Complex / mind cranking AIRBUS simulator scenarios

[alexious85]

Hello
Every time I go to the simulator , when I think I studied the systems enough or analyzed contingencies in my brain enough , I am surprised how the simulator instructor can eliminate all that and give you something small or big or combination of situations and change your mind about everything and your self. I am sure you all experience this at some point or another and that is the reason I created this post , so to exchange simulator experience .
Take this scenario for instance ( basically impossible in real life ) :
You are accelerating down the runway and few knots before v1 the screens black out and you understand you lost your electrics and you are in all likelihood in emerg. Elec. configuration . do you abort or continue take off ? unless you had this before in the sim you would say abort. But if you are in emer. Elec config ( before the RAT deploys ) at this stage you lose your brake and reversers so unless your are in a really long rwy with low weight you will overrun the runway .
I gave an example of something that can be described in few words , but the airbus can give rise to an incredible amount if complex scenarios . Do you have any scenario to share big and small ? As things move along with posts ill dig up some tricky scenarios I have had the past 2 years and share them

[Centaurus]

Can't help you on an A320 scenario but here is one 737 (Classic) scenario. Part of the 737 type rating training includes loss of both engine driven generators. Usually the instructor fails one generator in flight then shortly after the second generator goes off line as well. It is also assumed (for training purpose) the APU is inoperative thus its generator is unavailable.

The "student" flogs around a few turns on standby flight instruments and notes inoperative systems. Maybe an ILS on standby flight instruments is flown. This is tricky as usually the ILS needles in the standby ADI are small and it is easy to get quite significant localiser or glide slope deviations especially if having to use an RMI as a compass. Manual stab trim is needed which increases the work load. But with practice you cope. The ILS on standby flight instruments (737 Classics) will need definite practice because the PF in the left seat will be working like the proverbial one arm paper hanger what with manual stabiliser trim and an unaccustomed and difficult instrument scan. Worse if you happen to be an automation dependant pilot!

There have been incidents where both engine driven generators went off line simultaneously. No problem if you get the APU on line and its generator operating. However an interesting simulator scenario is where it is assumed a lightning strike during the take off roll causes both generators to fail simultaneously. Because the aircraft is still on the ground the standby flight instruments do not automatically illuminate unless the crew are swift enough to find the Standby Power switch and place it to Battery. That is one reason why it is good airmanship to leave the APU operating if taking off at night especially in stormy weather.

With loss of both engine driven generators before lift off there will be false warnings which may include persistent stick shaker and take off warning configuration. All this as the aircraft is accelerating down the runway. The temptation to reject the take off is strong. However loss of half of the anti skid system will extend the stopping distance with the added risk of blown tyres. There is no doubt the aircraft will still fly as both engines are operating.

It may be better to continue the take off from 20 knots below V1 and rotate normally while ignoring the various aural warnings. They will cease once airborne. Once airborne (737 Classic) the standby flight instruments are illuminated. Be prepared to use manual stabiliser trim and note the flap indicator is inoperative although the flaps operate normally. Obviously it is a high work load situation but unless you have practiced this scenario in the simulator the shock and surprise factor can easily lead the unprepared crew into precipitate actions. The worst case would be rejecting at or after V1

The QRH actions for loss of both engine driven generators requires several actions before attempting to place one generator on line followed by the second generator. It is important not to rush or circumvent the order of these actions. In other words, don't rush into getting one generator on line because of the natural desire to have at least one source of electrical power as quickly as possible.

With flap retraction on standby power after take off, the associated trim changes require to be carefully handled using manual stabiliser trim; especially as there is no flap indicator until electrical power is restored. The small ADI display makes pitch readings hard to see and excess pitch angles can easily occur in the heat of the moment. All in all, the loss of both engine driven generators on the take off run at night or in IMC requires excellent raw data instrument flying skills and 100% competency at hand flying. A very useful simulator exercise.

[stickN'rudder007]

Interesting . The concept of lightning strike putting both of engine driven generators off line is not presented on airbus . Thats perhaps a reason that a standard airbus take off is APU off . Thus the small scenario given by the original poster is still a completely hypothetical one . I am going to try to remember a complex and surprising scenario I had once but in the mean time here is one thing I learned the hard way in one of the last sessions , which applies to all airliners . You are in some kind of trouble and you are looking to divert to the nearest airport . You get the weather around you and you tempted to use one with calm weather but you have to do a circling approach right on the minimums ( visibility - wise ) . Now if you do the maneuver by the book , that is you come down to circling minimums and turn left/right by 45 degrees of the c/l course for 30 " , when wings level , for some procedures you will loose sight of the runway . So you will go out just enough to be able to see.
Also . Airbus erroneously has 2 different values for the amount of time you are suppose to continue the downwind track after passing abeam threshold . In one manual this time is 3 seconds per 100 ft AGL ( just like in a normal visual approach ) and in another manual 4 seconds per 100ft AGL ) . It turns out that 3 seconds per 100 ft AGL is wrong for a circling approach and it showed in the sim The reason : when doing a circling approach you are on the downwind with flaps 3 F speed . Your speed is significantly lower compared with a visual approach at the same position. Therefore using 3 seconds per 100 ft AGL will not get you as far as the same time in a visual approach and you will end up high and unstabilized if you are using normal rate of descent values .
So 4 seconds per 100 ft AGL is the right value , BUT be careful on some procedures right on the minimums . The amount of time you will extend the downwind plus the radius of turn might make you loose sight of the runway when turning final . The best course of action when you are unfamiliar with the airport is to have some basic formulas in your head to see how far this timing will take you out and how it relates with the reported visibility . It's a very tough balancing act that you don't normally think of unless you get in that situation.
So , I'll try to come up with a technical situation I had on an airbus sim .

[stickN'rudder007]

John smith you just presented the Airbus conditions to abort and they support the abort decision based on the original scenario
"between 100kts and V1 you only abort for a master warning or unihibited caution, a fire, sudden loss of thrust, or something which gives an unambiguous indication that it will be impossible to get safely airborne "
If you lose both generators simultaneously and get in emerg. Elec you will get a master warning . The screens will blank and what sort of pilot considers a take off on empty screens a safe take off ? The original poster is right , most people will be tempted to abort , and practice in the sim has shown that. It is only after training that people will continue the take off .

[A37575]

That said, it's such an unlikely scenario it's not really worth worrying about.

Air France Flight 447 into the Atlantic was also an unlikely scenario which company management obviously thought was not worth worrying about. Hence no simulator training for high altitude stall recovery.

The January 2002 Garuda Indonesia Boeing 737-300 dual engine failure in a 63,000 ft thunderstorm, coupled with total electrical failure, and subsequent all flaps up ditching, was such an unlikely scenario the company thought it was not worth worrying about. Hence no simulator training for dead stick landings.

Obviously there is a reasonable limit to what you can train for in the simulator. The trouble being how do you know when that limit is reached? Study of similar previous incidents/accidents might be a good way to start.

[alexious85]

Taxing in to the parking stand , according to company procedures ( also applicable to other companies) f/o makes a PA call " cabin crew doors to disarm and cross check " . Shortly after , an abnormality occurs and an engine fire breaks out . It cannot be extinguished and when all procedures are applied we give the command "evacuate" . BUT we forget that gave the earlier command for doors to be disarmed ( and the cabin crew in their panic forgot to arm them again , especially considering they are used to expecting such command from the cockpit ) . So doors open and there is no slide deployment , and of course like a god damn fool you got to close them again with the pax pushing over you to arm and open them again
The sim instructor said that the first crews to go into the sim almost all missed that point , until enough feedback went around