Airline Safety Perception Survey in Flight magazine

[MrNosy2]

Flight has apparently done an airline safety perception survey of aviation 'professionals' and found that '60% believe aviation safety has been improving and 52% expect it to continue to improve in the future...when asked to pick from a list of possible threats to safety, the most frequently expressed reservations concerned a reducing pool of expert employees, management style and priorities, and complacency.'

I found it a bit concerning that apparently only 52% of those who did the survey thought safety was going to continue to improve.

http://forms.flightglobal.com/0110_SafetySurvey2013?product=PREM&DMDcode=FGD43&mode=DOWNLOAD&fcid=%7b71e285a6-f10b-4e5e-99da-1966c23d72bd%7d_FC054_PREM_201312&fcfileext=pdf

[Tech_Log]

It's a catch 22.
As the industry gets more pressurised both in terms of finances (meaning a drive towards lower wages and costs) and time (shorter turn arounds, pressure to have aircraft serviceable quicker) you eventually find a point where you loose the valuable people, namely your most qualified and experienced, who go elsewhere or retire.
The reality is so long as nothing majorly goes wrong the situation won't change. Much like procedures and preventative measures usually only get put in place after an incident, so it is that the push towards the bottom line won't change.

Technology has improved massively and the tools we have to assist in our jobs is light years ahead of that available even a generation ago. Our understanding of composites, materials and learning from incidents has again bolstered our safety reputation and aviation is still very much safe.

But all of those advanced are lessened by the fact we fly the planes harder, work the crews longer and do less physical maintenance than ever before.

Safe flying
Tech_Log

[AirRabbit]

What you are describing is precisely the issue that places a higher priority on having competent professionals (with the necessary experience) agree on what the regulatory authority needs to include as requirements … AND …how to express what pilots need to demonstrate in terms of understanding what they need to do to fly in accordance with those regulations and the limitations of the airplane they are flying, to the degree that they are able and actually DO demonstrate the agreed upon tasks.

The training we should all expect and actually get should be at least sufficient to be able recognize or determine if the existing condition of the airplane (at ANY time and ALL the time) is what the pilot desires (not merely “accepts,” but desires); knows how to make that differentiation; knows what to do to make any necessary adjustment (flight path, power, configuration, etc.) to put the airplane back into or keep it from departing from, the appropriate flight condition desired by the pilot; and does so quickly, efficiently, and safely.

We need to recognize that there should be absolutely zero substitution for practice – and the practice we get simply must be through practicing the correct things (not just “close enough”). Additionally, the practice we get should initially be determined by and then administered (both visually and verbally) by knowledgeable, experienced, and sufficiently trained instructors, who observe what the pilot is actually doing, and determine what, if any, correction is appropriate – and if or when necessary, any deficiency is discussed and physically corrected, ASAP.

This philosophy puts a large amount of responsibility on regulators, on instructors, on evaluators, and on the equipment used to conduct such training and evaluation. Simulators are the MOST likely vehicles to use in such circumstances (training in airplanes simply does not allow the appropriate safety factors) and these simulators must be constructed and tested to ensure that they, in fact, are determined to be acceptably close to the performance and handling characteristics of the airplane. Instructors (and evaluators) using such equipment must know the existing limitations of any given, specific simulator (…and that’s not just be aware in general – they must know – or learn - each specific simulator), and must be trained to recognize the best training method (or evaluative method) to circumvent any negative aspect(s) that might be evident due to the fact that a simulator is not “actually flying.”

Anything less than the above can do little else but contribute to a lack of knowledge, a lack of awareness, a lack of demonstrated knowledge and competency … which are the key elements in the formula for an increasing potential for the occurrence of incidents … and for incidents to extrapolate into accidents.