The vital importance of high altitude stall recovery training in simulators

[Centaurus]

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y25/HSWL/LightningOverCongo2_zps8f502996.jpg (http://s2.photobucket.com/user/HSWL/media/LightningOverCongo2_zps8f502996.jpg.html)

A picture is worth a thousand words...

[galaxy flyer]

And the importance of IR enhanced vision systems!

[misd-agin]

The manufacturers say the current simulators DO NOT model the characteristics of the actual aircraft in high altitude stall conditions.




Boeing and Airbus have agreed on a simulator flight simulation software that generically models narrow body jetliners in post stall conditions. There's talk of making that a mandatory familiarization event in the future.

[BluSdUp]

Centur
All for it.
How do You figure it shall work ?

[Denti]

Isn't that a normal part of any typerating? Well, within the confines of current simulator specs of course as none can simulate a real stall yet. Anyway, stall recovery both low and high altitude have been normal parts in any typeratings I've done, just last night i had that once again. And then of course in regular intervals during normal simulatior training.

[deefer dog]

FAA have in recent years moved away from the demo of stall recovery with minimum height loss, and in my view this is a good decision. So often previously many in the sim would add full thrust, allow the nose to drop a fraction, and upon seeing speed increase would then pull up to reduce the loss of height ....often then hitting the buffet again, or worse stalling. Sometimes they would scrape away to regain the lost height, but in a state that was right on the edge and hardly capable of dealing with the consequences of turbulence that would start the whole scenario again.

I'm brave enough to admit that I did manage to stall a jet aircraft at FL410 once, but thanks to the revised training I was not stupid enough to try and recover with minimum height loss. Instead I used up plenty of the sky that was below me, and at those levels (for those of you who are not stupid enough to make the mistake I made), that is what it does take - especially when stall and over speed are close to each other.

[glendalegoon]

no need for simulators, just everyone read, "STICK AND RUDDER"> STALL? PUSH FORWARD until you are flying again.

windshear recovery should be a sep maneuver.

[BluSdUp]

A simulator can simulate anything ,a stall in particulare.
As it is the yardstik for any flght test and performance.
High alltitude test flights at full stall are not needed for sertificatiion and not always recovered. Thereby not required, and not documented by test data.

Have fully stalled a Jar25 aircraft many times at say 8000 feet, but no medium or large jet.
Computer says NO.

[ZFT]

The manufacturers say the current simulators DO NOT model the characteristics of the actual aircraft in high altitude stall conditions.

Simply not true. The TDMs state that their FSTDs will meet approved data, no more, no less.

The issue is that the major airframe manufacturers are reluctant to either release or produce the required data for the TDMs to model.

[_Phoenix_]

How about an unmanned full scale FBW airliner, flown over the ocean, via satellite, like a drone?
An aircraft at end of life cycle can be reused for this kind of training. Maybe not cheaper, but very accurate.

[Centaurus]

How do You figure it shall work ?

The 737 FCOM/QRH doesn't say what minimum speed should be attained during stall recovery at high altitude before attempting to return to level flight.

However, a handy guide to what minimum IAS you should attain before levelling out after a stall recovery process lies in the Boeing 737 Classic FCTM under Chapter 4 - Climb, Cruise, Descent, Holding. Sub heading: Holding Airspeeds Not Available from the FMC. It states among other information: Above FL250, use VREF40 +100 knots to provide adequate buffet margin.

Depending on actual weight of course, then for want of a better figure it works out at close to 230 knots IAS before attempting to level out after stall recovery. If nothing else, in the heat of the moment it is a quick figure to work on since it is high unlikely the crew will have the time and inclination to go heads down into the FMC during a stall at high altitude simply to locate a suitable level out airspeed.

By keeping the body angle between zero to minus two below the horizon until reaching at least 230 knots IAS, you can should count on (IMHO) losing at least 3000 ft of altitude before reaching that speed. That assumes high power used in the process. That figure was from observations in a full flight 737-300 simulator

[misd-agin]

Quote:
The manufacturers say the current simulators DO NOT model the characteristics of the actual aircraft in high altitude stall conditions. Simply not true. The TDMs state that their FSTDs will meet approved data, no more, no less.

The issue is that the major airframe manufacturers are reluctant to either release or produce the required data for the TDMs to model.








"Simply not true"? So if the airframe manufacturers don't release, or produce the data, exactly what data are the simulator manufacturers using to generate their simulation model?


Since you state that my statement is "simply not true" what Airbus or Boeing a/c have actual, and accurate, simulator modeling for post stall flight characteristics and which simulators can provide that training?


AW&ST has had several articles on this subject of high altitude upset in the last two years. That is the source I'm using. Interested readers could review those articles to find out what the simulators can and can't replicate. The articles discuss how Boeing and Airbus test pilots have agree to a generic software model that does a reasonable job replicating the flight characteristics of a generic n/b aircraft in the post stall regime.

[Judd]

A picture is worth a thousand words...


Pity the poor MPL or P2F in the right hand seat in that weather and the captain becomes incapacitated. Pity the passengers too..

[Blacksheep]

As an instrument tech at BZN I was involved in recalibrating the stall warning systems speeds on the Belfast, in order to increase the margin between the warning and the actual stall. A Belfast had encountered ice over the Alps along with tail de-icing failure and the stall warning system had not operated as required with the aircraft at a high nose-up angle. We did the adjustments by trial and error, with the crew holding the nose until the actual stall occurred for each tweak of the setting until we got the target margin of [30 knots?]. We covered all flap settings and I recall that the aircraft lost some 5.000 feet in the "clean" stall condition - producing some interesting comments during the first try, as we wondered if it ever would recover!

For civil certification the CAA predictably insisted on having a stick pusher installed.

[Kefuddle]

A picture is worth a thousand words...
I wouldn't typically associate that picture with stall recovery.

It seems to me that jetsteams are common cause of high altitude low speed events.

[Centaurus]

I wouldn't typically associate that picture with stall recovery.


I would. Air Algerie MD80 apparently stalled at high altitude in cloud during storm penetration. The accident appears to have developed as a loss of airspeed awareness leading to a fully developed stall and roll off departure to the port side with post stall gyrations. The nose then became planted way nose down, left wing down as the stall broke, but they never recovered from the nose down-wing down attitude

[ZFT]

misd-agin

"Simply not true"? So if the airframe manufacturers don't release, or produce the data, exactly what data are the simulator manufacturers using to generate their simulation model?

That's exactly the point. The TDMs do not have the data to generate a realistic/accurate model. It isn't that the TDMs DO NOT model, it's that they CAN'T model the stalls correctly.

I don't know of any current Airbus datapacks with adaquate data to produce an FFS with accurate modeling for post stall flight characteristics. Can't comment on Boeings but there are some other manufacturers that have produced accurate data that has allowed for realistic post stall flight characteristics.

[RetiredF4]

Centaurus

By keeping the body angle between zero to minus two below the horizon until reaching at least 230 knots IAS, you can should count on (IMHO) losing at least 3000 ft of altitude before reaching that speed. That assumes high power used in the process. That figure was from observations in a full flight 737-300 simulator

That might work at the early stage of a low stall AOA, it would not have worked for AF447. Attitude is not relevant for stall recovery (which is the phase from stall entry until recovery completed), AOA and speed are the key elements. If those are in the ballpark, then attitude is the next step. Sure we reduce AOA by reducing pitch, but not until a given amount of degree nose down, but until AOA is below stall AOA, then we maintain that AOA until enough speed for attitude correction is available. Sure we take care of the bank angle in order to not exceed safe aircraft parameters, but for reducing AOA as fast as possible it has no relevance. Bank angle might even help in reducing AOA, think about it like in a nose high unusual attitude recovery, where the reduction of lift due to bankangle helps to bring the nose down faster than by a pure push over.

Underslung engines can create a pitch up moment, thus hindering the attempts to reduce the AOA, while the speed increase by the power output might be minimal due to the high AOA high drag flight path. To power out of a stall is not the correct thing to do when enough altitude is available. AF447 is again a good example for the lack of positive influence of TOGA at the wrong moment. Sure it is vital to have enough power available after the AOA has been reduced enough for aceleration and following attitude and altitude correction maneuvers.

If i misunderstood your post, then please explain.

[Centaurus]

If i misunderstood your post, then please explain.

Thank you F4 for your reply. Of course you are quite right about recovering from the stall by what ever means necessary and that means no restriction on the nose down angle to get out of the actual stalled state. Without the benefit of an angle of attack indicator the crew have no choice except to lower the nose and thus reduce the angle of attack, to a speed where it is obvious the aircraft is unstalled (no buffet/stick shaker)

From simulator experience it takes very little nose down attitude below the horizon before it is obvious you are out of the stall and the next thing is to decide when to level out. Due to the loss of thrust at high altitude and slow engine acceleration, full throttle does not give the marked pitch up one would experience during a low altitude go-around in the landing configuration and is easily countered by appropriate elevator and stab trim use. In other words no problem for a competent pilot; especially as some stabiliser trim is needed to keep the aircraft in trim during the dive until a specific safe airspeed is reached. .

Although once attaining VREF 40 +100 knots should hopefully get you out of immediate trouble in good weather conditions, perhaps I should have mentioned that in the context of the original post (inadvertent stall in severe storm weather at high altitude) that the descent should be continued without delay until reaching severe turbulence penetration speed. Especially as the aircraft may well still be in severe turbulence in cloud. There may be significant height loss before reaching a typical severe turbulence speed.

[chimbu warrior]

I would. Air Algerie MD80 apparently stalled at high altitude in cloud during storm penetration. The accident appears to have developed as a loss of airspeed awareness leading to a fully developed stall and roll off departure to the port side with post stall gyrations. The nose then became planted way nose down, left wing down as the stall broke, but they never recovered from the nose down-wing down attitude

And unbelievably it was flown by a TRE with 10,000 hours on type. Presumably he had flown approaches to stalls in the simulator, and taught others the correct (??) recovery technique as well.

All of which leads me to conclude that Centaurus is absolutely correct; either simulators do not accurately replicate high altitude stalls, or there are experienced pilots out there with woefully inadequate knowledge of the correct stall avoidance and recovery techniques.

[RetiredF4]

centaurus
From simulator experience it takes very little nose down attitude below the horizon before it is obvious you are out of the stall and the next thing is to decide when to level out.

Thank you for your well placed answer. Let me add to the quoted point one more comment: The amount how much the pitch has to change depends on the AOA when beginning pitch down. If recovery is initiated just after sounding of the stall warning, then your statement is correct. But actually you might not be in a stall already, as the system sounds the horn prior to stall, it warns in advance of an imminent stall. At that point the reduction of AOA by few degrees is obviously sufficient. In a fully developped stall the difference between pitch attitude and flightpath, which is called AOA, will be much greater, AF447 had AOA in excess of 60°. After reducing the pitch by 5, 10, or even 20° would still leave a high enough AOA to keep the jet stalled. As AOA is not readily displayed in most aircraft to stick to some kind of degrees of pitch nose down is dangerous and will prolong recovery or even prevent recovery like AF447 showed.

Edit: Another point to note would be that different aircraft behave different, and upsets might happen in some degraded modes of aircraft systems or cause those degradation during the upset (degradation of flight LAW's, degradation of autoflight systems like autothrust, autotrim). The effects of thrust changes remain screened by such fully functional systems, the effect therefore unknown until those systems like autotrim or dampening system fails.

Stall recovery training and stall recovery procedures have to take acount of those possible degradations and should therefore be oriented on the basic aircraft handling.

[A37575]

After reducing the pitch by 5, 10, or even 20° would still leave a high enough AOA to keep the jet stalled

Having studied the posts by the OP, he made the point several times that it was necessary to get the nose below the horizon which means a descent in order to increase speed which is the same as lowering the angle of attack in my book. You seemed to have mis-understood his point judging by the highlighted text. It was never implied that lowering the nose only a few degrees from an extremely high angle of attack (as you appear to state) to a still stalled angle of attack was sufficient to recover from a stall.

[A37575]

And unbelievably it was flown by a TRE with 10,000 hours on type. Presumably he had flown approaches to stalls in the simulator,

You would be dismayed at the number of airline pilots who have not carried out or being trained for high altitude (30,000 to 41,000ft) stall recovery techniques in the simulator. This may be because 15,000ft is considered by some simulator instructors as sufficient for high altitude.

[RetiredF4]

A37575
Having studied the posts by the OP, he made the point several times that it was necessary to get the nose below the horizon which means a descent in order to increase speed which is the same as lowering the angle of attack in my book. You seemed to have mis-understood his point judging by the highlighted text.


Thank you for taking part in the discussion.

The problem of the misunderstanding is imho that the title of the thread is

"The vital importance of high altitude stall recovery training in simulators"

and the discussion centers around the topic of an "approach to stall recovery"

In the situation the thread title suggests the AOA might be anything from AOA being slightly greater than stall AOA to 60° degrees above stall AOA, whereas the statements i'm commenting on cover only the area just prior and just above stall AOA.

Now if the title of the thread is misplaced and the discussion likes to concentrate on the approach to stall situation and thus the avoidance of a stall situation, then the title should be changed or posters should make their point clear when discussing only the latter.


A37575
It was never implied that lowering the nose only a few degrees from an extremely high angle of attack (as you appear to state) to a still stalled angle of attack was sufficient to recover from a stall.

I might have a language barrier there, but here is the original wording, bolding by me.

Quote:
centaurus
From simulator experience it takes very little nose down attitude below the horizon before it is obvious you are out of the stall and the next thing is to decide when to level out.

That is true as a stall avoidance maneuver or a stall with very little higher AOA (just after stall warning sounded), but not to recover from a developped stall.

Most students were good at approach to stall recoveries, because they choose to initiate recovery the earliest moment possible (which they are supposed to do, military jet) with an automated response stick forward, firewall the engines, stick back), but when they had to wait a bit longer they lowered the nose not long enough, pulled back on the stick too early and went into a secondary stall. All at safe altitude, so no danger.

There is only one way to do it when sufficient altitude is available, lower the nose not a little bit, lower it not to a specified amount of degrees below the horizon, but lower it until stall warning ceases = AOA below stall warning AOA (hopefully not like AF447) and speed has been built up enough for recovery maneuver. That is the point im trying to make.

[Judd]

Latest report on unusual attitude scary recovery. It really makes you wonder about the paucity of training today's inexperienced first officers are given in simulators. Accent on automation is wrong. Accent on pure flying skills are needed well before automation is brain-washed into their heads forever:


An All Nippon Airways Co. co-pilot who accidentally put his plane into a violent dive and roll in 2011 came closer to losing control of the Boeing Co. 737 than previously believed, according to data released by investigators.

The Japan Transport Safety Board's final report about the serious incident over the Pacific Ocean reveals there were multiple warnings of an impending aerodynamic stall, while the plane carrying 117 people exceeded its maximum operating speed a number of times. The report said the jet also exceeded its structural-load limit, or the most stress the aircraft is expected to experience in service.

After the co-pilot mistakenly operated a rudder-control switch at 41,000 feet, instead of a different switch that unlatched the cockpit door, the jetliner plummeted 1.2 miles in slightly more than 30 seconds and briefly flew nearly upside down. The recently released report provides some new details about the extent of the danger.

Two flight attendants were pinned to the cabin floor and were slightly injured. One attendant told investigators that after she felt "earthquake-like vertical shaking," she slumped to the floor on her knees from downward forces so strong she couldn't raise her arm.

The report is likely to refocus industrywide interest in high-altitude upsets, or incidents in which jetliners slow dramatically or end up with the nose or wings at unusually steep upward or downward angles.

The 100-page document also highlights the 38-year-old co-pilot's delayed and confused response, which investigators attributed to gaps in training, undue reliance on automation and seeming anxiety about quickly letting the captain back into the cockpit. According to the report, "excessive dependence on autopilot" exacerbated "lack of full awareness about the need to monitor" flight controls. The co-pilot couldn't recall the stick shaker's activation, it said.

The report said the co-pilot failed to recognize there was a problem for 17 seconds, and then alternately pushed forward and pulled back on the controls. The captain, returning from a bathroom break, was locked out of the cockpit while the plane nose-dived and executed back-to-back rolls in opposite directions. The maneuvers lasted about 90 seconds, though passengers may not have fully realized what was happening because it was dark outside.

An earlier report disclosed many of the co-pilot's errors and the plane's excessive speed. But it suggested there was only a single activation of the "stick shaker," a last-ditch safety alert that a plane is about to lose lift and may be on the verge of a crash.

Investigators found that the plane's excessive-speed warning was also activated more than once during the episode.

All Nippon said it "took action following the incident to prevent any recurrence, and we are continuing to take additional measures in line with the report's recommendations."

The co-pilot, who hasn't been identified, remains an All Nippon employee but isn't currently assigned to flight duties, according to the carrier.

Japan's safety board urged the carrier to ensure compliance with single-pilot operation protocols and enhance training to cope with high-altitude stall warnings.

The report should get a lot of attention in the industry since it details "a real poster-child event about complacency" and an inappropriate response, said Rory Kay, an ex-737 captain and former senior pilot-union safety official who now works as a training captain on Boeing jets. Pilots should "treat high-altitude stalls totally differently than those at low altitude," he said. Thinner air up high means jet engines take longer to rev up power, and a sudden upward nose command is more likely to create control problems.

Once the plane was back on the correct course and altitude, neither pilot disclosed the extent of the problem to air-traffic controllers, who in turn never pushed for answers. The jet, en route to Tokyo's Haneda airport from Okinawa, made a normal landing.

The crew's failure to promptly alert mechanics about the specifics of the event, according to the report, meant the plane continued to carry passengers for four more flights before all required inspections for possible structural damage were conducted. The checks didn't detect any problems.

The nose of the ANA jetliner was pointed 35 degrees down from level flight, a much steeper angle than passengers typically experience. The plane was subjected to forces nearly 2.7 times the force of gravity.

The report determined that the co-pilot's training didn't include dealing with high-altitude flight upsets or any "upset recovery training accompanied with a stall warning."

Before the upset, the ANA co-pilot failed to follow company procedures requiring him to put on his oxygen mask when he was left alone at the controls.

Investigators found that the co-pilot's initial preoccupation with opening the cockpit door prevented using "calm judgment" to continue monitoring controls and then to fly the plane manually. Upon returning to the cockpit, according to the report, the captain took over the controls because he found the co-pilot's condition "fairly unsettled."

The ANA event occurred two years after the crash of Air France AF.FR -1.35% Flight 447, a widebody Airbus A330 that stalled at high altitude. That crew's failure to understand and counteract a rapid descent ended in the death of all 228 people aboard. The crash was a seminal event that sparked world-wide emphasis on stall-recovery training, particularly at cruise altitudes.

Many airlines quickly revised simulator training to include lessons learned from the Air France accident.

There have been more recent instances of high-altitude upsets. An American Airlines Boeing 757, cruising at 35,000 feet over Venezuela on August 30, lost some 7,500 feet in about one minute. There were no injuries and the flight continued on to Brazil. An American spokeswoman couldn't immediately be reached for comment.

Japanese investigators said the ANA co-pilot, who was relatively inexperienced, had less than 2,800 flight hours in another 737 version and only 197 hours in the Boeing 737-700 involved in the incident. As previously reported, the cockpit-door unlock switch on his earlier aircraft was similar to the location, size and shape of the rudder switch on the 737-700 model.

[Tee Emm]

Japanese investigators said the ANA co-pilot, who was relatively inexperienced, had less than 2,800 flight hours in another 737 version and only 197 hours in the Boeing 737-700 involved in the incident


The hours do not indicate a "relatively inexperienced" pilot although it is highly probable that he was hired initially with the usual 200 cadet flying hours straight from flying school then fed a diet of automation from the time he first entered a 737 simulator.

[Cornish Jack]

Years ago a well presented AA training video on unusual attitude recovery pointed out that AOA was a standard parameter in FDRs, but not on the Flight Deck ... so why NOT available as standard instrumentation? ... it still isn't , so why NOT?

[Kefuddle]

I would. Air Algerie MD80 apparently stalled at high altitude in cloud during storm penetration. The accident appears to have developed as a loss of airspeed awareness leading to a fully developed stall and roll off departure to the port side with post stall gyrations. The nose then became planted way nose down, left wing down as the stall broke, but they never recovered from the nose down-wing down attitude
Sounds more like failing to fly an attitude rather than an altitude. Not really what I mean. Any phase of flight runs the risk of stall of the crew are ignorant of the correct technique or where monitoring is lacking.

Where the crew are exercising good judgement, technique and awareness and still get horribly close to the wrong end of the amber bar. If that is the case, just imagine the lacklustre crew in the same situation.

[italia458]

...or there are experienced pilots out there with woefully inadequate knowledge of the correct stall avoidance and recovery techniques.

I think this is part of the problem.

Regulators and airlines need to mandate more theory and more practical training with regard to upset/stall experiences. There needs to be more aerodynamics training and more actual flying (airplane or simulator) experience.

It doesn't help that there are airlines in Canada who still teach their pilot to power out of the approach to stall exercise, disregarding an AC that has been out since 2005, and has since been replace with a more detailed AC, that says to treat any approach to stall as an actual stall and use elevator to reduce the AOA. It states that multiple times and it also states multiple times that altitude loss is secondary to stall recovery. It couldn't be clearer - powering out of stalls with zero altitude loss is NOT the way it should be taught but that's the way you get a 4 (highest mark) on the flight test for that exercise. :ugh:

For those interested, here is the current AC: https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/opssvs/managementservices-referencecentre-acs-700-1793.html


Japanese investigators said the ANA co-pilot, who was relatively inexperienced, had less than 2,800 flight hours in another 737 version and only 197 hours in the Boeing 737-700 involved in the incident

I've found throughout my relatively short aviation career that hours mean virtually nothing. You could take a group of 2000 hour pilots and they'd all perform wildly different from each other. You could take a group of 5000 hour pilots and do the same with the same results. And so on. The only thing you'll see is that with experience, you'll notice an improvement in skill and decision making but when looking at a specific pilot, it's impossible to judge a pilot's skill and decision making solely based on their flight hours.

but when they had to wait a bit longer they lowered the nose not long enough, pulled back on the stick too early and went into a secondary stall.

This is an issue with the way they train now. They'll set the airplane up at about 10,000' to 14,000' (most of the time in VMC with smooth flying conditions), in level flight, then slow down at a constant rate while trimming to about 20 knots above the stall speed, then with hands already on the control column and power levers, they will slam the power levers forward as soon as the stall horn sounds and then push a bit on the control column so that they don't climb immediately (because it will if you don't push enough after adding full power). The airplane on these training flights is at the lowest weight that you'll ever encounter while flying operationally and at it's forward CG limit.

That is the absolute easiest possible recovery you could have for a stall event! And that's all that's required... and they're still teaching it wrong. It's frustrating when discussing this with pilots at the airline because they dismiss the AC... what experience and training do they have to say that what is in that AC is not correct?

There is only one way to do it when sufficient altitude is available, lower the nose not a little bit, lower it not to a specified amount of degrees below the horizon, but lower it until stall warning ceases

Before you add power.

Teaching to power out of a stall event (stall horn, stick shaker/pusher, or actual aerodynamic stall) is the opposite of what you should do, especially at high altitude. Rapid power advances may cause asymmetric thrust which, if you are stalled, can put you into a spin.

I think it should be taught to lower the nose until the horn goes off, then smoothly add power while keeping the nose at the same attitude. By the time you've added full power (~2-3 seconds) you should be at a speed to start smoothly coming out of the dive. Adding power while there is still an indication of a stall shouldn't be done, especially at high altitude where longitudinal stability is reduced. This is a generic recovery procedure and each airplane will handle a bit differently but the basics are all the same.

Power is only used to reduce the altitude loss after a stall. How do you think a glider recovers from a stall?

Thoughts on that, RetiredF4?

[RetiredF4]

italia 458
Thoughts on that, RetiredF4?

Thank you for your excellent post, i completely agree and have nothing to add.

[FullWings]

There is only one way to do it when sufficient altitude is available, lower the nose not a little bit, lower it not to a specified amount of degrees below the horizon, but lower it until stall warning ceases = AOA below stall warning AOA (hopefully not like AF447) and speed has been built up enough for recovery maneuver. That is the point im trying to make.
Amen to that, bro’.

Having done some sim high-altitude exercises fairly recently, I think the absolute fidelity of the simulator was secondary to the emphasis on the above.

Hopefully, none of us will ever be in a situation where we have to recover from a low-speed LoC event but exposure to even generic training shows that a) you need to reduce the AoA in a positive and determined way and b) you’re going to lose a *lot* of altitude in the process but this is absolutely required to survive. Whether this is 4,000' or 14,000’ is less relevant - it takes what it takes...

As a someone who came into power flying from gliding, I always found the “old” method of stall recovery rather weird and difficult to get to grips with: now it’s just back to what I always did!

[EMIT]

Please be aware that although most civvie (big) jets do not have a real AOA gauge on the flight deck, they do have an indication of stall AOA in the form of the red bar(ber pole) on the low end side of the speed scale.

Yes, it may seem that that barberpole is only an indication of minimum speed, but that is not true: its position on the speed scale is driven by AOA - pull g and the red bar comes up (showes a higher minimum speed), unload and the red barberpole moves down to indicate a lower minimum speed. In other words, unload untill your actual speed is outside of the barberpole region and during pillout, do not let the barberpole grow up into your actual speed.

And about simulator fidelity - perhaps the motions are not exactly how they would be in the real aircraft, but manipulating the controls to make the SIM do what you want it to do is still a better learning experience than to have no maneuvering experience at all - real stall or stick shaker situations often show that pilots (without maneuvering experience) are too hesitant to make necessary control movements if those required movements are unusualy large or require unusuallly large forces, i.e. are outside the scope of daily routine tiny well trimmed out stick and or rudder applications. And before someone brings it up - the control movements that brought down the AA A-300 out of JFK were not "required control applications", they were excessive and totally not needed during the wake encounter.

[Tee Emm]

Appreciate if anyone could provide the direct link to the Japan Transport Safety Board Final Report (English version) on the All Nippon Airlines B737-700 incident on 7 September 2011 described in this thread. Have tried Google but no Final Report. Thanks in advance

[galaxy flyer]

Nothing wrong with this generation if pilots a thousand hours solo in a "steam gauge" single seat fighter wouldn't fix. You learn about AOA, trim, low and high speed aerodynamics there, all the while scaring the hell out of you.

[misd-agin]

ZFT - ultimately we agree - pilots as end users don't have accurate post stall simulator modeling. It doesn't matter that it could be done as an end user all I need to know is that the simulator doesn't accurately modeling how the airplane will respond.

[misd-agin]

DL and AA 737's and 777's have AOA gauges.


Checklists have had verbiage using the AOA gauges removed because they were poorly written AND Boeing said the procedures hadn't been flight tested AND in certain circumstances the AOA gauges could be inoperative or give misleading information.


The generic low altitude loss of airspeed training had lead to bad habit patterns that did not transfer to high altitude/low energy flight regime.


So having generic "put the nose this low" that havn't been vetted by flight test is meaningless.


Example - doing loss of airspeed at altitude in the simulator. CKA, new to fleet, didn't know I'd been involved in the issue for over two years. So we do the high altitude upset and run the airplane totally out of airspeed. Very similar to AF 447 in that we were several thousand feet above MAX ALT in a nose high attitude. Ugly. CKA loved the FPV and had come up with a generic 'rule of thumb' that had worked for him up until then - "set the FPV 5(?) degrees nose low and you'll fly out". So we're at twice his target FPV attitude and the plane's barely flying - AOA barely below stick shaker. CKA - "no, no. Keep the FPV at X". Tiniest reduction in back pressure results in instantaneous stick shaker (anyone doing a high AOA knife fight know's what I'm talking about). Unload, go back to twice his target FPV attitude(double wasn't a goal, just what was required to make the plane fly), and we eventually recover.


CKA "huh, that's always worked before." Ugh.


During the event N1's were limited to 75% due to the nature of the failure(s). Didn't bother deselecting EEC's/ELC's because AOA, and not engine thrust, was the primary focus needed to fly the aircraft safely.


Debrief sent to stop teaching unofficial techniques that didn't cover all areas of the flight envelope.


Low altitude techniques, like the AB stall recovery training in Normal Law, can be dangerous in other flight regimes or non normal flight law.


Basic flying skills still are the #1 priority.

[Clandestino]

Air Algerie MD80 apparently stalled at high altitude in cloud during storm penetration. It did not penetrate active storm cell at any time before the stall.

powering out of stalls with zero altitude loss is NOT the way it should be taught It is not and was never taught this way as it is impossible to power out of stall for any aeroplane except for aerobatic ones of extreme performance (e.g. Su-31 and -35).


The issue is that the major airframe manufacturers are reluctant to either release or produce the required data for the TDMs to model. Major issues being lack of a) need to provide such data at all b) funds c) adequately suicidal test pilots.

A picture is worth a thousand words...

There is no aeroplane in this picture. Could you please provide us with some incidents/accidents where plane was stalled at high level following penetration of CB?

How and why does one teach stall recovery for pilots of stick-pusher equipped aeroplanes?

[glendalegoon]

clandestino, actually it has been taught for some time in FAA land. Now, I don't like it, don't think its right, but it has been taught that way for some time now.

Low altitude stall recovery is firewall power and accelerate. In underwing mounted engine aircraft one must be careful not to allow the nose to come up with engine power application.

I WAS NEVER A FAN OF THIS and think you should get out of the stall (push forward) while adding power.

[Clandestino]

That's "Approach to stall recovery", not "stall recovery".

[glendalegoon]

clandestino

fine

then we have never practiced stall recovery in any us simulator session in any plane I have flown.

[Tee Emm]

There is no aeroplane in this picture


Huh?? What is your point?

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

@ glendalegoon and clandestino

And in that case (since you are both agreeing) what is unfortunate is that a whole generation has been, in effect, misled into thinking that their "approach to stall" recovery was the technique whenever the word "stall" was involved.

For those interested, there's a major revision to FAR part 60 in the works (there's a NPRM out for comment right now) which SIGNIFICANTLY changes the fidelity of simulators in stalls AND significantly changes the instructional tools as well.

[glendalegoon]

mad flt scientist

I was not misled as my hand dandy Aircraft Manual indicates that considerable altitude will be lost in a high altitude stall recovery.

Doing a simulator check and the combo apch to stall recovery/windshear recovery is one thing...but

PUSHING THE CONTROL WHEEL FORWARD in a complete high altitude stall is always in my mind (not that I have stalled or even approached a stall at high altitude)....

ask the pilots of AF447 about being misled in stall recovery!

[italia458]

Clandestino...

It is not and was never taught this way as it is impossible to power out of stall for any aeroplane except for aerobatic ones of extreme performance (e.g. Su-31 and -35).

It has definitely been taught to power out of a stall event and it is definitely possible to do so in a number of airplanes.

A stall event is any condition where you have a stall horn, low speed buffet, stick shaker, or stick pusher. It is now supposed to be taught that you are to treat all cases as being equal. Meaning that the "approach to stall" exercise that is taught in training is equal to an actual aerodynamic stall.

That, however, is not the case with a number of airlines - mine included.

As for powering out of the approach to stall exercise, I can do it in a SA227 and not only not loose any altitude, I will CLIMB less than 4 seconds later! I can power out of that and climb too. When the stall horn goes off I am at 1.1Vs and decelerating. I'm less than 10% away from the stall when I do this maneuver. This is exactly what confirms some instructors 'feeling' or 'thoughts' that this exercise should be taught that you should maintain altitude on recover - because it's possible... with an empty airplane, at 10,000' feet, while slowing down at a steady rate and when the crew is anticipating the stall horn and ready to slam full power... oh and no ice. How does that replicate any sort of situation that a crew would find themselves in where they're so close to the stall that the stall horn goes off?

The issue is that instructors teach the approach to stall exercise as a "precision flying maneuver" instead of an emergency maneuver. Ignorance is huge in this area.

I'd recommend reading this AC on the matter: https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/opssvs/managementservices-referencecentre-acs-700-1793.html

That AC acknowledges that current practice places an emphasis on minimum loss of altitude verses positive recovery from a stall event.

A couple quotes from the AC:

"This AC is consistent with previous TCCA guidance material (CBAAC 0247), which focused on eliminating a procedure which focuses on "powering" out of a near-stalled condition with an emphasis on a minimum loss of altitude."

"...although a successful recovery may be possible at low altitudes, this "powering out" technique may be totally inadequate during manoevering flight or during flight with icing contamination or at high altitude, due to the lack of excess thrust."

This is the most important quote from what I've seen:

"The standards which require training for recovery from an approach to a stall with ground contact imminent should not be interpreted to mean that an aeroplane should be powered out of a high angle of attack condition and any altitude loss avoided even though close to the ground."

"Reducing AOA is the only effective recovery action from any high AOA condition, even though a loss of altitude will most likely occur. Although thrust may supplement the recovery, thrust is not a primary control. Reducing AOA at the first indication of stall is more effective in minimizing altitude loss than attempting to power out and subsequently encountering a stall or aeroplane upset."

[Oakape]

To be fair, it would seem that when these exercises were created the only thing that was of concern was a low altitude stall leading to impact with terrain. Little or no altitude loss was of prime concern in order to try & avoid impact. These exercises were done in the sim at 10,000' in order to take a little of the stress out & ensure that impact did not occur, as that was considered negative training. Perhaps they should have been done at lower altitudes in order to create a realistic scenario & instil some respect for the seriousness of the situation.

However, this has now lead to these techniques being applied by flight crews across the entire stalling scenario spectrum, including high altitude stalls & upsets. Due to the lack of specific training in high altitude stalls, some pilots have fallen back on the only stall recovery techniques that they know.

The large range of operating conditions that are experienced by a airline jet pilot today means that there is not a 'one size fits all' for many areas of the operation. There are also differences between flying smaller, prop driven aircraft & jet transport aircraft. Flight crews need to understand that & be comprehensively trained in ALL aspects of the operation, including the differences in stalling at low & high altitude. D.P. Davies book, Handling the Big Jets, is a good start for those moving onto jet transport aircraft however, a lot of those who I fly with have never read it.

We have already had a good example of what happens when you try to use techniques taught when learning to fly on large jet aircraft when AA587 lost it's tail due to the F/O's excessive use of rudder in turbulence. It appears that he was using rudder to 'pick up the dropped wing', which is a technique I was taught when learning to fly. This technique was taught in order to prevent a further wing drop at the stall due to aileron input. When I first started flying jet transport aircraft, I remember reading somewhere that 'except for an engine failure, or when in the circuit area, the rudder pedals should be used as footrests only'.

D.P. Davies gives the following advice to airline pilots. -

"Know your aeroplane - and I do not mean only your system drills. References have been made in this book to all sorts of qualities that the aeroplane may possess and you should know the values of them all for the type you are licensed to fly. All this information exists. Go and dig it out or have it dug out for you. Under normal operating conditions of course you can live without a lot of the more exotic information; but when things go badly wrong then having this background information might make all the difference.

Do not become lazy in your professional lives. The autopilot is a great comfort, so are the flight director and the approach coupler. But do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete the flight. Keep in practice in raw data ILS, particularly in crosswinds. Keep in practice in hand-flying the aeroplane at altitude and in making purely visual approaches.

Airline flying really is money for old rope most of the time; but when things get hairy THEN you earn your pay. The demand of jet transport flying can best be met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a built-in productive force, and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and the search for knowledge. Enthusiasm thus generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline pilot's task."


Perhaps a little more personal enthusiasm for the job is all that is required.

[Clandestino]

then we have never practiced stall recovery in any us simulator session in any plane I have flown.Neither did I... up to my last type rating. Courtesy of AF447, training programme on 738 sim now includes fully developed high altitude stall. Drill was to decelerate with idle thrust towards shaker but stop trimming short of it and to pull when it fires until getting the stall break with nose drop. Despite expecting what was to happen and immediately applying corrective action, usual altitude loss was about 10 000 ft. If anything, it served as useful reminder to watch my speed and never ignore shaker.

And in that case (since you are both agreeing) what is unfortunate is that a whole generation has been, in effect, misled into thinking that their "approach to stall" recovery was the technique whenever the word "stall" was involved.Alas! One needs look no further than this thread to see how true it is. It might be that low quality of high school science education leaves today's pilot unprepared to appreciate difference in aerodynamics and performance brought upon flying in thin air. Anyway, this just cannot be made into a case of one-size-fits-all. Low altitude stall warning recovery and high altitude full stall require somewhat different techniques. Using the wrong one has good chance of terminating one's lifespan prematurely.

Huh?? What is your point?That while I'm aware of instances of structural failures, powerplant failures and loss of control followed by diving into ground after entering thunderstorms, the only case of stalling in CB I can recall is Pulkovo 612 and entering the CB was only an accessory.

[Tee Emm]

These exercises were done in the sim at 10,000' in order to take a little of the stress out & ensure that impact did not occur, as that was considered negative training. Perhaps they should have been done at lower altitudes in order to create a realistic scenario & instil some respect for the seriousness of the situation.


Negative training - rubbish. The best low level stall recovery training is on short final at 800 feet on a coupled approach then close both thrust levers to simulate autothrottle system failure. That is basically what happened in the Turkish Airlines crash at Amsterdam. The airspeed rapidly bleeds off and the stab trim works overtime trimming back to hold the coupled glide slope. The stick shaker sounds about VREF minus 30 knots. It is best demonstrated first by a competent instructor, because things happen so quickly.
On go-around from VREF minus 30, thrust increase gives a strong pitch up already exacerbated by almost full back stab trim at the time the stick shaker operates. This is not a play fun exercise but deadly serious and it takes several attempts before recovery technique is refined. This is exactly what simulators are for.


But to conduct landing configuration stall recoveries at 5-10,000 ft in a simulator in order to avoid someone's idea of "negative training" is ridiculous.

[italia458]

To be fair, it would seem that when these exercises were created the only thing that was of concern was a low altitude stall leading to impact with terrain. Little or no altitude loss was of prime concern in order to try & avoid impact.

The training requirement has been this way for a long time: 1) approach to stall with ground contact imminent, and 2) approach to stall with ground contact not imminent.

The only difference I see between the two is tighter margins when contact is imminent. When ground contact is imminent, you first need to ensure the aircraft is not stalled - usually by pitching down to reduce the angle of attack - then you need to establish a climb without delay. That last part is where you're performing with tighter margins (closer to the stall) because you're pulling out of the nose down attitude earlier; at a lower speed.

As far as it not being imminent, you're doing the exact same recovery except that you allow the airplane to pick up more speed before gently easing out of the nose low attitude.

But that's not how a lot of instructors see it.

They want you powering out of the stall event and they will argue that you are not stalled so you can power out and you can do it in the plane so how can you argue with that, right?

Well I strongly disagree. You can power out of a low speed scenario - 1.15VS or 1.2VS... but when you get any indication of a stall you MUST treat it as an actual stall. As I pointed out here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/548791-vital-importance-high-altitude-stall-recovery-training-simulators-2.html#post8686112), power must be applied after stall warnings have ceased. If it's just the warning and you haven't actually stalled, the warnings will cease almost immediately after you move the control column forward and you may apply power when the warnings do cease. However, if you are actually stalled, applying power before the airplane has recovered can easily put the plane into a severe upset, possibly a spin, due to the possibility of asymmetric thrust. A lot of transport and commuter category airplanes are sensitive when stalled - especially with swept wings. A little bit of yaw could be all that it takes to flip the airplane and put it into a spin.

However, this has now lead to these techniques being applied by flight crews across the entire stalling scenario spectrum, including high altitude stalls & upsets. Due to the lack of specific training in high altitude stalls, some pilots have fallen back on the only stall recovery techniques that they know.

This is perfect proof that you will revert to your training when in a bad situation. When you're trained to recovery from stalls when you're not actually stalled, when you are actually stalled you'll kill yourself if you did the same thing.

These approach to stall exercise were made decades ago. They were designed as approach to stalls instead of stalls because most airplanes didn't have a flight simulator that was easily accessible. Most companies were doing training in their aircraft. Understandably, most instructor pilots didn't want to be stalling a transport category airplane on a regular basis. Now that virtually every single commuter, transport, and business airplane has a simulator, there is no reason why they shouldn't be mandating actual stall training in the simulator.

This technique was taught in order to prevent a further wing drop at the stall due to aileron input.

This is a bit of a tangent but related to this statement.

Ever tried snapping aileron full deflection in a C172 at the point of stall? Which way will it go?

Theory says it'll go opposite the deflection (and it's correct) but in the Cessna it'll happily roll in the direction of the deflection.

It's good to teach and I recommend teaching it but it's virtually impossible to demonstrate to your student haha. "Hey Johnny, you don't wanna put aileron in at the stall because it'll roll the other way and might put you in a spin. Watch this!.... oh... it rolled in the direction of the deflection... hmm... well don't do it anyways!!!" :confused:

The reason for that is the outboard wing on the Cessna (due to washout) is generally not stalled when you stall the airplane. The whole point of washout is to provide roll control at speeds around stall speed. Not all airplanes have this which is why it's still a good practice to teach, regardless of being able to demonstrate it!

And as for picking up a wing... forget that! Pitch down and recover from the stall. There's a lot of simultaneous things happening during a stall recovery but pitching down is first, dealing with the wing drop is second.

D.P. Davies gives the following advice to airline pilots. -

That was an excellent excerpt! I fully agree... pilots do need more enthusiasm. Too many lazy pilots out there that don't take pride in doing their job well.

[john_tullamarine]

The whole point of washout is to provide roll control at speeds around stall speed. Not all airplanes have this which is why it's still a good practice to teach, regardless of being able to demonstrate it!

Minor qualification - maintaining reasonable roll control is a Design Standard requirement and will apply to all conforming Types other than those of ancient design.

See, for instance, FAR 23.201(d) (http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=797ba7db4cf3576169096e913ef2ebc3&node=se14.1.23_1201&rgn=div8).

If you play in the FAA website and have a look at superseded Regs .. you'll find this goes back a long ways ...

[italia458]

Good point, John! Thanks for that reference.

That is talking about roll control up to the point of stall. I haven't seen a requirement for positive roll control after the point of stall. My reference to the C172 included flight after the point of stall. I tried many times and could not get the airplane to roll opposite the aileron input.

Due to the very forward CG limit and the Cessna wings being built to be quite stable, I'm not surprised. In a Cirrus with a CG towards the aft limit, I would not be surprised if you could get the airplane to roll opposite the aileron input after the stall.

[john_tullamarine]

That is talking about roll control up to the point of stall

Yes, para (a) talks about that ....

Now, suggest you have another read of the words in the para cited ...

[Tee Emm]

IGh. Many thanks for all the very useful links. Really appreciated:ok:

[italia458]

John,

I read paragraph (d). If the airplane doesn't roll more than 15 degrees, why would there be a need to move the ailerons from neutral?

If the airplane is consistently rolling left when stalled then a stall strip that is properly placed on the right wing will ensure the airplane stalls evenly and complies with paragraph (d) without any deflection of the ailerons from neutral. Or a stick pusher could be installed to ensure that the roll does not exceed 15 degrees.

I don't think paragraph (d) guarantees that you are able to use ailerons after the point of stall without the airplane rolling opposite to the aileron deflection.

[john_tullamarine]

If the airplane doesn't roll more than 15 degrees, why would there be a need to move the ailerons from neutral?

Ah, but the devil is in the detail. The Reg indicates -

(d) During the entry into and the recovery from the maneuver, it must be possible to prevent more than 15 degrees of roll or yaw by the normal use of controls .. (my emphasis)

The inference is that (for some aircraft certifications, quite aggressive) normal control use may be required to prevent roll/yaw excursions.

For instance, one commuter category Type with which I am involved required very energetic control inputs for the certification compliance stalls to prevent excess roll divergence.

For other than ancient certifications, providing that the airframe complies with the TC (ie it hasn't been overly bent and twisted in use) control application must be normal in response. This is not to suggest that Captain Bloggs, line pilot, ought to be playing test pilot .. only that the typical worries about unexpected control responses are quarantined to older certifications (or unduly bent or twisted airframes ..)

[RetiredF4]

Imho it is not prudent to use aileron or rudder when in a stall (not stall aproach). There is no guaranteee how the jet will react to the input and there is no time to find out. Stall is a AOA problem and AOA is reduced by equaling pitch angle close to flightpath angle (the difference between both is AOA). The pitch must be changed, and bank up to 45° should have no negative influence for reducing AOA, it might even help to bring down the nose faster.

Take a look at the animation of AF447 event, link below.: From 02:11:33 until 02:12:15 the SS command was permanently full left, and the aircraft continued to bank right. At 02:11:56 FL 330 the pitch had dropped to -10°, AOA was 38°, 30° right bank, a good chance for recovery by forward stick and care about the bank later when AOA is reduced and the effectiveness of the ailerons is restored.




Vol AF 447 - Rio-Paris - animation - YouTubeReconstitution des 4 dernières minutes par les experts du 2ème rapport d'expertise

[italia458]

John,

I think I found a more definitive source showing that you are correct.

The Part 23 Flight Test Guide says this under 23.201:

(3) Pilot Determinations. During the entry and recovery, the test pilot should determine the following:

(i) That the stick force curve remains positive up to the stall (that is, a pull force is required) (reference § 23.171) when the trim speed is higher than the stall speed.

(ii) That it is possible to produce and correct roll and yaw by unreversed use of the rolling and directional control.

(iii) The amount of roll or yaw encountered during the recovery.

RetiredF4,

I completely agree. The aileron control discussion was only to do with certification and I wasn't condoning usage of ailerons during a stall recovery - I teach to nose down first until pitch aligns with flight path, coordinated use of flight controls back to wings level, smoothly add power and ease out of dive.

[john_tullamarine]

In all cases the ACs provide the expanded story of what the FAA thought its rules meant ie the recommended practices. In general, one follows the AC suggestions to minimise arguments and difficulties ..

To save others having to dig up the references ...

(a) heavy FTG is at AC 25-7 (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1020494)C

(b) lighties FTG is at AC 23-8C (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1019676)

.. happy reading.

[semmern]

For what it's worth, when I did my 737 TR in July, we practiced both "AF447" and "Turkish at Amsterdam" stall scenarios. In the case of the high-altitude stall, the recovery method we were taught, and that worked very well, was to get the nose well down, apply full thrust, and let the speed build to VREF40+100. We were also taught to use 230KIAS as a ballpark figure. Do NOT start pulling up until the tip of the speed vector touches 230, at which time you gently recover back to level flight. This method worked really well. We tried pulling up earlier, and most of the times this resulted in a series of secondary stalls and a massive altitude loss until you got down to thicker air. Nevertheless, we lost 7-10 000ft from FL400 before recovering, even with the correct procedure.

[misd-agin]

Vref 40+100 is also a generic speed for minimum speed above FL250.
Below FL 250 the generic speed is Vref 40+80.


Given the gross weight changes the Vref 40+100 would be - 220 KIAS light and 250 KIAS heavy for above FL250.


Below FL250 the speed range would be closer to 200 KIAS light and 230 KIAS heavy.


None of these speeds are G adjusted - pulling G's changes the minimum speed.


Rules of thumb are good starting points but the reasoning and logic behind them is also part of the equation. 230 KIAS is a medium weight speed. Heavier would require more speed, and lighter less airspeed, if the technique agrees with Boeing's recommendations. Lower speed would require less G's, higher speed would allow more G's.

[Centaurus]

We were also taught to use 230KIAS as a ballpark figure. Do NOT start pulling up until the tip of the speed vector touches 230, at which time you gently recover back to level flight. This method worked really well

While the above figures will get you out of immediate trouble, and depending on what weather conditions, if any, caused the high altitude stall problem in the first place, continue accelerating in the descent to severe turbulence speed before levelling out, will provide high/low speed margins in severe turbulent air.

[safetypee]

semmern, not to discard the value of the stall training #59, but did you, the trainer, or operator consider training for the situations leading up to the stall.
Of course no training after the event can truly represent the workload and mental process which may have contributed to the state of awareness in the accidents, but these aspects should be considered particularly if they aid avoiding such situations.

[Oakape]

Approach to the stall training has been conducted for many years. Yet it seems that no matter how much training is provided, it doesn't stop some from ending up in a 'bad' place. Once they get there, no amount of approach to the stall training is going to get them out.

Solid, realistic stall & U/A recovery training is essential in order to provide some of the skills that may make all the difference when it unexpectedly 'hits the fan'.

[semmern]

semmern, not to discard the value of the stall training #59, but did you, the trainer, or operator consider training for the situations leading up to the stall.
Of course no training after the event can truly represent the workload and mental process which may have contributed to the state of awareness in the accidents, but these aspects should be considered particularly if they aid avoiding such situations.

Yes, of course we did. We did lots of stalls, approach to stalls, a couple of unreliable airspeed scenarios, both during high-altitude cruise and approach, as well as the exact scenario from Amsterdam with a failed captain's RA in IMC.

The airline in which I have now got a job has AoA indicators at the top right of the PFD, which IMO should be mandatory in all airliners.

[safetypee]

semmern, I think that you miss my point. In many recent LoC accidents the crews did not appreciate that they were approaching the stall or in a stall. What training is given to improve these aspects? Stall recovery training is fine - it should be basic knowledge/skill, but if you don't know that you have stalled a real aircraft (not simulator) then what?

Fitting AoA is soft (meaningless) solution; if crews are not aware of airspeed then what value is a new parameter, is this any more likely to be seen than another 'speed' instrument if the instrument scan is deficient?
The failure of RA in simulation after the event probably cannot induce the same surprise as the accident crew apparently suffered. Is there any genertic 'surprise' training which enables crews to see and understand a situation in sufficient time, and then able to select an appropriate course of action?

[cockney steve]

Surely every pilot has, at some time , seen a war-film in which the Spitfire, being pursued by "the Hun", banks over to one wingtip and rapidly dives away.......Yes, I know the engine got fuel-starved in a bunt, but the issue here, is,A steep roll will drop the nose and accelerate the aircraft, reducing Aof A and increasing airspeed.
Any kid who ever played with a chuck-glider (are there any who didn't? observed that rapid climb to a stall, a nose-drop and with sufficient altitude, a pull-out from the dive....then,of course,one trimmed by adjusting CG with bits of lead or solder,to get a controlled level flight.....

Have highly-trained Professional Pilots really forgotten these basic childhood demonstrations and the explanation and reminder they got in their PPL and beyond, hacking around in spamcans for ~200 hours?
There really is a fundamental flaw in the training regime,if this is the case.
The laws of Physics are immutable. they don't give a fig about SOPS or Company Practice....Aviate!then , navigate, communicate and push paper around.......Nero and Fiddles?

[Linktrained]

Even when flying an empty aircraft with a Training Captain, one tended to expect the unexpected, which would sometimes occur !
"What was that ?"
And then look around, hoping to spot... Something...
To some extent one " Sat on the edge of ones seat", slightly expecting something to happen..
.In a Sim things might happen rather sooner than after some hours of rather boreing cruising night flight.
Then having to hand fly, something not often practiced.
I had a newish F/O who, following a A/P failure, allowed the Britannia to start to drift down into the opposing traffic flow. I think he may never have hand flown as high ( He had been a crop duster before, I think !)

He hand flew all the way home... Earlier in my life I had had to hand fly a York at cruising level for alternate hours, from UK to KIN before FTL had been appied, as the A/P seldom worked. (I had 1000 hours total time at this stage and was the only other pilot apart from the Capt.)

[italia458]

He hand flew all the way home... Earlier in my life I had had to hand fly a York at cruising level for alternate hours, from UK to KIN before FTL had been appied, as the A/P seldom worked. (I had 1000 hours total time at this stage and was the only other pilot apart from the Capt.)

The aircraft I fly (Metro 3) has no autopilot. That means hand flying it all the way up to FL250 with passengers on board (or FL310 without pax). I've been up to FL310 once before - it feels more and more like balancing the airplane on a pin the higher you climb above FL250. It's a cool experience.

An autopilot would be nice for legs that are over 1 hour but we survive. What's a copilot for anyways?! :p And as far as the copilots, they all have around 200-250 hours when they start flying this airplane.

[wilyflier]

Please p.m. me about your explanation of 'fighter knife fights' and 'getting stick shaker if you relaxed pullback on the stick'
I dont quite understand

[misd-agin]

So we're at twice his target FPV attitude and the plane's barely flying - AOA barely below stick shaker. CKA - "no, no. Keep the FPV at X". Tiniest reduction in back pressure results in instantaneous stick shaker (anyone doing a high AOA knife fight know's what I'm talking about). Unload, go back to twice his target FPV attitude(double wasn't a goal, just what was required to make the plane fly), and we eventually recover.






wilyflier - That's a text mistake.


I meant "tiniest INCREASE in back pressure results(resulted) in instantaneous stick shaker". That was in the 777 simulator.






Fighters don't have stick shakers but it was common to be at the edge of the stall/buffet with in high AOA maneuvering. So it was common to be at the ragged edge of the airflow separation(non FBW a/c) during high AOA maneuvering. Some a/c had an aural tone or you'd have to feel the change in airflow and the resulting change in a/c buffeting "seat of the pants" flying.

[BOAC]

Tiniest reduction in back pressure results in instantaneous stick shaker - yes, I thought he was talking Airbus too.......:)