More KC-46A woes.... [Archive] - Page 3

KenV

23rd Sep 2016, 17:37

Defense Daily 09/22/2016
Author: Rich Abott

The State Department approved a possible $1.9 billion Foreign Military Sales (FMS) request to Japan for KC-46A aerial refueling aircraft and related equipment, training, and support.The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of the potential sale on Sept. 21.
The sale would include four KC-46A aerial refueling aircraft., which is powered by two Pratt & Whitney Model 4062 (PW4062) Turbofan engines, with one additional spare engine. Each KC-46A is set to be delivered with GPS capability and defensive systems installed plus spares. This capability set includes the Raytheon [RTN] ALR-69A Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), Raytheon Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver (MAGR) 2000 (2K) to provide GPS Selective Availability AntiSpoofing Module SAASM capability, and Northrop Grumman's [NOC] AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system.

Each LAIRCM system comprises of three Guardian Laser Terminal Assemblies (GLTA), six Ultra-Violet Missile Warning System (UVMWS) Sensors AN/AAR-54, one LAIRCM System Processor Replacements (LSPR), one Control Indicator Unit Replacement, one Smart Card Assembly, and one High Capacity Card. All of the above major defense equipment (MDE) in the sale is worth about $1.5 billion.

Non-MDE equipment in the sale includes 12 AN/ARC-210 UHF Radios, six APX-119 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders, initial spares and repair parts, consumables, support equipment, technical data, engineering change proposals, publications, Field Service Representatives' (FSRs), repair and return, depot maintenance, training and training equipment, and contractor technical and logistics personnel services.

The sale also includes U.S. government and contractor representative support, Group A and B installation for subsystems, flight test and certification, and other related elements of logistics support.

The primary contractors for the sale are Boeing as aircraft manufacturer, Raytheon as manufacturer of the ALR-69A and the MAGR 2K, and Northrop Grumman as producer of the AN/AAQ-24(V)N LAIRCM system. Final assembly and delivery of the KC-46A occurs at Boeing's Everett, Wash., production facility, DSCA said.

Japan would use these aircraft and equipment to increase its capability to participate in Pacific region security operations and improve the country’s security posture as a U.S. ally, the agency said. DSCA characterized the KC-46A sale as a “needed capability” that will help Japan meet its legitimate security and defense needs.

[B]Side note: The 12 ARC-210 radios has me a bit baffled. The ARC-210 has been out of production for some time and we had trouble getting them for the last few C-17s, and that was a few years ago.

Onceapilot

23rd Sep 2016, 19:01

Stilton
re Thrust reversers, Not just "one slippery day"...every day!:oh: For a start, idle reverse reduces the need for wheel braking to almost nothing on a limiting LDR x 1.5 (or better) runway at MLW for normal ops.:ok: Additionally, there is a small factor to improve TORR and LDR performance with reverse and so, improve max operating weights and reduce operating base field requirements. The improvements to MTOW can be important where a base with limiting TODA/TORA must be used! :eek:

OAP

stilton

24th Sep 2016, 03:32

Couldn't agree more but this seems to be a USAF thing, they deleted the reversers
on the CFM56 that power the KC135R as well.

sandiego89

26th Sep 2016, 13:53

Can anyone ballpark what the savings would be not checking the reverse option on the dealer sheet? I would imagine initial and recurring savings in several categories, but how much cost, weight, reliability and maintenance are we talking about? I do understand that some thrust reversers cause more headaches than others.

KenV

26th Sep 2016, 15:11

Deleting reversers may seem like an odd thing (and I would agree), but requiring a main deck cargo door and main deck cargo floor are not that odd. They are basic customer requirements. Airbus did not agree and Airbus/Northrup Grumman's proposal was based on the passenger version of the A330 and not the freighter version, while Boeing's proposal was based on the 767F. It was obvious failures to meet basic requirements like these (along with illegal development aid by USAF to Airbus) that resulted in Boeing's successful protest. And the rest is history.

Heathrow Harry

26th Sep 2016, 15:44

according to Flight this week the USAF are already looking at a K-46 successor for 2030-ish.......

ORAC

26th Sep 2016, 16:19

Not so much a successor as the planned KC-Z. It looks like the KC-Y programme will be cancelled and split between extra KC-X (KC-46) and KC-Z.

The KC-Z was supposed to be the heavyweight tanker to replace the KC-10; not sure Airbus would even have bid though, even if the A330 is better on paper than the 777 for the job. Fingers burnt and knowing that they are only being used to drive the Boeing price down.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-lays-out-x-y-and-z-of-tanker-replacement-strat-210459/

However, it now seems that the USAF will want more of a stealth/tactical/UAV tanker, driven by the F-35s short legs and the needs of the Pacific theatre, so who knows?

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-commander-wants-technological-leap-to-kc-z-ta-429534/

maybe a spin off from the RAQ-25 CBARS? (http://en.ruvsa.com/news/unmanned_systems_development/UCLASS+Reborn+as+US+Navy+Unmanned+Tanker/)

KenV

26th Sep 2016, 16:21

according to Flight this week the USAF are already looking at a K-46 successor for 2030-ish....... The KC-135 has flown for over 60 years and will continue to do so for another decade or two. Maybe longer. The C-17 is planned to fly for another 100 years. It's likely that the "successor" to the KC-46 will be a derivative of the KC-46. But there is one big fudge factor in any future large aircraft programs. Boeing is on contract by NASA to further develop the Blending Wing Body and Low Drag Trussed-Braced Wing concepts. If there's a breakthrough in those technologies, USAF may ride on NASA's coattails to make an operational version.

KenV

26th Sep 2016, 16:24

The KC-Z was supposed to be the heavyweight tanker to replace the KC-10; not sure Airbus would even have bid though, even if the A330 is better on paper than the 777 for the job.I've heard from a number of quarters that the 777 is too highly optimized to cost effectively turn it into a tanker. The 787 even more so.

Lonewolf_50

26th Sep 2016, 19:55

KenV, do you mean too highly optimized for pax carriage? I had heard that 777's carry a bit of cargo as well ... but the devil is in the details.

NWSRG

26th Sep 2016, 20:50

The C-17 is planned to fly for another 100 years.

Now that is impressive...although I wonder what pilots born in 2096 will think of those archaic LCD displays :-)

tdracer

26th Sep 2016, 21:10

I've heard from a number of quarters that the 777 is too highly optimized to cost effectively turn it into a tanker. The 787 even more so.
KenV, that's not the way I heard it - the 777F would have made an great tanker. But there were three primary problems:
The ARINC 629 data system would have been a bitch to harden for HIRF/EMI/EMP;
The 777 is relatively expensive to build relative to the 767;
Most importantly, during the time frame in question (~2010), Boeing was able to readily sell all the 777s it could build to commercial customers, while orders for the 767 had pretty much dried up.

stilton

27th Sep 2016, 02:14

Is the KC46 'hardened' for EMP ?

tdracer

27th Sep 2016, 02:16

Is the KC46 'hardened' for EMP ?
Yep, EMP, HIRF, Lightning - to very high levels.
Much of the compliance has to be done by analysis because the levels are considerably higher than what can be generated in a lab environment...

Heathrow Harry

27th Sep 2016, 08:36

The US Air Force's head of air mobility command is calling for the service to acquire more tankers by 2035 and to possibly develop a "KC-Y" tanker to fill a procurement gap.

Based on the USAF’s current needs, Gen. Carlton Everhart says 179 Boeing KC-46 tankers the service is set to procure by 2028 are not enough. He also says the service's procurement of the future KC-Zs should be brought forward to 2035.

Even that schedule, however, would leave the US Air Force with no deliveries between 2028 and 2035 -- a gap Everhart says could be filled with an interim capability called KC-Y.
“I want to jump the leap in technology to go straight to the KC-Z,” he says. “If it means to bridge that, sure. But I’m also looking to the next leaps in technology because we do supply fuel to the nation.”

The air force will begin a study this year examining what the KC-Z tanker would look like and will start seeking investment opportunities a year after the study is completed. The USAF is considering whether the new tanker should include standoff, stealth or penetrating capabilities for an anti-access area denial environment. As the F-35 moves into denied environments, a low observable tanker should follow the fighter, Everhart says.

“We’re going to need a platform that we’ve never seen before,” he says. “The blended or hybrid wing, it’s a lifting body and it has a capability of being low observable.”
The service is also examining an unmanned tanker similar to the Navy’s MQ-25 Stingray, a programme which has shifted focus from a surveillance to air refueling role.

While Everhart has targeted a 2035 time frame for KC-Z, other factors in the service’s budget (including aircraft divestment), will affect the schedule. Science and technology (S&T) funding for KC-Z has already been covered under the KC-46 programme, Everhart says. “We gleaned some... funding off the KC-46 to help evolve the next programme,” he says. “S&T – we’ve already paid for it, it’s already been done.”

ORAC

27th Sep 2016, 09:32

HH, that's a copy of the second link in my post #511 above.

Heathrow Harry

27th Sep 2016, 10:47

Sorry and apologies - I missed that - but the text helps the lazy............

Still - seems a bit optomistic to be asking for more and new tankers when the latest one is just struggling into service and the last one lasted a thousand years (or it feels like it...)

KenV

27th Sep 2016, 18:49

KenV, do you mean too highly optimized for pax carriage? I had heard that 777's carry a bit of cargo as well ... but the devil is in the details. Well, 777F is a good freighter and a straight passenger A330 can be made into a tanker. So a freighter door and floor is not my point. I understand (but cannot confirm) that the 777's structure is so highly optimized that adding things like a refueling boom in the tail, fuel bladders in the lower hold, and WARP hardpoints and associated plumbing/wiring would require highly costly redesign/modification. And finally, it would be essentially impossible to harden the FBW flight controls on the 777.

The 767 design was less optimized and had manual fight controls. The A330 design was basically a stretched A300 with new wings and an A320 FBW added on. That A300 fuselage is why the A330 sits nose low on the ground, it has the same nose gear installation as A300 (albeit strengthened) while the main gear are taller which was possible given the new wing. I have no idea how Airbus proposed to harden the FBW system in their A330, assuming they even tried. Since Airbus was willing to propose an airframe with no cargo door and no freight floor contrary to USAF's spec requirement, perhaps they did not include FBW hardening either. I have no idea.

Heathrow Harry

28th Sep 2016, 09:07

"contrary to USAF's spec requirement"

Ken -was that the initial RFP that Airbus won or the revised RFP designed to gift the contract to Boeing??

KenV

28th Sep 2016, 12:37

"contrary to USAF's spec requirement...."
Ken -was that the initial RFP that Airbus won....Yes. That is why Boeing's protest was upheld.

....or the revised RFP designed to gift the contract to Boeing?? Airbus didn't seem to think the follow on RFPs (plural) were "gifts" to Boeing.

Heathrow Harry

28th Sep 2016, 17:17

Come on Ken - everyone knows the contest was rigged.............. not that I'm saying the British & French haven't done the same in the past.............

KenV

28th Sep 2016, 18:23

Come on Ken - everyone knows the contest was rigged....Indeed it was. In Airbus's favor. That's why GAO upheld the protest.

BEagle

28th Sep 2016, 19:34

Nonsense!

....................

KenV

29th Sep 2016, 12:44

Nonsense!
You're claiming that GAO upheld Boeing's protest because the selection process unfairly favored Boeing? Interesting viewpoint.

Heathrow Harry

29th Sep 2016, 14:12

Ken - when you are in a hole stop digging....................

Woff1965

30th Sep 2016, 02:27

Wasn't one of Boeing's gripes that the Airbus offering unfairly could haul cargo which the Kc 46 couldn't and this added capability therefore meant the USAF had used non-spec'd capabilities to go for the Airbus Tanker.

Bevo

30th Sep 2016, 03:47

From the GAO report on the tanker protest: LINK (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08991t.pdf)Note that the effect of the GAO report was not that Boeing should be awarded the contract, but rather that the Air Force should repeat the solicitation and evaluation process.

"First, we found that, although the solicitation identified the relative order of importance of the requirements and features of the aircraft solicited by the Air Force, the record did not show that the Air Force, in its evaluation and source selection decision, applied the identified relative weighting in assessing the merits of the firms’ proposals. In comparing Boeing’s assessed advantages against Northrop Grumman’s assessed advantages, the Air Force did not account for the fact that many of Boeing’s assessed advantages were derived from requirements and features of the aircraft which the solicitation identified as being more important than those from which Northrop Grumman’s assessed advantages were derived. Moreover, the solicitation requested that offerors propose to satisfy as many of the solicitation’s desired aircraft features and performance as possible, but the record did not show that the Air Force in its evaluation or source selection decision credited Boeing with satisfying far more of these features and functions than did Northrop Grumman.

Second, we found that a key discriminator relied upon by the Air Force in its selection of Northrop Grumman’s proposal for award was not consistent with the terms of the solicitation. Specifically, the Air Force credited Northrop Grumman for proposing to exceed a solicitation key performance parameter objective for fuel offload versus unrefueled range (that is, the amount of fuel a tanker could offload to a receiver aircraft at a given distance of flight by the tanker without itself refueling) to a greater extent than Boeing proposed, but the solicitation plainly provided that no consideration would be given for proposing to exceed key performance parameter objectives.

Third, we found that the record did not show that the Air Force reasonably determined that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft could refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing, tanker-compatible aircraft using current Air Force procedures, as was required by the solicitation. During the procurement, the Air Force twice informed Northrop Grumman that the proposed maximum operating velocity for that firm’s proposed aircraft would not be sufficient under current Air Force procedures to achieve overrun speeds for various Air Force aircraft. (In aerial refueling operations, if a receiver aircraft overruns the tanker during the final phase of rendezvous, the tanker and receiver pilots are directed to adjust to specified overrun speeds, and after overtaking the receiver aircraft, the tanker will decelerate to a refueling airspeed.) In response to the Air Force’s concerns, Northrop Grumman promised a solution to allow its aircraft to achieve the required overrun speeds. The record did not show that the Air Force reasonably evaluated the capability of Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft to achieve the necessary overrun speed in accordance with current Air Force procedures.

In addition, we found that the Air Force did not reasonably evaluate the capability of Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft to initiate emergency breakaway procedures, consistent with current Air Force procedures, with respect to a current fixed-wing, tanker-compatible Air Force aircraft. A breakaway maneuver is an emergency procedure that is done when any tanker or receiver aircraft crewmember perceives an unsafe condition that requires immediate separation of the aircraft. In such a situation, the tanker pilot is directed to accelerate, and if necessary to also climb, to achieve separation from the receiver aircraft.

Fourth, we found that the Air Force conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing. The agency informed Boeing during the procurement that it had fully satisfied a key performance parameter objective relating to operational utility. Later, the Air Force decided that Boeing had not fully satisfied this particular objective, but did not tell Boeing this, which would have afforded Boeing the opportunity to further address this. GAO concluded that it was improper for the Air Force, after informing Boeing that it had fully met this objective, to change this evaluation conclusion without providing Boeing the opportunity to address this requirement in discussions. In contrast, Northrop Grumman, whose proposal was evaluated as only partially meeting this requirement, received continued discussions addressing this same matter during the procurement.

Fifth, GAO found that the Air Force improperly accepted Northrop Grumman’s proposal, even though that firm took exception to a material solicitation requirement. Specifically, the solicitation required offerors to plan and support the agency to achieve initial organic depot-level maintenance within 2 years after delivery of the first full-rate production aircraft. Northrop Grumman was informed several times by the Air Force that the firm had not committed to the required 2-year timeframe, but Northrop Grumman refused to commit to the required schedule. GAO concluded that Northrop Grumman’s refusal to do so could not considered an “administrative oversight” as was found by the Air Force in its evaluation.

Sixth, we found that the Air Force did not reasonably evaluate military construction costs in evaluating the firms’ cost proposals. The solicitation provided that the Air Force would calculate a most probable life cycle cost estimate for each offeror. A most probable life cycle cost estimate reflects the agency’s independent estimate of all contract, budgetary, and other government costs associated with all phases of the aircraft’s life cycle from system development and demonstration through production and deployment and operations and support; military construction costs were specifically identified as a cost that the agency would evaluate in calculating the firms’ most probable life cycle costs. Because the agency believed that its anticipated requirements could not be reasonably ascertained, the Air Force established a notional (hypothetical) plan, identifying a number of different types of airbases, to provide for a common basis for evaluating military construction costs. GAO found that, in addition to four errors related to military construction costs that the Air Force conceded during the protest, the record otherwise showed that the agency’s military construction cost evaluation was flawed, because the agency’s evaluation did not account for the offerors’ specific proposals and because the record did not otherwise support the reasonableness of the agency’s notional plan.

Seventh, we found that the Air Force improperly increased Boeing’s estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating that firm’s most probable life cycle cost. Specifically, the Air Force assigned a moderate risk to Boeing’s system development and demonstration costs, because, despite several efforts to obtain support from Boeing for its proposed non-recurring engineering costs, Boeing had not sufficiently supported its estimate. Although we found the Air Force’s assignment of a moderate cost risk reasonable, GAO also found that the Air Force unreasonably increased Boeing’s estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating the firm’s most probable life cycle cost where the Air Force did not find that Boeing’s estimated costs were unrealistic or not probable."

ORAC

30th Sep 2016, 06:34

Seventh, we found that the Air Force improperly increased Boeing’s estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating that firm’s most probable life cycle cost. :ouch::ouch:

Heathrow Harry

30th Sep 2016, 15:36

you have to laugh!!!

ORAC

25th Jan 2017, 12:00

http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2017/01/23/boeing-kc-46-aerial-tanker-schedule-dod.html

Boeing KC-46 aerial tanker schedule 'unlikely to be executed' on time

Boeing's KC-46 Pegasus refueling jet is unlikely to meet its "aggressive" schedule, according to the annual report from the Department of Defense's Director of Operational Test & Evaluation. Boeing is scheduled to start delivering the tankers to Air Force bases in late 2017.

"Execution of the current schedule assumes historically unrealistic test aircraft fly and re-fly rates," the report says. The three-page Pegasus section from the report is below.........

Davef68

25th Jan 2017, 12:40

No chance of the New President cancelling it though, in spite of his AF1 comments, he seems to quite like Boeing

Heathrow Harry

26th Jan 2017, 08:09

"America First!" doesn't leave much hope of ever selling them anything for the next 4-8 years

ORAC

26th Jan 2017, 09:31

$2B overrun - so far - on a $5B contract. Not bad going. Perhaps Congress should ask who assessed the risk and the estimated costs when awarding the contract?

Boeing Takes Another $201M Hit On KC-46 Tanker (http://www.defensenews.com/articles/boeing-takes-another-201m-hit-on-kc-46-tanker)

WASHINGTON — Boeing on Wednesday announced a $201 million post-tax charge on the KC-46 tanker program, bringing cost overruns on the program up to more than $2 billion dollars.

Boeing is locked into a fixed-price contract with the Air Force that makes the company liable for any cost growth exceeding the $4.9 billion contract value. The company had previously paid more than $1.9 billion for cost growth induced by various technical issues during the tanker’s development. However, the $201 million charge incurred in the fourth quarter of 2016 stemmed from implementing changes to initial production aircraft, not a newly discovered problem, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg said in a Jan. 25 earnings call.

“The charge we took in the fourth quarter is [centered] around the previously defined configuration changes, the wiring changes,” he said. “Now we are implementing those at the detailed level in the initial production aircraft.” Although that work is well defined, "We have some job categories that are taking longer than planned in terms of hours per job, and that’s what you see in the charge,” he said.

The wiring issue dates back to 2014, when a Federal Aviation Administration review discovered that some wiring bundles within the tanker met commercial, but not military requirements. The issue forced Boeing to redesign some KC-46 wire bundles so that redundant wiring was not grouped together. Today’s charge comes in at $312 million before tax, which is split between Boeing’s commercial and defense business segments.

Although the company was “disappointed” with yet another charge on the KC-46A, Muilenburg told investors that he believes the program has turned a corner as it moves from development into production.

Heathrow Harry

26th Jan 2017, 12:23

I really think they made a mistake changing horses but I'm astounded how what looked like a simple conversion has turned so badly wrong - a bit like "upgrading" the 747-400......

OFBSLF

26th Jan 2017, 19:02

$2B overrun - so far - on a $5B contract.

That is some great work. :ugh:

galaxy flyer

26th Jan 2017, 19:58

Hardly a "simple conversion", it's an entirely new plane---200 fuse, -300IGW wing, -400 avionics plus all the AAR equptment. The configuration is like no civil B767,

GF

KenV

27th Jan 2017, 13:33

$2B overrun - so far - on a $5B contract. Not bad going. Perhaps Congress should ask who assessed the risk and the estimated costs when awarding the contract?Ummmm, it is a firm fixed price contract. The only risk to the government was schedule risk, which was mitigated by penalty clauses in the contract. Boeing paid for all the cost over runs out of pocket, NOT the government.

Heathrow Harry

27th Jan 2017, 14:46

Pity the UK MoD doesn't sign contracts like that..................

Heathrow Harry

27th Jan 2017, 14:47

"Hardly a "simple conversion", it's an entirely new plane---200 fuse, -300IGW wing, -400 avionics plus all the AAR equptment. The configuration is like no civil B767,"

I seem to remember it was partly sold (at least in public) on the basis it would be a fairly simple job on a well known and proven air-frame........

ORAC

27th Jan 2017, 15:08

KenV - they are supposed to do a rigorous check to ensure a big company doesn't bid below cost to drive competitors out of the market to ensure a future monopoly.

And who would expect Airbus to compete against Boeing in the future XC-Y and Z competitions, and Boeing not to price their bids accordingly?

KenV

31st Jan 2017, 15:47

Boeing refueling jet gets much-needed momentum with $2.1 billion deal
Washington Business Journal Online 01/30/2017
Author: James Bach
2017 American City Business Journals, Inc. All rights reserved

The new year is proving to be good thus far for The Boeing Co.'s (NYSE: BA) once-beleaguered tanker replacement, with the program gathering momentum in the wake of a $2.1 billion contract win Friday to build 15 more KC-46As.It represents the third contract for deliveries of the refueling aircraft and follows a $2.8 billion deal inked in August for a total of 19 planes. This means Boeing is currently on contract for 34 of the planned 179 KC-46As.

Boeing, a Chicago-based company, has about 2,700 employees in the Greater Washington area. Its defense business, which accounted for $29.5 billion of the company’s $94.6 billion in revenue in 2016, moved its headquarters to Arlington from Hazelwood, Missouri, earlier this month.

Since the contract was first awarded in 2011, the tanker has been an unexpectedly frustrating program for Boeing. Once considered a relatively low-risk program of converting a commercial 767 jet to a military refueling tanker that would replace the KC-135, KC-46 development has been marred by cost overruns and delays.
Because of the perceived low risk of the undertaking, the contract for development was fixed price. Unlike a cost-plus contract, Boeing would bear all the risk and have to swallow any cost overruns. In July 2014, Boeing took a $272 million after-tax charge on the program, and those only added up in the two years to follow. In July 2015, Boeing took another $536 million charge, with two more in 2016 totaling $549 million.

The final charge that came in July — and totaled $393 million — was expected to be the last as the program was moving into production. But last week the company reported it took a pre-tax charge of $312 million. The company’s commercial business absorbed $243 million of that total, while the defense business was saddled with the remaining $69 million.

Over the course of the program’s history, the KC-46’s problems could be traced to issues with the aircraft’s wiring and aerial refueling systems and a fuel contamination incident, sparking a 14-month delay, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported in November.
Despite these struggles, analysts I spoke with expected 2017 would be the year the program “hit stride”— with this recent contract reinforcing that notion.

“I think that that ought to be a program positioned to do much the same, pick up a lot of momentum this year,” Ben Harper, a partner and head of Boston-based Fairmont Consulting Group LLC’s aerospace practice, told me earlier this month.

KenV

31st Jan 2017, 15:56

KenV - they are supposed to do a rigorous check to ensure a big company doesn't bid below cost to drive competitors out of the market...Yes, they are supposed to do that and they did. Had the various problems not cropped up (bad wiring, quality control issues, over reliance on flight control software for the flying boom, a severe fuel contamination issue, etc) Boeing would have been on cost and on schedule. So their proposed price and schedule were reasonable and not a low ball bid to drive out competition.

BEagle

31st Jan 2017, 18:30

Those minor little issues apart....:rolleyes:

ORAC

31st Jan 2017, 19:21

"'Yes, yes, Mrs Lincoln, but, apart from that, how did you enjoy the play".....

None of the items you list were inevitable - they were due to the screw ups of the management team appointed - and IIRC you have commented on such repeatedly yourself - and that is one of the cardinal points considered during selection - the quality of the team.

Boeing screwed up putting in the team it did by misunderstanding the magnitude of the task - the DoD totally failed by failing to question Boeing's contract assumptions. Hindsight is wonderful - but who will pay the final expense - Boeing or the taxpayer?

As a personal observation, as major manufacturers have consolidated Boeing is half international as is Airbus - engines, avionics etc. The USA screwed up by having an industrial policy which closed MD and squeezed LM out of large aircraft manufacture - at the same time as effectively shutting down Boeing FJ manufacture. Airbus with the intent to open US plants gave the opportunity of reversing the emerging monopoly - they blew it.

Shareholder will ensure Airbus won't compete against Boeing for any future US military large jet contests as they know it is merely a way of the DoD trying to force Boeing to lower its price in a contest they can't win. Buy American does have its costs; and the F-35 programme and its costs may have done the same for the prospect of future US sales in the FJ market - China will do to LM what VW and Toyota/Mazda have done to the car market.

Just This Once...

31st Jan 2017, 19:28

A brace of 401(k)s will take the final hit.

Heathrow Harry

31st Jan 2017, 20:31

FYI

In the United States (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States), a 401(k) plan is the tax-qualified, defined-contribution (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defined_contribution) pension (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pension) account defined in subsection 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_Revenue_Code).[1] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/401%28k%29#cite_note-cornell-1) Under the plan, retirement savings contributions are provided (and sometimes proportionately matched) by an employer, deducted from the employee's paycheck before taxation (therefore tax-deferred (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax_deferral) until withdrawn after retirement or as otherwise permitted by applicable law), and limited to a maximum pre-tax annual contribution of $18,000 (as of 2015)

KenV

1st Feb 2017, 14:49

None of the items you list were inevitable - they were due to the screw ups of the management team appointed - and IIRC you have commented on such repeatedly yourself - and that is one of the cardinal points considered during selection - the quality of the team. Ummm, no it's not. What is considered during selection is the quality of the proposal. Boeing had a quality proposal, Airbus less so, and thus Boeing (eventually) won. Often (usually) many (most?) of the details of the development team are not known during the proposal stage so they cannot be evaluated by the proposal evaluation team. Even if the details of the development team were known, the government has no evaluation criteria for judging the quality of the overall team or of the individuals within that team. Second, a contractor can move people around within its organization with no government oversight. Perhaps anther program has a higher internal priority and a critical team member needs to be moved to that program. The government cannot stop that. So the team in the proposal may or may not be the team that actually does the job. And third, people are free to move from company to company. Once a company wins a proposal, they can poach top managers and engineers away from another company. And other companies can do the same to them. So even if it were possible to evaluate the quality of a team, there is no way to guarantee that team will remain intact for the life of the program/contract. So no, the development team is NOT "one of the cardinal points considered during selection."

KenV

1st Feb 2017, 15:11

Those minor little issues apart....:rolleyes:Indeed! Because NO ONE, not Boeing and not the government, could have predicted that those issues would crop up based on the content of the proposal. But the content of the proposal was sufficient to evaluate if a company was "low balling" a bid to win the contract and drive out competition. Something like that happened recently in the B-21 bid process. EVERY contract proposal was a "low ball" bid billions under the government estimate. So EVERY contractor team provided additional cost and pricing data to justify their bid price. NorthropGrumman significantly underbid Boeing/Lockheed and won. And then won the protest from Boeing/Lockheed.

KenV

1st Feb 2017, 15:19

A brace of 401(k)s will take the final hit. Certainly not.

1. Last year Boeing employees took a significant hit in their Performance Incentive Award (annual bonuses for good performance) because of the write downs on the KC-46 program despite huge gains elsewhere. This year, despite the KC-46 write downs, Boeing employees are expected to get near 100% of their Performance Incentive Awards.

2. 401(k)s belong 100% to the employee. Unlike traditional company pension plans (defined benefit plans) that can get wiped out when a company falters, 401(k) plans (defined contribution plans) cannot get wiped out even if the company goes completely bankrupt.

tdracer

3rd Feb 2017, 01:13

KenV - they are supposed to do a rigorous check to ensure a big company doesn't bid below cost to drive competitors out of the market to ensure a future monopoly.

ORAC
The Boeing proposal was a bit 'sporty' - we were basically told to put together our work statements 'assuming success' - but it was doable.
Most of the problems came from horrible management - in the Boeing commercial world only the 787 program had comparably poor management (and I doubt it's a coincidence that most of the management processes and management personnel for the 767-2C/KC-46 came from the 787 program :sad:). It was amazing how they managed to micro-manage areas where we knew what we were doing, yet totally ignored areas where they were clueless as to what was needed. As a result they ended up with refueling manifolds that leaked like a sieve, pipes that were too small to meet the required fuel transfer rates, and critical systems without the required wire separation. I was personally working propulsion system wire separation with the wire design people within months of contract award (wire separation is particularly tricky for the engines due to the limited number of places where wire bundles can pass through the pressure vessel). How those system separation requirements failed to be communicated to some of the other systems is a management mystery. Boeing knew the requirements, the stories in the press that we were caught off guard are bull:mad: - it was poor communication of the requirements.
The tanker program managers who knew what they were doing got so beat up and beat down that they transferred out of the program (I know two managers that simply retired when their efforts to transfer off the KC-46 program were refused).
All those poor design problems became magnified when the first five aircraft were pretty much built before much of the bad designs came to light, the resultant amount of rework was insane. Add to that the inevitable foul-ups and Murphy working overtime (such as the fuel analog screw up) and pretty soon you're $2 billion over budget.

BEagle

3rd Feb 2017, 07:28

Ummmmmmmmmm - thanks, tdracer, it's hardly surprising that the KC-46A programme is so seriously late and over budget following such a saga of mismanagement.

Has the ranting Trump stuck his nose into the Boeing KC-46A story yet? Or does he just trust in good Ol' Bubba Boeing to provide the 'warfighter' :yuk: with an American aircraft which does what it's supposed to?

ORAC

3rd Feb 2017, 07:54

Well with the two he has complained about - F-35 and AF1 - his issue has been price rather than slippage or capability.

Heathrow Harry

3rd Feb 2017, 08:12

He's a hotelier - he only can see $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

Evanelpus

3rd Feb 2017, 08:51

Well, it was up and flying yesterday off the coast of Seattle. It had been airborne for over 4 hours before I lost the will to watch it any more.

KenV

3rd Feb 2017, 17:29

Has the ranting Trump stuck his nose into the Boeing KC-46A story yet? Or does he just trust in good Ol' Bubba Boeing to provide the 'warfighter' http://cdn.pprune.org/images/smilies/pukey.gif with an American aircraft which does what it's supposed to? See post 545. USAF just signed a $2.1billion deal for 15 more KC-46's. No mention of Trump's nose anywhere in sight.

BEagle

3rd Feb 2017, 20:18

Ummmmmmmmmmm-yet?

Lyneham Lad

21st Feb 2017, 14:18

On Flight Global:-
KC-46A tests delayed until January 2018 (https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/kc-46a-tests-delayed-until-january-2018-434228/?cmpid=NLC%7CFGFG%7CFGFIN-2017-0221-GLOB&sfid=70120000000taAh)

Initial operational test and evaluation on the Boeing KC-46A tanker will begin in January 2018 at the earliest, US Air Force officials tell FlightGlobal.

In a 10 February interview at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, KC-46 programme manager Col. John Newberry told FlightGlobalthat testing will begin pending the results of a US Air Force IOT&E readiness review in the fall of 2017.

Lyneham Lad

24th Mar 2017, 22:39

More potential woe & slippages - Defense News article 24 March:-Already a year delayed, KC-46 program at risk of further schedule slips (http://www.defensenews.com/articles/already-a-year-delayed-kc-46-program-at-risk-for-further-schedule-slippage)

KenV

19th May 2017, 12:18

Boeing Still Tracking Toward First KC-46A Delivery This Year

Boeing is forging ahead with KC-46 Pegasus FAA airworthiness certification in the hopes of getting the aircraft certified for delivery to the U.S. Air Force by year’s end.

The company is on the hook to deliver 18 combat-ready aircraft to the service’s first operational and training bases by “early 2018,” a revised timeline set down by the government in late 2016 when the program entered low-rate initial production.
The program is running about one year behind its original delivery schedule because of various technical setbacks during development. Boeing continued building tankers on its own dime at the planned rate and now has six test aircraft built and flying, plus 20 more in various stages of assembly. But the Air Force won’t accept any deliveries of aircraft before the airworthiness certification process is complete.

Mike Gibbon, Boeing’s KC-46 vice president and program manager, says he is confident the aircraft will be certified by year’s end, and at that point Boeing will deliver the aircraft as fast as the Air Force can accept them.

Heathrow Harry

19th May 2017, 13:29

"Boeing is forging ahead" but is over a year behind - you have to laugh at the people who put out such statements

KenV

19th May 2017, 14:09

"Boeing is forging ahead" but is over a year behind - you have to laugh at the people who put out such statementsBy modern standards, a "year behind" in a military aircraft development program is remarkable. A400 for example is far further behind and getting worse, not better. Airbus is now attempting to renegotiate the entire program.

Heathrow Harry

19th May 2017, 14:13

The A-400 is a completely new airframe and engines

the KC-46 was supposed to be a risk-free simple reworking of a 36 year old design that they've already delivered over 1000 units...........

eckhard

19th May 2017, 17:12

Boeing is forging ahead with KC-46 Pegasus FAA airworthiness certification in the hopes of getting the aircraft certified for delivery to the U.S. Air Force by year’s end.

Why does a military aircraft need FAA certification before delivery to an Air Force?

KenV

19th May 2017, 20:04

Why does a military aircraft need FAA certification before delivery to an Air Force?Because it is a commercial derivative aircraft. There are actually three kinds of certifications involved. The aircraft will be produced on the existing Boeing production certificate. The basic airframe has an existing commercial FAA type certificate and will receive a new amended type certificate (ATC). The military bits will receive supplemental type certificates (STC). These are all pre-delivery processes/certifications. Post-delivery (i.e. after the airplane leaves the production environment and enters the operational environment) the aircraft will be supported and maintained using commercial maintenance certification. USAF deemed that to be a quicker, easier, and cheaper way to certify the aircraft as well as its production and support/maintenance processes

To put this into perspective, the 6 KC-46s that are now flying in the test program have not been delivered and are still in the production environment. Production processes (including all the record keeping) must be used to support and maintain them. That includes de-modding them from test aircraft configuration to operational aircraft configuration. The maintenance manuals/Tech Orders, SRM (Structural Repair Manual), etc may NOT be used in the production environment. Only after the test aircraft are demodded and the customer accepts those aircraft will they enter the post-production environment and use all the processes/certifications that apply there. It's complicated.

KenV

19th May 2017, 20:16

the KC-46 was supposed to be a risk-free simple reworking of a 36 year old design that they've already delivered over 1000 units...........Gotta love it. Only the clueless (or those with an axe to grind) would use "risk free" to describe any development project, especially a military one that is being certified using commercial processes.

eckhard

19th May 2017, 21:32

Thanks KenV for a very comprehensive explanation.
As you say, it's complicated!

Heathrow Harry

20th May 2017, 07:10

I agree ken - there are always risks - but at the time this is what Boeing said in their press release and they keep using the words "proven" & "low-risk":-

ST. LOUIS, Feb. 24, 2011 -- The Boeing Company [NYSE: A] has received a contract from the U.S. Air Force to build the next-generation aerial refueling tanker aircraft that will replace 179 of the service’s 400 KC-135 tankers.

The contract calls for Boeing to design, develop, manufacture and deliver 18 initial combat-ready tankers by 2017.

............................
In selecting the Boeing NewGen Tanker after a lengthy and rigorous proposal process, the Air Force has chosen an American-built, multi-mission tanker that is based on the proven Boeing 767 commercial airplane and meets all requirements at the lowest risk for the warfighter and the best value for taxpayers.

The Boeing proposal was created by an integrated "One Boeing" team from various sites across the company, including employees from the Commercial Airplanes; Defense, Space & Security; and Engineering, Operations & Technology organizations.
"This contract award would not have been possible without the hundreds of Boeing employees across the entire company, and the thousands of our industry teammates, who remained laser-focused on our commitment to offer a solution that is first in capability and best in value,” said Dennis Muilenburg, president and CEO of Boeing Defense, Space & Security. "This award is also a tribute to the Air Force and Defense Department officials who worked so tirelessly to make this procurement process fair, ultimately resulting in the selection of the right plane for the mission. We look forward to working with our Air Force customer to deliver this much needed capability to the servicemen and women we are honored to serve."

The KC-46A tankers will be built using a low-risk approach to manufacturing by a trained and experienced U.S. work force at existing Boeing facilities. The KC-46A tanker also will fuel the economy as it supports approximately 50,000 total U.S. jobs with Boeing and more than 800 suppliers in more than 40 states.

"Boeing has always been committed to the integrity of the competitive process, and the men and women across our Boeing commercial and defense teams and our entire supplier network are ready to extend that commitment to delivering these tankers on time and on budget," said Jim Albaugh, president and CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes.

Based on the proven Boeing 767 commercial airplane, the KC-46A Tanker is a widebody, multi-mission aircraft updated with the latest and most advanced technology and capable of meeting or exceeding the Air Force's needs for transport of fuel, cargo, passengers and patients. It includes state-of-the-art systems to meet the demanding mission requirements of the future, including a digital flight deck featuring Boeing 787 Dreamliner electronic displays and a flight control design philosophy that places aircrews in command rather than allowing computer software to limit combat maneuverability. The NewGen Tanker also features an advanced KC-10 boom with an expanded refueling envelope, increased fuel offload rate and fly-by-wire control system.

KenV

22nd May 2017, 18:14

I agree ken - there are always risks - but at the time this is what Boeing said in their press release and they keep using the words "proven" & "low-risk":-Maybe its the language barrier, but on this side of the Atlantic there's a rather large difference between "proven/low risk" and "risk free." Note that all the "proven" parts have indeed turned out to be "low risk." The delays have been due to the many "new" bits that require development, testing, and certification. And while the program is indeed a year behind, most indications point to that year being made up fairly soon.

All the above is rather a far far cry from a certain transport program that's not only several years behind and several billions over cost, but getting worse rather than better. And with the manufacturer demanding the program be renegotiated (a second time!) not much hope in sight. And all this ignores a 2015 tragedy in Seville.

Why do a pot and kettle spring to mind?

BEagle

22nd May 2017, 18:34

Oh my....errrrmmm....the usual KenV half-truths and anti-A400M bolleaux...

Judging by the number flying around here these days, the A400M Atlas is serving the RAF pretty well right now.

Whereas that aged, absurd KC-46A Pig'sArse Frankentanker is still a long way from even starting OT&E with Uncle Spam's Air Force, let alone becoming operational...:rolleyes:

Pots and kettles, for sure.

KenV

22nd May 2017, 19:26

Oh my....errrrmmm....the usual KenV half-truths and anti-A400M bolleaux....Oh my. I clearly touched a nerve. What "half-truth" have I uttered? Can you name one?

Since you've decided to make this personal, let's touch another nerve. What is the "truth" and "half-truth" concerning the number of people who have died flying an A-400M vs a KC-46? Is that an "anti-A400M" question or just a tragic albeit embarrassing factoid? And (once again) for the record, I am NOT anti-A400M. I believe it is an excellent aircraft with tremendous potential. It's development and entry into production on the other hand has been anything but excellent. And that's what this is about: a development program leading into early production. The program's many woes are self evident.

...Judging by the number flying around here these days, the A400M Atlas is serving the RAF pretty well right now.Hmmm. How well is it doing for Germany? German Minister forced to change plane after A400M trouble (http://www.reuters.com/article/airbus-germany-idUSL5N1FS585http://)

Further, how many should be "flying around" vs how many are actually "flying around?" (i.e. how many should have been delivered by now vs how many were actually delivered?) And of those delivered how late were their deliveries? And since the aircraft was designed and sold as a tactical airlifter with some strategic capabilities, how many tactical missions has the RAF performed with the aircraft? None you say? Hmmmmm. Is that a "half truth" or an embarrassing one? So that's another problem with the program: developing its full potential has been embarrassingly slow.

And once again, I'm NOT "anti-A440". I'm very confident the A400 will ultimately be an excellent tactical airlifter. It's just taken a whole lot longer and cost a whole lot more money than promised to get there. And that's what this discussion is about: the program, not the aircraft. Although you'd clearly like to make it about the aircraft with your oft repeated yet zero truth "frankentanker" epithet. And oh yes, how is that tanker capability the A400M was touted as having turning out?

As for you comparing flight hours of a developmental aircraft with flight hours of a delivered aircraft, that's apples and oranges, not pots and kettles. You need to get your idioms straight.

aw ditor

22nd May 2017, 19:43

Handbags at dawn?

BEagle

22nd May 2017, 21:10

Or this:

W4JBMwCm1zE

peter we

23rd May 2017, 06:01

Maybe its the language barrier, but on this side of the Atlantic there's a rather large difference between "proven/low risk" and "risk free." Note that all the "proven" parts have indeed turned out to be "low risk."

Maybe Boeing should have explained that in their press releases.
And the definition of Proven - "Having been demonstrated or verified without doubt"

Heathrow Harry

23rd May 2017, 07:23

To be honest it really doesn't matter - what we see is the two biggest aircraft manufacturers in the world making a mess of a) taking a proven design and screwing up the conversion and b) starting with a clean sheet and screwing up

I guess it goes to show that building aeroplanes is still not quite the science we think it is..............

PEI_3721

23rd May 2017, 07:54

It is of little of little consequence that both manufacturers 'screwed up'; we love to blame and point out 'error'.

The alternative is to consider what might be learnt.
Both manufacturers were directed by military requirement involving cost and time constraint, and specifications more often based on wish lists subject to change.
Modern large scale projects involve timescales greater than the changes in political and military objectives, yet in an era where technology is perceived to be easy to change or can meet any task. The reality is that any future requirement is difficult to define; countries lack the necessary foresight of future threats. The military require flexibility but cannot afford it, change appears easy, new regulation and testing constraints add complexity.

It is easy in hindsight to point out the 'errors', but there is greater value in understanding the evolution of programmes, the driving forces, and how these might be applied to future projects. How can we best manage uncertainty.
Unfortunately we often forget, there is always something better, and something worse ... politics.

ORAC

23rd May 2017, 08:11

I wouldn't agree that statement matches the KC-46 programme at all. On the contrary, it was exactly because it appeared as a simple modifications of a mature product that led to Boeing taking their eye of the ball.

From what I have read here previously, and I think KenV will agree, Boeing put their best management and engineers on other programmes which had problems and larger orders such as the 787 and P-8, and those assigned to the KC-46 were very much the B team. The problems which then occurred, such as not designing the wiring looms to DoD specifications etc, were down to engineering screw-ups and lack of management oversight - not a struggle to implement new technology.

They are sorting - but it's the Boeing shareholders who are feeling the pain.

KenV

23rd May 2017, 16:40

Maybe Boeing should have explained that in their press releases. They did. For example, here's a cut and paste from the article cited above:
The KC-46A tankers will be built using a low-risk approach to manufacturing by a trained and experienced U.S. work force at existing Boeing facilities.

Do you understand what "low risk approach to manufacturing means?" What "existing Boeing facilities" means? It does not mean "risk free development." Read the paragraph in post #569 regarding civil certification and using the existing production certificate to manufacture the aircraft. BTW, this sentence was addressing the Airbus proposal, which proposed an entirely new production facility using new people totally unfamiliar with the aircraft to build Airbus' KC-30. And oh yes, it would have required certifying that production facility and its processes. Not an easy or quick thing to do. Or cheap.

KenV

23rd May 2017, 17:46

From what I have read here previously, and I think KenV will agree, Boeing put their best management and engineers on other programmes which had problems and larger orders such as the 787 and P-8, and those assigned to the KC-46 were very much the B team. The problems which then occurred, such as not designing the wiring looms to DoD specifications etc, were down to engineering screw-ups and lack of management oversight - not a struggle to implement new technology.The final KC-46 engineering team was definitely not the A team, but still quite good. The management team on the other hand was not up to snuff. Further, the whole KC-46 program was exceedingly drawn out and convoluted. The original plan 15 (FIFTEEN!) years ago was to produce KC-767s (like the ones delivered to Italy and Japan) and lease them to USAF. That got killed to be resurrected as a mixed purchase and lease program. That got killed. The program morphed into the KC-X competition, which had 4 or 5 different proposals. Eventually that necked down to two. EADS (now Airbus) won round 1. Round 2 got killed. And Boeing won round 3. It is literally impossible to keep the same design or management team together over a 15 year period yet over that period there were lots and lots of changes by lots of different groups of engineers, including many from Douglas Aircraft in Long Beach and McDonnell in St Louis. Despite that, the engineering was quite good and coodination tight. But because of the very tough competition from EADS/Airbus, Boeing proposed a very aggressive development schedule (not to mention a very aggressive price.) with little margin.

So what caused the delay? First the aggressive schedule did not have a lot of margin for error. It was very success oriented. The first big foul up related to civil certification of a military aircraft. Wire harnesses were designed using civil requirements, but USAF insisted (properly) they should have been done to military requirements. That cost about one third of the delay. Then a real blunder was uncovered related to the design of new fuel manifolds. That cost another three months. Then during testing a vendor mis-labelled a container of test fluid contaminating and damaging the entire fuel system of the test aircraft. That added a few more months. The boom flight control system went digital (the original was analog) and included a software feature designed to replace a mechanical over pressure relief valve. It worked great during a bunch of flight tests. But it turned out the software was not quite "robust enough" under some conditions, necessitating a change back to include the mechanical relief valve. That added more months. Not to add the relief valve, that was easy. But a lot of flight testing had been done using the new configuration and going back to the old one meant redoing a bunch of that flight testing. And so it went until the program is now about a year behind schedule.

Such glitches are pretty much par for the course (A380 had huge wiring problems early in the program also.) and are usually accommodated by the dollar and schedule margin built into the program. But this program was exceptionally tight and the margin proved to be insufficient.

Rwy in Sight

23rd May 2017, 18:22

USAF insisted (properly) they should have been done to military requirements..

Why USAF did not insist on that before signing the contract?

ORAC

23rd May 2017, 19:51

They did. Which is why Boeing is paying to fix it.

George K Lee

24th May 2017, 00:03

It was very success oriented.

Execubabble for "yelling RUMPLESNITZ! as a way of eliminating risk".

Rwy in Sight

24th May 2017, 05:59

ORAC, I am not sure I understand. If USAF insisted on the military way, why Boeing did not include its cost on the revised calculations before finalizing the contract and delivery times?

ORAC

24th May 2017, 18:58

It's like the T&Cs on something like Amazon, di you actually read them before clicking yes?

Those used to working on military contracts know through long experience the relevant manuals and specifications for military work. You throw in a team used to working on civil projects who equally just know the civil specifications, are they going to spend months trying to read every book/standard in the contract?

Assumption? Someone in a hurry just assumed the specs were the same, nobody had the military contract background to query the design - and it came back to bite them.

KenV

24th May 2017, 19:25

Those used to working on military contracts know through long experience the relevant manuals and specifications for military work. You throw in a team used to working on civil projects who equally just know the civil specifications, are they going to spend months trying to read every book/standard in the contract?

Assumption? Someone in a hurry just assumed the specs were the same, nobody had the military contract background to query the design - and it came back to bite them.

That's part of it. Another part is that a lot of the wire harnesses are designed, installed, and certified to civil certification standards and other wire harnesses to Mil Standard. It was assumed that if a wire harness was going to be certified by the FAA, it would be designed and installed per the civil standards. Bad assumption. Many (though not all) civilly certified wire harnesses had to be designed and installed per Mil Standard. That's rather odd to certify to one standard and design and install to another, but that's how the contract read. And that was missed.

The Helpful Stacker

24th May 2017, 21:33

"What is the "truth" and "half-truth" concerning the number of people who have died flying an A-400M vs a KC-46?"

Being as the KC-46 is a development of an existing design...Over 700 people have died during the 'development' of the KC-46.

The problem with comparing apples (KC-46) with oranges (A400M) is that the stats can be manipulated as required to suit an agenda.

CONSO

24th May 2017, 21:59

That's part of it. Another part is that a lot of the wire harnesses are designed, installed, and certified to civil certification standards and other wire harnesses to Mil Standard. It was assumed that if a wire harness was going to be certified by the FAA, it would be designed and installed per the civil standards. Bad assumption. Many (though not all) civilly certified wire harnesses had to be designed and installed per Mil Standard. That's rather odd to certify to one standard and design and install to another, but that's how the contract read. And that was missed.
Well the military has always had- required greater shielding and power- instrument- safety separation for reasons of EMP hardening generally above FAA standards. Most old timers in Boeing knew this- but the few remaining were igmnored by the latest whiz kids- it was that kind ofv issue that fubared the italian and japanese tankers in the early 2000;s Thebasic 767 airframe WAS mil certified in early 2000 oor so. But the mcdoug types wanted it thier way and drove the costs/lease issue in 2001 to a fubar squared cluster.****- And the rest is history !

tdracer

26th May 2017, 03:24

I've posted previously that the 767-2C/KC-46 was, by far, the worst managed program I was involved in during my 39+ career at Boeing (with the disclaimer that I wasn't on the 787 program :rolleyes:).
When Airbus was awarded the tanker contract in 2008, I was simultaneously disappointed and relieved - both the 787 and the 747-8 were in development (I was heading my group for the 747-8 and we were already shorthanded) and I knew we didn't have the bandwidth to do another program.
A couple years later, when were asked for work statements for the revised proposal, we were told to "assume success", and not to pad our estimates. I put in what I thought was a bare bones estimate yet still got grilled as to why we needed so many hours (a later, independent audit concluded my estimate was less than half of what was needed). Plus, while I don't know if this happened on the tanker, I know for a fact, that my work statement estimate for the 747-8 was unilaterally reduced by 30% by upper management after I submitted it (needless to say, we over-ran that estimate...).

While it was certainly true that the tanker program didn't get the 'A' team, the level of miss-management was really mind boggling. The wiring and EMI protection requirements were fully known up front, and some groups took them into account early on. Perhaps it's because wire isolation and EMI protection have long been a major design concern for propulsion (engine to engine isolating being a FAR requirement), we were designing for them even during the proposal stage. It simply boggles the mind that some groups apparently remained completely ignorant of the USAF requirements until after the first tanker aircraft was basically built - to quote a great movie, "What we have here is failure to communicate". EVERY manager who's group didn't properly incorporate the required wire isolation and EMI protection should have been demoted or fired for incompetence - but to the best of my knowledge nothing of the kind happened. In fact, quite the opposite occurred - I personally know several people who were very competent managers on the 767-2C/KC-46 program who got so fed up/beat up that they voluntarily left the management ranks and returned to engineering or simply retired.
FAA cert was another can of worms - and contrary to popular belief the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (SACO) doesn't do Boeing many favors (BTW FAA Part 25 cert was a USAF requirement, although it drove massive cost into the program with little tangible benefit). The FAA has something called "Changed Product Rule" (CPR) - which is used on a derivate aircraft to determine what systems can retain their original cert basis and what has to step up to the latest regulations. Many systems were blindsided when the FAA ruled them to be 'Changed Systems per CPR' due to small changes, resulting in tens of thousands of hours of non-value added work to show full compliance to regulations that were only slightly changed from the original cert basis (I personally got caught out by that one). My question as to why we had to certify a military derivative aircraft to a greater level of safety than it's civilian counterpart (that, BTW, has an enviable safety record) went strangely unanswered :ugh:
I also grossly underestimated the additional effort required for USAF coordination (by roughly a factor of 10:sad:) as this was my first exposure to a military program.

tdracer

26th May 2017, 03:35

Being as the KC-46 is a development of an existing design...Over 700 people have died during the 'development' of the KC-46.

Strange that you'd include hijacking/terrorist related deaths as "development" - something that credible authorities discount when calculating safety statistics.

How about a meaningful, universally accepted safety parameter like "hull loss rate", or "fatalities per million operational hours". I think you'll find the A400 statistics would, well, suck...

Heathrow Harry

26th May 2017, 06:58

Thanks TD for the post - good, clear explanation as to how it went off the rails.........

ImageGear

26th May 2017, 10:27

Please forgive my ignorance if I have missed a comment.

I have been following the development of the KC-46A on here since it's inception, but only from the standpoint of large project management.

Since I have no design or development experience of any aircraft on my CV, let alone a large military aircraft, I have a fairly simple question.

History suggests that although the 767 basic airframe was used, virtually everything else was "reworked" to meet the requirements of the USAF.

Would anyone be prepared to say, what the percentage of new components, (as in designed and manufactured specifically for..) had to be sourced to meet the specific USAF requirements?

Thanks

Imagegear

KenV

30th May 2017, 14:54

Would anyone be prepared to say, what the percentage of new components, (as in designed and manufactured specifically for..) had to be sourced to meet the specific USAF requirements?

Structurally? Not too much. 5%?

Fuel system? Lots and lots of big changes to the tankage, plumbing, valving, pumping, displays, and processors/software.

Powerplant? Not too much. Slight change to engines (mostly to satisfy USAF servicing requirements). Nacelles are unique to KC-46 due to USAF not wanting thrust reversers, which also resulted in a change to the EEC software which controls the reversers that aren't there anymore. Off the shelf APU, but some changes to APU starting system to accommodate "alert status" APU starting.

Avionics, not too much. The biggest change was a switch to 787 flight deck displays and display processors/drivers. These parts have a KC-46 specific part number, but are essentially the same parts as on 787.

Wiring is a different thing. Over 25 miles of wire were added.

Obviously the refueling boom, WARP (Wing Aerial Refueling Pods), 3-D camera system, and RARO (Remote Aerial Refueling Operator) Station and associated installation provisions are KC-46 unique.

ImageGear

30th May 2017, 16:59

Kenv

With apologies:

You mention six completely separate pieces of work which needed to be seamlessly integrated with all the associated functionality, redundancy, recovery, and hardening.

That's beginning to sound more like a 25-30% modification across the piece. If so then that represents quite a significant amount of effort in terms of project duration and the potential for delay.

Even if, as they should have been, all the bases had been covered during the design process, do you believe that the project still had the potential to be successful (Within the definition of success) for the USAF?

If not, is there a fallback position which will allow face saving on both sides?

Imagegear

Lordflasheart

30th May 2017, 18:46

If not, is there a fallback position which will allow face saving on both sides? How about an irreverent misquote ? "We're surrounded. That simplifies our problem"

Crunch Time: USAF Says Boeing?s Tanker ?Several Months Behind? | Defense content from Aviation Week (http://aviationweek.com/defense/crunch-time-usaf-says-boeing-s-tanker-several-months-behind?NL=AW-19&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_2&utm_rid=CPEN1000000897413&utm_campaign=10219&utm_medium=email&elq2=f28ef755e84443dbb14d43d90eea663c)

"Boeing (http://awin.aviationweek.com/OrganizationProfiles.aspx?orgId=12083)’s time line for delivering 18 full-up KC-46A (http://awin.aviationweek.com/ProgramProfileDetails.aspx?pgId=1104&pgName=Boeing+KC-46A) tankers to the U.S. Air Force is getting tighter and tighter.

The manufacturer is several months behind schedule on the tanker program, which means the first aircraft will not be delivered until after September, top Air Force officials told Congress in written testimony May 25.

“We are making steady but slower progress than we had anticipated,” Lt. Gen. Arnie Bunch, the service’s military deputy for acquisition, told the House Armed Services Committee. “We are running into areas where we are being delayed.”

Boeing has fixed the design problems with the tanker’s refueling system it saw last summer, and has had no new technical issues with the aircraft, the company says. But those design problems delayed completion of key flight tests; the challenge now is making up for lost time.

The test program is running behind the planned pace because several test aircraft are still undergoing upgrades to incorporate design changes, Bunch wrote in his testimony. Meanwhile, Boeing’s design of several subsystems and production of conformed hardware are still pending FAA (http://awin.aviationweek.com/OrganizationProfiles.aspx?orgId=31159) approval, further slowing flight tests, he wrote. ..... "

LFH

precontact

31st May 2017, 01:17

CONSO

31st May 2017, 01:52

I thought the issue was that the criteria the FAA mandates for separation of critical wire bundles had been updated since the 767 was first certified in the early 80s but Boeing didn't comply with the updated rules for the 767-2C which has many more miles of wiring than a standard 767.

Military EMP shielding issues are much more stringent than FAA requirements. Its MORE than FAA separation and FAA lightning protection requirements. As in a ' nearby ' ( say within 50 miles ) nuke EMP detonation pulse . The basic 767 has ( still ? ) minimum cable controls useable in the event of total loss of electrical power except for a RAT to power a few instruments. ( look up the GIMLI Glider ) tosee how that works ). .Now add FBW style controls for boom, special communication wiring, etc and the ' separation ' issue is the least of the problems.

And ' simply' moving certain wires futher apart is NOT simple- nor adequate to ' fix' - especially in a plane already stuffed and assmbled. re wiring your home AFTER completion would be relatively simple by compariso.

Extra grounding- alternate power paths, and special terminations are a small part of the corrections needed to comply to long standing MIL spec ..:ugh:

stilton

31st May 2017, 05:44

The 767 RAT provides hydraulic power to the flight controls in the event of a dual
engine flameout.

It does not provide any electrical power.

Rwy in Sight

31st May 2017, 06:31

Davef68

31st May 2017, 13:58

From memory, the Italian and Japanese aircraft are basically 767-200ERs with the current (KC10?) flying boom. The KC46 is a 200F airframe with 300F floor and cargo door and -400 series digital cockpit, alongside a new version of the flying boom (Hence the 'Frankentanker epiphet that some detractors use)

BEagle

31st May 2017, 16:04

The USAF have a requirement for the KC-46A to operate far closer to a threat environment than virtually every other tanker nation. Hence the requirements for systems redundancy, including cable runs etc. are more severe for the KC-46A Pegasus than for the KC-767I or KC-767J.

The KC-46A is also intended to be used as a 'smart tanker', with an associated need for clever comms kit etc., but this isn't a feature of the KC-767I or KC-767J.

A lot of programme delay for the Italian tanker was down to buffet and flutter problems caused by the pods/pylons. Whereas the KC-767J has the 'old-style' boom rather than the latest generation version fitted to KC-46A; the KC-767J is not fitted with wing AAR pods, hence introduction into service with the JASDF was achieved very quickly.

KenV

31st May 2017, 16:24

Even if, as they should have been, all the bases had been covered during the design process, do you believe that the project still had the potential to be successful (Within the definition of success) for the USAF?"had the potential"? In my opinion, it STILL has the potential to be successful and very likely will be. A one year delay does not a failure make.

KenV

31st May 2017, 16:41

KenV,How much different is the US version of the tanker to the Italian or Japanese? I would have thought the US version and the Italian would share many specification - maybe as a part of the NATO specification.Quite a bit different. KC-767 was based on 767-200ER. Indeed they were built as 767-200ER and then flown to a mod center where they were modified to tanker configuration. KC-46 is based on the 767-200LRF (Long Range Freighter) which has -200ER fuselage, -300F wing, landing gear, cargo door and floor, -400ER avionics with 787 displays, different refueling boom (KC-10 advanced refueling boom vs KC-135 refueling boom) and different WARP (wing aerial refueling pods) than Italian tanker (Japanese tanker had no WARP). And about 25 miles of additional wiring to accommodate new USAF "smart tanker" requirements. The combination above is why some apply the absurd "frankentanker" epithet to the KC-46.

GlobalNav

31st May 2017, 17:38

A complex certification too (as if any certification is simple). Show compliance for FAA certification of the 767C amended type design, for certification of the supplemental type design (installations of all the "tanker" items) and military certification of the many GFE bits and pieces for which there are no FAA criteria and which may be classified. And there's the Plan for certification and the actual Execution, which require many iterations to reconcile. These were all part of the USAF requirements and Boeing proposal the USAF selected.

tdracer

31st May 2017, 18:28

The 767 RAT provides hydraulic power to the flight controls in the event of a dual
engine flameout.

It does not provide any electrical power.
Correct - the 767 battery is certified to supply critical electronics for 30 minutes (which in the case of an all engine power loss is considered to longer than a 767 would be able to glide).
However the hydraulics can supply some electrical power via the HMG (HydroMechanical Generator). I don't believe early 767s had an HMG basic, it was added as part of the ETOPS package.

Lyneham Lad

20th Sep 2017, 17:54

Article on Flight Global (https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/kc-46a-testing-glitches-could-delay-usaf-tanker-mile-441284/):-

(Snip) Despite earlier assurances that Boeing would deliver the US Air Force's first 767-based KC-46A tanker by the end of this year, boom scraping issues and a slew of uncompleted test points may delay delivery until 2018, the head of its Air Mobility Command has revealed.

More than half way into testing, the USAF has discovered severe flaws on the tanker, known as “category 1 deficiencies”. Among the most glaring, the tip of its boom has on occasion struck receiver aircraft outside their refuelling slipways. Boeing engineers are working to fix the problem, but unless the issue is resolved it could delay a scheduled 1 December delivery, Gen Carlton Everhart said at the annual Air, Space and Cyber conference near Washington DC.

Hmm, that could put a dent in things...:E

ORAC

20th Sep 2017, 18:44

Or at least take the shine off them....

CONSO

20th Sep 2017, 19:37

IMHO- having been on the initial 767 production in the early 80's- andalso worked on b1 and b2 programs - somewhat aware of the first 767 tankers fiasco and how it happened -and still knowing many current BA employees- the simplest explanation for FUBAR issues relates to miss- management, MDC- st louis types- Jack welch wannabees, and a focus on faster better cheaper mantra.

Note that the military versions of the 737 series, incuding very successful Navy p-8 program was run primarily by old commercial types with minimum interference by the ex MDC fighter jock types. Not so for the 2001-2003 767 tanker fiasco, the 787 cluster**, the dash 800 737 wing design types( ex MDC ) who stalled for a few years the Aviation partners winglet improvements now standard on most aircraft. :E

esscee

20th Sep 2017, 21:29

Oh dear, what a pity, how sad, p*** up in a brewery, springs to mind.

ORAC

21st Sep 2017, 06:23

Having to turn off the HF when tanking is a deficiency? It was always considered a prudent safety precaution in years past. As for the camera, the Dutch KDC-10 has managed using a similar system for many years, as have various Airbus types, so I don't see the inadequacy of current camera technology being the root of the problem.

The issue of undemanding boom extension could be an embarrassment or a danger depending when it happens....

NATIONAL HARBOR, Maryland—Boeing is looking at upgrading the camera systems used for aerial refueling on its new KC-46 tanker after the U.S. Air Force discovered the refueling boom can scrape and potentially damage receiver aircraft.

The remote air refueling observatory cameras in the new Pegasus tanker were the best the market offered in 2012 when the aircraft was being contracted, but is not the latest technology, Air Force spokesman Col. Christopher Karns told Aviation Week Sept. 20th. Boeing would assume the cost of upgrading the camera system, Karns said. A Boeing spokeswoman declined to comment.

The problem involves the KC-46’s rigid refueling boom, one of two systems it has to refuel aircraft in flight. As the tanker’s boom goes into the receiver aircraft, the device has a tendency to scrape the surface of the receiving aircraft, explained Gen. Carlton Everhart, commander of Air Mobility Command, on Sept. 20 during the Air Force Association’s annual Air, Space and Cyber conference here. This could pose a particular problem for stealth aircraft such as the B-2 bomber, F-22 or F-35 fighters, if the boom causes damage to low-observable stealth coating, officials acknowledge. The KC-46 has not yet refueled stealth aircraft during flight testing, Boeing spokeswoman Caroline Hutcheson said.

The KC-46’s other refueling system, the Centerline Drogue System (CDS), also has a tendency to leave scuff marks on the tanker itself. The CDS consists of a flexible hose that trails from the tanker aircraft and a “drogue” fitted to the end of the hose that acts as a funnel to aid insertion of the receiver aircraft “probe” into the hose. This refueling method is also called “probe-and-drogue” or “hose-and-drogue.” The drogue flies well, but contacts the airframe when being reeled in, leaving “witness marks” on the aircraft’s body, Air Force KC-46 System Program Manager Col. John Newberry says. “When you retract it and bring it in, it comes up and rubs across the bottom of the aircraft,” Newberry told Aviation Week in a Sept. 19th interview. Everhart said this is a more minor issue compared with the boom scraping problem. Newberry said the solution could be as simple as requiring closer inspections of that section of the airframe and applying touch-up paint because the Air Force does not want to redesign the drogue system over a few scuff marks.

The boom scraping issue is one of three significant—or “category one”—deficiencies the Air Force-Boeing team is trying to fix on Boeing’s new tanker, Lt. Gen. Arnold Bunch, the service’s top uniformed acquisition official, said Sept. 20 during the conference. The KC-46 is also having problems with high frequency (HF) transmission, during which the HF “turns off” when the aircraft goes into aerial refueling mode, Bunch said. The third issue is “uncommanded boom extension,” he said, which seems to mean the boom unexpectedly extends when it is not supposed to do so. The Air Force did not provide a more detailed explanation by press time.

Boeing’s engineering team and the program office are working hard to fix all three problems, Bunch said.

Heathrow Harry

22nd Sep 2017, 13:41

"Scuff marks"???????
They mean collision don't they...........

Lyneham Lad

23rd Sep 2017, 10:34

A little more background on the problems:-
KC-46 Problems Should Not Add Delays; Possible Boeing Cost Rise: BG Shipton « Breaking Defense - Defense industry news, analysis and commentary (http://breakingdefense.com/2017/09/kc-46-problems-should-not-add-delays-boeing-cost-rise-bg-shipton/?utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=56642500&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9m0bvxhk5ro5Xi8SLUnKmHFqKbgdncRt5kr4tO3SJx7a0uLY6-lbaoZHQMYQonktYhImv6TEswprTQiEcIQmJF4r5i2Q&_hsmi=56642500)

Sent from my iPad Mini.

Duchess_Driver

16th Oct 2017, 17:14

Not so much woes....a little progress perhaps...????

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/picture-kc-46a-refuels-another-kc-46a-442104/

Onceapilot

16th Oct 2017, 18:34

Drogue contact on a fuselage during trailing/winding has been a routine on many tankers. However, allowing for interested party understatement, maybe the issue here is more serious?

OAP

Heathrow Harry

17th Oct 2017, 10:48

Yes - that's what surprised me - I wonder if it's scraping off some stealth coating or similar??

ORAC

17th Oct 2017, 13:20

Drogue scrapping presumably being much gentler than boom scrapping....

siddar

18th Oct 2017, 06:06

The issue seems to be the want of a more advanced system for boom refueling then was in specs. The old system was deemed fine for non stealth aircraft but they have stealth aircraft now. That have a more fragile coating that can be disturbed by old type of refueling. But what do you know there are new active control booms that will fix that problem. Just a question of who is going to pay for it. The Air Force are Boeing I guess they will be some rather careful readings of the contract by both side to figure it out.

BEagle

18th Oct 2017, 06:36

ORAC wrote: Having to turn off the HF when tanking is a deficiency? It was always considered a prudent safety precaution in years past.

Not quite. It was only necessary to deselect HF transmitters during AAR, but there was no restriction on receiving provided that any 'auto tune' of the antenna was disabled so that changing receiver frequency did not cause any transmissions as the antenna tuning unit matched the antenna to the new frequency - as was the case with the early HF system in the VC10K before 'auto / man' HF tuning was fitted.

Another stupid HF design in a different tanker turned off the receiver audio when SELCAL was selected on. Which made it impossible to conduct a normal SELCAL check with the ATCC....:rolleyes: Which bright designer thought up that idea?

VX275

18th Oct 2017, 16:02

The old system was deemed fine for non stealth aircraft but they have stealth aircraft now. That have a more fragile coating that can be disturbed by old type of refueling.

Will it be cheaper to come up with a better paint for the stealth aircraft?

PhilipG

18th Oct 2017, 16:46

It surprises me that there have not been reported, or maybe it doesnt, reports of problems refuelling B2s?

Davef68

19th Oct 2017, 11:16

It surprises me that there have not been reported, or maybe it doesnt, reports of problems refuelling B2s?

Previous generation (or several generations) coating technology.

Maybe they need to go probe and drogue for tactical aircraft......;)

Ian Corrigible

26th Oct 2017, 11:24

Defense News: Boeing hit with another KC-46 cost overrun, this time worth $329M (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/10/25/boeing-hit-with-another-kc-46-cost-overrun-this-time-worth-329m)
Boeing on Wednesday disclosed more bad news on the KC-46 program: The company will have to eat another $329 million as a result of cost overruns.

Under the terms of its fixed-price deal with the U.S. Air Force, Boeing must pay out of pocket for any expenses over the $4.9 billion contract value. That agreement has been a tough pill for Boeing to swallow, as the company has now had to cough up about $2.9 billion in pretax fees — or about $1.9 billion after tax — as delays and cost overruns mount.

There are signs another missed milestone may be on the way.

Bing

26th Oct 2017, 11:41

At what point does it become more cost effective for Boeing to just pull out of the project and pay back the $4.9 Billion?

fleigle

27th Oct 2017, 00:34

I hear that they are now going to fly the unfinished frames to BAE for final refurbishment, therefore guarenteeing no further cost overruns....
:E:E:E
f

tdracer

27th Oct 2017, 18:38

CONSO

28th Oct 2017, 00:44

My friends still working the program are telling me they're having huge issues getting FAA Part 25 certification (which I'd predicted back when the program was launched). Getting Part 25 certification of a military airplane is the very definition of "non-valued added work" - and it's incredibly difficult and time consuming.
It seems that making something suitable for military use can make it incompatible with the FARs. Who would have known - oh wait, that would have been me, six years ago (and I was far from alone)...
Sometimes is sucks to be proven right.

Golly gee- the weast bellcurve types simply wired the first few to meet FAA standards including the extra military stuff. THEN after ghey rolled out a few, somebody reread the contract specs about the time a mil tped inspection said WTF ? re wiring separation. Panic ensued and they drafted man renton types who had been somewhat involved in P-8 and or mil versions of 737 for special purposes and ran them up tom everett on tdy ( avoiding paying extra milage by the way ) to teach the chart boys how to read a mil spec that had many two syllable words... and 3 and four letter abbreviations like EMP and shield and separation and redundant . . :sad:

And the beat goes on . . .

Lyneham Lad

6th Dec 2017, 10:20

Aviation Week article (http://aviationweek.com/defense/first-operational-kc-46-takes-flight-boeing-races-deliver?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20171206_AW-05_149&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_2&utm_rid=CPEN1000003474208&utm_campaign=12882&utm_medium=email&elq2=97d9379874fc4cc19557530fc1f19b77)

Snip:-
Boeing’s first KC-46 Pegasus tanker slated for delivery to the U.S. Air Force made its first flight Dec. 5, as the company finally acknowledged that the aircraft won’t be handed over to the service until 2018.

Progress - but costs still rising.
Meanwhile, costs continue to rise, with Boeing seeing an additional $329 million charge related to KC-46 development in the third quarter of 2017 in addition to the more than $2 billion incurred since 2014.

sandiego89

28th Dec 2017, 15:24

A modest, but interesting export order. One for Japan- perhaps up to 3 more.

Japan signs for KC-46A tanker | Jane's 360 (http://www.janes.com/article/76662/japan-signs-for-kc-46a-tanker)

2805662

28th Jan 2018, 08:12

DOT&E report on the KC-46A program that date:

http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2017/pdf/af/2017kc46a.pdf

Heathrow Harry

28th Jan 2018, 08:17

"A modest, but interesting export order. One for Japan- perhaps up to 3 more."

The Japanese know which side their bread is buttered on - especially with events in Korea............ The Israeli's are the same for the same reason

ORAC

28th Jan 2018, 13:49

Interesting? Perhaps inevitable would be the better word.

Lyneham Lad

7th Mar 2018, 10:25

Delivery doubts - on Aviation Week.

Boeing’s KC-46 Tanker Delayed Again (http://aviationweek.com/defense/boeing-s-kc-46-tanker-delayed-again?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20180307_AW-05_667&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_2&utm_rid=CPEN1000003474208&utm_campaign=13931&utm_medium=email&elq2=f471fd7cbc2b49c3ad74383b21dcf607)

Snip:-
The U.S. Air Force is predicting that Boeing won’t deliver the first KC-46 tanker until late 2018, casting doubt on the defense firm’s ability to meet a contractual deadline that, if missed, likely would result in significant penalties.
Boeing’s master schedule currently pegs first aircraft delivery to the fleet in the second quarter of calendar year 2018—already months behind schedule. But after a joint schedule risk assessment, the Air Force now believes delivery is more likely to occur in late 2018, according to spokeswoman Capt. Emily Grabowski.

Rhino power

17th Mar 2018, 19:42

https://www.airforcetimes.com/air/2018/03/16/air-force-adds-two-new-deficiencies-to-kc-46s-list-of-problems/

-RP

Compass Call

17th Mar 2018, 20:21

Have they got any refuelling pods to put on them yet?
Or is that another cost overrun?

George K Lee

21st Mar 2018, 13:33

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/secaf-wilson-rips-boeing-for-more-kc-46-problems/

The best bit:

A Boeing spokesperson emailed me that “there is no greater priority at The Boeing Company right now than the delivery of the KC-46."

That's some seriously weapons-grade bull:mad:.

Heathrow Harry

21st Mar 2018, 16:35

SWBKCB

21st Mar 2018, 16:54

Just goes to show there is no "easy" option in aerospace...............

I thinl ALL of us assumed this would be an easy, low risk, profitable design for Mr B.. and it's turned into an awful vale of tears................

However, the company has reported more than $2 billion in losses due to manufacturing and development issues since receiving the KC-46A contract. Over the long term, the company believes it can turn a profit as the total value of delivering the 179 KC-46As the US Air Force wants is expected to be about $30 billion.

Not shedding too many tears just yet...

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-criticises-boeing-on-new-kc-46-delay-concerns-446919/

Preemo

26th Mar 2018, 22:59

tdracer

27th Mar 2018, 00:56

I thought I had read earlier in this thread that Boeing's margins were razor slim on this deal...now they can be profitable with a $2B over-run means they must have 10%-15% profit in their price. In 2017 their operating margin was 11% so it looks like this was a good deal for them from the get go....or accounting magic happening here.
The margins for the KC-46 development program were razor slim - not so much the production program.
Even with all the hiccups on the 787 program, Boeing Commercial has been operating with around a 10% margin on the production side.
With a ~$30 billion KC-46 production program, Boeing should still do OK in the long - just not as well as they would if the program had been properly managed and executed...

CONSO

27th Mar 2018, 01:09

The margins for the KC-46 development program were razor slim - not so much the production program.
Even with all the hiccups on the 787 program, Boeing Commercial has been operating with around a 10% margin on the production side.
With a ~$30 billion KC-46 production program, Boeing should still do OK in the long - just not as well as they would if the program had been properly managed and executed...

ITS Called Program accounting - sort of a deluxe version of the Gillette razor blade method- Sell the razor at cost ( or less ) and make the real $$ on blades and future support. ( spare parts, unique parts, service and maintenance )

Boeing gave Military a fair price on the B-52 a few years ago and . . .:D

KenV

27th Mar 2018, 14:06

I thought I had read earlier in this thread that Boeing's margins were razor slim on this deal...now they can be profitable with a $2B over-run means they must have 10%-15% profit in their price. In 2017 their operating margin was 11% so it looks like this was a good deal for them from the get go....or accounting magic happening here.The current contract is to develop and certify the tanker and produce and deliver 18 production aircraft. The margins are razor thin and between the cost over runs and the likely penalties for late delivery, Boeing will almost certainly take a loss on this contract. The production contract for follow on aircraft does not have such razor thin margins. It will clearly take longer for Boeing to turn a profit on the total program than if the development and initial production program had gone to plan, but absent some huge miss step, Boeing will most certainly turn a profit long term. And not just from support, but from actual production.

KenV

27th Mar 2018, 14:21

ITS Called Program accounting - sort of a deluxe version of the Gillette razor blade method- Sell the razor at cost ( or less ) and make the real $$ on blades and future support. ( spare parts, unique parts, service and maintenance )Yes, BCA does Program accounting, but no, its not what you described. Boeing has THREE independent divisions: BCA (Boeing Commercial Aircraft), BDS (Boeing Defense and Space), and BGS (Boeing Global Support). So BCA does not get most of the support profits. BGS does. It may be subtle, but its significant.

CONSO

27th Mar 2018, 15:11

Yes, BCA does Program accounting, but no, its not what you described. Boeing has THREE independent divisions: BCA (Boeing Commercial Aircraft), BDS (Boeing Defense and Space), and BGS (Boeing Global Support). So BCA does not get most of the support profits. BGS does. It may be subtle, but its significant.

My point is and was - regardless of ' division '- the profits ALL flow to the bottom line for THE BOEING COMPANY and the resulting dividends in $$ are not labeled. Money and profits and losses are fungible.

for but one example --Many years ago, a military program was essentially "keeping the lights on" for a large chunk of the commercial part company by providing a place for many of the ' valuable " employees who might otherwise been on layoff.

KenV

27th Mar 2018, 16:07

My point is and was - regardless of ' division '- the profits ALL flow to the bottom line for THE BOEING COMPANY and the resulting dividends in $$ are not labeled. Money and profits and losses are fungible.
I got that. My point was not about your basic argument. My point addressed the preamble of your argument, to wit: "ITS Called Program accounting". Program accounting has NOTHING to do with it.

Further, the decision to pursue the RFP is made at the division level, NOT the corporate level. The division must prove it can make a profit before the program is even launched. And the BAC division will almost certainly make quite a bit of profit. Just not as much as hoped and certainly not as soon as hoped.

CONSO

28th Mar 2018, 03:42

Further, the decision to pursue the RFP is made at the division level, NOT the corporate level. Nice theory - but in the case of the tanker it was NOT that way. Way back in 2000-2001 as the initial tanker fiasco was aborning, it was corporate that pulled the strings and responsible for the resulting major FUBAR despite and over the objections of the ' commercial division ; It went like this - BA commercial wasx to build the airframe- and deliver it ( green ) to military division ( on paper ) Miitary would fly it to wichita/st louis where it would be partially disassembled and refit with mil standard stuff, ad naseaum.
Thru a set of circumstances not really pertinent here in this thread- I was at the time in a unique position to be an ' observer ' and party to a few discussions as to how the initial 767 tanker lease offer really came to be- and how it was screwed up- not by commercial but by the MDC whiz kids of which one spent time in Club fed

When the 737navy - P8 came along- it was renton commercial who ran the whole show.

But when the tanker again came on the scene- the st louis turkeys essentially froze out the commercial troops who had been building767s for a few decades - and started over again.

And in all cases, its the program accounting game used by Boeing which allows' losing' programs to eventually recover via volume/quantity bean counting- eg 7 late 7 is the current poster child.

Perhaps the meme should be - "we lose money on the first (xx) or each one but will make it up by volume." :ok:

ORAC

25th Apr 2018, 11:18

US Air Force, Boeing still clash over KC-46 delivery timeline (http://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/04/24/air-force-boeing-still-divergent-on-kc-46-delivery-timeline/)

WASHINGTON — Meetings between Boeing and the U.S. Air Force on the KC-46’s schedule appear to have stagnated, with both parties still at odds (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/20/boeing-kc-46-delays-are-frustrating-air-force-secretary-heather-wilson/) about when the first tanker will be delivered.

“We have had meetings with Boeing, and additional meetings last week to get an agreement on a schedule,” Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday. “We believe — the Air Force believes — that the schedule that Boeing has is still overly ambitious, and we’d like to get agreement on a delivery date and drive to that delivery date.”

Last month, the Air Force projected that the first KC-46 delivery would be delayed yet again (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/07/another-kc-46-delivery-slip-puts-pressure-on-boeing-to-meet-contract-obligations/) — an assessment with which Boeing has vehemently disagreed.

Based on the service’s estimates, Boeing may be able to deliver the first KC-46 aircraft by the end of the year, with a contractually required delivery of 18 tankers slipping from October to spring 2019. But Boeing asserts it will be able to deliver the first aircraft this summer, with a total of 18 tankers delivered by the end of the year. “We are working with the Air Force to complete all the required testing and are committed to delivering the first tanker as soon as possible,” a Boeing spokesman said in a statement. “Discussions are ongoing as to a specific delivery date.”

Missing the October deadline for required assets available, or RAA — in this case, 18 certified KC-46As and nine refueling pods — could trigger another round of penalties for Boeing, which is locked into a fixed-price contract that leaves the company financially responsible for schedule delays and cost overruns. Boeing has already had to pay about $2 billion post-tax (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/10/25/boeing-hit-with-another-kc-46-cost-overrun-this-time-worth-329m/) out of its own pocket.

The fiscal 2019 budget requested an additional 15 tankers, he added. “Do you agree that is an adequate number, an achievable number and a desirable number?” Wilson said that it was. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Dave Goldfein added that the 15-aircraft-per-year rate was the best way to sustain production as the weapon system comes online. “We are a global power because of our global reach, and it’s all of the services that rely on that tanker force, and our allies and partners, to be able to project power globally. So it’s a critical capability that we need to bring on as fast we can bring it on,” he said.

The Government Accountability Office estimates that RAA “could slip to May 2019, 21 months from the original schedule, if risks are not mitigated.” The agency’s findings were in an report on the program released this month. Those risk factors include ensuring all aircraft are in the correct configuration and fixing a number of deficiencies (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/16/air-force-adds-two-new-deficiencies-to-kc-46s-list-of-problems/), including one that involves the boom scratching the receiver aircraft (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/09/22/air-force-aims-to-fix-three-kc-46-deficiencies-before-key-milestone/). Boeing will also have to complete 6,550 test points in a window of February 2018 to June 2018 to meet its schedule projection, which GAO says amounts to a rate of double its current pace.

Addressing the boom-scraping issue, a Boeing spokesman said the company had begun flight testing a software enhancement that is expected to improve visibility.

Despite the schedule issues, lawmakers have generally been supportive of the program. Oklahoma’s Jim Inhofe, currently the top Republican on SASC, told Wilson that the committee was “anxious for the first KC-46 to get delivered” to the service.

glad rag

25th Apr 2018, 17:00

"Addressing the boom-scraping issue, a Boeing spokesman said the company had begun flight testing a software enhancement that is expected to improve visibility.'

Who'd have thunk it!

George K Lee

25th Apr 2018, 23:41

esscee

26th Apr 2018, 08:22

And at the contract price!!!!!!!!

KenV

26th Apr 2018, 18:36

Ha. May explain this Whine Spectator 91-pointer....

The Air Force seems to have worse relations with its contractors than any other service. Hardly a week passes in which some senior official doesn't question the performance and priorities of top contractors.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/04/23/as-space-war-looms-air-forces-biggest-weakness-may-be-how-it-buys-space-systems/2/#6fbd443fe3a8

Mean ol' air force. Expects you to deliver what you contracted to deliver.

There are two ways to approach the job of oversight:
1. You can take an adversarial approach and look for ways to hammer the contractor.
2. You can take a team member approach and look for ways to develop and implement solutions.

USAF tends toward the first approach. They took the first approach on C-17 for the first several years of that program's life. But eventually they switched to the second approach. Shockingly, the program flourished, costs went down, performance went up, and the C-17 become a "model acquisition program" after that switch.

tdracer

26th Apr 2018, 19:07

I have to say many of the USAF types were exceptionally difficult to work with - and simply would not listen to common sense. There were requirements for my engine system which may have made some sense 50 years ago, but were simply foolish for a commercially derived aircraft with modern FADEC engines - but when we tried to bring this up with the Air Force brass and point out there were better (and cheaper) ways to do it, the response was 'what part of mandatory don't you understand'. This sort of thing drove millions in unnecessary costs just in my area - and I seriously doubt I was exceptional in that regard.

ORAC

26th Apr 2018, 19:30

In my days as a system engineer there were three types of requirements:

1. Those that were mandated and had to be achieved in the manner specified.

2. Those were end result was mandated, but the means of achieving the end result was open to negotiation.

3. Those that could be waived if th end result could still be guaranteed to be achieved.

Signing a contract and then attempting to negotiate away class 1 requirements always lead to substantial heartache for the manufacturer. To quote your contract compliant questioner - which part of mandatory did you not understand?

They can, of course, be changed - at substantial cost to the contractor. After all, they probably underbid the contract assuming they could do it their way regardless of the contract they signed....For example on wiring looms....

tdracer

26th Apr 2018, 20:49

ORAC, I understand what you are saying. But the USAF made many requirements that had to be achieved in a specified manner when the manner specified was quite frankly stupid (and many of these were only listed as 'top level' at the RFP level). When we saw the specifics, we tried to point out that there were much better (and cheaper) ways to meet their requirements than what they'd specified. Rational people would at least discuss the options - but the USAF wouldn't.
One example - the RFP specified '10 minute takeoff' - so we assumed that was the same as the 10 minute takeoff capability currently available. Well, in the commercial world, 10 minute takeoff is only allowed if you lose an engine - come to find out, USAF wanted to be able to use it every single takeoff. Well, that's not the way the engine was certified - since engine failures during takeoff are rare, the engine cert basis assumes the use of 10 minute takeoff would be similarly rare. USAF says we need 10 minute takeoff for hostile areas where we need to get out of man pad range ASAP. OK, gives us a percentage of takeoffs where you'll need 10 minute takeoff and we'll see if that's consistent the cert basis. USAF responses NO, it's mandatory that we be able to use 10 minute takeoff 100% of the time. Recertifying the engine is a massive task - several million dollars, so we started looking at aircraft performance - with both engines operating, - unless you're at or very close to MTOW, you'll climb out of the takeoff rating envelop well before 10 minutes. Further, even at MTOW, 10 minute got you less than 100 feet extra altitude at the 10 minute mark. Again, we tried to explain this to the USAF, but again ' what part of mandatory don't you understand. Even the FAA will at least listen if you think they are being unreasonable - but not the USAF...
Of course, none of this was in the RFP - only the final contract.

ORAC

21st Jun 2018, 06:11

http://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/06/20/heres-when-the-air-force-will-get-its-first-kc-46/

Here’s when the US Air Force will get its first KC-46 tanker

WASHINGTON — After months of public — and sometimes contentious — disagreements, Boeing and the U.S. Air Force have finally settled on an October delivery date for the first KC-46 tanker.

“As a result of months of collaboration, the Air Force and Boeing KC-46A teams have reached an agreed joint program schedule to get to the first 18 aircraft deliveries. This includes the expectation the first KC-46A aircraft acceptance and delivery will occur in October 2018, with the remaining 17 aircraft delivered by April 2019,” Air Force Under Secretary Matt Donovan said in a statement. “While the KC-46A flight test program is nearly complete, significant work remains. The Air Force is looking forward to KC-46A first delivery and will continue to work with Boeing on opportunities to expedite the program.”

The new schedule appears to be a compromise between Boeing and the Air Force’s estimated timelines. For months, Boeing has held that it could deliver its first KC-46 (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/05/04/boeing-pushes-back-on-its-bad-reputation-on-kc-46-tanker-program/) this summer, with a total of 18 tankers delivered this year. The Air Force projections have been much more pessimistic (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/20/boeing-kc-46-delays-are-frustrating-air-force-secretary-heather-wilson/), with first delivery at the end of the year, and 18 delivered by spring.

While it’s clear that Boeing will not meet the required assets available, or RAA, deadline — a contractual obligation to deliver 18 certified tankers and nine refueling pods — whether it will have to pay a penalty for being late is still murky.....

The KC-46 currently has three outstanding category-1 deficiencies (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/16/air-force-adds-two-new-deficiencies-to-kc-46s-list-of-problems/), the designation given to urgent technical problems with no workaround in place.

Two of the deficiencies revolve around the system’s remote vision system, manufactured by Rockwell Collins..... Boeing believes it can solve both problems with a software fix that retunes the camera system to increase visibility and to make it more intuitive for operators to change the camera settings. That fix is currently being tested with the hope that the deficiencies will be downgraded or completely eliminated in the next few months...... Boeing’s expectation is that if they do not resolve the remote visioning system deficiencies, the Air Force will not accept the KC-46 this fall.

It’s unclear, however, whether the final category-1 deficiency will be fixed before first delivery. The issue involves a mechanical lock on the centerline drogue system, which unintentionally unlocks in certain conditions. Boeing believes it can rectify the problem through a software fix but needs more flight test data to do so. “It’s just [a matter of] when are we going to fix it,” Gibbons said in May. “We and the Air Force have agreed … for a while that the right time to do that is after we gather sufficient flight test information from some of these drogue contacts, go in and update the software, and then we’ll roll it in through the summer and test it out again.”

ORAC

27th Jul 2018, 06:36

Well that will improve delivery and resolution if any associated problems......

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/business/cobham-takes-dive-amid-boeing-dispute-x66l836qt

Cobham takes dive amid Boeing dispute

Boeing, one of the world’s largest aerospace and defence companies, has gone to war with one of its key suppliers in the UK, sending shares in Cobham, the air-to-air refuelling specialist, plummeting close to 15-year lows.

Cobham is the world leader in producing hoses and the conical drogues that enable tanker aircraft to refuel the likes of fighter jets mid-flight. Earlier this decade Cobham signed up to its single biggest contract, worth $1 billion, as the key partner to fit out the US air force’s new-generation Pegasus aerial refuelling and military transporter plane, the Boeing KC-46.

Already heavily lossmaking and classed as an onerous contract by Cobham, the KC-46 Pegasus programme has ejected more bad news, with the prospect of even worse to come. In an unscheduled statement to the stock market, ahead of its half-year results expected next week, Cobham said it was taking another £40 million loss on the contract. That is on top of the £150 million of provisions it has already booked.

It said that Boeing was refusing to pay its invoices for Cobham’s work on the main drogue refuelling system, which hangs out of the tail of the KC-46, and on the refuelling pods located on the aircraft’s wings.

Worse, Cobham was forced to declare that its customer could well be taking it to court. “Boeing has made as yet unquantified damages assertions relating to the programme,” it said. The Dorset-based company said that it was fighting its corner: “Cobham is formally disputing these assertions.”.........

sandiego89

27th Jul 2018, 13:15

glad rag

28th Jul 2018, 15:45

Sounds like the groundwork for a hostile takeover....

SASless

29th Jul 2018, 12:43

The British MOD, given a chance, could sort this very quick like, you think?

RAF aircrafts can't refuel mid-air so US have to do it instead | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6003165/RAF-aircrafts-refuel-mid-air-instead.html)

Pontius Navigator

29th Jul 2018, 14:40

Good article, grab a story from 5 years ago and throw in Special Forces, bingo, sell papers.

Clearly no mileage in US Navy jets had to rely on Royal Air Force tankers as US tankers can't refuel them.

Or international interoperability extends flexibility.

vascodegama

29th Jul 2018, 15:45

SASless-MOD sort anything quickly??

PN

Apart from the 59 KC10s and the small no (20 wish?) MPR KC135s then. Not to mention the BDA option on the remaining 400 135s?

Pontius Navigator

29th Jul 2018, 16:38

Vasco, as the DM was happy to use a 5 year old story I didn't see anything wrong with a 15 year old story when VC10s could do that which the USAF could not.

My point is you can spin it whichever way you want.

"RAF wasted money fitting booms . . .,"

Rhino power

30th Jul 2018, 00:05

Vasco, as the DM was happy to use a 5 year old story I didn't see anything wrong with a 15 year old story when VC10s could do that which the USAF could not.

PN, the KC-10 has been able to refuel probe equipped aircraft since entry into service and has been doing so for much longer than the last 15 years that you're suggesting...

-RP

KenV

30th Jul 2018, 11:42

Vasco, as the DM was happy to use a 5 year old story I didn't see anything wrong with a 15 year old story when VC10s could do that which the USAF could not.Wait, what? Way back when I flew probe equipped A-4s we refueled from KC-135s and KC-10s routinely. Later did it in F/A-18s also. So I don't know where this "USAF could not do it" comes from.

The Helpful Stacker

31st Jul 2018, 15:50

RAF aircrafts can't refuel mid-air so US have to do it instead...

Aircrafts? AIRCRAFTS?

Are sub-editors a thing of the past now?

Lyneham Lad

7th Aug 2018, 14:14

A step closer... (https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/faa-clears-obstacle-to-kc-46a-delivery-in-october-450906/) (Flight Global article)

From the article:-

An unresolved software flaw won’t delay the first delivery of the Boeing KC-46A tanker after the US Federal Aviation Administration approved a temporary exemption from safety requirements. Boeing’s engineers discovered earlier this year that the KC-46A lacks an independent system to monitor fuel flow, as required by the FAA’s safety regulations. If a single processor fails while the KC-46A is receiving fuel from another tanker, an overpressure event in the centre fuel tank may go undetected, according to Boeing’s nearly four-month old request for a temporary exemption.

On 2 August, the FAA approved Boeing’s exemption from the safety requirement, allowing the aircraft to be used on operational flights as scheduled after October. The FAA’s approval requires the USAF to operate the KC-46A in domestic airspace with another crew member in the cockpit to physically monitor the pressure in the centre fuel tank during an in-flight refueling.

k3k3

7th Aug 2018, 15:01

Boeing’s engineers discovered

It's not as if it's another Tutankahmun.

Lonewolf_50

7th Aug 2018, 15:47

PN: Back when refueling was an important part of my life, I recall the USAF having MPRS equipped tankers taking care of our strike aircraft from multiple nations. Not sure what era you are recalling. I do recall that hanging a MPRS on some tankers slightly shortened their on station time.

KenV

12th Sep 2018, 16:02

Despite the doom and gloom often expressed here and elsewhere, USAF appears to be confident in Boeing's ability to produce the tankers they want:

Boeing Receives $2.9 Billion For KC-46A
The U.S. Air Force awarded Boeing a $2.9 billion contract modification Sept. 10 for the fourth lot of KC-46A tankers.
The contract includes 18 aircraft, spares, support equipment, spare engines and refueling pod kits.
Boeing is now on contract for 52 KC-46 tankers. The company received its first two production lots for seven and 12 aircraft in August 2016. The third lot for 15 aircraft was awarded in January 2017.
“We’re excited to partner with the Air Force on an aircraft that will provide its fleet unmatched capabilities and versatility,” Mike Gibbons, the company’s KC-46A tanker vice president and program manager, said in a statement. “This is another big milestone for the team and we look forward to delivering this next-generation, multirole tanker for years to come.”
The program received its supplemental type certificate from the FAA that verifies the platform’s refueling and mission avionics systems meet requirements. The platform still needs to receive its military type certificate (MTC) before delivering the first aircraft to the Air Force.
The company concluded MTC flight testing in early July, which included aerial refueling, defensive and other military specific systems. In total, 3,500 flight hours were completed, and more than 3 million lb. of fuel were offloaded during refueling flights with the F-16, F/A-18, AV-8B, C-17, A-10, KC-10, KC-135 and KC-46 aircraft.

friartuck

12th Sep 2018, 17:58

Ken

they have no choice......

ORAC

12th Sep 2018, 19:23

As stated, they’re already committed so it doesn’t signify anything - and it doesn’t cost them anything because, with the accumulated penalties, all the DoD has to do is ask Boeing to take it off the bill....

LowObservable

12th Sep 2018, 23:20

Exactly. Their only option is to derail the program and give Boeing legal grounds to renegotiate the deal. But for the blinkered, it's evidence that the program is going fine.

friartuck

13th Sep 2018, 15:17

It's the guff spouted by their VP that grates TBH - a little humility would be better IMHO given the delays and cost overruns

KenV

13th Sep 2018, 15:45

Exactly. Their only option is to derail the program and give Boeing legal grounds to renegotiate the deal. But for the blinkered, it's evidence that the program is going fine.Hmmmmm. The firm fixed price contract was for the first 18 tankers. It does NOT apply to any follow-on tankers. In other words, the deal has already been "renegotiated."

Preemo

19th Sep 2018, 22:45

Originally the average cost was estimated at $241M per tanker ($43.16B for 179 tankers). This latest order costs $153M/tanker - a massive saving of 37%..... and this order includes " spares, support equipment, spare engines and refueling pod kits."

Looking at it from afar, it seems like a big financial inducement to get an order for 18 more tankers and keep the production line going.

tdracer

19th Sep 2018, 23:12

Looking at it from afar, it seems like a big financial inducement to get an order for 18 more tankers and keep the production line going.
Development, R&D, and Certification are all done and paid for. Now it's strictly to cover the recurring cost of building the things. There is also ten years worth of inflation built into the total program costs

chopper2004

21st Sep 2018, 14:16

SKunk Works talking about stealthy option for KC-7?

Skunk Works Talks Stealthy Aircraft Option For KC-Z Defense content from Aviation Week (http://aviationweek.com/defense/skunk-works-talks-stealthy-aircraft-option-kc-z?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20180920_AW-05_277&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1&utm_rid=CPEN1000001738169&utm_campaign=16534&utm_medium=email&elq2=34de4203af3e4b48bc97868b13c9e9a1)

chopper2004

25th Oct 2018, 13:53

The rumour mill reckons that the first KC-46 could be delivered to McConnell as early as next month..

https://www.kansas.com/news/business/aviation/article220490225.html

cheers

ORAC

11th Jan 2019, 05:51

https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2019/01/10/boeing-delivers-first-kc-46-but-fixes-to-technical-problems-still-years-away/

Boeing delivers first KC-46, but fixes to technical problems still years away

WASHINGTON — After more than a year of delays (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/07/another-kc-46-delivery-slip-puts-pressure-on-boeing-to-meet-contract-obligations/), the U.S. Air Force took hold of its first KC-46 tanker (https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/reagan-defense-forum/2017/12/03/boeing-will-miss-2017-delivery-goal-for-first-kc-46/) on Jan. 10, but it will take several years for the service and manufacturer Boeing to reconcile major technical problems (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/07/26/boeings-kc-46-penalties-now-up-to-34b-thanks-to-new-426m-charge/), and the company will not be receiving the full amount of money due upon delivery.

The agreement, finalized after months of sometimes public and contentious discussions (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/04/24/air-force-boeing-still-divergent-on-kc-46-delivery-timeline/), allows McConnell Air Force Base in Kansas to receive the KC-46 as early as this month, with more set to follow, said Air Force spokeswoman Capt. Hope Cronin. However, the new tankers will arrive with several outstanding category-1 deficiencies, the term used by the military to describe the most serious level of technical problems.

That may sound like a blow to the Air Force, whose leaders had previously implied that all category-1 deficiencies must be fixed before the service begins accepting the tankers. However, service leaders believe the Air Force retains significant financial leverage, even as Boeing delivers the KC-46 aircraft, and the service sees it as vital that Air Mobility Command be able to begin training pilots and boom operators to use the tankers even as technical problems are being corrected......

Perhaps more importantly, the Air Force holds a significant trump card in its hand (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/20/boeing-kc-46-delays-are-frustrating-air-force-secretary-heather-wilson/). According to the terms of its fixed-price contract with Boeing, the service can withhold up to $28 million per aircraft upon delivery — and the Air Force official said the service intends to keep that amount until it sees a good faith effort by Boeing to fix deficiencies. That means Boeing could miss out on $1.5 billion if the maximum withholding is applied to all 52 aircraft on contract.

“That is not something that legitimately can be contested by Boeing. That is purely a government decision until the airplane is brought up to specification,” the official said..........

Two key problems

Before the Air Force would accept the first KC-46, Boeing and the service first had to come to terms on the aircraft’s remote vision system, or RVS, the most significant technical hurdle that had bogged down talks between the parties. In short, Boeing has agreed to embark on a redesign effort for the Rockwell Collins-designed RVS that will involve both hardware and software changes. The Air Force believes it will take three to four years to develop a fully functioning RVS, and Boeing has agreed to fix it at its own expense, Cronin said.......

However, the Air Force also made key concessions. Namely, it will have to pay for another fix using taxpayer money.

During tests, the Air Force found that certain aircraft — most often, the A-10 Warthog — had trouble generating the necessary thrust to push into the boom for refueling. Boeing presented a boom design to the government at Milestone C that set the boom resistance to the international standard of about 1,400 pounds, which the government accepted, the Air Force official said. The problem is that to refuel the A-10, the boom must have a much lower threshold of thrust resistance, around 650 pounds.

Because the Air Force is asking for a change in requirements, it has agreed to fund the additional work — though it is still working out how much it will cost for the redesign work and retrofits, the official said. That redesign and manufacturing process will probably take about two years.....

Imagegear

11th Jan 2019, 18:20

There comes a time when it must be acknowledged that this program is well and truly past it's sell by date. By the time any of these things arrive in service, they will be seriously obsolete. Why would the great businessman himself not kill what is obviously a dire money pit.

IG

Asturias56

12th Jan 2019, 11:24

well it is for Boeing but the USAF is largely protected by a fixed price contract form the wilder shores of this financial disaster

Looking back on here there is quite a lot of discussion as to how such a great aeroplane builder managed to screw this one up so badly...............

Imagegear

12th Jan 2019, 12:23

Yup, been following the thread since it first appeared, but how much of a bath can a company take before the water runs out?

IG

Asturias56

12th Jan 2019, 16:52

Quite a lot when you're making money elsewhere and you are desperate to keep the opposition out

They'd never live it down if they pulled the plug now

sandiego89

12th Jan 2019, 21:11

Jackonicko

12th Jan 2019, 22:03

Some are saying another six years until fully operational......

BEagle

13th Jan 2019, 07:39

tdracer

13th Jan 2019, 07:56

Anyone know if this problem with the remote vision system will allow the 46 to tank or not? Is it just that it is not as good as they want, or they can’t tank with it? or just limitations in certain scenarios. 3-4 years to fix sounds huge.

As I understand it - the system tanks just fine but isn't 'up to spec' in certain low or tricky light situations.
Unlike previous USAF tankers, the boom is operated remotely from a station just aft of the flight deck, using a 3d vision system. The capabilities of the 3d vision system are good, but aren't quite as good as was originally promised. As a result, it can do anything the KC-135 can do, but isn't quite the step improvement that the USAF wants.

Oh, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, the A330MRTT doesn't meet the USAF requirements either.

rjtjrt

13th Jan 2019, 08:18

6 years? Surely not - that would mean some 14 years after the first A330MRTT first entered service...

...and some 16 years after the first operational use of the A310MRTT, which will celebrate 10 years of operational use on Feb 4 this year!
I hope no one is suggesting A330MRTT didn’t have a protracted and troubled development. Took a long time to get it to the stage it is now.

vascodegama

13th Jan 2019, 08:27

tdracer

In what way does the A330 not meet the requirements?

Asturias56

13th Jan 2019, 08:47

It's not American.............

tdracer

14th Jan 2019, 01:03

tdracer

In what way does the A330 not meet the requirements?

Read the thread - there are dozens of posts on the subject.
But the short answer is that the A330MRTT - as it currently exists - has a number of areas that would not comply with the published USAF requirements that both Boeing and Airbus needed to meet. No 'off the shelf' tanker would have come close. Mandatory requirements - not negotiable (some of them rather dumb but that's another issue).
That's why Boeing couldn't simply use the KC-767, which was already developed and has been in service for many years.

Rick777

14th Jan 2019, 02:59

The USAF has started taking delivery of the KC 46. There minor tech problems, but it sounds like they are easy to work around until they are solved.

melmothtw

14th Jan 2019, 07:03

I hope no one is suggesting A330MRTT didn’t have a protracted and troubled development. Took a long time to get it to the stage it is now.

Would have been ready for the USAF though, which is the point of the thread.

Oh, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, the A330MRTT doesn't meet the USAF requirements either.

It did the first time around, or rather it exceeded them.

IIRC correctly, Boeing's complaint was that the USAF hadn't asked for the extra capabilities of the A330 MRTT, and so shouldn't have considered them when making its decision. It was then that Boeing started talking about the 'tactical' nature of the KC-46A, and its ability to operate closer to the fight. This was the only positive differentiatior it had, IMHO.

That's why Boeing couldn't simply use the KC-767, which was already developed and has been in service for many years

Had only been in service 3 years by the time KC-X was first awarded in 2011, and was still suffering technical problems (Japan was the only customer at that time, with Italy yet to receive its first aircraft). KC-767 development seems to have run as smoothly as the KC-46A's in terms of technical issues and missed deadlines.

It's not American.............

Interestingly, when I interviewed Muilenburg (then head of Boeing Defense and Space) at the time this was very much his angle. He said he made no apologies for pushing that US taxpayer dollars be spent on US products being built by US companies. Of course, this completely missed the point that the KC-45 was to be built in Alabama by Northrop Grumman or that Boeing was at that time partnering with AgustaWestland to offer the AW101 as the new Presidential helicopter, but there you go.

ORAC

14th Jan 2019, 10:21

There minor tech problems Interesting choice of words. The DoD classifies them as Catergory-1 deficiencies, which is why they are allowed to withhold $28M per airframe. Category-1 deficiencies are critical system deficiencies for which no work-arounds are in place or have been identified.

KenV

14th Jan 2019, 16:42

Anyone know if this problem with the remote vision system will allow the 46 to tank or not? Is it just that it is not as good as they want, or they can’t tank with it? or just limitations in certain scenarios. 3-4 years to fix sounds huge.The problem is related to tanking stealth aircraft under certain very specific lighting conditions. USAF has approved the software fix Boeing has proposed and Boeing will apply it to all the KC-46s for free.

KenV

14th Jan 2019, 16:49

Would have been ready for the USAF though, which is the point of the thread....It did the first time around, or rather it exceeded them.Ummm, no. Northrop/Airbus won the competition to DEVELOP a tanker based on the A330MRTT. The A330MRTT did NOT meet USAF requirements at the first competition, nor did it later, not does it now. That's total bollocks.

melmothtw

14th Jan 2019, 16:54

Ummm, no. Northrop/Airbus won the competition to DEVELOP a tanker based on the A330MRTT. The A330MRTT did NOT meet USAF requirements at the first competition, nor did it later, not does it now. That's total bollocks.

Yep, to add a cargo door basically.

Of course it didn't meet the USAF requirements, which is why they didn't select it. Oh wait...

KenV

15th Jan 2019, 15:41

Yep, to add a cargo door basically.
Of course it didn't meet the USAF requirements, which is why they didn't select it. Oh wait...KC-767 had a cargo door and it did not meet the requirements. No aircraft anywhere met USAF's requirements. Northrop/Airbus's proposal (as well as Boeing's) met the requirements, but not the existing aircraft. But the bottom line was that neither the A330MRTT nor the KC-767 could meet USAF's requirements. Keep in mind that in 2006 when the RFP was released, Airbus did not even have a single flight qualified refueling boom, while Boeing had two. But Northrop/Airbus's proposal was superior to Boeing's and thus it won the first competition. To put this in perspective, by the time of the final proposal, Boeing had switched to their "advanced boom" (developed on the KC-10) to overcome Airbus's superior boom envelope (the original boom was based on the KC-135 boom). USAF also required a very robust OBIGGS (tank inerting) suite that neither the A330MRTT nor the KC-767 had and which required development. This resulted in a significant delay when the manifolding was done wrong. Also consider that over 25 miles of wiring were added to the KC-767 to turn it into a KC-46. This wiring accounted for a lot of the delays in the program. I can't get into what all that wiring does, but rest assured that neither the A330MRTT nor the KC-767 includes that wiring nor the systems that wiring services. But I can say that because of those systems, the KC-46 does a LOT more than just pass fuel to other aircraft.

LowObservable

16th Jan 2019, 10:54

melmothtw

16th Jan 2019, 11:25

Indeed, by that reasoning the A330 MRTT didn't meet any customer requirements until the national-specific features (comms, defensive aids etc) were added during development.

Also, not only does the A330 MRTT 'do more than pass gas to other aircraft', but it doesn't need to be reconfigured to do it either.

Asturias56

16th Jan 2019, 12:35

So the USAF wanted more than a simple refueler? Crazy..............

Bill Gunston, the famous aviation writer, used to opine that if Air Forces had been willing to accept 90% of the spec they'd have got a lot more aircraft, sooner and on budget... it's that last 10% where the people (who are only in their jobs for a couple of years before moving on) add the crazy bells and whistles to look good

KenV

16th Jan 2019, 13:11

So, basically - saying that the A330 "doesn't meet USAF requirements" has nothing to do with the basic MRTT system, but has to do with add-ons such as OBIGGS, support for future comms roles &c, which are USAF-unique and would have been added during development.That's exactly what LOTS of people have been saying for years. No existing tanker met all the requirements and meeting all the requirements required development. So the oft repeated mantra of "if only USAF had bought A330MRTTs they'd have had their tanker years earlier" is tosh. That is what I'm arguing against.

melmothtw

16th Jan 2019, 13:19

That's exactly what LOTS of people have been saying for years. No existing tanker met all the requirements and meeting all the requirements required development. So the oft repeated mantra of "if only USAF had bought A330MRTTs they'd have had their tanker years earlier" is tosh. That is what I'm arguing against.

There's 'development', and then there's development. No one can truly say what might have been, but given the nature and extent of the modifications that would have been needed to turn the MRTT into the KC-45A and given the track record of the MRTT since the KC-X contract was first awarded back in 2008 I don't think it is too much of a leap of fatih to suggest that the USAF would now have the fully operational tanker-transport it desperately needs had it stuck to its original decision.

KenV

16th Jan 2019, 13:40

Also, not only does the A330 MRTT 'do more than pass gas to other aircraft', but it doesn't need to be reconfigured to do it either.Really? Do all A330MRTTs have a main deck cargo door? Do they have a main deck floor designed, stressed, and equipped to handle freight? Do the UK's Voyagers? Adding a main deck cargo door and main deck freighter floor is a damn serious "reconfiguration" if that's what the customer needs. Can the A330MRTT 3D camera vision system enable the boom operator to pass gas to receiver equipped stealth aircraft under all lighting conditions? Yet another serious "reconfiguration" issue of that's what the customer needs. Can the A330MRTT act as an airborne data relay station for stealth aircraft equipped with directional datalink systems? I could go on, but I think the point has been made. And in case you missed it, the point is that neither the A330MRTT nor the KC-767 can do many of the things that are required of the KC-46.

The point is, this was not a non-developmental program with USAF buying an off-the-shelf aircraft. Many of USAF's requirements needed to be developed, integrated, and tested. That took time and money. More time and money than provided by the firm-fixed-price contract. Boeing paid out of their own pocket for all the additional expenses, and paid penalties for the extra time. They were willing to accept that risk to win the competition. Northrop was not. And in the end, neither was Airbus. They could not match Boeing's low-ball bid. Just as Lockheed and several others could not meet Boeing's low ball bid for the T-X trainer (with a EUROPEAN partner), nor Boeing's low-ball bid for USAF's UH-1N replacement (the only bid based on a EUROPEAN helicopter), nor Boeing's low-ball bid for the MQ-25.

KenV

16th Jan 2019, 14:01

There's 'development', and then there's development. No one can truly say what might have been, but given the nature and extent of the modifications that would have been needed to turn the MRTT into the KC-45A and given the track record of the MRTT since the KC-X contract was first awarded back in 2008 I don't think it is too much of a leap of fatih to suggest that the USAF would now have the fully operational tanker-transport it desperately needs had it stuck to its original decision.You're right, "no one can truly say what might have been." But Airbus clearly decided it took too much of a "leap of faith" to develop, integrate, and test all the requirements that needed to be developed within the time and cost constraints required by the contract. Simply put, it couldn't be done, by either Airbus or Boeing. The difference was that Boeing was willing to bid low and win the firm-fixed-price contract and accept the risk of paying out of pocket for the additional costs and paying the penalties for the additional time. Airbus was not. The final KC-X contest was won on price, pure and simple. Just as the T-X trainer, UH-1N replacement, and MQ-25 contests were won on price. Boeing underbid all the contestants by being willing to pay for the inevitable cost overruns out of pocket. None of these are the result of "anti European" sentiment claimed by so many.

Now about the phrase " I don't think it is too much of a leap of fatih to suggest that the USAF would now have the fully operational tanker-transport it desperately needs had it stuck to its original decision." You're suggestion requires the leap of faith that Airbus could have done in less time and less cost what Boeing could not do. The track record of both companies does not begin to support such a leap of faith.

TwoStep

16th Jan 2019, 14:08

Really? Do all A330MRTTs have a main deck cargo door? Do they have a main deck floor designed, stressed, and equipped to handle freight? Do the UK's Voyagers? Adding a main deck cargo door and main deck freighter floor is a damn serious "reconfiguration" if that's what the customer needs. Can the A330MRTT 3D camera vision system enable the boom operator to pass gas to receiver equipped stealth aircraft under all lighting conditions? Yet another serious "reconfiguration" issue of that's what the customer needs. Can the A330MRTT act as an airborne data relay station for stealth aircraft equipped with directional datalink systems? I could go on, but I think the point has been made. And in case you missed it, the point is that neither the A330MRTT nor the KC-767 can do many of the things that are required of the KC-46.

If you mean, can the A330 MRTT refuel at night under strict lightning conditions, yes it can and does over Iraq and Syria.
Given that F-35 and F-22 communicate only with each other on specialist datalinks, then no the A330 MRTT cannot, but nor can the KC-46. However the MRTT does have Link 16,so can communicate by other means.
Can a KC-46 get airborne with a full load of fuel from a 9,000 foot runway? I'd question that.

melmothtw

16th Jan 2019, 14:11

Do all A330MRTTs have a main deck cargo door?

Those for the nation that asked for the main deck cargo door have. The USAF's would have too.

Do they have a main deck floor designed, stressed, and equipped to handle freight

Not required - can carry 45 tonnes of freight in the underfloor cargo area. This is something the KC-46A can't do this as much of the underfloor space is taken up with auxiliary fuel tanks, which would be why most of the cargo needs to be carried in the main cabin - a case of the aircraft's capabilities dictating the requirements, rather than the other way around.

Do the UK's Voyagers?

No, see above.

Can the A330MRTT 3D camera vision system enable the boom operator to pass gas to receiver equipped stealth aircraft under all lighting conditions?

Australia is the only current 'boom-MRTT / F-35' operator, and I have heard no reports from the RAAF that it can't.

Can the A330MRTT act as an airborne data relay station for stealth aircraft equipped with directional datalink systems?

See above.

I could go on, but I think the point has been made.

I'm not sure what point has been made. None of these things - the reinforced floor, the ability to fuel stealth aircraft under all lighting conditions or the ability to act as an airborne data relay station - are the reason why the KC-46A is so massively delayed and over budget. It is telling that nowhere did you ask if the MRTT has had a fully functioning fly-by-wire boom for the last 11 years.

They could not match Boeing's low-ball bid. Just as Lockheed and several others could not meet Boeing's low ball bid for the T-X trainer (with a EUROPEAN partner), nor Boeing's low-ball bid for USAF's UH-1N replacement (the only bid based on a EUROPEAN helicopter), nor Boeing's low-ball bid for the MQ-25.

I do agree with you on this, but it's a slight divergence from the operational requirements/ merits of the MRTT vs the KC-46A in relation to the KC-X contract award and re-award.

KenV

16th Jan 2019, 14:24

If you mean, can the A330 MRTT refuel at night under strict lightning conditions, yes it can and does over Iraq and Syria.No, that is not what I meant. KC-767 does that. As does KDC-10, and KC-10, and KC-135, all Boeing products. USAF has some VERY robust requirements for refueling stealth aircraft under certain lighting condition. No tanker can meet those requirements. NONE, including KC-46. However, Boeing has proposed a software upgrade for KC-46 that USAF has (preliminarily) accepted will meet the requirements. At a future date. At Boeing expense to integrate, test, and install.

Can a KC-46 get airborne with a full load of fuel from a 9,000 foot runway? I'd question that.Question it all you want. What matters is does USAF have such a requirement? If not, what's your point? My point is and has been that no off-the-shelf tanker could meet all USAF's requirements. NONE. It took more years of development and more money than USAF's firm-fixed-price contract provided to develop, integrate, and test all those requirements. Boeing was willing to pay all those costs and penalties out of pocket. Neither NG nor Airbus were willing to do so.

KenV

16th Jan 2019, 15:05

Do they have a main deck floor designed, stressed, and equipped to handle freight?
Not required - can carry 45 tonnes of freight in the underfloor cargo area.Hilarious. You're actually suggesting you can tell USAF to go pound sand when they have a requirement for a main deck cargo floor. Have you ever considered that USAF's main deck cargo requirement relates more to dimensions than it does to weight? Let me provide a for instance. The KC-10 has a taller belly cargo hold than A330 and can hold more weight. And yet every USAF KC-10 has a main deck cargo door and main deck cargo floor. USAF wants the height of a main deck cargo hold. To put it in USAF parlance, the airplane is much more likely to cube out than to weight out. It's volume they care about, especially height.

I'm not sure what point has been made.I've been very clear what point I'm making and repeated it multiple times. I don't see how you missed it. But since yo clearly did I will reiterate again:
1. No off-the-shelf tanker met USAF's requirements. NONE.
2. Meeting all USAF's requirements required development, integration, and test. USAF's firm-fixed-price contract provided neither sufficient time nor money to accomplish that.
3. Boeing was willing/able to pay out of pocket for the additional time and cost beyond the contractual terms to meet all the requirements. Neither NG nor Airbus were willing/able to do so.

None of these things - the reinforced floor, the ability to fuel stealth aircraft under all lighting conditions or the ability to act as an airborne data relay station - are the reason why the KC-46A is so massively delayed and over budget.Really??!!! And you base this claim on what? Try actually reading this thread rather than conjecturing. And about your "over budget" statement. That's tosh. This is a firm-fixed-price contract. The program has stayed within the contractual budget because Boeing is paying for all the additional costs. Neither NG nor Airbus were willing to do that.

It is telling that nowhere did you ask if the MRTT has had a fully functioning fly-by-wire boom for the last 11 years.Telling? Why? Is that even a requirement? And BTW, the KC-10 has had a "fully functioning" fly-by-wire boom for several decades (since the late 70s). The KC-46 uses a modernized KC-10 boom. So what? (you may want to google "red herring fallacy")

I do agree with you on this, but it's a slight divergence from the operational requirements/ merits of the MRTT vs the KC-46A in relation to the KC-X contract award and re-award.You appear to be under the delusion that the first contest (won by NG/EADS) had the same requirements as the final contest. It did not. A lot changed over the years between the first and final contest. It's one of the reasons NG later pulled out of the contest.

KenV

16th Jan 2019, 15:25

Can the A330MRTT 3D camera vision system enable the boom operator to pass gas to receiver equipped stealth aircraft under all lighting conditions
Australia is the only current 'boom-MRTT / F-35' operator, and I have heard no reports from the RAAF that it can't.You're missing the point. The KC-46 was not designed to meet European or Aussie requirements. It is designed to meet USAF requirements. USAF has multiple stealth aircraft with more currently in design/development. KC-46 has to meet those requirements. They are very difficult to meet and currently not even the KC-46 can meet them. Boeing has proposed and USAF has (preliminarily) accepted a software upgrade that meets the requirements. But Boeing must integrate, test, and install this upgrade at their own expense and must meet an aggressive schedule for doing so.

Davef68

16th Jan 2019, 15:38

If only there had been an interim solution where the USAF could have perhaps leased some tankers to provide capacity and releive the elderly KC-135s until KC46 came onstream....

KenV

16th Jan 2019, 16:35

If only there had been an interim solution where the USAF could have perhaps leased some tankers to provide capacity and releive the elderly KC-135s until KC46 came onstream....Which brings up some interesting factoids about funding and the "color of money".

When the KC-767 lease idea was put forward, the point was to avoid sinking lots of money into half century old airframes to keep them flying until a suitable replacement could be developed. The lease option was based on using KC-135 operating/maintenance dollars to lease the KC-767s, because buying them would require procurement dollars (one color of money) which USAF did not have and instead using operating/maintenance dollars (a different color of money) which USAF did have. But Senator McCain essentially single handedly killed that idea because he seriously disliked Boeing and called it "corporate welfare." So instead, the KC-135 fleet was upgraded with new avionics/cockpits to keep them flying. Guess who got that contract? Boeing. (Yeah Rockwell built the parts, but did not install them along with other upgrades.) And we all know that Boeing also ended up with the contract to build new KC-46 tankers. So much for sticking it to Boeing. And oh yeah, with the new cockpits, the KC-135s aren't all that decrepit after all and the pressure to retire them is greatly diminished. So while KC-46's late entry into service is lamentable, it has not resulted in a loss of aerial tanking capacity.because none of the KC-135s have been retired with most of the fleet having service life to well into 2040 and many well beyond. Theoretically, KC-135s will start to be retired as KC-46s come into service. But it's still not clear if this will be on a one for one basis, or a two for one basis. We'll have to wait and see.

melmothtw

16th Jan 2019, 16:54

If only there had been an interim solution where the USAF could have perhaps leased some tankers to provide capacity and releive the elderly KC-135s until KC46 came onstream.

in 2015 Airbus was in discussions to provide the USAF with additional tanking capacity, so there was/is an interim tanker of sorts...the A330 MRTT.

...it has not resulted in a loss of aerial tanking capacity.because none of the KC-135s have been retired with most of the fleet having service life to well into 2040 and many well beyond.

Really? Because in 2017 the chief of USTRANSCOM, General Darren McDew, told Congress that the shortfall in tanker capacity was the thing that was causing him "to lose sleep at night". He added that plans to retire the KC-10A from 2019 to 2024 were being considered because of this shortfall in capacity.

It's one thing to have KC-135s in the inventory, it's quite another to have them available for operations.

Bing

16th Jan 2019, 17:39

You're actually suggesting you can tell USAF to go pound sand when they have a requirement for a main deck cargo floor.

To be fair, if someone had they might have had an in-service tanker by now.

KenV

16th Jan 2019, 18:45

Really? Because in 2017 the chief of USTRANSCOM, General Darren McDew, told Congress that the shortfall in tanker capacity was the thing that was causing him "to lose sleep at night". He added that plans to retire the KC-10A from 2019 to 2024 were being considered because of this shortfall in capacity.Yes, really. I said USAF had not lost any tanking capacity. It has not. The shortfall is due to an increase in tanking requirements, not a decrease in tanking capacity. That's why USAF is looking at delaying KC-10 retirements, looking at buying tanking services from vendors versus buying tankers for organic tanking, further extending the life of KC-135s, and more. Now keep in mind that if USAF decides to buy tanking services, there will be a plethora of vendors who will convert old aircraft into tankers to provide those services and that Lockheed/Airbus will have to compete with those low-cost providers. Good luck with that.

KenV

16th Jan 2019, 18:48

To be fair, if someone had they might have had an in-service tanker by now.Ummm, USAF has literally hundreds of "in service tankers" now, all with main deck cargo doors and floors. It's a basic requirement for a USAF tanker. The KC-767 had such a door and floor, but did not meet the other requirements USAF says it needs. These decisions aren't made in a vacuum. Keep in mind that the KC-46 will almost certainly still be flying 50 years from now. Maybe (likely?) into the next century. They're already planning on keep the C-17 flying well into the next century.

CONSO

16th Jan 2019, 18:51

[QUOTE=KenV;10362344]Which brings up some interesting factoids about funding and the "color of money".

"When the KC-767 lease idea was put forward, the point was to avoid sinking lots of money into half century old airframes to keep them flying until a suitable replacement could be developed. The lease option was based on using KC-135 operating/maintenance dollars to lease the KC-767s, because buying them would require procurement dollars (one color of money) which USAF did not have and instead using operating/maintenance dollars (a different color of money) which USAF did have. But Senator McCain essentially single handedly killed that idea because he seriously disliked Boeing and called it "corporate welfare." So instead, the KC-135 fleet was upgraded with new avionics/cockpits to keep them flying. "......

++++
Partly correct- but somehat wrong- The cliff note version of what follows is that the lease of 767 tankers was to save employment and more specifically the 767 Assembly line...

. A bit of history- prior to 911, Boeing had put forward the 767 as a tanker and had contracted with Japan and Italy for a few. Airframe had been "mil spec" certified and design work was well underway. - 767 line at that time was close to running down- out. When 911 happened, the effects on Boeing re airplanes, was significant- and air travel all of sudden got more expensive. - Meanwhile, back at the ranch- The local union ( SPEEA ) was putting together a CVD (Countervailing duties petitiion ) against airbus without any help from Boeing re Airbus selling into the U.S at ultralowball prices. Boeing had that summer quietly hired Rudy DeLeon ( former asst sec defense ) to start to push 767 as a U.S tanker( and squelch the CVD ) . Since after 911, it was obvious that Boeing (BA) was going to take a majo employment hit, insurance costs to airlines were going up, etc, and the 767 line was near end.- A non management Boeing engineer with a unique background and many many very high level contacts was asked by the Senator from Alaska (Ted Stevens) what might be done re Boeing. The answer was threefold. 1) Feds to provide special insurance re hijacking 2) Increase airport security, and 3) Use funds to lease with option to buy at a later date 767 tankers similar to the japan and italian version. this would support the 767 line and dull somewhat the expected drop in airtravel, and bolster the expected need for more tankers to help carry on overseas activites by military re al queda and similar.

But then what happened was the MDC dummies stepped in re how to build and deliver said tankers by Everett delivering to the military division a green- flyable airplane which would then be flown to Wichita and disassembled to install tanks, booms, etc, and re- assembled. As if that wasn't enough Ms Dryiun and Mr Sears got involved wIth corruption and bribes etc. Meanwhile, Boeing stepped in and squelched The CVD re backdoor methods, and sent Rudy de Leon to persuade SPEEA to push the tanker and provided a two page analysis and comments about how the costs/arrangements would be handled. Problem was it was a poorly written attempt to snow the engineers who were supposed to stand in awe of a former asst sec def with his tassel toed sneakers, etc. His presentation did NOT go well when one Engineer stood up, waved Rudy's paper handout and splaIned to Rudy it was a buch of garbage, and as to rudys comments re tankers,
Said engineer explained he was delivering the KC135/s when Rudy was not yet in high school- or maybe it was grammer school.- and BTW said engineer also splained to rudy ( not me BTW ) that he had probably been in more high level pentagon meetings than Rudy. So politican v Engineer did not come out well.

Of course mccain was unhappy- and as the corruption and insane pricing game came to the front, the whole mess was cancelled.

How do I know all this- ? 1) I was at said meeting 2) Said Engineer was a good friend of mine and was WELL known by upper management for being a straight shooter and more than willing to speak truth to power.

Bing

16th Jan 2019, 18:53

Ummm, USAF has literally hundreds of "in service tankers" now, all with main deck cargo doors and floors.

Well in that case they can cancel the KC-46A and save all that time and money. If you write requirements that can't be met don't be surprised if it goes badly.

tdracer

16th Jan 2019, 21:11

Can a KC-46 get airborne with a full load of fuel from a 9,000 foot runway? I'd question that.

"What part of mandatory requirement don't you understand"...
In short, yes, the KC-46 has demonstrated the ability to take off fully loaded from an 8,000 ft. on a plus 15 deg C day. That was one of the requirements. As was main deck cargo (with an automated handling system), provisions for future 'features' that we were not allowed to ask about, and a whole laundry list of other stuff.
You may not have noticed, but the basic KC-135 airframe has been used for a number of non-tanking applications over the last 60 years (e.g. electronic surveillance). It's a pretty good bet that the KC-46 will get similar treatment - and I'm sure a lot of that extra 25 miles of wiring is provisional for future applications. I spent a lot of time on and around several of the KC-46 aircraft - and there are numerous features both inside and outside that are not on any other 767. I can't even guess as to what some of them are for (and if I could I wouldn't be able to talk about it - I had to take training and sign a non-disclosure before I was even allowed on the aircraft). All stuff that would have needed to be developed an integrated into the MRTT at considerable time and cost.
Now, I'm not saying Boeing didn't make some mighty foul ups that resulted in large cost and time over runs - things like fuel manifolds that couldn't hold fuel and the well known wiring errors. Maybe Airbus would have avoided making those sorts of major mistakes. Then again, maybe not - the A400M has hardly been a shinning example of good program management - nor was the A380.

I think what Asturias56 wrote is pretty close to the mark - there were several mandatory requirements that simply didn't make sense when applied to a aircraft derived from a commercial airliner. But even the mention to the USAF that a requirement didn't make sense was immediately shutdown with the 'what part of mandatory don't you understand'.

LowObservable

16th Jan 2019, 22:42

Ken - May I remind you of basic Internet etiquette: ALL CAPS is shouting. Please stop.

You're right about one thing. Boeing underbid on the initial contract. But let's get things clear: the customer, Gawd bless him, is going to end up paying what it cost to develop the airplane, plus margin, irrespective of the initial price. Boeing will make its money back once the USAF needs support and services and Boeing owns the IP on the commercially certificated baseline aircraft,

As for whether Airbus would have incurred the same delays - we don't know. However, it does seem that a very conscious Boeing decision, post-award, to change the way the KC-46 was built has played a part in the problems. To get the cost closer to the price they'd bid, Boeing decided to build the aircraft at Everett, as the 767-2C, up to the point where the boom and pods (and other things) got bolted on, because commercial manufacture was cheaper. I believe it's been suggested here that some commercial/military standards conflicted.

Also, enough with the red herrings over the cargo floor. Previous MRTTs did not have one. However, by the time the contract for KC-X was awarded, the A330-200F had been in service for a year, so it was not exactly a risk factor.

Jackonicko

16th Jan 2019, 23:45

In short, yes, the KC-46 has demonstrated the ability to take off fully loaded from an 8,000 ft. on a plus 15 deg C day.

That's surprising. Not that it can take off inside 8,000 ft, but that it can actually operate from a 9,000 ft runway. The KC-767 can't do it with full fuel, nor could the variant offered to the UK.

What's the Balanced Field Length requirement with all 93 tonnes of fuel? My understanding is that it needs a longer runway than a 330 MRTT with 111 tonnes of fuel.

tdracer

17th Jan 2019, 01:33

That's surprising. Not that it can take off inside 8,000 ft, but that it can actually operate from a 9,000 ft runway. The KC-767 can't do it with full fuel, nor could the variant offered to the UK.

Different engine, more thrust, lighter airframe (KC-46 is based on a 767-200, the others listed are -300)

Edited to add:
The 767 tanker proposed to the UK was using ex BA 767s powered by the RB211-524H. Quite frankly, the Rolls 767 was a dog - heavier engine, poor TO performance, lousy fuel burn - the engine simply wasn't a good match to the airframe (there was a reason why only 40 were built, compared to the several hundred each for both the PW4000 and the CF6-80C2). I suspect some of the negativity aimed at the KC-46 from the other side of the pond is based on the crappy specs of the proposed Rolls powered UK tankers.

CONSO

17th Jan 2019, 02:08

An awful lot of data on 767 and models can be found at

Boeing 767-200ER, Photos and Specifications (http://www.skytamer.com/Boeing_767-200ER.html)

BEagle

17th Jan 2019, 07:04

KenV

17th Jan 2019, 10:35

Well in that case they can cancel the KC-46A and save all that time and money. If you write requirements that can't be met don't be surprised if it goes badly.Oh my. Requirements that can't be met? The suggestion was made that if someone had stood up against USAF and eliminated the main deck cargo door and floor requirement they'd already be flying new tankers. That's utter tosh. Those items were ALREADY developed, tested and certified. The delays and cost increases have NOTHING to do with the cargo door and floor. But lets suppose USAF did eliminate the cargo door and floor requirement for the KC-46 because they already have hundreds of cargo door and floor equipped tankers. Those tankers will ALL be retired and then USAF will only have tankers with no main deck cargo door and floor. You might as well argue to eliminate the boom requirement. After all, USAF already has hundreds of boom equipped tankers. The delays are all due to various developmental items the no tanker anywhere has. USAF wanted those items in their new tanker because they wanted the new tanker to do much more than just pass gas or haul trash. They wanted them to be part of future fights. That's one reason the KC-46 (unlike any other tanker, including A330MRTT) is EMP hardened.

Bing

17th Jan 2019, 11:18

USAF wanted those items in their new tanker because they wanted the new tanker to do much more than just pass gas or haul trash.

So requirements that can't be met. Or you'd have operational KC-46As.

KenV

17th Jan 2019, 11:41

KC-767I is powered by the GE CF6-80C2, but I understand that even after the RW at Pratica di Mare was extended, the Italian Air Force cannot operate it with max fuel for most of the year.

Quadra-national think-tank comparison of KC-767 (not the old ex-ba aircraft the MoD was offered), A330MRTT and A310MRTT with an equal task requirement at ISA / SL / zero wind showed how poor the Boeing RW performance truly was. The RW was a level 10000ft balanced field and each aircraft was required to land with an hour's average burn to tanks dry (simulating an alternate aerodrome requirement) and the reps were required to calculate the max fuel available on take-off. The first thing the US rep said was "Can we make it 12000ft?" - which was refused. As the Boeing rep told us during FSTA times "Yes, that's where we think Airbus has us beat"...

Presumably the KC-46 has uprated engines and uprated brakes if it can really operate from an 8000ft balanced field within normal certification limits? Or was 8000ft the take-off ground roll?KC-46 has uprated Pratt, not GE engines, and has a bit more wing than the KC-767 (KC-767 has a -200 wing and KC-46 has a -300 wing). And no, 8000 ft is not take off ground roll. And, oh yeah, no thrust reversers. I think the latter is foolish, but presumably the USAF planners know a quite a bit more than I do. Or maybe it has such a powerful braking system (it has the -300 brakes on a -200 fuselage) that it needs no thrust reversers, which could perhaps account for the improvement in balanced field length. I'm not familiar with those particular details. So maybe designing a "franken tanker" was really not such a bad idea after all. And on the subject of "Franken tanker", the 767C2 airframe is the 767-200LRF airframe, which mates a -200 fuselage with -300 wings, landing gear, engines, etc. So all those "franken" bits were put together and certified well before the KC-46 came into being.

KenV

17th Jan 2019, 12:07

You're right about one thing. Boeing underbid on the initial contract. But let's get things clear: the customer, Gawd bless him, is going to end up paying what it cost to develop the airplane, plus margin, irrespective of the initial price. Boeing will make its money back once the USAF needs support and services and Boeing owns the IP on the commercially certificated baseline aircraft,Indeed. But such a bidding strategy requires accepting lotsa risk and deep enough pockets to defer profiitability for several years. Airbus was apparently unwilling and/or unable to do that.

As for whether Airbus would have incurred the same delays - we don't know. However, it does seem that a very conscious Boeing decision, post-award, to change the way the KC-46 was built has played a part in the problems. To get the cost closer to the price they'd bid, Boeing decided to build the aircraft at Everett, as the 767-2C, up to the point where the boom and pods (and other things) got bolted on, because commercial manufacture was cheaper. I believe it's been suggested here that some commercial/military standards conflicted.We won't ever know how Airbus would have done schedule wise, but given the track records of both Airbus and Boeing, probably, almost certainly, no better and likely worse. Unlike Airbus, Boeing's been doing military derivatives of commercial airliners for decades. Cost is a different matter. Boeing figured out how to build a military product on a commercial line on the 737 for the P-8. They applied those lessons learned to the 767 so, unlike the KC-767 and A330MRTT, the KC-46 could be built on the production line rather than completely built, flown elsewhere, and then taken apart to turn it into a tanker.

Also, enough with the red herrings over the cargo floor. Previous MRTTs did not have one. However, by the time the contract for KC-X was awarded, the A330-200F had been in service for a year, so it was not exactly a risk factor.I agree. The main deck cargo door and floor have absolutely zero to do with Boeing's cost and schedule difficulties. ZERO. The 767C2 airframe upon which the KC-46 is built was developed, tested and certified well before the KC-46 came into being and include a cargo door and floor because it is the basis of the 767-200LRF.

Asturias56

17th Jan 2019, 12:27

At the end of the day Boeing took a commercial decision - no doubt at the highest level- to go lo-ball on a technical spec that was challenging -I'd love to know if they were warned what the risks were...

they have the income from elsewhere to be able to take the hit - the only people hurting are the shareholders - and the USAF guys waiting and waiting for their promised super gas tank...

Maybe Airbus dodged the bullet..............

CONSO

17th Jan 2019, 15:14

" That's one reason the KC-46 (unlike any other tanker, including A330MRTT) is EMP hardened. "

KC135 and variants have been emp hardened for years and years
some hints and other related data at

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71448/html/CHRG-112hhrg71448.htm

KenV

17th Jan 2019, 15:48

It's one thing to have KC-135s in the inventory, it's quite another to have them available for operations.KC-135 availability and mission capability rates have held steady for more than a decade and currently stand at 65% and 80% respectively. This compares to KC-10 of 65% and 79% over the same period. To put these numbers in perspective that's more than three times better than A400M (which has been holding for some time at under 20% availability) and more than twice better than Typhoon, both of which are are much much newer than either KC-135 or KC-10. Can't speak to A400M mission capability because it's still not cleared for many of its tactical capabilities.

KenV

17th Jan 2019, 16:23

" That's one reason the KC-46 (unlike any other tanker, including A330MRTT) is EMP hardened. "
KC135 and variants have been emp hardened for years and yearsYou are correct. I misspoke. More accurately, KC-135 and KC-10 while hardened, were not hardened to the levels of MIL-STD-2169. KC-46 is hardened to more then twice the level of MIL-STD-2169 (although not quite to the level of VC-25 and E-4) and has been HEMP tested per TOP 01-2-620. Further, no legacy tanker has been HEMP tested per TOP 01-2-620 for the simple reason that those tests had not been developed when those aircraft were designed and certified. I may not go into any more detail than that.

KenV

17th Jan 2019, 16:32

At the end of the day Boeing took a commercial decision - no doubt at the highest level- to go lo-ball on a technical spec that was challenging -I'd love to know if they were warned what the risks were...Boeing was well aware of the risks and put in place various measures to mitigate the risks. Not all were successful. Boeing took similar and significantly greater risks to win the MQ-25, T-X trainer, and UH-1N replacement programs. Several contractors are crying foul because none have the cash flow that Boeing's commercial airliner business generates and are consequently forever disadvantaged.

Maybe Airbus dodged the bullet..............I personally believe they consciously did so by submitting a final bid that was essentially non compliant in addition to being significantly pricier than Boeing's. But by staying in the program they ensured Boeing would 1) have to put the KC-10 boom and some other improvements on it and 2) force them to bid low. If Airbus had not bid, the project would have been sole source and Boeing could have effectively written the contract. Strategically it was a good decision on their part even if they knew they could not compete, because it kept Boeing's feet to the fire.

Davef68

17th Jan 2019, 17:15

They applied those lessons learned to the 767 so, unlike the KC-767 and A330MRTT, the KC-46 could be built on the production line rather than completely built, flown elsewhere, and then taken apart to turn it into a tanker.

Of course the RAF surge Voyagers were built, flown elsewhere to be turned into tankers, then flown to the UK to be turned back into airliners again!

weemonkey

17th Jan 2019, 20:04

Of course the RAF surge Voyagers were built, flown elsewhere to be turned into tankers, then flown to the UK to be turned back into airliners again!

Nicely done, say three days for the light bulb to come on?

tdracer

17th Jan 2019, 21:37

KC-767I is powered by the GE CF6-80C2, but I understand that even after the RW at Pratica di Mare was extended, the Italian Air Force cannot operate it with max fuel for most of the year.

The PW4000 as installed on the KC-46 has over 5% more takeoff thrust than the CF6-80C2BF as installed on the KC-767.
Deleting the thrust reverser doesn't affect TO performance calculations since the FARs don't allow you to take credit for thrust reversers (real life of course is different).
EMP/HIRF hardening requirements on the KC-46 were so high that at many frequencies there were no test facilities capable of creating the required fields - much of the validation had to be by analysis because it couldn't be tested. There is so much shielding on the engine wiring that deleting the T/R was a blessing in disguise - otherwise there wouldn't have been sufficient room for the wire bundles.

KenV

22nd Jan 2019, 14:04

Given the length and complexity of this thread (not to mention the various dead ends and red herrings) the following synopsis is provided:

No, not a single off the shelf tanker met USAF’s final RFP requirements for a new tanker. The RFP included many items which no manufacturer had ever before produced and which would require development, integration, and testing. Doing so required time and money. USAF’s budget and schedule for all this development plus delivery of the first 18 aircraft and all their maintenance documentation as well as spares and support equipment was very aggressive.

No, the A330MRTT being delivered today would not remotely meet USAF’s latest tanker requirements.

No, the KC-46 does not meet the A-10’s refueling receptacle requirements. But USAF admits that the A-10s requirements stated in their RFP (and to which Boeing worked) were in error. USAF and Boeing are working on correcting that now.

No, the vendor/manufacturer cannot tell USAF their requirements are “not necessary” or are “gold plating” or whatever and then ignore/alter those requirements.

No, neither the A330MRTT nor any legacy tanker can remotely meet USAF’s latest EMP/HERF requirements.

No, the KC-767I offered by BAE could not take off from a 9000 ft balanced airfield when fully loaded. But the KC-46 has more powerful engines, more powerful brakes, a slightly larger wing and shorter fuselage which enables it to take off fully loaded from an 8000ft runway on a plus 15C day.

No, Airbus was not the first to produce a fly-by-wire refueling boom. The DC-10 boom is fly-by-wire and entered service in the mid 70s. And an updated version of that boom is on the KC-46.

No, the main deck cargo door and floor have nothing to do with Boeing’s cost and schedule difficulties delivering the KC-46. The 767C2 airframe on which the KC-46 is based is the airframe for the 767LRF (Long Range Freighter), which was developed and certified well before KC-46 came into being and has been in production for some time.

No, Boeing’s cost over runs have not cost USAF or the taxpayers a dime. This is a firm fixed price contract and Boeing has borne all extra costs.

No, Boeing’s late delivery of KC-46 has not caused an airlift/tanker shortfall. The KC-135 and KC-10 availability rates have held steady for the past decade. Shortfalls are the result of an increase in tanking requirements, not a decrease in tanker availability.

No, Boeing did not get away with late deliveries without penalty. Although the late delivery did not result in an airlift shortfall, it did result in an increase in operational/maintenance cost to USAF to keep the legacy fleet going. USAF is computing that cost and Boeing will be penalized for those costs.

No, the KC-46 (unlike the A330MRTT) is not built as a commercial airliner, flown to a modification center, taken apart, and converted into a military tanker. Lessons learned from building the military P-8A MMA (based on 737) on a commercial production line were applied to 767, and the KC-46 is consequently built on a commercial production line in Everett. And yet meets all the Commerce Department’s Export restrictions and State Department’s Trafficking in Arms restrictions. This was one of the innovations Boeing used to meet their aggressive selling price which won them the contract.

Octane

22nd Jan 2019, 14:29

"This was one of the innovations Boeing used to meet their aggressive selling price which won them the contract."

Wasn't it third time around?!

KenV

22nd Jan 2019, 14:42

"This was one of the innovations Boeing used to meet their aggressive selling price which won them the contract." Wasn't it third time around?!Indeed. By the final RFP (which resembled the first RFP very little), NG could not meet USAF's very aggressive development schedule and backed out, and Airbus could not meet Boeing's very aggressive price.

Mk 1

23rd Jan 2019, 07:21

Given the length and complexity of this thread (not to mention the various dead ends and red herrings) the following synopsis is provided:

No, not a single off the shelf tanker met USAF’s final RFP requirements for a new tanker. The RFP included many items which no manufacturer had ever before produced and which would require development, integration, and testing. Doing so required time and money. USAF’s budget and schedule for all this development plus delivery of the first 18 aircraft and all their maintenance documentation as well as spares and support equipment was very aggressive.

No, the A330MRTT being delivered today would not remotely meet USAF’s latest tanker requirements.

No, the KC-46 does not meet the A-10’s refueling receptacle requirements. But USAF admits that the A-10s requirements stated in their RFP (and to which Boeing worked) were in error. USAF and Boeing are working on correcting that now.

No, the vendor/manufacturer cannot tell USAF their requirements are “not necessary” or are “gold plating” or whatever and then ignore/alter those requirements.

No, neither the A330MRTT nor any legacy tanker can remotely meet USAF’s latest EMP/HERF requirements.

No, the KC-767I offered by BAE could not take off from a 9000 ft balanced airfield when fully loaded. But the KC-46 has more powerful engines, more powerful brakes, a slightly larger wing and shorter fuselage which enables it to take off fully loaded from an 8000ft runway on a plus 15C day.

No, Airbus was not the first to produce a fly-by-wire refueling boom. The DC-10 boom is fly-by-wire and entered service in the mid 70s. And an updated version of that boom is on the KC-46.

No, the main deck cargo door and floor have nothing to do with Boeing’s cost and schedule difficulties delivering the KC-46. The 767C2 airframe on which the KC-46 is based is the airframe for the 767LRF (Long Range Freighter), which was developed and certified well before KC-46 came into being and has been in production for some time.

No, Boeing’s cost over runs have not cost USAF or the taxpayers a dime. This is a firm fixed price contract and Boeing has borne all extra costs.

No, Boeing’s late delivery of KC-46 has not caused an airlift/tanker shortfall. The KC-135 and KC-10 availability rates have held steady for the past decade. Shortfalls are the result of an increase in tanking requirements, not a decrease in tanker availability.

No, Boeing did not get away with late deliveries without penalty. Although the late delivery did not result in an airlift shortfall, it did result in an increase in operational/maintenance cost to USAF to keep the legacy fleet going. USAF is computing that cost and Boeing will be penalized for those costs.

No, the KC-46 (unlike the A330MRTT) is not built as a commercialcairliner, flown to a modification center, taken apart, and converted into a military tanker. Lessons learned from building the military P-8A MMA (based on 737) on a commercial production line were applied to 767, and the KC-46 is consequently built on a commercial production line in Everett. And yet meets all the Commerce Department’s Export restrictions and State Department’s Trafficking in Arms restrictions. This was one of the innovations Boeing used to meet their aggressive selling price which won them the contract.

wow - the Airbus offering was the Wright Flyer by comparison...

Asturias56

23rd Jan 2019, 08:13

Ken has made a good point tho

The USAF want something that is way beyond a tanker. And they want it to "join the fight".

This is wayyyyyy beyond everyone else's deployment of large tankers which tries to keep them well out of harms way.

God knows if it will work and I hope we never find out. My guess is it will work against the likes of ISIS but against a decent opposition it could be a real mistake

BEagle

23rd Jan 2019, 08:57

Asturias56 , current policy in ATP-3.3.4.2 is as follows:
1.11. COMBAT OPERATIONS

The employment of AAR in war or other hostile environments will depend on the capabilities of the aircraft types employed, local threat assessments and proximity to unsecured airspace. It is not appropriate in this document to detail AAR operations under combat conditions; however, tankers are vulnerable and high value assets and therefore, in general, they should be placed well clear of the combat zone or protected using fighter support. The procedures and principles of AAR described in this document should be applied whenever possible.

Taking an HVAA 'to the fight' is inviting disaster as you suggest.

KenV

23rd Jan 2019, 12:47

Asturias56 , current policy in ATP-3.3.4.2 is as follows:
The employment of AAR in war or other hostile environments will depend on the capabilities of the aircraft types employed, local threat assessments and proximity to unsecured airspace. It is not appropriate in this document to detail AAR operations under combat conditions; however, tankers are vulnerable and high value assets and therefore, in general, they should be placed well clear of the combat zone or protected using fighter support. The procedures and principles of AAR described in this document should be applied whenever possible.
Taking an HVAA 'to the fight' is inviting disaster as you suggest.Hmmm. "Current policy" is subject to change as new technology and tactics are developed. This "current policy" certainly did not take into account whatever survivability measures have been included in the KC-46. How effective are those survivability measures? I have no idea. And neither does anyone else on this forum. Consequently no one here has any idea what is and what is not "inviting disaster" with regard to how the KC-46 is employed. For all anyone knows, the KC-46 has a Klingon cloaking device aboard. ;-)

KenV

23rd Jan 2019, 13:15

wow - the Airbus offering was the Wright Flyer by comparison...Ummm, both yes and no. Why do you folks keep going back to the off the shelf tankers? How much clearer can it be that by the final competition USAF was not interested in off the shelf tankers and neither Airbus nor Boeing offered off the shelf tankers in their final bids. So, yes both the Airbus and the Boeing offerings at the first competition were "the Wright Flyer by comparison". But no, both the final Airbus and Boeing offerings were far more advanced, with the Airbus offering costing much more than the Boeing offering. Plus the schedule for developing, integrating, and testing all the developmental stuff was so aggressive, that Northrop Grumman pulled out as a partner. And this does not even include the very aggressive schedule for delivery of the first 18 tankers. Boeing had a hot 767 production line in Everett. NG/Airbus's offering was to develop, build, shake out, and ramp up an A330MRTT production line in Mobile, Alabama. And they had zero experience building a military product on a commercial production line. These two production factors (not development/test factors) meant that they had a very very steep (i.e. very high risk) learning curve to overcome which was not true of Boeing. And because risk equates to cost, this is one of the reasons Airbus' offering was more expensive than Boeing's. Also a factor was that Boeing had very deep pockets and was both willing and able to make a low-ball bid on a firm fixed price contract.

esscee

23rd Jan 2019, 13:23

Maybe NG and Airbus "took a view" that it was not going to be viable and "let" good ole Boeing to suffer all the grief and hassle that has proven to be the case. As for using very very old engines, makes me wonder if GE decided that they did not wish to support their old design CF6 for many more years to come which left only PW. Let's face it, they would have only chosen an American built engine after all the PR "moaning" etc that went on when Boeing did not win in the earlier "contests".

CONSO

23rd Jan 2019, 15:13

Also a factor was that Boeing had very deep pockets and was both willing and able to make a low-ball bid on a firm fixed price contract.

IMHO - Boeing used the gillette razor blade marketing method. Give the basic unit at ' cost' or ' less' and make make your money on the replacement ( blades ), in this case the multi year modiication, srework, impovement, repair, etc - to go on for the next 50 years or so .

Trumpet trousers

23rd Jan 2019, 16:20

Fly KC46 and A330 MRTT in formation, line abreast, trail the hoses, and see who has the longest ones...
For bonus points, dump fuel, and see which one pisses dumps the longest...

KenV

23rd Jan 2019, 17:17

IMHO - Boeing used the gillette razor blade marketing method. Give the basic unit at ' cost' or ' less' and make make your money on the replacement ( blades ), in this case the multi year modiication, srework, impovement, repair, etc - to go on for the next 50 years or so .That's exactly what it was. But it required very deep pockets and accepting big risk. Boeing won the contract in February 2011. Here we are eight years later and Boeing has not only made no money on the program, but has lost around $4 billion. What company could afford such a huge investment with a payback measured in decades? (picture the hypothetical razor company investing $4B and not making a profit on the hypothetical blades for a decade.) And it's still risky, USAF can still back out of buying more tankers. USAF can decide to buy tanker services rather than buy tankers for organic tanker support. Indeed Lockheed and Airbus have just teamed up to provide such services. The "multi-year" support contract can go to someone other than Boeing. And there are plenty of other risks.

And there are other serious internal factors to consider. Boeing is made up of three divisions: commercial, military, and global support. The plane is being built by Boeing Commercial, but it's a military contract. Which division gets the profit? Can you imagine being the president of the military division who signs the contract and takes the risk, while the commercial division gets all the profits for building the product (if and when they finally appear?) That's why Northrop Grumman pulled out. The economics made no sense to them because they would take on too much risk while not getting enough profit to offset the risk. Now let's assume the Boeing Global Support division gets the support contract. How does the commercial division share in those profits? The military division? It's very very easy to talk about "One Boeing", but actually doing it is massively difficult.

Let me provide a real world example of how difficult this is. The KDC-10 contract was won by Douglas Aircraft. But they were required (by corporate McDonnell Douglas headquarters) to accept a significant loss on the project. Why? So the Dutch would buy McDonnell Douglas AH-64 Apache helicopters. And the Dutch did indeed buy Apaches. But the losses prevented Douglas from developing new airliners, including the MD-12. Bottom Line? Douglas literally no longer exists. Most of the Douglas plant in Long Beach has literally been bulldozed. Meanwhile the helicopter division in Mesa where the Apache is built is going gangbusters. Does the (former) president of Douglas think this was a good outcome? What think you?