RAF CAS says 'Politicians make it up as they go.'

[mmitch]

RAF chief says politicians 'make it up as they go along' - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10960082/RAF-chief-says-politicians-make-it-up-as-they-go-along.html)


Notice the mealy mouth response at the bottom.
mmitch.

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

"Jehovah! He said Jehovah!"

That'll be another CAS redrafting his CV then.....

[Lima Juliet]

That the image of the Royal Air Force is driven by two comedians wearing this uniform, selling beer. Is that what air power is about?

...Errr, yes it is and sh!t. I said you CAS, bro, is well naff and those bloods that is selling beer are sick. Flying fighters and high-end aircraft is well wicked and makes us the kings. Just coz mechanical palm trees and trash hauling is cool at the moment doen't mean they'll be worth sh!t and that in the next war - and we could get anyone to fly them, even my mum... Isn't it?

LJ :E

And the army fly helicopters and they smell well rank!

http://www.comedy.co.uk/images/library/comedies/180x200/t/the_armstrong_and_miller_show.jpg

[500N]

That'll be another CAS redrafting his CV then.....

Has probably been told that he isn't going to get the top job !

[CoffmanStarter]

Very good Leon :}

As an aside ... I was disappointed that the Pythons didn't do the RAF "Banter" sketch at their O2 reunion gig last week :(

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rKYL0tW-Ek&app=desktop

PS. Nail, Head, Bang, On ...

[Maxibon]

In all fairness, it's nice to see a senior officer state the obvious for once, irrespective of the RAF comments attempting to defuse the speech. Most individuals beyond OF4 seem to forget their responsibilities to their men and focus more on their pension.

[alfred_the_great]

If a Very Senior Officer can't deal with ambiguity, a desire to leave things until the last safe moment (and that's probably much later than we care to admit), and an understanding that the Military gold-plated solution is rarely actually necessary, then I'm not sure he is fit to be a Very Senior Officer.

[MPN11]

Nice dit ... at least there's a CAS who lays it on the line. :ok:

[Could be the last?]

'It was certainly not intended as any form of critique of the current UK Government or any previous UK Government.'

MMM really........... I hope it was!

[Wander00]

That will be a meeting without coffee on Monday then.................

[Red Line Entry]

CAS was speaking at a RUSI conference (at which SofS was also to speak) and was discussing the inevitable tensions between political and military priorities. This was second hand reporting of a detailed and honest debate. Typical media spin!

[Evalu8ter]

LJ,
Fighters are for airshows and this and that aren't they? After all Blud, they've not done any fighting or sh1t since Korea - which is well wicked cos you can cut around telling public how, like, sick you are without, like having to fight or anything!! Well, apart from those well dodgy viff puffer toys that, like the Navy had in the Falklands or whatever, but they were like, not supersonic so we, like, totally got rid of them - random....

Anyway, fighter pilots, seem to have an intolerance to medals and Sh1t - so it must be against your human rights to talk to SH mates with, like, loads of medals and stuff, and they must just diss you off with a "whatever" when you tell them how hard Libya was or how, like, operational, the Falklands are nowadays....isn't it?

Snap shot banter mate; CAS is either showing naïveté ( I doubt it, knowing how smooth he us) or he's really trying to lay a pre election marker down. I care not for the horse soldiers waffle afterwards - they're still competing for advancement after 2015. With other recent statements by other VSOs it suggests a rare degree of harmony at the top of the MoD. Perhaps helped by having a CAS far more purple than most of his predecessors?

[Lima Juliet]

Coff

Yes, a great shame on the Pythons 'RAF Banter' - a classic that lead to things like Armstrong and Miller. I do think that the WWII aircrew image is so deeply rooted in our heritage that we would be fools to turn our back on it.

Here's another favourite:
horrible history RAF pilots song - YouTube

Pully's chollywhoppers are a comparitively new capability and the SH force have in the past insisted on wearing Frank Spencer berets with their flying suits - all of which further detaches them from the RAF in the public's eyes. Whenever a Pongo gets on board an RAF cab or Herc then they should be in no doubt that it doesn't belong to the Army's teeny weeny airways. That starts with the way that we present ourselves and stopping wearing CS95/MTP with berets is just the beginning. Stopping the slow malaise of down-playing aircrew status - like the idiotic recent shirt badge palava and the placing of non-aircrew into traditional aircrew posts. We need to stop pretending that non-operators are Air Power experts - only those that operate in, with or around aircraft can be. A blunty going to the so called 'College of Knowledge' at Shrivenham does not make them an Air Power expert. All of this 'thins' our brand and a previous CAS was 'on the money' in asking us to wear blues whenever possible to try and raise RAF profile. However, putting us in nasty 'tuppence-halfpenny' nasty-nylon shirts, trousers and wooly pulleys with no proper heritage is a disaster - travelling on the train in the No 2 wooly pulley combo I have been asked what my uniform is on at least a dozen occasions! Oddly enough, I never get asked when in flying clothing and also the bluntys often ask us to turn out in flying clothing at media events to showcase that the RAF is about flying - I wonder why? Is it because our No 2 blues make us look like office workers; even RAC men have more appropriate clothing these days!

He said: “We all of us in this room should be ashamed. We have been in this game for over 100 years and the people don’t understand air power. That the image of the Royal Air Force is driven by two comedians wearing this uniform, selling beer. Is that what air power is about? We have got to do better.”

The public face of the RAF is the Dambusters, the Battle of Britain and the Great Escape. Live with it and work with it. We need to stop tailoring No 1s so you can see what you've eaten for breakfast and then they might be comfortable enough to be everyday wear like a suit for wearing in HQs and Main Building. Introduce a comfortable (non-hairy mary) battle-dress style jacket to wear as No2s - God knows there are so many campaign medal ribbons on our people; well let them wear them with pride. Get rid of the beret full stop - it's for Frenchmen, Pongos and Frank Spencer!

Finally, what a mixed message we are passing at the moment. On one hand we have CAS giving out a pseudo b0ll0cking for not actively plugging Air Power and then in another message we have spelled the end of the RAF Leuchars and Waddington Airshows. :confused:

Right that's tonight's real-ale rant sorted!

LJ

[Lima Juliet]

Evalu8ter

Top banter old bean! :ok:

BTW, I agree with you...

he's really trying to lay a pre election marker down and I don't believe that he is naiive on the main thrust of his speech regarding political decision making.

[Easy Street]

The RAF frittered away its best opportunity for years to engage the public on modern air power when it was so desperately modest about its achievements in Libya. 'Typhoon can drop a bomb!' and 'Look at these really useful Sentinel GMTI images!' seemed to be the only messages that we bothered to push. Sir, we only have ourselves to blame.

[bridgets boy]

We are all from different generations (cue Python misquote: "I'm not!...") and we sometimes don't get the Zeit Geist, such as the furore surrounding the self appointed partial experts who didn't watch the whole of Blackadder Goes Forth, so missed the point of the final scene, which actually made a valid connection that many of the 1980s generation could make with their forebears, ie real people larking around but eventually having to face up to their duty. Lost on the attention seeking politicians (card-carrying or otherwise) and Daily Mail readers.
Normal people (and I have met some) LOVE the RAF, the uniform, even the forage caps (though not the berets, natch). They WANT us to be like the 1940s pilots, and forgive us the lack of brevets and medals. It has to do with civility, and everything that made us chose the mob instead of other fighting arms, industry, the airlines, or perish the thought, The City. Armstrong and Miller have got it right - they do not paint the whole picture, but any tech-savvy youth will be able to work that out in a few key presses on his I-phone.
Those of us that care should make sure the right kids make the key presses necessary to apply online to join up, so they can use their skills (and by god the have some - frighteningly capable youngsters, in every way better than my generation coming through when I left 4 years ago) to continue our evolving Premier Fighting Arm.

[Brian Abraham]

He told an audience of military officers from around the world there was a “balance between what the politicians might want me to do and how much they want me to pay for it, and how much time and effort and resource they wish me to invest in it”.Nothing much has changed.

MESSAGE FROM THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE IN LONDON -- written from Central Spain, August 1812

Gentlemen,

Whilst marching from Portugal to a position which commands the approach to Madrid and the French forces, my officers have been diligently complying with your requests which have been sent by H.M. ship from London to Lisbon and thence by dispatch to our headquarters.

We have enumerated our saddles, bridles, tents and tent poles, and all manner of sundry items for which His Majesty's Government holds me accountable. I have dispatched reports on the character, wit, and spleen of every officer. Each item and every farthing has been accounted for, with two regrettable exceptions for which I beg your indulgence.

Unfortunately the sum of one shilling and ninepence remains unaccounted for in one infantry battalion's petty cash and there has been a hideous confusion as the number of jars of raspberry jam issued to one cavalry regiment during a sandstorm in western Spain. This reprehensible carelessness may be related to the pressure of circumstance, since we are at war with France, a fact which may come as a bit of a surprise to you gentlemen in Whitehall.

This brings me to my present purpose, which is to request elucidation of my instructions from His Majesty's Government so that I may better understand why I am dragging an army over these barren plains. I construe that perforce it must be one of two alternative duties, as given below. I shall pursue either one with the best of my ability, but I cannot do both:

1. To train an army of uniformed British clerks in Spain for the benefit of the accountants and copy-boys in London or perchance,

2. To see to it that the forces of Napoleon are driven out of Spain.

Your most obedient servant

Wellington

[Evalu8ter]

Easy Street,
Perhaps Libya was the exception, and modern air power is actually more like Iraq and Afghan where the critical tasks have been air mobility, air assault, strat/Tac lift, ISTAR and CAS? Not as glamorous as air combat but more prevalent. The problem we have is convincing people to carry on investing in a DCA/OCA capability (at great expense) when, apart from the odd Q intercept, it's not heavily used - and certainly not as media friendly as a MERT documentary or, sadly, a repatriation. One day we will need the high end stuff again, but if we over focus on it we risk being ambushed by our sister services for displaying an obsession with FJ at the expense of everything else. Control of the Air remains sacrosanct, but perhaps we, as an organisation need to raise our game re the other, less sexy, roles as they are seen as more important day to day.

[Pheasant]

CAS's speech was a well delivered summary of the RUSI conference. He was describing the well known tension between the military and politicians and it was not stated in a critical way but a pure statement of fact. Ben Farmer's article is pretty accurate.....remember he did not write the headline, the sub-ed did.

You probably have the best CAS you have had for several generations. He understands the proper position of the RAF as a supporting arm to the Army and RN (the RAF will never be the "supported" arm, that is not its role). He stated this very clearly in the same speech. AP will win many friends in the Westminster village which should pay handsomely in SDSR 2015, but the naysayers will have to understand that it will probably not be a one sided drive for RAF owned kit. He is much more of a Joint Capability man.

As an example AP "gets" the new carriers and the importance of them as a strategic national asset. If the jets need to spend lots of time at sea he will make sure they do. The reason is that unless this happens, and short of a new war, the RAF will be largely UK based contributing little to influence around the globe - a role that is back in the RN's hands now that Iraq and Afgh campaigns are complete.

Wake up and smell the mustard!

[minigundiplomat]

Pully's chollywhoppers are a comparitively new capability and the SH force have in the past insisted on wearing Frank Spencer berets with their flying suits - all of which further detaches them from the RAF in the public's eyes. Whenever a Pongo gets on board an RAF cab or Herc then they should be in no doubt that it doesn't belong to the Army's teeny weeny airways. That starts with the way that we present ourselves and stopping wearing CS95/MTP with berets is just the beginning. Stopping the slow malaise of down-playing aircrew status - like the idiotic recent shirt badge palava and the placing of non-aircrew into traditional aircrew posts. We need to stop pretending that non-operators are Air Power experts - only those that operate in, with or around aircraft can be. A blunty going to the so called 'College of Knowledge' at Shrivenham does not make them an Air Power expert. All of this 'thins' our brand and a previous CAS was 'on the money' in asking us to wear blues whenever possible to try and raise RAF profile. However, putting us in nasty 'tuppence-halfpenny' nasty-nylon shirts, trousers and wooly pulleys with no proper heritage is a disaster - travelling on the train in the No 2 wooly pulley combo I have been asked what my uniform is on at least a dozen occasions! Oddly enough, I never get asked when in flying clothing and also the bluntys often ask us to turn out in flying clothing at media events to showcase that the RAF is about flying - I wonder why? Is it because our No 2 blues make us look like office workers; even RAC men have more appropriate clothing these days!

Leon,

You and I are normally in sync on most things, and there are many elements of the above which I can agree with.

As for wearing berets with flying suits and not being distinguishable from the army, I view that as a positive; they are our primary customer and we forget that at our peril.... ask the former members of 12 Sqn RAAF.

When it comes to the Army, for whom we provide the majority of support services (the support as in Support Helicopters) the RAF has an image problem which is mainly centered around the AT fleets 'check in not dig in' mentality.

You will find that one of the few elements of the RAF that has climbed that mountain is the SH Force. Horses for Causes, kind sir, but I believe that 'Pully's chollywhoppers' have it right, innit!

I also agree with Andy, and it is good to see a VSO speak out whilst still in the job, and not sit quietly, accept the pension and then snipe from the sidelines.

[FantomZorbin]

it is good to see a VSO speak out whilst still in the job, and not sit quietly, accept the pension and then snipe from the sidelines.

Spot on Sir! :D

But will the politicians take heed? Of course not. Now that sandpit ops. have virtually ceased, we'll be back to the world of part-time Dismal Des:ugh:

[OldnDaft]

I was fortunate to have an hour with CAS, as part of a course, a couple of weeks ago. He is a straight shooter and says it exactly how it is. He wasn't being controversial at RUSI, merely confirming what most of us already know. He is savvy enough, imho, to ensure we get the best possible outcome from SDSR15.

[Lima Juliet]

MGD - d'accord! :ok:

Pheasant

He understands the proper position of the RAF as a supporting arm to the Army and RN (the RAF will never be the "supported" arm, that is not its role).

Realy? So what about strategic Air Power delivery? Ranging from 'No Fly Zone', 'QRA' (including anti-terrorism stuff), Storm Shadow shots to bring another country to the negotiating table by taking down their air defences, positioning high end assets to deter agression (which we failed to do for Ukraine), etc..? No brown-jobs or fish-heads in sight for this type of mission.

We need to stop reliving the ground war that we are just winding up; a future conflict may not have any sea or land requirements at all. If we had not let our high-end warfighting capabilities whither so badly then we might have been able to save more lives in Ukraine but showing that strategic presence and intent that I have just spoken about.

I think the biggest problem is that we have allowed parochialism enter the debate too many times before. It shoukd be simple: if it floats then let the Navy have it (I never did understand why the RAF had its own Marine Branch - why couldn't the Navy have run this?); if it stays on the ground (ie. it doesn't float or fly) then let the Army have it (yes, I would include the RAF Regt in this); if it flies then let the Air Force have it (that would mean the FAA and AAC becoming light blue). That way it is simple, we can manage our highly skilled types like aircraft engineers and aircrew in a bigger pool and ensure that each Service Arm is supported and tasked by a Joint Force HQ (where we support each other depending on the military task). At present the numbers of these highly-skilled personnel is too small and we have seen manpower issues creep in with Sea Harrier, Apache and other small fleets of aircraft in the past.

Maybe I'm too simple for my own good!

LJ :ok:

[FODPlod]

LJ - Strategic air power is all that's needed? Harris would have loved you. With you as his deputy, the RAF could have sewn up the Second World War all on its own. I'll bet you regard aircraft carriers as floating airfields instead of integrated weapons systems platforms fighting the sub-surface, surface and air battle, too. ;)

[London Eye]

Where did LJ say Strategic Air Power was all that was needed

[Pheasant]

Leon,

Either you are right or CAS is and my vote is with CAS. The only thing that air forces really do in an independent way is control of the air. But control of the air doesn't win the war it is an enabling function for land or maritime forces to complete the "winning" of the battle - controlling the land or sea space. Firing a storm shadow is an enabling function to further action. Re the FAA and AAC, ownership of tactical air power is probably best left to the arm that "owns and understands" the domain. If you enter this argument too deeply you will lose assets to the FAA and AAC not gain them for the RAF.

Listen to CAS he really does know best.

As for wearing flying ovies when not flying/in the flying environment, you chaps really need to realise how silly you look and how much people are laughing behind your backs. It might make RAF aircrew feel superior to their non-flying colleagues but they think you look like pr*ts!

[minigundiplomat]

I am sure you achieve the same effect with or without flying overalls.

We've never met and I think your a d1ck.

[4fitter]

I have known Pully for many years and have worked with and for him in both benign and operational environments. He is not immature or naive and is certainly streetwise and politically astute. Moreover, in my opinion he is the most credible joint CAS we have had. Personal views I know but based on 37 years in a polyester suit. I would hope that his RN and Army peers support his thrust as I would expect Hammond to also.

[Pheasant]

Yes, it is all about me.

Sums up the RAF FJ attitude that this CAS is trying to distance himself from.

[500N]

Del

Re the FAA and AAC, ownership of tactical air power is probably best left to the arm that "owns and understands" the domain.

Is that not true though ?

Having someone in the Cockpit of an Apache who understands the Army tactics not better than someone who doesn't ?

[teeteringhead]

We need to stop reliving the ground war that we are just winding up It's a great Brit tradition Leon.

We always procure to fight better the war we've just finished.

Which is where Pully's points about flexibility - that well known characteristic of Air Power - really count. Until we get serviceable crystal balls, we WON'T know what's coming next....

[And for the record, I too think he's the best CAS we've had for a while - and not just cos he's a rotary mate.]

Puts me in mind of a dit a mate in plans sent on a Christmas card once.

"We planners are a funny lot,
We wear no sword or pistol.
But please excuse the way we walk;
Our balls are made of crystal!"

[LeggyMountbatten]

LJ "It should be simple: if it floats then let the Navy have it (I never did understand why the RAF had its own Marine Branch - why couldn't the Navy have run this?); if it stays on the ground (ie. it doesn't float or fly) then let the Army have it (yes, I would include the RAF Regt in this); if it flies then let the Air Force have it (that would mean the FAA and AAC becoming light blue). That way it is simple, we can manage our highly skilled types like aircraft engineers and aircrew in a bigger pool and ensure that each Service Arm is supported and tasked by a Joint Force HQ (where we support each other depending on the military task). At present the numbers of these highly-skilled personnel is too small and we have seen manpower issues creep in with Sea Harrier, Apache and other small fleets of aircraft in the past."

The reduction in personnel, types and capability, in my view, means we have reached a point where it is no longer a sensible use of the declining resources to maintain 3 air arms (RAF, FAA, AAC).

The logical alternative is 2 services but, we trust, that would not be politically acceptable.

Mind you, achieving LJ's view will require a determined PM not just SoS. I'd throw RM in with RAF Regt and why Paras? When was the last time there was a unit (say company) drop - or will there ever be again?

[Easy Street]

The argument that 'air' is different from 'sea' and 'land' in being only a supporting environment doesn't hold water, if you'll pardon the turn of phrase. People are born, grow up, have families and generally live their lives on land. Ultimately, our interests are those which secure and facilitate our ability to do so in some measure of comfort. In that sense our individual lives are land-centric (unsurprisingly). There are plenty of resources in the sea, and of course it's a great medium for trade, but ultimately trade and resources are just things that make our life on land that much richer. So, taking the pedantic view of 'supporting' vs 'supported' environments, air and sea are both 'supporting' - mediums for trade and providers of resource. Take the 'supported should own the supporting' argument further and the Army should own the Navy, too, which is self-evident nonsense.

I won't contribute to the FJ vs RW vs AT debate other than to observe that the independent role of air power was exercised successfully over the 6 months of the Libya campaign. It was 'independent' in the sense that NATO air power operated independently of NATO sea and land forces. Yes, local forces were able to exploit the situation to conduct land operations. But, I'll observe again, since people are born, reproduce and grow old on land, the final intended effect of everything we do in the military (independently or not) is a change in the course of people's earthbound lives.

Deep breath.... and back to the original topic!

CAS is obviously bang-on with everything he says about the political-military interface, and I don't see it as controversial at all. I haven't seen the full transcript, but I hope that he made a point about the resource implications of making decisions at the last possible moment. This is where politicians' desire for a late decision is in total opposition to their desire to spend no money until the decision has been taken.

Our forces are funded in peacetime to maintain defined readiness states for various types of operations. If politicians want forces held at higher readiness than has been funded, or if they want to have their finger on the trigger of an operation beyond the scope of the planning assumptions, then there is cost involved - but 'operational' expenditure cannot be authorised until an operation is actually declared in progress. On several occasions over recent years, we've marched up the hill, picking up costs within core, only to be marched down again and left to get on with it. Our own senior leadership is complicit to the extent that the answer is more often 'yes' than 'yes, but...'. If there was more recognition that out-of-scope readiness has costs, I think the tensions caused by last-minute decision-making would be somewhat lessened.

[500N]

When was the last time there was a unit (say company) drop - or will there ever be again?

British or any body ?

Brits would have to be the Falklands ? SAS into the sea ?

US would be the airfield in Grenada.

[Davef68]

US Rangers in Afghanistan? Operation Rhino

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rhino

[LeggyMountbatten]

"British or any body ?

Brits would have to be the Falklands ? SAS into the sea ?

US would be the airfield in Grenada."

Without looking it up, about the only Para drop was probably H's replacement HALO? SAS would be SF, so not necessarily Para originally - surely we don't need to maintain 3 battalions of para qualified infantry because some might go SF, along with all sorts of non-para qualified SF recruits.

US - ISTR there was a large scale drop into Afghanistan in 2001. But they are in a different resource paradigm...

[500N]

Dave

Good one, I had forgotten about that one.

[Pheasant]

Del,

I didn't respond to Leon's first two paras as I could see nothing worth responding to. If he thinks QRA is a strategic role then he clearly understands little.

No chip re FJ, and I am aircrew, but I have observed over the years the way the RAF has been poorly served by the "FJ pilots rule OK" attitude of the top of the RAF. At long last the best man for the job has been selected and you will reap the reward.

Re your comment on MPA. The MPA role was cut because Nimrod 4 was a disaster and the department needed to make savings. The role will return in some guise but don't fall into the trap that it will be an RAF ownership. The role is maritime and the appropriate duty holder may well be the RN.

PS The no fly zones in Iraq did not bring Saddam to the negotiating table, they just stopped him flying. Effect? Good for the Kurds and some others, but little else.

[kintyred]

"I don't care about the cost."

Somebody has to. Surely the head of an organisation needs to have some financial accountability?

[Flugplatz]

Op Serval: French forces took the airports at both Timbuktu and Gao: once on the ground the troops met very little resistance from rebels and quickly gained control of the airport at Timbuktu. It was found that the runway at Timbuktu was littered with obstacles so much so the French had to para drop the 17th Airborne Engineer Regiment and its equipment to clear the obstacles and return the runway to active use and the ability to receive air traffic.

Served to gain the initiative and leapfrog hundreds of miles of desert.

Don't think we really have the nerve or mind-space to do this sort of thing; too cautious and would no doubt still be in the 'consideration'/planning stage CAS was talking about. Sometimes there are real penalties to not being able to make a timely decision

[500N]

Sometimes there are real penalties to not being able to make a timely decision

Clinton and Obama know that well !

[Jimlad1]

The French drops in mali were interesting, but owe a lot to luck. Talking to well informed commentators, I'm left with the impression that had the Rebels fought, then the French paratroops would have been very exposed and short of supplies quickly.

The lesson seems to be, only jump far enough ahead that you can be relieved should your opponent pick a fight...

[Lima Juliet]

Pheasant

Here's a good example of strategic Air Power effecting a total outcome without any Navy or Army input...

http://b-29s-over-korea.com/Enola/images/Enola.jpg

God knows how many lives would have been lost trying to take Japan with 'boots on the ground' and multiple littoral manouevres subject to Kamikaze attacks!

Warfrare changes and we need to get used to it - trench warfare died 100 years ago with the introduction of Air Power and tanks. Fast forward 20 years from that point then our 'boots on the ground' were c0ck all use following a total beasting by Blitzkrieg - only our Navy and Air Force bailed us out and stopped the rot that the land forces couldn't.

QRA is strategic if you consider the strategic assets that it is up to defend against - no need to shoot anything down, just the meer capability to meet the ASM carrying assets outside of the ASM's WEZ is a very good example of strategic defence. It negates other weapons systems that might be brought to bear (including the use of airliners as flying bombs!).

The Iraqi No Fly Zones shaped Saddam's behaviour significantly and he knew that he did not have freedom of manoeuvre above/below the parallels. Again there was strategic intent in keeping Saddam at bay inside his own borders, which is why he started fiddling about with chemical weapons and making (now known to be) empty threats to the Coalition. Quite simply, it was all he could do as Air Power had him hemmed in and neutralised any conventional effect he might want to use.

But sadly I think I am wasting my words on you - you have your opinion and I have mine!

LJ

[500N]

Leon

What about the Falklands ?

Without FJ air power of any colour .......................

[Lima Juliet]

TTH

I agree and your point "Until we get serviceable crystal balls, we WON'T know what's coming next...." is very well made. However, for this we need a balanced force and I don't think we have this. We have procured in recent years for another Afghanistan and let the rest of our capabilities fall or whither. Multiroling of capabilities is helping with some of this, but we have too many 'capability holidays' to be effective for a lot of what might come next (in my opinion).

LJ :ok:

[Lima Juliet]

LeggyMB

The reduction in personnel, types and capability, in my view, means we have reached a point where it is no longer a sensible use of the declining resources to maintain 3 air arms (RAF, FAA, AAC).

The logical alternative is 2 services but, we trust, that would not be politically acceptable.

I would argue that the logical alternative is 1 Service and that is politically acceptable but the Royal Navy and the Army don't like it! :eek:

LJ :ok:

PS. in case you haven't worked it out the 1 Service starts with a 'R' and ends in an 'AF'. :E

[Lima Juliet]

500N

Without FJs the Falklands War would have been a bloodbath for the UK...

...the Argentine Air Force and Navy would have torn any UK Task Force to shreds before it got anywhere near the islands...

...I think that is the answer you were looking for?

LJ :ok:

[500N]

That is what I was hinting at, yes.


It very nearly was a blood bath anyway and then have a couple of major cluster fcks courtesy of a couple ships Captains and
then Army officers not getting people off the LC and Ships as fast as they could.

[FODPlod]

...I won't contribute to the FJ vs RW vs AT debate other than to observe that the independent role of air power was exercised successfully over the 6 months of the Libya campaign. It was 'independent' in the sense that NATO air power operated independently of NATO sea and land forces...

How about the aircraft from USS Kearsarge (http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/article/8093/navy-and-marine-corps-aircraft-strike-libya), FS Charles de Gaulle (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13573848) and ITS Garibaldi (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110620/DEFFEAT06/106200310/Libya-Proving-Value-Carrier-Jets-Italian-Navy), each capable of flying more sorties and being more reactive than their land-based equivalents owing to their closer proximity to the target? Secondly, why don't you classify the TLAMs launched by ships and submarines as (maritime) air power too? Not identical missiles but they funtioned similarly to the Storm Shadows flown all the way from RAF Marham by Tonkas and launched (when the mission wasn't aborted at the last moment) from outside Libyan airspace. Thirdly, what about the attack helos from HMS Ocean (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13651736) and FS Tonnerre (http://www.frontline-defence.com/Defence/index_archives.php?page=1782)? Fourthly, what about the Air Direction services and firing of illumination rounds by the Type 42 destroyer HMS Liverpool (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8682572/Libya-Royal-Navy-warship-HMS-Liverpool-comes-under-heavy-fire.html) to facilitate air attacks? Fifthly, who possessed and exercised the only CSAR capability on Libyan territory? It was MV-22B Ospreys from USS Kearsarge supported by AV-8B Harriers from the same ship. I'm not knocking the contribution of any air force (it was a joint effort with ship-based aircraft) but the above statement is grossly inaccurate.

Here's a good example of strategic Air Power effecting a total outcome without any Navy or Army input...

http://b-29s-over-korea.com/Enola/images/Enola.jpg

And today's equivalent is...?

Strategic, yes, but I would no more classify the Enola Gay and its atom bomb as an example of strategic 'Air Power' than I would classify Trident as an example of strategic 'Maritime Power'. Like state-sponsored assassination, the use of strategic nuclear weapons is a political tool of last resort and its non-warfighting raison d'etre, use and effect extends far beyond any single environment.

However, I would equate a conventionally armed aircraft (fighter, bomber, UAV, etc.) with a conventional missile in being a useful and often interchangeable aerial component of a weapons system, be it air, land or sea-based.

[Easy Street]

FODPlod,

I class the naval and army aircraft you list as having delivered air power, not maritime or land power, during the operation, and British Joint Doctrine agrees with me! The only example you quote where air and maritime power were integrated was NGS illumination, and in the context of the entire operation, that isn't a lot. I'm not suggesting that the other services shouldn't operate those aircraft or missiles, by the way, just that we should recognise when we're talking about air power as distinct from other forms. Describing ship-launched missions as 'maritime power' simply because they come from the sea is like describing a airfield-launched missions as 'land power'. It's where you operate and what you do that counts. You are guilty of making the knee-jerk defensive assumption that 'air power' = 'Air Force' and that's incorrect.


I stand by my earlier point that, NGS excepting, there was little need for integration of the environments (note: NOT services) in support of ops over Libya.

[500N]

Easy

What about air cover for the C-130 flights / recovery operations ?

[teeteringhead]

Leon

I agree and your point "Until we get serviceable crystal balls, we WON'T know what's coming next...." is very well made. However, for this we need a balanced force and I don't think we have this. We have procured in recent years for another Afghanistan and let the rest of our capabilities fall or whither. Exactly so. Hence my points:

We always procure to fight better the war we've just finished.

Which is where Pully's points about flexibility - that well known characteristic of Air Power - really count.

The balanced force would (will?) give that flexibility of capability that is required.

Sadly, the force must also be (or will always be) as lean as the Treasury dictate. :{ The conversation should always be - and never is - thus:

1. PM: We want you to be able to do "this".

2. CDS: Yessir - that will cost you £X Bn.

3. Treas: Can't have that, can only have £X - Y Bn

4. CDS: Then we can only do "this" minus "that"

5. GOTO 1

[Climebear]

The balanced force would (will?) give that flexibility of capability that is required.

Sadly, the force must also be (or will always be) as lean as the Treasury dictate. :{ The conversation should always be - and never is - thus:

1. PM: We want you to be able to do "this".

2. CDS: Yessir - that will cost you £X Bn.

3. Treas: Can't have that, can only have £X - Y Bn

4. CDS: Then we can only do "this" minus "that"

5. GOTO 1

Spot on. From what I've observed during op planning at the Mil Strat level it generally goes something like:

1. PM: We want you to be able to do 'something'.

2. CDS: Yessir - not sure exactly what you mean by 'something'; but I can give you this (which I think meets your poorly articulated strategic intent) which will cost you £X Bn.

3. Treas: We don't thing that the PM meant that much 'something' so you can't have that, can only have £X - Y Bn

4. CDS: Then we can only do "this" minus "that"

5. GOTO 1

[Brian Abraham]

Here's a good example of strategic Air Power effecting a total outcome without any Navy or Army input...So the USN delivering the bomb from the US to the island doesn't count?

[Easy Street]

Brian, that's like saying that Trafalgar was an example of joint warfare because the ships were all built on land. Reductio ad absurdum.

[Roland Pulfrew]

I didn't respond to Leon's first two paras as I could see nothing worth responding to. If he thinks QRA is a strategic role then he clearly understands little.

And clearly the potential strategic implications of ascribing this as a tactical role and not doing it are equally as naive. Sadly this is yet another example of green/dark blue thinking that was prevalent in World War One (and seems to remain prevalent now).

The role will return in some guise but don't fall into the trap that it will be an RAF ownership. The role is maritime and the appropriate duty holder may well be the RN.

Really? And you evidence for that is.........nothing more than ill-informed speculation and dark blue wishful thinking!!

[Brian Abraham]

Easy, no, just a comment that Enola wouldn't have been in a position to drop the bomb without the grievous sacrifices made by thousands of men in taking control of the island. All arms are players, none stand alone.

[Pheasant]

Roland,

Surely QRA is a tactical role? A strategic role is something like delivering the nuclear deterrent. QRA in modern parlance could be fulfilled by a Type 45 in the N North Sea depending on the ROE in force. Presumably the Typhoons launching to meet the Bear are doing nothing more than the RN do when intercepting and shadowing Russian warships...mostly for the PR image.

Re ownership of maritime surveillance....the current capability is owned by the RN (FAA Helos, warships and submarines). IF a wide area capability is reintroduced there is bound to be an ownership discussion. It is not an anti-RAF view, just common- sense.

[Easy Street]

Pheasant,

The terms strategic, operational and tactical get confusing very quickly when applied to 'actions' rather than 'levels of command'. Every action is 'tactical' when you boil it down to the kit and the operator; a SSBN manoeuvering into position and launching a salvo of Trident is undertaking a tactical action with distinctly strategic outcomes. Similarly, while the isolated act of flying a Typhoon out to intercept a Bear is tactical, the cumulative effect of many such acts over years is strategic (demonstrating that we remain prepared to meet potential incursions into our sovereign airspace). Nations that don't consistently show such resolve may find that they get overflown, and collected against, with impunity -a strategic failure to secure their own territory.

A Type 45 in the middle of the North Sea can do nothing to a Bear except broadcast radio warnings and/or shoot it down. Since aircraft have every right to fly in international airspace more than 12 miles offshore, those are empty threats unless open hostilities are already in progress. The Type 45 would have to let the Bear fly on by. Then, if the Bear did subsequently enter our territorial airspace, any missile fired by the Type 45 would be at long range and into congested airspace, with the Bear already having got into range to do whatever it was going to do. In contrast, a fighter can escort the Bear all the way into the territorial boundary, demonstrating the ability to engage with immediate effect, and able to observe visual cues of intent such as bomb bay door position. If you think shadowing foreign militaries near territorial boundaries is all about PR, well, just look at what goes on daily in the East China Sea. It isn't.

Also, our handful of Type 45s are the air defence for the carrier group, and were not bought to defend our home territory - a job which can be done more sustainably from a fixed-base footing. Without the Type 45s, the carrier group would be reliant on its F-35s for air defence - the proverbial self-licking lollipop.

[London Eye]

Well put Easy Street and I would add that the ability (potentially) to counter a 9/11-style terrorist threat is somewhat above the tactical level...

[Not_a_boffin]

Also, our handful of Type 45s are the air defence for the carrier group, and were not bought to defend our home territory - a job which can be done more sustainably from a fixed-base footing. Without the Type 45s, the carrier group would be reliant on its F-35s for air defence - the proverbial self-licking lollipop.

The T45s are "part of" as opposed to "the" air defence for a maritime force, not limited to the carrier group. Something many people seem to forget. Any maritime force, faced with a credible air threat usually needs organic f/w to protect it, for precisely the same reasons you describe vs Mr Bear. That does not make the carrier a self-licking lollipop, it just adds to the rationale for having carrier-based air.

Personally, I'd suggest that QRA is strategic, as the number 1 item in any defence "strategy" is to be able to defend the homeland from attack. Whether the UK has any other role for land based FJ is a much bigger debate.

[Roland Pulfrew]

QRA in modern parlance:ugh:

No a Type 45 couldn't do it, several (probably more than we own) might be able to do it, but no, the dark blue can't do QRA and provide AD (of the UK mainland) that an aircraft can. To think anything otherwise shows an unbelievable naivety.

Strategic isn't just about nuclear weapons, and Easy and LE have covered the implications well enough.

Maritime surveillance is not just the preserve of the RN I'm afraid (even now) and I dispute the "common sense" view as parochialism.:=

[switch_on_lofty]

I don't think that the RAF is at all like Armstrong and Miller of the Spitfire Ale Adverts. Those guys are hilarious!

[Arbie]

So CAS is disappointed that Armstrong & Miller are the public face of the RAF, and this is misleading. Shame nobody told the editor of the RAF News...

[Hempy]

That does not make the carrier a self-licking lollipop, it just adds to the rationale for having carrier-based air.

In my limited strategic thinking, carriers are about PROJECTING capability. Would this not seem at odds with the 'desire' that the country first needs to have the capacity to DEFEND itself?