Voyager Plummets (Merged)

[beardy]

WARNING: thread drift

http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4219/Chapter11.html

In late November 1977, while the two Voyagers were still on route to Jupiter, one of Voyager 2's two duplicate radio transmitters began to degrade. It was switched to low-power mode to nurse it along. Something was wrong, but there was no way to know exactly what. Months later, in April 1978, the Voyager team discovered that Voyager 2's backup receiver had failed to detect signals sent from Earth because of a shorted capacitor. The primary radio receiver suddenly failed completely, as well. Voyager 2 was silent. Continuing to Uranus and Neptune was no longer possible, unless a way could be found to communicate with the backup receiver. Moreover, the failure of the Voyager 2 primary radio system had potential repercussions beyond the Voyager project. Its radio equipment was very similar to that on Pioneer Venus, which was launched the following month, in May 1978. 78

Normally, the radio receiver automatically compensated for the Doppler shift of signals transmitted from Earth. The changing velocity and direction of the spacecraft relative to Earth caused this Doppler shift. Without the ability to compensate for the Doppler shift, the Voyager 2 radio system could not detect any signals sent to it. The solution to Voyager 2's radio problems came from NASA Deep Space Network engineers. They prepared computer tapes that slowly varied the frequency of the radio signals transmitted from Earth in order to compensate for the expected Doppler shift. The Deep Space Network station outside Madrid transmitted the first test signals on April 13, 1978. Fifty-three minutes later, Voyager 2's acknowledgement returned. The trick worked. As a backup measure, in October 1978, Voyager 2's memory banks were loaded to the brim with commands that would provide

[mr snow]

I believe that ZZ333 returned to Brize today at approx 1700 hrs after an uneventful flight from Incirlik.

[BEagle]

TBT, if it was pukka, it wouldn't have been the first Airbus A330MRTT Voyager total radio failure....

[Top Bunk Tester]

And a little more thread drift, being totally sad I have Plane Finder set to alert on 75, 76 & 7700. It's amazing the amount of Sleazy Jets that squawk 7700 in a week. A lot of medical emergencies but I wonder how many are fuel priorities given their alleged propensity for cutting fuel corners?

[Redcarpet]

I suspect Easyjet are crewed by very well trained and capable pilots. Do you honestly think they would routinely put their little pink bodies at risk by carrying so little fuel as to regularly require Mayday Calls? :ugh:

[ShotOne]

Easyjet have a lot of aircraft -just short of 200, and they're all flying most of the day. I haven't heard any allegations of them cutting corners, fuel or otherwise. Are you making one?

[Top Bunk Tester]

I'm not but I believe Channel 4 did not so many weeks ago, I seem to recall that an Orange and a Green airline were implicated and allegedly heads rolled for talking to the program, just sayin'

[ShotOne]

Wrong airline mate. But yes, heads did roll. Interestingly C4's principal charge against Ryanair was of having a "non-transparent safety culture". Does that perhaps bring us back on-thread?

[greenhornet]

Has a cause been found yet?? Just sitting here in my armrest chair and wondering....

[lj101]

On going SI.

[cessnapete]

On going SI or not, the reason for the 6000ft plummet must have been known, and the operating crews fully informed before resuming flights.
Otherwise the grounding would not have been lifted would it??

The rumour that a mod. of a pee tube at the P2 position so he/she can remain seated the entire flight, is apparently untrue.
The only change to SOPs appear to be, to further encourage the pax to keep their seatbelts fastened at all times.

[lj101]

Er, is all I answered was the SI is still on going.

No idea about anything else you ask Cess.

[beardy]

Cessnapete,

Do I understand you correctly that CM2 was in the latrine when this happened?

[devonianflyer]

I believe Oops is the phrase! This has quietly appeared on MOD home page.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/293230/interim_si_voyager_report.pdf

[Just This Once...]

Extract from the report:

The Panel has found evidence to link the movement of the seat to the movement of the side-stick, in the form of a Digital SLR camera obstruction which was in-front of the Captain’s left arm rest and behind the base of the Captain’s side-stick at the time of the event. Analysis of the camera has confirmed that it was being used in the three minutes leading up to the event. Furthermore, forensic analysis of damage to the body of the camera indicates that it experienced a significant compression against the base of the side-stick, consistent with having been jammed between the arm rest and the side-stick unit. Crew interviews have corroborated this evidence. As such, the Inquiry has confidence that the pitch-down command was the result of an inadvertent physical input to the Captain’s side-stick by means of a physical obstruction (the camera) between the arm-rest and the side-stick unit. Simulations have been carried out which have re-created the scenario which has shown that it is possible for objects to become inadvertently lodged in the space between the arm rest and the side-stick, generating an identical pitch-down command to that seen during the incident. Safety advice has been issued to the RAF and to Airbus to highlight this possibility.

[beardy]

In post #163 BEagle wrote

As for blaming the crew, if anyone was stupid enough to try that they'd soon wish they hadn't..

As yet nobody has blamed the crew. However were they fortunate to have Flight Law protections since:

Within 27 seconds, the aircraft lost 4,440 ft in height, before the self-protection system initiated a recovery back towards controlled flight

[lj101]

With a Just Culture hat on.
How many times has that side stick been knocked by mistake?
So have 'we' set up people for 'failure' due to design? This incident hi lights the issue and so barriers can be now be out in place.
That's where we are.

Something happened, why did it happen, what can we do to reduce the chance of it happening again.

[JFZ90]

Anyone got a picture of the armrest and side stick arrangement on an A330?

How did the camera come to be put between the 2? Is there a flat space?

Edit : found one or two

http://www.airliners.net/aviation-photos/small/7/3/2/1850237.jpg

http://www.ainonline.com/sites/default/files/styles/article/public/uploads/af447sidestick-1_0.jpg?itok=_JklSsOp

and a bit of youtube "side stick cam"......

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8YaQch_y9DA

[Right Stuff]

Just culture?!

This is gross incompetence bordering on negligence frankly.

1) The camera should arguably not have been on the flightdeck
2) Failure to connect movement of seat with aircraft pitch down
3) Failure to identify movement of sidestick (did the captain even touch it during the event?!)
4) Failure to control speed in the ensuing dive
5) Why did this take so long to come to light - was there an attempt to cover it up?

Thankfully the actions of the copilot (having crawled back into the cockpit via the ceiling) brought some order back into the cockpit.

Several people were badly injured and a fully serviceable fleet grounded with the associated severe knock-on effects thanks to this incident - If I hadn't read it I wouldn't have believed it.

[JFZ90]

Well I'm glad someone else said it, I was going to let the pictures do the talking...

[Roadster280]

A sticker ought to suffice between the two. "PUT NOTHING HERE".

Not blaming the crew for crew's actions is like blaming Ford/Mercedes/Rolls Royce if you put a camera under the handbrake handle, preventing you from using the brake in your Focus/S Class/Silver Wraith. (I have no idea if these vehicles have lever operated handbrakes, but you get the picture).

I'm sure the operating manuals don't say "do not dive this aircraft into terrain". They can't cover every eventuality!

[BEagle]

...it is possible for objects to become inadvertently lodged in the space between the arm rest and the side-stick...

Why was this loose article hazard not known beforehand? Note that the report states inadvertently.

[tubby linton]

The phenomena is well known and I described a similar incident albeit in roll in my post number 171 of this thread.

[JFZ90]

BEagle - do you consider the report suggesting that the DSLR was not placed on that particular flat space deliberately?

How else would it have got there - crept along the flat space due to aircraft motion/vibrations? In 3 mins?

[BEagle]

According to the Oxford Dictionary, 'inadvertently' is an adverb whose meaning is: Without intention; accidentally:
It has the following synonyms: accidentally, by accident, unintentionally, unwittingly; unawares, without noticing, in all innocence; by mistake, mistakenly

[JFZ90]

Oh, so you weren't.

I was reading too much into your emphasis.

[Roadster280]

accidentally, by accident, unintentionally, unwittingly; unawares, without noticing, in all innocence; by mistake, mistakenly

Couldn't those synonyms also be applied to this? I'm sure it wasn't intentional, but that doesn't automatically make it OK or excusable.

http://www.baaa-acro.com/wp-content/themes/TheSource/timthumb.php?src=http://www.baaa-acro.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/XV304-11.jpg&h=300&w=600&zc=1

[lj101]

Just culture?!

This is gross incompetence bordering on negligence frankly.

1) The camera should arguably not have been on the flightdeck
2) Failure to connect movement of seat with aircraft pitch down
3) Failure to identify movement of sidestick (did the captain even touch it during the event?!)
4) Failure to control speed in the ensuing dive
5) Why did this take so long to come to light - was there an attempt to cover it up?
Thankfully the actions of the copilot (having crawled back into the cockpit via the ceiling) brought some order back into the cockpit.
Several people were badly injured and a fully serviceable fleet grounded with the associated severe knock-on effects thanks to this incident - If I hadn't read it I wouldn't have believed it.

Yep - Just Culture. Have you attended any of the mandatory briefs?

[Justanopinion]

A culture that recognizes that competent professionals make mistakes and acknowledges that even competent professionals will develop unhealthy norms (shortcuts, "routine rule violations"), but has zero tolerance for reckless behavior.

As has been said, yes, just culture.

Not a large aircraft operator myself but find it hard to imagine it is not common place to have loose articles on the flight deck. If it can go wrong it will go wrong and this incident has highlighted an area where this is the case. We can learn from it, design can be improved, loose article procedures tightened up.

Clearly some on prune are perfect aviators

[Right Stuff]

Okay, object deliberately placed in an unfortunate position. Mistake.

But do you not think that the actions (or lack of) that follow are some cause for concern when considering the Captain of an aircraft with several hundred passengers onboard? I am also wondering why the investigation into this incident took so long.

[BEagle]

Justanopinion, quite so! I can't imagine many people in such a sudden and unexpected situation in the dark of night thinking "You know, I wonder if something might actually be snagging the base of the sidestick" whilst the aircraft is bunting into an unexpected descent.

I imagine there'll be simple mitigations put in place now - such as checking that there's nothing in front of the arm rest when motoring the seat and a ban on anything being placed on the side console. Not necessarily a camera / iToy etc - anything could get caught, such as a flight document.

Time out for a war story - the Luftwaffe exchange officer on my F-4 squadron very nearly ran out of fuel way out over the North Sea once. All because he'd stuffed his flying jacket into the cockpit and nudged the fuel selector to the wrong position. Plenty of fuel, but the engines weren't getting it. Master Caution and FUEL caption, but he at least spotted the selector once he'd shifted his jacket off the panel and recovered the situation - although his frantic turn towards home and call of "Fuuuuuuuuuuelll priority" had us wondering!

I think it was Duncan Simpson who had a control restriction in the early days of testing the HS1182 (prototype Hawk). Whilst inverted. Being such a supremely experienced TP, he calmly remembered "I had this once when I was testing a Sea Fury", took the same recovery action and gingerly brought the aircraft home.

[Alber Ratman]

What a fantastic HF inject to add to the list.. Who in 15 pages saw a loose article control restriction on a resolver stick system with no mechanical linkage. :)

[Rulebreaker]

There has been some change in attitude on this thread now that human factors are in play

[GreenKnight121]

It certainly adds to one's confidence in the "return to service" statement of "highly unlikely to re-occur", now doesn't it?

[The Old Fat One]

Having reviewed the first few pages of this thread, a hat tip to Steve Tonks for providing the clue as to where our thinking should have gone, and a glass of champers to Silverstrata at post 118, for listing the actual problem (control restriction) together with some possible sources of said restriction.

For the rest of us, responsible for producing multiple pages of speculative tosh, I recommend Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow by Daniel Kahneman. It will tell you exactly why all humans (yes that means you!) are pre-programmed to make bad judgements all of the time.

It's what we do.

[The Old Fat One]

Who in 15 pages saw a loose article control restriction on a resolver stick system with no mechanical linkage

Silverstrata in post 118 ;)

[dervish]

Can the pilot claim compo for his damaged camera?

[Onceapilot]

Are there any similar sidestick incidents known in civil Airbus operation?

OAP

[Alber Ratman]

Just missed Captain and Camera.. RAF in flight magazines? LOL

[melmothtw]

Is there an intrinsic flaw in the side-stick design concept (given what happend to the Air France flight also)? I'm assuming this particular incident wouldn't have been possible with the traditional yoke.

[Cows getting bigger]

Depends on the size of the captain's camera, innit. :cool:

[Onceapilot]

Oops... Just noticed the incident is "classed as unique". So, no problem, it cannot happen again!:uhoh:

OAP

[Photoplanet]

...Roadster 280...

http://www.baaa-acro.com/wp-content/themes/TheSource/timthumb.php?src=http://www.baaa-acro.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/XV304-11.jpg&h=300&w=600&zc=1

This was not inadvertent... From what I understand, the operating crew disabled the warnings by virtue of pulling CBs.... Wilfully deviating from operating procedures.

[Gordon Brown]

Just Culture?

Erm, did the pilot say at any stage

"Oh, I put a camera down there and it turns out it's been damaged, so maybe the camera had something to do with it"

Or did the pilot keep schtum? Because if the pilot did, then that wouldn't be very 'Just.'

[Top Bunk Tester]

Not bad Photoplanet, 24 words and I count 4 factual inaccuracies in your post, could almost be a record :D

Whilst it was beyond doubt a monumental cock-up, you need to check "your understanding" of the facts. I have tried to find the SI or BOI but to no avail.

[lj101]

TBT

Not the findings but an interesting overview of error management here;

http://www.raes-hfg.com/engineering-standing-group/reports/12oct11-HFGE_SMS/12oct11-SimonBrailsford.pdf

[Onceapilot]

I think I can see now, a "unique event". No one would believe it could happen. How could it happen? How do all the other airliners fly without this happening? Answers to Wg Cdr Spry please.....
Hmmnn... The released report is disturbing from many aspects. Seems to me that they were seconds away from losing the aircraft. I estimate they must have reached approx 20 degrees of dive in about 10sec to achieve the 15,000'/min descent quoted within the 27sec event. Thank God the co-pilot was not in the loo, or further "down the back". :\
No mention of actual G or IAS/Mach ?

OAP

[On_The_Top_Bunk]

Just Culture?

Erm, did the pilot say at any stage

"Oh, I put a camera down there and it turns out it's been damaged, so maybe the camera had something to do with it"

Or did the pilot keep schtum? Because if the pilot did, then that wouldn't be very 'Just.'

I'm not privvy to the investigation on whether there was admission early on or whether it came out after the DFDR was examined and pitch down was associated with the seat movement.

However if this is the case then it is a worrying aspect and to have a grounded fleet for a considerable period when an honest admission early on could have saved a lot of time and money.

Other cases spring to mind...

[beardy]

Are there any similar sidestick incidents known in civil Airbus operation?

Define similar. In my understanding of it, no.

[Easy Street]

If it turns out that the captain kept schtum about his camera then Wg Cdr Spry et al would be well-advised to seek an independent assessment of how well-embedded the just culture is. Fact is, it's very easy to write about and promote, but very difficult to apply, and is therefore a prime candidate for 'tick box' implementation (much like another great mantra 'people first').

Meanwhile, even allowing that the captain might not have realised that his camera was to blame, the fact that P2 reportedly returned to a 'disorderly' cockpit does not reflect particularly well on the captain's grasp of the warning system or the AP functionality... especially since he was pretty much the only person strapped in suitably for a negative g excursion and should have been best-placed to recognise indications!

On the light side, at least we can be thankful this didn't happen at the hands of a TP. If it had, they might have followed the Tri* precedent and banned some perfectly usable AP modes! ;-)

[Cows getting bigger]

Why was the captain motoring his seat forward after the co-pilot left the cockpit?

[Runaway Gun]

CG adjustment...

[Onceapilot]

Isn't everyone as shocked as I am about this incident? The flagship AT/AAR fleet of RAF almost lost 200+ passengers and crew! The proposed cause is worthy of inclusion in an "airplane" movie, if it was not so serious. How much does this reflect on the whole PFI and the people who pushed from within for this hugely expensive "private raf" instead of cheaper, proven, options?
I am concerned that the problems run deep within the whole set-up. Please RAF, let's see the "private raf" have its great gloating publicity machine wound-up and the whole outfit knuckle-down to the basics of safe, productive flying, if that is possible from the alien monster that has been allowed to form within the RAF?

OAP

[esscee]

Maybe the Capt was moving his seat forward in anticipation of potential better photo opportunity but forgot that his seat left armrest was bigger than the right armrest due to the adjustment for operating the sidestick?

Schoolboy error, what a plonker!

More concerned with having a camera close by than concentrating on flying the aircraft.

Now if there were any injured pax, they know who to claim against?

[ShotOne]

The grounding..sorry, pause in Voyager operations which resulted from this event caused great disruption to UK forces, the Afgan drawdown and must have incurred enormous costs in charter fees alone. Is it conceivable that the authorities would have taken such action if they had been in possession of a frank account of events from the Captain?

On the same lines, if one examines earlier posts by certain regular contributors there is a stream of posts pointing to quite specific technical faults hinting at inside knowledge but not supported by anything in the public domain at that time, simultaneous with a firm, indeed aggressive, refusal to entertain the possibility that crew action may have been a factor. Would they care now to explain their reasoning?

[Roland Pulfrew]

More concerned with having a camera close by than concentrating on flying the aircraft.

Oh please! I seriously hope you never fly on holiday. There are stacks of websites out there where pilots post photos taken from the cockpit! With your view this would also mean that pilots couldn't eat a meal in their seat. Read in flight documentation in their seat. Drink a coffee in their seat because, of course, all of these would stop them from "concentrating on flying the aircraft" - which is being done by the autopilot at that time!

[Onceapilot]

For those who don't know, or have forgotten....routine Flightdeck protocol should have prevented the assumed cause.:\
"No Accidents is not an Accident":=

OAP

[BEagle]

Roly - see PM. It might help to clarify certain matters.

OAP, different jet, different SOPs?

[Onceapilot]

BEagle, different "private raf"?:sad:

OAP

[Easy Street]

OAP,

On the basis that the civil sector delivers a vast daily flying task, out of all proportion to anything the combined militaries of the world can muster, and does so with the sky-high safety figures so often quoted (reportedly involving no camera-induced fairground rides), would it not be advisable for the RAF's transport fleet to become MORE civilian in its approach? After all, these were 2 military pilots operating on a military-flagged sortie.

Not my view, you understand- just pointing out the gaping hole in the logic of your incessant complaint.

[Onceapilot]

Easy Street, quite so. Mil use of civ best practice where applicable, is the sound basis that should used. However, my contention is that, in this instance "best practice" cannot have been used. Furthermore, the experiment that has developed a "private raf" combines some of the worst elements of mil ops and private entrepreneurship whereby the MOD are being fleeced while a glittering cloud of propaganda obscures reality.
I will say it again, the whole FSTA project has been a money making machine for interested parties.

OAP

[lj101]

OAP

Would you expand on this as I'm interested to know your perspective.

combines some of the worst elements of mil ops

[Onceapilot]

lj101. Maybe you have a different view? Or, are you trolling? My views clearly given in many posts, are yours? Are you involved with the "private raf"?
BTW, your quote misrepresents my complete sentence. :=

OAP

[Roland Pulfrew]

OAP

However, my contention is that, in this instance "best practice" cannot have been used.

I accept your contention, but may I ask why you think this to be the case? Do all civil A330 operators ban their crews from placing anything in the vicinity of the side stick?

[Onceapilot]

Thank you Roly. I cannot speak for any Airbus operator. However, the risks from inadvertent inputs on flying controls, and the elimination of such inputs, forms the basis of many simple flightdeck protocols and proceedures. This is basic stuff but, it requires the strict maintenance of those standards to be effective.

OAP

[kaitakbowler]

In the end it wasn't FBW, GIGO software, Airtanker modifications or any of the other speculative theories, it was just a human being and Murphy's law.

For all you aircrew out there, look, digest and thank whomsoever you like it wasn't you motoring that seat forward.

Surely now its RIP this thread.

[thefodfather]

Whilst I have no knowledge of this occurrence at all, if, as has been suggested, the flight crew failed to own up to the true nature of what happened for some time, one might question the crew's perception of their local Just Culture.

The worse the outcome, the harder it is for management to apply it properly, especially when their higher management are clamouring for a scapegoat. Just Culture is as much about the organisation as it is the individuals involved. I hope that these questions aren't lost in the aftermath of the investigation.

[woptb]

Just Culture is about perception,if its your belief you don't have one,then you don't.The behaviour pre & post are key,was the risk of an error increased or compounded by the crews behaviour. The captain should have 'fessed up',but without knowing more about context I wouldn't throw the first stone.

[mr snow]

OAP. Don't forget that the MAAIB and their SI took ATrS out of the loop immediately after this incident occurred. Also, against the aircraft manufacturer's advice, AOC 2 Group decided to ground the MIL fleet.
No 'Private RAF' involvement here.
I would agree with some your sentiment though. For example, how many hours on the Voyager A330 do the RAF crews on 10 and 101 Sqn have? My guess would be that you have RAF Voyager Captains and Co-Pilots flying this aircraft together with very little?

[higthepig]

I would agree with some your sentiment though. For example, how many hours on the Voyager A330 do the RAF crews on 10 and 101 Sqn have? My guess would be that you have RAF Voyager Captains and Co-Pilots flying this aircraft together with very little?

Can I assume we should never fly a Mk1 of any type?

[Easy Street]

Can I assume we should never fly a Mk1 of any type?

Of course not, but it'd probably have been a good idea to log a few hundred hours and bed down the SOP before introducing randomness like cameras into the mix.

[tubby linton]

A number of UK airlines received the A330 in the late 1990s early 2000s without any exposure to the type before. Off we went to Florida with very few hours on type but we did have a background on Airbus aircraft , both conventional and FBW.
I mentioned in a previous post the situation whereby a pilot was disconnecting the autopilot by putting pressure on the side stick with his foot. This incident does not seem a lot different except that I am surprised that the FBW protections took longer then I thought to activate. The RAF seemed to have discovered very early on in their operation of an Airbus FBW the problem with having sidesticks that are not linked. It is a major failing in the basic Airbus design. Hopefully it may be addressed in the future.
I think that blaming it as a MK 1 version is incorrect. There are over 1000 330s in operation worldwide and Airbus through their CPIP are always tweaking the design.

[higthepig]

Of course not, but it'd probably have been a good idea to log a few hundred hours and bed down the SOP before introducing randomness like cameras into the mix.

Can't believe the RTS included a camera.

[course_profile]

CASBO - it's in a privilege to be able to share this forum with gifted aviators such as yourself who have spent a whole career with out ever making a single mistake. I doff my cap sir.

[lj101]

Nor can it be hidden behind when you've misled and deceived in an attempt to cover up a totally avoidable incident of your own creation.

Just Culture is based on facts. If the Captain involved did mislead and deceive then he will be dealt with accordingly. If he didn't then he will be dealt with accordingly. We look at the error, not the consequence of the error.
If someone forgot to put their handbrake on and the car didnt move, is that an error?
If the same thing happened but the car rolled down a hill and hit a wall that's the same error, but different result.
If the same thing happened, the car rolled down the hill, and a child was hit by the car, its the same error, but now a tragic result.
So do we look at the error in the same way on all 3 occasions?

Looking at the pictures of the crews searching for the MH370, anyone notice any cameras placed on the side of the lookout window?

[beardy]

Such arrant nonsense concerning Just Culture. Try going to explain to the mother of the child that the twit who left the brake off and killed her child will get the same treatment as the twit who did the same and nothing happened. No we don't treat the twit who committed the error the same in all circumstances

It's not the placement of the camera that is the problem here. It's the ignorance of where it was when the seat was motored forward, the ignorance of AP disconnection when the sidestick was moved (before the major push to full forward limits) the ignorance of control law implementation, the ignorance of sidestick priority handling and the mishandling of the situation by both pilots. Compounded with what, on the face of it, appears to be less than complete frankness in the debrief.

The initial error was not grave, the resultant handling of the aircraft leads to some very serious questions about the level of competency displayed.

[Justanopinion]

The initial error was not grave, the resultant handling of the aircraft leads to some very serious questions about the level of competency displayed.

Again, not a large aircraft pilot but I imagine a sudden rapid -2g descent in the middle of a bog standard cruise, is not regularly practiced in the sim. The Captains first action was to pull back on stick, seems natural enough to me, and then when that did nothing and autopilot would not disconnect I can only imagine the confusion.

Before jumping on the outrage bus at this one individual, perhaps if these drills are incorrect, (and I don't know) then learning can occur.

Still, sure all here would have dealt with it perfectly , would have had no loose articles on the flight deck etc etc. perhaps attitudes here are a generational thing.

[beardy]

If you understood Airbus systems, and there is no talk of them not working in this case, the first nudge of the stick would have disconnected the autopilot with accompanying aural warning and a change on the FMA. Apparently these were not noticed. The reason the CM1 could not disconnect the autopilot was because it was already disconnected.
The first action in a suspected sidestick problem is to hand control to the other pilot, who when he takes it presses the sidestick priority button to disable the other sidestick. The "dual control input" call out shows that this was not done.
The aircraft established controlled flight all on its own despite the best efforts of the pilots. They then recovered the flight path setting power and attitude, not wrong in itself, but indicative of them not recognising what the aircraft was doing, despite the aircraft telling them.

Of course this is pure speculation, but the behaviour of the aircraft, as described here, is what would happen in these circumstances if all the systems were functioning.

[Just This Once...]

If you understood Airbus systems…

The first action in a suspected sidestick problem is to hand control to the other pilot, who when he takes it presses the sidestick priority button to disable the other sidestick.

Clearly I do not understand Airbus, but what is the first action when the other pilot is not there?

[beardy]

Apart from removing the camera, there is nothing you can do when operating single pilot. At the moment Airbus do not make aircraft that are designed to be single pilot, the presumption is that 2 crew will be in the cockpit. Of course it is up to the operator what they consider as an acceptable time for one pilot to be alone in the cockpit.

However apart from an incident like this with an external control restriction I find it difficult to imagine anything like this happening. The sidestick has no input when the autopilot is engaged, it is isolated. Mechanically moving the sidestick will disengage the autopilot allowing sidestick inputs. Following disengagement if no movement to the sidestick is made the aircraft maintains it's last attitude (within control law limits.) Although we practice problems with sidestick input in the sim and there are procedures, I don't think they have ever been needed in live operations, although I could be wrong.

[VinRouge]

The initial error was not grave, the resultant handling of the aircraft leads to some very serious questions about the level of competency displayed. What, you mean a bit like a recent civvie national carrier that taxiied into a building at Joberg?

Fortunately beardey, you are the sort of dinosaur that doesnt fit in a modern safety aware military or any high consequence organization for that matter. The same sorts of attitudes I saw many years ago, when the same dinosaurs thought that CRM stood for "Captains right mate", more willing to sling mud than accept they could, you know, make a genuine mistake.

Lots of assumptions being jumped to here, without all the facts (as per usual), including slurring of individuals who probably feel bad enough as it is. If they broke a reg or an FCOM warning or caution, so be it. A little bit of understanding and "walk a mile in their shoes" wouldn't go amiss.


Of course this is pure speculation, but the behaviour of the aircraft, as described here, is what would happen in these circumstances if all the systems were functioning.

your damn right its pure speculation.

[esscee]

Pure speculation of course, but which numpty laid his digital SLR camera, not a small compact digital camera, next to the Left sidestick?

Not the person in the RH seat is a far point.

Someone mentioned earlier about a camera on the side panel of a RAAF P-3 so others do it, does the P-3 have a sidestick and "fly-by-wire", no.

Bad old habits of "we used to do it on ..... types" do not wash with sidesticks.

Learn from mistakes but lucky this time, could have been much worse.

[beardy]

Well VinRouge that illuminated the discussion.:D

It is not pure speculation that all the systems were functioning, the interim report says so.

[thefodfather]

Beardy, I would have to agree with Vin Rouge that your outcome focussed approach to Just Culture is never going to improve safety in the slightest. It is exactly such an approach that clamours for the scapegoat when something bad happens and fails to deals with the real causes of an occurrence that will actually stop it happening again.

I'd advise a read of a book called "Whack a Mole" by David Marx.

[beardy]

Well, fodfather, I agree with you, to an extent. Hanging the guilty does not prevent someone else taking the same actions (although it can dissuade), and in the case under discussion here may be inappropriate. I have no idea how the RAF deals with a Just Culture, but, if true that the crew in this case were less than forthcoming in their debrief, is the problem with the RAF interpretation or in the integrity of the crew? Not being privy to the machinations I don't know.

What I am fed up with is the constant repetition of the congenitally bigoted rantings of the Airbus detractors. In this case Airbus and it's philosophy took a battering on this thread until the facts were revealed. The aircraft performed as designed, the control laws prevented an increasing pitch rate and set the thrust to idle (if in doubt just read up the normal law protections.) In the man/machine interface the machine performed as designed and as described in the FCOM and in the simulator profiles. Now is the time to address the training (and assessment criteria) of this operator. Airbus have a vested interest in the safe operation of their aircraft, perhaps that may be a good place to start.

[glad rag]

I've flown with the RAF a number of times and only twice have experienced a mishap, once aboard a Herc landing -at West Freigh [but not where they should have] and once going forwards to visit the cockpit, as invited, only to find it full of sleeping green men [VC10K? returning from Suda Bay via Cairo :hmm:].

Oh and having an unexpected layover in Asi, twice, as Timmy, the useless piece of s**t, left us stranded, AGAIN....

:=

[Tourist]

It's against my nature to say anything in support of the RAF, but all the "learn best practise from the airlines" is being taken a bit far.

My experience of Airbus in the airline world is that there is a frankly astonishingly large amount of clutter loafing around the average cockpit, including behind the side sticks. Cups, glasses cases, newspapers, ipads, iphones, cutlery, stray hand baggage, plogs, food trays plus the enormous and ever growing pile of paper that spews incessantly from the acars box.
Sounds like some crappy luck.

[melmothtw]

Can't comment on the RAF, but flew the jumpseat in a USAF C-17 out of Ramstein and into Bagram a couple of years ago. It appeared the two pilots were being assessed by a third more senior crewman on the flight deck.

Being plugged into the comms, I heard this more senior fellow instruct a left turn shortly after departure, only for the plane to start banking right. "LEFT turn!!" he shouted. It didn't exactly fill me with confidence, especially in light of where we were heading...

[Axel-Flo]

Nicely put Vin Rouge...

Yes Beardy of course you too are correct in that the "Airbus detractors" all jumped up and shouted about its failing while guess what......
Yes...making wise A$$ assumptions and coming to false conclusions using all their apparent expertise making wise A$$ guesses....
You could be making the same mistake, maybe not its true, but without all the facts your accusations, akin I must say to all the current ones in the MH 370 thread, are perhaps a tad too premature and slanderous to the individuals concerned. :=

Now for example, camera used, placed on the side coaming by the ash tray in the dark, without knowledge of its subsequent movement to an inappropriate position directly behind the side stick, the P1 motors seat forward and situation arises...
While crew deal with the developing situation, the camera, now free falls back and left and into an open Nav Bag on the floor. Once the immediate situation is resolved, on looking around the crew can find no reason for the aircrafts trajectory hence on initial interviews are unable to say they know the cause....

Latterly with CVR and DFDR info available to the board, the movement of the seat etc all tie in and the crew perhaps re questioned?

Now I am not claiming that is what happened, I wasn't there either, but it would mean it were not a wilful act of diss-information as perhaps your posts seem to suggest....

Maybe we let the Board deal with it, I am sure their findings will be just as open....and maybe the immediate flogging and dismissal of the alleged guilty is disproportionate and unwarranted in our "just culture":ok:

[thefodfather]

Beardy, I think we are actually in agreement on many things although coming at the discussion from different positions. The constant Airbus bashing at the start of this thread was very annoying when there was not a lot of information available. There seems to be a lot that can be learnt from this incident, both in terms of the occurrence itself and what it might imply about the reporting culture. I hope that the management chain is thinking very carefully about the long term implications of their reaction to this occurrence.

[Dengue_Dude]

That's the nice thing about Prune - it always seems to bring the best out of people.

Leaves me wondering how many posters have actually sat and worked on a flight deck let alone made a mistake in their office.

A mistake was made and had serious consequences, however it appears the aircraft ACTUALLY had a clean bill of health.

I would have thought more folks would have appreciated that considering the comments that preceded the interim report.

Yellow & black

[Axel-Flo]

ah yes, DD.
Sadly the anonymity allows any Walt with an opinion, a soap box to stand on or ego to thrust forth the chance to pass comment. Still, free speech, an open forum and all.....

I think, to be fair, you get to know who has an agenda, who an axe to grind, he/ she who talks complete hoop and who actually is worth listening to...

Bottom line is of course, you don't even need to have been on an aircraft to post here.....;)

[thefodfather]

It always intrigues me how people often get very excited at the start and then go quiet, rather than the other way around.

[ShotOne]

Your point about walts with axes to grind is totally valid, axel flo...so why didn't you make it during the many pages of vitriolic and unfounded Airbus bashing??

There are three distinct phases of this event; initially placing a camera in that spot, while a big mistake, was far from the worst aspect. The attempts at recovery showed major deviations from Airbus procedures and demonstrated a serious lack of understanding of the aircraft. But by far the most serious issue is the failure to come clean afterwards. The captain MUST have realised exactly what had happened soon after. It is this refusal to own up which caused such massive operational issues and trashed the RAF's reputation.

[downsizer]

Have I missed the bit that says he didn't own up?

[BEagle]

I'm sure that the ongoing SI will take a thorough look at the simulator training given to the RAF's Voyager pilots, particularly concerning AP disconnect, jammed sidestick and control priority procedures. Plus the associated aural warnings; for example the different nature of the AP disconnect aural warning when anything other than the AP disconnect button is used.

Perhaps there will be additional safety procedures introduced regarding temporary 'one pilot only' flight deck procedures and the importance of keeping the area around the sidestick base clear of any potential loose articles.

One point which must be made to the ignorant 'hang him high' people posting here, is that the Captain's integrity is most certainly NOT in any doubt.

[ShotOne]

?? How come the fleet was grounded for two weeks? It is surely inconceivable that such huge dislocation and financial cost would have been incurred had it been known the aircraft was not the issue.

[esscee]

If the captain's integrity is not in doubt, then whose camera was placed where and why did he not admit it?

[beardy]

for example the different nature of the AP disconnect aural warning when anything other than the AP disconnect button is used

The only difference is that when using the takeover button the 'cavalry charge' only lasts for1.5 secs, when there is a FAILURE the cavalry charge is permanent. I have only ever had the AP on the A330 disconnect once when I didn't press the takeover button, it was due to turbulence, the cavalry charge did not sound permanently. Such disconnections are not uncommon on the A320 family.

I would hope that the SI would look carefully at the whole training package. If your reporting from your contacts in the unit is correct then there seems to be an unsubstantiated underlying lack of confidence in the aircraft and it's technologies. Training is but one method of establishing that confidence.

BEagle I admire your loyalty to your friend and that you have no doubts about him. I have never met him. Your reporting of events seem to have left some gaps in the narrative that were filled in by the interim report. I take it those gaps didn't come from him.

[Wrathmonk]

Just out of curiosity what are the written down (RAF) rules regarding taking cameras into the cockpit (whether it be ME, RE or FJ)?

[downsizer]

why did he not admit it?

Again, where does it say he didn't?

[beardy]

I don't believe that it has been said anywhere that he did not admit the position of the camera. Nor has it been said that he did, specifically it is missing from the interim report. He may not have realised the implication of where he subsequently found it, nor that it was, in part, the cause of the incident.

It does seem rather extreme to trawl through his data card for timings in order to match those from the FDM and then forensically examine the camera body simply to confirm a story.

[Willard Whyte]

Just out of curiosity what are the written down (RAF) rules regarding taking cameras into the cockpit (whether it be ME, RE or FJ)?

Not sure there were, I certainly can't recall any from my time on (ME) types. Rather, it was left to 'airmanship' to determine that which elevated risk.

Pretty sure some rules will be following shortly, which as usual will be of the lowest common denominator variety, affecting those, the vast majority, who are sensible, as well as the numpties*.

*That's probably a little harsh, I've witnessed a very experienced, reliable, capable and trustworthy pilot have a 'momentary lapse' and bust a descent altitude because he was taking a photograph during an arrival procedure.

[JFZ90]

It seems important at this stage to have an open mind about the captains actions as the full sequence of events does not appear to be public. It is certainly unfair to denigrate on the basis that no-one ever should make a mistake. On the one hand you could draw comparisons to ensuring the absence of control movement restrictions as a fundamental rule, and even with an everyday scenario such as letting a coke can roll under the brake pedal in a car - clearly driver error as it is a well known risk. On the other hand the flat surfaces in an airbus cockpit do seem rather innocent places to put things, ignoring hindsight etc., so perhaps this mistake is fundamentally forgivable - the first time etc.

There remain some questions though about how obvious it was the camera was the cause. As the ac started to pitch down, surely the first instinct would be to reach for the stick, at which stage its forward displaced or jammed(?) state would become apparent or obvious? Was the seat motored back immediately afterwards?

Was this crew a classic 'always in the RAF' RAF crew or one of the hybrid ex-civ A330 crews (if I understood correctly that they were recruited and exist flying voyager, and if they are still around on the programme?)

[BEagle]

beardy wrote: It does seem rather extreme to trawl through his data card for timings in order to match those from the FDM and then forensically examine the camera body simply to confirm a story.

I strongly suspect that the Captain had absolutely no idea that his camera had caused the problem and that the damage to the camera was initially suspected to have been caused by it having been thrown about during the manoeuvre and recovery. I'm also pretty sure that he would have been entirely happy to volunteer his camera for forensic analysis, as he was as mystified as everyone elase about the cause of the incident.

I do agree that the whole training package should be carefully examined - and I agree with beardy that the significance of the continuous 'cavalry charge', plus the FMA indication should have provided an obvious clue. Out of curiosity, is the break-out force to disconnect the AP through side-stick override particularly high? Is this something shown to new Airbus pilots in the simulator during Type Rating training in the civil world?

One wonders what the effect of a jammed control column in an aircraft without Airbus' excellent flight envelope protection would have been....:sad:

[JEM60]

BEAgle. Seem to recall the loss of an R.A.F Phantom shortly after take-off when the back seater had dropped a clipboard or similar, pilot pulling into the climb, jammed the stick, both ejected unharmed.

[Tourist]

BEagle

"Out of curiosity, is the break-out force to disconnect the AP through side-stick override particularly high?"

No, happens quite regularly when you bump it with your knee/elbow

[ShotOne]

Beagle your loyalty to your friend does you credit but the camera would have been an inch or so from his wrist and in his line of sight. It's a big stretch to believe he didn't realise, even afterwards.

I'm not an advocate of "hang em high" but "Just" culture isn't the same as "no-blame" culture.

[Peter G-W]

The real issue here is not the camera but the fact that the Captain was not sitting at the controls whilst alone on the flight deck.

[Rhino power]

the fact that the Captain was not sitting at the controls whilst alone on the flight deck

So you haven't bothered to read the SI then? You know, the one where it clearly states that the Captain WAS at the controls whilst he was alone on the flight deck... :=

-RP

[3 bladed beast]

Peter G-W - Unbelievable! You can read? Oh no, it's clear you can't.

I also hear the Captain deliberately did it, there were 7 prostitutes, an orgy and lots of cocaine.

This guy is an experienced aviator, who has done what many of us have - taken a camera into a cockpit. What happened is a 'freak' occurrence and very unfortunate for all concerned. There is no cover up, the report has come out quickly and lessons have been learned.

I think everyone who is judging here, should take a long look at themselves and think what they have done ( and got away with) in aviation first.

Safe flying to all.

[beardy]

Tourist,

I don't know which aircraft you fly. The breakout force to disengage the autopilot on an Airbus sidestick is high. In 19 years on Airbus 320 & 330 I have never seen anybody inadvertantly disengage an autopilot this way.

[Megaton]

Beardy

I may have only 7 years Airbus experience but I've seen the autopilot disconnected inadvertently by knocking the side stick several times: in fact, I've done it myself.

[beardy]

Ham Phisted,
Fair enough, I wonder why that could be? There may be some difference in the disposition of cockpit articles. We rarely have anything on the console next to the sidestick. We use the clip on the window for plates and the table for everything else. What is it that knocks the sidestick? A previous poster mentioned knees and elbows which, the way I fly, makes little sense to me, but then I don't cross my legs when flying.

[Peter G-W]

RP, you are not at the controls if the seat is motored back by several inches. As was subsequently demonstrated by this Captain in quite a dramatic fashion.

[lj101]

RP, you are not at the controls if the seat is motored back by several inches. As was subsequently demonstrated by this Captain in quite a dramatic fashion.

Maybe he has very long arms, some of our pilots are very odd shapes. Maybe he had cramp in his legs and was stretching them after 6 hours in the seat? Maybe he had reached back to get his TAP's or similar out of his nav bag, we are allowed to do that. I'm sure the report will explain all.
With ref to knocking the stick in error, Airbus apparently said this does happen on occasion as mentioned on here.

[Megaton]

It's 3/4 years since I flew Airbus but I seem to recall our Flying Manual had some statement about keeping the sidestick area clear of objects for this very possibility although being rather larger than most of my colleagues it was usually my knee that managed to knock the sidestick, disconnecting the A/P.

[BEagle]

beardy wrote: There may be some difference in the disposition of cockpit articles. We rarely have anything on the console next to the sidestick. We use the clip on the window for plates and the table for everything else. What is it that knocks the sidestick? A previous poster mentioned knees and elbows which, the way I fly, makes little sense to me, but then I don't cross my legs when flying

Does Voyager have OITs for the (still non-functioning) Mission Planning System instead of the normal A330 trays? I know that was planned for the KC-30A, but am not sure whether it's the same for the RAF version.

Quite how an elbow / knee can nudge a sidestick seems strange to me - don't pilots sit correctly in seats these days? I've seen a few co-pilots in other aircraft slouch in their seats with legs crossed when acting as non-flying pilot, but very few.

As for motoring the seat whilst acting as flying pilot, I can see that a slight nudge or two might be needed to fine tune the seat position, but that's about all.

[Onceapilot]

So, the RAF has procured a new tanker that will routinely fly in close formation with other aircraft, day and night, on Ops, on trails, fair weather and foul for the next 25 or so years. And yet, the autopilot can easily be accidently disconnected in flight? Also, with the second pilot out of the seat or incapacitated for any other reason, a lone pilot does not have full authority over the flying controls? How can such a situation have been allowed to develop? How can such an aircraft be cleared for formation flying?
So many Questions!

OAP

[beardy]

Yes Onceapliot, so many questions, none of which will be answered here, so they must be rhetorical.

I think many of your fears will be allayed by how the aircraft is operated. Just have a think how the F16, with all those same problems inherent in it's design, has been operated all those years.

BTW the lone pilot in the circumstance under discussion in this thread had full authority over the flying controls, they worked properly, he just didn't realise it. An operating technique if there is a problem with either sidestick or thrust lever is to use the automatics (autopilot or autothrust.) Of course this wouldn't have worked in this instance for the sidestick principally because there was no fault with the sidestick.

[Tourist]

BEagle

"Quite how an elbow / knee can nudge a sidestick seems strange to me - don't pilots sit correctly in seats these days? I've seen a few co-pilots in other aircraft slouch in their seats with legs crossed when acting as non-flying pilot, but very few."


It is usually nudged by a knee after motoring the seat back to put feet on the strange foot rest thingys.
Civvy flying is not like military. People tend to roam around a lot more rather than being both sat in a flying posture. I find it quite odd.

[Onceapilot]

beardy,
Please retract your insult. I do not insult you.
I have little faith in the FSTA, borne out by an almost-disaster in 7000 odd hrs of FSTA flying. There is little point in comparing any sidestick fast jet with a 200 tonne tanker. If you have any knowledge/experience of AAR you should know that was a specious argument. I have no connections with FSTA or Airbus, do you?

OAP

[beardy]

"Insult" duly retracted. BTW some would say Jeremiah was right all along!

I have no connection with FSTA, I fly Airbus which is my only connection to them. My only experience of AAR is as a receiver and is irrelevant to this incident. There is every point in considering the integrity of sidestick operations in all sidestick operated aircraft. The 'almost disaster' was as a result of the actions of a pilot, the result would have been far worse in an aircraft without the normal law protection offered by Airbus.

Now I believe the thread was not about the rights or wrongs of FSTA, but about a specific incident, which is independant of FSTA and could have happened to any Airbus 330. It just happened to be one flown by the RAF in fewer hours than I have on Airbus.

[Onceapilot]

Thank you beardy. You should not see my criticism of the FSTA/AirTanker/RAF project as direct attack on Airbus aircraft. However, the level of robust integrity of the A330 autopilot/flying controls in the role of a close formation leader has been severely called into question by this accident. As a (former?) receiver you might recall the reliance that you put in the smooth accurate flying of a tanker? Well, most of that was through the autopilot. Surely the introduction of the FSTA should not see questions about the suitability of the flying controls in this role?

OAP

[beardy]

Sure, there has been no questioning of the autopilot, it performed as advertised. The only time I have had an A330 autopilot drop out was in severe turbulence, the drop out is a very rare occurrence, unlike in the A320 series. I have never had the autopilot do anything it was never designed to do, nor the flying controls. It is actually an impressive and impressively capable autopilot. I would assume that, unlike in this incident, during tanking there would be 2 pilots at the controls throughout, but of course it is dangerous to rely upon assumptions.

When I tanked from the Vulcan was that the autopilot flying it too?

And yes a former receiver from my 17 years occupying an ejection seat.

[goffered again]

I can't help but wonder what you would all be saying if a maintainer had left an uncontrolled loose article in such a position?

[Onceapilot]

beardy,
I have no idea what autopilot modes the Vulcan used in AAR. However, getting back to the 330, it would seem incredible to me that a less robust system is replacing the first-class kit we are scrapping. As regards two pilots in seats, are you saying the A330 would need this?

OAP

[beardy]

Nope, I am not saying that: I am assuming that in a critical phase of flight including take off, landing and, in the case under discussion, tanking then a crew aircraft would have the full crew complement at station and would be operated as designed, as a crew aircraft. But, it is only an assumption, it would be up to the operating authority to decide, not me. It is not impossible, but would not be advisable, to land the A330 single pilot, it has been done when the other pilot has been incapacitated.

I am not sure why you think that the A330 is less robust, where is the evidence of that? A loose article misplaced by a pilot impinged on the flying controls. In the same scenario an older aircraft would have continued to pitch down until the article was removed or the aircraft broke up, the control laws on the Airbus prevented that by stabilising it in a high speed descent with idle thrust.

[Tourist]

I must admit, It is not the control system I would be wary of re tanking so much as the Airbus autopilot lackadaisical attitude towards height and speed keeping if it is anything like a A320.

They tend to let the speed wander a long way and then power up quite aggressively.

[beardy]

The A330 isn't like the A320 in those respects. The engines are much bigger and have much more inertia. Mind you I don't usually operate at altitudes lower than FL 350/370, apart from climb and descent.The AUTOTHRUST may well have different characteristics when cruising at lower altitudes.

[haltonapp]

I know that the FDR records lots of parameters, but pilots seat movement is not one that I would have thought of!

[BEagle]

Vulcan autopilot 'modes' indeed! It had a single Smiths autopilot with very basic functionality! I never flew it in the AAR role, but when prodding against it with the F-4 it was a nice, stable platform and was much nicer than the Victor to prod against.

The VC10K autopilot system was a little more advanced, but as with the Vulcan, thrust had to be controlled manually (except during Auto ILS).

For AAR, both pilots were required to be properly strapped-in and the flying pilot had control of the control column and throttles. One of the primary responsibilites of the other pilot was to look out on his/her side of the aircraft.

I doubt very much whether Voyager is operated in the AAR role without both pilots being properly strapped in during any close formation work.

OAP, the TriStar couldn't have continued in service for very much longer, given the increasing cost of maintaining such an elderly aeroplane. Moreover, the Mk 17HDUs were very long in the tooth. However, I do think that the aircraft was retired prematurely - I saw one in the distance over Brize at 13:18 today, so I guess that was one of the last flights of the old beast? Even though the cause of the Voyager plummet has been proved to be an unique event and notwithstanding the excellence of the aircraft in the basic air transport role, it still hasn't met its AAR spec., by all accounts.

[Onceapilot]

beardy, robust AP modes in suitability and function. Never mind the recent accident, according to some contributors, the Airbus sidestick/autopilot suffers from regular accidental disconnection and confusion about its functionality. Is this correct or not?

OAP

[Tourist]

Onceapilot

What do you imagine happens when the autopilot is accidentally knocked out by a knee or elbow?

Suddenly the aircraft is flying along in perfect trim....
...and the pilot presses the autopilot button again and all is well...

A motoring chair against an SLR into the stick is one thing but one would assume that during AAR nobody would be moving around.

[beardy]

No. I have never had an accidental disconnect, so it cannot be a regular occurrence. When it disconnects the aircraft maintains trajectory as commanded by the side stick, if the stick is neutral 1g flight will be maintained.
If there is any confusion about AP mode, it is not the aircrafts fault!

[mr snow]

OAP, do you include the VC10 as one of the: 'First class pieces of kit' ?

One of the most common phrases recorded in the aircraft's defect log was: '# 1(2) autopilot random disconnect'. ;)

[BEagle]

Failure to engage, I can certainly recall. But 'random disconnects'? Very, very unusual.

The best autopilot snag I ever read was on one of the Crows' F-4s we were flying at the time: Use Autopilot with caution - prone to random uncommanded +4G pitch errors. But I don't think that I ever used the autopilot in my brief times on either the Buccaneer or F-4 though - there was simply no point.

During my brief acquaintance trip on an A330, the instructor disconnected the AP....and absolutely NOTHING changed - the aircraft maintained its trimmed state until I deflected the sidestick. It took about half a minute for me to understand how simple the manoeuvre demand character of the Airbus flight control system made flying the aircraft.

[Dominator2]

BEagle, It is great that you have an opinion on almost everything. A shame that you didn't last a little longer on the F4 and then you would have learnt how to operate some of the more temperamental systems. The F4 autopilot was basic, some may say crude, however, a Godsend on a 8 hour transit flight. Due to lack of any integration or proper testing it's limitations were learnt in Sqn use. It became well known that every time that the Nav selected PD on the radar there would be an AP disconnect. This may be accompanied with an un-commanded pitch-up or pitch-down. I'm sure that 228 OCU QFIs would have taught you all you needed to know!!
The use of the AP just required an understanding of the system and good Crew Coop.
On a previous post, the was no significant difference between AAR on the Victor or Vulcan on the CL. I must admit that I never tanked on the Vulcan wing pods, maybe you did, and have an opinion

[Roland Pulfrew]

I must admit that I never tanked on the Vulcan wing pods I didn't know that the Vulcan had wing pods, was that a double top secret modification?? ;)

[gzornenplatz]

Dom2, in 15 years on the f4 I must have had no more than a handful of AP disconnects and I can't recall selecting PD causing one, anyway back to the thread...

[Dominator2]

Roland,

I must admit that I never tanked on the Vulcan wing pods.
Was only inserted to see if BEagle is awake and responsive.

[BEagle]

Dominator2, notwithstanding the typically friendly 228 OCU staff manner of your post :rolleyes:, my point was that, although I was well aware of the use of the F-4 autopilot, it was that one particular piece of junk which The Crows hadn't managed to fix which was lim'd for that ridiculous snag.

Roly, actually some Vulcans did have wing pods. Not for AAR though - they were the same 'special' ones we inherited for 3 of our K3s in the 2R role....:oh:

Which is doubtless yet another capability the RAF no longer has............:mad:

[Haraka]

Now please don't be sniffy Beags , we can't have everything.

[BEagle]

I know, Haraka. But it's ADAM shame...:uhoh:

The role was supposed to have been passed on to FSTA, but seems to have been binned. It's a good job the world is so much more stable these days...:\

[Chris Griffin]

Once the PFI was approved there was no way the role would pass to the acquired airframe due to the potential of an airframe write off.

Potential successors to the VC10 role have been studied for many a year. I wouldn't be at all surprised if there are no more 2R globals :(, unless you count a live feed into a container.

[NutLoose]

It surprises me that there isn't a requirement to hold the stick constantly in position for a period of time to disconnect the autopilot, not simply for a knock to do it.

It reminds me of a Cessna 182 fatal crash at Leicester, the pilot on take off opened the throttle and his hand accidentally turned the autopilot on which was situated above the throttle, the elevator trim then ran all one way unnoticed during the roll and on lift off it climbed and stalled killing them both.
The autopilot system was later modified to require a press on the power button for a couple of seconds to operate it, additionally they introduced a verbal trim warning that you couldn't miss.

[beardy]

It surprises me that there isn't a requirement to hold the stick constantly in position for a period of time to disconnect the autopilot, not simply for a knock to do it.

Perhaps that is because you don't understand the design logic. There are 3 ways to disconnect the AP. Stick movement is the least used, it is designed so that instant response is given for an urgent requirement to uncouple the AP and manoeuvre the aircraft immediately in non-normal situations where a time lag could be detrimental. i.e I need a response NOW, not in a little while, when you are ready, please.....

[ShotOne]

While most autopilots will disconnect if bashed or tugged, it's not a recommended technique on any aircraft I've come across... and most certainly not on any fbw Airbus since it risks an immediate and unwanted control input. Even if the system had required sustained pressure, what difference would this have made other than delaying the accident by a few seconds?

Why is there so much discussion of the autopilot and it's disconnect system when neither was in the slightest respect at fault in this event? Is it perhaps more comfortable ground for some than discussing the human factors involved?

[NutLoose]

Beardy, I understand that, I am saying I am surprised it does not require a pressure of say a couple of seconds or less to disengage it, having a system that can disconnect the system at the slightest stick movement seems a bit flawed, that's all. One's not talking of holding it over one way for an inordinate amount of time.

[Onceapilot]

Well, could there be so much discussion because the flying controls were centrally involved in an accident?:ok:

[Dan Winterland]

It surprises me that there isn't a requirement to hold the stick constantly in position for a period of time to disconnect the autopilot, not simply for a knock to do it.


It takes more than a knock to do this - it takes a hell of a force to achieve an AP disconnect this way. In 6000hrs on the Bus, I've never seen it happen. Accidental disconnects are relatively common and is much more likely with an inadvertent touch of the stick disconnect button, or even something falling off the table. As BEagle mentioned, the aircraft is artificially stable and if an inadvertent disconnect occurs, the attitude will stay the same, unless there's applied force to the side-sticks. Recovery is a simple matter of pushing an AP engage button and is normally hardly worthy of comment, except for saying "sorry".

In this case, the brute force both disconnected the AP and applied the pitch down input. I suspect the pilot was motoring his seat forward and the camera applied force to the base of the side-stick. The report mentions witness marks on the camera which indicates considerable force.

[beardy]

Nutloose

If you understood what I was saying then you would realise that this form of disconnect is when 'one' needs to take control instantly for the sake of safety. In order to make the 'slightest movement' a considerable break out force is required, it is not the same resistance felt when the AP is not engaged.

I am not sure the relevance to this incident, nor I have I seen it pose a problem either inline flying or in any safety reports.

[melmothtw]

Final MAA report here - https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/service-inquiry-incident-involving-voyager-zz333-on-9-february-2014

[keesje]

“With his feet on the flight deck roof, the co-pilot reached down and attempted to disengage the autopilot by pulling back on his sidestick,” the report says.

A330 flight control laws saved Voyager, inquiry finds - 3/24/2015 - Flight Global (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/a330-flight-control-laws-saved-voyager-inquiry-finds-410491/)

“Modern technology may be capable of reducing crew workload to historic lows and aircraft can now protect themselves as never before, but the requirement for crews to understand and interact with the aircraft and its systems when things deviate from the norm remains as challenging as ever"

http://i55.photobucket.com/albums/g151/rivetjoint/Voyager%20AAR/013n1_zps4320be27.jpg

[Otto Throttle]

Makes you wonder how many other unreported incidents there have been around the world as a result of crews messing about with cameras, phones, iPads etc and forgetting why they are sitting in the flight deck in the first place. :ugh:

[Jhieminga]

The report certainly makes for interesting reading. Looking at all the contributing factors you could also construct an argument that some design features of the Airbus family paved the way towards this incident. It has taken a while but this was something that was almost certain to happen at some point, fortunately the damage that was done was mostly material in this case. As Otto Throttle mentions, it may have happened before many times but gone unreported.

Yes crews need to understand and interact with the aircraft but on an Airbus the 'understanding' part can be difficult. I'm certainly not against the types, just saying that there are some additional layers of system logic that crews should be aware of and which Airbus may not fully explain in their manuals. With this historic low crew workload we're taking the sharp edges off the operation in a way, leaving crews in a state of mind from which the awakening can be problematic at times.

Just my two cents.

[Monarch Man]

The concept here with respect to design had everything to do with the arrogance of the designers and their superior ideas, rather than having any basis in best practise and overall design philosophy.
The amount of times I've personally observed line pilots and trainees falling into the various design traps due to a lack of tactile and intuative feedback, it makes me question how it was ever certified.
My personal favourite is still the genius design of the side stick where the other pilot doesn't get any feedback.

[ShotOne]

What total nonsense!

Those would be the same arrogant designers whose superb flight envelope protection, as highlighted by the official MAA report (did you even look at it?) stopped a far worse accident and possibly saved scores of lives.

[Cows getting bigger]

The pilot is (was?) the commander of an aircraft. To sit and play David Bailey whilst No2 was outside chatting with the purser (is that the new name for loadmaster/doorman/head steward?) and a mate of his is, in itself, not exactly military. Plonking his camera down next to a primary control just smacks of complete ignorance.

Sorry, but MAA/MilAAIB can flower this up with all sorts of useful chain-of-events and Swiss-cheese stuff but the bottom line is the whole incident makes the RAF AT fleet look like a bunch of amateur........ photographers. :ugh: As Airbus say, it's the first time in a squillion hours that this has ever happened.

[tubby linton]

If both sticks had been linked then the force pushing one forward would be translated into the other stick. In this case having seperate sticks meant that the other pilot only had only to press the disconnect button and command a pitch up with his working stick. I have read the report and I don't believe that he did this , but instead merely commanded full back stick instead to counter the pitch down.. For this reason I question the quality of the training received by the crew.

[Clunk60]

Are we not missing the elephant in the room here. Had the aircraft captain, a military officer with all the associated military ethos associated with such a profession, confessed ALOT earlier as to the circumstances then all this baggage of cultural, endemic behaviour across the AT/AAR fleet been avoided. Plain and simple he screwed up and lacked the moral fibre/PQ's/OQ's to admit it until the evidence was overwhelming. End result; the rest of the AT/AAR fleets are now tarred with the same brush and will be subject to arcane, long screw driver, morale sapping over sight to prevent this "sort of thing" happening again.

[Courtney Mil]

MANY years ago I took my SLR (long before digital days) flying with me in a F4 FGR2. The front seat was fully up when I climbed in and had to motor it down to my usual position after "power on".

The seat motored down just fine for a while, but soon started to slow down and the seat motor was clearly becoming laboured.

My insurance claim to my insurance company was paid straight away with a note stating that mine was the most original claim for a new camera they'd ever seen.

Proud moment.

[jonw66]

Courtney
You need to look at page 1 of the no more selfies thread I'm sure you're comments would be appreciated.
Cheers
Jon

[MechGov]

I wonder if I have misunderstood the findings. The analysis of the data seems to suggest that the captain had to "gorilla" the camera from between the arm rest and the stick. This assessment was derived from the tapes and not from the admission of the captain. Surely not.....

[tubby linton]

All he had to do was lift the armrest up to release the camera

[Wrathmonk]

Clunk60 - couldn't agree more. Is he still a Captain / flying / in the RAF (delete as appropriate) I wonder.

[Dan Winterland]

If both sticks had been linked then the force pushing one forward would be translated into the other stick. In this case having seperate sticks meant that the other pilot only had only to press the disconnect button and command a pitch up with his working stick. I have read the report and I don't believe that he did this , but instead merely commanded full back stick instead to counter the pitch down.. For this reason I question the quality of the training received by the crew.

If the sidestick is pushed with enough force, the AP will disconnect. this is what happened in this case. The CM1 assumed the AP was still engaged because he couldn't move the stick. The CM2 by pulling back did the right thing as the sum of the two sticks is combined and this would have cancelled out the forward movement of the CM1's stick.

Had the aircraft captain, a military officer with all the associated military ethos associated with such a profession, confessed ALOT earlier as to the circumstances then all this baggage of cultural, endemic behaviour across the AT/AAR fleet been avoided.

I get the impression he didn't understand what had happened until a long time after the event.

[Tourist]

I think your impression is wrong Dan

[Dan Winterland]

It's backed up in the report - it states that the Captain was convinced during the investigation that the problem was technical. Having known him well for many years, I consider this very likely.


As for inadvertent AP disconnects in FBW Airbus types, they are relatively common. But in 10 years and 7000 hours, I have never seen one caused by brute force. The effort required is huge - but easily within the scope of the seat to administer. The usual inadvertent disconnect is caused by an inadvertent touch of the disconnect button which, because if it's purpose, is necessarily available and therefore quite vulnerable. It can easily be done by an item falling off the tray table in turbulence. In my airline, an inadvertent disconnect is not a mandatory reporting event.

[cessnapete]

Yes, yes and yes, as of late last year.

[ShotOne]

If by "backed up in the report", Dan, you're implying it clears the Captain on this point, that's simply not the case. Findings, Part 2 detail the extensive simulator tests in which they were unable to free the camera without physical manipulation which could only have been applied by the Captain. Also the DFDR trace shows a series of small lateral sidestick inputs the moment before it came free accompanied by the words "ok ok ok, ok" from the Captain.

Clearly you know and have a high regard for this fellow but good guys do sometimes make mistakes.

[AtomKraft]

Surely, if the Capt. Had any doubt about what had happened, the mighty dent on his camera would have given him a clue?

Poor show all round.

[Al R]

.. thread creep. Wasn't one of the popular theories surrounding the Tu144 crash near Paris, that the strap of the co-pilot's camera snagged on, and accidentally engaged a trim switch resulting in a loss of control?

[Easy Street]

If by "backed up in the report", Dan, you're implying it clears the Captain on this point, that's simply not the case. Findings, Part 2 detail the extensive simulator tests in which they were unable to free the camera without physical manipulation which could only have been applied by the Captain. Also the DFDR trace shows a series of small lateral sidestick inputs the moment before it came free accompanied by the words "ok ok ok, ok" from the Captain.

I think all that makes a heavy inference that the captain did remove the camera, but that doesn't necessarily mean that he would remember doing so when interviewed later. Just imagine what was going on in his head: he'd been at near-zero mental stimulation for a while, and suddenly his enormous new Airbus is bunting over, the co-pilot is climbing in on the ceiling and his sidestick appears stuck fast. I know we pay and train pilots to stay calm, but such a set of circumstances is so far out of the expected that I would not be surprised if he was in full-blown raging panic. I probably would have been too!

Once intense panic has subsided, it's quite possible for memory of the occurrence to be sketchy or even non-existent (I'm sure some of us have been there in other walks of life) and the brain does a very good job at filling in the gaps with stuff that it thinks would make sense, which may bear little relation to what actually happened. The psychologist on the inquiry panel would inevitably have advised the President of this phenomenon, which might introduce enough doubt to prevent any firm finding of dishonesty.

[Mushroom_2]

I think all that makes a heavy inference that the captain did remove the camera, but that doesn't necessarily mean that he would remember doing so when interviewed later. Just imagine what was going on in his head: he'd been at near-zero mental stimulation for a while, and suddenly his enormous new Airbus is bunting over, the co-pilot is climbing in on the ceiling and his sidestick appears stuck fast. I know we pay and train pilots to stay calm, but such a set of circumstances is so far out of the expected that I would not be surprised if he was in full-blown raging panic. I probably would have been too!

Once intense panic has subsided, it's quite possible for memory of the occurrence to be sketchy or even non-existent (I'm sure some of us have been there in other walks of life) and the brain does a very good job at filling in the gaps with stuff that it thinks would make sense, which may bear little relation to what actually happened. The psychologist on the inquiry panel would inevitably have advised the President of this phenomenon, which might introduce enough doubt to prevent any firm finding of dishonesty.

Another example of today's culture of "explaining away" rather than apportioning blame or responsibility of any sort.
I thought the captain's actions were some of the worst examples of airmanship and professionalism I have come across in a long time.
Good to see he is still in the RAF though - I would not want to see him anywhere near the flightdeck of a civil aircraft.

[Easy Street]

That's not what I was trying to say... the incident is clearly the captain's fault since he put the camera there, although the purpose of the SI is not to apportion blame (that would be done via another means, not released to the public). My post was addressing the question of whether the captain was being wilfully dishonest with the inquiry panel by (apparently) not owning up to what he had done and thereby causing the fleet to be unnecessarily grounded, as was inferred by an earlier post. And my point was that his alleged dishonesty might not have actually been wilful.

[Roland Pulfrew]

Good to see he is still in the RAF though - I would not want to see him anywhere near the flightdeck of a civil aircraft.

Of course there are no civil pilots out there that, take photographs from the cockpit, flying aircraft with side stick controllers are there?

Oh yes, of course there are! As the numerous "view from the cockpit" type albums all over the Internet will attest. Perhaps they are more careful. Perhaps they use their iPads, or have slimline cameras. Or perhaps they've just been lucky!:mad:

[Mushroom_2]

Of course there are no civil pilots out there that, take photographs from the cockpit, flying aircraft with side stick controllers are there?

Yes there are. An Airbus flight deck has been my office for the last 15 years and in that time I have taken numerous photos with different devices from the flight deck. The difference is I haven't been stupid enough (yet) to put my camera down behind the s/stick when there are plenty of other places to put it. Like behind the steering yoke, the bin beside you or your nav bag.

Even so, if you are stupid enough to place it where he did, you motor the seat forward, the aircraft starts a dive, the autopilot drops out (not that he noticed!) and no thought to glance at the base of the s/stick.
Give me a break.

[Hyds Out]

Having seen the article in Flight, I have just had a quick scan through the full report. All I can say is the whole event seems quite amazing, let alone the camera issue.
A few that spring to mind are:

Flight authorised 2 days before the trip! And then the authoriser could not be contacted when there was an issue (1 less cabin crew)
Lack of knowledge of en-route diversions - I know you aren't able to know everywhere you can land, but a military aircraft flying over many countries, you might think it is something that would have been thought about. 500nm is quite a way to go.
If the Captain was alone in the cockpit, why wasn't his seat in the correct position to be able to control the aircraft?
Anyway, thankfully the aircraft helped them in this case...

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

Soldiers sue Ministry of Defence after aircraft plunged 4,400ft | Daily Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3740293/Soldiers-sue-Ministry-Defence-aircraft-plunged-4-400ft.html)

Soldiers are suing the Ministry of Defence after their military aircraft plummeted 4,400ft when the pilot’s camera got stuck.A civil servant and nine soldiers claim they suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder after the incident as they flew to Afghanistan from the UK in February 2014.
They were amongst 200 passengers on the Voyager, which was flying at 33,000ft over the Black Sea when the captain’s camera became wedged against the jet’s controls.

Blah blah blah....

It is understood that the captain, who has not been named, will appear before a court martial in February on perjury and negligence charges.

[Snyggapa]

I'm just SLF but have an interest in aviation human/machine interaction so read a lot of reports to try and get insight into why people do certain things - and one thing here terrifies me from the report.

1.4.51 e - "the captain initially considered switching off the ADIRUs to put the craft into direct law"

My understanding of that would have disabled the airbus protections that effectively saved the aircraft - so would have resulted in a full and sustained nose down because of the jammed forward side stick. I don't know at what point aircraft start to break up, but I can't see a happy ending if he did that. Wasn't there a recent event where similar happened, captain pulled out the breakers to "reset a system", ended up in direct law and also impacting with the ocean as a result?

But the thought process behind that fascinates me. Do pilots have such little trust in the automatics that disabling it as a first troubleshooting factor is instinctive? Is this lack of training, lack of competence, all of the above - or is it just that human's don't react as expected in high stress situations - and stuff like this is hard to train to make instinctive.

[Tourist]

Snyggapa

If the captain (incorrectly) believed that the problem was that the aircraft was doing things without his input, then turning off the automatics and giving him unfiltered control would/might be a sensible option.

The fact that with hindsight this might have been disastrous is beside the point. If the problem presents itself as being an automation problem, then considering losing automation is not stupid.


The rest of his actions.......

[Jhieminga]

The amount of trust a pilot has in automatics depends a lot on his/her experience. Years of flying Airbuses will most likely breed more trust in the computers than you will get from years of flying 60s/70s types with sometimes unreliable automation. Also people have a tendency to revert back to what they were taught first, which for any pilot will be a simple control system without any computers.

[Martin the Martian]

PTSD? From soldiers who probably spent a lot more time being shot at?

Why are the words 'ambulance' and 'chaser' circulating in my mind atthe moment?

[Jimlad1]

I don't think its ambulance chasing at all -being in the back of a plane doing something unexpected can be terrifying. I've had two incidents in my life - first was in Basra, in the back of a Merlin where clearly something unpleasant was going on outside, involving a lot of diving around the sky at night and flares going off (and I flew often enough to understand difference between routine flares and normal jogging and sense that something wasn't right). This left me shaken, not due to the crew, but the circumstances and not knowing what was going on.

Second one was last year on a Virgin aircraft flying NYC - LHR, where without warning mid atlantic, during a meal service we descended so severely for about 30 seconds that we had to hold on to the cabin crew to stop them flying down the aisles. No explanation offered after we levelled out, nor seatbelt signs on. It was genuinely frightening as the crew themselves began to look and sound worried.

In the latter circumstance, for several months after, and to a degree even now, I found myself feeling very uncomfortable when it felt as if the plane was doing 'something it shouldnt'.

So, yes, I can easily sympathise with those who by all accounts had a deeply unpleasant experience. Whether they should sue or not is a different issue.

[H Peacock]

Surely in any aeroplane, if it starts an abrupt uncommanded change of attitude you'd instinctively place your hands on or very near to the flying controls. If the aircraft initiates an aggressive pitch-down you'd have a quick glance at your IAS and, provided you're well away from the stall, you'd apply a suitable nose-up pitch command. If that didn't work (and assuming the stick actually moved) then perhaps you might now start to fault diagnose. If the stick didn't move, then that would hopefully initiate an alternative plan!

[rock34]

I'll take my chances with small arms, RPG, IED etc etc. I have a vague degree of control over what I do and what happens. What I don't like is the circumstances and facts behind this incident. So yes, I can see why people are taking legal action.

[Two's in]

If you allow negligence or plain stupidity to occur and it's proven as such, damn right you're going to get hit by "ambulance chasers". It will be interesting to see (if the stated CM takes place) whether this will be viewed as a personal versus an organizational liability.

[Cows getting bigger]

Indeed. The whole affair also makes the RAF look like a bunch of c**ks. (Said as an ex-RAF man).

[Brian W May]

What he said. Grossly unprofessional. (Also ex-RAF man)

[Rotate too late]

Met a guy that was in the back of "that flight", seemed like a decent genuine guy. They REALLY thought they were going to die, the way he tells it had me very sweaty indeed. I felt sorry for him, honestly thought he was going to be sick....I'm afraid that there seems to be a case to answer, the circumstances behind the "dive" are staggering. A lot people could have perished. I'm sure that things have been put in place to ensure this won't happen in future. Fair play the the crew for avoiding complete catastrophe though.

[Mil-26Man]

Fair play the the crew for avoiding complete catastrophe though.

The credit goes to the aircraft, from what I've read of the incident.

[212man]

Met a guy that was in the back of "that flight", seemed like a decent genuine guy. They REALLY thought they were going to die, the way he tells it had me very sweaty indeed. I felt sorry for him, honestly thought he was going to be sick....I'm afraid that there seems to be a case to answer, the circumstances behind the "dive" are staggering. A lot people could have perished. I'm sure that things have been put in place to ensure this won't happen in future. Fair play to the crew for avoiding complete catastrophe though

I would commend people to read the report; for example the discussion about the co-pilot re-entering the cockpit by traversing across the ceiling whilst weightless! It was clearly a very traumatic event for the pax.

The credit goes to the aircraft, from what I've read of the incident

Yes, indeed. Similarly an easyjet B737 narrowly avoided spearing into Norfolk a few years ago (during a maintenance check/test flight) by virtue of an automated protection system 'kicking in' (Mach Trimmer). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f73640f0b613420005db/Boeing_737-73V__G-EZJK_09-10.pdf

[Shell Management]

“In July 2011, Baines Simmons completed a Safety Diagnostic Survey at Royal Air Force Brize Norton. Through the use of questionnaires, computer surveys and individual interviews, Baines Simmons compiled a very detailed
and accurate snap-shot of the cultures, attitudes and processes
that were in place at the time.

‘While our gap analysis had identified many of the same issues, the report enabled us to direct our resources more effectively and target those areas that most needed our attention. This process led to an overall increase in effectiveness of our Safety Management System as evidenced by a very positive recent audit by the MAA.” - Group Captain D A Stamp, MA
RAF

Baines Simmons made 21 recommendations as relative risk levels were assessed and benchmarked by location.
The report findings were summarised under five key themes:
1. Hazard reporting and investigation
2. Policy disconnects
3. Knowledge and awareness issues
4. Risk-taking behaviour
5. Capability inhibitors

http://www.bainessimmons.com/wp-content/uploads/SMD-Brize-Norton-Strategic-Safety-Consulting.pdf

The plummet was 2 years 7 months later. Perhaps they should ask for their money back.:suspect:

[HP90]

As with all Airbus A/C, the two side-sticks are not linked (meaning moving one will not move the other), so the A/C instead uses a system of "side-stick priority" to determine which input to act upon in the event of simultaneous stick inputs.

So, assuming the captain had side-stick priority, then any inputs by the co-pilot would have been ignored, as the jammed camera was making a constant input on the captain's side-stick. If the co-pilot had pushed his own side-stick priority button, then he would have been able to pull the A/C out of the dive, allowing the captain to retract his seat and cease the input on his side-stick.

I know it's easy to say from an armchair, but I'm amazed that neither the captain nor co-pilot apparently thought to do that.

http://image.slidesharecdn.com/a330flightdeckandsystemsbriefingforpilots-131030181518-phpapp01/95/a330-flight-deck-and-systems-briefing-for-pilots-78-638.jpg

[langleybaston]

As SLF and an ex-Met Man, I am totally convinced that flying an aeroplane is more difficult than driving a car. My two pennorth for what it is worth.

When I was given informal advice on advanced driving and defensive driving by an army professional, he said his mantra as he stepped into a car was "I am going to make this the best drive of my life". I try to remember to do this, and it does help to avoid the "how did I get from home to here?" that can occur after a routine brain-dead uneventful drive.

With the best will in the world, drivers and aircrew will make mistakes: **** happens.

But to add to the risk-load by mucking about with a camera in either mode of transport is grossly unprofessional, and to attempt to shed some responsibility is grossly dishonest in my opinion.

[BEagle]

Regarding the side-stick priority issue, it should be remembered that the overall experience level of the RAF's Voyager aircrew was quite low at the time.

I presume that the (unlikely) case of a jammed side-stick was covered during training?

Given the amount of kit that the aircrew were obliged to take with them at the time, which was FAR more than that required by an airline crew, one wonders what guidance (or SOP) was in place concerning the placing of unrestrained objects in the vicinity of the side-stick...

As for 'mucking about' with a camera, dear weather-guesser, that's rather an unpleasant slur to cast...:=

[Brian W May]

As for 'mucking about' with a camera, dear weather-guesser, that's rather an unpleasant slur to cast...

Well it does beg the question what was the camera doing on that nice piece of side-shelf doesn't it?

Mine used to sit in my NavBag and as an FE, I had a nice desk.

[212man]

As with all Airbus A/C, the two side-sticks are not linked (meaning moving one will not move the other), so the A/C instead uses a system of "side-stick priority" to determine which input to act upon in the event of simultaneous stick inputs.

So, assuming the captain had side-stick priority, then any inputs by the co-pilot would have been ignored, as the jammed camera was making a constant input on the captain's side-stick. If the co-pilot had pushed his own side-stick priority button, then he would have been able to pull the A/C out of the dive, allowing the captain to retract his seat and cease the input on his side-stick.

I know it's easy to say from an armchair, but I'm amazed that neither the captain nor co-pilot apparently thought to do that.

http://image.slidesharecdn.com/a330flightdeckandsystemsbriefingforpilots-131030181518-phpapp01/95/a330-flight-deck-and-systems-briefing-for-pilots-78-638.jpg

That is addressed in the report and from memory was related to the captain continuously pressing his AP disconnect button (believing it must be an AP malfunction) which inhibited the priority function. I think it also mentions the difficulties the co-pilot was having physically getting back into position. By all accounts it was a wild 30 seconds!

[yoyonow]

Beagle,
While your loyalty is admirable, I feel that you do your friend an injustice.
Having been in aviation long enough to realize that this, and most other incidents, have an element of "there by the grace of God" his lack of OQs and apparent gross misconduct in the subsequent enquiry is inexcusable.

[ShotOne]

While the sidesticks aren't connected, that's not quite the whole picture since in normal operation the system sums the inputs; full up on one stick and full down on the other produces level flight (and also a "dual input" callout and a letter from the flight safety dept!) HP90's right to say that if the FO had pressed his takeover button it would have given him full control. But if the Capt subsequently pressed his, his sidestick regains authority.

Whoever resuscitated this thread from last year said the Capt "faces a court martial and perjury charges". Is this the case?

[langleybaston]

QUOTE:

Given the amount of kit that the aircrew were obliged to take with them at the time, which was FAR more than that required by an airline crew, one wonders what guidance (or SOP) was in place concerning the placing of unrestrained objects in the vicinity of the side-stick...

They need guidance? Sheesh!

[BEagle]

ShotOne asked Whoever resuscitated this thread from last year said the Capt "faces a court martial and perjury charges". Is this the case?

Actually, that allegation came from the Völkischer Beobachter, aka the Daily Mail...:\

And yes, weather-guesser, although some pilots of large aeroplanes have a somewhat cavalier attitude to loose articles (e.g. the 'shiny Ten' pilots who used to leave pens on the centre console which could easily have obstructed the throttles or speedbrake lever...:mad:), if there's a location significantly at risk, it should perhaps be marked as such and placarded 'No objects to be placed in the marked area' or similar.

As that sadly fatal US C-130J accident showed, flight deck flying controls must never be compromised by arse looticles.

Isn't that still taught these days?

[vascodegama]

Well I read it in the Sunday Times so it must be true.

[H Peacock]

As for 'mucking about' with a camera, dear weather-guesser, that's rather an unpleasant slur to cast...

Trying to defend the indefensible beagle? If the report is correct and the captain was indeed on his own on the flight deck, then he should have been monitoring his aircraft and not doing anything with his camera!

[BEagle]

Trying to defend the indefensible...

Not at all. 'Mucking about' to my mind means something more than just a few snaps out of the flight deck window and leaving the camera in an unwise location.

It will be for others to determine whether there were SOPs in place to cover 'pilot off the flight deck' procedures and whether those were obeyed. There certainly were in VC10K days - but there wasn't anything like the level of automation reliability in our old coal-fired 4-jets that there is in the Voyager.

[Stu666]

So, assuming the captain had side-stick priority, then any inputs by the co-pilot would have been ignored, as the jammed camera was making a constant input on the captain's side-stick. If the co-pilot had pushed his own side-stick priority button, then he would have been able to pull the A/C out of the dive, allowing the captain to retract his seat and cease the input on his side-stick.


From what I read in the report, that's exactly what they did, but by then the aircraft was already recovering itself. The captain was convinced autopilot was engaged and diving the aircraft, despite the visual and aural indications otherwise. Because he couldn't pull the stick back due to the then-unseen obstruction, he gave a clear instruction to the co-pilot to take priority and disengage AP. At least that was my interpretation of it.

[On_The_Top_Bunk]

The captain lied and tried to cover up his mistake and for that he should be punished. Can't really see a reason to debate. It's not the mistake that's punishable it's the attempt at cover up that sucks.

[Tourist]

The captain lied and tried to cover up his mistake and for that he should be punished. Can't really see a reason to debate. It's not the mistake that's punishable it's the attempt at cover up that sucks.

Fully Concur.

[Snyggapa]

From what I understand, if the copilot was in his seat it would have been a simple, almost non-event. pull back would sum the inputs to level (one full down the other full up), computer shouting at you for dual inputs. Then press button, take control , work out what went wrong

As it was the co-pilot wasn't there to take control, he was out of the cockpit and had to crawl back in on the ceiling due to negative G and by the time he managed to get near his controls the airbus had decided by itself that this was a "bad thing" and brought nose up / power down meaning some kind of return to normality.

there seemed to be a determined attempt to remove slices of the swiss cheese here though:

so pilot alone in cockpit for extended period
alone pilot bored
alone pilot decides to relieve boredom by getting out camera and taking pictures
pilot possibly interrupted taking pictures by the purser and puts camera down in inappropriate position

you have to question all of those

That is stupid and maybe unprofessional but a lesson that can be learned from. if indeed he then tried to cover all this up, that's a crime in my eyes.

[Shell Management]

That is stupid and maybe unprofessional but a lesson that can be learned from. if indeed he then tried to cover all this up, that's a crime in my eyes.

So, in such a case, we must ask what was there to fear? Was there an actual Just Culture? if not, what was the responsibility of station management and what of the expensive hired hands (those external consultants and trainers)?

[Bollotom]

Perhaps the idea of having flat and level surfaces on the flight deck should be visited and such surfaces inclined to preclude any attempts at stowing things that shouldn't be. :cool:

[Tourist]

Or, since this appears to be the only instance of this ever happening in a squillion Airbus hours, and since everybody has heard about it, don't bother?

[safetypee]

So much for a safe culture, a just culture.
The issue is not about the incident, cause, contribution, or outcome, but the underlying attitude and management process leading to a CM.
If the Capt's statements were as described, perhaps consideration of why this was so would help the management get to grips with any latent problems. Is it necessary to punish the lack of 'officer and gentleman' qualities as an example to others, or just in order to maintain or improve standards. If the situation is that poor then beware the decline in both safety and behaviour.
But there again it's much easier to blame the sharp end then reconsider the higher level policies which could have influenced behaviour.

Having suffered a double engine bird strike, where thanks to RR they continued to work until landing, the investigation found that due to the cost of replacement the incident was a major accident. Thus this officers record should be marked as having such an event.
The 'boss' said that he would not be doing that, and wrote a stiff letter to those who thought otherwise.
Do we still have this type of leadership or have the current senior positions been achieved via adapted 'officer and gentleman' behaviour, by either not saying anything or not being found out.

[downsizer]

Just to be clear, I do not know the PF, nor the circumstances surrounding the alledged CM.

However, if the PF fessed up straight away about the camera then we wouldn't be at CM stage would we, Isn't the CM to do with the fact that he didn't tell the truth straight away, as opposed to the incident itself? If he lied about what happened then IMHO it is entirely correct for him to face disciplinary action.

[Tankertrashnav]

What on earth has "officer and gentleman" behaviour got to to do with telling the truth. If (and I know nothing of the circs so I repeat if) this officer lied he should certainly be up before a court martial. But then so should an SAC who had omitted some essential bit of servicing and caused a major incident then lied about it. Integrity has nothing to do with being an "officer and a gentleman" (or indeed a lady as we now have female aircrew). It is required from all ranks

[langleybaston]

This SLF has been wondering about the " camera in the cockpit" aspect and conclude that it may have something to do with "autopilot" [whatever that is] being engaged.

When driving my car, I dont have "autopilot". I need at least one hand on the wheel, one foot on a pedal, and a continuous hazard watch. If I am caught by the police swigging a drink, eating a bun, or using a hand-held mobile I am liable, rightly, to be punished.

In my seventies I am well aware that my general driving skills have probably deteriorated. On approaching any recognisable hazard the radio [even Test Match Special] is invariably turned off. My driving is limited to about 2 hours at a time [fortunately my wife is a highly skilled driver and nav. so we do turn and turn about except she "does dark" better than I do].

So I come back to "mucking about with a camera". What has it to do with the very responsible task of captaining and flying?

"Buggerall, my Lord!" as the joke goes.

[Gary Lager]

My driving is limited to about 2 hours at a time

...and therein lies the problem.

[Shackman]

I just wonder.........

Could the fact that legal proceedings have been initiated against MoD for this incident have any bearing on the 'need' to find the captain culpably negligent or similar. Was it not the case that the crew/captain of the Mull of Kintyre Chinook being 'declared' culpably negligent by the VSOs that got MoD off the hook as far as claims by the families involved and pushed them towards the estates of said crew?
I'm not condoning the actions of the captain in this case in any way (although I do not know anything about Voyager operations or SOPs), and I may not even be right about the legal side, but ...........

[EAP86]

The legal principle is that the employer (MOD) is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees in the performance of their duties. Those involved may be named as part of an action but that is usually just a device to reinforce the linkage of the involved parties to the accident. If there is a rule in these matters, it's sue those with the deepest pockets which isn't likely to be the aircrew.

EAP

[Shell Management]

Does that liability extend to the employers of the consultants who lectured the crew on how they would be culpable for such a violation for personal gain and so encouraged a cover-up?:hmm:

Of course not!:*

But the defence may want to call them!;)

[mickjoebill]

In GA accidents, one wonders if this is a reasonable explaination for any instances where cause is unknown so pilot error is given.

Numerous aerial filming accidents where a fouled control input could have been the cause, yet accident investigators don't mention it as an option.

Mickjoebill

[ShotOne]

.? But the cause isn't unknown (see previous 24 pages!)

[Al R]

Solicitors doing one final trawl - unedifying.

http://www.boltburdonkemp.co.uk/news-blogs/military-claims-blog/raf-voyager-zz333-incident-deadline-civil-claims-looms-9-february-2017-criminal-proceedings-due-start/?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=claire_withey&utm_medium=social&utm_term=Jan_17&utm_content=raf_voyager_zz333_incident_deadline_civil_claims _looms_9_february_2017_criminal_proceedings_due_start

[air pig]

The court martial has started today, report from the Telegraph.

'Bored' RAF pilot sent 187 passengers into a nosedive 'while playing with his camera' (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/06/bored-raf-pilot-sent-187-passengers-nosedive-playing-camera/)

[JFZ90]

Does this raise some wider questions about culture?

I would hope that the 99.9%/vast majority of aircrew today would fess up immediately - or is there an issue with the overarching need to be honest in these situations?

PS edited as on reflection I'm unsure specifics should be discussed

[pr00ne]

Surely it raises the question of the integrity of one specific individual?

[Nige321]

From the link above...
In an incident with disturbing links to the German Wings crash

Really?
And people wonder why layers are held in the same esteem as double glazing salesmen...

[MOSTAFA]

The Courts Martial is there to decide whether there is any guilt or not. I would certainly not comment either way until then. But what I find slightly perplexing is that the daily papers allow readers to comment! I have never seen this happen to any civilian case going through the courts because I think it is illegal, as reading said comments can supposedly sway a jury or in this case a panel.

How comes this being a Courts Martial the press are allowed to show comments - where I representing this Officer in anyway I would certainly be asking the question. Any lawyers around?

[MAD Boom]

No different to them reading the comments on here. Surely the opinions expressed here are just as likely to sway a jury, in fact you may say more so seeing as this is a 'professional' forum....

[MOSTAFA]

Maybe but I can't see the difference between a military court and a civilian one and if legally they are not allowed to comment on ongoing cases why have the daily papers.

I wonder if Flying Lawyer ever shows up on the military forum I'd be interested in what he thinks. Maybe one of the mods can point him in this direction.

[air pig]

No comments have been shown in the Telegraph piece, elsewhere is a different matter. The JAG will assist the President of the Court in addressing the jury about how they should put out of mind any information not given in evidence. In fact, in a civilian court if a jury member uses MSM google etc or social media they can and people have been found to be in contempt of court and maybe fined or imprisoned.

[MOSTAFA]

I am sure you are right AP but the question remains, the rags always put - we are not accepting comments on this matter due to legal process. I've seen it many times so why because it is a military court are they allowed to - is it a case of one rule for one and another for another? I don't actually care about the the unfortunate in the dock that's for the panel/jury to decide. Where is Flying Lawyer when you need him.

[Lordflasheart]

Where is Flying Lawyer when you need him ?

Or Gilbert Blades for that matter ............ .... :E

......................

[MOSTAFA]

Surely this chap guilty or not, yet to be established - should be afforded the same principle in law or does the fact he is serving negate that right - I certainly don't think so.

[Chinny Crewman]

Mostafa my understanding is that the press will only prevent public comment if there are reporting restrictions in place as a comment by the public could leave the newspaper in contempt as it is the publisher. No restrictions are in place for this trial and I have certainly seen public comments on other civilian trials where there are no restrictions.

[RetiredBA/BY]

As I see it, if this l guy had been completely honest about this incident it would have been no more than that, a frank and open a discussion with his boss,. Getting to a court martial , unbelievable in the era of a "just culture ".

Been there, done that,with an educated nanagement.

[Top Bunk Tester]

RetiredBA/BY

I don't think this unbelievable at all, I think a Court Martial is fully justified and I hope they throw the book at him and that he loses his commission. This is not about cameras, sidesticks and a rapid descent this is about a total lack of integrity, a cornerstone of being in the military, or it used to be. If he'd have fessed up immediately, as you say, a hats on one way conversation with the boss, poss loss of seniority/captaincy for a couple of years and that would/should have been that. As it is he has brought the whole weight of military justice down on himself. Have I ever made a mistake when flying? YES Have I ever tried to cover it up and blamed someone else or the aircraft? NO

This is only opinion, we have to wait and accept the CMs findings.

[Tankertrashnav]

What TBT said. The bloke was in a hole and he decided to keep digging. Now he is reaping the consequences.

[Easy Street]

BA/BY,

A "just culture" is exactly that - "just". It is not a "blame-free culture". If it turns out that the extended grounding of the Voyager fleet and corresponding additional expense for Defence was all down to one man's lack of integrity then some kind of punishment would be entirely appropriate.

[Avtur]

What TBT and TTN said. No integrity, no honesty, no Commission. End of.

[BEagle]

Top Bunk Tester, Tankertrashnav and Avtur, you would be wise to note the words posted earlier by MOSTAFA:

The Courts Martial is there to decide whether there is any guilt or not. I would certainly not comment either way until then.

[Just This Once...]

It really is for the court to decide before condemning the man. That the camera impinged in the controls is common ground and his statements afterwards are a matter of fact, so the key point will be the clearing of the camera from the stick and if this was a conscious act or not.

Certainly the SI opined that the camera could not free itself (but limited their testing to static conditions and not those experienced during the incident) and offered that the coincidental changes in stick movements and 'ok, ok, ok' commentary suggested a conscious recognition of the obstruction and clearance.

Notwithstanding the 'conscious removal' he has admitted negligence and his career is over.

[RetiredBA/BY]

RetiredBA/BY

I don't think this unbelievable at all, I think a Court Martial is fully justified and I hope they throw the book at him and that he loses his commission. This is not about cameras, sidesticks and a rapid descent this is about a total lack of integrity, a cornerstone of being in the military, or it used to be. If he'd have fessed up immediately, as you say, a hats on one way conversation with the boss, poss loss of seniority/captaincy for a couple of years and that would/should have been that. As it is he has brought the whole weight of military justice down on himself. Have I ever made a mistake when flying? YES Have I ever tried to cover it up and blamed someone else or the aircraft? NO

This is only opinion, we have to wait and accept the CMs findings.

I think you missed my point. I, too, believe a court martial is entirely appropriate in this situation. What is hard to believe is that the guy was not completely honest about exactly how this happened rather than trying to cover it up, particularly on a modern aircraft complete with CVR and FDR etc.

As I see it from what I have read here and in other sources, he is not facing the CM for his error on the flight deck, but for his attempted coverup.

Like you , I too have made mistakes, but have never covered it up.

Total honesty and integrity when errors occur are the cornerstones of the "just culture", at least in civil aviation. I don't recall it being much different in my days in the RAF albeit 40 years ago.

We, inc. TTN and two others are obviously of similar beliefs.

Anyway the findings of the CM will make interesting reading.

[Top Bunk Tester]

RetiredBA/BY

We reside upon the same song sheet :)

Beags

This is only opinion, we have to wait and accept the CMs findings.

Are we now not even allowed to voice an opinion? I believe I caveatted accordingly. Unless I directly quoted sub judice information outside the public domain, which I didn't, then where is the problem? Genuinley interested in your view.

[Brian W May]

Best Beags has a word with the media then.

I'm sure they'll listen to his wisdom . . .

[MOSTAFA]

Nobody is asking anybody to fall out over this, or throw their teddy's out of the cot.

My question was simple and I don't think anybody has actually answered it yet! I did make a point and I still stand by it, in the best part of 30 years of piloting HM aircraft around the world I made some whoppers. The whole purpose of the Courts Martial is to decide with all the available evidence of guilt or not, not the media or come to that some posters on here.

Can I suggest those that are; are perfect, I'm not.

[beardy]

I think it was somewhere about post 162 that Beagle said

As for blaming the crew, if anyone was stupid enough to try that they'd soon wish they hadn't.....

[Brian W May]

Yep #162.

What'll happen then Beags?

[EESDL]

9-tails or hung, drawn and quartered?