More KC-46A woes....

[Rhino power]

To add to GlobalNav's Post........

See post #991...

-RP

[Lyneham Lad]

It never rains but it pours - fuel in this instance... :eek:

Flight Global-:

Fuel is leaking from the Boeing KC-46A in-flight refuelling tanker (https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/fuel-is-leaking-from-the-boeing-kc-46a-in-flight-refuelling-tanker/137624.article)

[Asturias56]

It really is a shambles isn't it.....................

[RAFEngO74to09]

With the overall KC-X, KC-Y and KC-Z legacy tanker replacement programs - of which KC-46A is KC-X - in a shambles - US TRANSCOM and USAF have now agreed to push ahead with part contractorization of the overall USAF AAR task - such as routine AAR training, trials, exercise support, Foreign Military Sales delivery flights etc.

I don't think there will be much chance of the KC-46A being the choice for KC-Y as well now.

A 2nd Industry Day for discussions of the art of the possible regarding contractorization was held on December 17, 2019 which was attended by 14 companies. Solicitation of bids is now expected June 2020.

It will be ironic if Airbus gets the contract with new-build / reworked surplus civil A330-MRTT which the USAF could have started getting 12 years ago if the original contest winner (KC-45A) in 2007 hadn't been derailed by vested interest interference which led to a re-run of the contest with parameters skewed towards Boeing !

https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/us-air-force-wants-to-use-private-in-flight-refuelling-tankers-in-two-years/137599.article

https://www.airforcemag.com/private-tankers-could-help-usaf-keep-up-with-unrelenting-need-for-booms/

[ORAC]

I don't think there will be much chance of the KC-46A being the choice for KC-Y as well now.

On the contrary I think it’s a certain shoo-in.

Congress and the Pentagon don’t seem to understand the concept of sunk costs.....

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost

[GlobalNav]

On the contrary I think it’s a certain shoo-in.

Congress and the Pentagon don’t seem to understand the concept of sunk costs.....

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost
We certainly have SUNK costs in that project. Boeing should be BIG TIME embarrassed, but I suspect share price is all that matters to the execs.

[RAFEngO74to09]

Yet another KC-46A Category 1 problem - fuel leaks between the 2 containment systems - several aircraft need to reworked at the factory - production stopped due to COVID-19. This is in addition to the other long-term Cat 1s - rear vision system and flying boom.

So fuel, flying boom and rear vision - everything that matters - all now Cat 1 problems !

Category 1 deficiencies are defined by the USAF as issues “which may cause death or severe injury; may cause loss or major damage to a weapon system; critically restricts the combat readiness capabilities of the using organisation; or results in a production line stoppage”.

https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/fuel-is-leaking-from-the-boeing-kc-46a-in-flight-refuelling-tanker/137624.article

[Rhino power]

Yet another KC-46A Category 1 problem - fuel leaks between the 2 containment systems - several aircraft need to reworked at the factory - production stopped due to COVID-19. This is in addition to the other long-term Cat 1s - rear vision system and flying boom.

So fuel, flying boom and rear vision - everything that matters - all now Cat 1 problems !

Category 1 deficiencies are defined by the USAF as issues “which may cause death or severe injury; may cause loss or major damage to a weapon system; critically restricts the combat readiness capabilities of the using organisation; or results in a production line stoppage”.

https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/fuel-is-leaking-from-the-boeing-kc-46a-in-flight-refuelling-tanker/137624.article

See post #1002...

-RP

[airsound]

News from Boeing 2 April 2020:Boeing Statement on KC-46 Agreement with the U.S. Air ForceARLINGTON, Va., April 2, 2020—Boeing Defense, Space & Security President and CEO Leanne Caret issued the following statement regarding Boeing’s KC-46 agreement with the U.S. Air Force:

The Air Force and Boeing will make the KC-46 synonymous with aerial refueling excellence. The agreement we announced today takes advantage of new remote vision systems technologies that are orders of magnitude better than what was available when the program started. Generations of women and men in uniform will benefit from the advancements we are making in the science of visualization systems. Not only will these advancements benefit the KC-46 by preparing it for future capabilities like autonomous refueling, they will also benefit other programs for years to come. The investments we continue to make in the KC-46 clearly demonstrate Boeing’s commitment to Pegasus being the standard by which all future refueling aircraft are measured.

# # #
Can Ms Caret possibly be serious?

airsound

[RAFEngO74to09]

More on the RVS fix - at cost to Boeing here. "Almost complete replacement" of the RVS hardware and software.

https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2020/04/02/done-deal-boeing-will-have-to-rip-and-replace-kc-46-sensor-and-camera-systems-on-its-own-dime/

[GlobalNav]

Boeing, having under bid this program deliberately, seem to also have relegated it to the third team, though it’s beginning to look like that’s the best they can do after trading the first team for MBA bean counters.

[Commando Cody]

It will be ironic if Airbus gets the contract with new-build / reworked surplus civil A330-MRTT which the USAF could have started getting 12 years ago if the original contest winner (KC-45A) in 2007 hadn't been derailed by vested interest interference which led to a re-run of the contest with parameters skewed towards Boeing !

https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/us-air-force-wants-to-use-private-in-flight-refuelling-tankers-in-two-years/137599.article

https://www.airforcemag.com/private-tankers-could-help-usaf-keep-up-with-unrelenting-need-for-booms/

Although the KC-46 systems problems certainly don't bode well for the whole fiasco, the above is not why Boeing won KC-X.

Basically, there were three competitions for KC-X. The first was the one that Airbus won. However what GAO said in reviewing the protest was not that Boeing OR Airbus had the better plane. They refused to even rule on that. What they said was that by USAF's own specifications, weightings for ranking and their own rules for evaluation, the award to Airbus couldn't be justified as announced. They stated that USAF needed to explain how under their own rules, how they could make the award they did. USAF didn't even try and so the contract was canceled (no doubt with penalties awarded to Airbus). Basically, USAF said they wanted one thing, then decided they wanted something else and rather than just issue a new solicitation, twisted their evaluation to get the result they now wanted. Boeing didn't win on every complaint but did raise the point that if USAF had asked for what they were eventually desiring to begin with, Boeing would have bid a "KC-777", which may or may not have won.

The second contest was very short because it was clearly loaded for Airbus. Among the things done was that requirements where the A330 had fallen short were changed or simply eliminated. And, as a kicker, the time for bid was shortened as was the required development time. This would make any "KC-777" bid be deemed too high risk. This became so obvious that the second competition was aborted and never hit the street.

In the the third case, the requirements that finally came out (Boeing said it wouldn't decide on a KC-767 or KC-777 design until they saw them) were much closer to the original requirement, the larger load options would be requested in KC-Y or KC-Z. Boeing apparently lowballed, possibly thinking the big profits would come down the line, but it's likely they still would hae come in lower given they were starting with a KC-767, which was smaller and less expensive that the A330 base airframe.


Now it's just my opinion, but with the crazy way Air Force was awarding and managing contracts and developments, Airbus would have had problems too. The KC-46A is based on, but not the same as the KC-767s offered for export earlier.
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/800x581/kc777_kc767_e0e3d24532f9794dec1ef842e51584227b897106.jpg

[etudiant]

Even factoring in the AF specific extras for the KC-46, the performance is execrable, as Boeing had two prior chances to get this tanker right.
They had KC-767 sales to to Italy and to Japan . Both of those programs were badly messed up,so many of the pitfalls had already been visited before the KC-46 came around. It seems no lessons were learned at all.

[typerated]

Although the KC-46 systems problems certainly don't bode well for the whole fiasco, the above is not why Boeing won KC-X.

Basically, there were three competitions for KC-X. The first was the one that Airbus won. However what GAO said in reviewing the protest was not that Boeing OR Airbus had the better plane. They refused to even rule on that. What they said was that by USAF's own specifications, weightings for ranking and their own rules for evaluation, the award to Airbus couldn't be justified as announced. They stated that USAF needed to explain how under their own rules, how they could make the award they did. USAF didn't even try and so the contract was canceled (no doubt with penalties awarded to Airbus). Basically, USAF said they wanted one thing, then decided they wanted something else and rather than just issue a new solicitation, twisted their evaluation to get the result they now wanted. Boeing didn't win on every complaint but did raise the point that if USAF had asked for what they were eventually desiring to begin with, Boeing would have bid a "KC-777", which may or may not have won.

The second contest was very short because it was clearly loaded for Airbus. Among the things done was that requirements where the A330 had fallen short were changed or simply eliminated. And, as a kicker, the time for bid was shortened as was the required development time. This would make any "KC-777" bid be deemed too high risk. This became so obvious that the second competition was aborted and never hit the street.

In the the third case, the requirements that finally came out (Boeing said it wouldn't decide on a KC-767 or KC-777 design until they saw them) were much closer to the original requirement, the larger load options would be requested in KC-Y or KC-Z. Boeing apparently lowballed, possibly thinking the big profits would come down the line, but it's likely they still would hae come in lower given they were starting with a KC-767, which was smaller and less expensive that the A330 base airframe.


Now it's just my opinion, but with eh crazy way Air Force was awarding and managing contracts at the time, Airbus would have had problems too. The KC-46A is based on, but not the same as the KC-767s offered for export earlier.
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/800x581/kc777_kc767_e0e3d24532f9794dec1ef842e51584227b897106.jpg

Why did the USAF go Airbus in the first place?

Was it politics - with Boeing? Or something they fancied in the A-330?

[Commando Cody]

Why did the USAF go Airbus in the first place?

Was it politics - with Boeing? Or something they fancied in the A-330?

Originally, they were just looking for a replacement for the KC-135 and specified capability and performance requirements based on that, and that's how the solicitation ran. When the proposals came in and they saw how much more load, cargo especially, the "KC-30" could handle they became enamored of that and decided that's the kind of plane they wanted. With a dramatic requirements change such as that, the normal and proper action would be to pull the existing RFP and issue a new solicitation with revised requirements and evaluation criteria and let the best plane win. AF didn't want to take the time to do that, so they just analyzed the two proposals not as they requested the companies to provide but as what they decided they wanted now. While there was a certain amount of credit given for exceeding the advertised specifications to a point, it wan't enough to overcome the price difference. In addition, in certain areas where the "KC-30" didn't meet the RFP requirements, they simply ignored those areas. Or, they changed the evaluation criteria to overcome certain things where the "KC-30" wasn't as capable without informing Boeing (or maybe even Airbus). I am not saying Airbus was colluding with them on this; I don't know.

When the results were published, what had been done was pretty clear. Further, Boeing stated, "If you had advertised for this rather than what you actually did advertise, we would have bid a "KC-777", Boeing having had a broader product line. Because of all this, the GAO said there could have been a valid competition for what USAF had now decided they really wnated if they had honestly asked for it. Note they did not say Boeing would have won that one. They simply said that as advertised and under USAF's own rules and selection report the award to Airbus couldn't be justified, and to be allowed to proceed further USAF had to explain how under its own rules the award went to the "KC-30", now designated the KC-45. USAF realized it couldn't defend is actions, so canceled the whole thing. The third competition's RFP was pretty much a straight KC-135 replacement spec, and Boeing had the advantage of a smaller, cheaper plane that met the requirements.

[Commando Cody]

Even factoring in the AF specific extras for the KC-46, the performance is execrable, as Boeing had two prior chances to get this tanker right.
They had KC-767 sales to to Italy and to Japan . Both of those programs were badly messed up,so many of the pitfalls had already been visited before the KC-46 came around. It seems no lessons were learned at all.


I'm not going to defend Boeing's performance on this contract. I will point out the KC-46 would be more properly described as a plane based on the KC-767, but not just the KC-767 with USAF painted on the side. For that matter, Airbus' proposal was based on, but not identical to their very successful A330 MRTT (which hadn't even flown when the RFP was released whereas the basic KC-767 had).

With all the things and changes USAF wanted, I suspect Airbus would have had problems with a US version as well (can you say "US-101/VH-71"?). whether they would have ended up as bad, who can say? I find it noteworthy that it seems the problems are not with the KC-46 aircraft itself but rather than the systems in it, which isn't that much comfort, really.

[Asturias56]

Time and again Air forces strive for 100% of their wish lists in designs which then fail when if they'd accepted 95% of the wish list they'd have got something useful, on time and on cost.

Read any of Bill Gunstons books for examples...................... his favourite was the A-12A Avenger

[msbbarratt]

There's been extensive analysis of Boeing and its financials over on leehamnews.com. Suggestions are that the company is in deep financial doo-doo, especially now with corona virus screwing everything (including the money markets) up.

It seems that Boeing has been lobbying for a government bailout in these extraordinary times, but has now changed its mind. The rumours are that the US Gov said that any government aid would come with government controls attached - near enough a nationalisation. My guess is that the company management, knowing what sort of damage that'd do to them personally (through their devalued shareholdings) and their reputations, are now trying to tough it out in the (vain?) hope of somehow getting away with it.

There really is a question as to how long this can keep going on. Does Boeing actually have the financial and personnel resources to finish the KC46? If the USAF does end up with A330-MRTTs, that'd be one less reason for the US gov to prop up Boeing. Perhaps Europe can swap facemasks and medical provisions for tankers...

[Jackonicko]

Worth remembering that even if everything on the KC-46 had worked exactly as advertised, even if it had not been delivered groaning with FOD, with cargo locks that self-opened, and pissing fuel, it would still have been an inferior tanker to the A330MRTT, needing more balanced field length to lift an inferior load of fuel.

[Jackonicko]

With all the things and changes USAF wanted, I suspect Airbus would have had problems with a US version as well (can you say "US-101/VH-71"?). whether they would have ended up as bad, who can say? I find it noteworthy that it seems the problems are not with the KC-46 aircraft itself but rather than the systems in it, which isn't that much comfort, really.

VH-71 remains a better choice for the Presidential helicopter. Bigger cabin, quieter, smoother, faster. What defeated it were shifting goalposts and the addition of more and more kit (including, famously, very heavy safes). The requirement for all of this heavy stuff was suddenly removed to allow VH-92 to win....... There really aren't very many cases where Europe has a much better solution to a requirement than US industry can provide, but you have identified two of them in US101 and KC-30/45/A330MRTT..

[GlobalNav]

Why did the USAF go Airbus in the first place?

Was it politics - with Boeing? Or something they fancied in the A-330?
Easy, the source selection team found the Airbus superior under the established criteria.
It was politics that nixed the selection.

[Commando Cody]

VH-71 remains a better choice for the Presidential helicopter. Bigger cabin, quieter, smoother, faster. What defeated it were shifting goalposts and the addition of more and more kit (including, famously, very heavy safes). The requirement for all of this heavy stuff was suddenly removed to allow VH-92 to win....... There really aren't very many cases where Europe has a much better solution to a requirement than US industry can provide, but you have identified two of them in US101 and KC-30/45/A330MRTT..

This basically accurate. The VH-71 was two knots faster, had better range, but had a crew of four whereas the VH-72's crew is two, and as far as pax go, may actually carry a few more, depending o how the cabin is configured. After the "US101" got the contract, more and more change orders came through requiring more power, extra mods, etc. This meant more costs, naturally, by March 2008 the program cost had reached $400 million per helicopter and by March 2009 was $464.2 million each. Lockheed's management in the program wasn't held in high regard, either. When President Obama came in, he publicly stated that "The helicopter I have now seems perfectly adequate to me". Even though it might cost more overall to terminate the VH-71 and start a new program, this pretty much sealed its fate.

Change orders have been the death of many a program.

[Commando Cody]

Easy, the source selection team found the Airbus superior under the established criteria.
It was politics that nixed the selection.

Again, I'm not going to defend Boeing's performance post award, but that first sentence ain't quite what happened.

Briefly there are two basic kind of awards. The first is Lowest Bid Technically Acceptable. They're quite handy for many non-complex solicitations. Basically, you put out your basic requirements. Whoever has the capability to meet all those basic requirements and has the lowest price wins. Period. The other is Best Value. You don't have to award to lowest price, but you've got to be very explicit on what is the minimum acceptable and how much exceeding that is worth. This can be used to justify not awarding to the lowest bidder, but you must do the analysis exactly as you say you will. The KC-X was one of these.

Keep in mind that KC-X was a replacement for the KC-135. They [said] they weren't looking for a KC-10 replacement or a much higher capacity vehicle. That would come later in KC-Y or KC-Z. They wanted it quickly ("quickly" being a relative term in the Government), established minimum capabilities required and desirable features. They indicated how much extra credit would be given for certain features that could be used to offset a higher price in the competition, and said there may be other things considered only as a tie breaker but otherwise would receive no extra credit.

When the two bids came in, they noted how much extra cargo the KC-30, especially under the floor and decided they wanted that cargo capacity. Problem is, they never asked for all that in the solicitation. The proper thing to do would be to revise and reissue the RFP and analyze the subsequent bids under the new criteria, but they didn't do that. Instead they just decided to not follow their own rules and do the analysis in such a way that they could get the new stuff they now wanted. Some examples:

One of the requirements was that KC-X had to perform a standard, defined "escape maneuver" (used when the tanker was threatened by opposing forces). The KC-135 could do this maneuver and apparently so could the KC-767. The KC-30 could not, so they simply ignored that in the evaluation.

There was a go/no go requirement that KC-X had to be able to refuel any AAR-capable fixed wing aircraft in USAF inventory. KC-30 couldn't, but this was ignored.

At the time, USAF wanted a guarantee that once in service major maintenance would transition to the Air Force and the contractor would facilitate this transition. Airbus wouldn't provide such a guarantee, but AF dismissed this as a "clerical error".

There was a requirement that KC-X had to be able to routinely operate from any KC-135 base or other fields that the KC-135 could. Much was made by the Europeans that the KC30 did not need runways as long as did the KC-767, and they were 100% correct. What the problem was that because it was so much larger and heavier, it couldn't use existing KC-135-capable taxiways and intersections. If AF wanted to allow this, they would have to add the cost of modifying those at KC-135 bases, where necessary, to the KC-30 requirements to the overall price of the KC-30 bid. Since this would add hundreds of millions of $ to the KC-30 bid, they just didn't add the costs.

One significant analysis point was how many KC-Xs could operate from a specified ramp size using standard USAF wingtip-to-wingtip spacing. Being a larger aircraft, naturally fewer KC-30s could fit. So, without telling Boeing, they simply reduced the required spacing so more KC-30s would fit.

Although the solicitation said that beyond a certain value, no further credit would be given (I believe it was for even more below floor cargo). Yet in the analysis they gave the KC-30 extra credit beyond that point.

Again, one of Boeing's most powerful arguments was that if USAF had published specifications for them to bid to for what USAF actually selected on, rather than what they announced they were going to select on, their bid would have been substantially different. They bid the KC-767 because they could meet the AF's stated requirements at a lower cost with it than with a larger machine with larger capabilities. We might have even seen the KC-777. Not saying it would have won. Not saying the KC-30 wasn't a more capable tanker overall than the KC-767, albeit more expensive. We know it was more expensive, because if it had come in lower cost, Boeing would have had nothing to protest.

Just saying that the cancellation of the KC-30/45 award can't be explained away by saying it was simply politics.

[Asturias56]

But it was MAINLY politics I think..................

[Jackonicko]

Some examples:

1) One of the requirements was that KC-X had to perform a standard, defined "escape maneuver" (used when the tanker was threatened by opposing forces). The KC-135 could do this maneuver and apparently so could the KC-767. The KC-30 could not, so they simply ignored that in the evaluation.

2) There was a go/no go requirement that KC-X had to be able to refuel any AAR-capable fixed wing aircraft in USAF inventory. KC-30 couldn't, but this was ignored.

3) At the time, USAF wanted a guarantee that once in service major maintenance would transition to the Air Force and the contractor would facilitate this transition. Airbus wouldn't provide such a guarantee, but AF dismissed this as a "clerical error".

4) There was a requirement that KC-X had to be able to routinely operate from any KC-135 base or other fields that the KC-135 could. Much was made by the Europeans that the KC30 did not need runways as long as did the KC-767, and they were 100% correct. What the problem was that because it was so much larger and heavier, it couldn't use existing KC-135-capable taxiways and intersections. If AF wanted to allow this, they would have to add the cost of modifying those at KC-135 bases, where necessary, to the KC-30 requirements to the overall price of the KC-30 bid. Since this would add hundreds of millions of $ to the KC-30 bid, they just didn't add the costs.



OK, I'll bite.

1) what escape manoeuvre could a 330 not fly that a -135 and a -46 can?
2) which fixed wing aircraft can the 330 not refuel that a -46 can?
3) Airbus say that isn't so. Your evidence is....?
4) Which tanker bases could not accomodate a 330 because of taxyway restrictions? There are a host that a KC-46 can't operate from with full fuel because of runway length.....

[golder]

Worth remembering that even if everything on the KC-46 had worked exactly as advertised, even if it had not been delivered groaning with FOD, with cargo locks that self-opened, and pissing fuel, it would still have been an inferior tanker to the A330MRTT, needing more balanced field length to lift an inferior load of fuel.
Yes, In my opinion, it was purely politics, that Boeing was chosen.. The A330MRTT is the better platform. The C-27J that they canceled, was also a good one.

[Commando Cody]

OK, I'll bite.

1) what escape manoeuvre could a 330 not fly that a -135 and a -46 can?
2) which fixed wing aircraft can the 330 not refuel that a -46 can?
3) Airbus say that isn't so. Your evidence is....?
4) Which tanker bases could not accomodate a 330 because of taxyway restrictions? There are a host that a KC-46 can't operate from with full fuel because of runway length.....


!) I don't know the specific details of the maneuver, I suspect it is classified. However, this was one of the findings that was cited as why the evaluation of the bids was not up to snuff.
2) The V-22 comes to mind, there may be others.
3) Boeing (naturally) said it is, it was part of their protest and so did GAO. It is true that in their defense of the award Airbus relented, but apparently at the time of the analysis the USAF didn't get the guarantee they required.
4) I can't name the specific bases, but GAO found that indeed hundreds of millions of $ should have added to the costs of the KC-30 to cover this. Air Force acknowledged this was true. It is also true that the A330 needs less runway length that the 767. I assume this holds true for the tanker versions with full fuel, although Boeing claimed the KC-767 needed less runway than the KC-30 because it was smaller (ramp footprint for KC-767 was 25,000 ft², while KC-30 was 38,000 ft², and I assume that Airbus' numbers don't take into account its "receptacle credit which allows it cite a runway length with less that full fuel and "top off" once airborne). But runway length was not the issue here, both competitors met that requirement. The issue was ability to do full operations from a KC-135 base and the hangup was the taxiways and intersections, and to a lesser extent runway width and strength. Note that a KC-777 would have had the same issues, which is one of the reasons Boeing didn't try bidding that It would have had the same problems, and its capacity was not needed to meet the requirements of the solicitation.

GAO, in partly sustaining Boeing's protest, ruled that the competition was conducted in a flawed manner. Note that it did not say the award should have gone to Boeing, just that the way the award was made it was flawed.

Airbus could have bid an A300/310 based tanker but chose to go with the larger A330 because it was easier for them as the A300/310 line was planned to wind down and they were already working on the A330 MRTT anyway. This put them at a cost disadvantage.

Boeing waited until the RFP for the third came out before deciding to rebid the KC-767 because it better suited what USAF was asking for than a KC-777. The CEO of Northrop Grumman, Airbus' partner, in commenting on the RFP for the third competition said that the Air Force had shown a "clear preference," for a smaller tanker. He then stated that competing would impose, “contractual and financial burdens on the company that we simply cannot accept”. This whole thing could have been avoided had USAF simply revised the first competition's RFP to reflect their changed priorities and then competed, letting the chips fall where they may.

You can find a lot of this stuff in Aviation Week of the time.

[FlightDetent]

C.C, wonderful insights. I assume when an auditing body axes a public procurement due to selection not following the rules within itself, it's not a bad thing. Whether or not the auditing agency was tasked to dig up all they could, might give it a different taste, but does not alter the course.

It is all bit relative since no large government investment project worldwide is ever flawless or deep-water current free. Still, I enjoyed reading the way you present the arguments.

[Commando Cody]

C.C, wonderful insights. I assume when an auditing body axes a public procurement due to selection not following the rules within itself, it's not a bad thing. Whether or not the auditing agency was tasked to dig up all they could, might give it a different taste, but does not alter the course.

It is all bit relative since no large government investment project worldwide is ever flawless or deep-water current free. Still, I enjoyed reading the way you present the arguments.

Thank you. The auditing agency got involved because when you protest, you have to choose one of two paths: the courts or the GAO, you can't do both. Boeing chose the GAO route. In those days, very few big procurements were protested, but the flaws in this process were so egregious that Boeing decided to go forward, knowing they'd risk the wrath of the customer.

I blame not Boeing, or Airbus or the GAO for how this went down. I blame USAF. Looking back at that time, you'll see that they were bungling procurement after procurement. There were glaring errors made, awards that didn't make sense, and outright corruption. In fact, after the first debacle on KC-X, DoD took the KC-X procurement away from USAF and considered running the whole thing themselves, a tremendous vote of no confidence

[Commando Cody]

... The C-27J that they canceled, was also a good one.

The C-27J craziness was not an example of politics, but rather of bureaucratic infighting and "It's MY sandbox".

Briefly: Army felt it was spending way too much money hauling people and cargo in CH-47s between Army bases that had runways . Plus, this used up precious Chinook flight hours. So they thought they could gain a double benefit by procuring a smallish cargo aircraft to perform this mission (not to takes forces/supplies into combat). USAF, who believes that by Divine Right they should run all fixed wing bitterly opposed this, saying it was not needed, it was their mission even if they didn't have the available assets to do it and that was what the C-130 was for anyway. Congress, though, thought the idea made sense.

USAF then pivoted and said, "Well, maybe it's not such a bad idea, maybe we should get some too for lighter missions. We'd like to participate as well and Army, we're your Best Pal". Thus was born the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). In due time, a competition was held and was won by a partnership of Alenia Aeronautica (who had designed the G.222 on which the C-27J is based) with L3Communications, forming the Global Military Aircraft Systems GMAS company to bid the C-27J. Boeing later joined. Army had leadership because they were going to be buying substantially more.

As production got underway, each service placed their own orders. A curious thing was soon discovered. Even though the AF and Army versions were virtually identical except for a few radios and paint, thanks to their contracting acumen USAF was paying twice what Army was paying per aircraft. The solution seemed obvious: USAF said it would all work out better if management of the program was transferred to them. for reasons I've never figured out, DoD agreed and so AF took over. Well, it wasn't to long after that that AF announced they were killing the C-27J program because it was not needed, it was their mission even if they didn't have the available assets to do it and that was what the C-130 was for anyway. They also said the plane cost too much, but there were a few details there that weren't addressed.

The few that made into service were soon retired and those still under construction were flown directly from the factory to Davis-Monthan. Army had to go back to using CH-47s.

In a footnote, USAF tried to recover some of the cost by offering the Spartans on the world market. Alenia, though was thoroughly pissed because they had geared up for substantial production for the program and were ending up out in the cold. They were also offering the C-27J on the world market separately, and were not too happy about having to compete against these C-27Js which would be offered at fire sale prices. They announced to the world that they would provide no support for any of these aircraft sold outside the US, which of course rendered them unsalable and the US taxpayer ended up with nothing for all the money expended so far.

The final result was that the 21 built remained in US hands. Seven C-27Js went to SOCOM, who was very happy with them, and the remaining 14 went to the Coast Guard who was thrilled because they got them for free, which did wonders for their budget.

[golder]

From what I know of the Aussie perspective. Is that we were going to piggyback on US procurement. We had L3 fit ours out. We got a static trainer from the US recently. I'll assume SOCOM are joint with RAAF. To keep the kit current and with development cost sharing. US gov. has better public contract information that our ADF/RAAF. I haven't followed it. A fear at the time, was that we would have an orphan fleet.

[sandiego89]

Seems like a total rework of the troubled vision system.

https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/boeing-usaf-agree-dramatic-kc-46-remote-vision-system-redesign

So back to the drawing board, release $882M so they can try come up with a totally new system, 'cause they couldn't get the first (or second) version correct. That will teach them!!

[Jackonicko]

!) I don't know the specific details of the maneuver, I suspect it is classified. However, this was one of the findings that was cited as why the evaluation of the bids was not up to snuff.

So it can't actually be stood up?

2) The V-22 comes to mind, there may be others.

Why would a 330 MRTT not be able to refuel a V-22? And where is this, in black and white, because without evidence, these A330 shortcomings sound a bit makey-uppy.....

3) Boeing (naturally) said it is, it was part of their protest and so did GAO. It is true that in their defense of the award Airbus relented, but apparently at the time of the analysis the USAF didn't get the guarantee they required.

Right.... so the bottom line is that Airbus were, in fact, able to meet the requirement.

4) I can't name the specific bases,

Funny that. No-one ever can. I wonder why?

It is also true that the A330 needs less runway length that the 767. I assume this holds true for the tanker versions with full fuel,

You assume correctly. My understanding is that the 767 can theoretically take off in a shorter distance, but can't stop as quickly so needs a longer runway to operate safely.

As a result, the KC-46 cannot take off with full fuel from some well known real world tanker bases, and yet Boeing were not penalised for this, even though it would have cost millions of dollars to extend the runways...... or indeed to operate with sub-optimal fuel loads.

The issue was ability to do full operations from a KC-135 base and the hangup was the taxiways and intersections, and to a lesser extent runway width and strength.

I was once told that at one base (Altus, I seem to recall) there was supposedly a runway intersection that the A330 was too big to use. But there was another intersection a little further along that it could use. The kicker? The intersection concerned was too close to the threshold for any tanker to actually use.

[Commando Cody]

Jackonicko:

I'm not as good as you at embedding previous posts, so let me address
your concerns in this way, please.

Escape maneuver: I'm not sure what you mean by "So it can't actually be
stood up"? Although I don't think all the details are public knowledge,
from what I do know part of the maneuver involves accelerating away from
the receiving aircraft and climbing. The GAO specifically noted,
"...the Air Force did not reasonably evaluate the capability of Northrop
Grumman’s proposed aircraft to initiate emergency breakaway
procedures...".


V-22: GAO's finding was, "...the record did not show that the Air Force
reasonably determined that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft could
refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing, tanker-compatible aircraft...".
That the V-22 was one of the aircraft concerned came from an article, I
believe, in Aviation Week.

The maintenance issue and Airbus' relenting: Airbus may have changed
their mind after the award was protested. That's too late. The award
had to consider only what was being offered in the response to the RFP at
the time the solicitation closed. GAO again: "Specifically, the
solicitation required offerors to plan and support the agency to achieve
initial organic depot-level maintenance within 2 years after delivery of
the first full-rate production aircraft. Northrop Grumman was informed
several times by the Air Force that the firm had not committed to the
required 2-year timeframe, but Northrop Grumman refused to commit to the
required schedule".

The specific bases that I couldn't name: That's because I don't know
the name of every USAF tanker base worldwide.

A330 and runway length. The civil A330's balanced field length is less
than that of the civil 767. Again, I'm assuming that holds true for the
tanker versions as well. Boeing (and you) say that the 767 can take off
in less space than the A330, so the discrepancy must be that at V1 an
A330 can stop in less space than a 767. This would mean that the civil
Accelerate Stop Distance Required for the A330 is less. Fair point.
But we are not talking a civil situation here. Not all of the
procedures that are required for civil operations apply to the military.
They don't worry as much about ASDR in determining the runway length
required. For example, except for that brilliant strategy of the Guard
in creating the E model, I don't believe any of the KC-135s have thrust
reversers. I don't think the KC-46 does, either (don't know about the
A330MRTT). I know I've seen heavy KC-135s rolling down the last 1/3-1/4
of the runway where there's no way they're going to be able to stop if
they don't get airborne. So for the purposes of the solicitation the
takeoff, not balanced field length, would be the driver. However, as
previously stated, runway length was not the issue. It was runway width
and strength, but more importantly existing taxiways and intersections.
That was the problem, and not just one taxiway at one base. AF might
have addressed this by saying they would make the modifications as
necessary, but for the analysis to be valid that would have to add the
cost of that to the A330 bid. When they start talking KC-10
replacement, which KC-X was not, they'll have to revise requirements,
because that would be a larger plane.

I could go into more aspects [giving extra credit for things they said
they wouldn't give extra credit for, making changes without informing
Boeing, etc.), but for brevity I've just limited my self to the points
you raised. Everything I've said is a matter of public record,
including the full (redacted because of proprietary and source
information) GAO decision. Again, GAO never said which plane was better
just that the award, based on what was asked for and how it was
announced evaluation would take place, couldn't be sustained. It's also
worthy of note that most of Boeing's claims were denied. But what was
sustained was enough to "poison" the award.

Finally, let me include another direct quote from GAO: "In its decision,
GAO recommends that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors,
obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a
new source selection decision, consistent with GAO’s decision. GAO
further recommends that, if the Air Force believed that the solicitation
does not adequately state its needs, the agency should amend the
solicitation prior to conducting further discussions with the offerors".

Exactly.

[Commando Cody]

Jackonicko:

Now if you were talking about the proposed lease and options examined before KC-X, you might have a point. It is definitely arguable that Airbus got screwed there.

[vascodegama]

CC

The A330/Voyager/MRTT operate fully compliant with civilian performance-not the ancient rules applied to the KC135.

The only stopper for refuelling a V22 would be the AAR speed -is 180 KCAS too fast for a V22 and where is the evidence that a KC46 could do it any slower?

The KC46 doesn't seem to doing too well in the refuelling stakes at the moment.

[esscee]

Best thing for Airbus with regards to USAF and the tanking is to do enough work to put in a bid to think Boeing might lose to Airbus so Boeing incur more costs. Basically let's face it there is no way certain people in the US will allow Airbus to actually win and produce tankers for the USAF. Let Boeing have it, they cannot do the job properly on this 767 tanker let alone on the Boeing problems with 787 and the current ongoing 737 "not" MAX or whatever it may get called.

[BEagle]

The only stopper for refuelling a V22 would be the AAR speed -is 180 KCAS too fast for a V22 and where is the evidence that a KC46 could do it any slower?

From Omega Air Tanker on 1 Oct 2018:
This week, Omega completed a long-range overwater aerial refueling “drag” mission that brought eight VMM-268 MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft from Guam to their home station of MCAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii after a successful MRF-D deployment.

On the first of two legs, Omega dragged all eight MV-22Bs to Wake Island. On the second leg, Omega made two trips, dragging four MV-22Bs each time - over 2000 NM legs over open ocean.

These are the first steps for Omega to conduct ops that can help us ensure the Marine Corps can rapidly deploy across the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans with their MV-22B aircraft.

We will continue to evolve this capability and grow our operating methodology. Planners and operators’ warmest congratulations on this historic mission. What an awesome trip with the Marines!

They used a 707 with centreline hose for the mission.

[Asturias56]

"Best thing for Airbus with regards to USAF and the tanking is to do enough work to put in a bid to think Boeing might lose to Airbus so Boeing incur more costs"

I'm sure that AB would have preferred to win the contract - BUT if winning it gets Mr B stuck in a swamp I doubt anyone in Toulouse is crying - probably thinking how its killed off a Boeing Middle of the Market airframe for a start..........

[Commando Cody]

CC

The A330/Voyager/MRTT operate fully compliant with civilian performance-not the ancient rules applied to the KC135.

The only stopper for refuelling a V22 would be the AAR speed -is 180 KCAS too fast for a V22 and where is the evidence that a KC46 could do it any slower?

The KC46 doesn't seem to doing too well in the refuelling stakes at the moment.

The statement regarding "...fully compliant with civilian performance.." is likely true---but irrelevant. Also, not sure what "ancient rules" to which you're referring. The fact of the matter is that while the A330/KC-45 may be superior in balanced field length, balanced field length was not the measurement used in the specification. In any case, this is clearly a straw man, since runway length required was not where the issue was.

Regarding your V-22 point, I trust you are being sarcastic. Why would anyone want to AAR a V-22 at a speed that has to be pretty close to a KC-45 stall speed at that weight in refueling configuration, when a V-22 can easily maintain a speed 70 to 90 knots (and maybe more) faster? I'm not sure about the exact issue(s) involved, just that GAO found that the AF had not properly validated that the A330 could refuel all USAF fixed wing aircraft.


As I said some time back, I'm not going to defend the poor performance post award, I'm just discussing the award itself. Like I also said, though, given how badly this has been administered and how much extra USAF demanded beyond a basic KC-767, I suspect that had Airbus kept the award, they'd be in trouble as well.

[Commando Cody]

"Best thing for Airbus with regards to USAF and the tanking is to do enough work to put in a bid to think Boeing might lose to Airbus so Boeing incur more costs"

I'm sure that AB would have preferred to win the contract - BUT if winning it gets Mr B stuck in a swamp I doubt anyone in Toulouse is crying - probably thinking how its killed off a Boeing Middle of the Market airframe for a start..........

The lack of Boeing's MMA is probably more due to all the resources having to go towards resolving 737 Max issues and the lack of foresight and decision making ability at Boeing upper management levels. I gree with those who say that since Boeing bought MDD and the latter's management got entrenched, Boeing has become more of a financial conglomerate masquerading as an airplane company.

[vascodegama]

CC

No sarcasm-not this time. Firstly study of post 1038 kindly added by Beagle shows that even a legacy aircraft has managed it. A quick search suggests that the V22 has a max cruise speed of 270 KCAS so would not need to refuel at 90 kt. The hose speed range on the A330 family hose is 180-325 which should easily cover the V22. Indeed at least one member of said family of tankers has a clearance to refuel the V22. Maybe the GAO didn't look to hard! Not only that where was the evidence that the KC46 was any better?

As far as performance is concerned the ancient rules I referred to are those that were in force when the KC135 was built/certified. The A330 does meet all current perfA requirements and does not rely on balanced field calculations-it uses an optimised V1 based on the choice of take off configuration chosen.

[BEagle]

Some years ago now I was involved in a research project comparing tanker capabilities. Rather than relying on manufacturers' glossy brochure claims, we set the ground rules for comparison. All aerodromes would be sea level with 10000ft RW length, still air and ISA. The aim was to establish the max offload available in a set time period on an AARA at a given distance from the departure aerodrome, with recovery to the same aerodrome to land with the equivalent of an hour's transit fuel burn (to simplify diversion assumptions).

All participants were requested to provide the actual RTOM for the specified conditions and the max offload within the set criteria.

The US participants immediately requested a 12000ft RW; this we refused.

When the results came in, the KC-46 was unable to take off at anything close to its MTOM; the A330MRTT was the clear winner and even an A310MRTT with 5 rather than 4 ACTs came very close to the KC-46.

Back when ex-ba 767s were being considered as potential RAF Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft, the Boeing rep admitted "That's where Airbus has us beat" when I queried the figures shown in Boeing's own brochure, which indicated that the 767 (admittedly not fitted with the uprated engines/brakes of the KC-46) would struggle to be able to take-off at MTOM from Brize Norton except with a significant head wind and low ISA deviation. Mates who flew the thing in airline service confirmed that it was a real slug departing Africa with a full load.

[Commando Cody]

There seems to be a fixation here about GAO's sustainment of Boeing's protest in terms of the technical aspects of the Airbus vs Boeing bid for the original KC-X award.

I'd like to reiterate that GAO did not sustain some of Boeing's objections on technical grounds. It never said which aircraft was "better" and even made a point of saying it wasn't in that business and wasn't doing that. What it did, as it always does, was rule on contractual grounds. It said the USAF so botched up their analysis in the award of the contract that as it stood, the award could not stand. USAF started out saying it wanted one thing, decided it wanted something else and rather than properly redo the thing just went and shoehorned the analysis so it would come out the way they now wanted.

This was not the only time this happened. TheKC-X fiasco was just one of a series of contractual screwups the USAF did in the mid 2000s. Awards were canceled or overturned, people were replaced, some even went to jail on things. It all could have been avoided even they just did their job right.

Let me again quote from GAO's findings: "In its decision, GAO recommends that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors,
obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with GAO’s decision. GAO
further recommends that, if the Air Force believed that the solicitation does not adequately state its needs, the agency should amend the
solicitation prior to conducting further discussions with the offerors".

That's all they had to do.

[Commando Cody]

CC

No sarcasm-not this time. Firstly study of post 1038 kindly added by Beagle shows that even a legacy aircraft has managed it. A quick search suggests that the V22 has a max cruise speed of 270 KCAS so would not need to refuel at 90 kt. The hose speed range on the A330 family hose is 180-325 which should easily cover the V22. Indeed at least one member of said family of tankers has a clearance to refuel the V22. Maybe the GAO didn't look to hard! Not only that where was the evidence that the KC46 was any better?

As far as performance is concerned the ancient rules I referred to are those that were in force when the KC135 was built/certified. The A330 does meet all current perfA requirements and does not rely on balanced field calculations-it uses an optimised V1 based on the choice of take off configuration chosen.

With respect, again, all the GAO said in its summary was that USAF had not demonstrated in its analysis that all USAF-fixed wing aircraft could be refueled by the A330 submission. It was a separate source that said it was the V-22 Whether the 767 bid could do that better was not the issue, it was USAF's lack of properly addressing the issue regardless of what aircraft the receiver in question might have been. GAO looks at contractual issues.

Regarding your second point, how it calculates V1 isn't the issue; military allowances are different (which is why a number of military aircraft never get civil certification). Runway length was not an issue in the award, protest or sustainment. This whole thing was a contractual problem, one of a number USAF experienced in the 2000s. .Like I said, USAF was doing so badly at this point that DoD seriously considered taking the authority to make the next tanker award away from them and doing it itself. That is a severe condemnation and rarely taken step .

[Less Hair]

The 767 is some proven airplane, Boeing builds tankers since forever. I don't get what the bloody problem is? It's billions of business value and Boeing is making a loss on it now? Can't be true?
What is wrong that can't be rectified within a short time?

[ORAC]

The last KC-135 was built in 1965. The first KC-767 was built in 2003 and not exactly a total success.

People retire, corporate memory is short, and technologies change.

[Asturias56]

"What is wrong that can't be rectified within a short time?"

Pretty much everything I'm afraid............... :uhoh:

[Lyneham Lad]

On Flight Global:-
Boeing KC-46A refuelling boom camera redesign to cost $551 million (https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/boeing-kc-46a-refuelling-boom-camera-redesign-to-cost-551-million/138148.article)

Article intro:-
It will cost Boeing $551 million to redesign the boom camera on the KC-46A Pegasus in-flight refuelling tanker.

In total, the aerospace company took a pre-tax charge of $827 million for the KC-46A tanker in the first quarter of 2020, it says in an earnings call on 29 April. In addition to the boom camera redesign, the programme lost money because of “productivity inefficiencies” and coronavirus-caused shutdowns of Boeing’s Puget Sound factories where the KC-46A is made, the company says.

Total losses on the KC-46A programme have now risen to about $4.6 billion.

The tanker charge caused Boeing’s Defense, Space & Security business to lose $191 million from operations in the first quarter of 2020. In the first quarter of 2019, the company earned $852 million from operations.

[Asturias56]

$ 551 mm for a new boom camera? How on earth does it cost that sort of cash??

[bvcu]

no direct knowledge of it but reading the info sounds like someone signed a contract for a camera system that was a lot more difficult than it appears. I suspect that when it eventually gets sorted will be the state of the art for years to come , unless someone out there knows otherwise !

[golder]

$ 551 mm for a new boom camera? How on earth does it cost that sort of cash??
It's OK, they under bid on the first few aircraft years ago. To win the contact. Then make profit on the following.ones. I'm sure it's all going to plan. USAF are happy and it's much better than getting the A330. :ugh:

[Big Pistons Forever]

Boeing used to be run by engineers, now it is run by MBA bean counters who's only concern is to juice the stock price so they get a bigger bonus. The whole company needs a management reset.

[Dan Gerous]

I suppose they'll get it sorted just before everything goes contactless.:E

[MAN777]

The way camera technology is advancing the new system will be years out of date before its delivered.

I know its comparing apples and pears but just look at the quality of micro cameras flying round on sub one thousand dollar drones.

[GlobalNav]

Av Week headline: USAF Extends KC-46A Testing For Three Years

[Saintsman]

Boeing could do quite well out of this. The A330s will be due to be phased out just as the KC-46 is ready for service...

[GlobalNav]

Yeah, but by then, getting parts will be hard.

[ORAC]

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/19/house-to-block-kc-135-retirements-for-three-years-but-some-b-1-bombers-could-be-headed-for-the-boneyard/

House to block KC-135 retirements for three years, but some B-1 bombers could head for the boneyard

WASHINGTON — The House Armed Services Committee will forbid the Air Force from retiring KC-135 tankers in fiscal 2021 (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/12/13/the-air-force-needs-more-tankers-could-the-defense-industry-have-the-answer/), but will allow the service to divest some B-1 bombers and KC-10 tankers.

In its FY21 budget, the Air Force requested permission from Congress to retire 17 of its oldest B-1B bombers (https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/air-force-makes-reductions-to-b-1s-a-10s-global-hawk-drones-and-more-in-fy21-budget-request/) and a total of 29 aerial refueling tankers, comprising 13 KC-135s and 16 KC-10s. However, the House hopes to block the Air Force from mothballing any of its 398 KC-135s until after FY23, according to the HASC’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee’s markup of the FY21 defense policy bill, which was obtained by Defense News.

It also would require the service to retain a total of 50 primary mission KC-10A aircraft in FY21; 38 primary mission KC-10A aircraft in FY22; and 26 primary mission KC-10A aircraft in FY23.

The Air Force currently has 56 KC-10s that are considered primary mission aircraft, so the HASC’s language would allow the service to retire six aircraft in FY21 and a total of 30 tankers over the next three years, said a source familiar with the bill. That will allow the service to retire roughly the same number of tankers as it proposed, but over a longer time period........

The House committee’s reluctance to begin retiring tankers was expected given U.S Transportation Command’s concerns about a tanker shortfall (https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/02/25/air-force-mulls-halt-to-tanker-retirements/)and ongoing complications with the Air Force’s newest tanker, the KC-46. TRANSCOM listed $110 million in its unfunded priorities to buy back 13 KC-135 and 10 KC-10 tankers that the Air Force wanted to retire, claiming the divestments would create a “capacity bathtub” and limit options for military mobilization if military leaders were “confronted with a crisis.”

Worries about the tanker fleet being too small were also compounded by the slow pace in resolving ongoing KC-46 deficiencies, particularly with its remote vision system. Prime contractor Boeing has agreed to completely redesign the RVS, which is used by the boom operator to see outside of the aircraft during the refueling process. However, the new system will not be ready (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/09/the-air-force-delays-a-full-rate-production-decision-for-the-kc-46/) until at least 2023.

Without it, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Dave Goldfein has said the aircraft will not be ready to deploy (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/03/a-fix-for-the-kc-46-is-already-a-year-late/) in normal operations, though it would be used in combat if necessary......

[Asturias56]

Maybe there's a place for Airtanker over there.................

[airsound]

Maybe there's a place for Airtanker over there.................
If I've understood Airtanker's system correctly, any air force that uses it cannot use any other tanking facility without incurring big costs. Surely, no air force would accept such terms? Oh..... wait.....

I suspect the USAF might understand that?

airsound

[RAFEngO74to09]

Not Airtanker - but I do not believe that there is a cat's chance in hell of the KC-46A being bought in sufficient numbers to replace the entire Cold War legacy fleet of KC-135s and KC-10s. It's not just the huge delays but also the need to use funds for higher priorities in classified programs, cyber and cutting edge systems like the B-21.

It is extremely likely that there will be a significant element of contractoriztion and that the KC-46A buy will be limited to some extent by the numbers needed for the additional special missions that the platform is planned to perform (for which there was all the additional gold plating of the specification in terms of wiring and EMP protection etc).

US TRANSCOM / US Air Mobility Command have been investigating contractorization for over 12 months now and have already held 2 Industry Days and come up with 5 potential options - explained here.

The five potential solutions are:

(1) Government Furnished Equipment to a contractor.
(2) Government sale or lease of surplus aircraft to a contractor.
(3) Foreign government surplus tankers purchased and used for contract air refueling.
(4) Modifying existing commercial aircraft to perform contracted boom air refueling support.
(5) the use of a commercial off-the-shelf tanker for contract air refueling support.

In April 22, 2020 Sec AF required parameters for a further study to be submitted within 60 days.

Full report here - scroll down and open the first pdf dated June 5, 2020:

https://beta.sam.gov/opp/54df80f9174646a9bb25b7f38f03dba4/view?keywords=Refueling&sort=-modifiedDate&index=&is_active=true&page=5

My money would be on Airbus pitching a A330 MRTT PFI - especially since they will probably be plenty of "slightly used" A330 from bankrupt airlines that could be converted for a lot less than $300M a throw a new A330 MRTT would be.

Also, while that gets up and running, there may be a place for a number of small private companies eventually buying up surplus KC-135s from small air forces displacing them with A330 MRTTs and / or taking on early retirement USAF KC-135s and relieving the USAF of the manning, infrastructure and maintenance burden.

[BEagle]

Several years ago I discussed the notion of an A330MRTT 'lite' with a senior Airbus Military (as it was then) mate. The idea being a pre-owned A330 with minimum essential modifications to equip it for the AAR role. Similar in concept to the level of modification needed to convert the A310 to the A310MRTT / CC-150T in the early '00s.

No need for the complexity of the full-fat A330MRTT or Voyager - just a 2 pod design with a 3rd seat for an ARO who would have the same level of 'Fuel Operator Station' as in the A310MRTT / CC-150T including a Mission Computer System which actually works! No centreline FRU or boom, purely to keep cost to a minimum. Although the lack of interoperability with F-16 operators was acknowledged.

Unfortunately the hierarchy wasn't interested and preferred to offer only the brand new A330MRTT at at an eye-watering price.

The USAF is unlikely to adopt the probe-and-drogue AAR system, so the only real option is to stick with the much-delayed KC-46A or go back to the superior Airbus KC-45A which was the original choice over 12 years ago...….

[RAFEngO74to09]

The game has moved on considerably since the original KC-45A competition win / cancellation and the KC-46A debacle. The point now is the KC-46A will take another 3 > 5 years to get right (primarily the RVS), the delivery of the initial tranche under KC-X is already years behind schedule and the production rate has been slowed down.

Options need to be considered not only to maintain a 415-tanker force at an acceptable operating cost over the period it would take to buy the next batch of tankers under KC-Y - which will take another 29 years - but also reduce acquisition and operating overhead costs by contracting out an element of the overall task using one or more of the options being considered.

Airbus already produces "flying boom" A330 MRTTs. Also, 30% of the US TRANSCOM / USAF AMC mission requirement is for "hose & drogue" [as the US DoD calls it over here] - so in the overall force mix there will be dual-method tankers - like the RAF Mildenhall 100 ARW KC-135Rs which have a "flying boom" and 2 x underwing "hose & drogue" pods (not just the "hose & drogue" adaptor on the flying boom).

Dual-method French AF A330 MRTT here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cnFj5rfVaRA

Up-to-date info on the A330 MRTT options currently offered are here:

https://www.airbus.com/defence/a330mrtt.html

[Asturias56]

Plenty of suitable aircraft sitting around going cheap to fill the gap - as long as you keep the spec at 1990's levels instead of 2020 ones.............

[vascodegama]

airsound

The RAF signed up to that one but I doubt anyone else would.

RAF Eng

I will be interested to see how the French intend to refuel large probe and drogue receivers.

[ORAC]

https://www.mcchord.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2273652/first-kc-10-extender-retires-from-joint-base-mdl/

First KC-10 Extender retires from Joint Base MDL

[Lyneham Lad]

Came across this link in the Flight Deck / Rumours & News section.
Airbus just beat Boeing to be the first to complete a wholly automated air-to-air refueling operation (https://www.businessinsider.com/airbus-a330-achieves-first-aerial-refueling-beats-boeing-2020-4?r=US&IR=T)



An Airbus A310 aerial tanker successfully underwent a test to autonomously refuel an aircraft to be implemented on the A330 MRTT.
The achievement marks the next step in Airbus' goal to enable autonomy in routine flight operations.
Rival Boeing has not been able to achieve the same goal as its new flagship refueler continues to show problems.

[TBM-Legend]

The game has moved on considerably since the original KC-45A competition win / cancellation and the KC-46A debacle. The point now is the KC-46A will take another 3 > 5 years to get right (primarily the RVS), the delivery of the initial tranche under KC-X is already years behind schedule and the production rate has been slowed down.

Options need to be considered not only to maintain a 415-tanker force at an acceptable operating cost over the period it would take to buy the next batch of tankers under KC-Y - which will take another 29 years - but also reduce acquisition and operating overhead costs by contracting out an element of the overall task using one or more of the options being considered.

Airbus already produces "flying boom" A330 MRTTs. Also, 30% of the US TRANSCOM / USAF AMC mission requirement is for "hose & drogue" [as the US DoD calls it over here] - so in the overall force mix there will be dual-method tankers - like the RAF Mildenhall 100 ARW KC-135Rs which have a "flying boom" and 2 x underwing "hose & drogue" pods (not just the "hose & drogue" adaptor on the flying boom).

Dual-method French AF A330 MRTT here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cnFj5rfVaRA

Up-to-date info on the A330 MRTT options currently offered are here:

https://www.airbus.com/defence/a330mrtt.html

Try this>>

https://www.contactairlandandsea.com/2020/07/24/raaf-deploys-to-guam-for-unnamed-exercise/

[Lyneham Lad]

On Flight Global.
Boeing takes $67m loss on KC-46 tanker, but sees reason for optimism (https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/boeing-takes-67m-loss-on-kc-46-tanker-but-sees-reason-for-optimism/140856.article)

Boeing has taken another multimillion dollar charge on the KC-46A Pegasus in-flight refueling tanker, but believes the programme is beginning to “clear the hurdle” in terms of how the US Air Force (USAF) views its manufacturing performance.

For the quarter ended 30 September, the Boeing Defense, Space & Security division’s earnings fell because of a $67 million charge to the tanker programme caused by to coronavirus disruptions and undisclosed productivity inefficiencies, it says in an earnings call on 28 October. As a result, the division’s profit fell 16.7% to $628 million for the third quarter, compared to the same period a year earlier. Revenue for the division fell 2.2% to $6.85 billion.


The KC-46A tanker programme has been plagued with problems for years. One of its most expensive problems is its remote vision system, a series of cameras that are meant to guide its refuelling boom into recipient aircraft. That camera produces distorted or washed out images creating a risk that an operator could accidentally steer the boom into an aircraft awaiting refuelling. In the first quarter of 2020, Boeing Defense took a $827 million loss to cover the cost of redesigning the boom cameras.

Boeing’s tanker programme has also suffered from poor manufacturing quality. Shoddy design and manufacturing work by the company’s employees has led to leaking fuel tanks, cargo locks that come undone and foreign object debris found inside the airframes of many aircraft.

Despite those problems and nearly $5 billion in losses, Boeing believes the KC-46A programme is turning a corner.

“The tanker has been a drag on us for like three or four years in every way you can think of with respect to investors. But we are beginning to clear the hurdle with our customer with respect to its performance in their fleet and then their need for that tanker,” says David Calhoun, Boeing chief executive on the earnings call. “So that whole relationship, I believe, will begin to transition next year. And as opposed to being a drag on our franchise, as it’s been, I believe it will become a strength in our franchise.”

[ORAC]

What's the old quote.... "We lose money on every one we build, but we hope to make it up in volume....."

[Lyneham Lad]

Article header on Flight Global:-
Boeing wins $2.1bn for 15 more KC-46A tankers, points to battle communications role

Unable to link - I've run out of free articles...

[unmanned_droid]

What's the old quote.... "We lose money on every one we build, but we hope to make it up in volume....."

It's all about the spares and support contracts...

[airsound]

Lyneham Lad - I have the same problem with Flight Global! However, that nice Mr Boeing has a media room that'll give you the details:
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130812

Briefly, he say15 More Boeing KC-46 Tankers to Fuel the Air Force into the Future
New multirole tanker contract brings number of U.S. Air Force orders to 94
Digitally advanced KC-46 an essential link connecting Air Force to broader battlefield

EVERETT, Wash., Jan. 21, 2021 – The U.S. Air Force on Wednesday awarded Boeing [NYSE: BA] a $2.1 billion contract for 15 KC-46A tankers, expanding its fleet of aircraft that will not only set the standard for aerial refueling but will also help enable the integrated digital battlespace. Like a cellular tower in the sky, the KC-46 connects air forces to data needed to maintain the decision advantage and win on the 21st century battlefield.

“The KC-46’s adaptability is going to be a game-changer for the U.S. Air Force,” said Jamie Burgess, Boeing KC-46 tanker vice president and program manager. “We know our defense customers will need to transform how they fight and win in the modern era. That’s why Boeing is focused on making sure the KC-46 grows and changes with them.”

The KC-46 is a widebody, multirole tanker designed for state-of-the-art air refueling, cargo and medical transport. Boeing is now on contract for 94 KC-46A tankers.

airsound

[Duchess_Driver]

What's the old quote.... "We lose money on every one we build, but we hope to make it up in volume....."


Wasn’t it the Dave Gunson line about Pan Am always making a profit, albeit a negative one?!?!

[NutLoose]

Boeing wins $2.1bn for 15 more KC-46A tankers

https://youtu.be/upD6cB9Rzvk

[ORAC]

https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2021/01/27/boeings-cost-overruns-on-kc-46-now-exceed-its-initial-contract-with-the-air-force/

Boeing’s cost overruns on KC-46 now exceed initial contract with US Air Force

WASHINGTON — With the Jan. 27 announcement of a new $275 million charge (https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/07/29/financial-pressures-on-boeings-commercial-biz-results-in-another-155m-charge-for-the-kc-46-tanker/) on the KC-46, Boeing has now paid as much in cost overruns for the troubled program (https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2020/04/02/done-deal-boeing-will-have-to-rip-and-replace-kc-46-sensor-and-camera-systems-on-its-own-dime/) as the U.S. Air Force invested in the tanker’s development.

The new charge, which the company reported as part of fourth-quarter 2020 earnings, means Boeing has now paid more than $5.0 billion out of pocket to pay for the myriad technical problems and production issues that have cropped up since the company won the program in 2011.

Under the firm, fixed-price contract signed then, Boeing is responsible for paying for any costs in excess of the contract’s $4.9 billion ceiling.......

[kenparry]

Well, according to the London "Times" today, the KC-46 program involves "converting old 747 airliners into refuelling tankers".

Perhaps that's where it all started to go wrong....................

[tdracer]

ORAC, to be fair, most of that new charge is being blamed on COVID related delays and disruptions in the production system.
If true (and I can certainly understand some skepticism), that can hardly be blamed on Boeing. Just more of the worldwide suffering due to Covid.

[cavuman1]

Further information from The Air Force Magazine/Daily Report:

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1333/kc_46_pegasus_tanker_2a64367f61f3a5427126373e145f14779500737 c.jpg
Army and Air National Guardsmen from the Oklahoma National Guard disembark a 157th Air Refueling Wing KC-46A Pegasus from Pease Air National Guard Base, N.H., after returning from the District of Columbia to Oklahoma City, Okla., on Jan. 23, 2021. ANG photo by Senior Master Sgt. Andrew M. LaMoreaux.USAF, Boeing Make Progress on KC-46 Fixes (https://go.afa.org/e/285922/kc-46-category-1-deficiencies-/cywhgb/1308745885?h=I9LXWGYjAJFLnu3l8LuZsKaq8carl7rvNGX3GUr_s7o)By Brian W. Everstine

The Air Force recently resolved two Category 1 deficiencies on the troubled KC-46 tanker, both problems with the aircraft’s auxiliary power unit that could impact the safety of flight. However, the four remaining issues are still years away from being solved. The KC-46’s APU, located in its tail, developed two serious problems, one with a duct clamp that was moving excessively and another with a drain mast on the outside of the tail that could potentially break loose. As of the end of January, both problems have been addressed, with one closed and the other downgraded to a Category 2, or less serious, deficiency, AMC boss Gen. Jacqueline D. Van Ovost told reporters Feb. 1.

- Ed

[BEagle]

Army and Air National Guardsmen from the Oklahoma National Guard disembark a 157th Air Refueling Wing KC-46A Pegasus from Pease Air National Guard Base, N.H., after returning from the District of Columbia to Oklahoma City, Okla., on Jan. 23, 2021.

Having enjoyed the luxury of 'Rendition Class' travel in the Pegasaurus.....

Travelling in the Voyager is vastly more civilised!

[charliegolf]

Having enjoyed the luxury of 'Rendition Class' travel in the Pegasaurus.....

Travelling in the Voyager is vastly more civilised!

A third class ride always beats a first class walk!

CG

[BEagle]

Well, it'd be a 1340 mile walk, so I guess a couple of hours in a windowless Pegasaurus would indeed be preferable, particularly at this time of year!

Although they could pick up old Route 66 from St Louis to Oklahoma City, I guess. Which would be nice.

[Asturias56]

"Having enjoyed the luxury of 'Rendition Class' travel in the Pegasaurus....."

H​​​​​hey getting out of Oklahoma at someone else's expense is GOOD no matter what way you travel....................

[airsound]

News from Boeing's 'mediaroom'

EVERETT, Wash., Feb. 9, 2021 – The first Boeing [NYSE: BA] KC-46 tanker destined for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) took to the skies on its maiden flight yesterday. This successful flight highlights an important milestone as the aircraft now transitions into the certification phase of development.

“This is an exciting milestone for the JASDF and Boeing,” said Jamie Burgess, KC-46 program manager. “Japan is getting closer to receiving the most advanced air refueling tanker in the world.”

Japan is the KC-46 program’s first international customer and is scheduled to receive its first jet this year.

airsound

[chopper2004]

JASDF KC-46 makes its first flight

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130825

[airsound]

Oh no! Not another problem for the much troubled Pagasus? It's powered by P&W 4062 engines, part of the same 4000 series as the Denver UAL 777 (P&W4077) and the Belgium Longtail Aviation 747 (P&W4056), both of which recently rained parts on the ground below.

Boeing recommended grounding the P&W 777s, but there's been no mention, as far as I can see, of grounding the P&W 747 or the KC-46.

airsound

[Less Hair]

Israel has ordered two.

[esscee]

The P & W 4060 series engine is different to the engine fitted to United B777, as it does not have the hollow wide chord blades that are fitted to the larger engine installed on B777. Still a very old design though.

[Asturias56]

Israel has ordered two.


But they get mates rates...................

[tdracer]

Oh no! Not another problem for the much troubled Pagasus? It's powered by P&W 4062 engines, part of the same 4000 series as the Denver UAL 777 (P&W4077) and the Belgium Longtail Aviation 747 (P&W4056), both of which recently rained parts on the ground below.

Boeing recommended grounding the P&W 777s, but there's been no mention, as far as I can see, of grounding the P&W 747 or the KC-46.

airsound
As esscee notes, you're talking apples and cumquats. The PW4000/94" engine as installed on the 767 and 747-400 has well over 150 million flight hours and has been in-service for over 3 decades. You're going to have the odd failure when you have an engine that has been in-service for those sort of hours. We also don't know what sort of maintenance Longtail was subjecting their engines to - some freight operators are pretty stingy in their maintenance practices.
While there is considerable commonality between the high pressure portions of the various PW4000 models, the low pressure sections are completely different between the 94", 100" (A330), and 112" (777) variants. There is simply no connection between the fan blade failures on the PW4000/112", and the PW4062/94" engine installed on the KC-46, aside from their being designed and built by the same company.

[airsound]

Thanks tdracer - I'm OK on apples, but I'll obviously have to brush up on my cumquat recognition.

airsound

[BEagle]

BOEING = Bits Of Engines In Neighbours' Gardens!!

[chopper2004]

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39375/its-official-kc-46-tankers-and-more-f-35s-for-israel-but-no-advanced-f-15s-for-now?fbclid=IwAR19qkZRVvQp8CJAyQuHxh6kQxGwh-0T6mccqGSlPA8CFdsVINrZjKdLKzU

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/960x540/59579da7_6a8a_4a99_b056_1113753ae07c_8522220476082bf7b5c5ff7 d645823242ebd9f88.jpeg

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1600x900/50ab34b3_f283_4cbc_800b_935b39590259_f006436d9cc752db4654466 b2e13585e2af8209b.jpeg

[airsound]

Defense News has more news, and is quoting Gen. Ryan Samuelson, who leads the Air Force’s KC-46 cross-functional team, and Air Mobility Command chief Gen. Jacqueline Van OvostThe Air Force currently has 44 KC-46s of the 179 it plans to buy over the program of record. By the end of 2021, that number will be up to 60 tankers, Samuelson said.

However, there are a number of missions that the KC-46 will not be permitted to perform until its critical deficiencies are resolved and the Air Force deems it fully operational, Van Ovost said. Namely, it will not be allowed to perform wartime missions in the Middle East for U.S. Central Command, nor will it be tasked for missions in U.S. European Command or U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
It will also be restricted from refueling stealth planes such as the F-35, F-22 and B-2, which all feature a low-observable coating that protects them from radar detection, Samuelson said. Air Force officials believe the KC-46 is at higher risk of damaging stealth coatings with its refueling boom because of longstanding issues with the Remote Vision System, (https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2020/04/02/done-deal-boeing-will-have-to-rip-and-replace-kc-46-sensor-and-camera-systems-on-its-own-dime/) a collection of cameras and infrared sensors used by operators to steer the tanker’s boom into a fuel receptacle.

https://www.defensenews.com/smr/air-force-priorities/2021/02/24/despite-growing-pains-the-kc-46-will-begin-limited-operations-soon/

airsound

[sandiego89]

Missed that update. Good to see they are finally passing gas (but not to stealthy airframes and A-10's). Anyone know if they are actually being used much for air to air refueling?

[ORAC]

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/04/14/the-kc-46-has-a-messy-problem-with-its-palletized-toilet/

The KC-46 has a messy problem with its palletized toilet

[BEagle]

Why on earth did the USAF specify such a primitive system as the ATGL to be delivered in the 21st Century? Surely their passengers deserve better in this day and age?
The Air Transportable Galley-Lavatory (ATGL) is a piece of palletized support equipment that is currently used in military airframes with pallet restraint systems. It has been used for over 35 years by the Air Force and provides inflight lavatory, oven, refrigeration, and coffee capabilities. The unit was designed to hold up to 39 gallons of potable water and 60 gallons of waste (including 11 gallons of precharge). It is designed to accommodate galley and lavatory facilities for 160 people and up to 15 hours of flight.
Joking apart, toilet spillages cause considerable corrosion which is highly dangerous in pressurised aircraft.

All Airbus tanker transport aircraft have normal airline standard facilities.....as well as proper seats and cabin windows. Why on earth doesn't the KC-46A?

[TBM-Legend]

Why on earth did the USAF specify such a primitive system as the ATGL to be delivered in the 21st Century? Surely their passengers deserve better in this day and age?

Joking apart, toilet spillages cause considerable corrosion which is highly dangerous in pressurised aircraft.

All Airbus tanker transport aircraft have normal airline standard facilities.....as well as proper seats and cabin windows. Why on earth doesn't the KC-46A?


I guess the primary difference is that the KC-46 has limited to no underfloor cargo availability given the IFR tanks are there so they have built a hybrid CF aircraft that uses upstairs for everything hence all on pallets vs. A330 MRTT [KC-30] having full under floor cargo area for cargo and full permanent pax seating upstairs...

[tdracer]

All Airbus tanker transport aircraft have normal airline standard facilities.....as well as proper seats and cabin windows. Why on earth doesn't the KC-46A?

Because the USAF specified a cargo aircraft that was capable of doing aerial refueling. Had the A330 been selected, it to would have had to be turned into a freighter - main deck cargo door, cargo handling equipment, etc. While the A330 can carry more underfloor cargo than the KC-46, it would still fall far short of the USAF requirements.
In other words, had Airbus proposed the standard MRTT, it would have been dismissed out of hand for failing to meet the basic, mandatory requirements.

[GlobalNav]

<excerpt>
While the A330 can carry more underfloor cargo than the KC-46, it would still fall far short of the USAF requirements.
In other words, had Airbus proposed the standard MRTT, it would have been dismissed out of hand for failing to meet the basic, mandatory requirements.

We are impressed by how the KC-46 has been meeting all the requirements so far.

[tdracer]

We are impressed by how the KC-46 has been meeting all the requirements so far.
So, you're suggesting that USAF should have altered their requirements to suit what Airbus had?
That's what got the previous contract award thrown out...

[GlobalNav]

So, you're suggesting that USAF should have altered their requirements to suit what Airbus had?
That's what got the previous contract award thrown out...

I would suggest the contractor over-promised, under-bid, under-delivered, and poorly produced. Bringing shame upon itself and it’s customer’s acquisition prowess.

[tdracer]

I would suggest the contractor over-promised, under-bid, under-delivered, and poorly produced. Bringing shame upon itself and it’s customer’s acquisition prowess.
You mean like the A400M?
No one is immune to that disease...
At the risk of repeating myself for the umpteenth time, the A330 MRTT doesn't meet the mandatory USAF requirements - not even close. It would have required a major development program to come up an A330 derivative that did - with no guarantee that Airbus would have performed much better than the lazy B.

[TBM-Legend]

Because the USAF specified a cargo aircraft that was capable of doing aerial refueling. Had the A330 been selected, it to would have had to be turned into a freighter - main deck cargo door, cargo handling equipment, etc. While the A330 can carry more underfloor cargo than the KC-46, it would still fall far short of the USAF requirements.
In other words, had Airbus proposed the standard MRTT, it would have been dismissed out of hand for failing to meet the basic, mandatory requirements.


The EADS/Northrop Grumman KC-45A was selected by the USAF as compliant to their then needs only to be torpedoed by the "Buy USA" brigade and now look at the mess. Very late and not yet 100% fit for purpose.

[Imagegear]

The EADS/Northrop Grumman KC-45A was selected by the USAF as compliant to their then needs only to be torpedoed by the "Buy USA" brigade and now look at the mess. Very late and not yet 100% fit for purpose.

and of course the re-written spec would have been authored to ensure that "the A330 MRTT doesn't meet the new mandatory USAF requirements - not even close".

IG

[gsky]

Why make the comparison with the A400?
It is not a tanker?

The A330 is a developed tanker and is working well.

We all the know the rules for tender were changed for political reasons to ensure Boeing got the contract.
And what a disaster that has been! ( and is on going!)
Politics always interfere and rarely for the better.

[Commando Cody]

A few things about the KC-X award. I'm not talking about the subsequent development in which Boeing and USAF did not exactly cover themselves in glory, just the selection. Keep in mind that this took place during a time when USAF was screwing up contract after contract.

USAF put out certain specs and requirements for KC-X, which included mandatory requirements, and things they'd give extra credit for and things that would be nice but would not receive extra credit (they might count as tie breakers if all else was equal). Keep in mind that the objective was to replace the KC-135, not the KC-10 or a potential future larger tanker.

When Boeing lost to the the KC-45 they looked at the rationale USAF publicly disclosed in justifying the award. Boeing felt the award so egregiously violated the rules that they decided to, unusually for the time, protest the award. What had clearly happened was that USAF had asked for one thing, but when they saw the bids got excited by the extra cargo capacity of the more expensive A330. Instead of doing the right thing and withdrawing the solicitation and coming out with a new one that reflected their new desires, they just cooked the books to award the contact to EADS/Northrop Grumman (no one alleged that that team itself did anything untoward). When the protest got to GAO their decision was that they wouldn't say that Boeing's bid was better or worse, just that by its own criteria and their published description of how the bids would be judged the award couldn't be justified and invited USAF to explain how the award was made. USAF couldn't, so withdrew the award (and had to pay penalties).

Some, though not all, of the problems included: USAF said points for more cargo capacity would only be provided up to a certain amount. However, USAF gave credit beyond what they said. Boeing said that if USAF had disclosed that, they would have bid a tanker based on the 777, which carried even more cargo than the A330. The requirements included the ability to refuel any AAR-capable USAF fixed wing; A330 couldn't do that for at least one a/c, but this was ignored as was the requirement that the new tanker had to be able to operate from any KC-135 base. But to operate a KC-45 from said bases, modifications to the base(s) costing hundreds of millions of $ were required which USAF didn't include in the cost of the EADS/NG bid. Points were to be awarded regarding how many tankers could be parked on a ramp of a specified size. When it was found that more 767 tankers could be parked there (767 was smaller), USAF simply lowered the standard separation required between parked tankers so that the A330 could fit in more a/c (I don't know if Boeing was ever informed of this change). Air Force had a requirement that the winner would assist in setting up a transition for maintenance from the contractor to USAF. EADS/NG said they wouldn't do that; USAF characterized that as an "administrative oversight"- which normally refers to typos or minor mistakes that have no significant effect on the overall bid. There were more...

Again, GAO did Not say which plane was better for USAF, simply that per USAF's own solicitation and announced selection criteria the award could not be sustained.

Work started on a second solicitation, but it was soon seen that it was written in such a way that any problems with the A330 were simply written out of the requirement, and the suspense for response was so unusually short that there was no time to design and propose a KC-777 that wouldn't be judged "high risk". This was so obvious that the solicitation was never formally issued.

On the third try, Boeing said that it would bid a plane based on either the 767 or 777 depending on how much capacity USAF said it wanted. The new criteria were similar to the original, for a smaller KC-135 replacement. Since apparently a larger A330 based craft could not be offered for a price as low as a 767 based one, EADS (NG had dropped out) decided not to go to the expense (they cost tens of millions of $$) of making a bid.

Personally, I think if they had won EADS would have had almost as many problems, because USAF was asking for a lot more than just a 767 or A330 based tanker (this includes A330MRTT).

[airsound]

Thanks, Commando Cody, for that in-depth explanation.

But isn't it a great piece of comic irony that this disaster-prone project is now wallowing in sh1t? I mean, as Beagle quotes The Air Transportable Galley-Lavatory (ATGL) is a piece of palletized support equipment I mean, who writes this stuff? Galley-Lavatory - really? Not so much a piece of palletized support as a piece of cr@p, you might think.

airsound

[GlobalNav]

You mean like the A400M?
No one is immune to that disease...
At the risk of repeating myself for the umpteenth time, the A330 MRTT doesn't meet the mandatory USAF requirements - not even close. It would have required a major development program to come up an A330 derivative that did - with no guarantee that Airbus would have performed much better than the lazy B.

No argument re MRTT, but KC-46, in spite of promises, doesn’t meet the agreed requirements either. The company used to be capable of much better.

The problems of the A400M are not an excuse nor justification for the problems of the KC-46. But both programs are shameful failures in spite of remedial attempts to salvage them and will continue to be embarrassments for years hence.

[Two's in]

Who knew that demonstrating and testing new technologies could avoid embarrassing withdrawal problems?

https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/usaf-bungling-caused-kc-46s-100m-refuelling-boom-redesign-inspector-general/143935.articleBy overlooking design changes made by Boeing to the KC-46A’s refuelling boom, the US Air Force (USAF) missed an opportunity to catch problems early and stave off a $100 million redesign effort.

The service also “did not ensure that critical technologies for the tanker’s refuelling boom were demonstrated in a relevant testing environment” the Department of Defense’s Inspector General says in a report released on 21 May.

The Inspector General’s report adds more detail to problems that continue to dog the KC-46A programme. Many of those problems, including problems with the tanker’s refuelling boom, came from immature technology that wasn’t sufficiently tested prior to the aircraft starting production.

The KC-46A’s refuelling boom is too stiff and thus not able to extend or retract while in contact with an aircraft receiving fuel, says the Inspector General. As a result, recipient aircraft pilots have to make large engine power corrections, to adjust their aircraft’s position forward or backward to maintain contact with the refuelling boom.

“The large engine power corrections could result in potentially unsafe flight operations during the process of disconnecting the receiver aircraft from the refueling boom,” says the Inspector General’s report. “Because the refueling boom was too stiff, it caused pilots of receiver aircraft to inadvertently use excess engine power or not use enough engine power, which, upon disconnecting from the refueling boom, could cause the receiver aircraft to rapidly accelerate toward or away from the tanker.”

By using aircraft throttle to maintain contact with the refuelling boom, pilots could accidentally lunge forward into the boom, causing damage, the report adds.

As a result, the KC-46A tanker could not refuel the Fairchild Republic A-10 close-air support aircraft or several variants of the Lockheed Martin C-130 transport. The USAF has said that the A-10 lacks the thrust necessary to push into the boom.

Furthermore, the USAF imposed operational limitations on many of its other aircraft, allowing the Boeing B-52, Boeing C-17, Boeing F-15, Lockheed Martin F-16, Lockheed Martin F-35A, Lockheed Martin HC/MC-130J, McDonnell Douglas KC-10, Boeing KC-46A, and Boeing KC-135 receiver to refuel in limited conditions only. For example, aircraft are allowed to refuel when the boom’s range of motion is reduced. And, aircraft are forbidden from refuelling in covert or lights-out scenarios.

Initially, the KC-46A tanker refuelling boom design was based on the KC-10’s refueling boom and its control laws were based on the control laws of the Italian KC-767A and Japanese KC-767J. Those technologies were deemed well-proven and thus it was thought further review wasn’t needed.

However, during the preliminary design review in 2012 Boeing presented a new boom design that “differed significantly”, the Inspector General says. The KC-46A’s new boom was computer controlled versus the hydromechanically controlled boom on the KC-10. The KC-46A’s boom was novel and should have been further reviewed, says the Inspector General’s report.

Ultimately, the design changes didn’t receive the review or testing necessary, the Inspector General says.

“Had KC-46 programme office officials effectively managed the development and testing of the refuelling boom for the KC-46A tanker, the Air Force would not have had to spend an additional $100 million for the redesign of the refuelling boom to achieve the required performance,” the report says.

Retrofit work is not likely to start until January 2024 and will cost the service even more, it adds.

“This delay limits the [Department of Defense’s] use of the KC-46A tanker for its intended refuelling missions,” says the Inspector General. “Additionally, the Commander of United States Transportation Command identified the aerial refuelling fleet as the most stressed of air mobility forces and stated that any delay of the KC-46 production puts the joint force’s ability to effectively execute war plans at risk.”

[The AvgasDinosaur]

Should save some KC-135 and KC-10 hours until/if the KC-46 gets fixed !

https://theaviationist.com/2021/06/07/mq-25-first-refuel/
David

[sycamore]

USAF don`t do `hose-and-probe` refuelling.....

[RAFEngO74to09]

USAF don`t do `hose-and-probe` refuelling.....
Incorrect - the USAF does it for spec ops CV-22Bs, HH-60G and HH-60W. They also provide it for Allied nations.
A significant number of KC-135s have underwing pods - for instance the KC-135Rs of 100 ARW at RAF Mildenhall.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPrFBcVe9jE

[gums]

Salute!

Thank you RAFE, and the special ops folks, as well as the original century attack planes use thed probe. The F-105 could do both.
I really liked the receptacle method, as flying good formation, even in a rainstorm at night, was lots easier than trying to hit the drougue with enuf smash to seat the fuel line.
And that brings up another stoopid thing about the new tanker - the television for the refueling boom! Can't have a real experienced boom-op back there, no, we go high tech with a 3D Tv or whatever and the thing sucks according to the pilots and the old boom operators. Gonna be interesting when the tv system crashes and without a direct view and basic electric/hydraulics to control the boom is not available. Hmmmm..... I refueled a few hundred times in 'nam and later in the Viper and the nuggets just outta pilot training cracked the code and got gas easily.
I am not sure how USAF screwed up the plane, and seems mostly after the procurement and development process was well underway.
The plane I flew that seemed the least bothered by changes from test to production and operational was the Viper, with the SLuf close behind. I'll even award a tie. Sure, we had minor beefs and groans, but went from test to operational in 6 years or so. In my second career I saw the worst of our procurement when the "client" would add new capabilities that were not in the original contract. So Brand X would calmly invoke the "change of scope" clause and demand big $$$ to redo machinery, sfwe and such. So no wonder the purchse price zoomed.

Oh well, I am not happy with the new tanker, but guess we live with the thing.

Gums opines..

[ORAC]

So what’s new?

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/06/07/whats-a-fair-price-for-kc-46-spare-parts-the-air-force-isnt-sure/

What’s a fair price for KC-46 spare parts? The Air Force isn’t sure

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force recently awarded Boeing an $88 million contract for spare parts for Japan’s KC-46 tankers (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/12/22/boeing-scores-big-with-f-15-kc-46-contracts-with-foreign-militaries/), but service officials confirmed to Defense News on Monday the deal included about $10 million in costs that Air Force leaders investigated and could not determine if they were fair or reasonable.

That finding has led to concerns from Capitol Hill that Boeing is artificially inflating prices to help recoup financial losses incurred during the program’s development stage (https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2020/04/02/done-deal-boeing-will-have-to-rip-and-replace-kc-46-sensor-and-camera-systems-on-its-own-dime/). Thus far, the company has paid more than $5 billion in cost overruns (https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2021/01/27/boeings-cost-overruns-on-kc-46-now-exceed-its-initial-contract-with-the-air-force/) after winning a fixed-price contract in 2011 worth $4.9 billion.

“They’re trying to recover some of their costs on the back end, and they’re starting to recover their costs basically on some of these spares,” said one government official with knowledge of the contract discussions.

One part in particular now costs 15 times what the Air Force previously paid for it, the official said.

Virginia Rep. Rob Wittman — the top Republican on the House Armed Service’s Committee’s seapower and projection forces subcommittee — is expected to raise the issue during a HASC hearing on the Air Force budget scheduled for June 8.

“We need to change course on this troubled contract by pursuing one of two options,” Wittman said in a statement to Defense News.

“The Air Force could either change the contract incentive structure and actively manage the KC-46A development; or, seek a new path and pursue a non-developmental recompete of the tanker effort,” he said.

“Without pursuing one of these paths, at this point, I am confident that we will continue to see poor performance and an increasingly negative impact as tanker capacity is diminished.”….

[Less Hair]

With Boeing claimed to be working on the next commercial program NMA would there any chance to prelude it with a tanker like the KC-135 was back then and start from scratch?

[sycamore]

RAFEng,sorry ,just being a bit `broad -brush`..I know you can fit the `short-hose` to the boom...so it was a `generalisation`.....

[BEagle]

I know you can fit the `short-hose` to the boom
Hopefully with a 2-pod KC-46A, that abortion known as the 'boom drogue adapter' will be $hit-canned for ever!!

[gums]

Salute!

I thot the beast already had drogue feeds like the KC-10, besides with a short drogue on the boom it only allows one refueling op at a time.
Gotta check the spec again..... BRB.

Gums sends...

[tdracer]

Salute!

I thot the beast already had drogue feeds like the KC-10, besides with a short drogue on the boom it only allows one refueling op at a time.
Gotta check the spec again..... BRB.

Gums sends...
Gums, the USAF requirement was that the KC-46 could refuel 3 aircraft simultaneously - I've not heard anything to the effect that they are not meeting that requirement.

[ORAC]

Gums, the USAF requirement was that the KC-46 could refuel 3 aircraft simultaneously - I've not heard anything to the effect that they are not meeting that requirement.
Three abreast? That would be an achievement with that wingspan. The VC-10 norm was either one centreline or two on the wing hoses.

I believe, theoretically, all three at once was possible but clearance was marginal if a break- away was required.

Best of luck with the trials - I await the videos with anticipation…

[gums]

Salute!

Agree with TD, and I think we can find a pic of three receivers hooked up at one time.

My basic feeling is the probe is for special ops helos and the Osprey and the F-35 Bees some folks want and/or need.

I will guarantee that in a high intensity scenario you can get more gas passed faster to more planes than you can with the probe. I watched the scenario during LB 2 and was amazed. I also escorted a burning Jolly outta North Vee and he was able to hit the drogue and then limp in to NKP.

I only used the probe twice when flying the A-37B and it depended a lot more on me than the tanker. I liked the receptacle combo more due to getting the best outta me and the boom op. The receptacle also transferred more fuel per minute.

Gums sends..

[vascodegama]

So with a requirement to refuel 3 ac at once, was the USAF going to rewrite the appropriate safety procedures for ATP56; that would probably take longer than sorting out the KC46.

To be fair at least the KC46 would in theory at least be able to refuel all NATO receivers, big, small and probe.

[gums]

Salute!

Looks to me, Vasco, that the pods on the wings are for the probe receivers and main boom is the only one for receptacle dudes.

The probe folks like the F-35's and Hornets and some RAF/RN can easily hook up two at a time, way it looks.

Other things bother me, but not the receptacle or probe aspects of the plane. Of course, the stoopid remote TV for the boom op is my biggest gripe.

Gums sends..

[vascodegama]

Gums

The ac has wing pods, centre line drogue and boom. So in theory you could have say 3 FJs connected at the same time . The problem is that the safety procedures as written don't give the 3 rd receiver anywhere to go if vis contact is lost when astern. Whether the ac systems would allow for such AAR -I have no idea.

[gums]

Salute!
Good point, Vasco. May have to look up latest guidance.

My recollection was to hit the disconnect button, reduce power, drop low and back off. No movement left or right until altitude separation. The procedure was a bear at night in weather, but somehow thousands of us made it.

The 'nam gaggles usually had four lights close, And maybe another four-ship sitting alongside and high, waiting their turn. About an hour before first bombs dropped. We were talking about two hundred plane raids with maybe 4 or 5 tankers over Laos and another two tankers for the Navy dudes out over the S. China Sea.

The receptacle drill was usually like clockwork and my flight topped off in about 7 or 8 minutes, max.

Without the need for the boom, I feel the RN Bees have it made and can refuel two at a time on the '46".

Gums sends...

[vascodegama]

Hi Gums

The issue is with 3 rx on hoses at once. RH guy goes down 1000 if still lost contact the one on the left goes 500, so where does the one in the middle go? The ATP says 500 down which is occupied, hence the need for a rethink. Admittedly not a likely scenario combination but one that would need legislating for.

[sycamore]

Vasco ,A-A Tacan offset with height/range..?

[gums]

Salute!

I only had to do the four ship weather break out, so we went left/right/down and lead kept going st a head, slight descent.

I would not award a major contract to the users if they did not have their sierra together. Good grief.

I ask all of you how many times you hooked up at night during a rain storm, not a thunderstorm ith lightning and such.

You design and train for the weakest link, but define that condition and pilot capability., Right?

I like the receptacle refueling ( heh heh it's easier!), but I unnerstan the probe requirement for some of the planes due to mission and other requirements.

Gums sends...

[vascodegama]

Gums and Sycamore

At the risk of repeating the point, the specific (admittedly very rare) event that I am alluding to is that of the rxs losing visual on disconnection (either on breakaway or routine) and all 3 now astern (not on the wing) and unable to see the tanker or each other. Any offset etc is after the initial action which requires immediate sanctuary heights. The bottom line is that the guy in the middle has nowhere to go. It is obviously considered an issue because there is a specific procedure in ATP 56 (or whatever it is called these days). It is that rare point that currently precludes having 3 rx in contact .

[BEagle]

Controlling the simultaneous safe movement of 3 receivers onto the hoses, making contact, refuelling, disconnecting and moving to echelon would be fraught with risk. 2 receivers can take immediate action if one threatens the other with inappropriate manoeuvring, but 3? Recipe for disaster. Also the air refuelling operator would have to monitor position, hose state, offload rate and fuel transferred - far too easy to make the wrong call to the wrong receiver.

2 receivers are fine, although I did once have to disabuse a clever bugger test pilot who thought that there was nothing wrong with clearing 2 receivers to make contact simultaneously.

AAR procedures have been developed to a consistent safe standard over the years. Reinventing the wheel is unnecessary!

That said, the US Navy did once refuel 4 x F9F Cougars simultaneously from a Convair R3Y Tradewind.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/500x361/4_rcvr_2f5828fefac58189ab1ec178ab1ace5a625db541.jpg

The Cougar had a wingspan only 6" shorter than an F-35B and although the Tradewind had a wingspan 10' shorter than the KC-46A, the outboard pods are about the same distance out from the aircraft centrelin. The event looks to have been rather....sporty.

[BEagle]

Yet more woes................
During a June 16 hearing, multiple members of the House Armed Services Committee said the Air Force should consider re-competing the KC-46 program because of extensive delays and performance issues with the Boeing aircraft.

Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.) accused the Air Force of paying $226 million for a “lemon.” He said “it is time that something changes.”

Acting Air Force Secretary John P. Roth defended the program and said re-competing the tanker program makes no “economic or business sense.” The best way forward, he said, is to work within current contracts to improve the aircraft to make it “hopefully ready” by 2023 or 2024.

[Asturias56]

"hopefully".................. oh dear......................

[ancientaviator62]

Old Chinese proverb. 'It is better to travel hopefully than to arrive'.

[GlobalNav]

Old Chinese proverb. 'It is better to travel hopefully than to arrive'.

I suppose the OEM buys into that proverb. The USAF should stipulate that they get only paid for arriving not hoping.

[ORAC]

Stability issues?……

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/06/17/more-cost-overruns-are-coming-down-the-line-for-boeing-as-the-kc-46-program-logs-another-two-technical-deficiencies/

More cost overruns are coming for Boeing as the KC-46 program logs another two technical deficiencies

WASHINGTON — Boeing will have to pay to fix two new technical problems afflicting the KC-46 refueling tanker (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/06/16/another-boeing-airbus-tanker-war-is-coming-soon/), which the U.S. Air Force has designated as “category 1” deficiencies that rank among the program’s most critical issues.

The Air Force has discovered that drain tubes in the KC-46′s air refueling receptacle — which are used to remove water from the aircraft — can become cracked when the tanker operates in cold temperatures, the service stated in response to questions from Defense News. According to the service, this issue has occurred approximately three times, when water in the tubes froze and expanded, forming cracks.

The second problem involves a software bug in the KC-46′s Flight Management System, which has triggered “navigation anomalies,” according to Boeing.

The Air Force said this issue has been limited to “isolated incidents,” most recently during a March 3 flight over the Pacific Ocean. Then, the crew “deferred to other navigation methods and did not declare an in-flight emergency” before landing safely in Honolulu, the service said.

Boeing added that the problem did not make the aircraft less safe and that each KC-46 has since been cleared for flight.…..

As a short term strategy for dealing with the cracked aerial refueling receptacle tube issue, Boeing has issued inspection guidance to the Air Force to mitigate known risk factors. To permanently fix the problem, however, it will have to redesign the drain line tubes and retrofit existing KC-46s with the modification, the service said.

General Electric — Boeing’s subcontractor for the Flight Management System — is already testing a software fix aimed at resolving stability problems.

To mitigate current risks, Boeing has issued guidance to help KC-46 crews to reset the system if a problem is experienced during flight. It has also delivered updated pre-flight procedures aimed at decreasing the likelihood of a software anomaly, the Air Force said.

The Air Force classified the two new problems as “category 1” deficiencies in May 2021.

Four other CAT-1 problems remain on the books: two issues with the Remote Vision System (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/31/the-air-forces-kc-46-tanker-has-another-serious-technical-deficiency-and-boeing-is-stuck-paying-for-it/)—the camera and sensor suite that provides imagery of the receiver aircraft to boom operators during a refueling — which requires Boeing to redesign the system; a problem with the stiffness of the boom (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/05/27/dod-inspector-general-air-force-mismanagement-led-to-10m-kc-46-boom-redesign/) that prevents some aircraft from being able to receive fuel; and an issue with fuel leaks (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/31/the-air-forces-kc-46-tanker-has-another-serious-technical-deficiency-and-boeing-is-stuck-paying-for-it/).……

[ORAC]

Use of centreline Drogue finally approved….

https://www.18af.amc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2691413/amc-approves-operational-use-of-the-centerline-drogue-system-as-first-kc-46a-in/

AMC approves operational use of the Centerline Drogue System as first KC-46A Interim Capability Release milestone

[BEagle]

Those photos show the F-18 sitting too low on the hose, which should have a slight bend to avoid stress on the probe tip.

[sandiego89]

Use of centreline Drogue finally approved….

https://www.18af.amc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2691413/amc-approves-operational-use-of-the-centerline-drogue-system-as-first-kc-46a-in/

AMC approves operational use of the Centerline Drogue System as first KC-46A Interim Capability Release milestone

While I understand the boom will require MUCH more work with the vision system, why did the centerline drogue take so long? Sorry if I missed that. Are there problems with the the wing pods?

[sandiego89]

Refueling with the boom now cleared for B-52's, C-17 and other 46's

https://www.airforcetimes.com/industry/2021/08/09/boeings-kc-46-can-now-use-its-refueling-boom-for-operational-missions/

[ORAC]

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/42539/a-plastic-cap-in-a-kc-46-fuel-valve-generates-more-turbulence-for-troubled-tanker

A Plastic Cap In A KC-46's Fuel Valve Generates More Turbulence For The Troubled Tanker

The U.S. Air Force’s beleaguered Boeing KC-46 Pegasus tanker program hit yet another snag earlier this year. Deliveries were halted for around a month after plastic debris was found inside an internal fuel line in one of the aircraft as it flew to its future home in North Carolina. The small red cap jammed a valve open, causing an uncontrolled fuel transfer between tanks……

[tdracer]

Last night - during the Monday Night pre-game ceremonies (San Francisco Bay area), a KC-46 flew by (boom deployed) in formation with three F-16s.

[BEagle]

Last night - during the Monday Night pre-game ceremonies (San Francisco Bay area), a KC-46 flew by (boom deployed) in formation with three F-16s.

Wow, that must have taken some skill..... :rolleyes:

[sandiego89]

Last night - during the Monday Night pre-game ceremonies (San Francisco Bay area), a KC-46 flew by (boom deployed) in formation with three F-16s.

Imagine California ANG F-16's from Fresno. Don't think there any 46's at Travis yet, so maybe Edwards based or a long cross county?

[gums]

Salute!
.
Make no mistake, I am biased about these matters due to my presence on the coast where the 'bus version of the tanker would have been built using U.S. folks, trains, boats and low cost of living area, etc.
On the tech and economic side, the thing is worse than the Aardvaark was in the late sixties.At least the f-111 turned into a supreme penetrating attack jet and very good Spark 'vaark.
- whoever thot TV display for the refueling boom was better and cheaper than a human boom-op looking at the reciever 25 or 30 feet away was not a boom operator with hundreds, if not thousands, of successful hook-ups. Sheesh. Virtuality and 3-d cameras/displays can only go so far. And then, on a stormy night when a low fuel receiver joins up, the damn stuff goes tits up! I will guarantee that the boom-op will connect faster and more reliably, especially after a few offloads on various receiver types. The experience many of us had in 'nam and the Storm will bear me out.
- production standards by what used to be the gold standard company of lore went AWOL. I can also guarantee that labor costs for the contract went up compared to Alabama due to the "right to work" laws and lower costs of living, just like making the 787 outside of the Seattle area.

MY VIEW: Big B got the production after initial award due to the U.S. delegation from Washington and their poly-tickian efforts and threats. That is my story and I am sticking to it.

Gums sends...

[tdracer]

Imagine California ANG F-16's from Fresno. Don't think there any 46's at Travis yet, so maybe Edwards based or a long cross county?
I think they mentioned the formation was from Edwards - so both the KC-46 and F-16s were presumably from Edwards.

[West Coast]

Imagine California ANG F-16's from Fresno. Don't think there any 46's at Travis yet, so maybe Edwards based or a long cross county?

Not saying the F16s couldn’t have originated out of FAT, but they weren’t part of the guard unit there. The 144th swapped out their F16s for F15s a few years back.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/144th_Fighter_Wing

[Saintsman]

Salute!
.

- whoever thot TV display for the refueling boom was better and cheaper than a human boom-op looking at the reciever 25 or 30 feet away was not a boom operator with hundreds, if not thousands, of successful hook-ups. Sheesh. Virtuality and 3-d cameras/displays can only go so far. And then, on a stormy night when a low fuel receiver joins up, the damn stuff goes tits up! I will guarantee that the boom-op will connect faster and more reliably, especially after a few offloads on various receiver types.

Gums sends...

Airbus seem to manage it from the flight deck...

[sandiego89]

Airbus seem to manage it from the flight deck...

True, but has the bus passed gas to stealthy aircraft at night/low viz via the boom? That seems to be the main challenge for the Boeing vision system, which has been an absolute travesty.

[gums]

Salute!
Tnx, folks......guess I gotta find the 'bus proposal to compare.

My memory points toward a conventional boom-op station and real eyeballs to use controlling the boom.
The drogue is a no-brainer, and is easily implemented by drones nowadays'

I have refueled many times in "marginal" weather conditions but only a few times when almost outta gas. The boom op dudes got me hooked every time.

Gums sends,,,

[ORAC]

True, neither the 46 or bus will probably ever “tow” someone back to friendly territory - but the bean counters will add up the cost of an extra crewman in every tanker crew over the life of th3 aircraft against the probable need and decide it’s more cost effective.

Plus, of course, the bus is trialling fully automatic refuelling and, machines being what they are, that most probably be more reliable over time, if only because it’s reaction time is thousands of times faster.

[gums]

Salute!

I have no problem with a new system and maybe a dual role person on the crew. Was there, been that and flew/tested many new systems and concepts in the Sluf and Viper their first few years.

My USAF rumor network has indicated the visual system for operating the boom lacks a few things besides depth perception. Nevertheless, if ROSCOSMOS and Space X can have their super hook up system for the ISS using Dragon and Soyuz, I can see a similar implementation with a manual backup. Maybe a benign coating around the receptacle and a sensor on the boom.

My main beef has been the poly-tickian influence on the source selection at the beginning of the program and then the problems big B has had along the way. I'll back off, now.

BTW, I have no problem with snuggling up to the tanker at night in the rain, then stabilizing as the robot boom makes contact and gives me gas. My concern is the human using a bad visual system and the boom hitting my canopy. As far as I recall, once hooked up, even the antique 135 boom and the KC-10 one operated independent of the human boom op. Maybe another pilot that has experience with the things can comment here.

Gums sends...

[ORAC]

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/01/10/the-air-force-and-boeing-havent-yet-fixed-the-troubled-kc-46-pegasus-vision-system/

The Air Force and Boeing haven’t yet fixed the troubled KC-46 Pegasus vision system

[Less Hair]

We have Boeing jet drones landing on aircraft carriers at night but the bloody boom can't be fixed over years? By a company that successfully built hundreds of tankers over tens of years? Hard to believe. Ask Israel for a fix.

[SpazSinbad]

We have Boeing jet drones landing on aircraft carriers at night but the bloody boom can't be fixed over years? By a company that successfully built hundreds of tankers over tens of years? Hard to believe. Ask Israel for a fix.
BOING! MQ-25A Stungray arrived onboard BUSH as per photo: https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Screen-Shot-2021-12-02-at-6.15.05-PM.png Deck Trials taxiing about etc. only, with some at night, then craned off.
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1650x1019/mq_25acranedonboardbushdec2021_e63db5f30716f1fef32c726481062 7f5392583eb.jpg

[GlobalNav]

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/01/10/the-air-force-and-boeing-havent-yet-fixed-the-troubled-kc-46-pegasus-vision-system/

The Air Force and Boeing haven’t yet fixed the troubled KC-46 Pegasus vision system

Endlessly spending time and money on what was a bad idea to begin with (using 2D imaging do what 3D vision is needed for). Put a boom operator station back in the tail like we've had in the KC-135 for 60 years. Otherwise make it all automatic, based on a LIDAR solution.

[megan]

Boeing on Jan. 26 reported another charge of $402 million on the KC-46, bringing the total cost overruns for the tanker to about $5.4 billion

https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/new-kc-46-charge-highlights-rift-between-boeing-usaf?utm_rid=CPEN1000000180327&utm_campaign=31401&utm_medium=email&elq2=a4c22ea0e5a64952a48a219a7a209d3e&utm_emailname=AW_News_Aerospace_20220127

[BEagle]

[...]bringing the total cost overruns for the tanker to about $5.4 billion

Which means the total overrun alone is about what 18 x A330MRTT might have cost?

[ORAC]

Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.....

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/01/27/us-air-force-could-repeat-kc-46-vision-system-mistake-warns-watchdog/

US Air Force could repeat KC-46 vision system mistake, warns watchdog

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force risks repeating its previous mistakes on the KC-46A Pegasus program by planning to accept a redesign of its troubled Remote Vision System (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/01/26/kc-46-vision-system-problems-lead-to-402-million-charge-for-boeing/) without taking the right precautions, the Government Accountability Office said.

In a report released Thursday (https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104530), GAO said the Air Force’s plan to accept the financial responsibilities of the vision system’s redesign could put the service at risk of incurring more costs and delays, if it finds out later the system needs further redesigns.

“These choices mirror those made during the development of the KC-46 that led to the delivery of an aircraft that did not fully meet its requirements, and the Air Force stands poised to potentially repeat its past mistake,” GAO said......

The Boeing-made aerial refueling tanker, which is eventually meant to replace one-third of the service’s legacy fleet of aging tankers, has a problematic vision system (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/01/10/the-air-force-and-boeing-havent-yet-fixed-the-troubled-kc-46-pegasus-vision-system/)that makes it hard for the boom operator to clearly see the receiving aircraft’s refueling receptacle in some lighting conditions. This has sometimes led to the boom making undetected contact with the aircraft being refueled and damaging its coating.

Boeing in 2020 signed a memorandum of agreement with the Air Force to design a new vision system to address those problems, dubbed RVS 2.0, which is expected to be finished by mid-2024. Boeing is also updating the existing system along the way. But GAO expressed concern about the Air Force’s plan to assume financial responsibility for the new vision system’s design without making sure the program is taking steps to ensure its critical technologies are mature.

GAO said that KC-46 program plans to commit to “an immature design” for the new vision system, without setting up its own technology readiness assessment and a plan to mature the critical technologies involved. GAO also criticized the KC-46 program for not planning to test a prototype of the revised system in flight before the design is finished, which it said could lead to the discovery of new problems.

The memorandum of agreement said the Air Force would be financially responsible for any design changes that are made after the preliminary design review is finished. “This arrangement, effectively, reversed the original terms of the firm-fixed price contract that aimed to hold Boeing fully responsible for delivering a system that would work in any lighting conditions,” GAO wrote.

The Air Force told GAO that this was necessary because the service and Boeing had reached an impasse on how to address the vision system’s problems, and who would be financially responsible......

[havoc]

Single Pilot KC-46 Tanker Operations Eyed By Air Force For Major Conflicts (msn.com) (https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/companies/single-pilot-kc-46-tanker-operations-eyed-by-air-force-for-major-conflicts/ar-AAZIv0u?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=331da2526c124eb787dc001c6e47673e)

The U.S. Air Force is exploring the possibility of allowing KC-46A Pegasus aerial refueling tankers to fly with just two individuals on board – a pilot and a boom operator – in certain high-end wartime scenarios, such as a future conflict against China. These tankers are currently not available to support combat operations of any kind, except in emergency circumstances. News of the plan has already prompted intense discussion, as well as criticism, online about potential safety concerns as a product of the increased workload on such a skeleton crew.

Air Force Maj. Hope Cronin, a spokesperson for Air Mobility Command (AMC), which oversees the bulk of the service's aerial refueling tanker fleets, has confirmed to The War Zone that officials at McConnell Air Force Base in Kansas have submitted a request for a waiver to allow two-crew KC-46A operations. Typically, tankers will fly with a minimum of a pilot, co-pilot, and boom operator. As of May, the Air Force had received 59 Pegasus tankers (https://www.boeing.com/features/2022/05/kc-46a-pegasus-supports-missions-around-the-globe.page), with more than 20 of those (https://www.mcconnell.af.mil/News/Article/2055647/mcconnell-welcomes-kc-46-21-to-the-fleet/) having gone to units at McConnell

The first information about the waiver had appeared on unofficial Air Force social media channels, such as the Air Force amn/nco/snco Facebook page and the r/AirForce Subreddit, on July 15. The anonymous source for this initial information claimed that AMC commander Gen. Michael Minihan had received this request and was considering it due to concerns about recruitment and retention at McConnell, something the command has denied. The Air Force, overall, is experiencing a pilot shortage at present, something that has been an issue in the past and that the service had been making some minor progress in recent years to reverse. The post-pandemic boom in air travel and hiring by the airlines could see the situation worsen once again in the future.

“AMC is moving forward faster in a risk-informed manner to ensure Mobility Air Forces are ready to be the meaningful maneuver force required to meet Joint Force needs in a peer competitor fight. Mobility aircraft typically fly with a pilot, co-pilot, and based on aircraft type, a loadmaster and/or a boom operator," Maj. Cronin, the AMC spokesperson, told The War Zone. "The command is currently reassessing minimum flight crew requirements as we explore and validate new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) oriented towards a dynamic, future fight."

"The waiver request in question is part of the process to safely validate exploratory TTPs that are being assessed in training simulations and concept of employment development for potential use in a hypothetical peer competitor fight," she continued. "The AMC staff is currently reviewing this concept development and ensuring the authorities to execute this type of maneuver are at the MAJCOM [major command] level and can be executed within an adequate safety margin before approval will be provided."Air Force Col. Nate Vogel, at right, commander of the 22nd Air Refueling Wing at McConnell Air Force Base, shakes hands with AMC commander Gen. Mike Minihan, at left, during the latter officer's visit to the base on April 27, 2022. USAF / Airman Brenden Beezley)

The War Zone has reached out to AMC to find out whether similar TTPs have been approved or are now being considered for use with the Air Force's KC-135 (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44252/air-force-restricts-use-of-autopilot-on-upgraded-kc-135-tankers-again) or KC-10 tankers (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/34785/first-air-force-kc-10a-extender-tanker-heads-to-the-boneyard-for-retirement). The KC-135 and KC-10 are both much older designs than the KC-46, and have far more limited degrees of automation, which could limit any potential ability to operate with reduced crews. It is also important to note that there is no indication, even if the two-crew option for the KC-46 is approved, that it would ever be authorized for routine, day-to-day use.

Being able to fly KC-46As with just two crew members could possibly be useful in a large-scale conflict situation where the demand for aerial refueling sorties will be very high, but the total number of available tankers may be low, including due to losses from enemy action. In recent years, the Air Force has made no secret about its desire for more tanker capacity (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/kc-46s-recent-97-percent-milestone-isnt-the-whole-story) and concerns about the vulnerability (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40136/kc-135-tanker-tested-with-loyal-wingman-drone-as-part-of-major-defensive-upgrade) of these aircraft in a high-end fight (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32401/general-atomics-wants-to-give-aerial-tankers-their-own-missile-laden-loyal-wingmen-drones). It's important to remember that KC-46As are also capable of carrying out cargo and passenger-carrying (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/12/20/the-kc-46-is-back-to-carrying-cargo-and-passengers/) and aeromedical evacuation missions (https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2276760/kc-46-completes-its-first-aeromedical-evacuation-mission/), which will only add complexity to mission planning and tasking processes during a major conflict.

At the same time, as many commenters on social media, including current and former Air Force personnel, have already noted, the idea of attempting to operate a KC-46A, or any other tanker, with just two crew members can only prompt questions about safety and the general strain put on those individuals. Aerial refueling is an often complex and potentially dangerous task (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/31724/watch-the-boom-on-boeings-troubled-kc-46-tanker-smack-into-an-f-15e), especially during major combat operations, requiring significant communication and coordination between members of the tanker's crew, and between individuals on that aircraft and the one receiving the gas, especially during major combat operations.

With only a single pilot and boom operator, a KC-46A would have no backup personnel to perform a host of critical functions should either one of those individuals be incapacitated for any reason, including unexpected medical emergencies (https://www.newsweek.com/pilot-suffers-heart-attack-midflight-copilot-successfully-lands-plane-biman-bangladesh-airlines-1625386), during a mission. Impacts on other basic quality of life issues, including just needing to do things like eat, sleep, and go to the bathroom (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/35967/air-force-wants-new-ideas-to-help-make-it-easier-for-female-fighter-pilots-to-pee-in-flight), would be exacerbated by having no alternate crew members on the aircraft.

There is a reason why the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) places restrictions on what kinds of private and commercial aircraft can be flown with just one pilot and when – certain light jets and smaller aircraft (https://blog.wepushtin.com/blog/what-makes-a-plane-single-pilot-certified/) only, and even then only under certain circumstances (https://compareprivateplanes.com/articles/do-private-jets-require-two-pilots) – and those flights can generally be expected to be far less demanding than operating a tanker on a potentially long-duration sortie in a conflict zone. Nowhere in the world are commercial jets of a similar size to the KC-46 allowed to fly with just one pilot.

Robert Hopkins, an aviation historian, author, and contributor to The War Zone (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36787/a-dozen-of-the-most-unusual-variants-of-the-ubiquitous-kc-135-family-of-aircraft), who flew C-135s variants, among other aircraft, during his tenure with the Air Force, further highlighted on Twitter how this two-crew concept seemed to both acknowledge the vulnerabilities of traditional tankers and offer as a solution simply putting more of them in harm's way.

[Asturias56]

They ARE talking about a war situation - not routine ops

[safetypee]

Fight as you train; train as you intend to fight.

The word ‘Except’ enables opportunity for error.

Common type rating; differences training as in commercial aircraft.

Design for man and machine, where the machine provides IA, Intelligent Assistance, and that ‘intelligent’ is from the human viewpoint - what is required and when.

[fdr]

Single Pilot KC-46 Tanker Operations Eyed By Air Force For Major Conflicts (msn.com) (https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/companies/single-pilot-kc-46-tanker-operations-eyed-by-air-force-for-major-conflicts/ar-AAZIv0u?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=331da2526c124eb787dc001c6e47673e)

There is a reason why the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) places restrictions on what kinds of private and commercial aircraft can be flown with just one pilot and when – certain light jets and smaller aircraft (https://blog.wepushtin.com/blog/what-makes-a-plane-single-pilot-certified/) only, and even then only under certain circumstances (https://compareprivateplanes.com/articles/do-private-jets-require-two-pilots) – and those flights can generally be expected to be far less demanding than operating a tanker on a potentially long-duration sortie in a conflict zone. Nowhere in the world are commercial jets of a similar size to the KC-46 allowed to fly with just one pilot.

Robert Hopkins, an aviation historian, author, and contributor to The War Zone (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36787/a-dozen-of-the-most-unusual-variants-of-the-ubiquitous-kc-135-family-of-aircraft), who flew C-135s variants, among other aircraft, during his tenure with the Air Force, further highlighted on Twitter how this two-crew concept seemed to both acknowledge the vulnerabilities of traditional tankers and offer as a solution simply putting more of them in harm's way.

The planes are military aircraft. Flying SPIFR is not unreasonable when there is a chance of losing the plane from hostile action, and operationally, get the boomer to come up to the cockpit to keep the coffee flowing for both. There are not too many things on the 767 that actually require a fire axe and someone cutting their way out of the fuselage and along the wing with a fire extinguisher under their blues or zoom bag. For force training, that can be simulated, and also practiced with a safety pilot if that is felt to be necessary. Back in round 2, not sure that B-17 and B-24, A-20s etc fared any better for having 2 polers vs the Lancasters, Stirlings, Halifax, Wellies and mossies... Seems like a prudent force surge capability to have on hand.

Rimpac 80 mass brief: "y'all gotta go out, ya don't gotta come back..."

[BEagle]

Probably the stupidest idea ever considered by the USAF.....

[dervish]

IIRC the RN once made a decision to change from two to single pilot in a helicopter. I've never understood what the logic is if the aircraft is designed for two. Is it as simple as lack of aircrew?

[Just This Once...]

They ARE talking about a war situation - not routine ops

That's the point - in real ops you get very very busy, very quickly. You don't get issued an extra set of ears and an extra mouth for all the radios, nor the extra eyes to look out, or to look in for link management, ESM / DAS, plan revisions over long vul times, tank as a receiver and, god forbid, actually doing the basic aviate, navigate and communicate bit!

[Fortissimo]

Probably the stupidest idea ever considered by the USAF.....

In your opinion, although if you were just talking of the KC-46A decision we might be on common ground.

Most of the discussions about SP ops assume that the pilot will be 'alone and unafraid', whereas the risk mitigations will drive you to a scenario where the other pilots are on the end of the satellite link and will be capable not only of flying the aircraft remotely but also provide the "extra set of ears and an extra mouth for all the radios" and "look in for link management, ESM / DAS, plan revisions over long vul times" etc. and they will be hooked into the CAOC or whatever C2 system more closely than an airborne crew could ever hope to be.

See and avoid for most transport category aircraft does not work, so it's not an argument even for AAR ops.

[LateArmLive]

And yet single pilot ops is the norm in combat for pilots who have to do all that and more.

[GlobalNav]

They ARE talking about a war situation - not routine ops

Yes, so what is necessary under benign circumstances is no longer necessary under the most challenging lethal ones? Dumb as dirt.

I don’t know what “genius” at Mobility Command dreamed this up, but he’d be the first pilot I’d send out on a single pilot combat mission. Pity the poor boomer who goes with him. He’s probably the same guy who dreamed up RVS and wants the Air Force to take financial responsibility for inevitable failure of the RVS “fix”.

What’s the wartime crew duty day for a Pegasus? Does the single pilot just activate the autopilot while taking a nap? How many emergency situations require (or should require) two pilots? This only complicates the survivability dilemma of the tanker. Just plain dumb as dirt. I sure hope there’s still a general officer at Mobility Command with an ounce of common sense.

[tdracer]

Meanwhile, the USAF seems to think that Boeing is finally getting its act together on the KC-46:
US Air Force mulls skipping tanker competition as confidence in Boeing’s KC-46 builds (defensenews.com) (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/07/16/us-air-force-mulls-skipping-tanker-competition-as-confidence-in-boeings-kc-46-builds/)

In recent months, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has suggested (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/03/28/air-force-would-cut-150-aircraft-including-a-10s-buy-fewer-f-35s-in-2023-budget/) the Air Force could opt to skip the competition for the bridge tanker, dubbed the KC-Y, and instead buy more KC-46 planes.“Compared to a year ago at this time … we’d say ‘We’re not using the KC-46, it’s not really operational,’” Hunter said. “There’s been a huge sea change in the last year, and Air Mobility Command has really cleared the way for operational use of the KC-46.”

Last month, AMC announced the KC-46 had been approved to refuel 97% of the aircraft flown on U.S. Transportation Command missions.

[ORAC]

“We lose money on every sale, but make it up on volume”…

Its an old joke, but how many companies have operated over the years - slowly losing money but hoping something will turn up to turn the business around before investors lose interest. (Take Uber as a current example).

Boeing is struggling in the FJ business, paused production of the newer versions of the 777, losing money on the 787, struggling with the 737 Max and threatening to cancel the Max-10*

* https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-ceo-threatens-to-cancel-737-max-10-unless-congress-acts/

They lost $4.3B last year and another $1.5B in the first quarter of 2022. Their loses on the KC-46 program to date total $5.4B**

** https://www.airforcemag.com/kc-46-losses-now-top-5-4-billion-as-boeing-takes-a-new-402-million-charge/

But they’ll bid to build more at the same price… hoping something will happen to turn things round…

https://www.airforcemag.com/boeing-loses-1-billion-on-vc-25b-t-7a-calhoun-pledges-to-rethink-lowball-bids/

“We lose money on every sale….”

[GlobalNav]

Meanwhile, the USAF seems to think that Boeing is finally getting its act together on the KC-46:
US Air Force mulls skipping tanker competition as confidence in Boeing’s KC-46 builds (defensenews.com) (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/07/16/us-air-force-mulls-skipping-tanker-competition-as-confidence-in-boeings-kc-46-builds/)

Whatever the Air Force is thinking of doing it isn’t based on merit or performance of Boeing. I wonder if this is about taking the heat off Boeing to avoid a major loss of a defense and aerospace contractor. What if Boeing decided to default on the tanker contract and cut its losses?

Strategically, it may too much a blow to national security, so try to keep Boeing in the business. It would not exactly be a bailout, but an incentive for favorable decision. It’s a losing strategy though, nothing keeps the company from reneging on a deal and meanwhile the Air Force funds the shareholder interests and executives’ golden parachutes. It sure isn’t meritocracy.

[kiwi grey]

Meanwhile, the USAF seems to think that Boeing is finally getting its act together on the KC-46:
US Air Force mulls skipping tanker competition as confidence in Boeing’s KC-46 builds (defensenews.com) (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/07/16/us-air-force-mulls-skipping-tanker-competition-as-confidence-in-boeings-kc-46-builds/)
In recent months, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has suggested (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/03/28/air-force-would-cut-150-aircraft-including-a-10s-buy-fewer-f-35s-in-2023-budget/) the Air Force could opt to skip the competition for the bridge tanker, dubbed the KC-Y, and instead buy more KC-46 planes.
“Compared to a year ago at this time … we’d say ‘We’re not using the KC-46, it’s not really operational,’” Hunter said. “There’s been a huge sea change in the last year, and Air Mobility Command has really cleared the way for operational use of the KC-46.”
Last month, AMC announced the KC-46 had been approved to refuel 97% of the aircraft flown on U.S. Transportation Command missions.


Reads like the politicians at the top of the USAF are casting desperately around for an excuse to not have a competition and run the risk of Airbus winning again.
They're talking in glowing terms about an AAR system with a number of Category 1 Defects, and stressing how as it can refuel almost all the transport fleet, glossing over the fact that it can't refuel a big part of the combat fleet.
Gotta give Boeing the unimpeded opportunity to sell another couple of hundred KC-46 at a high enough price that they'll get back the money they've flushed away so far on this program.

[CAEBr]

Don't think they actually had to do a landing with the boom extended as part of the certification, but better safe than sorry, its done now - unless it was an ex carrier pilot who thought it was a hook !!

Another issue for Boeing to sort.

Article and video (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/kc-46-flying-a-congressional-delegation-landed-with-its-boom-deployed)

[Compass Call]

Couldn't they 'fly' the boom to keep it off the runway till the last moment? Or did they just forget that it was down?

[The Helpful Stacker]

Don't think they actually had to do a landing with the boom extended as part of the certification, but better safe than sorry, its done now - unless it was an ex carrier pilot who thought it was a hook !!

Another issue for Boeing to sort.

Article and video (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/kc-46-flying-a-congressional-delegation-landed-with-its-boom-deployed)

Quite amusing that it's one of the aircraft they've slapped the star-spangled rag on.

It may be shoddy but at least its 'Merican.

[GlobalNav]

Meanwhile, the USAF seems to think that Boeing is finally getting its act together on the KC-46:
US Air Force mulls skipping tanker competition as confidence in Boeing’s KC-46 builds (defensenews.com) (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/07/16/us-air-force-mulls-skipping-tanker-competition-as-confidence-in-boeings-kc-46-builds/)

Well, if anybody thinks Boeing is getting it’s act together, finally, I’d suggest it’s wishful thinking. Looking like a big exodus of the most experienced engineers, as they will be retiring this year to avoid the new pension provisions, so the only ones possibly able to improve Boeing’s “act” are bowing out. The accountants know how to use Excel so they can handle it, I suppose.

[ORAC]

Israel buying 4 KC-46. Or rather, the USA buying them for Israel….

https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2022/09/01/israel-boeing-prepare-to-sign-927m-deal-for-four-kc-46a-tankers/

Israel, Boeing agree to $927M deal for four KC-46A tankers

JERUSALEM — Boeing will soon sign a $927 million contract to deliver four KC-46A aerial refuelers (https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/04/21/israel-has-a-kc-46-problem-heres-the-solution/) to the Israeli military, the Israeli Defense Ministry and Boeing announced this week.

The ministry agreed to purchase the planes in January (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/01/04/israel-inks-3-billion-deal-for-kc-46-tankers-ch-53-helos/), following years of delays (https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/idex/2021/02/23/israel-to-buy-two-kc-46-tankers-with-plans-for-more-f-35s-and-weapon-systems/) in finalizing a contract that stemmed from budgeting issues and local elections. The aircraft, which will arrive in 2025 and 2026, are coming from Boeing’s Lot 8 production….

Funding for the KC-46A aircraft will come from the $3.3 billion in security assistance that Israel received as part of a foreign military financing agreement with the U.S. The current contract gives Israel the ability to purchase four more of the planes after the initial four.….

[MJ89]

We should have offered those 4-5 tristars now turned into coke cans, they could have had them for 20 million, or a pound or FREE (at least there'd still be some flying.)

then again i suppose it don't beat being paid to have new stuff, however woeful

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/720x435/sq5cbv2g_e9da74d4963c0fd551b0b292c00a7c4b0a16f544.jpg

[ORAC]

https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2022/10/26/boeing-reports-33-billion-loss-as-defense-programs-drag/

Boeing reports $3.3 billion loss as KC-46, other defense programs drag

[ORAC]

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/10/31/kc-46-tanker-test-puts-fuel-boom-operator-not-copilot-in-cockpit/

KC-46 tanker test puts fuel boom operator, not copilot, in cockpit

The Air Force is moving forward with experiments to test whether a two-person crew could safely fly a KC-46 Pegasus tanker in an emergency.

A solo pilot and a fuel boom operator with the 22nd Air Refueling Wing at McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, on Oct. 25 took to the skies for two KC-46 sorties on a military test range, the service said Oct. 28.

Flying tankers without copilots is one idea Air Mobility Command is trying out as it considers the tactics it may need in a possible military conflict with China. The Air Force has stressed that approach would not be the norm.

Launching missions with a skeleton crew could lessen the number of potential American casualties in case of attack, or make the crew more nimble in a crisis. Multiple small crews could swap out in shifts during around-the-clock sorties, another concept the Air Force is fleshing out..

During the flight test, the McConnell airmen completed a simple flight path before adding in refueling tasks, the Air Force said.

“The boom operator was co-located in the cockpit with the pilot, except when performing boom operations, and a second instructor pilot was on board throughout the entire mission to serve as a safety observer,” the Air Force said.

Air Mobility Command called the test successful but did not immediately answer what the boom operator was allowed to do in the cockpit. The service has suggested additional training so airmen can learn the basics of other crew positions.

The Air Force has “thoroughly” considered the risks of removing a tanker’s copilot and how to minimize potential problems, wing commander Col. Nate Vogel said.

“This mission was practiced extensively in flight simulators,” he said in the release. “Each phase of evaluation has been carefully considered, taking into account crew safety, aircraft capabilities and existing federal aviation standards.”

But the idea has raised eyebrows among military watchers who question its motives and safety, particularly as the Air Force’s new aerial refueling platform continues to struggle with major design flaws.

The service has refuted claims that its enduring pilot shortage is what’s driving the concept.…..

[Big Pistons Forever]

https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2022/10/26/boeing-reports-33-billion-loss-as-defense-programs-drag/

Boeing reports $3.3 billion loss as KC-46, other defense programs drag

Maybe Boeing should have kept all those engineers they got rid of to reduce costs….

[gums]

Salute!

Vet of many refuelings, and all I ever needed was a good tanker pilot and boom-op. If I could get within visual of the tanker, I could snuggle up to a good spot for the boom-op to plug in.

Gums sends...

[fdr]

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/10/31/kc-46-tanker-test-puts-fuel-boom-operator-not-copilot-in-cockpit/

KC-46 tanker test puts fuel boom operator, not copilot, in cockpit

The Air Force is moving forward with experiments to test whether a two-person crew could safely fly a KC-46 Pegasus tanker in an emergency.

A solo pilot and a fuel boom operator with the 22nd Air Refueling Wing at McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, on Oct. 25 took to the skies for two KC-46 sorties on a military test range, the service said Oct. 28.

Flying tankers without copilots is one idea Air Mobility Command is trying out as it considers the tactics it may need in a possible military conflict with China. The Air Force has stressed that approach would not be the norm.

Launching missions with a skeleton crew could lessen the number of potential American casualties in case of attack, or make the crew more nimble in a crisis. Multiple small crews could swap out in shifts during around-the-clock sorties, another concept the Air Force is fleshing out..

During the flight test, the McConnell airmen completed a simple flight path before adding in refueling tasks, the Air Force said.

“The boom operator was co-located in the cockpit with the pilot, except when performing boom operations, and a second instructor pilot was on board throughout the entire mission to serve as a safety observer,” the Air Force said.

Air Mobility Command called the test successful but did not immediately answer what the boom operator was allowed to do in the cockpit. The service has suggested additional training so airmen can learn the basics of other crew positions.

The Air Force has “thoroughly” considered the risks of removing a tanker’s copilot and how to minimize potential problems, wing commander Col. Nate Vogel said.

“This mission was practiced extensively in flight simulators,” he said in the release. “Each phase of evaluation has been carefully considered, taking into account crew safety, aircraft capabilities and existing federal aviation standards.”

But the idea has raised eyebrows among military watchers who question its motives and safety, particularly as the Air Force’s new aerial refueling platform continues to struggle with major design flaws.

The service has refuted claims that its enduring pilot shortage is what’s driving the concept.…..

For national emergency cases, that seems to be a reasonable option, however, they can also get about 10,000 rated drivers out of the woodwork with a simple phone call, there is no shortage of competent crew that can still assist the squadron guys to get the job done, in a national emergency. Particularly for the 46, as gums says, the work gets done from the receiver guy and the boomer in the airforce, and the guy at the end of the hose is always on his own doing his thing.

For the majority of cargo ops as well, and even much of the EW large frames, this remains an option in an emergency. The US DOD should be looking at all means to achieve max effectiveness in bad times, much of the rest of the world hasn't even woken up to keeping reserve competency up to speed, and cannot surge in the same manner as the US can.

[Asturias56]

"much of the rest of the world hasn't even woken up to keeping reserve competency up to speed"

they have but they take one look at the costs and they can the idea.

I can't think how many times people in the Uk have tried to build decent reserve capability and they always run up against the military (who want all the cash fro current projects) and the Treasury (who hate spending any cash at all)

[GlobalNav]

"Air Mobility Command called the test successful but did not immediately answer what the boom operator was allowed to do in the cockpit. The service has suggested additional training so airmen can learn the basics of other crew positions.

The Air Force has “thoroughly” considered the risks of removing a tanker’s copilot and how to minimize potential problems, wing commander Col. Nate Vogel said.

“This mission was practiced extensively in flight simulators,” he said in the release. “Each phase of evaluation has been carefully considered, taking into account crew safety, aircraft capabilities and existing federal aviation standards.”

But the idea has raised eyebrows among military watchers who question its motives and safety, particularly as the Air Force’s new aerial refueling platform continues to struggle with major design flaws.

The service has refuted claims that its enduring pilot shortage is what’s driving the concept.….."

My bulls**t meter is pegged! I am ashamed, but not surprised, at how disingenuous AMC is over this. In aviation it is wise to evaluate something not only when all goes well, but also how it stand up under the stress of the non-normal. Of course, how often does "non-normal" happen in warfare?

In my many years in the USAF, the time spent in the right seat was preparation for upgrade to the left seat. The shared experience, the mentoring, the learning that occurred in both seats over hundreds and thousands of hours paid off in those "few moments" of sheer terror.

Of course this couldn't happen in a better airplane.

[Lonewolf_50]

The service has refuted claims that its enduring pilot shortage is what’s driving the concept.….."
Well they would, wouldn't they? :yuk:
Gotta love them powder blue spokespersons. Laying it on nice and thick.

[sycamore]

Global, seems like they haven`t really sorted out the route to be a `Captain`; or is a co-pilot suddenly promoted to be a `Captain` on the day of the `emergency`.The original `captain` will remain,as he is a trainer,etc and has to teach `co-pilots....Bit of a `risky shift`,akin to the WW2 Japanese `kamikazi training...

[GlobalNav]

Global, seems like they haven`t really sorted out the route to be a `Captain`; or is a co-pilot suddenly promoted to be a `Captain` on the day of the `emergency`.The original `captain` will remain,as he is a trainer,etc and has to teach `co-pilots....Bit of a `risky shift`,akin to the WW2 Japanese `kamikazi training...

I suppose the fighter community is scratching their heads over my concern. But in my opinion, having witnessed it for thousands of hours, the continuity of the interactions between pilots in transport airplanes has tremendous training benefits that pay off when things become difficult.

This is not like the airlines. This is having an aircrew where the AC and CP could be relatively low time lieutenants. In old days we at least had a grizzled flight engineer to watch over us.

The consequences of single pilot operations will not manifest on every mission. But it lacks the investment that pays big dividends later.

[gums]

Salute!

As much as I loved being the only one in the jet, I have to go with Global.

True, we lights could refuel from a drone, but the big tanker needs more human systems besides the boom-op and a good pilot in the front seat.

In a last ditch situation, I can see a pilot taking off with a boom-op to do the mission. But not a routine operational requirement or employment.

Gums sends...

[ORAC]

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/11/03/kc-46-tankers-boom-breaks-dents-plane-while-refueling-fighter-jet/

KC-46 tanker’s boom breaks, dents plane while refueling fighter jet

Air Force officials are investigating a mishap that heavily damaged a KC-46 Pegasus tanker plane while it refueled a fighter jet last month, Air Force Times has learned.

The tanker was on its way from Glasgow Prestwick Airport in Scotland to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, when it was tasked to gas up an F-15, an Air Force official confirmed Wednesday.

Investigators believe that during the rendezvous, the two aircraft were traveling at such different speeds that the refueling boom forcibly broke away from the fighter jet and slammed back into the KC-46, the official said. The Pegasus safely continued on to New Jersey after the mishap.

A photo posted Oct. 28 on an Instagram account for tanker memes appears to show a cracked refueling boom below a dented tail cone. The post voiced concerns about the jet’s safety, particularly as mobility officials experiment with using two-person crews instead of three in emergencies.

While the service believes it will cost at least $2.5 million to repair the KC-46, the official said he isn’t aware of any damage to the F-15.

“The incident is currently being investigated as a potential Class A mishap, with anticipated conclusion in late November,” Air Mobility Command spokesperson Capt. Natasha Mosquera said. “Final cost estimates will be determined at that time.”

“Brute force disconnects” are uncommon, but do happen, the official said. They recalled at least one or two other such in-flight tanker mishaps within the past few years.

The service said it does not suspect any systemic problems with the boom. It’s unclear if the Oct. 15 incident is related to multiple boom design issues (https://www.airforcetimes.com/breaking-news/2018/09/17/air-force-finds-new-kc-46-deficiencies-putting-planned-delivery-date-in-jeopardy) that the Air Force added to the KC-46′s extensive list of faults in 2018, including that the pipe was too stiff to properly refuel lighter aircraft.

That has prevented the KC-46 from refueling the A-10C Thunderbolt II attack plane. Boeing is still redesigning the boom under a 2019 contract worth up to $55.5 million.


https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/481x599/image_ae02dcabd0a132497788f420be72691aa90cab21.png

[Imagegear]

Does not look good

Air Force Times www.airforcetimes.com (https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/11/14/kc-46-tankers-boom-issue-will-prevent-a-10-refueling-for-years/&ved=2ahUKEwiFqeL23LD7AhUTRPEDHbUIB4UQFnoECAsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3wrA2zPqN7ZBTYPxji3Kf1) KC-46 tanker's boom issue will prevent A-10 refueling for yea

IG

[airsound]

By the time this is fixed, they'll probably have dumped the Warthog.

Oh, wait.... they've tried that before, more than once?

airsound

[sandiego89]

Another 15 KC-46's ordered, bringing orders to 128 with 68 already delivered and being used. They seem to passing gas on a regular basis? including some fighter drags, although the vision system fix is still being worked.

Also note that more and more KC-10's going to the boneyard in recent weeks.

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/01/30/us-air-force-awards-boeing-23b-contract-for-15-more-kc-46s/

[RAFEngO74to09]

House Armed Services Committee hearing today - RVS 2.0 delayed again to FY2025 - delivery in calendar year 2026 - all costs to be borne by Boeing including retrofit on all aircraft already delivered by then.

Also KC-135R will be remaining in service for another 20-30 years to maintain the mandated minimum 466 overall tanker fleet size (currently 467). So KC-135R will be getting another avionics upgrade.

[GlobalNav]

House Armed Services Committee hearing today - RVS 2.0 delayed again to FY2025 - delivery in calendar year 2026 - all costs to be borne by Boeing including retrofit on all aircraft already delivered by then.

Also KC-135R will be remaining in service for another 20-30 years to maintain the mandated minimum 466 overall tanker fleet size (currently 467). So KC-135R will be getting another avionics upgrade.

This sobering news after the optimistic interview in January:“The new version of the vision system, dubbed RVS 2.0, uses 4K ultrahigh-definition cameras to give boom operators a full-color, sharp 3D image as they guide the refueling boom into the receiver aircraft.

The Air Force, which last year approved the design for the new RVS, says the upgrade will eliminate the KC-46′s longstanding issue with lighting conditions — and that it’s time to start making this design a reality.

We have the demos, we have the videos, we’ve flown it on [Boeing] planes … and it looks magnificent,” Lt. Col. Joshua Renfro, the head of the Air Force’s KC-46 Cross-Functional Team, said in a January interview with Defense News.”

I can smell the BS! It looks great, but it doesn’t meet the requirements.

[tdracer]

I can smell the BS! It looks great, but it doesn’t meet the requirements.

I don't know - this sounds more like the USAF wants perfection instead of what they really need which is 'gets the job done'.
I saw that attitude more than once during the various KC-46 design reviews I was in. When we'd point out that a requirement didn't add any value to the end product, the response was 'what part of mandatory don't you understand'.
The aircraft operates in the real world - perfection is seldom possible in the real world. They seem to think it's some big laboratory where perfection is obtainable.

[GlobalNav]

I don't know - this sounds more like the USAF wants perfection instead of what they really need which is 'gets the job done'.
I saw that attitude more than once during the various KC-46 design reviews I was in. When we'd point out that a requirement didn't add any value to the end product, the response was 'what part of mandatory don't you understand'.
The aircraft operates in the real world - perfection is seldom possible in the real world. They seem to think it's some big laboratory where perfection is obtainable.

Not perfection. Meet the contract requirements and satisfy the military need. Promises promises.

[tdracer]

Not perfection. Meet the contract requirements and satisfy the military need. Promises promises.
But some of the requirements are silly or unrealistic. While I have no direct knowledge of the remote vision system - I know that in my area we spent lots of manpower and millions of dollars meeting a spec requirement that had no basis in reality (and the 'what part of mandatory don't you understand' was the response when I tried to explain that to the USAF reps). This stuff is all considered proprietary so I can't elaborate - but the requirement might have made sense and been meaningful on a 1950s tech engine, but had no basis in reality for a full FADEC PW4000 engine. But it was a mandatory requirement and we had to meet it.
Government bureaucracy at is inefficient finest.

[ORAC]

The time to challenge a KUR is at the bid phase, not after you underbid to win the contract and can’t meet it….

[tdracer]

The time to challenge a KUR is at the bid phase, not after you underbid to win the contract and can’t meet it….
That's not something in the engineer's control - that's done by accountants and lawyers - and apparently people in the USAF that still have a mind think based on the KC-135 technology.
Think about it - you hire someone to make an addition to your house. You spec something based on how they built things 50 years ago. The builder comes in - points out that what you're asking for doesn't make any sense with today's technology - they can do something that works better, will last longer, look nicer, and oh by the way, will save you money not only up front but in maintenance/operating costs.
Would you listen to them and give it a fair hearing, or would you tell them to shut up and do it the way you spec'ed it?
Because I know first hand how the USAF handled it.

[GlobalNav]

That's not something in the engineer's control - that's done by accountants and lawyers - and apparently people in the USAF that still have a mind think based on the KC-135 technology.
Think about it - you hire someone to make an addition to your house. You spec something based on how they built things 50 years ago. The builder comes in - points out that what you're asking for doesn't make any sense with today's technology - they can do something that works better, will last longer, look nicer, and oh by the way, will save you money not only up front but in maintenance/operating costs.
Would you listen to them and give it a fair hearing, or would you tell them to shut up and do it the way you spec'ed it?
Because I know first hand how the USAF handled it.

Well, I’m not sure it was engineers who promised what they couldn’t deliver. But if you can’t, you should not submit a bid saying you can. I agree it’s probably a dumb requirement, because you can’t show a “3D” image on a 2D display. I’ve been around displays and imaging technology for decades and can attest to that. And I’ve been around display and imaging vendors who claim otherwise. That’s called “snake oil”.

For the money USAF and Boeing poured down this rat hole, I suspect automatic connection could have been designed and built. But putting the boomer in the tail looking out a window worked for longer than the KC-135 has been in service, and for whatever the cost of modifying the 767 tail to accommodate it, would have been less risky and less costly, and would satisfy the military need. Not sure why USAF specified RVS. Was it their idea or Boeing’s? But Boeing said they could do it.

[tdracer]

Well, I’m not sure it was engineers who promised what they couldn’t deliver. But if you can’t, you should not submit a bid saying you can. I agree it’s probably a dumb requirement, because you can’t show a “3D” image on a 2D display. I’ve been around displays and imaging technology for decades and can attest to that. And I’ve been around display and imaging vendors who claim otherwise. That’s called “snake oil”.

For the money USAF and Boeing poured down this rat hole, I suspect automatic connection could have been designed and built. But putting the boomer in the tail looking out a window worked for longer than the KC-135 has been in service, and for whatever the cost of modifying the 767 tail to accommodate it, would have been less risky and less costly, and would satisfy the military need. Not sure why USAF specified RVS. Was it their idea or Boeing’s? But Boeing said they could do it.

Again, I can't comment too much because this stuff is all considered Proprietary (or higher). But its not a '2d system'. It doesn't work as well as they hoped - the newer 4k systems is way better. I don't know what sort of issues they still have - but the question remains - is it 'good enough' to get the job done at least as well as the dude laying in the back could?
Because that's what the requirement should be.

[Asturias56]

So it wasn't just "technology for technology's sake" TD?

because that's what it looks like from the outside

[Less Hair]

I fail to see what is so hard to solve concerning this tanker? A proven airframe, an experienced manufacturer, a need for a new tanker, a lot of money and it still can't be done? How about the other 767-tanker operators?

[Asturias56]

There are 1205 other posts on this topic all asking the same question. It looked like a complete no-brainer - the worlds biggest Aerospace company, one that has built more tankers than every one else put together, a proven airframe that had been in serial production for years, it wasn't even a tremendously challenging spec on the headline numbers.............................

Someone had to try very very hard to get to where we are now.

[Imagegear]

With Boeing, everything is a no-brainer until it can't be made to work. 747 excepted.

IG

[tdracer]

So it wasn't just "technology for technology's sake" TD?
because that's what it looks like from the outside
Some of it might be. The USAF spec'ed a remote vision system (the refueler stations are right behind the flight deck). It occurs to me that access to the traditional tail station could be limited if there were cargo pallets in the hold, but I don't know if being able to refuel while carrying a large cargo load was a consideration.
I do know the KC-46 doesn't use the same boom system as the KC-767 does - and the USAF didn't want the legacy system that the KC-767 uses.
The KC-767 had it's fair share of issues - but the expectation was there would be lessons learned to keep similar issues from occurring on the KC-46. Instead the KC-46 had some of the same issues, plus many, many new ones.
Repeating myself here, but many of the issues with the KC-46 trace back to sloppy management - for example many systems did not implement the required wiring separation (e.g. battle damage protection). Yet in Propulsion we knew all about the requirement and designed for it (tricky, because there are limited places to route wiring on the wing and wing/body joint) - so why did so many other systems neglect that requirement resulting in massively expensive rework? Piss poor management IMHO. Most of the KC-46 managers came from the 787 - and brought along the same flawed management techniques that messed up that program so badly. Too much emphasis on process, not enough emphasis on outcome (i.e. product). Some people can't seem to learn from their own mistakes...
There were other issues that seem to defy explanation - for example they designed a new fuel system manifold that leaked like a sieve - to fix it they had to start over from scratch. How can a company that's been successfully building large aircraft for 80 years suddenly be unable to design a fuel manifold that doesn't leak?

[Asturias56]

Looks like an appalling loss of institutional memory

[Less Hair]

They should put some modular automated boom in there and forget about the manual system. Just jump the queue to the next level and use the delay to progress. Like a MQ-25 with a boom.

[ORAC]

FFS, they can’t even get the toilets to work….

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/04/14/the-kc-46-has-a-messy-problem-with-its-palletized-toilet/

The KC-46 has a messy problem with its palletized toilet

WASHINGTON — The Boeing KC-46 tanker (https://www.defensenews.com/smr/air-force-priorities/2021/02/24/despite-growing-pains-the-kc-46-will-begin-limited-operations-soon/) currently can’t carry the palletized toilet normally used by mobility aircraft without the risk of waste water leaking into the cabin (https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/04/08/darpa-has-a-crappy-new-idea-to-help-soldiers/), leaving the tanker unable to conduct long-distance flights with a large number of passengers until the lavatory is modified.

The issue, according to U.S. Air Mobility Command, involves the Air Transportable Galley-Lavatory, a combined kitchen and bathroom that can be rolled on and off mobility aircraft like the KC-46, C-17 and C-130.

A source with knowledge of the program told Defense News on Wednesday that the problem arises because the ATGL cannot be loaded and stored in its normal orientation. The source said the issue stems from the KC-46′s cargo rails and locks, which are not as wide as other Air Force cargo aircraft. Instead, the ATGL is turned 90 degrees to fit inside a KC-46, but the lavatory system’s anti-spill valve does not work correctly while in that orientation.

That could allow toilet waste to drip into the cabin whenever the tanker climbs or descends in altitude, resulting in a messy problem. The source indicated that the issue was discovered during ground testing.

The problem is not considered a technical deficiency (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/02/01/the-air-force-has-a-fix-for-two-of-its-major-kc-46-problems/)against the KC-46 aircraft because the Air Force’s 2011 contract with Boeing did not forbid the company from delivering a tanker with a narrower cargo rail system, the source said. Ultimately, the Air Force intends to fix the issue by developing a new valve for the ATGL, but so far the service has not designed, tested or fielded a replacement.

The Air Force intends to start testing a solution to the issue imminently, an Air Mobility Command spokeswoman said in a statement…..

[tdracer]

ORAC, not sure you can blame that on Boeing. The toilet is a standard USAF unit, not something Boeing is responsible for, and they never told Boeing they had a requirement for a specific orientation requirement for the palatized toilet.
Hard to design for a requirement that isn't communicated...

[Imagegear]

tdracer

While you are correct within the context of design by a subcontractor, I suspect the "powers that be", will consider Boeing as the prime contractor and therefore responsible.

If I have a problem with the oil pump in my new car, I will not accept the supplier of my car saying it is not our problem because we did not design the oil pump. It may have been supplied to the manufacturer for inclusion in their final product. But to me, the supplier of my new car is at fault.

IG

[sandiego89]

That could allow toilet waste to drip into the cabin whenever the tanker climbs or descends in altitude, resulting in a messy problem. The source indicated that the issue was discovered during ground testing......



Now there is some incentive to keep pitch to a minimum! Flat approaches- no flare!

[GlobalNav]

Now there is some incentive to keep pitch to a minimum! Flat approaches- no flare!

Hire Navy pilots.

[tdracer]

tdracer

While you are correct within the context of design by a subcontractor, I suspect the "powers that be", will consider Boeing as the prime contractor and therefore responsible.

If I have a problem with the oil pump in my new car, I will not accept the supplier of my car saying it is not our problem because we did not design the oil pump. It may have been supplied to the manufacturer for inclusion in their final product. But to me, the supplier of my new car is at fault.

IG
Image, in the airframer world, we have a couple of terms - BFE and SFE - "Buyer Furnished Equipment" and "Seller Furnished Equipment". The airframer is directly responsible for anything that is SFE, even if they didn't actually manufacture it. BFE is a completely different kettle of fish - unless the buyer specifies that the aircraft must function correctly with various BFE, it's the buyer's problem if it doesn't work.
To put it a little differently, if you buy a car with a fancy entertainment system from the factory - the auto manufacture is responsible for it working correctly. OTOH, if you take your car in and get a fancy aftermarket entertainment system installed - and it doesn't work right or interferes with proper operation of the car - the manufacturer will (rightly) tell you to pound sand - that it's your problem...

[GlobalNav]

Image, in the airframer world, we have a couple of terms - BFE and SFE - "Buyer Furnished Equipment" and "Seller Furnished Equipment". The airframer is directly responsible for anything that is SFE, even if they didn't actually manufacture it. BFE is a completely different kettle of fish - unless the buyer specifies that the aircraft must function correctly with various BFE, it's the buyer's problem if it doesn't work.
To put it a little differently, if you buy a car with a fancy entertainment system from the factory - the auto manufacture is responsible for it working correctly. OTOH, if you take your car in and get a fancy aftermarket entertainment system installed - and it doesn't work right or interferes with proper operation of the car - the manufacturer will (rightly) tell you to pound sand - that it's your problem...

It’s strictly speculation on my part, but Boeing probably met the written requirement of being able to securely load the latrine. The Air Force folks who wrote the RFP and evaluated Boeing’s proposal were probably unaware of the latrine’s design details, at least regarding its required orientation.

[tdracer]

It’s strictly speculation on my part, but Boeing probably met the written requirement of being able to securely load the latrine. The Air Force folks who wrote the RFP and evaluated Boeing’s proposal were probably unaware of the latrine’s design details, at least regarding its required orientation.
I agree and would add to that, the latrine is likely a 'standard' pallet size - and as a freighter the main deck is configured to hold a bunch of standard pallets (~20 IIRC)(a real pain to walk around back there due to all the automated cargo handling hardware - for flight tests they had these floor panel things mounted so everyone didn't fall on the butts, but they didn't cover the whole cargo floor). But due to the width of interior, to allow side by side pallets they are oriented with the 'long' side fore and aft. The latrine was designed to be loaded with the 'short' side fore and aft.
Whoops...

[BEagle]

Of course if the USAF had acquired a civilised aircraft such as the A330MRTT in the first place, they wouldn't have any need for this 'rendition class' palletised seating nor for the 'Air Transportable Galley-Lavatory, a combined kitchen and bathroom' - which sounds quite disgusting, particularly for long flights...

[Big Pistons Forever]

Of course if the USAF had acquired a civilised aircraft such as the A330MRTT in the first place, they wouldn't have any need for this 'rendition class' palletised seating nor for the 'Air Transportable Galley-Lavatory, a combined kitchen and bathroom' - which sounds quite disgusting, particularly for long flights...

Or just use the C130 system................ERRRR never mind :ouch:

[tdracer]

Of course if the USAF had acquired a civilised aircraft such as the A330MRTT in the first place, they wouldn't have any need for this 'rendition class' palletised seating nor for the 'Air Transportable Galley-Lavatory, a combined kitchen and bathroom' - which sounds quite disgusting, particularly for long flights...
Can the A330MRTT carry 20 pallets of main deck cargo (and a cargo loading door to go with it)? Because that was one of those USAF non-negotiable mandatory requirements. If the idea was to just carry SLF on the main deck, I'm sure Boeing would have been happy to provide main deck seating - but the USAF wanted an aircraft that was a jack of all trades.
Or do we need to go through the whole 'the MRTT didn't meet the USAF requirements' debate again?

[Bksmithca]

Can the A330MRTT carry 20 pallets of main deck cargo (and a cargo loading door to go with it)? Because that was one of those USAF non-negotiable mandatory requirements. If the idea was to just carry SLF on the main deck, I'm sure Boeing would have been happy to provide main deck seating - but the USAF wanted an aircraft that was a jack of all trades.
Or do we need to go through the whole 'the MRTT didn't meet the USAF requirements' debate again?
According to Google Airbus did that for the German Airforce

[tdracer]

According to Google Airbus did that for the German Airforce
Really? Germany has A330 MRTTs?
Since when?

[Bksmithca]

Really? Germany has A330 MRTTs?
Since when?
Sorry my bad had a seniors moment. It was Lufthansa that had popped as having the A330

[Buster Hyman]

According to Google Airbus did that for the German Airforce
Yes, on the A310 MRTT.

[BEagle]

The Luftwaffe already operated the A310 MRT in 'combi' fit before the tanker conversion. The additional fuel for the tanker conversion was carried in 4 x removeable auxiliary tanks in the lower holds, although it would have been feasible to have included a 5th tank. The upper deck freight floor and rear passenger seats were retained, so that the aircraft had a wide variety of possible operating fits.

Luftwaffe AAR is now provided by the A330MRTT, operated by the multinational tanker force at Eindhoven and Köln/Bonn.

Even in the non-freighter variant, the A330MRTT has prodigous lower hold space for a wide variety of freight options and is fitted with large lower hold doors, so that there is no real need for the upper deck cargo and cargo door option.

[tdracer]

The Luftwaffe already operated the A310 MRT in 'combi' fit before the tanker conversion. The additional fuel for the tanker conversion was carried in 4 x removeable auxiliary tanks in the lower holds, although it would have been feasible to have included a 5th tank. The upper deck freight floor and rear passenger seats were retained, so that the aircraft had a wide variety of possible operating fits.

Luftwaffe AAR is now provided by the A330MRTT, operated by the multinational tanker force at Eindhoven and Köln/Bonn.

Even in the non-freighter variant, the A330MRTT has prodigous lower hold space for a wide variety of freight options and is fitted with large lower hold doors, so that there is no real need for the upper deck cargo and cargo door option.
While the A330 has a much larger cargo hold than the 767, it in no way compares to the main deck cargo capability of the 767 when configured as a freighter - the A330 can't take full size freighter pallets under the floor, the 767F can on the main deck. And once again, there is that messy USAF MANDATORY requirement for main deck cargo carrying.
As for doing some sort of 'combi' setup, another one of those messy mandatory requirements is for full FAA certification (no idea why - it added considerable costs to the program with no real value added - but "What part of Mandatory don't you understand" :ugh:). FAA/JAA/EASA really upped the regulations for a 'Combi' after Helderberg disaster - to the point where I don't think anyone has successfully certified a new "combi" configuration since then.

[melmothtw]

While the A330 has a much larger cargo hold than the 767, it in no way compares to the main deck cargo capability of the 767 when configured as a freighter - the A330 can't take full size freighter pallets under the floor, the 767F can on the main deck. And once again, there is that messy USAF MANDATORY requirement for main deck cargo carrying.
As for doing some sort of 'combi' setup, another one of those messy mandatory requirements is for full FAA certification (no idea why - it added considerable costs to the program with no real value added - but "What part of Mandatory don't you understand" :ugh:). FAA/JAA/EASA really upped the regulations for a 'Combi' after Helderberg disaster - to the point where I don't think anyone has successfully certified a new "combi" configuration since then.

The A330 can take pallets on the upper deck with a door fitted (as was spec'd on the USAF KC-45 and as fitted to the French Phenix).

I think the part of 'mandatory' that I dont understand is the part where it seemingly wasn't required when the initial A330 selection was made, but suddenly became a must have when Boeing forced a rerun.

[tdracer]

The A330 can take pallets on the upper deck with a door fitted (as was spec'd on the USAF KC-45 and as fitted to the French Phenix).

I think the part of 'mandatory' that I dont understand is the part where it seemingly wasn't required when the initial A330 selection was made, but suddenly became a must have when Boeing forced a rerun.
My response was to BEagles post regarding how the A330 MRTT has main deck passenger accommodations so no need for 'palletized' seats and conventional lavs. Sure, you can specify either an A330 or a 767 for conventional main deck passenger accommodations. Or you can spec if for carrying main deck cargo.
BUT, you can't spec the aircraft to do both!
You can have one or the other. The only other option is to do some sort of Combi configuration - but good luck getting FAA/EASA certification of a combi with the current regulations...
Regarding the 'rerun' - Boeing protested because the USAF gave the A330 'extra credit' for exceeding the required capacities -rather than matching what the KC-135 could do (which is what the RFP specified - a KC-135 replacement, not something bigger). That broke the stated procurement rules - which don't allow for 'extra credit' unless it's specified in the RFP.
Regarding all those messy mandatory requirements, the new request after the successful Boeing protest including a bunch of 'new stuff' relative to the previous RFP - it seems that since the USAF couldn't grant 'extra credit', they created a big wish list of everything they wanted the 'tanker' to do and made them all mandatory. Obviously can't detail what, but there was a lot of stuff in the new RFP that had absolutely nothing to do with aerial refueling - and the existing A330 MRTT didn't meet those requirements (nor did the existing KC-767). To have competed in the revised competition would have required a major redesign of the A330 MRTT - just like it did the KC-767 - to meet all those requirements.
For the most part, it was the redesign needed to meet all those new mandatory requirements that caused problems with the KC-46.

[ORAC]

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/04/27/boeings-tanker-losses-top-7-billion/

Boeing’s tanker losses top $7 billion

WASHINGTON — Boeing reported a $245 million charge on the KC-46A Pegasus tanker in the first quarter of 2023, due to a supplier’s quality issues.

The penalty means the KC-46 has now racked up more than $7 billion in charges, and follow a $1.2 billion hit the company took on the Air Force tanker in the third quarter of 2022.….

Boeing said the charge was largely driven by a previously disclosed quality issue due to a supplier, but did not offer further details in a call with analysts.

The aviation news website the Air Current (https://theaircurrent.com/aircraft-production/boeing-kc-46-767-fedex-ups-center-tank/) reported in March a subcontractor had not followed proper painting and priming procedures on the center fuel tanks of some KC-46s and 767s, on which the KC-46 is based, which has held up deliveries. That quality issue could risk contamination of the aircrafts’ fuel systems, Air Current reported.

Brian West, Boeing’s chief financial officer, confirmed the quality issue with the 767 center fuel tanks later that month at a Bank of America conference.

David Calhoun, Boeing’s chief executive, said on Wednesday’s call work is progressing on fixing that problem. But the company warned investors more losses on the KC-46 could come during the remainder of the year…..

[tdracer]

It would appear that Boeing should be hammering on its suppliers to meet (and maintain) quality standards rather than cost targets. 787, 737 MAX, now this have cost the company billions - much more than just doing the job right would have cost.
More fallout from the MacDac merger...

[Less Hair]

It feels like some time ago they changed their traditional QC for cheaper "watertight" legal contracts that didn't prevent practical hiccups from happening and became much more costly in the end. I'd move it back to more real world QC. Add fixed price contracts like for this tanker and much left to do this is expensive and might only turn profitable with services and spare parts on a very long run if ever.
The B-52 business will make up for it.

[ORAC]

“We lose money on every one we make, but we’ll make it it up op on olume”….

[GlobalNav]

Just read about the latest status of the KC-46 program and 6 Category 1 deficiencies remain. I’m surprised that although these all concern military unique parts and systems that FAA certification is still an issue with some of the “fixes”. I just hope the Air Force and FAA are relentless is ensuring the safe and effective resolution of these deficiencies.

The Air Force defines a Category 1 deficiency (https://www.tinker.af.mil/Portals/106/Documents/Technical%20Orders/AFD-082216-00-35D-54.pdf) as one which “may cause death, severe injury, or severe occupational illness; may cause loss or major damage to a weapon system; critically restricts the combat readiness capabilities of the using organization; or result in a production line stoppage.”

[ORAC]

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/kc-10-extender-has-flown-its-last-combat-mission

KC-10 Extender Has Flown Its Last Combat Mission

After more than four decades during which it provided vital inflight refueling and airlift, the U.S. Air Force’s venerable KC-10A Extender (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/31609/this-cockpit-video-of-a-kc-10-refueling-another-kc-10-is-amazing) has flown its last combat mission.

While the Air Force already began sending KC-10s to the boneyard in 2020, the latest milestone signals the impending retirement of the type (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/hundreds-of-aircraft-headed-to-the-boneyard-in-new-usaf-budget), although it’s not yet entirely clear what the service’s future tanker fleet will consist of.

Photos published today by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) show a KC-10 departing Prince Sultan Air Base (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/30664/air-force-sends-b-1b-bombers-to-saudi-arabia-amid-u-s-military-buildup-in-the-kingdom) (PSAB), in Saudi Arabia, on October 5.

According to accompanying captions, the departure of the Extender concluded the type’s final combat deployment at the base.

Air Mobility Command (AMC) confirmed to The War Zone that this was the last combat deployment of the KC-10 anywhere in the world, not just in the Middle East.

“For nearly four decades, the KC-10 has helped secure global reach for America,” AMC spokeswoman Jessica Brown said. “It’s expected to redeploy to its home station soon.”….

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[SLXOwft]

Well that explans why there were so many KC-10s in close proximity over Europe yesterday morning, a flight of 3 into Mildenhall and another flight of 3 into Spangdahlem. 43 years since first KC-10 flight, 67 since first KC-135 flight and in the later case that's well over half the 120 since Kitty Hawk.

[charliegolf]

I'm pleasantly shocked by the 43 years of the KC10. Everyone's aware of the longevity of the 135- I just would never have said the 10 was so long. Brilliant!

CG

[megan]

Wonder the sort of airframe hours any particular 10 or 135 has logged, certainly long service, then again might wonder about the venerable 52 as well. Damn things last longer than we do.

[tdracer]

Wonder the sort of airframe hours any particular 10 or 135 has logged, certainly long service, then again might wonder about the venerable 52 as well. Damn things last longer than we do.

At least for the KC-46, the USAF said ~1,000 hours/year.
By comparison, most commercial aircraft are in the 3,000-4,000 hours/year range.
I do find it interesting that - in spite of it's alleged advantages in capabilities, they are retiring the KC-10 before the 20+ year older KC-135s.

[ORAC]

You don’t save much money cutting a few airframes, you cut money by cutting fleets along along with all their engineering, manpower and logistic tail.

There are between 400-600 KC-135 in active, ANG or reserve service - the KC-10 fleet numbers around 60 airframes….

[esscee]

Well 2 more KC-10's are presently making their way up the NE coast of UK on their journey "home".

[teeonefixer]

Well 2 more KC-10's are presently making their way up the NE coast of UK on their journey "home".
I think these were part of "Clean" flight taking the Hill F-35's from Mildenhall back home

[Lonewolf_50]

When tanker management and tanking was part of my daily life, the KC-10 was great to have on task.
So long, thanks for all of the hard work. :ok:

[ORAC]

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/10/23/lockheed-drops-us-air-force-tanker-bid-partner-airbus-to-go-it-alone/

Lockheed drops US Air Force tanker bid; partner Airbus to go it alone

WASHINGTON — Lockheed Martin has ended its effort to compete for a U.S. Air Force contract to build the service’s next wave of 75 refueling tankers (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/08/02/us-air-force-to-issue-new-refueling-tanker-request-in-september/).

But Airbus, with whom Lockheed Martin had planned to build the proposed LMXT strategic tanker (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/06/06/lockheed-picks-engine-to-bolster-interim-tanker-case-for-us-air-force/), will still compete for the KC-135 recapitalization (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/09/08/us-air-force-warns-budget-delays-could-jeopardize-ngas-tanker-fielding/). LMXT would have been based on Airbus’s A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport.

“Airbus remains committed to providing the U.S. Air Force and our warfighters with the most modern and capable tanker on the market and will formally respond to the United States Air Force KC-135 recapitalization” request for information, an Airbus spokesperson said in a Monday statement to Defense News.

“The A330 U.S.-MRTT is a reliable choice for the U.S. Air Force; one that will deliver affordability, proven performance and unmatched capabilities.”

Lockheed spokeswoman Stephanie Stinn said in an earlier statement the company had decided not to respond to the Air Force’s RFI. The news was first reported by Reuters (https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/lockheed-exits-us-air-force-tanker-competition-lifting-boeings-kc-46-2023-10-23/).

Stinn said Lockheed plans to transition the team and resources working on the proposed LMXT strategic tanker to other programs, including the next-generation aerial refueling system, or NGAS, program.

In a follow-up email, Stinn said the Air Force’s decision earlier this year to accelerate NGAS was one of several factors that led it to drop its pursuit of LMXT and focus on the next-generation tanker, along with other elements in the recent RFI. Lockheed declined to say how much it and Airbus spent to develop LMXT.…..

[ORAC]

I have to wonder if they’ll buy the KC-10s as they are retired or if they’ll go into the AMARG, in which case if there is a civil market for the MRTT as an end-run around Congress and Boeing…

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/11/13/commercial-tanker-refuels-us-air-force-fighters-for-singapore-exercise/

Commercial tanker refuels US Air Force fighters for Singapore exercise

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force conducted its first aerial refueling of fighter aircraft by a commercial tanker (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/05/the-us-air-force-is-getting-ready-to-make-a-decision-about-commercial-aerial-refueling-services/) on Nov. 6.

The commercial refueling of F-16 Fighting Falcons from Osan Air Base in South Korea took place as part of the Commando Sling 23 joint exercise conducted in Singapore…

This aerial refueling marked a major step forward for the U.S. Air Force’s efforts to broaden this capability (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/11/15/brittle-air-refueling-capability-endangers-us-during-major-war/). The service has considered augmenting its refueling operations with commercial tankers for several years. Earlier this year, a commercial tanker refueled an E-3 Sentry and an RC-135 Rivet Joint during an Air Combat Command exercise, the service said in a Nov. 9 release.

This month’s refueling during Commando Sling was carried out by a KDC-10 aircraft, the service said, and photographs showed the tanker bore the markings of Omega Air Refueling.

The Virginia-based company, which formed in 2004, has been a prime contractor to the U.S. Navy for commercial refueling services since 2007. It has also supported the air forces of U.S. allies such as Australia and NATO nations.

Lt. Col. Curtis Holtman, the air mobility operations chief for Pacific Air Forces, said this refueling served as a “proof of concept” to show a commercial tanker can gas up the Air Force’s fighters during exercises and training, while keeping its own tankers available for real-world operations….

Photographs showed at least four F-16 jets from Osan’s 36th Fighter Squadron flying alongside the Omega tanker on their way to Singapore. The KDC-10 can carry up to 247,000 pounds of fuel to gas up other aircraft.

Holtman said this tanker carried more than 40 passengers and four pallet positions worth of cargo to show how it can also execute airlift missions. The KDC-10 can carry up to 100,000 pounds of freight or passengers.

Holtman said commercial tankers are expected to also refuel F-15C Eagle and F-22 Raptor fighters by the time the exercise ends.

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1024x731/4e4pwk74tfeejbpuslozd6jtrm_7f44ff49d5bd2f11481d14873c49af830 bb4a399.jpg

[ORAC]

https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2024/01/09/cautionary-tale-how-boeing-won-a-us-air-force-program-and-lost-7b/

‘Cautionary tale’: How Boeing won a US Air Force program and lost $7B

[stilton]

I have to wonder if they’ll buy the KC-10s as they are retired or if they’ll go into the AMARG, in which case if there is a civil market for the MRTT as an end-run around Congress and Boeing…

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/11/13/commercial-tanker-refuels-us-air-force-fighters-for-singapore-exercise/

Commercial tanker refuels US Air Force fighters for Singapore exercise

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force conducted its first aerial refueling of fighter aircraft by a commercial tanker (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/05/the-us-air-force-is-getting-ready-to-make-a-decision-about-commercial-aerial-refueling-services/) on Nov. 6.

The commercial refueling of F-16 Fighting Falcons from Osan Air Base in South Korea took place as part of the Commando Sling 23 joint exercise conducted in Singapore…

This aerial refueling marked a major step forward for the U.S. Air Force’s efforts to broaden this capability (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/11/15/brittle-air-refueling-capability-endangers-us-during-major-war/). The service has considered augmenting its refueling operations with commercial tankers for several years. Earlier this year, a commercial tanker refueled an E-3 Sentry and an RC-135 Rivet Joint during an Air Combat Command exercise, the service said in a Nov. 9 release.

This month’s refueling during Commando Sling was carried out by a KDC-10 aircraft, the service said, and photographs showed the tanker bore the markings of Omega Air Refueling.

The Virginia-based company, which formed in 2004, has been a prime contractor to the U.S. Navy for commercial refueling services since 2007. It has also supported the air forces of U.S. allies such as Australia and NATO nations.

Lt. Col. Curtis Holtman, the air mobility operations chief for Pacific Air Forces, said this refueling served as a “proof of concept” to show a commercial tanker can gas up the Air Force’s fighters during exercises and training, while keeping its own tankers available for real-world operations….

Photographs showed at least four F-16 jets from Osan’s 36th Fighter Squadron flying alongside the Omega tanker on their way to Singapore. The KDC-10 can carry up to 247,000 pounds of fuel to gas up other aircraft.

Holtman said this tanker carried more than 40 passengers and four pallet positions worth of cargo to show how it can also execute airlift missions. The KDC-10 can carry up to 100,000 pounds of freight or passengers.

Holtman said commercial tankers are expected to also refuel F-15C Eagle and F-22 Raptor fighters by the time the exercise ends.

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1024x731/4e4pwk74tfeejbpuslozd6jtrm_7f44ff49d5bd2f11481d14873c49af830 bb4a399.jpg


Impressive, IIRC however the KC10 total fuel capacity was over 100K greater

At 356000 pounds it carried more than a 747 Classic but with one less engine

[ORAC]

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240212243032/en/Merlin-Signs-an-Agreement-with-the-United-States-Air-Force-as-First-Step-Towards-Bringing-Uncrewed-Flight-Capabilities-to-the-KC-135

Merlin Signs an Agreement with the United States Air Force as First Step Towards Bringing Uncrewed Flight Capabilities to the KC-135

BOSTON--(BUSINESS WIRE (https://www.businesswire.com/))--Merlin (https://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.merlinlabs.com%2F&esheet=53895676&newsitemid=20240212243032&lan=en-US&anchor=Merlin&index=1&md5=8a1dd1b38aac32cbe1cfc05073d4ff5b), the leading developer of safe, autonomous flight technology for fixed-wing aircraft, today announced it has entered into an agreement with the United States Air Force (USAF).

In collaboration with Air Mobility Command (AMC) and Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Merlin will design, integrate, test, and demonstrate aspects of the Merlin Pilot on the KC-135 Stratotanker for the first time.

The multi-year partnership is focused on using a stepwise approach starting with reducing crew workload, then proceeding to reduced crew operations. As the system gains experience and trust, it will pave the way for autonomous uncrewed operations of the KC-135; an unprecedented new capability for AMC and the USAF.

Merlin and the USAF’s collaboration will include, but is not limited to, system integration, ground testing, and extended flight demonstrations…….

[ICM]

So, "autonomous uncrewed operations"? It looks like C-135 variants will stretch to the designation's 100th birthday in some 20 years. Well done, Boeing.