whose original design was to enhance or make easier the eventual operation of an airplane, into those deliberations and training/evaluation development efforts.

Cutting salaries of some employees … reducing training costs or service costs or reducing some other supposedly costly function … extending flight duty times … and other such outwardly recognizable efforts are NOT going to achieve the lasting kinds of results that any industry needs to be successful. I am almost – well not almost – I AM pleading for the world’s airlines (including managers, supervisors, vice presidents, managers, trainers and evaluators; training systems purchasers and users) … local, national, and international pilot/flight attendant/dispatcher organizations … and the world’s regulators … to join in this international effort – to expand it where required – improve it where necessary – and revisit the process on a regular basis … each time reflecting on history and what “new” industry innovations have made it (or will make it) to the front page. Rational and equally respectful understandings of everyone else’s positions, problems, and potential solutions – should be the regularly scheduled subjects for such discussions and reviews.

[calypso]

Lovely.

Unfortunately it leaves out the fairly crucial aspect of company politics and the relentless self advancement pursued by some. We have to operate in the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.

[AirRabbit]

Well … calypso as you, and everyone else here, understands (or should), politics and self-advancement are not merely “fairly crucial” aspects, they are very likely the most centrally obstructive attitudes that are seemingly ever-present in many, if not most, organizations. So … do we attempt to do something about the circumstances – whatever those circumstances may be - or, do we “fold our tents” and head for the bar?

So … what are the alternatives?
1) throw barbs over a bargaining table?
2) write “letters to the editor”?
3) carry UNFAIR picket signs?
4) cut labor costs by reducing salaries?
5) institute lay-offs?

Of course, such a list could go on “ad nauseam” – and could include any of all the other tried-and-failed alternatives. Notwithstanding this unlikely-to-occur effort, it seems that the only logical alternative is—
a) to determine what may be in error (perhaps training goals and evaluation methods?);
b) identify what can be improved (perhaps competence, knowledge, understanding, and practice?);
c) recognize and understand the fiscal limitations (perhaps frontal understanding that corporate income is generated by ticket sales – alone – and recognizing the impact of lowering salaries is not necessarily off-set by increasing work hours?);
d) understand the costs of “doing business” (perhaps acknowledge rising fuel costs and airport fees? – and/or the necessity for specifically qualified personnel to install/maintain/repair the advancing technology currently found in modern aircraft?)

The bottom line quickly comes into focus … work within these boundaries to understand the meaningful methods that can be employed to correct errors, to improve what can be improved, and allow everyone the opportunity to experience the satisfying recognition of their own participative efforts being a contributing factor to the success of the organization employing them.

Is this “pie-in-the-sky?” Maybe … a bit. A perfect solution? Certainly not. But, no one ever got anywhere by sitting on their duff while complaining. What I, and others – most notably the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society – are attempting to employ, is a process involving ALL of the significant parties in a regular review of existing operations and collective agreements regarding what can be done to improve the process (the WHOLE process) and, from that, the meaningful bottom line.

[framer]

I am almost – well not almost – I AM pleading for the world’s airlines (including managers, supervisors, vice presidents, managers, trainers and evaluators; training systems purchasers and users) … local, national, and international pilot/flight attendant/dispatcher organizations … and the world’s regulators … to join in this international effort
So what would it take for this to occur? You would need the heads of the globes major Airlines to recognise and pursue a long term goal, to cooperate , to have a shared vision of the industry, to shift their individual priorities away from their personal six year career goals. You would have to have true leaders of industry.
At the moment it is easier for them to cut spending, watch the balance sheet react, take the bonus, and move on to the next CEO job in a different industry ( hopefully before the next incident).
All short term activities.
We need a distinct 'fit and proper person' requirement for the leaders of this industry and ongoing requirements for them to demonstrate active management of their company's 'safety culture'.
When ICAO and the FAA publicly acknowledge that aircraft accidents are just as often caused by poor leadership within the company as they are by operational staff making 'one off ' mistakes, then the pressure might come on to regulate those with the greatest influence on safety, the heads of our Airlines.

[AirRabbit]

We need a distinct 'fit and proper person' requirement for the leaders of this industry and ongoing requirements for them to demonstrate active management of their company's 'safety culture'.
When ICAO and the FAA publicly acknowledge that aircraft accidents are just as often caused by poor leadership within the company as they are by operational staff making 'one off ' mistakes, then the pressure might come on to regulate those with the greatest influence on safety, the heads of our Airlines.

Well … that has been, is now, and is likely to continue to be well beyond my pay grade – but, I think you’re on the right track. I’ve said, several times now, that in all but the biggest of “no-brainers,” most airline officials will do only what the regulations require … and precious little more – if any at all.

If those in the job functions I’ve described earlier, can get together, repeatedly, regularly … perhaps with smaller groups a couple of times a year, and the larger, more international kinds of gatherings perhaps every other year, or so … I think that a legitimate set of understandable and logical standards could very likely be developed. If those standards can be put into meaningful and understandable regulatory language – any airline manager is going to have to comply or be in violation of those regulations.

The “trick” (if you will) is to find language that provides for the development of logical competence (for all of those who must undergo some kind of regulatory required training, evaluation, or observation – pilots, flight attendants, instructors, evaluators, mechanics, and so forth…) that sets out the minimum training time requirement (i.e., number of hours – usually broken into segments of training/evaluation) before being able to be released “for duty,” BUT allowing a demonstration of a specifically defined set of performance requirements or standards to preclude the necessity of continued training time that would have been clearly unnecessary – depending on the voracity of the prescribed “demonstration of performance.” As you would expect, the KEY here is the language used … and a clear, and unambiguous understanding of what that language means.

Yes – there could be attempts to circumvent such standards – but if these standards are carefully worded and policed correctly by those who fully understand the meaning of the terms used and are honest in their characterizations of what they see in the performance of those undergoing that training, any attempt to subvert these authorizations can be more easily recognized for what such efforts really are attempting to do.

It shouldn’t take long to determine whether or not the language used is doing the service intended and it would logically be affected any time an adjustment is warranted due to a change in operations, a change in equipment capabilities, or other such alterations from the initial examinations. BUT, there are some who believe this effort – or something very similar – is one of the few ways in which a meaningful set of standards can be developed, used, and ultimately produce the kinds of human performance we all would like to see occur.

Will it break/falter? Certainly there will be times where closer attention may be needed – which is ONE of the reasons I’m recommending a regular, periodic re-gathering of the appropriate personnel to review, and revise when/where necessary, to ensure the program is producing what it was/is intended to produce … capable, productive, competent professionals to run, manage, supervise, and ultimately, reflect proudly on an industry that has few rivals for the kinds of self-worth recognized by those involved, while providing a determinedly needed service to the general public.

I, for one, want to do all I can to find some way to make right what we all know is right - and do it honestly, directly, (and hopefully, with the willing cooperation and participation by ALL involved) but in the end, I'd very much like to see it occur ... period.

[Airbubba]

Here's a union response from the UAL MEC Chairman to a Wall Street Journal article about the safety memo:

United’s Pilots Working for Safety

We take pride in our work, in our professionalism and in our safety record.

March 6, 2015 3:56 p.m. ET

As chairman of United Airlines’ 12,539 pilots represented by the Air Line Pilots Association, International, I would like to respond to the article “United Issues Pilot Warning After Recent Close Calls” (page one, Feb. 26). We take pride in our work, in our professionalism and in our safety record. Procedures, traditions, infrastructures and tired processes that worked for the previous respective legacy airlines need to be readdressed, updated and modified. The United pilots have repeatedly raised these concerns with our management and offered solutions that seek improvements in training, mitigating external distractions, flight planning and the use of new technology to conduct safe operations.

The fact that pilots and management can discuss these issues and work toward solutions should give our customers comfort. The U.S. aviation industry has long-standing safety programs in place that identify threats and errors through a cooperative approach among ALPA, management and the Federal Aviation Administration. The release of a Jan. 9 confidential company memo to the media is unfortunate. Good practice requires open communication within the company regarding safety issues. Every employee at United Airlines has safety at the forefront of their minds and their actions. The pilots have a legacy of leadership in airline safety and will continue to advocate and strive for the safest transportation system.

Capt. Jay Heppner

United Master

Executive Council

Rosemont, Ill.


http://www.wsj.com/articles/uniteds-pilots-working-for-safety-letters-to-the-editor-1425675378

[Bergerie1]

Once again AirRabbit speaks words of wisdom. It is not enough for management, pilots and all those who work in the safety front line of airlines just to talk safety. It requires ALL these people to live, breath and enact safety all the time. And safety is also consistent with sound economics.
The work of the RAeS in this area is very much along the right lines.

[Aluminium shuffler]

Every time I hear an airline executive utter the words "safety is out number one priority", I cringe. Most don't care at all about anything other than their own careers - they want the bonuses and salaries and little else. Therein lies the problem - as long as they can circumvent rules and regulations well enough to stay out of prison while increasing profits and thus their bonus, then they will congratulate themselves on a job well done with no interest in the long term future of the business or its staff and customers.

What is needed is for legislation to be invoked that links salaries and bonuses of executives to the long-term performance and safety of whatever business they're in. It needs to be legislative because few executives will do this voluntarily. There are interesting statistics on the psychological makeup of of certain jobs, psychopathy being a worrying norm in certain roles. The worst on the list, unsurprisingly, were bankers/traders, followed by executives. They cannot be persuaded to look after the long term interests of others - it has to be forced on them.

I can't disagree with anything AirRabbit has written, but sadly I think hoping for enlightened airline management is fantasy because of the nature of the people involved.

[Uplinker]

The way of the world now is to make profit.

The low cost airline industry model has been recognised as a good way to make money.

The CEOs and upper managers DO understand all about safety and morale:-

BUT THEY DON'T CARE.

It does not affect their balance sheet, so they don't need to pay it much attention. They only pretend to care about safety. It's like politicians pretending to believe in God. Believing in God gets the politicians votes. Pontificating about safety gets the CEOs passengers for their airline.

If conditions get so bad that pilots leave, the CEO will just hire more new pilots. (At a reduced salary of course. A benefit to the CEO is that with a high staff turnover, they can drive wages down).

Many companys nowadays are run like this. The CEOs know that all they need to do is slash operating costs by reducing training, maintenance and salaries, and increase hours, and hey presto ! They make more profit. But these profits are only for them and the owners, not us, (even if it were ethical to make profits in this way, which it isn't).

My company has recently slashed our salaries and pensions - by about 35% - and thanks to EASA, we are about to be legally allowed to work even longer hours in a flight duty period. And why? - so the company can offer even cheaper fares. And why are they doing that? - because it is a very easy way of making profits. You don't have to worry about quality or anything. So myself and my fellow pilots are now effectively subsidising the passengers' cheap fares though our reduced salaries. Some of my colleagues have had to sell their houses and move to cheaper areas. Why are we doing this?

Our new CEO seems to think that he can maintain our airlines' standards of passenger comfort and satisfaction NO MATTER WHO IS PROVIDING THE SERVICE. He thinks that he can staff the aircraft with anybody and the service will be as good as it used to be. All the dedicated staff who really cared and worked hard to provide that service and make the airline what it was have gone or are going.

The CEO will move onto another company in five years time or less, so he/she does NOT CARE about you or the state they will leave your once proud airline in, or if it fails after they have left. The CEO will be taking the profits with them. Profits YOU earned by having your pay reduced and by working more hours for them.

[AirRabbit]

BUT THEY DON'T CARE.

It does not affect their balance sheet, so they don't need to pay it much attention. They only pretend to care about safety. It's like politicians pretending to believe in God. Believing in God gets the politicians votes. Pontificating about safety gets the CEOs passengers for their airline.

If conditions get so bad that pilots leave, the CEO will just hire more new pilots. (At a reduced salary of course. A benefit to the CEO is that with a high staff turnover, they can drive wages down).

Many companys nowadays are run like this. The CEOs know that all they need to do is slash operating costs by reducing training, maintenance and salaries, and increase hours …

Not too very long ago, in a thread under Tech Log (entitled “Hand flying skills not a priority says Embry Riddle educator”) during a discussion on practicing certain skills and skill-sets by pilots during initial and/or recurrent flight training, I said the following:

It seems to me that if this “practice” can be beneficial, but someone, someplace has decided “not-on-my-airline/airplane,” things are likely not to change unless someone in a superior position (either in fact or in theory) to those who are currently “having it their own way,” clearly says what will be done and makes this “hand flying” exposure a regular occurrence. Again, it seems that this will occur only if one of 2 things take place; 1) similar thinking line pilots pool their resources and buy the airline from the current owner and make such a practice logical and expected; or 2) the regulator adds such a requirement to the regulations and thereby makes such a practice necessary to comply with the rules, if not logical and expected as well … and I’ll leave to your imagination which of those alternatives is the most logically to occur … at least, in my not-so-humble opinion.

Well … my opinion hasn’t changed. I continue to advocate that the really important “stuff” that has to be known about, understood, practiced … and practiced to the point that it becomes close to “automatic,” simply has to be accomplished. If it means having a more sophisticated piece of training equipment, so be it. If it requires a regulation to require practicing whatever ‘it’ is, so be it.

But, again, I am NOT advocating that a “blank check” be handed to the regulators! Rather, I am advocating that a regular meeting of interested parties (regulators, airline managers, pilots, pilot’s representatives, educators, and anyone – everyone – else who may be able to make meaningful inputs, comments, and/or recommendations about the best way to ensure each pilot behind the controls of an airplane (primarily airline operations) has the very best opportunity to learn, practice, and absorb all there is to know about, and practice performing the appropriate skills necessary, to initiate and follow through on any task set before that pilot. Anything short of that goal will be just that – short of that goal.

This industry has been fortunate enough to have some pretty knowledgeable folks, full of foresight and imagination. I believe we cannot afford to lose those folks. But we ALSO need to find a way to take advantage of what they say, and make what they develop into meaningful examples of professional competence. And if that means putting a new requirement into the regulations – then THAT is exactly what we must do. If an airline manager decides he/she does not want to follow the lawful presence of a regulation – there are ways he/she may go about seeking an exemption – and what would be done would be to provide the proverbial level of safety “equivalent;" BUT knowledgeable folks MUST be able to agree that what is being proposed really does provide an equivalent practice that provides an equivalent ability to perform the tasks required to an equivalent level of competence. Anything less is simply NOT equivalent!

To prevent someone from finding a convenient combination of “words” to “sound” good in support of granting an authorization to disregard a regulatory requirement – the knowledgeable folks who examined, proposed, and wrote that requirement simply MUST be ever-diligent and stand up for what they know - including whether or not a proposed "equivalent level of safety" actually WILL provide that "equivalent level of safety." Truth is a hard thing to prove at times, but it is the only thing that regularly brings airline flights to successful and safe conclusions.