The Shar Decision - Questioning "Their Lordships"`

[alphaleaderuk]

Ppruners!

Sea Harrier FA2 withdrawal from Service: the Decision

I have followed this debate with considerable interest and I note with great approval that there is overwhelming support for reversing the Sea Harrier FA2 withdrawal decision. That “approval” is a result of my background as a professional aviator and an acknowledged Air Warfare expert with considerable active experience.
The Sea Harrier FA2 is by the US and NATO as one of the most capable all weather BVR fighters in the world. It represents the first line of air defence for the Fleet and for Joint Task Force operations. It may also be seen as the eyes of the Task Force Commander, able to see all types of air movement within its extended radar coverage over land or sea. It is the one weapons system in UK service today that has the proven ability to detect, intercept and destroy all known air threats that might menace Task Force units – whether naval or on land.
But its most important capability is the ability to deter such threats. As such, it most definitely qualifies as an air superiority fighter that can deny the use of airspace to threat aircraft. Arguably, it is therefore an indispensable constituent of the expeditionary force policy that has been laid down by the Government in Defence Policy Statement 2001. (If you haven’t read this, you should do so – ask and I’ll send!)
What then is the operational argument for this FA2 withdrawal decision? Our Naval and Air Staff Chiefs have combined to support it strongly. They talk about learning from experience and applying the lessons learned from that experience.
Let us briefly examine their personal experience in the context of the last twenty years or so.
First Sea Lord (1SL), Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh has served with distinction as a Hydrographer. And he also served with “the grey funnel line” in the Gulf during the Kuwait crisis. That was when there was zero actual threat to our ships from Iraqi aircraft and when the US Navy and US Air Force had established air superiority over the Gulf area. (At the time, the RAF Tornado F3 flew CAP missions over the water well clear of hostilities – it didn’t have an effective weapon system, couldn’t fly high enough and is still the same on both counts.) This “active” experience obviously convinced 1SL that modern expeditionary force operations will always take place in a benign environment – i.e. when nestled under the umbrella of US firepower. His operational experience and, probably, his judgement rests on that Kuwait experience and, perhaps, because of that one might excuse his part in this appalling defence decision.
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire is a very different animal. An ex Harrier GR3 pilot, he is a “mud-mover” and as such he flew several exacting war missions in the Falklands. (The GR3s flew 157 sorties when down South of which only about 59 were active missions over enemy territory. They lost 6 aircraft, five to enemy action. The Sea Harrier flew about 1600 missions, 90% of which were against the enemy. They lost six aircraft, two to enemy ground fire, three from pressing too hard and one just fell off the deck. Mind you it was rough!) So for every 12 low-level attack missions, one GR3 was lost to enemy fire. For every 800 Sea Harrier missions, one was lost to enemy fire – and none air-to-air. These statistics speak volumes about the outdated practice of low-level direct attack missions in the face of relatively simple ground-to-air defences.
None of Sir Peter’s missions were flown with any real threat of attack by enemy fighters. That was because the Sea Harrier deterred such attacks – just as it turned away 453 Argentinean attack missions that were destined to deliver their war load against our ships and ground forces.

In the light of this and of other MoD-accepted statistics from the Falklands campaign, one might justifiably assume the following to be true:
a. Sir Peter and his GR3 boys faced and put aside considerable personal danger when doing their gallant work down South;
b. In spite of this, and apart from a staged fire power demo over Goose Green in support of the Paras, in real military terms the GR3 did not destroy/achieve much (their contribution to the success of the campaign was therefore small but welcome);
c. The Sea Harrier knocked down a couple of dozen enemy aircraft;
d. The Sea Harrier prevented more than 450 enemy attack aircraft from reaching their targets and delivering up to 1,800 HEMC bombs against our Task Force Units;
e. The Sea Harrier provided a relatively benign air environment in which the GR3 could operate;
f. The Sea Harrier delivered at least as much ordnance against enemy ground targets as the GR3 (mainly from medium level);
g. The multi-role Sea Harrier achievements and presence made a most significant contribution to the Campaign success, facilitating the eventual victory by our ground forces.

Perhaps you can see a pattern emerging here. The Sea Harrier was vital to the success of the Falklands Task Force campaign. The GR3 was not.
Since then, the Sea Harrier has been involved in every expeditionary force type operation conducted by British forces. It has acquitted itself with distinction in Bosnia, Kosova, Sierra Leone and in policing the “No fly zone” over Iraq (F3s have also done this Iraq task – but only when escorted by proven all weather BVR fighters). It has successfully carried out air space denial, reconnaissance and ground attack missions.
In stark contrast and through no fault of its pilots (genuinely the “cream of the Royal Air Force”), the “chosen son” of 1SL and CAS, the Ground Attack Harrier (GR3/7) has not actually achieved very much at all. It hardly ever embarks in Her Majesty’s carriers and when it does, it faces many problems such as not being able to find its way back to the ship (Sierra Leone). This is hardly an enviable track record in Task Force terms compared to the FA2.
Yet 1SL and CAS have for reasons best known to themselves (but not enunciated publicly – one must ignore the verbage on financial imperatives and jointery – neither hold water) taken the operational judgement to throw away the FA2 and to keep the GR7. This judgement must be described as “appalling” especially when measured against CAS’ personal operational experience.
In very simple terms, the decision taken represents a very real threat to the security and survival of our Joint Task Force personnel (including the GR7 boys). It is not backed by operational experience, expertise or logic. As such it must be viewed as unacceptable.
It is my impression that 1SL and CAS are not paid to be politicians. They are paid to honour the Queen, defend her dominions and to provide our military personnel with the proper wherewithal to wage war without unnecessary loss of life.
Quite clearly they are failing to do this.
There is no doubt that when at the top in the MoD one faces many pressures. Some of these, I am acquainted with and some, perhaps not. But one should not attribute “black magic powers” to those who loftily tread the hallowed corridors of Whitehall. Instead, we should remind them that the decisions they take can indeed cost lives and that when alternative courses are open to them that provide much less risk to our servicemen and women, these are the courses that should be chosen.
With the threat to the homeland base being rated as very small in the SDR and DP2001, is it not illogical to be spending a lot of money on upgrading the impotent F3 when its successor, the Euro-fighter will enter service at about the same time that its upgrade is complete. And could we not “make do” with say, 250 Euro-fighters instead of about 330 in this low threat environment. Either or both options would easily release adequate funding to keep the FA2 in service and to ensure the viability and survivability of “Expeditionary Task Force Operations”.

Please reply if you would like to hear more!

[CAVU]

alphaleaderuk

A clear and insightful posting; Thank you

[BEagle]

Well posted. A clear and very readable summary of the essential need for SHAR2; a need which will hardly diminish given Blair's flawed logic of requiring global air power projection without having the the actual means to do so and without adequate force protection for those discharging this policy.

[Mike RO'Channel]

'Bravo'
A fine summary of the disastrous decision on the SHAR. But I'm not sure that anyone on high will listen to reasoned argument.
Once upon a time, I was told that it was a sign of good leadership and honour to admit your mistakes - otherwise people will see you for the charlatan that you are and as someone who doesn't have the courage to admit 'sorry chaps, I cocked that one'! Unfortunately, a point lost on the 'leadership' of today, both political and military.

[Archimedes]

alphaleaderuk ,

Not disagreeing with your sentiments, but a couple of things: according to Falklands Air War (recommended by several ppruners as the best source on the war), the losses for the GR 3s are given as four, not six. One of these losses was not to enemy action (CAS himself discovering that it is awkward to fly without an engine). Also, I think it's only fair to point out that the GR 3s 'arrived late' (not their fault) and were only operational from 20 May - as they were there in smaller numbers too, it's only natural that they'd fly far fewer sorties.

The view that the three GR 3 losses to ground fire would have been 3 SHAR losses had the GR 3s not been there might also be put forward (I'm not sure about the validity of that, but it's a argument I've heard). Your point about the loss rates, though, is fair enough.

This said, you're quite right - it's frankly daft to remove SHAR capability, and coupled with the decision not to integrate ASRAAM (see another thread), the govt's contention that what AD that's required can be performed adequately looks even more threadbare than before. Of course, if a CVS gets sunk as a result, it will all be the fault of the ship's Captain/ CAS/ 1SL/ the woman who makes the tea in Sec State's Office, but most emphatically not the fault of anyone with the letters 'MP PC' after their name...:rolleyes:

[steamchicken]

that's the Good Oil: a real contribution!

[Jackonicko]

Well argued but inaccurate in places! Some very dodgy analysis of the part played by the GR 3 in the Falklands (they were sent south mainly as FRS1 attrition replacements, remember, and weren't needed, and had they not done the low level BAI then SHars would have had to - a role in which they proved equally vulnerable). The SHar won the Falklands, but it has proved less vital in all subsequent operations. The GR3 did rather better than you infer, and the GR7 is anentirely different proposition, with a heavier warload, longer range and a genuine night attack and PGM capability, all capabilities sadly lacking in the SHar.

Also cutting back EF procurement from 330 to 250 would certainly save 'loadsamoney' but since the number being procured is 232 to support an active fleet of about 140 are you suggesting that we buy more?

No-one argues that the SHar isn't a great and useful bit of kit, only whether it's worth retaining in the face of other, more versatile and more useful priorities.

And we do have allies who can provide this level of air cover .............. if we need carrier aviation at all.

[alphaleaderuk]

Ppruners,

GETTING THE BASELINE RIGHT

I am going to presume to take us all back to basics in this debate so that, hopefully, when you decide to write to the press or to your MP you will consider reminding your reader/s of such basics. MoD appears to have forgotten or disregarded some of them. I see the basics as:-

1. Our armed forces represent one of several tools that the Government uses to ensure that Britain’s interests at home and abroad are protected (other tools include politics, diplomacy, economic devices, counter-intelligence, etc.).
2. The foundation for the make-up of our armed forces is Defence Policy as given in the Strategic Defence Review (and follow-up amendments such as DP2001). It is against this Policy that decisions should be taken concerning the effective equipping of each of the three Services.
3. When a major shift in Defence Policy occurs (e.g. following the end of the Cold War) and because Defence spending is always tightly controlled, a review of existing assets should be made and balanced against the needs of the new Policy.
4. It is very clear that “offensive expeditionary force operations” are at the forefront of current Government Policy. As such, this JTF capability should be given high priority by our Service Chiefs and, where shortfalls in JTF funding occur, lesser priority projects/capabilities should be critically examined with a view to making any necessary financial savings. The last place that cuts in vital operational capability should be made is, logically, in the stated priority area -JTF weapon systems and personnel.
5. Too often, the different Services have to fight for limited funds – and frequently, the one with the loudest voice (the most desk officers in Whitehall) wins the day. Such inter-service funding battles often obscure the main issues of Policy. These lead not only to “empire building/conservation” but they can arguably become a tool for changing stated Government Policy via the back door (something which should be anathema to the House of Commons).
6. What then of the Central Staffs? Are they not there to moderate the otherwise adverse effects of inter-service funding battles and to ensure that MoD spending does indeed match the stated needs of Government Policy? If that is the case, then the Chief of Defence Staff and his “Central” subordinates have been suspiciously silent during the current FA2 debate. Could this be because CDS, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, does not wish to be seen in any way biased towards the needs of the Navy? Or, is it more likely that the partisan Financial/Empire Building squabbles between the three services have contaminated Central Staff judgement?

I trust that the above represents a reasonably accurate summary of the basics affecting this debate. Add to the above, the need to preserve the lives of our servicemen, to spend tax-payers’ money wisely and to protect our expensive equipment investments and you are then in the a position to analyse more accurately the MoD statement released at the time that the FA2 decision was made public – and to judge whether this decision was indeed as misguided as I believe it was.

I shall forward parts of that MoD statement with appropriate comment in my next post. Later, I shill look at expanding this debate to take a critical/clinical look at lesser priority projects/capabilities that should be examined with a view to making the essential financial savings needed to secure the future of the FA2.


Final Comment: “What Mr Ingram should have said concerning the FA2 decision.”

It could be concluded that the UK Armed Forces Minister, Adam Ingram, intentionally misled the Nation when making his announcements concerning the demise of the Sea Harrier. His statement is damning more by what he didn’t say than what he did. Let us review what he should have said but left out:

a. Elimination of the Sea Harrier FA2 force from Joint Force Harrier will deny the Fleet at large and its JTF operations its first line of air defence for at least 8 and probably more than 10 years.

b. The loss of this first line of air defence will be compounded by a gap in service between the current Type 42 Air Defence Destroyers and the new Type 45 Air Defence Destroyers; leaving the Fleet at sea vulnerable to even the least sophisticated air to surface weapon systems for up to 10 years.

c. The Harrier GR7 and GR9 do not have any form of Air-to-Air radar and will be fitted with a short range, fire and forget, Air-to-Air missile. These Harrier versions are very slow compared with any other fast jet attack/fighter aircraft. They will therefore be unable to get close to an attacking aircraft in order to engage it and will be unable to run away from any fast jet fighter aircraft. With their lack of radar and without a Beyond Visual Range weapon system (like the Sea Harrier FA2 Blue Vixen/AMRAAM system) they will be unable to provide the Fleet with a first line of air defence beyond the radar horizon.

d. Operational experience since 1980 has shown that Low Level Ground Attack Aircraft such as the Harrier GR7/9 and the Tornado GR1/4 are extremely vulnerable to ground fire. Without true stand-off SMART weapons and Airborne Electronic Warfare (Jamming) support, the GR7/9 force will not endow a JTF with any “credible expeditionary offensive capability”.

e. The Government is spending a large amount of money on the latest update to the Tornado F3. This update may at last, after twenty years in service endow the Tornado with a working Air-to-Air weapon system. However, the Euro-fighter is soon to enter service and will replace the Tornado. The money that is being spent on Tornado is therefore being wasted and it should be taken out of service. As neither Tornado nor Euro-fighter are capable of defending the Fleet at sea, the money being wasted on Tornado should be applied to running the Sea Harrier FA2 force on until the Future Joint Combat Aircraft (JSF) enters service.

f. The Nimrod is not an effective Anti-Submarine Warfare vehicle. Even with better avionic systems that may allow it to detect and prosecute a submarine threat, this will be of limited use to the Nation because:

i. The agreed submarine threat against the UK mainland is now low (Strategic Defence Review);

ii The Nimrod is a land based aircraft with limited range and can not therefore support Fleet/JTF operations away from the UK base “without prepositioning” (Defence Policy 2001 Statement).

The £3 billion (US$4.3 billion) being spent on the Nimrod upgrade would therefore be better spent on maintaining an effective first line of air defence for the Fleet and on upgrading the already proven Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare systems.

g. The RAF have three types of attack/reconnaissance fighters in service: the Tornado GR4, the Harrier GR7 and the Jaguar. If money has to be saved and spent on realistic military capability, the Jaguar should be withdrawn from service now and the strengths of the GR4 fleet and the Harrier GR7 fleets rationalised.


Logical thinkers, strategists and tacticians might well have formed the view that the UK Air Staff had not given up their efforts to deprive the Fleet of Organic Air Defence. Is this still their aim? And will the present UK Government now address these scandalous issues and begin to demonstrate a true intention to follow the principles laid down in Defence Policy 2001 Statement?

The UK has been lucky to survive without any real mainland air defence for over twenty years. Now that Euro-fighter is being procured to correct that situation, let us not now denude our Fleet of the capability to defend itself. “Maximising investment in one aircraft type” (Harrier GR7/9) will definitely bring “greater certainty” to JTF operations prior to the Future Joint Combat Aircraft and Britain’s two new aircraft carriers. That certainty will be the inability of a JTF to defend itself from air attack and the possible loss of many lives and ships in any limited war engagement.

[Jackonicko]

You've been in the sun too long, chum!

Your view on the Jaguar is out-of-date and erroneous. You have a pre-TIALD/pre-EO Recce/Pre-Granby view of the aircraft, which has consistently proved to be the most deployable, flexible and economical OS platform available to force commanders in recent years.

Your view on the F3 is similarly behind the curve. With JTIDS and AMRAAM it does quite well enough, and with minor investment in ELS, TIALD and recce could have become a very useful multi-role aeroplane. It's Eurofighter by the way, not Euro-fighter.

Our post Cold War post SDR posture does NOT envisage autonomous national operations, so the lack of any one particular capability is not in itself a problem. The SHar just happens to be the easiest thing to ditch, and certainly represents a less useful capability than is offered by the Jag or the F3. If the Navy had been more realistic when it came to assessing the post Cold War usefulness of Trident, I'd be a little more sympathetic, but while it may be a bad choice to bin SHar, it's the 'least bad' choice if one fixed wing FJ fleet has to disappear.

Personally I'd have kept the SHar for land based air defence and binned the carriers, but there you are ..........

On a more serious note, were the forces serious about Smart procurement, and was best practise employed (following the Jag upgrade template rather than the GR4 template for other upgrades, for example) there might be more money in the kitty. Propping up BAE with inflated price contracts for gold-plated and often inappropriately Gucci programmes should not be a matter for the defence budget. If it's industrially necessary for BAE to prosper, then let the DTI pay for it.

WEBF,

I know you want to fly SHars. Get over it. Join the RAF and fly GR7s or if you must bob about on the briny, then fly a Lynx. You'd be lucky to do either job, and either job would give you just as much challenge and satisfaction.

[bystanderish]

Gentlemen, in pure military terms the argument to keep FA2 until JCA is compelling. You all put the case well. However, your arguments would be even more compelling if you resisted the temptation to descend into tribalism by making statements about other forces that are not only derogatory but inaccurate. However(!) following your lead:

Fact 1:

I have read some utter rot about how well the FA2s performed during DELIBERATE FORCE. If you were there and supported this shame on you. If you were not don't comment. Do not get me wrong, the FA2 boys did well considering the weapon aiming systems they were using. But do be not fooled into believing their performance came close to the Harrier GR7/ Jaguar performance dropping LGBs. Furthermore, mounting a cap over Albania during ALLIED FORCE does not constitute 'a credible offensive capability'. Although the GR4/ GR7 made a greater contribution during ALLIED FORCE, I would ask those forces to look at their statistics before they crow too loud.

Fact 2:

I completely agree that the GR7 is not a credible air defence platform and the FA2 is. However, you that done it, know that even the 65% Lerx GR7 (let alone the 100% lerx) has superior manoeuvrability in the close fight (and I agree we do not necessarily end up there). That being said the boys in dark blue are probably better trained.

Fact 3:

Jacko the Jaguar message is wearing thin! Speak to the Norwich stano about survivability in anything other than a benign environment. Sorry but despite the quality of the pilots, and the fact it is a useful avionics testbed, the Jaguar is underpowered and has an ew suite that only the FA2 would envy. You do not have long left - the RN are correct; you are the weakest link good bye (if only because we need the money). Medium level at a push, with an attack/recce capability equal to or less than the others does not merit 'flexibility'. If its economy we want lets arm up those Hawks.

If only the FA2 had not been described as the only ac with a 'credible, expeditionary, offensive capability', I could have kept my normal place in the shadows. Sorry 'alphaleaderuk' I am not going to patronise you with my reasons for speaking with authority but I suspect you might recognise some home truths. The FA2 community has a lot of support don't spoil it by throwing inaccurate stones.



Thanks for the therapy. Pin out, roll grenade and step back to the sidelines...

[MOA]

Alpha,

You've gone and done it. You've forced me to stand up for the Nimrod. I must have spent too long up here all ready.

Your statement about the aircraft being an ineffective ASW platform willl have many a wetman up in arms. With the new processor the abilities have come on in leaps and bounds. It is true that the threat from submarines has diminished over the years, but it still remains. The threat from hoards of Russian bombers streaming in over the North Sea has diminished over the years but we still maintain a land based AEW network.

Indeed, the threat to a task group from an SSK may be increasing, with the ability for third world countries to purchase, maintain and run ex soviet kit ie Kilos. With task groups deploying to all areas of the world you never know who could be next door and sailing what little black boat he might have in international waters.

Task groups of course carry their own organic helo's which provide the groups own ASW protection. For the UK this is solely rotary so the protection is very localized. What about the sub surface SSN firer who could sit over 60 miles from your task group. Rotary ASW is not going to provide you with that level of coverage.

Weather considerations are also a factor. I was involved in an exercise the other day involving 2 ships plus their organic helos, a nimrod, all working against one sub. The helo's were grounded due to the fact that the sea state was too high to enable them to launch. Nimrod provide detection and targetting information for the group. Dont even let me get going about the Merlin claiming to be an MPA. It's not at the moment. It has a great potential but its going to take a while.

It is true that the aircraft has to pre position to support task groups, but there is a multitude of friendly nations all over the globe who can provide support. We've proved now that all we require is a long strip of concrete and we can pretty well supply the rest. With a crew working day of 19 hours (3 hours planning), say 5 hours on task you can quickly see we can travel vast distances to any AOI, albeit with AAR support.

The Nimrod is not just about ASW. It is an extremely efficient ASuW platform providing realtime surface picture reporting to commanders via Link11 (poormans Link16). The aircraft can also provide targetting information for over the horizon surface-surface attacks or vectoring in fast movers. This provides greater standoff freedom to units and placing fewer ships/aircraft in threat areas.

There are also several other roles which the aircraft undertakes which cant be repeated here. These are highly sensitive and alone prove the aircrafts worth. If you have access to the last (or could be the one previous now) CinC Strike Command's bulletin which concentrated on the Nimrod, have a read. It highlights some of the jobs not readily plublicised in the wider world.

Last (you'll be glad to hear), but by no means least, comes SAR. SAR trails, the ability to provide up to 8 MS10 dinghys plus container stores. The ability to locate a vessel in distress prior to the helicopter turning up. Vectoring in the helicopter so most fuel efficient extraction possible allowing greater working range for the helo's. Recently the Nimrod has been launched 4 times in the last 5 days (QEII, Princess Something (engine room fire, 800 POB)HMS Exeter (CASEVAC), two fishers (CASEVAC)). Probably more but I forget. What other aircraft has the ability to vector in helicopters to a burning ship (7 in total for the Princess), drop dinghys to distressed airmen. I could go on.

The MRA4 is going to be a another level above the capability of the MR2. Extended range, more sophisticated EO suite. Greater/more diverse weapon carrying capability. I feel the money is more than justified if only BAe can get their finger out and sort it.

You've had my thoughts. A bit of a ramble, but its late and I'm tired so all spelling is, of course, deliberate. I now lay myself open to ridicule........:cool:

[Jackonicko]

By,

By and large the post Cold War environment IS benign, and Jaguar is more deployable that GR7 or GR4, cheaper to operate, and offers superior (not just equal to) recce capability (EO GP1 with PRISM IDM any time), superior TIALD, and has both gun and CRV 7. It's all about deployability and economy. Also the aircraft doesn't need a fortune spending on it to reach 7,500 FH (it's largely paperwork) and we still own Jags with less than 2,000 FH on them. Compare that to GR4 SLAP/SLEP or HMP3......

Yes it's underpowered and the 106 engine is a CRIME and yes it badly needs better EW, and no, it couldn't fight it's way out of a paper bag without assistance, but compared to the SHar.....

It's cheap, not much money there to be saved, and its retention positive in a community that's seen as vital to EF. Bin it at your peril!

And MOA has a point, the submarine/surface threat is probably more real than the air threat to our ships, while Nimrods potential as a general support platform (perhaps even with Storm Shadow) makes it a versatile post Cold War air power tool.

[average pilot]

You lot witter on a lot, don't you ? Your wives must be champing at the bit whilst you prattle on at your keyboards...........get a life !

[Jimlad]

The NAvy doesnt' want trident particularly - if you read any of the books on naval policy during the earlu 1980'd you'll see we did out damndest to shove the bill elsewhere. If we could get rid of it we would, its cost forced us to scrap lots of much more useful ships like escorts/SSN's = to say the Navy hasn't made sacrifices is untrue - we have.

Given that the Jaguar has a rapidly approaching out of service date, then it to me would have made more sense to scrap the jagur on purely cost grounds. I know its a useful plane to have around, but if its replacement is about to enter service, then surely it should be first up. Scrapping a plane who's replacement is 10-12 years away is idiotic. But since when has this Government done anything sensible? (other than order CVF;) )

[Nozzles]

Bystanderish,

RE: "Fact 1"
I presume your reading of 'utter rot' about how well the FA2s performed in Op Deliberate Force over Bosnia in '95 was a reference to one of my postings on the subject.

Let's get a few things straight:

As I stated to Jacko, I no longer serve HM and have no axe to grind in this debate. I see my inputs simply as challenging incorrect facts about this and other aircrafts' capabilities.

I took part in Deliberate Force in '95, as well as Deny Flight both before and after DF. I had access to BDA imagery from DF. I also, like everybody, had access to the bolix rumours, spread by some individuals lacking self-confidence, throughout the FJ community about the FA2's bombing perf in theatre.

The DMPIs were chosen by the CAOC to match the platform. Those DMPIs got shacked. I don't think that anybody is trying to claim that the FA2 could tackle all the DMPIs a dedicated attack platform can handle.

I have always believed that if you have sufficient faith in your own argument, you don't need to exaggerate or twist the truth. I have posted nothing but independantly verifiable facts, if you care to find the appropriate archive.

I hope I didn't 'fool anyone into believing that the FA2's bombing performance came close to that of the Jags/GR7s dropping LGBs.' A careful read of my posting will show that I stated that the PUBLISHED CEPs of UNGUIDED weapons from the FA2 in its CURRENT CONDITION (using its RLG INS with embedded GPS) are in competition with all other UK assets' UNGUIDED WEAPON CEPs. If you don't believe me-go read the book. There's nothing more I can say.

"Fact 2" is essentially correct. The SHAR's agility has been exaggerated ever since '82

"fact 3" I can't imagine why the FA2 would envy the Jag's EW suite. Both aircraft have the same RWR. If the Jag is capable of carrying BOL LAUs (can't remember) then both aircraft have the same chaff carrying capacity. The FA2 is capable of carrying multiple GEN-X active decoys. Last time I looked, the Jag didn't have them. Have they fitted the Jag with some great new EW kit since I've been away?

Jacko,

Not many fighter pilots think much of the F3/ AMRAAM combination (apologies to my F3 brethren-not trying to be personal). Unfortunately we can't discuss the whys and wherefores in this forum.

MOA,

I once trailed all the way from Yeovilton to SW USA with a Nimrod along as SAR. They didn't need a suck of gas and were a very welcome and reassuring sight. Just wish they wouldn't keep showing you endless cups of coffee, hot chicken tikka wraps and mars bars through the window.............

Finally......

Best of luck to WE Branch Fanatic, who joins the Navy imminently:)

N

[Jackonicko]

Jimlad,

The Jag force is cheaper to run (for three 13 aircraft squadrons) than the SHAR force (two seven aircraft squadrons), entirely excluding the huge cost of running the carriers and their hangers on. The Jaguar provides a broader range of capabilities. The capabilities it provides are the capabilities actually needed in the post Cold War environment, and that have been used AGAIN AND AGAIN during recent years.

Its replacement may or may not be imminent. Service entry next month, as originally scheduled, cannot happen. Certainly in the air-to-ground role, many believe that JSF could be in service before EF has a full spectrum of A-G capabilities.

The only alternative (if one had to withdraw an entire type) to removing the SHar would be the F3, and doing without UK AD for five years would be politically unacceptable.

Noz

My understanding is that the Jaguar's EW kit is being addressed in just the same way as its other capability gaps were, so we can expect a cost-effective and enviable solution fairly quickly, perhaps?

My understanding on F3 is that limitations should not be there and could be addressed very quickly and with a relatively small cash injection. It is however not fulfilling its potential at the moment but could be a useful asset. Perhaps they'll use the SHar savings to make it one?

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Thanks Nozzles

Jacko, you might like to consider that the fleet is NOT just their to support the CVS. Often it is the way round. In any case, the RN will supposedly get Harrier GR9 aircraft to replace the Sea Harrier. So the savings involved are only the cost involved in the Sea Harriers upgrade - a paltry £109 million.

[Jackonicko]

The cost of the upgrade is neither here nor there, though £109m is far short of what will actually be required.

The important savings to be gained are from the running and support costs for the time during which the aircraft would have continued in service, and the savings from ending logs support for an entire aircraft type.

Besides which the Thai Navy need 'em!:p

And why do we need an Empire-driven Blue Water Fleet anyway?

I'm battening down my hatches and putting a funny white hood on right now.....:D

[BEagle]

'White hood'? - have you joined the KKK?

Average Pilot - obviously very average.......

[keiysersaucy]

Average pilot. If you don't give a monkeys then go elsewhere. AOL provide a lot of chat sites for people who want to trade snide remarks. As for the topic, it makes no difference how capable the SHAR is/was. All the "lordships" care about is money. If it is cheaper to bin them and hide behind Bush's coattails then that is what will happen. With the military yes men looking out for their own promotions and nothing else, the "lordships" can do what they want.:mad:

[Mike RO'Channel]

I fear k-saucy is right. We can argue all we like and while we can see the pitfalls of policy decisions from our lowly positions, those above can only focus on budgets and the highly unsavoury management-style yukspeak phrase, 'risk management'. (Risk management is another word for 'cut the cost, never mind the performance, I won't have to make a career-threatening decision but will probably get promoted as long no-one catches on until after the end of my tour'!)

While we can see the flaws in their arguments -

what if Uncle Sam ain't there,
what if there is a credible air-threat,
what if there is a sub-surface threat,
what if there isn't any AD/SEAD/CAS/SH/AT etc.....

- the people who call the shots have been so far removed from the front-line for so long, their actual decisions are based on previous experience that is of little use. Or of course, they never had relevant experience in the first place, which is quite feasible in this day of 'right person for the job'!
Oh, and most likely, he/she will not have asked the front-line experts either!

The fact is we won't get any highly-paid Neddie to admit he's porked it and we will have to accept that any exped fleet from 2006 -201? will have to hope that the USN is on our side and close by with top cover. It doesn't make good reading, its very sad for the Sea Jet and the FAA as a whole but that's tough sh*t.

Oh, Av Plt........ go away, you sad boy.

[Mike RO'Channel]

Oh Jacko, almost forgot..... we need a blue-water fleet cos His Excellency for World Affairs and Grovelling, El Tone, tells us we are a 'farce for good and world stability'.
Our masterful and kind leader want's us to be 'world policemen' dontchaknow! (The images of Keystone Kops or Inspector Clouseau come to mind.....oh well!)



:D :D

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Jacko your last comments explain your hostility towards the Sea Harrier and the Royal Navy in general. Why do we need a blue water fleet you ask?

Didn't you do geography at school? Britain is a MARITIME nation. Throughout history our fortunes have been largely dependant on sea power and maritime trade. A capable blue water fleet is VITAL if the UK is to have any influence in the world.

We have interests around the world. Some strategic, some financial. We need the assets to protect these interests. More to the point, over 90% of UK trade goes by sea? Want to attack the Uk? Traditionally you do it by sea. Even today, a few submarines lurking in shipping lanes could serverely disrupt out economy. As for aircraft, what do you think they run on? Apple Juice? Oil, which has to be imported. These supply/trades routes need to be defended. Remember the attacks on oil shipping during the Iran/Iraq war? I seem to recall the deployment of naval forces by western nations.....

Of course, defence policy is the servant of foreign policy. This concept makes the loss of organic air defence even more disturbing. Should the UK be....

a) An extension of US foreign and defence policy, with every decision on deployment of British forces being made in Washington.
b) Part of an centralised Europe, with decisions being made in Brussels, regardless of British needs.
c) An strong ally of both Europe and the US, but a slave to neither, and with influence on both camps, and with the ability to act independently if required.

If you think c), then we need a capable blue water fleet, with the ability to operate in hosile areas. To do that, we need organic air defence. In other words, the Sea Harrier.

[Jackonicko]

Webf,

Not hostile, just cynical. Besides which, I think you're living in the 1950s, before the withdrawal from Suez, and before the disappearance of a global threat. In Devon Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Francis Drake may still seem like relevant role models, but the world they inhabited is not one I recognise today.

The sun has set on the glorious British Empire, old chap, and no-one is threatening these sea lanes upon which we supposedly depend so much more heavily than our neighbours and partners. (Nor, in my opinion, is today's RN remotely capable of keeping them safe on its own, it's simply too small). We could never afford the kind of Navy required for the role you outline, nor is that role the one outlined in SDR, 'Options or any other recent DWP. You must accept that the RN is incapable of autonomously performing the kind of global strategic role you outline and will always rely on co-operation with allied Navies. Why not rely on our Allies for Fleet Air Defence too, even if only for the brief time window before the arrival of JSF?

Moreover, there is no real global threat to the sea lanes, which is why the World's navies have shifted to an increasing emphasis on Littoral operations. The US Navy clearly believes that it no longer needs an AD aircraft with the range of the F-14, and is instead packing the decks of its carriers with more versatile and more useful F/A-18s.

Even if there was a threat, it's probably the case that land-based air power represents a more efficient and cost effective solution, with a land-based Nimrod able to cover massive areas of ocean in the ASW role, and with sea-skimming air-launched missiles (according to you) representing the worst case threat to surface warships.

And just for interests sake, our democratically elected government (not just this one but the last one too) have quite deliberately moved away from the belief that we need to be able to act autonomously. If we did need to do so, the first thing we should spend money on is decent SEAD so that all operations can be protected, not on a handful of SHars so that we can send a single carrier to sea with its own air defence, but with inadequate capacity to do anything else worthwhile.

This Government's policy (which I think is mistaken in this regard) does at least give the RN's carriers and JFH a role in expeditionary warfare, despite their lack of cost-effectiveness. You should perhaps welcome its commitment to the GR7/9 and the Harrier's shipborne role, and you should be overjoyed that they are even contemplating CVF and FCBA.

We're again guilty of delusions of grandeur and of emptily trying to punch above our weight, and cannot afford to maintain these relics of the Cold War and Corporate when there are other, more pressing priorities for the Defence budget. Yours is exactly the kind of attitude that has seen the RN consume a disproportionate amount of our limited defence budget for decades, and is as inappropriate and old fashioned as the 'Cavalry enthusiasts' who still think that we should maintain massed formations of heavy armour.

[alphaleaderuk]

Archimedes

Thanks for the correction – much appreciated!

Of course, we shouldn’t commit the FA2 to low-level suicide attack missions à la Falklands any more – but the interesting question is, “If the GR7/9 is to deliver from medium or high level, who is going to protect its six?”
We actually need both aircraft types for efficient air-to-ground operations – LGBs from the FA2 won’t work without “lazing” from the GR (or ground forces).
As a team, they have a fairly good offensive capability – separately, that capability is much diminished. And, at the risk of boring everyone, without the FA2 all Task Force Units become vulnerable to air attack.

[alphaleaderuk]

Jackonicko

I must say that you enjoy being provocative! No harm done!
The issue here is not a competition between FA2 and the GR7/9. Nor is anyone trying to do down Jaguar pilots or their steed.
What appears clear to me from your remarks is that you do not have the embarked/maritime experience to understand how very important it is to be able to defend yourself at sea – especially when you get caught with your pants down (i.e. no shore-based air assets nearby and the enemy approaching fast). The ability to “cope” in a situation like that depends on organic Fleet resources that are under the direct control of the Naval Task Force Commander.

Your comment, “whether it's worth retaining in the face of other, more versatile and more useful priorities.

And we do have allies who can provide this level of air cover .............. if we need carrier aviation at all.” – this represents a sad reflection of a somewhat frivolous attitude during a serious debate. (I don’t mind being corrected on facts, at all – different numbers for Eurofighter do get spread around – so I accede to your privileged information.)
Do read DP 2001, you may be surprised by its content. For example:
“Force and Capability Development
27. The validity of the Strategic Defence Review’s conclusions about the broad shape of our future capability requirements is confirmed by this reassessment both of the future strategic context and of our immediate operational priorities. The key characteristics are to be able to:
· respond to crises using forces at graduated states of readiness, rather than relying on prepositioning;
· deploy early to reduce the risk of a crisis escalating;
· successfully conduct large, high intensity combat operations against demanding opponents with advanced capabilities;
· prepare, deploy, operate, sustain and recover our forces within a NATO, EU, UN or ad hoc multinational framework;
· maintain a qualitative edge in key military capabilities.”
What could be more “versatile or useful” in the context of this than carrier-borne fixed wing air defence?
Please don’t continue to quote the F3 and the Jaguar as being versatile or useful in this context. Both aircraft types require “prepositioning”.
As for the F3 in particular, your stated knowledge of that aircraft’s weapon system is less than convincing. Look at what our Allies say about this “fighter” aircraft:-
Dear Friends,

I received further independent confirmation of our perceptions regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Tornado F3 Radar in comparison to the Sea Harrier Blue Vixen and AMRAAM system. This completely independent evaluation is from a senior Air Force Fighter Weapons School graduate and a recently retired full Colonel from our Air Force who has flown in and evaluated the combat capabilities of these systems. He is brutally specific that the poor "mechanization" of the F3 Radar is less capable than our late model Phantom F-4E Radars from the late 70's and early 80's. He described the design as "tragically inadequate," and that the ergonomics and human factors in the system are quite poor. Most radar functions must be done manually by the backseater in the Tornado F3--he gave very specific examples. The radar is powerful and can see airborne targets at altitude at long range but has no auto gain control found in modern US systems. The F3 has a very incomplete pulse doppler capability and minimal over land look down capability (comparable to the early Blue Fox in the Sea Harrier FRS1). His conversations with their crews led him to believe that a good early F-16 radar (mid 80's capability) would be a real improvement for them. Their AMRAAM capability is specious, very likely not real AMRAAM missile compatibility (perhaps as little as 1/5 the functionality available in the US systems). This would not make it on to a fighter I designed and integrated, and I would have eaten the radar supplier for lunch in the simulator tests and again after his first delivery to the systems integration lab with the fixes in the system.

Note that an individual with operational experience only on the Tornado F3 system would be "stuck" in his cognitive understanding of the air intercept environment in the late 70's or very early 80's. I believe that matches Air Marshall Peter Squire's resume exactly. It explains to me why such a bad decision was possible.

The Sea Harrier Blue Vixen radar is a good "F-16 type system” and was very well thought out in the "mechanization" area" with many important functions, including auto gain, done by software, eliminating the need for the additional person required for the same human functionality in the Tornado F3. The Sea Harrier Blue Vixen "mechanization," human factors design, and ergonomics are thoughtfully done and has true AMRAAM capability equivalent to our own F-16C's or 18's.

Perhaps you should stop all Tornado F3 upgrades and spend the money on Sea Harriers and new jets. An interim capability could be retrofitted from the Sea Harrier pipeline to the Tornado F3, but would not solve its aircraft performance issues.

Very Respectfully Yours,

Charlie Weinert
USAF Academy Class of 1969
Vice President
Thresholds Unlimited, Inc.

Remember, my friend, we are all in this business to defend our nation and our interests abroad. Providing inaccurate and misleading comment in a debate such as this is against the national interest – and if your comments re the F3 are seen to be blatantly inaccurate, what can we believe about your comments on the Jaguar (especially if it doesn’t have a 10,000 ft runway to operate from).

[alphaleaderuk]

bystanderish,

You mention, “making statements about other forces that are not only derogatory but inaccurate. However(!) following your lead”
Sadly, it is arguable that you have been hung by your own petard! FA2 is at least as accurate as any RAF aircraft in the free fall bombing mode (see last year’s Inter-service Bombing competition). Of course free fall can’t hold a flag to LGB (which the FA2 can drop if a lazing unit is ashore)! So don’t compare oranges (free fall from FA2) with lemons (LGB from GR7) and pretend to be giving an authoritative statement!
You are right to question the following even though you have quoted it out of context:
“If only the FA2 had not been described as the only ac with a 'credible, expeditionary, offensive capability'”
I should have said, “the only available a/c with a 'credible, expeditionary, offensive capability' that meets the air defence needs of a JTF and that also contribute to the Air-to-Ground Attack tasks.”
I stand corrected! Do come out of the shadows again soon!

[alphaleaderuk]

MOA,

Thanks for your input! It is very clear that the Nimrod has an important role to play in SAR (and perhaps, local fisheries protection). But £2.8 billion for an upgrade? We could do the same task for less than half the price by buying and using new civil aircraft.

Deployment? A nineteen hour day, I believe – but who needs 3 hours preparation for a standard operating task? And 5 hours on task – forgive me but waiting to see if you arrive is not good enough against a submarine threat – we already have an ASW helo screening procedure that works well (60 nm is not so far!).
My mention of Nimrod as a possible candidate for cost saving would indeed mean replacing it with a cheaper alternative for tasks such as SAR. But we never see you guys around the Fleet when we are deployed – en route to or at a trouble spot – so much for the ease of deployability (which in any case is not within the spirit or the word of DP 2001).

My basic criticism comes from an occasion in the mid-eighties. Let me quote from a particular paper (notal):

“NIMROD MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (MRA) TO REPLACE
ROYAL NAVY ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) FRIGATES AND HELICOPTERS

An Air Staff claim was being put forward in the late Seventies and early Eighties that the Nimrod MRA could and should replace the Fleet’s Anti Submarine Warfare frigates and helicopters in defending the Fleet from submarine attack. It was claimed that the Nimrod was at least as effective as the organic Fleet Units (ASW warships & helicopters) in detecting, prosecuting and destroying submarines.

The Air Staff was again conveniently ignoring the laws of physics and aerodynamics. Although the small UK Nimrod force could indeed fly in the sky above Fleet Units when they were close to the UK and maintain a reasonable presence, longer support distances were not possible.

When the Task Force sailed South to the Falklands in 1982, the Nimrod MRA was conspicuous by its absence in spite of the very real submarine threat. Even at Ascension Island, there were no Nimrods available to sanitize the sea areas until well after the Task Force had proceeded South. When they did arrive, they carried out missions around Ascension but on only two occasions did they venture up to 600 nms South of the Island. That was well short of the 4,000 nms to the Falklands Exclusion Zone.

Post the Falklands, some fictitious reports were circulated under the auspices of MOD(UK)Air claiming that the Nimrod MRA had regularly patrolled the coast of Argentina within 60 nms of the shore looking for enemy submarines. How strange that the RAF wouldn’t allow Vulcans to fly close to the outer limits of the Falkland Islands without Sea Harrier protection and without a Task Force “Weapons Tight” policy but it would send off Nimrods without any protection into the jaws of the Argentine Air Force.

The true facts concerning the Nimrod MRA’s ability to find and destroy submarines became clear in the early eighties. Statistics showed that when patrolling over the Fleet during Exercises and when submarines were definitely present as a threat to that Fleet, the Nimrod had autonomously achieved only one “possible submarine contact” for every 5,000 hours flown – and it had never carried out a successful autonomous prosecution and kill of a submarine on exercise. Discussions between a UK Naval Staff Desk Officer and Nimrod crews attending an Exercise debrief at Rosyth revealed further alarming facts:

a. Nimrod Crews were sworn to secrecy by their Administrative Authority concerning the track record of the Nimrod in its primary ASW role (because the record was so bad);

b. During exercises against a known submarine threat, the Nimrod would inevitably be unable to autonomously locate or detect the “orange” submarine. So it would signal to the submarine to launch a green grenade – the smoke from which would then be visible on the surface above the submarine. Using this smoke beacon as a datum, the Nimrod crew would carry out set procedures for locating and prosecuting the submarine. Even with this help from the target, the Nimrod was invariably unable to detect, much less prosecute the submarine. Nonetheless, the Nimrod crew would then file a post exercise report detailing the patterns flown over and the sono buoys dropped in the target area. It would go down on the exercise report as a successful prosecution.

c. This falsely reported prosecution would then go to the UK Ministry of Defence for use by the Air Staff in proclaiming the operational effectiveness of the Nimrod to Ministers.

By hiding the true lack of effectiveness of the Nimrod ASW and promoting it as a viable ASW defence for the Fleet at Sea, the Air Staff were:

a. At best, concerned with empire building;

b. At worst, showing complete disregard for the defence of the Fleet and the lives of the sailors onboard Fleet units.

The saddest thing about it all is that this major UK Air Staff subterfuge continues. Central Committees and Ministers obviously remain ignorant of the true merit of Nimrod as an ASW vehicle. Why else would they have agreed a $3 billion upgrade programme for the Nimrod in 1996?

The UK Ministry line seems to be, “Tornado doesn’t work! Upgrade it at any cost! The Nimrod doesn’t work! Upgrade it at any cost!”"

Can we afford to wait and check if this upgrade works? And if it does, does the perceived threat balanced by the inherent lack of deployability of the Nimrod make it worth the huge investment?

I don't think so!

[MRA4]

alphaleaderuk

Re: Defending the Nimrod

Who are you, some sort of journo or MOD Police trying to get some poor sod to break the official secrets act!! Your threads seem to imply some sort of RN background, but it would appear you have no concept of ASW. What are you hoping to hear, some poor sap telling you in great detail his experiences of finding/tracking submarines in a Nimrod to refute your lies!!

I HAVE NEVER EVER, EVER, SEEN SUCH A PATHETIC COLLECTION OF BLATANT LIES WRITTEN IN PRINT.

I am not claiming that the Nimrod is the greatest thing since sliced bread in terms of ASW, but your claims that is so ineffective are pathetic, untrue and a great insult to anyone who has been in the Nimrod fleet in the last 30 years. You seem to imply there has been some sort of systematic cover up over the years of the Nimrods lack of ASW capability, from junior ranks up to Flag Officers. Don't you think over time this might have leaked out, both to the rest of the RAF and the RN, from a dsigruntled source. How about the fact that the Nimrod is as capable an ASW platform as any other nations MPA, P-3, Aurora, Atlantique, etc, as is regularly proved in international competitions and Exercises (e.g Fincastle). So why do other nations have MPA (with an ASW role), and are replacing them. Oh, I was forgetting, this is obviuosly a global conspiracy by the entire MPA community!!! (I guess you must be a grassy knoll man!!!) Most other countries operate MPA as part of their naval forces, manned by navy personnel who also serve tours on ASW frigates etc. So, according to you, other nations NAVYs are wasting money and perpetuating useless assets out of THEIR OWN BUDGETS are they!!! I think not.

Submarines are VERY quiet, VERY elusive targets, more so in the last 10-15 years, and finding them is very difficult. That is one reason why many third world nations are buying them. If you have/are serving in the navy you will know that ASW is a team game, most effective when a variety of assets are employed. These include helos, MPA, submarines, frigates etc. Each has a part to play. I am not claiming the Nimrod is the answer to ASW, but it is far more capable than you imply. The MRA4 will be more capable than the Merlin in the ASW role, and I haven't even discussed other roles for MRA4, are you advocating the RN scrap their Merlin fleet. Talking of spending too much money on an asset, what is the current price tag for a Merlin??

I have a very slow fuse as a rule, but reading the utter drivel you have written has so incensed me I bear no responsibility for spelling or punctuation. I hope a lot of already very unhappy (pay and conditions) AEOps never find out where you live. I would duck, you can expect LOTS more incoming!! (You are not Admin Guru are you?)

[RotaDish]

Great Topic,

But...Please stop writing "Service Papers", my monitor is too small, and most of it is Baullaux anyhow. If it's worth a point, make it short. (ISS "Brevity is the key to Comunication")

Thanks,

Rota

[NoseGunner]

:mad:
I can't take it any longer. I try to just laugh at it but I'm afraid I just can't contain myself.
alphaleaderuk:

You and that american obviously have absolutely no concept of the F3. It is tempting to let all this sort of disinformation get spread around thus making it even easier for us when the opposition get all arrogant. All I'll say is if you don't know what you're talking about (and "my mate who once fought an F3 said..." doesn't count) then keep quiet.

Just for the record on one small and relatively minor point: the F3 with weapons can out turn all other UK fast jets with weapons on. Only the hawk with no weapons (and what use is that?) is a bit of a "challenge".

Thanks:)

ps anyone had a go against our ASRAAMs yet???He He

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Jacko

Have you read my letter on the SHAR Wars thread?

The RN have not consumed as much of the defence budget as the Army or RAF. Please explain your reasoning...

[Jackonicko]

Alpha

My comments on the F3 seem to be validated by one of its users here, and by most of the aircrew I've spoken to about it during the last few weeks. Yours, however, are outdated and unbalanced.

The Jaguar's record speaks for itself.

You talk about the need to pre-position these assets. I'd point out that it has always been quicker, cheaper and easier to deploy a FJ squadron than it is to deploy a carrier and its various support ships. Remember that in Sierra Leone a Jag squadron could have been there (operating from Dakar in Senegal) long before the carrier, had a political decision not been taken to send the carrier (principally to underline El Tone's CVF decision in SDR, I suspsect).

Moreover, once in theatre the Jags would have had 30-mm cannon, CRV7, 1,000-lbers, PII, PIII and RBL755 and CBU87 to choose from, whereas because 1,000-lbers were held to be unacceptable in the circumstances the only weapon available to the carrierbased GR7s was said to be "Noise!"

The carrier's USP is not rapid deployability, it is independence of host nation support (though for a carrier to operate close enough to the target for the SHar and GR7 to be useful an absence of outright opposition is handy). In this day and age however, if it's impossible to get basing in a neighbouring nation the operation you are trying to undertake probably isn't politically viable anyway.

Using a carrier just ensures that its economic viability is pants, too.

Even I know that your Nimrod bull refers and relates to the MR1 (and is biased, partial and in key areas factually incorrect even here), and that the in-service MR2 is the dog's whatsit. The 4 promises to be even more useful, if only they'll expand their thinking and stick Storm Shadow on it as well!


Nosey,

You say (on the other thread) that I should be Jagonicko - it's just that Jag mates have bought me more beer and bent my ear more than you and your lot!;)

[Seven of Nine]

Alpha,
I agree with you. Keep the SHAR, upgrade it using the money destined for the F3 force, and retire the F3 from service early.
Then, please inform the RAF when the SHAR force is ready to take over ops in Southern Watch, the Falklands, QRA......

[Jackonicko]

WEBF,

The RN may or may not have “consumed as much of the defence budget as the Army or the RAF”. That’s not what I said. I just pointed out that it had consumed a “disproportionate amount of our limited defence budget for decades” and that much of that expenditure has been on big ticket, grandiose and inappropriate systems (like Trident, Polaris and Chevaline).

You assume that proportionate means one third of the budget available, whereas I'd see a small Navy consuming a relatively small fraction of available funding. We need a small Euro-Navy (like the Dutch or the Germans) yet we persist in maintaining a global Empire-protecting and cash-quzzling monster.

And yes, I have read your letter on the other thread, and noticed a raft of lies and mistakes.

The Sea Harrier’s serviceability is not ‘good’
Sea Harrier cannot carry ALARM (never cleared or integrated)
Sea Harrier can no longer carry Sea Eagle (not in RN service)
Sea Harrier has no autonomous laser designation capability
Sea Harrier has no recce capability beyond a single oblique F95

Which CBUs and rockets are currently cleared for service use on the FA2, by the way?

Your claim that the Sea Harrier FA2 is the most versatile aircraft in Britain's inventory is a blatant lie. It’s capable enough in the air to air role, but apart from that it’s probably the least versatile fast jet aircraft in the inventory.

Sea Harrier may have had acceptable bringback in the Adriatic (though not according to some of those I’ve spoken to), but it is certainly inadequate in the Gulf.

£100 million was the figure given for the saving due to the cost of the upgrade (though this is a major under-estimate), and represents a tiny fraction of the total cost savings gained by early retirement of the SHar.

[1st Threshold]

alpha

What a load of horses #rse! I dont know where you have got your info from, but its totally off mark.

You obviously have no idea of the way that Nimrods operate or indeed what they actually do. If you did you would not be trying to tempt a response to the drivel that you have written.

I get the impression you are one of the 2 Shar pilots actually left in the Navy, and are just a little bit bitter that 3 billion is being spent on an aircraft other than yours.




Edited to remove correct spelling at sauce

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Jacko

You are starting to show yourself up. Polaris was a NATIONAL system, not a naval asset. Polaris was cheaper than Skybolt or similar being carried by RAF Nimrods. Chevaline was an upgrade to Polaris. As for Trident, the same arguments applied. the Navy never really wanted it, and the Naval vote got clobbered for paying for it. Does the 1981 Defence White Paper mean anything to you?

So, you want a "small Euro-Navy" do you? Why do you think it should be like the Dutch or the Germans? Why not the French? We have world wide involvements, and these simply cannot be achieved without naval forces. The whole modern idea of expeditionery warfare means we need more than a brown water Navy. Look at the UK contribution to Operation Sharp Guard, the NATO enforcement of the arms embargo on the warring parties during the conflict in Bosnia. We deployed (over the years) TWENTY frigates and destroyers AND five Fleet Submarines. This was entirely seperate to the deployment of a CVS and Sea Harriers etc.

Certainly your ideas would mean the ending of any amphibious capabilities. But hey, maybe your idea of a balanced fleet is a few RAF Regiment Gunners patrolling the waterways around Norfolk?
The idea that a maritime nation like ours can do without a reasonable fleet is ludicrous. You should consider what Churchill said to a similar statement in 1914: "Are you sure? It would be a pity to be wrong". During the Kosovo "war" people kept criticising the NATO leaders and pointing out the the only way to really effect events would be to use (or threaten to use) troops on the ground. The same is true at sea, the capbilities of airpower are limited. You need ships, and the means to protect these ships.

Now for your criticisms of my letter....

1. My letter was six pages (of A4) long. You have only found a few things to argue with. Hardly full of lies and misinformation, is it?
2. The Sea Harriers servicabilty. Interesting topic isn't it? "Good" and "not good" are not particularly helpful terms. Various people have told me the Sea Harrier's servicability is much the same as the other FJ aircraft the UK operates. Servicabilty is largely due to the ability to get spare quicky. With the current DLO fiasco, this is a impossibilty. Consider the problems the RAF Sea Kings are having due to lack of spares. Or the Tank regiments. Or ANYONE else.
3. Yes, Sea Eagle is no longer routinely carried aboard the carriers, but the capability still exists.
4. Air Forces Monthly (I assume that you don't write for them) was the source for much of the information I used, and it was confirmed by various people, including a friend who is involved the the world of defence journalism. This is where the ALARM info came from.
5. I never said the Sea Harrier had a Laser target designator, did I? Stop twisting my words.
6. Nor did I say it carried more than a F95 for reece.
7. Bringback is not such an issue with air defence weapon loads than with air to ground ones. As I said, the new engine would improve this. Anyway, why would you take off with a full bomb load unless you expected to drop them? So hence the ability to bring them back is less important. 8. I'm not going to get involved in a discussion about cost. But the savings gained by getting rid of the Sea Harrier will be more than wiped out if we lose several ships needlessly. Personally I care more about the lives at risk.

[Jackonicko]

Who's showing themselves up?

Skybolt was cancelled by the US before we could buy it. It was cheaper than Polaris. The last strategic air launched nuke carried by RAF aircraft was Blue Steel. It wasn't carried by Nimrods, but by Vulcans and Victors.

Any weapons system could be seen as a national asset. The RN, however, took over the strategic deterrent role (with alacrity) and therefore took reponsibility for it. To describe the Admiralty as 'never really wanting it' is bonkers.

The cost effectiveness of Polaris is extremely controversial, but few would describe it as having represented value for money. Chevaline is widely reckoned to have been an almost complete waste of time and money.

If the aim is to provide a genuinely independent nuclear deterrent I'd argue that Trident is similarly weak.

Yes, a small Euro Navy. And like the Dutch or the Germans and not the French because they spend to much on sea power too, doubtless labouring under a similar legacy of Imperial and Colonial tradition. Why not? Especially if we could then spend money on more relevant and frequently used capabilities like SEAD, or could avoid FSTA being a half-arsed PPP or PFI, or could afford a couple of squadrons of C-17s, or a proper number of Longbow Apaches, etc.

Your bias against air power is beginning to show, especially in your comments about Allied Farce!

1) Couldn't be arsed to go through it in detail, just highlighted the real problems.

2) Exactly. By comparison with other FJs the SHar has a poor serviceability record (fair enough, it's an old jet and it operates in an unfavourable environment). You specifically said the opposite.

3) Sea Eagle is no longer in service. The capability no longer exists - except in India!

4) AFM, god love 'em, are wrong on ALARM. It's never been integrated on SHar, and I've never even heard of it being fit-checked or seriously feas.studded. I'm not going to tell you whether or not I write for them - you might realise that I am, in fact Oscar Wilde, and thereby destroy the anonymity of my PPRUNE handle.... (Oh Bu**er!)

5) You inferred that the SHar ("the most versatile aircraft in Britain's inventory") had a viable PGM capability. It doesn't except as a dumb, bomb truck.

6) You described the SHar ("the most versatile aircraft in Britain's inventory") the FJ with the poorest recce capability in the inventory as being the most versatile, and highlighted its recce capability. An F95 does not really count!

7) Bringback's an issue, especially if you're claiming that SHar is an all-singing, all-dancing, versatile multi-role aircraft. Andits relevant in the AA role, too, sometimes, especially since AMRAAM cannot be jettisoned by SHar, but (god forbid) has to be fired if the aircraft cannot get down to landing weight with them attached!

8) You don't want to talk about cost. What a surprise. Any cutbacks will result in some increase in risk, it's all about risk assessment and risk management. More lives would be saved by spending the SHar pot of money on (say) decent SEAD capability or better EW for other FJ types.

8)

[WE Branch Fanatic]

I have no bias against air power, Jacko. But your implied claim that naval forces are never used or deployed is a complete load of rubbish. Lets say we need to support an operation far away, with lots of heavy armour involved. How do you move Tanks etc?

By either RFAs or STUFT. How would you defend them from enemy submarines (which, according to you, are the main maritime threat now)? By frigates and destroyers of course. Don't start about the Nimrod, we all know that the Nimrod is more suited to offensive ASW operations (as are our own submarines).

Same applies for enemy surface vessels. Also aircraft cannot implement an embargo, unless they just sink everything. If stop and search is what you want, send for the Navy!!

In short naval forces allow you to dominate the sea space, aircraft on their own cannot do that.

As for cost effectiveness, in 1981 Keith Speed MP got sacked for point out that the Royal Navy and maritime elements of the RAF provided 70% of NATO forces in the Eastern Atlantic for approx 23% of the defence budget, but BAOR and RAF Germany provided 10% of NATO forces in central Europe for 40% of the defence budget.

A naval contribution by the UK to a multinational operation will be more significant (particularly vis-a-vis the US) then sending a few more aircraft instead.

[BlueWolf]

Here's where things start to get interesting.









New timetable for Eurofighter entry into RAF service

24 May 2002

The UK's MOD has announced a revised timetable for the introduction of Eurofighter into service with the Royal Air Force. The current slippage is thought to be about six months.

In a statement the MOD said that as early as February it believed the June 2002 In Service Date (ISD) was under threat, "...delays in bringing the detailed design to full maturity in some areas prevented the flight test programme from starting on time

Defence Procurement Minister Lord Bach said, "Following a thorough review of the programme involving the partner nations, the NATO agency responsible for undertaking the procurement, and industry, we have jointly concluded that acceptance of the first aircraft into service should be delayed, to take place by the end of this year, and we shall plan on that basis."

The MOD said it would work with industry to recover lost time and to achieve the planned Operational Employment Date in the second half of the decade, in order to avoid any gap in front-line capability or extra costs to the Ministry of Defence.

The Eurofighter partners are Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain who have ordered a total of 620 aircraft, with the first production tranche of 148 jets running through to 2005. The second tranche begins in 2005 and the third in 2010.


REF XQQEE XQQAR









[email protected]





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[Mad_Mark]

Alpha, wot an a-hole! :rolleyes:

First I will state that I agree with you that the SHAR should not be scrapped. The RN needs an independent force fighter protection. The GR7/9 is also required in mud-moving role. Both aircraft have their particular role and both aircraft are needed.

However you speak out of your ar$e when it comes to the Nimrod (and probably when it comes to the other RAF aircraft you seem so quick to put down). "My basic criticism comes from an occasion in the mid-eighties" which was written about the Nimrod and its capabilities in the early 80's.

The Nimrod in the early 80's was a completely different machine to the one flying today, let alone the MRA4 (which incidentally stands for Maritime Reconnaissance and ATTACK - not Aircraft). The MR2 was just coming into service, and since that time has seen several major systems upgrades.

I will not comment on the role of the Nimrod during the Falklands Campaign, except to say that we were there flying far more operational sorties than is commonly publicised.


The Nimrod, as has already been mentioned, is not only an ASW platform. Neither is it concerned purely with "SAR (and perhaps, local fisheries protection)", but has many roles, several of which can not be mentioned. So get your facts straight.

Yes, the RN has ASW helos in the screen, but you have obviously never looked at the way the ASW screen operates. If you really do wear dark blue try popping along and having a chat with the PWO or ASWAC.

Your earlier quotes from SDR and the DP2001 Statement whilst accurate are also misleading. Yes the "agreed submarine threat against the UK mainland is now low" as is the current air threat to the RN in UK waters, but like you we also deploy OOA. Yes, "The Nimrod is a land based aircraft with limited range and can not therefore support Fleet/JTF operations away from the UK base “without prepositioning”", like the SHAR is also land based and also has to preposition to the carriers, otherwise it's range is even less than ours ;-) We do prepossition, and operate very effectively when we do.

"But we never see you guys around the Fleet when we are deployed – en route to or at a trouble spot – so much for the ease of deployability". Oh dear, showing your lack of awareness again. Try looking at the air picture and you will probably see us. Just because we aren't buzzing your boats, doesn't mean we are not there ;-) (And yes I do know what a boat is, just looking for the usual RN bites <bg>)

Finally, before posting utter $#!t about something you obviously know gnats cock about, try getting your facts right. It is so obvious that you know sweet FA about what the Nimrod MR2 does and where. By the majority of the other posts it appears your vastly substandard knowledge extends to other aircraft types too. The fight to save the SHAR is an extremely important one, but you are doing it no favours at all. All aircraft types from the Grob up to the Tornado, Jag, GR7/9, SHAR, Nimrod, helicopters, etc, etc have their role to play and their place in our Armed Forces, so wind your neck in will you!

Mad Mark!! :mad:

[Alibi]

The Defence Budget

The Defence Budget for 2000/2001 in £23.03Bn, represents 2.5% UK GDP. This compares with 5.3% UK GDP in 1984 which would be £47Bn today.

Budget allocations for other Government Departments include Health 4.8%, Social Security 10.5% and Education 2.0%. Spending by other nations on defence (% GDP in 99) include France 2.8%, Germany 1.5%, USA 3.2% and Greece 4.9%.

The Royal Navy receives £1.899Bn - 8.28% of the Defence Budget. In comparison, the Army receives £5.657Bn and the RAF £2.641Bn (24.56% and 11.47% of the Defence Budget respectively).

The remainder of the Defence Budget is allocated to Research, Logistics and the Ministry of Defence.

[artyhug]

Webf fella,

When are you going to pull your head out of your hole and read and digest some of the seemingly watertight stats you spout as hard evidence for the superiority of the RN.

Quote
As for cost effectiveness, in 1981 Keith Speed MP got sacked for pointing out that the Royal Navy and maritime elements of the RAF provided 70% of NATO forces in the Eastern Atlantic for approx 23% of the defence budget, but BAOR and RAF Germany provided 10% of NATO forces in central Europe for 40% of the defence budget.

So the fact that when the might of the free worlds armed forces were deployed to Battlefield Germany it surprises you that our contribution was in relative hardware terms small?? And yet your savvy enough to reinforce that the RN, whose primary resposibility was ASW in the GIUK gap, contributed a large proportion of the total deployed forces....

I have no real desire to get involved in a slanging match but there is a serious case at the heart of the argument.

Unless public opinion changes, ie We go to war and lots of people die, we aren't going to get anymore money. Ipso facto we can't afford everything and hard decisions have to be made, now I've yet to be convinced that scrapping the SHar is the right decision but clouding the argument with half arsed statements and barrack room lawyer bravado is demeaning to the force you wish to serve.
You have a point, make it succinctly and accurately and you may find people have the tendency to agree.

As for you alpha, don't make me laugh.
http://www.theunholytrinity.org/cracks_smileys/contrib/owen/fett.gif

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Sorry Arty, it wasn't meant to be bravado, I was simply responding to Jackonicko's assertion that the RN consumes (and has consumed) a disproportionate share of the defence budget.

Also I was making the point that for the same amount of money we can make more of a contribution to multinational operations by conributing naval forces that we could by adding more aircraft (compared to x hundred from the USAF/USN/SSMC).

I just saying that there is no "one size fits all" solution, we need different tools for different jobs. Therefore we need airpower AND landpower AND seapower.

Thats all.

As for my point about enforcing emargoes, I was simply pointing out that FJs and MPAs cannot put boarding parties aboard merchant vessels. I accept I could have worded it better. No offence intended to anyone!

Jacko, please explain your assesrtion that losing organic air defence will save lives? What about the guys and girls aboard the ships that are hit?

[artyhug]

No Webf

'for the same amount of money we can make more of a contribution to multinational operations NOT by contributing naval forces than we could by adding more aircraft (compared to x hundred from the USAF/USN/SSMC).'

But by contributing what is needed in that particular case its not a contest, its supposed to be about ensuring the rights of all mankind.

I really didn't want to get to this but,

Eastern Atlantic, cold war, primary responsibilty of RN (plus USN obvs) hence proportionately high contribution of forces.

Plains of West Germany, cold war, primary responsibility of the whole friggin free world hence proportionately lower contribution of forces.

See?

Remember 99% of stats are complete BS made up by lying two faced politicians, or something like that...
http://www.theunholytrinity.org/cracks_smileys/contrib/owen/fett.gif

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Arty I'm sorry. Don't take it the wrong way.

"But by contributing what is needed in that particular case its not a contest, its supposed to be about ensuring the rights of all mankind."

Actiually, thats what I was trying to say. Sort of!

[steamchicken]

Well...I don't have the knowledge or the inclination to get involved in a spat about Nimrods, but I will make some response to Jackonicko's comments about the Navy. We do need a blue water capability. In fact, I can't see why we would need a "Euro navy" - to blockade French ports? to intercept a possible Norwegian invasion fleet? If our defence policy is based totally on Northwest Europe, then I'd argue we don't need a navy at all. If, on the other hand, we are "expeditionary in nature" and committed to peacekeeping, crisis intervention etc., we do, and a frigate navy for guarding Pompey would be as good as useless. We can't rely on the ERRF in this connection, because it relies on our current shipbuilding programme for its transport and carrier support! If as Jackonicko says, the advocates of heavy armour are as foolish as "cavalry enthusiasts", it is not very coherent to argue that the Army should move away from defending the North German Plain with massed tanks whilst at the same time saying the Navy should confine itself to home waters!

WE has a point when he says that certain posters don't understand the role of the navy - it's not just to launch aircraft. I think we need to restate aims here. The point of sea power (to quote Mahan) is sea control, and (quoting Mahan again) "control of the sea means the freedom to use the sea and to deny that use to others". As well as providing a base for aeroplanes, a task force also offers control of the sea, protection for logistical shipping (and aircraft), support helicopter basing, Special Forces insertion and support, headquarters facilities, casualty receiving and amphibious transport. To take Sierra Leone as an example, a squadron of Jaguars might indeed have reached Dakar faster than the navy task group did, but the intervention did not take the form only of aircraft. There were troops, and support helicopter transport. The arrival of the ships brought: a. GR7 Harriers. b. More choppers. c. Logistical support. d. Reserves - the Marine battle group. e. Medical help on board ship. f. The possibility of NGS around Freetown. g. Psychological presence. (I admit the last one is weak.) I would query whether letting off bangs in the hinterland would have had the same effect - especially given the eruption of "Blair Bombs Babies" propaganda which would have followed. There seems to be a lot of interservice incomprehension here.

On a lighter note...has anyone else thought Jacko should change his handle to Jag-onicko?

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Excellent Steamchicken, you understand my point exactly.

I pointed out a number of possible RN operation on (in?) my various postings on the SHAR Wars thread. Many of those missions may involve the deployment of the CVS and Sea Harrier in support of the rest of the fleet.

[steamchicken]

I know you agree, WE, it's the others I'm worried about! I wonder how long it'll be until Jagonicko's flame arrives.....*starts building the shelter under the stairs*

[nav attacking]

Alpha you really do know how to wind up people. I can only think that you do it on purpose. as to not seeing the Nimrod around when you deploy, maybe that was because all you were doing was sailing around the oceans waving your flag and enjoying your Pink gins in yet another foreign port with no threat to you what so ever, except for the local groupies. Hopefully you caught some unimaginable disease from one of the local girls brought on board for your cocktail parties.

Speak to the boys that deployed to the Gulf just after Sept 11 and ask who was operating around Cyprus giving them a much needed heads up of any small craft coming their way. We managed to give them a nice warm feeling when they were approaching the Suez Canal. I think most of the navy will agree that the skimmer is not a place to be when faced with fanatical terrorists in small boats armed to teath with RPG's or just packed with explosives. The USS Cole incident highlighted your vulnerabilities.

I think everyone can see from the sudden rush of posts from Nimrod guys that you have stirred up a hornets nest from up north by talking such drivel. As has been said the current nimrod is not just an ASW platform and not all its roles can be advertised widely. As for MRA4 well that will be a whole new ball game. Just look at what the US can do with its new P3s. The MRA 4 will be even better there won't be the problem of loiter times or getting sensor information to the shooter because it can be the shooter. The way ahead is highly equipped larger aircraft with good payloads.

Nuff said I think....................

[alphaleaderuk]

Nimrod Boys!

Methinks you protest too strongly!

:D

[difar69]

:mad:

Alphaleaderuk!

Methinks you should not present yourself as the font of all Aviation knowledge until you get your facts right. I would not have the ill manners/disrespect to wax lyrical about the SHAR, having never flown in one. You should consider doing the same regarding other specialisations i.e MPA, Airwarfare Instructor or not, unless you know what you are talking about, and you clearly don't.

Nuff said.

[MOA]

Alpha,

You still don't get it. If you are a wind up merchant, then congratulations you have got me good. However, relying on papers published in the 80's is no basis for an argument about todays military procurements.:confused:

I agree that ASW is extremely hard and cannot be carried out by a Nimrod on its own. It has been pointed out by others that it is very much a team game with a good result relying on all players bringing their own unique abilities to bare.

As for not being able to preposition is total @rse. We deploy on a regular basis, taking minimal support with us. Aircraft are still on OOA ops as we speak.

As for not wanting to wait whislt we turn up.....Ever heard of 24 hour coverage. Aircraft being on station providing direct support or others providing ASuW but being on associated support and therefore able to help if a FFCH picks anything up on the towed array.

It also has been pointed out that the Nimrod provides copious more abilities than ASW, but you fail to acknowledge that fact. You instead rely on outdated articles which seem to expound your lack of MPA understaning.

Our armed forces and the MOD is becoming more increasing reliant on the capabilities of the Nimrod not only as an MPA but an incredibly flexible airborne asset, able to provide unique skills to any situatuion. With the new aircraft, extra opportunities will open up, and when utilized will prove the that the MRA4 is excellent value for money.

[timzsta]

I was "stunned" to hear of the decision to scrap the FA2 earlier this year. Alphaleaderuk makes all the points in an informative post.
It seems very strange that less than 2 years after a retention initiative to retain FA2 pilots, the aircraft is then to be removed from service.
Just as the GR7 community say "we didnt join the RAF to go to sea" those in the FA2 world are going to say "I didnt join the Navy to fly out of the east coast".
I feel once again the need for short term financial savings have taken priority of long term planning. Looking to future, ie the time JSF arrives with CVF, given how little time the GR7 community spends embarked in the CVS, there is going to be a severe shortage of maritime experience to introduce JSF to service at sea.
Also a whole generation of PWO/AAWO's are going to have no experience conducting fixed wing aviation and air defence. And it is this generation that will go on to be the first CO's of the CVF.
Many painful lessons are going to have to be relearnt I imagine.
I feel it is extremely unlikely a reversal on the decision is going to come, u-turns went out of fashion in the 90's. It is good to see that the FA2 community is still fighting though, as ever, for some common sense regarding the future of their most capable multi role aircraft.
Regards to all at 801/800/899, "Limp". (Any off you wanting to get in touch can e-mail me at [email protected])

[steamchicken]

good to have you on board tim!


PS: How did this thread turn into a row about Nimrods in the first place?

[BlueWolf]

Some years ago I recall Griff Rhys-Jones doing a skit on "Not The Nine O'Clock News" in which he was the Green Party's Defence SpokesHuman.

"Our defence policy is to grow a very high hedge..." was the line.

Who'd have thought it would actually come to that? SHar is going and Nimrod is under threat. It's happened to us already, and your El Tone is of the same mind as our own idiot pinko pacifist PM.

Watch carefully for departmental memos concerning base gardens, or window boxes on ships. They may be serious.

[Mad_Mark]

SteamChicken,

This thread would not have turned into a 'row' about the Nimrod had arsebandituk known what he was talking about and then accepted that fact when the replies rolled in.

It started with the following in one of his earlier posts...

"Final Comment: “What Mr Ingram should have said concerning the FA2 decision.”"...

..."f. The Nimrod is not an effective Anti-Submarine Warfare vehicle. Even with better avionic systems that may allow it to detect and prosecute a submarine threat, this will be of limited use to the Nation because:

i. The agreed submarine threat against the UK mainland is now low (Strategic Defence Review);

ii The Nimrod is a land based aircraft with limited range and can not therefore support Fleet/JTF operations away from the UK base “without prepositioning” (Defence Policy 2001 Statement).

The £3 billion (US$4.3 billion) being spent on the Nimrod upgrade would therefore be better spent on maintaining an effective first line of air defence for the Fleet and on upgrading the already proven Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare systems."


And was later followed by...

"It is very clear that the Nimrod has an important role to play in SAR (and perhaps, local fisheries protection). But £2.8 billion for an upgrade? We could do the same task for less than half the price by buying and using new civil aircraft."


With the subject of this thread being maritime related it is hardly surprising that many in the Nimrod fleet will read it.

As I have said before, the base line of alphaleaderdrunks argument is very valid, it is incredible that the SHAR is for the chop and all should be done to save this vital fleet asset. Where alphacluelessuk went wrong was to start to slag off other aircraft types where his knowledge seems to extend no further than the names of the aircraft. He was just unfortunate (or was it planned?) to slag off Nimrods in a thread that we read with interest (after all, the SHAR CAP also protects us, unless alphaleadsnoone is around as he doesn't even know we are there!!). If we started to slag off the SHAR, getting our facts wrong about its roles and capabilities, I am sure there would be a massive response putting us right. That is all we are doing, giving the facts (as far as permissible) on the capabilities and roles of the Nimrod.

Answer your question?


Mad Mark!!! :mad:

[TL Thou]

I have been reading this VERY long but entertaining thread with interest. Instead of having a pop at Alphaleader about what he is saying about various bits of kit, just think about venting your anger in other directions. At the end of the day most of us are on the same side.

The Nimrod guys are understandably getting wound up about comments here, but don't forget the order for MRA4 has been cut, and the worry must surely be, when all the signals from the MoD have been that the ASW threat is not to be worried about (eg cut in SSN nos. etc, oh and more frigate and destroyer cuts to come post CSR)(oh and the ASuW threat too, let's just take that Exocet off Sheffield shall we?), that even more cuts or a binning is in order.

Now THAT's what you should be getting mad about!

[CAVU]

alpha

Well, that went down like an anvil. I'd offer to get your coat, but it seems as if you've already taken it? :D

[Farfrompuken]

A L K....

Mate, I think you are spot on.

However, more importantly, I would like to congratulate you on the recent addition to your genome project. Saw the said experiment recently, and he looks like he has more than safe levels of ALK genes!

In case you wonder who I am, I'm the driver of a large 'Transport aircraft' in Dimble-terms, who was also your driver back from No. 1's wedding from VLN. My nickname implies I have an elastic molecular structure.......

Best wishes from the middle east!

Interestingly, if we 'can't afford' to run SHAR and Illustrius, why on earth are India interested?????

Any spelling mistakes are a result of alcohol intolerance!

[Alibi]

The reasons why the Nimrod is useless at Anti Submarine Warfare are down to the laws of physics.

Consider a Nimrod flying along at 200 feet. It fires a sonabouy out the back into the sea. These things are pretty heavy and by the time it hits the water we're talking about a lot of kinetic energy here.

The submarine CAN HEAR the sonabuoy hitting the water with its sonar, and calls a 'splashdrop'. Not only that, but it can also get a range in yards and a bearing to the sonabuoy.

Its not rocket science....!

[nav attacking]

Alibi

I don't know where you get your info from but it is not as simple as all that. A submarine at slow speed will always have an advantage but at higher speeds it becomes blind and probably won't hear a sonobuoy hit the water. Also the buoys aren't that heavy and they are slowed down by paravanes, don't see many sycamore seeds hitting the floor with a big thud!! Anyway during wartime we would only be in the business of tracking a submarine for as long as it would take to get a weapon on it, ROE allowing! ASW isn't just about passive accoustics there are many more ways to skin the cat.

Finally as all of us in the nimrod world have been trying to say the Nimrod isn't just an ASW platform. That is just one of its many roles.

Nuff said! (please)

[difar69]

Alibi,
Rearrange:
HOOP
YOU
TALKING
ARE

I'm sure with your fantastic logic/reasoning you'll be able to work that one out.

[West Coast]

You chaps like to pipe in about our defense matters..so here goes

Jacko
I agree that the emphasis is no longer on the sea lanes and now focused on the littorals. That being agreed upon, you profer that it is cheaper to deploy a squadron of FJ's as opposed to firing up the boat and sailing. Again we agree on the facts of the statement but differ on its value. What has greater staying power? When do you stop counting in money and start counting in flesh. Placing a squadron of jets in a host country(along with the logistical tail) exposes you to political whims of that country.
With ethnic groups not contained by borders, political support for action in a third country may be subject to differing political views and objectives. Types of mil ops may be limited by political pressure to non combat, SAR type ops, logistics, etc.(sound familier?)
Staying power requires you to bring your airport on the roof of your house. Time and again you retreat to fiscal considerations.
Instead, think of a cost to benefit analysis weighted in blood instead of pounds. What provides you with the best chance for victory. Go big, go smart or stay home in times of war, if only I could get my own government to understand this.

[alphaleaderuk]

Ppruners all and “light blue” proponents in particular!

It would appear that, on the face of some of your reactions, a number amongst you believe that the ongoing £2.4 billion update for the Nimrod is money well spent. Privately, I can only surmise that, at over £100 million per aircraft, there must have been serious operational problems to overcome – otherwise the update could not have been justified. (QED)

In the light of past erroneous claims by the Air Staff concerning the warfighting effectiveness of various AFD air weapons systems, I remain hard to convince. Please allow me to explain my doubts with a couple of anecdotal remarks.

1. In the late seventies/early eighties, the JP233 weapon system cost the nation in excess of £10 billion (R & D). Why it was approved is because the AFD stated that it was going to be a viable weapon system against the Warsaw Pact. To some of us professionals, it was clear then and it is clear now that the proposed low-level delivery profile against WP airfields would have spelt certain death for the Tornado GA boys – and for supporting tanker crews – probably well before they had reached their targets. This view was, in the main, substantiated when JP233 was used in anger for the first time against the very much less capable Iraqis who had far less sophisticated ground-to-air defences than those of the WP. The weapon proved a miserable failure – leading to the downing, capture and degradation of several “caterpillar club” aircrew. All in all, it must be seen as an ill-advised weapon system that was approved by Ministers on the very strong but blatantly misguided assurances of the Air Staff.

2. The Nimrod MR1 was unquestionably ineffective as an ASW weapons platform at least up to the mid eighties. During this era of its early operational impotency, the Air Staff continued to proclaim it as “an effective ASW weapons system”; so “good” was it that they were actually telling Ministers that the Fleet no longer needed ASW frigates or helicopters – “the MR1 could do the job instead”. Now, unless a magic wand had been waved to make the MR1 effective (and there is no such wand available), one may only class this as a dangerously ill-advised deception by those at the top. One might even describe it as a very large “porky”.

3. . The Minister for the Armed Forces recently stated in the House that the Tornado F3 is fully operational and is fitted with AMRAAM – implying that the F3/AMRAAM system is fully operationally effective. The House also heard from Ingram that F3 update costs were not yet available – then in almost the same breath, it was admitted that the present update would cost about £120 million. (Which one do we believe?) By chance, this figure approximates to “what will be saved by withdrawing the Sea Harrier FA2 from service early”. What is the logic behind losing the best BVR capable fighter in Britain’s inventory, the FA2, and basing one’s hopes on “a song and a prayer” that will not be easily deployable? On the face of it, and in the light of the Government’s stated Defence Policy (expeditionary force operations without prepositioning; minimal air threat to the UK; minimal submarine threat in UK waters), we appear to have a few ultra expensive “white elephants” here that consume a large share of the Defence Budget without either,

a. having a significant operational role under the new DP, or,

b. without having the capability to meet that role if it was pertinent to the DP task”.

What of the next British expeditionary force that has to act independently of US Naval Air Power (do note the word, ‘Naval’)? Who will provide air defence for the Task Force ships, amphibious forces or our Land Forces ashore?

Certainly not the land-based Tornado F3 with its many limitations!

Certainly not the land-based Eurofighter with its yet to be developed BVRAAM weapon system!

And certainly not the land-based Nimrod! Supporting the Fleet for just a fraction of its transit time to a trouble spot is just not acceptable – when you guys go back to your digs, the front line carries on with the war.

There is no magic expertise being applied here – just common sense, physics, aerodynamics and a recognition of Government Defence Policy.

“Come back” if you wish – but don’t expect a reply if you revert to emotional and rather uncalled for outbursts/personal attack – that only convinces me that I have a point!

(And, yes! If the New York Police Department can hide its failures/shortfalls using the infamous “code of silence”, why not the RAF?)

AWI.

Edited upon advisement from a reliable source for legal reasons. Admin.

[Jackonicko]

Alpha,

I knew you were misguided, but not that you were either deliberately prevaricating or deluded, or a fool. Just to set the record straight, I'd challenge four of your glib arguments.

1) JP233. Loss rates when using it were very low - only one of six RAF Tornados lost in action during Granby was on a JP233 mission and that was hit by a SAM while outbound, well outside the target area, having achieved its objective. Of the other four lost at low level two were lofting 'dumb' 1,000-lb bombs (the profile that your precious FA.Mk 2s would have used under the same circumstances) and one was downed by the premature explosion of its own bombs when these 'bumped' on release.

It was hardly the "miserable failure" which you aver, and one which did not "lead to the downing, capture and degradation of several “caterpillar club” aircrew". In fact two aircrew Flt Lt David W and Flt Lt Robert Stuart were captured, but (uniquely as Iraqi PoWs) according to official accounts were 'treated well in an Iraqi hospital' before being repatriated. Oh yes, and the Russians feared it, and it drove the GSFG drive to the establishment of highway strips co-located with most of the main airfields in East Germany.

2) Nimrod. a) don't bore me with your ill-founded nonsense about the MR.Mk 1, which has been adequately countered here and elsewhere. b) your allegations about MR1 are as factually inaccurate as those about JP233 c) you ignore the MR2 and d) most of the cost of MRA 4 will improve the aircraft's capability in other areas and roles (eg Storm Shadow).

3) Tornado. You are out of date and inaccurate about F3's current capability, as has been hinted at on these fora by current F3 aircrew, who one might expect to be rather more 'up to speed' than a super-annuated ex RN pilot who is lounging around in the sun (perhaps you should wear a hat?). The F3 was 'held back' in Desert Storm because of others (including F-14 aircrew) aver that the reason was a desire to maintain a USAF kill monopoly. The F3 is not agile. The F3 lacks thrust at medium level. But the radar is very good, and with JTIDS and a back-seater the aircraft's BVR capability is respectable enough. Repeating your nonsense does not make it any closer to the truth.

You claim to be "one of that strange breed that wants operationally and cost-effective weapon systems for Britain" yet you denigrate the Jaguar (cost effective if nothing else), ignore the F3's multi-role and SEAD potential and yet harp on and on about single-role Sea Harriers and Carriers (gold plated and highly expensive solutions).

4) Eurofighter's costs are transparent and are available easily from the NAO. £61 m apiece including R&D, £42 m without. Not £93 m.


Westy,

You make good points, as ever, but have the advantage of being from a country which CAN AFFORD carrier air power (which we cannot) and which is used to carrying out sustained operations where carriers may enjoy some of the advantages you claim. Fast Jet squadron deployments suit our pocket and more short term approach rather better.

JN

Edited upon advisement by a reliable source for legal reasons. Admin

[Biggus]

Alphaleaderuk
It would appear that your "beef" is with the entire RAF, or at least the Air Force Board, and their apparent conspiracy to do away with the RN! Not too sure about that, way above my pay scale. I must at this stage admit to being light blue, I also have a very small brain - but heres a thought or two.

One of your arguements for doing away with the Nimrod is the stated low risk of hostile submarines in UK waters, not quite sure how that lines up with the predominant ASW role of the RN. I am no expert on the maritime world, just have a general servicewide grasp of such matters. However, how would you answer the question "DOES THE UK REQUIRE EFFECTIVE ASW FORCES?".

If your answer is yes, then provided the Nimrod is effective in ASW it has a role to play in the UKs armed forces. (The Nimrod boys on this thread all seem to be saying the MR2 is at least as effective as ASW helos, the MRA4 will be better still - AND THE NIMROD DOES A LOT MORE THAN ASW!!). If your answer is no then as well as doing away with the Nimrod (ignoring its other roles!) we can also do away with Merlin helos, Towed array frigates, and the ASW carriers that carry lots of ASW helos and your shiny Sea Harriers!

Personally I think the MRA4 should become the closest UK equivalent of the B-52, carrying shed loads of smart ordinance for use in a variety of different conflicts. (Yes I read Tom Clancy) It should have lots of loiter time, throw weight etc, all those good buzz words. The future is in smart long range weapons on more general purpose aircraft - converted biz jets would probably do. Maybe BEagles A400s could do it as a secondary role!!!??? But the Air Force Board won't wear that because they would probably have to give up some of their Tonkas in exchange - now that is a conspiracy for you!!

[steamchicken]

So if we go with stuffing the Nimrods with missiles, then could that to some extent replace one of the other classes of aircraft? As the long-range strike stuff would be done by cruise missiles fired from MR4As, wouldn't that affect the GR4's role? Or is that c**p? It certainly fits with the general philosophy of expeditionary forces, mobility and the like.

[canberra]

what you must remember about the navy is that the navy is all about ships! this may come as a shock to navy aircrew but when it come to making cuts they will cut aviation first its as simple as that. surely the time has come to put all aviation under raf control? after all the raf was formed as an amalgamation of the navy and army.

[Jackonicko]

"So if we go with stuffing the Nimrods with missiles, then could that to some extent replace one of the other classes of aircraft?"

Or replace Tomahawk carrying submarines?

Rather than disbanding the RAF why not re-introduce the RAF Marine Branch and put all RN assets under AFB control?

[scroggs]

Seems to me that there's a good deal of wilful ignorance of the basics of this argument here, in favour of single-service, or even single-aircraft side issues.

The UK Government, rightly or wrongly, has decided that its Services will, within the constraints of the Defence Budget, arrange themselves to be capable of, and ready for, expeditionary warfare. Fundamental to that capability (in the Government's view) is the Navy's ability to project carrier groups to areas of foreign-policy interest.

It is surely, then, totally illogical for the Government to now announce that those carrier groups will be denied the only airborne air defence assets they can currently rely on? It is irrelevant what other capabilities might or might not be sacrificed to keep the carrier-borne AD assets. It is certainly not helpful to use the argument as a cover to attack other branches and resources of the Services.

If this capability is genuinely useful and desirable, then the case should be made for its retention - and for the provision of extra funds to do so if necessary. It should not be the cause of a 'turf war' between the stormtroopers of the various interest-groups within the armed forces.

We are, I believe, all on the same side. Aren't we?

[Jackonicko]

It isn't policy to do any of these things autonomously, without allied support. If it was then we'd need adequate SEAD of our own and an F-15 class air superiority fighter every time we deploy a GR4, a Harrier or a Jag. Instead we rely on the Spams or the Dutch or whoever for fighters, and on the Germans and Spams for SEAD. It's not ideal, it 'goes against the grain' but it works.

In just the same way, in those rare circumstances where we need Fleet Air Defence, we'll expect to get it from our Allies. Not an ideal solution, but it's only a capability gap, pending introduction of FCBA, anyway. And if we had to get rid of one frontline fast jet type, Sea Harrier was the one to lose. It's a shame, and we'd be better off keeping it, but that's not an option, financially.

Simple as that.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Despite my problems, my commitment to the RN and to the Crown continues....

From the Daily Telegraph

The Government did not consult Britain's closest military allies or Nato about its plans to axe the Fleet Air Arm's Sea Harriers, the Ministry of Defence has admitted.

Ministers have argued that from 2006, when the Harriers are due to be withdrawn in a cost-cutting measure, the Navy would be able to dispatch a task force with air defence provided by a "coalition" aircraft carrier.

But the MoD has now admitted, after questioning by Tory MPs, that no advance discussions were held with America, France, Spain, Italy and Germany before the decision was announced on Feb 28.

Neither were discussions held with Lord Robertson, the Nato secretary general, Adam Ingram, the Armed Forces minister, said in a Commons written reply.

The decision to withdraw what the Navy regards as Britain's best all-weather fighter is known to have caused alarm among senior officers of the US Navy and US Air Force.

Without the Sea Harriers, the Navy could not unilaterally deploy a task force from 2006 until at least 2012 when the planned new Anglo-American Joint Strike Fighter is introduced.

Ministers have argued that they cannot envisage Britain participating in any military action between 2006 and 2012 when the Navy would not be acting in partnership with allies.

But Mr Ingram admitted the MoD had kept its close allies in the dark about the decision and they would be informed officially only in Britain's annual submission to the Nato defence planning questionnaire.

[high spirits]

This pissing contest between Nimrod/Tornado etc is rather missing the point and I think that the dark blue do themselves no favours every time they suggest an RAF asset is scrapped in favour of a naval one. As a light blue bod, I am alarmed by the govts comment that it can not envisage going sausage side after 2006 without some form of air cover ie US. We suffer under a govt who is famous for sending us away sans gucci kit but this takes the buscuit. The Sea Harrier is an integral part of layered defence for the Fleet. I don't want to be deployed on a ship that is simply defending itself with missiles or cannon. This is the govt trying to take the forces back to the dark ages.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

I agree totally High Spirits.

The letters/postings I have written have made this point. As you may know my career has suffered something of a disaster lately, but I still feel loyalty and commitment to service, nation and Crown.

My long letter on the SHAR Wars thread explored some of the problems of relying entirely on ship based defences. Or other peoples' air defence assets. Particulary when you consider that none of our allies have been consulted.

Cutting one asset to spend the money on another (which, basically, is what has happened to the Sea Harrier) is like not buying a hammer for your new tool kit so you can buy an extra spanner.

[Jackonicko]

Yes, WEBF, but if experience shows that you use your toolkit only for working on your car, maybe the extra spanner is what you need - specially since a brand new hammer is already on order and you can borrow the neighbours in the interim.

[timzsta]

Biggus - your understanding of the RN's role is about a decade out of date. I trust you have not had time to read about British Defence Policy of late because you have had your head stuck in your aircrafts TACMAN and your FRC's lately.

When I first saw this post I thought "Wow people are making a stand against the appaling decision". However as usual it has developed into nothing more than an RN v RAF slanging match.

So perhaps its time to state some objective facts:
1. FA2 = best AD aircraft in UK inventory.

2. F3 = Red Air Mig 23 simulator for rest of NATO (takes two to fly it versus the former Warsaw pacts one).

3. No ASW threat to UK waters. Those who know anything about ASW will tell you anout 75% of submarine detections are made visually, by lookouts on ships or by helo crews. I cant remember one exercise where any MPA has made the initial detection. And the best thing to counter a submarine is another submarine. The RN has some quite good ones, and the best submariners in the world inside them.

4. Nimrod is a good ASuW assett. Its speed, loiter time, radar and comms fit is excellent for this role. Lets keep some for this job. But not spend £100 million per aircraft on the off chance of getting a detection when someone looks out of the galley window.

5. If we want to talk about efficiencies (those who sing this as the Jaguars strength) lets look at the big picture. The RAF has 3 aircraft types doing the same role. I dont even think the USAF has this luxury! Multi role is the only way to go.

6. All this is pointless anyway - the ministers will never go back on their decision. Those who stay better start keeping their fingers crossed and looking for lucky charms. Because if I worked in long term plans in Argentine military I would be looking at what I might be capable of doing in about 2007/8. Gives me a nice run in to train and procure.... Those who dont stay, see you in the airlines.

[Biggus]

Timzsta
Thank you for your reply, as I told you I have a very small brain, and am more than willing to listen and be informed. As I said my knowledge of maritime is limited - all I was trying to do was point out what I considered was an illogical arguement by Alphaleaderuk reference the Nimrod and the UKs requirement for ASW assets.

I am not an air defender either, but for what it is worth my opinion is that with its potent mixture of radar and weapons the Shar IS THE BEST AIR DEFENCE AIRCRAFT THE UK HAS! My knowledge of the RN and its capabilitys is general, but I believed - rightly or wrongly - it was largely slanted towards ASW, with the Type 23/Merlin combination forming over half the surface assets. This opinion may well be wrong - I am more than willing to be re-educated. Perhaps I should go away and do some research before I dare to post again! I have not had time to read about British Defence Policy of late because I have been too busy doing my job in an overstretched and undermanned part of the RAF (which I am sure applies equally to the RN and Army), where none of the flight commanders ever turn down tasking (no one gets promoted by saying no) whilst trying to prevent my marriage and family life from going down the tubes - besides which it is a boring read, and you can't just flip to the back page to see if the butler did it!!!

I have no wish to get into a slanging match, and have nothing at all against the RN (I do actually have this strange concept that we are ALL ON THE SAME SIDE!!!), but feel I should point out that I made no comments defending the F3 or on the value of the Jaguar. The F3 may or may not be a valuable asset, once again I am not in a position to say - other light blue guys have defended it - but I do remember reading once that it is far easier to turn a good fighter into a bomber (F-15 for example) than a good bomber into a fighter (the RAF tried that with the Blenheim in 1940!!!).

[WE Branch Fanatic]

It has been claimed that I have had a disagreement with an ex Sea Harier ace. If this is true I apolegise. I think that most of the RN/ex RN people on PPRuNE agree broadly with most of my points. I apolegise for any inaccuracies that my postings may contain.

On a slight tanget, local news reported the other night that there are plans to make Yeovilton (not just the FAA museum but large parts of the base, including the SHAR hangers) open to the public. Whats that all about? And how can it work, considering issues such as security, public safety, FOD etc?

[canberra]

it is mod policy (and its been a policy for as long as ive been in the mob) that mod assets within reason can be used by civilians. to give you an example when the open golf was on at leuchars we took over 100k in landing fees from the likes of monty, tiger, the golden bear etc. after all as a tax payer would you be happy at all the stuff paid for by you, such as the gym and swimming pool not being used to their full extent? and as for security believe it or not airfields are at less risk than barracks in towns.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

But surely a hanger contains classified materials? And what about the problem of people dropping Mars Bar wrappers, empty Coke cans etc?

Still, it might help gain public sympathy/support over the Sea Harrier issue.

[Chinese Vic]

WEBF

Usually when Joe Public is around you lock the "classified materials" away! (or cover it up, deny access to a particular area depnding on the size of the the thing...)
:cool:

[BEagle]

Or you can leave a few deliberate spoofs lying around to confuse the anoraks who poke their lenses through office windows.....

[Tbird]

This is just a question, but i saw in the Sunday Telegraph an article on the F3 not being compatible with the AMRAAM. The article claims that the Foxhunter radar in the F3 isn't compatible with the AMRAAM. During live firing exercises the missile even tried to engage the escorting F3 (apparently). The problem being (it states), is that the Tornados radar is unable to communicate with the missle before and after firing, so the missle is fired 'blind' and has to use it's own seeker head to engage targets.

The article goes on to talk about how there is little point spending £125 million on a missile that cannot be used in combat. Now comes what the article is getting at. Could the money saved go towards saving the SHAR, which is capable of using the AMRAAM to an awesome effect? Do you think that this is possible? I don't know the figures for the amount of money needed to save the SHAR, but could it be done?

Can i also add that this isn't a reply designed to have a dig at the F3 crews who i have huge respect for. Thanks

Tbird

[rivetjoint]

Is it written in stone yet that the USMC/RN version of the JSF/F-35 will actually make it off the production line?

[Jackonicko]

T Bird, See the thread 'Keystone Kops get Airborne'.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

See http://users.ox.ac.uk/~daveh/Military/seaharrier/index.html

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Mr. Robert Syms (Poole): The focus of today's debate is the Ministry of Defence's decision, announced on 28 February, to axe the Royal Navy Sea Harrier units from the beginning of 2004; service will end by 2006. The decision is of great concern to the Opposition as it affects the Royal Navy and the future of this country's defence. Even the Minister of State for Defence, who was involved in the decision, pointed out:




"There is an associated risk attached to all of this, but it is without question a decision based on the balance of investment. We believe it to be an entirely logical step".—[Official Report, 29 April 2002; Vol. 384, c. 660.]

We will point out the flaws in the decision during the debate, I hope that the Minister will not only respond, but reconsider this short-sighted policy.

In 1998, the Government conducted their strategic defence review and decided to restructure the Harrier forces in the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Air Force.


Mr. Mark Francois (Rayleigh): Will my hon. Friend comment on two related points? First, although we are discussing a matter of great importance to the defence of the fleet and therefore to the defence of the realm, no Labour Back Bencher is present. Secondly, without intending any disrespect to the Under-Secretary of State, for whom I have a considerable amount of time, I have to say that it is disrespectful of the Secretary of State for Defence not to be present in Westminster Hall this morning to discuss such an important matter.


Mr. Syms : I make no comment about the Government: people can make up their own mind about the Government's priorities. However, I draw attention to my hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State for Defence, who is answering the debate for the Opposition. I welcome his contribution, as it proves what importance the Conservative party attach to the issue.

The 1998 strategic defence review proposed a joint force of the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Air Force. The Opposition were not against that because there is logic in it, but we are concerned that already, only two years later, the Government are changing the shape of the defence forces proposed in the review, and the decision will reduce the flexibility of the Royal Navy. Between 2006 and the introduction into service of the new aircraft carriers between 2012 and 2015, there will be a major gap in air defence of our fleet. The Opposition regard that with great concern. A key lesson of modern defence is that air superiority is vital to our armed services, so it is a serious matter to give up air superiority of our fleet.

8 May 2002 : Column 70WH

The United Kingdom's Sea Harrier is a capable fighter aircraft. We all remember its vital role in defending the fleet from air attack during the Falklands war. In 1982, the Sea Harrier destroyed 28 of the 100 enemy aircraft destroyed; more importantly, United States Air Force analysts said that it deterred 453 further attacks on the fleet. Without it, that enterprise would not have been successful. In 1996, Commander Richard Dawkins—Commander Air for the Fleet Air Arm—said:




"the F/A2 is the best air-defence aircraft in Europe".

It is therefore important to keep the aircraft as part of our armoury to protect our fleet.

Many members of the press have expressed concern about the decision. In March 2002, the much respected Jane's Defence Weekly commented:




"Withdrawal of Sea Harrier FA2, equipped with the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile will . . . represent a significant diminution of the RN's fleet defence capability. Whereas the FA2 is equipped with the Blue Vixen multi-mode radar, the GR7/GR9 lacks a radar and is only equipped with short range air-to-air weapons for self-defence."

That is a critical point. There has just been a major refit of the FA2s. In 1985, work began on a mid-life update of the Sea Harrier fleet. Finished only in 1996, the programme cost £466 million. We can stretch the life of the aircraft to give our fleet substantial protection.

Why have the Government changed their policy and what are their motives? Is it money? The overall cost of keeping the Sea Harriers would represent good, not bad value for the taxpayer. The Government claim that the move will save £109 million between 2002–03 and 2005–06, but if it impedes the flexibility of naval forces and does not provide protection for carriers, it is a short-sighted economy. The replacement of the Harrier GR7 with the upgraded GR9 means no stand-off weapons capability, as the aircraft will not be equipped with an appropriate gun. The arms it possesses will give it an over-the-target capability, but, as we all know, it is difficult to deliver that payload when the enemy state has an air defence system.

It is important that the fleet has a layered defence. Sea Harriers provide the outer layer, patrolling perhaps 100 nautical miles around the fleet's exterior. Because radar can see down and jet fighters can cover hundreds of square miles, they provide the outer protection. The key to protecting the fleet is to see off any potential threat before it becomes a real threat to our ships, and that involves deterring as well as shooting down. The problem with relying on the type 45 for missile defence is that the moment an aircraft comes within the range of our missiles, we are within the range of its missiles. That puts our fleet in great danger.

We all know that Britain has been involved in several areas of tension, albeit not clear-cut war. Our fleet may be stationed off the coast of a nation over which the west is in dispute. I can readily imagine a rogue state sending jet fighters to threaten our fleet, and presenting our fleet commander with a difficult choice—to take an aircraft out, or allow it to come close enough to launch its missiles, which could result in the loss of a ship. That choice would not arise with Sea Harriers protecting the fleet, because of their great reach.

8 May 2002 : Column 71WH

I remain deeply concerned about the change. The Government place great emphasis on the type 45, but the fact remains that by 2010 to 2012, we shall have only three type 45s. The missile for which we all have great hopes—the principal anti-air-missile system—will certainly be superior to the Sea Dart, but to provide high-level protection it will have to act at the height of its capability from day one, straight out of the box, and we know that high technology does not always work like that. I am worried that we are giving away an air superiority fighter that would have provided protection for the fleet, and instead relying on missile defence when we may not have sufficient ships or sufficient missiles to make it work for our fleet in areas of significant risk.

The Government have spoken about significant technical difficulties, such as problems with the Harrier and Sea Harrier in hot climates, which can affect the power of the engines, but the Harrier's record shows that it has served all over the world, including the middle east and off Sierra Leone, so I see no reason not to continue its service. Even with a slight diminution of capability, it remains a capable air defence fighter for protecting our fleet. Off the coast of Sierra Leone, the Sea Harrier was used for patrolling and bombing missions on the mainland in preference to the Army version. Its radar enables it to find the ship, which the Army version cannot do.

Incidentally, a hardy aircraft is required to serve in a maritime environment. The Sea Harrier has anti-corrosive treatment to enable it to serve in that environment, whereas adapting the proposed GR9 to ensure that it can serve on land and off aircraft carriers might involve quite expensive treatment.

My principal concern is that getting rid of the Sea Harrier will make us heavily reliant on other forces if we were to deploy in the air defence of a British battle group. We would have to rely on US carrier protection, which immediately inhibits what we can do. The French are also a possibility, because they have an aircraft carrier and air superiority forces; perhaps India is, too. Perhaps if we had to sell the aircraft to India, we could do a deal whereby the Indians protect the Royal Navy. The Government's policy decision leads us to all those conclusions.

I am genuinely concerned because the Sea Harrier is a proven aircraft. Admittedly, it is slowly becoming obsolescent, but all military kit becomes obsolescent. There is a substantial difference between keeping an aircraft that is ageing but can perform a role, and getting rid of it entirely and having no aircraft to perform that role. Our fleet needs protection: the added security of an air defence fighter in the form of the Sea Harrier is vital to ensure the maximum flexibility of the armed services.

I hope that the Government will reconsider carefully the arguments being advanced from all quarters, including the Opposition. The policy decision will substantially inhibit the Government's strategic outlook. It will be a sad day in the future when the Royal Navy can deploy a battle group only by agreement with other countries. The Royal Navy has always been the third navy in the world and a blue-water navy that can deploy around the world. I believe that, at least in the

8 May 2002 : Column 72WH

interim before the future aircraft carriers are introduced, the Navy will not be able to perform the tasks that the Government continually give it.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Several hon. Members rose—


Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst): Order. With such demand, brevity will be our friend.


9.42 am


Richard Ottaway (Croydon, South): First, let me pick up on the final remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Mr. Syms). Once, as the British fleet closed on the American fleet, the Americans signalled to the British fleet, "How's the world's second largest navy?" The Royal Navy replied, "Fine. How's the second best?"

I had the privilege to serve in the Fleet Air Arm in the 1960s. I was a fighter controller, carried on board HMS Eagle and operating out of Royal Naval air station Yeovilton. It was a time of great tension: Russian aircraft would constantly overfly the fleet. We operated primarily in the north Atlantic, off the coast of Norway, and in the Mediterranean. I had the privilege of being on board HMS Eagle when the first vertical take-off aircraft landed. The Kestrel was the forerunner of the Harrier, and it became obvious to those of us involved in defence of the fleet that it was an integral part of Britain's defence system. I was also involved in the trials of the Phantom, which was the backbone of the Fleet Air Arm throughout the 1970s and 1980s. HMS Eagle carried a fleet of Sea Vixens of 899 Squadron, which were the backbone of the air defence capability of the Fleet Air Arm. Those aircraft were flown in combat air patrols over the fleet, in a manner that was described admirably by my hon. Friend the Member for Poole, in an air defence capacity.

It is unthinkable that British amphibious forces could be deployed in a modern theatre without air cover—it is an essential ingredient of modern warfare. I can understand how the problem has arisen. The new carriers are predicted to come into service in 2012, but I guess that it will be 2015 or even later. There will potentially be an eight, nine or 10-year gap in the fleet.

The FA2 is a fantastic aircraft: it carries a tremendous weapons system and good radar. One difficulty is that it is getting old; another is that it is designed to operate in the north Atlantic, not in hot weather conditions such as the Indian ocean and the Gulf. It is unable to land if it is still carrying a heavy load of unused missiles, and the only alternative is to dump the missiles, which is a bit like dumping a Rolls-Royce every time the aircraft comes in to land. It differs from the GR7, which is bigger, lighter and made of more modern fibres than the heavy FA2. More recently, the FA2 has effectively ridden as shotgun for GR7 bombers, for example in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The solution is to upgrade the FA2 and fit a modern engine, but the Government have chosen not to do so. I assume that the reasons for that are budgetary, but there are only 17 FA2s: is it really worth sacrificing the essential air defence cover of our amphibious forces because there is a lack of cash to upgrade the engines of 17 aircraft? It is a big risk, and the Government are seriously exposing themselves with the decision.

8 May 2002 : Column 73WH

The second world war was won as a result of air superiority, and HMS Sheffield was lost due to a lack of air superiority. In the Gulf war, the position was never tested, but I am sure that the Americans would not have gone to the Gulf had they not had air defence cover.


Mr. Francois : There is an old naval saying about spoiling a ship for a ha'p'orth of tar. Is this decision not a modern variant?


Richard Ottaway : My hon. Friend is right. It is such a bad decision for a modest budgetary sum, which is why it baffles me.

The Government say that the answer is to upgrade the missile defence system and have spoken about the introduction of the type 45s and new PAAMS air defence system. However, the world is an uncertain place. Who would have thought 12 months ago that the Marines would be deployed in Afghanistan today? We have no idea where future threats will come from. We are highly vulnerable in many theatres, and the Government's decision will put at risk the lives of many men and women who serve the interests of this country.

Equally seriously, the Minister will be putting at risk major warships at the centre of our amphibious fleet. The potential to lose a ship is dramatically increased in the event of a missile attack on the fleet, and the result would be catastrophic. The Exocet that sunk HMS Sheffield is now out of date, but just as British and European technology has advanced, so too has other technology. Missiles now have all the capability in the world.

I have three questions. First, how good does the Minister think PAAMS, which is, unfortunately, a French system, will be on the type 45, and how much cover will it give to our amphibious forces? Secondly, what are his proposals for airborne early warning radar cover of the fleet? Thirdly, how do the Government intend to fill the gap I have mentioned?

If there are no clear answers, the consequences will be profound. If the fleet is lost as a result, I would not like to be in the Minister's shoes when he faces the House to explain the decision. Defence is the most basic function of Government, and a strong defence is the surest way to peace. By this decision, the Minister has put that status at risk, and he will be held to account if he gets it wrong.


9.49 am


Mr. David Heath (Somerton and Frome): I, too, congratulate the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) on securing the debate. It is a great pleasure for me to take part, because I represent the constituency that contains Yeovilton, where much of the Fleet Air Arm is based—although if the boundary commission has its way, it will be moved to the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Laws). I would consider that a great loss.

We are proud of the Fleet Air Arm, which is the oldest air service in this country. We are proud of both its history and its future capabilities. I am pleased that the Government have recognised that capability in some of their recent decisions, but the decision on the Harriers has rightly caused some consternation, not least because of the personal issues associated with the crew and

8 May 2002 : Column 74WH

families at Yeovilton, who have faced considerable disruption in the past year or so. First, they were told that they were to leave Somerset for what I was criticised in the papers for calling "the wilderness of Lincolnshire". I withdraw that comment unreservedly. I am sure that Lincolnshire is a delightful place, but it is not where the crew and their families want to live, having built their lives in Somerset. They have faced considerable uncertainty. They have made career and family decisions based on a decision that was subsequently rescinded. It is regrettable that the information on which so a recent a decision was based has in a short time changed so much that the decision has been reversed.

Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex): The hon. Gentleman misunderstands the point. The fact that the Government were planning to transfer the Sea Harriers to Lincolnshire underlines the short-term nature of their decision. It was not the intended decision; they made it under budgetary pressures in the short term. It was originally intended to extend the life of the Sea Harriers and deploy them from Lincolnshire.


Mr. Heath : The hon. Gentleman pre-empts my point. This is an example of the Ministry's short-term thinking, which is difficult to defend to the people involved, however grateful I am to see a continuation of their presence in Somerset in years to come.

The hon. Member for Poole raised the wider issue that the decision strikes at the heart of the expeditionary strategy, which was the basis of the strategic defence review. I welcomed the development of the strategy, which puts amphibious operations at the heart of the future capabilities of the British armed forces, treats the Navy as a crucial element of that capacity, and envisages the amphibious taskforce as a basic unit of deployment in the Navy. However, if that strategy is to be successful, the decision on the Sea Harriers leaves many questions, because it leaves an amphibious force no air-to-air capacity and no forward detection capability beyond the horizon offered by rotary aircraft above the taskforce. The decision suggests that the Ministry has taken the view that within the relevant period an amphibious taskforce can and will be deployed only in the context of littoral warfare, and only with support from America or other navies that still enjoy air-to-air capacity.

Although I understand that rationale, it begs the question what happens in the case of the unexpected and the unknowable. To what extent is an expeditionary strategy constrained by that lack of capacity? As we have heard, eventually we will have type 45s, which will provide missile defence in the form of PAAMS, but that is an untried system, and as a replacement it will need to work from day one.

The second strand of replacement is the joint strike fighter, but there are questions about the JSF's design and how far advanced its marinisation is. There is a conundrum: the Government have announced that they want to have two carriers, but they cannot be designed until we know the form of the aircraft that will fly from those carriers. The whole process is held up while we wait for the Americans to work on the marinisation of the JSF.

8 May 2002 : Column 75WH

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Have the Government accepted a curtailment of the capacity of the expeditionary strategy during the interim period? How soon will we have firm proposals for the marinisation of the joint strike fighter, and at what stage will firm design proposals for the new carriers be possible? What will happen to our existing carriers in the interim—at what stage will one or both of the operational carriers be taken out of service? Do those carriers have the capacity to convert to rotary wing use, which would enhance our amphibious capacity and might supplement HMS Ocean, which is one of the most important elements of the strategy.

Is it clear that the contribution made by naval air capacity is crucial to the future defence of this country and to the deployment further afield that the Government clearly want to use and have used frequently in the past few years? If so, are they willing to put in the investment that will make the means equal to the ends?


9.56 am


Mr. Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford): I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) on securing such a timely debate. I declare an interest in that two members of my family are serving officers in the Royal Navy.

The Government's on-the-hoof decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier is bad for both the Navy and its personnel. I contend that it reduces the capability of the joint force Harrier. Most significantly and, as highlighted by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), it will undermine the pivotal role of the Royal Navy in the future defence of this country and its role in an expeditionary force.

The Sea Harrier has served this country well. The original version was at the heart of the naval campaign in the Falklands, where, even shorn of its current capabilities, it showed its defensive strength on several occasions. Since then, the Sea Harrier has been radically upgraded. Only three or four years ago, at the time of the strategic defence review, it was clearly intended by the Government to be the provider of air defence for the Royal Navy all the way through to 2012. All the documentation and information that the Royal Navy has published clearly supports that intention, so the last-minute decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier 10 years earlier than was previously anticipated seems peculiar.

What is the reason? Ministers say, "Well, the aircraft is ageing," but we are discussing the FA2, which only began service in approximately 1993—indeed, one of those aeroplanes was delivered only three years ago, in 1999. It is not an ageing aircraft. If it were, Ministers might be less able to sell it to other countries. We are told that the engine will not be able to cope with the heat, yet it has served in Sierra Leone and the Gulf. It is said, "Well, don't worry because the Harrier GR7 and GR9 will replace it," but those aircraft are designed specifically as a ground attack plane—a specific and different purpose. To replace a defensive aircraft with a ground attack aircraft is like trying to replace a shield with a spear. They are inherently different in their function and, operationally, such a replacement makes no sense.

8 May 2002 : Column 76WH

The unstated reason is, as usual, money. As my hon. Friend the Member for Poole pointed out, in practical terms, the Royal Navy will be left without a defensive fixed-wing aircraft for at least six years—and probably 10 years. We all accept that air defence should be provided in layers, the first and most important of which is the Sea Harrier; therefore to remove that layer will inevitably increase the risk to our ships and service personnel. I understand that the Minister of State for Defence has already accepted that possibility, but I ask the Minister present today whether he believes that our service personnel should have to accept such a risk. After all, it is their safety on the line, not his.

Another argument put forward by the Government is that the type 45 destroyer will fill the gap. That is to overlook the tiny detail that one is a ship and the other is a subsonic aircraft. There are other problems. The type 45 does not have the Sea Harrier's over-the-horizon radar and, as we heard earlier, there will not be sufficient numbers to provide complete cover in any realistic sense until at least 2010. Also, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome rightly pointed out, the much vaunted PAAMS missile system is still in a box and has yet to be tested. We do not know whether it will work: it may be superb, but it may fail. That is the risk that Ministers are taking.

Perhaps the most ironic result of the decision to scrap Sea Harriers is that the capability of joint force Harrier will be set back, because, as we have heard, Sea Harrier has the Blue Vixen radar and GR7/9 does not. Therefore, joint force Harrier will now have to rely on the one aircraft that does not have that radar. That is a retrograde step and although I appreciate that the Minister is not directly responsible for the decision, I hope that he will confirm that in his reply.

The Government's on-the-hoof decision will undermine the Navy's expeditionary role—a critical role that lies at the heart of the whole characteristic of the strategic defence review. All expeditionary sea forces need air defence—ask any Falklands veteran. Even 20 years ago, the Sea Harrier was able to take out 28 Argentine aircraft for the loss of only two of our own in combat. Sea Harrier is essential to any task force or similar naval operation.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Without our own naval air defence aircraft, the MOD is asking the Royal Navy to face an invidious choice. This country must either rely on the forces of another country if we sail beyond our own shores, or take the huge risk of travelling without proper cover; or we must play safe and the Royal Navy become a coastal defence force. The Minister does not have to take my word for that. Lieutenant-Commander Peter Burgess wrote to The Daily Telegraph at the end of March saying:




"Without the Harriers, the Royal Navy is reduced to a coastal force. Any attempt to operate elsewhere would place an unacceptable risk on any task group and the elements it supports."

Twenty years ago, this country sailed across the world in defence of its interests. Today, under the Labour Government, there is every danger that our services would be unable to repeat a mission on that scale and would instead be restricted to our coasts. I appreciate that this is not the Minister's area of responsibility and I am sorry that the Secretary of State has not seen fit to participate in this debate. Clearly, he has other priorities. However, I say to the Minister that the
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decision represents a cut too far. It is operationally unsound and strategically inept, and I call upon him to reconsider, go back to the drawing board and plan again.

10.4 am


Patrick Mercer (Newark): I am grateful for this opportunity to speak and especially grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) for securing this debate, which goes to the heart of our future defence policy. I have never been in the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy or the Fleet Air Arm, but I have been carried by and served under the protection of the Fleet Air Arm, and I was hugely grateful in both instances for the professionalism and dedication of that service.

I should like to start with a quote:




"The removal of the air arm from the control of the Navy left the fleet vulnerable to air attack and meant that the endeavour that had cost so much British blood could not be completed effectively."

On St. George's day 1918, there was a combined attack on the German naval base at Zeebrugge. Admiral Sir Roger Keyes felt that, despite the death of nearly 1,000 bluejackets and Royal Marines, the nation's safety was still endangered because he did not have aircraft in his control, as the Royal Naval Air Service had recently been transferred into the nascent Royal Air Force. I suggest that we may be putting ourselves in a similar position today.

The lessons of history were heeded at first. Our understanding of the projection of power from or by ships into the air both for coastal and blue-water defence developed into the Fleet Air Arm. That led to our outstanding naval successes in the second world war, the Korean war and, most recently, in the Falklands. What worries me horribly about the gap of at least six years that will be left is that the lessons of history have been ignored.

A great deal has been said and, for the sake of brevity, I shall not repeat much of the technicalities. I shall talk about the essential difference between the FA2 and the GR7/GR9. We have heard the splendid analogy made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Prisk) of the shield and the spear. We should take that further and use it to try to understand the layered element that the use of Sea Harriers gives the Royal Navy.

We know about the medium-range Sea Dart, which has the limitations of its age and radar, and about the closer-range Sea Wolf. There is also the last-ditch defence, the Phalanx gun, which we trust and hope will—as it did in many cases in the Falklands—interdict enemy aircraft attacking the fleet. However, the Sea Harrier is the shield, or more properly the eyes and ears of the Navy. It is capable of seeing beyond not only the physical horizon but the radar horizon provided by the Royal Navy's current radar suite. Without that aircraft not only to interdict but to see and report for maritime reconnaissance, the Navy is effectively blinded.

The GL7 is and the improved GL9 will be an impressive aircraft that will fill much of the capability gap for ground attack. However, the aircraft has no defensive capability, and it has precious little reconnaissance capability without the radar system that the FA2 already has. These systems are still highly

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vulnerable to a sea-skimming attack by, for example, the Exocet and the much-improved modern versions of that missile, which are too numerous to mention. We are told that PAAMS will fill that gap much better than the Sea Dart can in the interim, before the joint strike fighter comes on stream.
I have personal understanding of two systems of radar and radar-controlled missiles. The first is Sea Owl, which was a naval system that was meant to be extremely well adapted, capable and competent for use at sea. We tried to adapt that system for use in the Victor towers in south Armagh, to oversee the landscape in that difficult countryside. Eventually, we got the system working, but it was not as adaptable as we had hoped, and there were all sorts of glitches. That meant that our operational effectiveness as soldiers on the south Armagh border was severely hampered until the equipment worked.

Secondly, and much more pertinently, I have experience of the Rapier system. As many of my hon. Friends will know, the Rapier was developed for point defence of military instillations against ground-attack aircraft. It worked extremely well, and was designed for the cold war. It was extensively troop-trialled, and was embarked with a naval force to go to the Falklands. It was thought to be highly effective until it was established as point defence in winds of up to 70 or 80 mph, at which point the system failed. Eventually, those involved got the thing working, but in the interim operational effectiveness had been severely curtailed and British Marines and paratroopers had died as a result of ground attack. The system simply did not work and had not been tried in such conditions.

I urge the Minister not to place too much faith in an untried system. Any soldier, sailor or airman will make the point that equipment must be tried. Until such time as it tried, PAAMS cannot be relied on to plug the gap that will be at least six years in duration. I do not want to iterate points that have already been made, but an aircraft that may be aging, obsolescent and under severe trial in hot and dusty conditions is none the less battle proven and, most importantly, still commands the faith and trust of its pilots. I speak from personal experience—a Harrier coming in at low level over the top of one is a hugely reassuring sight. Until such time as we have a proper, reliable and sensible replacement, I urge the Minister to reconsider his decision.

We have heard that the Navy has been reduced to coastal protection. I take that a stage further: it is almost a fisheries protection fleet. That is all that we have. Without the aircraft, the Navy is effectively blinded. Someone once said that, if nothing else, war is the province of confusion and uncertainty. Until such time as we can guarantee that we can operate without crucial help from allies, to propose that we should operate only under an American or French air umbrella is simply ridiculous.

One point that I do not believe has been mentioned is that there will be a vital training gap until such time as our two new carriers are on stream. That will be sometime between 2012 and 2015, by which time the Fleet Air Arm, or what remains of it, is likely to have lost any capability that it has for the style of operation involved. It is not an operational style that is quickly

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acquired or understood, and we do a grave disservice to both our surface fleet and our Fleet Air Arm by not allowing them to maintain that capability.
In conclusion, I simply say this: all the time, the armed forces have a finger pointed at them and are told that they are preparing for the last war—they are blamed for not looking over the horizon and preparing for the next war. However, in this instance we have neglected the lessons of the last war and previous wars. One thing is certain: we can never be certain. To protect against uncertainty, we must keep the Sea Harrier in service.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate): Occasionally, the MOD throws up a decision that is so bizarre or so illiterate, as the shadow Secretary of State described the decision this morning on the radio, that some analysis has to be carried out to ascertain how it could possibly have reached such a conclusion. Inevitably, we find that the dead hand of the Treasury sits behind the reason why the MOD has reached an extremely strange conclusion.

I take issue with one point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, South (Richard Ottaway). He said that he would not want to be in the Minister's shoes if and when Royal Navy sailors incur the decision's potentially awful consequences. By the time the decision comes into effect, the Minister will be long gone—being, in Sir Robin Day's famous words, "A here today, gone tomorrow Minister", as all Ministers are. It is likely that the Minister who will carry the can at that stage is sitting on the Benches alongside my hon. Friend. I therefore hope that the MOD will review the decision, but not merely in the interests of one of my hon. Friends, who may have responsibility for the matter in future.

The decision is important because the consequences at some point down the line are potentially catastrophic. The MOD is making a decision now that will have an effect in 12 or 14 years' time. The analysis that it has advanced in support of the decision not to upgrade the FA2s and to keep them in service until the joint strike fighter comes on line does not bear scrutiny. The risks that the Ministry is taking, such as those associated with PAAMS and the difficulty of bringing such technology into service on time, are far too great. The MOD's claim that the type 45s will be delivered on time and in sufficient numbers to cover the gap left by the FA2s does not bear analysis either.

In its 1998 strategic defence review, the MOD confirmed the decision taken by the previous Conservative Government and announced in the 1997 general election manifesto to replace existing carriers with new ones. It was an expensive decision, and the necessary investment must be behind it if it is to be delivered. I speak as a veteran of three long-term costings rounds, in 1993, 1994 and 1995. Mr. Deputy Speaker, you will remember from your service on the Select Committee on Defence that at that time the defence budget was under significant pressure. Money is the reason why the MOD has come up with a decision that flies in the face of the overall strategy of the SDR and violates the principles of the entire direction of British defence policy as set out in 1998. The Ministry is plainly scratching round within each area of its budget for savings to meet the budget line.

8 May 2002 : Column 80WH

The whole LTC process is always an effort to get a quart into pint pot, and it occasionally throws up painful decisions. Perhaps this is a case of royal yachting gone wrong. To those hon. Members who are not familiar with royal yachting, I should explain that when the Navy was asked for cuts, the first thing it offered was the royal yacht. It knew that as long as there was a Conservative Secretary of State for Defence, there was no question of the royal yacht being taken as a defence cut. Eventually that strategy became discredited, but it did not stop the Navy continuing with it from time to time. I suspect that someone may have made the suggestion about the FA2s in the firm knowledge that as we now have a carrier strategy and as the whole of the MOD's policy is predicated on expeditionary capacity and a proper ability to defend the fleet, there could be no question of taking the FA2s.

Optimistic calculations give us a six-year gap, but the aircraft will start to come out of service in 2004 and will be completely out of service by 2006. The gap will last between six to eight years—and that is an optimistic estimate. There may be problems bringing a new carrier into service. We may have to wait until we know the exact capability and requirements of the new joint strike fighter. The timetable may slip—they always do—and we could be carrying a risk for a wholly unacceptable period.

Those who put this measure in LTC 2002 may have believed that it would never be accepted, yet it has been. The decision may have been taken because of the consequences that the carrier strategy, which I endorse, has for expenditure in other areas. Some painful decisions are having to be taken in the land and air budgets. Perhaps this was an opportunity for a little bit of revenge to be taken inside the MOD. Who knows what happened in the internal MOD debate and exactly what the motivations are of the staff who accepted the measure and allowed it to be put to Ministers? None the less, Ministers must understand that their job is to take decisions, and they are the ones who have to engage with the Treasury to ensure that the defence strategy to which the Government have set their hand will be properly funded.

In the light of the decision on the FA2s, one has to conclude that the Government are not prepared to invest properly in the defence policy that they have announced and to which they have committed the country. It cannot be right for the Government to accept the appalling risk created by the length of time that the Royal Navy will be without a proper air-to-air capability that would enable it to act, if necessary on its own, in circumstances that it is impossible to predict, in the next decade and beyond. The decision vividly illustrates the fact that the Ministry of Defence appears to have lost its debate with the Treasury about securing proper funding for the 1998 strategic defence review and the new chapter.

The Government must collectively reconsider. The Secretary of State for Defence must make it clear that the position is unacceptable and that he must have a properly funded defence strategy. If the Government will not provide the means, they must re-evaluate their strategy—an uncomfortable conclusion—because there is no point in having a carrier-based, expeditionary strategy to enable the United Kingdom to operate around the world if that strategy is not properly funded

8 May 2002 : Column 81WH

and equipped. We are conning ourselves about our ability to sustain that strategy if we are not willing to give the means to support it. Our servicemen will pay the price, and that is unacceptable.

10.21 am


Mr. David Laws (Yeovil): I am grateful for the opportunity to take part in this important debate, and I add my thanks to the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) for having raised the subject. All our defence debates are important, but some are more important than others, and this debate addresses one of the biggest issues that has arisen in defence policy since the election—and perhaps for considerably longer than that. We are talking about losing for years not merely a small portion of our capability in a particular defence area, but our entire capability in that area.

The case for the prosecution has been made effectively in the speeches by the hon. Members for Poole, for Croydon, South (Richard Ottaway), for Newark (Patrick Mercer), for Reigate (Mr. Blunt), and for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Prisk) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). However, from the perspective of actually having a debate, it is a pity that we have not heard the other side of the argument, because that would have made it possible for us to engage more fully with the points that we will hear shortly from the Minister.

I take particular pleasure in being able to take part in the debate because of the proximity of the Yeovilton air base to my constituency. As my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome said, when we are both swept back into power after the next election, we may find that boundary changes make the Yeovilton air base part of my constituency.

The main arguments have already been thoroughly covered, but I wish to raise several points. The one common factor in all our debates on defence is the need for our forces to retain flexibility, so that we can respond to all the different challenges we face in this post-cold war era, wherein we do not know where the next threats will come from. In the 1970s, many people considered it unlikely that we would fight a campaign such as the one we fought in the Falklands in the early 1980s. The Sea Harrier was vital to our success in that campaign—indeed, it is difficult to imagine how we could have won that war without the contribution of the Sea Harrier. None of us are in a position to know whether we will have to fight similar campaigns in future, and the Government are making a serious mistake if they base their policy on the experiences of recent times.

On 28 February, the Minister of State for Defence sent a letter to my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch)—and, no doubt, to the Conservative defence spokesman—that explained the reasons for taking the decision. The Minister wrote:




"The SDR emphasised the requirement for increased carrier-based offensive air-power. This has been borne out by operations in recent years in which it has been the ground attack capabilities of the Harrier GR7 that we have needed most on our carriers."

That may be so, but the Minister was wrong to imply that because that has been the experience of recent years, it will remain the experience in the future.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence will know that there is not only the question whether we need Sea Harriers to defend our fleet in the future, but the fact that in some conflicts we will need aircraft that can defend our ground-attack aircraft against attack from other aircraft. An officer who served with the Fleet Air Arm in the Falklands conflict put that point to me this morning. One consideration that we have perhaps underplayed so far is the great concern felt by experienced, serving and former members of the armed forces about the Government's decision. That includes the taskforce commander in the Falklands, who said that it would impossible to mount a similar campaign now without the protection that Sea Harriers currently provide and that we will shortly lose.

I do not want to open up a gap between my Conservative colleagues and myself, but we should also address the Government's intentions in respect of European Union military capability. Were the Government not intending combat aircraft, including Sea Harriers, to form an important part of that military capability? What decisions have the Government taken about the gap that will be opened up with their future inability to deliver on their commitment to our EU partners regarding the availability of Sea Harriers to act as air defence for our fleet and, potentially, the ships of other EU navies?


Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife): My hon. Friend raises a very important point that relates to not only the European security and defence policy, but to our NATO allies. The capability represented by the Sea Harriers is a NATO capability in the sense that it is available to NATO. Does my hon. Friend have any information about the extent to which the Government's decision was the subject of consultation with our NATO allies, particularly the United States, to whom we might have to look for the protection that the Sea Harriers currently provide?


Mr. Laws : I thank my right hon. and learned Friend, but sadly such matters are beyond me. No doubt the Minister will be able to enlighten us about any discussions that took place with EU and NATO allies before the Government took such a fundamental decision.

Other hon. Members have commented on the gaps that will exist in the lines of defence for the fleet and our other various lines of air defence. That is not only because the furthest outline of defence—the Sea Harriers—are proposed to be removed for some years with nothing in their place, but because there will be holes in the missile defence based on the destroyers. Again, the Minister of State for Defence did not reassure us in his letter of 28 February. In explaining the departure of the Sea Harriers, he said:




"The entry into service of the Type 45 destroyer, equipped with the Principal Anti-Air Missile System from 2007 will provide the Royal Navy with a world class maritime area air defence capability."

Not only are we talking about another gap before we can be sure that that capability is in place, but, as other hon. Members have said, no serious individual with even the remotest experience of military matters would

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consider that a missile system based on a destroyer could offer any protection comparable to the types of defence that the Sea Harriers can and have offered.

Mr. Heath : Is not the obvious conclusion that the Government's decision represents, at least in the medium term, a substantial change to the strategy of the Royal Navy and United Kingdom forces? As such, is it not extraordinary that the Government announced that not as a change in strategy, but as either a procurement decision or a decision based on the location of units in the United Kingdom, neither of which does credit to the fundamental decision that has been taken?


Mr. Laws : My hon. Friend is right. It is difficult to deduce the significance of the decision in the press release in which the Ministry of Defence announced it. It merited a more significant statement, so that the matter could be properly debated in the House first.

The hon. Member for Newark mentioned skills, which are important. Over the past few years, aircrew have built up significant experience in air-to-air defence activities. If they no longer engage in those activities and if those skills are not in place for the next few years, we may lose a vital part of our capability. Even if we have new aircraft to fulfil the Sea Harriers' role, it will take some time to acquire the skills that were deployed to such effect in the Falklands conflict.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome mentioned, the decision raises a fundamental question about the Government's approach to defence policy. We understood that the Government wanted to have large carriers in the years ahead—hopefully, shortly after 2012; presumably, they would have not only ground-attack aircraft, but aircraft that could fulfil the Sea Harriers' role. How can the Government take a decision that involves so much expenditure on new aircraft and aircraft carriers that are so fundamental to our future defence needs and argue that we can limp along for the next few years with a couple of much smaller carriers with no serious air defence capability for themselves, the fleet or the ground attack aircraft? This is an important part of air defence policy, and I am grateful to the hon. Member for Poole for having raised the issue.

On 29 April, the Minister of State was kind enough to acknowledge in the House that




"There is an associated risk attached to all of this".—[Official Report, 29 April 2002; Vol. 384, c. 660.]

Many hon. Members have concluded that the Government are taking not only a risk, but a serious gamble with their defence policy, and with the lives and security of the servicemen whom we ask to do important jobs on our behalf.


10.32 am


Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex): I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) for obtaining this debate on such an important subject. We have expressed the serious concern felt in this Chamber and by many well informed members of the defence community with little, if any, party political point scoring.

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I agree with the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Laws) that we have not had much of a debate so far. I will be brief, so that the lonely Minister can express his and the Government's thinking. It is disappointing that the Government have been so unwilling to engage in the debate. This morning's Daily Telegraph reported that it sought to publish the Government's point of view, but that Ministers declined to be interviewed. What sort of open government is that? The Government have an obligation to be braver and to explain more. It is an insult not to me, but to the Royal Navy and the services that the Secretary of State for Defence is meant to represent that he will not engage in the debate.


Mr. James Gray (North Wiltshire): My hon. Friend might not have heard the comment made twice by the Under-Secretary of State from a sedentary position. The answer to the question, "Where is the Secretary of State?" was, "He's working." That indicates his view that coming to the Chamber to answer this important debate is not work. Is that not a disgraceful attitude?


Mr. Jenkin : I have no animus towards the Under-Secretary of State, but I sent a message through him that I would be taking part in the debate and that I hoped that the Secretary of State would attend. That is why this Chamber exists. [Interruption.] The fact that the Under-Secretary of State is muttering betrays his embarrassment.


The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Dr. Lewis Moonie) : Please do not be so pompous.


Mr. Jenkin : I shall not rise to that insult.

There is emotion attached to the question because the Sea Harrier became such a symbol of British military prowess and expertise during the Falklands conflict. It is worth recalling that 4 May 20 years ago last Saturday was the day that HMS Sheffield was hit by a sea-skimming missile. A year ago tomorrow, it finally sank. That is the price we may find ourselves paying for inadequate fleet air defence. We did not have enough of the previous variant of the Sea Harrier in theatre to provide round-the-clock air defence at that stage of the conflict. We were reliant on ship-based radar, which provided barely more than a minute's warning to manoeuvre craft to a more advantageous position and deploy counter-measures. As Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward subsequently explained, ultimately, HMS Sheffield was out on the edge of the defence perimeter to act as a sacrificial decoy, to save the more important ships of the taskforce. We might find ourselves in that position again because of the decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier FA2s from 2004 onwards.

The debate is not about the past or about emotion; we must engage constructively to ensure that we understand why the Government have made their decision. As we have heard from all hon. Members participating in the debate, that decision not only potentially puts the lives of our servicemen at risk and imperils the operational capability of the British Navy, but it is a militarily illiterate decision in the context of the expeditionary concept of warfare set out in the SDR and in "Options for Change" under the Conservative Government. The purpose of the Government's

8 May 2002 : Column 85WH

supposedly foreign policy-led defence policy is to be able to deploy a battle group with the full spread of high-intensity warfare capability to fight medium-sized wars in any corner of the world. Without comprehensive air cover, that capability will no longer exist.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Many of the technicalities have been covered. The FA2 is not comparable with the GR7 or the upgraded variant, the GR9, which do not have radar that can track 20 targets simultaneously 70 miles away from the aircraft, 100 miles away from the battle group. The first key capability of the FA2 is its deep penetration 100 to 200 miles away from the battle group, seeing over the horizon. The second is the AMRAAM—the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile. Even the upgraded variant, the GR9, will carry only the Sidewinder missile, which is a short-range missile requiring visual contact that can be used only in daylight and is ultimately a weapon of self-defence rather than a weapon for taskgrouped defence. GR7/GR9 is a slower aircraft: if it encounters fighter aircraft—Russian Migs or French Mirages—it will be outrun. It will not be able to catch up with the target if it is attempting to attack. It will not be able to escape an attacking aircraft because it is too slow. That leaves the GR7s and GR9s—which are supposed to replace the FA2—deeply vulnerable to attack.

Reference has been made to the militarily dyslexic assertion that the type 42 and new type 45 destroyers




"will herald a quantum leap in our maritime air defence capability".

That is the sort of rubbish that should end up at the bottom of deep-trenched latrines in Kabul. It is no serious contribution to a debate on defence. Radar capability on these destroyers will be a mere 20 nautical miles. Even with the new helicopter-based airborne early warning system, it might extend no more than 70 nautical miles—not the vital hundreds of miles that provide the crucial first and second layers of air defence that the fleet requires in order to remain capable.

The only possible conclusion is that the Government have decided that compromise requires us to forgo a considerable element of our expeditionary capability. That means that they do not foresee the need for that capability—what an extraordinary risk to take. As my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) pointed out, the only certainty is that things are uncertain. Who could have foreseen an amphibious assault on Sierra Leone led by British forces? Who could have foreseen that we would send a huge taskforce to fight in the Gulf war in the early 1990s? Who could have foreseen that we would send 1,000 Royal Marines to do battle with terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan at the same time as an infantry battalion and headquarters were managing peacekeeping in Kabul? The precise purpose of our defence policy is to provide for the unforeseen. If the unforeseen happens, how long do we have to prepare for it? How many times in history can we look back and say that we wish we had what we have not? The Falklands was a case in point; we need go back no further than that.


Mr. Henry Bellingham (North-West Norfolk): Does my hon. Friend agree that we have been here before. When a previous Labour Government decided to get rid of strike carriers, the Gannet airborne early warning system was scrapped as well. That proved to be the main

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weakness of the taskforce that went to the Falklands. We have been there before, but we did not learn the lesson. What on earth are the Government up to?

Mr. Jenkin : One can conclude only that Ministers have cajoled themselves into this decision on the basis of advice from the services about what is available. Our armed services are brilliant at making do. If they have been told that they must make do with less than they really need, they will not appear on the television screens to say that it cannot be done. That is not in their character and we should not expect them to do so. It is for Ministers to ask themselves whether the advice that they are receiving is the best that could have been provided if the strategic defence review had been properly funded from the start. We know from the comments of Lord Guthrie in another place in December that the SDR was underfunded from the start.

No doubt the Minister will speak about obsolescence: he will say that the aircraft is obsolete, the engine inadequate, and so on. Every piece of defence equipment becomes obsolete, but many obsolete pieces can prove extremely effective in certain types of conflict. We can all agree that it is desirable to upgrade the Sea Harriers' engine and we know that it will be expensive. Even if the Government cannot afford the engine upgrade, I submit that Sea Harriers with the existing engine remaining in service as long as possible is much better than no Sea Harriers at all. We should not be scrapping them all on the basis that they cannot deploy in extreme tropical conditions when they will be capable of deployment everywhere else. Even in extreme tropical conditions, we could deploy them, perhaps with fewer munitions and a lighter load of fuel, to perform their essential airborne early warning function.

That option would be better than scrapping the Sea Harriers altogether simply because the Government think that they cannot afford the upgrade. Money is, of course, at the heart of this issue. The real question is whether the Government are capable of funding the strategic defence review by which they set so much store when it was launched in 1998.

The purpose of drawing attention to the Sea Harriers in an emotional way is that the decision about them betrays what is going on in the armed forces in a way that we can communicate to the public. The scrapping of long-distance weapons programmes and the downgrading of other technical capabilities do not seize the public imagination. That may be why Ministers have chosen Sea Harriers: it is the bleeding-stumps syndrome, where something visible is cut to up the ante in negotiations with the Treasury. Those negotiations are the real crunch point in the Government's defence policy. It is meant to be foreign policy led, but is proving to be anything but.

I shall conclude my remarks now to give the Minister plenty of time to respond. I hope that he can also take one or two interventions. His purpose must be to explain a major change in the Government's defence policy and a major departure from their original intentions, but how he will square that circle, I do not know.


10.46 am


The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Dr. Lewis Moonie) : I begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) on securing the

8 May 2002 : Column 87WH

debate, which has given us a chance to explore an important issue. I shall preface my remarks with a couple of points that have gone astray in the Opposition's fantasy football league equivalent of defence. All our decisions are taken within the framework of a finite budget, so they all involve some form of opportunity cost or benefit foregone elsewhere. It is worth remembering that when considering what we are trying to do.

Mr. Blunt : The Minister should say what programmes have been kept in the budget. The Government's decision to strike out the Sea Harriers for the period that has been mentioned indicates the enormous pressure that the Ministry is under because of a wholly inadequate budget. He should shed some light on the alternatives that produced such an extraordinary conclusion.


Dr. Moonie : The hon. Gentleman did not listen: I said that we had a finite budget. In the real world, when one is in government, that is what one has to deal with. It is only in opposition that people have the luxury of a fantasy budget that can be expanded infinitely to take in every choice that they want to make.


Mr

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Mr. James Gray (North Wiltshire): Will the Minister give way?


Dr. Moonie : No. In 12 minutes, I cannot go through all our programmes and the balance of choices that we had to strike when deciding what and what not to keep.

There have been many references to danger and past conflicts. I remind Opposition Members that all operational decisions that we make involve a balance of risk for our forces. We are well aware that we may call on our men and women to make the ultimate sacrifice on our behalf. We need no reminders about that from Opposition Members.

Last week, Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, in charge of commitments, gave evidence to the Select Committee on Defence. I shall paraphrase his remarks, because the evidence has not yet been published as a minute and has merely been placed on the internet for information. His comments provide an appropriate framework for our discussion. He said that to sustain the Sea Harrier—the FA2—beyond 2006 as a viable weapon system would require a great deal of investment and entailed substantial technical risk. He went on to say that a number of other areas of the programme required investment and, as ever, it was a question of balance of priorities. Given the need to balance the priorities and the risk, the decision was taken that it would not be sensible for that period of time to make the degree of investment in the Sea Harrier that would have been necessary to keep it viable in service.


Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. John McWilliam): Order. May I assist the Minister? The fact that the Committee's sitting was public and the transcript has gone out on the internet means that he can quote every word of it.


Dr. Moonie : I am grateful for that, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I would hate to have overstepped the bounds of propriety in quoting from a Select Committee.

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Sir Jock went on to ask:




"what is that we seek in terms of capability from our carriers? We seek the projection of offensive power. That was the purpose behind the decision to procure two new larger carriers in the defence review. The carriers are about the projection of offensive power in which the Sea Harrier plays a very small part and a reducing part as the technology, in terms of offensive power, moves on."

When questioned further, he said:




"I need to make clear, before moving on some more detail about air defence, why we have carriers in the first place and it is not to provide air defence for the fleet, it is to provide projection of offensive power. Clearly, if you have a fleet at sea, you need to make sure that it is properly protected from the range of threats that it might face: sub-surface, surface and from the air as well. We are introducing, as you know, the Type-45 Destroyer".

He went on to describe the future systems.


Patrick Mercer : Sir Jock Stirrup also said that he could not see that destroyers would ever wholly fill the capability that aircraft currently provided.


Dr. Moonie : Absolutely. No one has tried to pretend otherwise for a moment. If the hon. Gentleman reads carefully at the remarks that were made last week, when Sir Jock was speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Defence, he will see that we are well aware that any decision like the one we are debating involves a balance of risk. Nobody has attempted to hide that— neither Ministers nor any of our senior military advisers who have led us to our decision

The Sea Harrier has had a long and distinguished career and the decision to withdraw the aircraft earlier than planned was complex. I welcome the opportunity to explain the decision that was announced on 28 February and how we plan to improve the utility of the joint force Harrier to meet today's and tomorrow's defence needs. The aircraft was procured in the mid 1970s to meet the threat posed principally by shadowing reconnaissance aircraft and long-range bombers threatening our anti-submarine forces operating in the North Atlantic in concert with United States Navy nuclear aircraft carrier battle groups.

The Sea Harrier entered service in 1979 and, as hon. Members have recalled, it achieved early operational success in the campaign to recover the Falkland Islands in 1982, accounting for 26 Argentine aircraft. Today, of course, the circumstances in Argentina and the nature of the Falklands garrison are entirely different. Beginning in 1994 the Sea Harrier fleet was upgraded to the FA2 standard to provide an enhanced capability for the following decade. When the Sea Harrier is withdrawn from service in 2006 it will have been in service for a significant length of time—more than 25 years, which is far longer than most of its predecessors in the Fleet Air Arm.

A strong theme throughout the strategic defence review was the importance of joint operations. The SDR concluded that the emphasis for the Invincible-class carriers had already moved away from cold war deep-water anti-submarine operations supported by the Sea Harrier providing a limited air defence capability. In future, as Sir Jock Stirrup said, the priority will be the delivery of flexible expeditionary air power, with an increased emphasis on ground-attack strike missions

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from the embarked air group. That has been confirmed in the emerging conclusions of our post-11 September work.

Mr. Prisk : Is the Minister arguing that we do not need any air defence aircraft? Certainly all hon. Members present would accept that there is a case for having an increased ground-attack capability. The concern here is that the removal of all air defence capabilities removes the defence and security of the personnel. This long read-out passage, which seems to be replacing a speech, does not answer that question.


Dr. Moonie : I have already made the point, but I shall make it again. We are not saying that there is no change in the balance of risk, but our advice and the advice that we have received from the service chiefs on which we base our decisions is that the balance of risk is acceptable. We are not saying that in an ideal world we would not have every capability, but we do not live in an ideal world. We live in the real world and within that we must make decisions. The balance of risk has changed, but it remains acceptable.


Mr. Jenkin : The hon. Gentleman is arguing that the aircraft is old. The FA2, which was introduced in 1993, is a much newer aircraft than the Tornado GR1A or GR4A, which was introduced in 1989, or the Tornado F3, which was introduced in 1986, or the Jaguar, which the Government are keeping in service and which was introduced in 1973. The age of the aircraft is not relevant to the debate.


Dr. Moonie : Unfortunately, the age of the aircraft is relevant to the debate. The upgrade in the FA2 is concerned predominantly with avionics and other systems that are placed on the aircraft. The aircraft frame remains old. The aircraft structure remains old, and there is nothing that we can do about that. The hon. Gentleman has not properly examined what the upgrades involve. I now want to make some progress. As usual, I have given way far too often. I apologise to the hon. Member for North Wiltshire for not giving way to him before, but I want to finish my remarks.

The strategic defence review included a commitment to establish a joint force Harrier—a joint, flexible and deployable force that is ideally suited to the demands of the new strategic environment. It was formed on 1 April 2000 under the command of 3 Group, Strike Command, and it operates two aircraft types. During 2001, it became evident that both Sea Harrier FA2 and the GR7 would require substantial investment over the next few years to ensure that they remained effective until replaced by the future joint combat aircraft. Upgrades to both aircraft types were considered, but the improvement and maintenance of one type was deemed achievable and preferable to maximise our ability to deliver carrier-based offensive air power in a joint force.

To ensure that the Harrier GR7 fleet maintains a credible expeditionary capability by day and night from land and sea until the introduction to service of the FJCA, several important aircraft system enhancements will be necessary, and they have been drawn together to form the GR9 upgrade programme. The GR9 aircraft will be able to communicate securely with each other and with likely coalition parties, and they will be capable

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of employing the latest smart and precision weapons. They will enable the Harriers to deliver the Brimstone anti-armour missile, the precision guided bomb, the Maverick missile and so on. There will be considerable upgrades.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Mr. Francois : Those are tank busters.


Dr. Moonie : That is the ground attack role.


Mr. Francois : So the fleet is under threat from tanks?


Mr. Deputy Speaker : Order.


Dr. Moonie : Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Because of what the Sea Harrier was designed to do and where it was designed to operate, there are limitations on the worldwide operational deployment of the FA2. That renders it incapable of operating to its full capability for certain periods of the year in the Gulf and the middle east due to the thrust limitations of its engine. While the FA2 possesses a capable weapon system, it would also require significant investment to remain effective beyond 2005 to deal with obsolescence and shortcomings in its radar and self-protection systems. Unlike the GR7, the FA2 was not designed to be able to take the more powerful Rolls-Royce Pegasus, so any engine upgrade would carry considerable technical risk.

In the light of those considerations, my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence announced to the House on 28 February the Government's intention that the joint force Harrier should migrate to an all-Harrier GR force, maximising investment in one aircraft type.


Mr. Richard Bacon (South Norfolk): Will the Minister give way?


Dr. Moonie : No, I shall not. The Sea Harrier FA2 will therefore be withdrawn earlier than planned, by 2006. As a consequence of its earlier withdrawal from service, the planned relocation of Sea Harrier FA2 aircraft from RNAS Yeovilton to RAF Cottesmore and RAF Wittering in 2003 will not now proceed. The relocation of Royal Navy personnel will go ahead, but slightly later than planned, over the period 2004 to 2006. By 1 April 2007, joint force Harrier will have migrated to an all-Harrier GR9 force manned by roughly equal numbers of RN and RAF personnel.


Mr. Bacon : This is absolutely pathetic.


Mr. Deputy Speaker : Order. The Minister is not giving way.


Mr. Bacon : This is absolutely disgraceful.


Dr. Moonie : Oh dear, I am sorry, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to have so disappointed Opposition Members, but I have to give the reply that will show exactly why the decision was made—and that is what I am

8 May 2002 : Column 91WH

attempting to do. The decision was made in the real world, not the fantasy world that the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues seem to occupy.
The immediate urgency of the announcements made was to minimise nugatory expenditure on enabling work—


Mr. Deputy Speaker : Order. Time is up. I invite all hon. Members who are not staying to leave the Chamber quickly and quietly.

[BEagle]

Can many possibly have much faith in El Presidente's defence policy? Moonie's behaviour above in failing to give way was astonishing.

Perhaps fraudulent diamond-protecting world adventurism should be re-titled 'Worldcon'.......

[canberra]

lewis moonie is the mp for kirkcaldy in fife. fife (or to be more precise south fife) is a labour stronghold. in 91 lewis moonie stated in the house that anyone who joins the armed forces is psychologically flawed.

[ORAC]

Sunday Times - August 25, 2002

Falklands flying ace warns of gap in air defence
Nicholas Rufford

A TWICE-DECORATED hero of the Falklands war has accused the Ministry of Defence of endangering the lives of British service personnel by scrapping the fighter aircraft that protects Britain’s naval fleet.
Commander Nigel Ward, a former combat pilot who shot down three Argentine warplanes, has written to defence chiefs warning that British warships would be at the mercy of anti-ship missiles similar to or better than the Exocet, the weapon used against the British fleet during the conflict in 1982.

The letter from such a distinguished former naval officer, who was also a weapons adviser to the defence ministry, will reignite the controversy over the scrapping of the 29 Sea Harriers as the navy prepares to send ships to the Gulf in support of possible action against Iraq.

Ward’s letter to Sir Nigel Essenhigh, the first sea lord, who retires shortly, says “many lives would be put at risk” if the decision by Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, is not reversed. It points to deep divisions in the upper echelons of the MoD.

“I realise that you (Essenhigh) may have fought tooth and nail against this errant decision . . . It is sad that you have decided to retire earlier than planned but . . . I trust you will use the time remaining to you in office to question the untimely demise of the FA2 (Sea Harrier).”

Ward said the “fatal” decision to withdraw the Sea Harrier before a replacement was introduced meant ships would have no protection against missiles of the type being acquired by a growing list of states including Iran, Syria, Libya, China and North Korea. Exocets fired during the Falklands conflict sank HMS Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor.

The MoD announced in February that Sea Harriers would be withdrawn between 2004 and 2006, saving an estimated £109m. Critics point out that is less than the cost of two of the new Eurofighters, on which a total of £2 billion is being spent. The decision has already been questioned by the Commons defence committee.

Ward received the Distinguished Service Cross after the Falklands war, during which he commanded 801 squadron.

The withdrawal of the Sea Harriers is said to have led to the early departure of Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the chief of defence staff.

[BEagle]

...and you thought that Sharky was just doing Vauxhall Vectra ads these days!

Seriously, he is absolutely right in what he says.