Jet2 evacuation at Blackpool

[Super VC-10]

A Jet2 aircraft was evacuated after landing at Blackpool due to smoke being seen.

BBC News - Plane at Blackpool Airport evacuated after smoke spotted (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-27742368)

[M-ONGO]

A bad week for Jet2. They lost pressurisation on a PFO-NCL a couple of days ago.

More photos here http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=166772

[Aluminium shuffler]

Unless it has been extended in the last few years, that is a pretty short runway, so braking would be fairly hard, especially for a 300 compared to an NG. How much smoke was seen and at what point would be interesting - I have occasionally seen brakes smoking when a 73 has rocked up on stand, and while it shows they're pretty hot, it doesn't signify much more than that unless the smoke is profuse. I think I'd be inclined to have the fire crews come out but not to evacuate unless flames were seen. Still, hindsight is easy and it's always better to err on the safe side, especially with smoke and fire.

[M-ONGO]

Still, hindsight is easy and it's always better to err on the safe side, especially with smoke and fire.

Totally agree. Remember the Virgin A330 at LGW though? Damned if you do, damned if you don't... The BBC report says the tower advised an evacuation. I wonder how accurate that is?

Blackpool shows 1869m.

[STBYRUD]

What I don't understand is this - if ATC advises them that they have smoke coming from their landing gear and they are still on the runway, why would they retract the flaps instead of keeping them extended for a possible evacuation? Did they already backtrack and rush to do their after landing items on the runway? Or did they maybe already land flapless and therefore keep the overwing exits closed (would obviously explain the hot brakes on Blackpool's 1900m runway :rolleyes:)?

[fa2fi]

If I you're landing with no flaps I very much doubt anyone would select BLK to land there unless there was an absolute dire need to get on the ground and even then it's likely they would have over-ran. By a LONG way.

MAN is just down the road with two nice longish runways. PIK is up the road too. So I doubt very much this was a flight control or flap/slat issue although I'm happy to be proven wrong.

[STBYRUD]

Exactly... Even stranger then to see this 733 evacuated with its flaps up and the overwing exits closed. Maybe someone here knows if its Jet2 SOP to set Flaps 40 by memory...

[Dysonsphere]

Hmmm if in doubt evacuate, better safe than sorry.

[fa2fi]

If we think back to the Jet2 GLA rejected takeoff I'm pretty sure that the flaps were set to 40 and that passengers evacuated via the over wings. I remember reading in the Daily Fail the terror when they realised the slides on the wings didn't inflate (perhaps they didn't inflate because there are none?).

[Lord Spandex Masher]

F40 is SOP but the evacuation checklist is not a memory item.

[Aluminium shuffler]

It's longer than I remember it, but I confess I only went there once or twice a decade ago, in the wet and dark in mid winter! Still, smoking brakes aren't dictated by runway length but braking effort.

The fact the flaps were up suggests any ATC comment, if correctly reported, must have been made during taxy or after parking. I think it's likely the aircraft was already stopped when the smoke was spotted - brakes probably wouldn't generate enough smoke for it to be visible at 10kts or more, from what I've seen in the past. Now that I've said that, of course, I'll be wrong.

Regardless, it would be helpful if any photos or video of the smoke exists so we can see the amount present.

Edit: I just read the Blackpool Gazette article posted in the Jet2 thread in "Airlines and Routes" and it quotes an airport spokesperson in mentioning an undercarriage hydraulic leak. That could be a big factor, or it could be utter rubbish. Guess we'll have to wait for some reliable information. The article also says a slide failed, but who knows if the pax or media were expecting to see slides from the overwing exits?

[west lakes]

Confused here

A report is made of smoke in the vicinity of the right engine/main gear/wing.

What person in their right mind would instigate an evacuation into that area via overwing exits or even suggest a captain was at fault for not doing so.

[BOAC]

or even suggest a captain was at fault for not doing so. - sadly quite a few on this site.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

The OWEs are self help exits, operated by passengers who pay close attention to the safety briefing (don't they?). In this case it could have been passenger aware of what was going on outside and, correctly, didn't open it or forgot everything they were told and buggered orf out of a door. Who knows.

[Aluminium shuffler]

West lakes, if you're referring to my comment, then all I can say is that is all the article said! The article said a slide failed, the photo only shows the two rear slides in use and the right overwing closed, which would be appropriate for a fire or significant smoke in the wing area. The front of the fuselage and left overwing are not visible. No judgement in my part over that - it worries me more whether all companies train their cabin crew well enough to check exterior threats well enough and think whether opening the door is the right thing to do. Glad to see in this case they made a good call.

[west lakes]

If you look at the photos on Aviation Herald the first one shows fire fighters inspecting the area with all doors CLOSED.

The aircraft stopped on the runway, emergency services responded and recommended evacuation of the aircraft. The occupants of the aircraft subsequently left the aircraft via slides onto the runway.


This suggests it was more of a planned evacuation so exit choices were probably made

[Capn Bloggs]

What person in their right mind would instigate an evacuation into that area via overwing exits
Who in their right mind would create an SOP where Flight Attendants/Pax in the cabin, not having any idea about what is going on outside save looking, have to decide on what exits to use?

[A and C]

Here we have an aircraft evacuated on advice received from the emergency services, no one is hurt, the aircraft is not damaged and because of advice from the emergency services who would have been far better placed to view the incident the over wing exits are not used so the passengers are not dumped on top of a potential fire.

All good airmanship and CRM on the part of the pilots, cabin crew & fire service.

Yet above we have the SOP police commenting about the flaps not set to 40 and the over wing exits not being used.

I would like to remind some of you that SOP's alone will not keep you safe they are just a building block for flight safety, sometimes the SOP is the wrong thing to do, and sometimes the rules have to be broken to assure safety of the aircraft, any person who fails to understand this should no be let out without adult supervision.

Fortunately it would seem that all involved with this incident were wise enough to understand the difference between doing the correct thing ( SOP evacuation ) and doing the right thing ( safe evacuation).

[Piltdown Man]

Maybe this is the "evacuation" which raises the important questions of how and when should we evacuate. What is clear is that our current policies are criminally lacking. For a start, I don't think we shouldn't be doing "precautionary evacuations." In general, because most aircraft are not fitted with integral air stairs, we should either do a full evacuation or nothing at all. This is because we are not trained to do "half evacuations". Our training is "evacuate" and that's it, shooting from the hip in critical situations like this doesn't work. I'll also throw another one in here as well. If you have a "smoke" problem, you should consider where you will be parked. Airport staff should not connect an airbridge to an aircraft they suspect of having a problem such as this. And if they did, the door to the terminal should be locked. Which would generate additional problems for PAX emerging from a sick aircraft.

We should also question the value of evacuation advice from airport fire crews. These poor sods play table tennis and volley ball day after day and every new and again put out yet another practice fire. They rarely get up close and personal with aircraft; partly because there are not enough of them on shift to allow them to wonder around the apron learning about aircraft from engineers - if the security Gestapo would allow such activity in the first place. Therefore, I'll suggest they will play "safe" and get you to evacuate.

As for this event, we have some interesting questions such as why were the flaps up and why were the over wing exits not used? Why did they evacuate? I wasn't there so I won't judge the crew, but it would be nice to know. Also Bloggs and LSM throw in their "right on the money" comments as well. Combine this with the previous Jet2 (please, I'm not having a go at Jet2, it's just that it was them) evacuation at GLA and we might be able to come up with a better way of dealing with not only "real" evacuations but also those occasions where something is not right, but where an evacuation is not the most prudent course of action.

[malc4d]

As a pilot and more often SLF who likes the OTW exit seats... Cap. Blogg brings up a very valid point.
Yes l am prepared to open the door when told to, and get out of the plane/way.
I have also thought as l sit down, What would l do if and when.... do l blindly open and jump or do l make an executive decision after looking and assessing the situation.
Would the flt crew announce which side and or which doors ......??

[BOAC]

Referring back to my post #13, may I ask the skygods how they would handle advice from the fire crew to 'get the passengers off without delay'? No steps available this side of Christmas, no obvious signs of fire to alert the c/crew.

PM reckons a full evacuation should be called and others seem to think the overwings should be used in that.

Your moves? I think I know what I would do and it would look pretty much like this one, hopefully with the same results.

A and C's post is worth a re-read.

[west lakes]

Oh looking at the photos, the aircraft would have already turned and would be backtracking

Just a knowledge gaining question.

Would the flaps normally be retracted after landing anyway? Bearing in mind if RWY 10 was in use it is a long backtrack/taxi

I would assume that as the fire service were inspecting near the engine, one or both would have been shut down, possibly also the APU.

Can the flaps be extended with no engine/APU power?

So if the answer is such, would it make sense to restart an engine to extend the flaps in an emergency?

[Capt Groper]

I have always advised flight crew to confirm ATC visual reports of fire/smoke, from another source, when available, before rushing into an evacuation. For example; opening the windows and stretching out the window to see the wing area, fire chief on 121.60 mHz.

Case 1
In daylight conditions A/C at high landing weights and landing on short RWYs may well have smoking brakes. This smoke should not necessarily lead to an EVAC. This smoke should dissipate once the brake temps reduce. In actual fact containing to taxi, with minimal brake application, will help reduce BRK temps.

Case 2
In night time conditions the same A/C after landing will have a red glow around the centre of tyres. Smoke may not be initially seen unless using binoculars.

ATC are also suffering from a lack of experienced controllers so beware of the over descriptive / enthusiastic ATC Tower controller saying that your A/C is on fire. It may just be hot BRKS. This is especially true for larger A/C, eg A380, where an evacuation is a very serious decision.

My two bobs worth..

[Aluminium shuffler]

This is a situation where too much SOP prescription causes trouble. One airline will say that the CC decide which exits to use, another will say it's the Captain's decision. If time permits, as in this case, I'd say sod the SOP and brief the crew to use the main exits if they can see no threats but in this instance to keep the overwings shut, given they were above the potential fire area.

Then again, I am concerned that this evacuation seems as yet to have been unwarranted. I can't blame the crew if they were urged by the fire crew to evac, but evacuations are inherently dangerous and best avoided unless confidence is high that it is needed. Since the fire crews were there with their appliances, with a good close view of the smoking brakes, why could they not just monitor the situation, ready to extinguish and flame the moment it appeared and inform the crew that a fire had actually started, allowing them to evacuate at that point? It would have saved several injured passengers and a lot of maintenance work and cost in this case.

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Jet 2 had an issue yesterday at EMA also. No drama though

https://www.flickr.com/photos/plane_spotting_freak/14367781375/

[Aluminium shuffler]

The Blackpool Gazette quoted the airport spokesperson as saying the Blackpool aircraft had a hyd problem. I wonder if that information came from this other event and got mixed up, or whether there were two hyd events.

[Alycidon]

A & C statesFortunately it would seem that all involved with this incident were wise enough to understand the difference between doing the correct thing ( SOP evacuation ) and doing the right thing ( safe evacuation).

In this case of course, the Flightcrew were no doubt aware that the fire service were inspecting the main gear and it would therefore not have been a particularly bright idea to drop Flap 40 on their heads.

[Blues&twos]

As SLF I have a question, which was alluded to earlier on in this thread. In the past I have taken the seat next to the overwing exit. I' ve thoroughly read and inwardly digested the instructions for opening the door in an emergency, one flight attendant even commenting "i see you're training yourself". Now, in a catastrophic accident I would be quite keen and happy to get that door open. But no-one has ever told me what would happen if there was, say, a potential problem on my side of the a/c when things weren't quite so obviously 'get out or die'. Are further instructions given ? Logic suggests yes, but what form would they take?

[Ballymoss]

My observations for what they're worth (No speculation or judgement)

I watched the a/c make a normal landing on 10 pleased to see it on time as I was due to travel on its next rotation to PMI. Nothing out of the ordinary going on, outbound crew were in the dep lounge awaiting its arrival on stand.

The drama unfolded out of sight, view being hidden by the twr. From the pictures I've seen the a/c was obviously well into the backtrack (cleaned up) at the point it stopped and subsequent evacuation took place.

After some time an airfield ops vehicle was noted escorting two off airport fire engines onto 10. Same again with an ambulance a few minutes later. It was only when I saw the tug and towbar followed by Jet2 engineers van trundling across the apron in an easterly direction that the old grey matter started to ponder.

A/c was eventually towed onto stand where used chutes were dumped on apron . Snippets of conversation overheard suggesting runway closed due to hydraulic fluid contamination. More than two hours after the event a quad bike with tanks on rear akin to something used by the council for kerbside weedkilling was escorted to the runway, I guess for the big clean up!

Reassuring to read SK's ramblings in the Gazette that BLK emergency procedures kicked in and worked (right down to the double deck school bus which finally brought the inbound pax to the tent in two runs)

On boarding the replacement a/c LS positioned over from LBA, I noted LJ jacked with R/H MLG inboard wheel removed. Jet2 (other than a rather quiet set of ground staff) handled it well. BLK handled it like BLK do.

As I said, just my observations.

[Piltdown Man]

PM reckons a full evacuation should be called...

I don't think I said that. What I tried to say was that we are not trained to do "half evacuations" and doing so puts you into uncharted, unpracticed and un-rehersed territory. I also went on to ask if this evacuation was necessary (with the caveat that I wasn't there and don't have the full facts). The reason behind this is that we must very careful about choosing our sources of information. For example, although a brake fire (but this appears not to be one) is an interesting event, with a properly trained fire crew and well equipped fire appliances an attendance I wonder if a full blown evacuation is required. Any such fire should be capable of being knocked out in seconds. Also, how long should a brake fire be able to burn without compromising the integrity of the cabin? I don't know and I'm not suggesting we should try and find out on line during a real incident, but this is something for the AAIB to look at. Current certification standards require a minimum time which I have not been told about. Also, what is the brake temperature limit before you have a real problem? I'm sure each aircraft is different but I also reckon fire departments have one tune "see smoke - order evacuation"

What I'm saying is that our current evacuation policies must be re-examined. Our current, old fashioned approach to this subject is out of date.

[BOAC]

doing so puts you into uncharted, unpracticed and un-rehersed territory. - as my Fleet Manager used to say "That's why God put four bars on your shoulder"..................:)

[M.Mouse]

An evacuation is a serious business which often results in injuries in itself.

It is all very well second guessing the crew but any decent crew will make decisions based on the best information they have at the time.

For example what about the QANTAS B747 which slid of the end into soft ground at BKK some years ago. I don't believe any evacuation was ordered there despite partial gear collapse.

Thankfully I have never been in any situation requiring a decision to evacuate/no evacuate but as is so often the case it is not the obvious problems like a visible fire but the less clear cut problem which makes the decision fraught with difficulty for the crew.

[Thrush]

Excellent stuff! Well done to all crew involved. Tea and medals all round I hope.
A and C is spot on. Why would you hinder the fire brigade by dropping the flaps to 40...?! Cracking call by the crew and an SOP well over-ridden.

I suspect a highly experienced crew (not a wet-behind-the-ears crew!!) and a credit to Jet2.

[no sponsor]

Hydraulic fluid onto hot brakes. White smoke. Engines still running makes it look a lot worse than it is: can make it look like the engine is smoking. Had that before...

[westie]

I wonder how many pax would have looked at the safety card and listened to the safety brief rather than rudely and more importantly, dangerously, ignoring things and continuing to read their paper. I reckon the cabin crew should do a quick 20 questions before take off. Any pax not up to speed with safety procedures should be offloaded. They're a liability..... Smug :mad:.

[paully]

Not forgetting those whose IQ is so low they will be incapable of even reading the safety card let alone understand it :ugh:

[SLFguy]

Not forgetting those whose IQ is so low they will be incapable of even reading the safety card let alone understand it

Are you saying the mentally handicapped should not be permitted to travel?

Wow - nice guy.

[Aluminium shuffler]

SLFguy, stop trying to pick a fight, you know exactly what he meant.

Sometimes I wish that companies would make their web-booking sites really complex, rather than strive to make them simpler, so that they'd serve as a filter. To be honest, I think it'd be a good idea if every airline had an online safety demo and test that you had to pass before being able to book tickets. The problem with onboard demos is that most pax not only ignore them, but prevent the smarter, better passengers from listening to it too. That's one of the reasons why I have the PA and service interphone selected on my CCS panel - if I hear the CC give a second plea to passengers to listen to the demo I'll add a PA. If they get more interruptions I go back on stand and start offloading the transgressors. I'm not going to let a handful of gob****s make the whole flight a battle for the CC and potentially endanger other passengers.

[enola-gay]

I wonder how many pax would have looked at the safety card and listened to the safety brief rather than rudely and more importantly, dangerously, ignoring things and continuing to read their paper.

The "safety card and safety brief" have nothing to do with safety. Apart from the seat belt stuff which every car occupant understands, the rest is an emergency response procedure, which the cabin crew are supposed to be experts in.


Safety management has nothing to do with the nearest exit and oxygen masks. It is all to do with safe methods of work by crew, engineers, ATC and the rest.


Ask any airline safety manager and he will agree. The briefing is a CAA (and other regimes) requirement which has nothing to do with safety. I am sure that the pax on MH370 were given a "safety briefing"

[Bealzebub]

The "safety card and safety brief" have nothing to do with safety. Apart from the seat belt stuff which every car occupant understands, the rest is an emergency response procedure, which the cabin crew are supposed to be experts in. That's right! Every car occupant understands how to operate the seat belt because they do it every single day. It is deep in their instinctive memory, They reach down the side of the seat and click the little red button. So in an emergency situation involving high stress and panic their short term memory will (if they watched the safety briefing) have been told how to operate the seat belt. Those that neglected to refresh that part of their survival toolkit will revert back to instinct and reach down the side of their seat to find the little red button....only guess what.... it isn't there! History has the names of plenty of corpses that failed to survive perfectly survivable events but were still secured in their seats. Many survivors have recounted tales of reaching instinctively for the seat belt release down the side of their seat.

Of course this is why as pilots we brief prior to every take off and landing. We are putting the important points of that brief back into short term memory and thereby beefing up the toolkit.

So when you say:The briefing is a CAA (and other regimes) requirement which has nothing to do with safety. I am sure that the pax on MH370 were given a "safety briefing" You are wrong! It has everything to do with safety. It may not guarantee your survival but it is designed to enhance your chances. Would you like a very long list of flight numbers where the safety briefing did contribute to a successful outcome?

[westie]

Enola-gay

I've read some rubbish posts on here but yours takes the biscuit. You don't seem to have a clue what you're talking about and your post doesn't warrant discussion

[dogsbreath]

The aircraft braked in a normal manner, well as normal as it ever is at BLK, (autobrake 3) Tower advised the crew that lots of white smoke was coming from the area of the undercarriage, they crashed the Fire Crew, FIRE CHIEF ADVISED THAT THE CAPTAIN EVACUATE THE AIRCRAFT. It's a brave Captain that goes against the advice of the Fire Chief, ( At the subsequent board of enquiry, blah blah blah ) The smoke was caused by a loose union in a hydraulic pipe, non- flammable fluid dripped onto the hot brakes following the landing run those are the facts so can we please stop all this rubbish speculation. The Crew and especially the Captain acted in a thoroughly professional manner, and .....NOONE WAS HURT !!!!

[A and C]

Thank you for the concise description of the events, posts #18, 21 & 33 had already raised this as being the most likely chain of events but it is always helpfull to get the precise detail.

However the posts from some above seem to prove that some are incapable of reading and understanding a safety card, let alone the technical issues described by the wiser contributors to this thread.

A job well done by the flight crew, cabin crew and fire service in my opinion.

[captplaystation]

I was under the impression that Skydrol was flammable. . . . .

[BOAC]

Going back to my post #21, I do not see any response from our resident skygods as to how they would have handled the situation as described by 'dogsbreath'. We understand from the brethren that the method of evacuation chosen was 'wrong' or 'inappropriate', so it would be useful for all of us to know the way you SGs would have handled it so we can offer our learned opinions and possibly learn a better way.

Listening.................?

[A and C]

Skydrol will burn if in contact with a flame or heat but won't it's Self support combustion, hence in this case a vapour that appeared to the observers to be smoke but no fire.

[WindSheer]

The fire crew apparently deemed an evacuation a suitable action.

There was an aircraft many years ago (cant recall the detail, but featured in Naked Pilot HF book) where an in flight fire was followed by a safe emergency landing. The captain decided not to evacuate and sadly, everyone perished on board due to sudden smoke inhalation.

It is so easy to judge based on hindsight, but at the end of the day....no one was majorly hurt in this incident, and the aircraft is still intact.
Lessons can be learned. UK aviation should be proud of its just culture. Some of you speculators that are apportioning blame......that blame culture is an unwelcome thing of the past!

:cool:

[Super VC-10]

Windsheer -

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudia_Flight_163

[Facelookbovvered]

An evacuation is a serious incident that nearly always results in injury, i Would go with Fire 1 recommendation every time. It will be interesting to see what the problem was with the R1 door slide, the picture seems to show the door only partially open I assume a door handling problem rather than a defect, but a useful reminder that things don't always work as described in the cabin simulator, a lose hydraulic union is just one of those things.

All well handled by the crew and Blackpool fire service. :ok:

[DADDY-OH!]

Fire Chief on scene recommended evacuation, Capt. elected to evacuate the cabin using the main doors only. Good call in my opinion. To any detractors or the habitual Jet2.com 'Knockers', I'll say it was the safest decision, professionally executed with excellent support from the Airport Services.

Well done to all.:D

[rmiller774]

That the smoke was later found to have been caused by a loose union in a hydraulic pipe, non-flammable fluid dripping on hot brakes etc. is immaterial to the decision made on the spot. The decision re evacuation had to take place quickly, well before those facts were known to either the PIC or the Fire Chief. They could not wait for a lab analysis of the fluids involved.

[Trossie]

Smoke from fluid dropping on hot brakes can turn nasty very quickly: INCENDIO FIRE BOEING 737 CHINA AIRLINES NAHA OKINAWA JAPAN 1 - YouTube

I agree with rmiller774:[Do] not wait for a lab analysis of the fluids involved.

[L1649]

That China Airlines incident was caused by fuel leaking onto a hot engine exhaust.

[Burnie5204]

A & C - trust me. Skydrol WILL burn. I've seen first hand the resultant fire caused by hydraulic fluid leaking onto hot brakes. I should know I attended the award presentation today to the colleague of mine who spotted the smoke on CCTV and crashed the Fire Crews.

What followed the white smoke was an approximately 12 foot fireball when it ignited followed by a sustained fire until the fire crews could mobilise and knock down the fire.


And whilst, yes, the firemen do spend a lot of their time training they dont just go "Oooo flames. Must. Squirt. Water..." They train for a wide range of scenarios using real incidents and shared experience to inform their training. Many of those guys could tell you more about a fire spreads and the flammability of your aircraft than you. Bear in mind also that many of the airport firefighters were highly experienced local authority firefighters and have fought more real fires than you can imagine.

[Aluminium shuffler]

Trossie, it's a good idea to make sure your example is relevant before you post it - the Okinawa fire was a massive fuel leak onto the engine, not a small hyd leak onto warm brakes, and resulted in an immediate large fire, not some smoke. Saying that fluid leaks lead to fireballs is ridiculous. Stretching the logic, are you going to evacuate because someone sees fluid dripping from the engine pylon during a turnaround? Chances are it's just condensation from cold soaking. Check first, then react accordingly...

I agree that that crew had no option but to evacuate after being so advised by the fire crew to do so - that recommendation put the aircrew in a very narrow and compromised situation, raking away their options. Frankly, I think the fire crew were overzealous and should have informed the captain that there was smoke but no fire and monitored the situation. With the appliances on site, they could have contained any fire that did erupt and then reported that for the captain to then order an evacuation. I think it's wrong that external agents make decisions for the pilots rather than just give them the information that is needed in what was an urgent, not emergency situation. Had this been a taller aircraft, more serious injuries would have occurred, all unnecessarily.

[A and C]

Skydrol may burn if exposed to a very hot surface but take the heat away and it will not continue to burn.

[Burnie5204]

You mean a hot surface like a set of hot brakes just after landing...


Basically what I'm saying the Fire Crews were there, looking at the situation, knowing what the possible scenarios are (is this fluid oil, is it fuel) and have correctly assessed that the fluid dripping onto the hot brakes and vaporising represents a significant fire risk and have given their advice. They were there, they had all the facts and trying to armchair quarterback a decision made by someone who is an expert in their field (a field which, I would postulate, you know little [namely firefighting and fire development]) is not helpful when a decision was made in the interests of securing immediate safety for the passengers.

[fokker1000]

So far, I have never needed the airport fire services chasing me down the runway, and hopefully never will.
But a relative of mine is a firefighter for one of our busy airports, and I'm really impressed with the way its all planned and trained for.
I have a lot of faith/respect in the guys and girls who are coming towards a potential inferno when we are doing our best to get away from it:D

[Backseat Dane]

As SLF I have a question, which was alluded to earlier on in this thread. In the past I have taken the seat next to the overwing exit. I' ve thoroughly read and inwardly digested the instructions for opening the door in an emergency, one flight attendant even commenting "i see you're training yourself". Now, in a catastrophic accident I would be quite keen and happy to get that door open. But no-one has ever told me what would happen if there was, say, a potential problem on my side of the a/c when things weren't quite so obviously 'get out or die'. Are further instructions given ? Logic suggests yes, but what form would they take?

The last time I flew as SLF seated at a OWE the cabin attendant gave an instruction in how to operate the door adding that I shouldn't open it on my own initiative but wait for an evacuation order from the CC unless there was heavy smoke and/or flames in the cabin AND: Take a look through the window and make an assessment of the situation outside before actually opening the door. "You don't want to exit onto a wing that's on fire" were pretty much the exact words she gave.

[manrow]

Nothing wrong with that surely?

[Piltdown Man]

Let's get one thing straight. Given the training system in the UK and the "Daily Wail" second-guessing interesting events (which I'm about to do), I'm not going to criticise the crew, just the system which they and the rest of operate in. I think AS had summed up the situation pretty well.

So now lets put the RFF category into context. Blackpool is Category 4 which means that the RFF appliances should be able to deliver between 2,400 and 3,600 litres (min. 40 liters/sec) of water and 1,800 to 2,600 litres (min. 30 litres/sec) of foam per minute. Now, please tell me where I'm going wrong. With that kind of discharge rate, even if the wheels are on fire and blazing away, a professional fire crew with that discharge rate should be able to knock that fire out. With hindsight, the advice to evacuate was probably not the best one.

And as I said with my first post, maybe we should reconsider these "Precautionary - Better safe than sorry - Can't be too safe evacuations - Safety First" evacuations. I'm sure we can often be safer by doing nothing.

[Helen49]

Surely BPL upgrades to Fire Cat 6 for a B733?

[A and C]

It is quite clear that you have not taken the time to read my posts on this subject, from the very start I have said that the flight crew, cabin crew and fire services did a very good job, clearly the flight crew ordered the evacuation on the advice of the fire crew ( and did not put the flaps to 40 because that would get in the way of the fire crew) the cabin crew got the passengers off the aircraft without anyone going out of the over wing exits and landing on top of a potential fire.


My statements about Skydrol not supporting combustion are true, that is why it was developed to replace MIL 5606 in high pressure hydraulic systems, I think you have demonstrated a difficulty in understanding the difference between a fluid that burned when heated and one that continues to burn on its own account when that heat source is removed.

So before you accuse me of being armchair quarterbacking I would suggest that you read and digest all I have written on this subject and you will be forced to the conclusion ( unless you are just a mindless troll) that I am fully supportive of the actions taken by all involved in this incident.