Two Generals now looking for employment.

[West Coast]

Two generals asked to retire in wake of Bastion attack (http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/09/30/bastion-marines-afghanistan-gurganus/2897953/)

[VinRouge]

[The British are responsible for guarding Bastion, which is ringed by a chain-link fence, triple coils of razor wire and watchtowers from which sentries can scan the horizon for any potential attackers. British commanders had assigned the task of manning the towers to troops from Tonga, which has sent 55 soldiers to Afghanistan.

On the night of the attack, the Tongans left unmanned the watchtower nearest to the Taliban breach, according to an investigation by the U.S. Central Command.

Other aspects of the U.S.-British security plan were “sub-optimal,” the investigation found, with no single officer in charge of security for both Bastion and Leatherneck. The security arrangement created command-and-control relationships “contrary to the war-fighting principles of simplicity,” Amos wrote in a memo accepting the investigation.

Pretty damning if true. Defence cutbacks having an effect?

[500N]

"Defence cutbacks having an effect?"

More like not being able to set up a perimeter security picket.

Guard tower unmanned ?

[sitigeltfel]

Guard tower unmanned ?

During the height of the troubles in the mid 70's the watch tower at the Ulster Radar Operations base at Killard Point was manned by RAF Regiment gunners, and the gate was controlled by RAF Police.
At night, the tower was abandoned and the sole perimeter guard was an RAF dog handler and his pooch.
Maybe they thought the local boyos were scared of the dark :rolleyes:

[500N]

Doesn't make it right.

I wonder how many lower down got kicked as well.


I was reading about the attack, they said 12 minutes for the RAF Regt
to arrive. Not bad going.

[Wrathmonk]

So what happened to the RAF 1-Star who was in-charge of the base?

Knowing the RAFs messed up view of where 'the buck stops' I would imagine he/she got a DSO or CBE whilst the SAC radio op on shift when word of the attack came through got 6 months in Collie......:(

[Party Animal]

Amos has made accountability a hallmark of his tenure at the top of the corps and said that the command is a "sacred responsibility."


and


Gurganus, who has commanded American Marines in Haiti, Iraq and Afghanistan, released a statement Monday in which he said he respected the commandant's decision.
"It has been an honor and a privilege to serve beside and lead Marines for over 37 years," Gurganus said. "I will treasure that forever. I have complete trust and confidence in the leadership of our Corps and fully respect the decision of our commandant."


Without debating the rights and wrongs of the decision, how refreshing is it to see leadership making accountability such a high priority. Even more respect to Gurganus for taking the decision like a man.

Contrast that with the UK where no leader wants to rock the boat and glaring errors in the decision making process result in promotion and OBE's for those that really should be demoted or thrown out. I can't think of a single military leader or politician that has been held to account through professional incompetence since the Foreign Secretary resigned during the Falklands conflict.

[fabs]

I agree with Wrathmonk, can you honestly see many of our VSOs releasing a statement like Maj Gen Gurganus following his censure?
Having worked with US Marines fairly recently, I can honestly say that across the ranks they are an extremely professional bunch; fiercely loyal to each other. If they mess up they immediately take responsibility for their (and their subordinates) actions; you just don’t see much of that in the RAF today, my branch in particular.
I do hope the UK investigation (I assume there was one) is as far reaching and thorough.

[Basil]

If the task of guarding the base was assigned to the Brits, why have two US generals bitten the dust :confused:

Pretty impressive, honourable and exemplary behaviour by the USMC top brass.
Food for thought for anyone in a position of authority.

[500N]

Probably because Gurganus was in charge of that region
and Sturdevant in charge of Aviation in that region.

Therefore they are your assets and even though local defense
might be a subordinate, ultimate responsibility rests with you.

[NutLoose]

Do you think they will get their pension or simply a letter from Congress telling them the cheque is in the post.

[bvcu]

Interesting report, wasnt aware of the loss of the Harrier squadron commander in the battle. Brings home to you the ethos of the marines. Also to me as an outsider the problem of a mixture of nationalities/armed forces working together. Something like airfield defence in a war zone you would think would be totally watertight. Be interesting if any of the others involved got the same treatment as the Generals , somehow doubt it !

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

I'm all for accountability, but why is Gurganus being asked to retire when it appears he had identified the weaknesses, asked for changes and had them denied? He certainly didn't have the authority to change the security command structure.
Who denied the changes?!

[ozbiggles]

Who denied the changes?
Probably the same people who wrote the report and hung the two generals out to dry whilst preventing them having the require resources to do the job.
The general who sacked them said they were both fine officers. He is the man who should go for not having the balls to point out to the politicians we can't fight wars with hands tied behind our backs.
After the Tillman story I think we can see some of the calibre of the Generals running the Pentagon.
Hats off to the General who took his unfair sacking on the chin. Now there is a General you could believe in.

[dervish]

I'm with Fox3. If the Commander is given a task, but not the resources, especially when he's identified the shortfall and been denied it, then there is MUCH more to this than reported.

[West Coast]

The much more to this story, at least from the Marines end is force protection. Since the Marine barracks in Beruit was blown up with great loss of life, after mission accomplishment, it is the highest priority mission the Marines recognize. I was in some ****ty places in Africa, South East Asia and elsewhere and we had some particularly primitive accommodations as the better ones were deemed unsafe from a protection standpoint. A bit of a downer to see other services in air conditioned buildings while the Marines are in a tent away from anything with deep trenches around. Just part of being a Marine.
Even if the Brits had overall responsibility, the Marines should have had a security plan in place accounting for such an attack. I can all but guarantee that Marine elsewhere have received guidance to be prepared for this.

[SASless]

On the night of the attack, the Tongans left unmanned the watchtower nearest to the Taliban breach, according to an investigation by the U.S. Central Command.

Either awfully convenient....or a standing practice to which the Taliban tweaked!

Makes one wonder why the Taliban could figure it out but not the Brits or the Marines?

I know it is old fashioned.....but aggressive patrolling and the use of OP/LP's outside the perimeter at night is the very best way of preventing such attacks.

[ShotOne]

Complaints about refusal to accept responsibility are a common theme on this forum. To see senior officers (if indeed they were at fault) do so in an honourable fashion is both refreshing and unusual.

It is also interesting to contrast this with the 4th largest mil thread. I don't see the Taliban on it yet their attack destroyed more NATO jets than anyone in the top 40!

[West Coast]

SAS

One of the downsides of large bases in Indian country is a (false) feeling of immunity from danger. Couldn't agree with you more regarding operations outside the wire. Hopefully the takeaway lesson is etched in leaderships mind that if you sit looking like a big fat target, you're encouraging attacks.

[Roland Pulfrew]

Either awfully convenient

SAS, that comment is beneath you and highly inappropriate. May I ask if you have been to BLS? Patrolled the base, inside or outside? IMHO the 2 MGs didn't deserve today's outcome. Hindsight is a marvellous thing.

[500N]

West Coast

And under estimating the enemy.

I think I saw a quote where one person said the Taliban got a "Lucky Break".

Well if we train our troops to conduct raids behind enemy lines,
why can't the enemy ?

[West Coast]

Well said 500.

[Trim Stab]

It is interesting to compare the handling of this incident to how the aftermath of the 1998 Cavalese disaster was handled (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cavalese_cable_car_disaster_(1998))

I applaud the changes in USMC leadership that have evidently taken place over the past decade.

[gr4techie]

Nevermind, I bet Gurganus and Sturdevant won't be struggling on a Major Generals pension.
Maybe they could always get a job with G4S.

[Melchett01]

I know it has already been alluded to about the UK being responsible for FP etc, but it looks like the Independent has picked up on that very point and is conducting its own investigation:

Exclusive: Revealed - how Ministry of Defence penny-pinching led to disaster - Home News - UK - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/exclusive-revealed--how-ministry-of-defence-pennypinching-led-to-disaster-8859897.html)

If correct, it makes for some uncomfortable reading, and if correct, maybe this is the kick up the arse the UK needed for someone somewhere to realise that value and price are 2 different things and that in war, price should not necessarily be the over riding factor.

That said, I very much doubt that anybody on the UK side will be held to account, especially if the decision was taken by a bean counter or a VSO who has since been promoted:
In response to the report, an MoD spokesman said that it would be looking into the US report’s conclusions ... The US review was intended to examine US actions only and not those of coalition forces. However, the UK will consider the findings of this review to confirm our earlier assessment that no further UK action is required.

Just what will it take for the military to be funded correctly and interference by beancounters and policy types with little knowledge and even less understanding to butt out of things they clearly don't understand?

[Just This Once...]

Tonight the MoD was urged to investigate the actions of British officers, with political and military figures insisting that the commanders of the base share the blame for the security lapses.

...security at the base was in fact the responsibility of British officers, some of whom have since been promoted.

Maj-Gen Gurganus’s former deputy, Stuart Skeates CBE – who was awarded a Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service in the operational honours announced yesterday – has been elevated from brigadier to major-general and is now the Commandant of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Jeff Portlock, the Bastion base commander on the night of the attack, has been promoted from group captain to Air Commodore.

"If British commanders were culpable then, like their American counterparts, I would expect disciplinary action to be taken. Questions do need to be answered."

….extracts from today's Telegraph.

[dervish]

Savings at the expense of safety. I've heard that one before somewhere.........

[Just This Once...]

It's good to know the purse-string-holding political figures insist that the commanders at the base get the blame. Perhaps they were expecting these officers to fund the FP from their own pocket?

[SASless]

Roland,

You tell us what you think about the causes for the Tower being unmanned then preach to us.

My money is it became a routine and the Taliban tweaked.....and thus used that point for entry as they knew it to be a weak point.

One does not have to attend the Base to understand the benefit of aggressive Patrolling in preventing attacks by the bad guys on fixed defenses. That is a concept taught at every level of Infantry training or physical security school.

Pinkerton rent-a-cops get that taught to them so why would the British/American/Tongan/Afghanistan forces assigned to defend the Base not adhere to that policy?

Large bases are hard to protect....but then does that come as a surprise to anyone....or should it be a surprise as it seemed to have been?

Excuses don't cut it in combat.....there is no "Try"....either you do or you do not.

Failing to do right gets people killed.

[TEEEJ]

CENTCOM report at following link.

https://www2.centcom.mil/sites/foia/rr/CENTCOM%20Regulation%20CCR%2025210/Camp%20Bastion%20Leatherneck%20Shorabak%20(BLS)%20Investigat ion/Enclosure%200.%20AR%2015-6%20Report%20(Final).pdf

[HamishDylan]

SASless,

Sorry mate - the 'policy' of aggressive patrolling and fully layered defences was in place - but it is a big base with a huge perimeter. When you look at the 1,000s of square kms around the base that need to be dominated, we could pour wing after wing of FP troops into theatre and still have had the same result. I am reminded of the phrase that we have to get lucky every time, the enemy only once.

I'm confident that appropriate requests for increases in force concentration were made, but these were not upheld - the guys on the ground have to live with the risk factors which are present, the grown ups higher in the food chain have to live with their conscience if things go wrong on their shift. Sadly, the guys in the field are easily identified, the grey men in the out of theater command chain (including the civil servants and NATO civilian accounting officers) can slope off into the shadows when the chips are down. Life was ever such.

As for the smoke and mirrors diversion about a flight line fence, a fence is just a delineating feature. Unless it is covered by observation and fire, an obstacle isn't an obstacle - surely something taught at 'every Infantry training or physical security school'?

HD

[Chugalug2]

dervish:-
Savings at the expense of safety. I've heard that one before somewhere.........
Indeed, and in every instance portrayed as a one-off! It is high time that the MOD's "stove-piping" of repeated instances of financial savings causing loss of life be seen for what it is, Gross Negligence at the highest levels of command.
Whether it be Bowman, Trabant, Flak Jackets, Chinooks, Nimrods, Hercules, Tornado, or whatever, many have died because of the Gross Incompetence of a few. The MOD is Unfit for Purpose, and nothing short of its total reform will change that. In the meantime Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation should be moved outwith the MOD and independent of it, and of each other. That at least could start to stem such avoidable losses suffered by the Armed Forces, whether they be at peace or war.

[London Eye]

The Independent article contains the phrase (much discussed in other media) that:

"The attack in September saw 15 Taliban fighters dressed in American uniforms walk past an unmanned watch tower"

This reads as if there was a decision not to man the tower in question which left sections of the wire unobserved. If this was true then one might conclude that this was an unacceptable risk taken by commanders against the insurgent threat faced. However, if the towers chosen by those commanders to be manned were sufficient to provide uninterrupted continuous observation of the perimeter fence one would need to consider whether the sentries did not observe the incursion due to a human factor - whether blameworthy or otherwise. In any case perhaps there are degrees of complexity that might reasonably be left to those with all the facts – this is a rumour site but people’s names are in public here and we are normally rightly sensitive about speculation in such cases.

[500N]

London Eye

It is worth reading the CentCom report above.
It answers a few questions.

[London Eye]

The report is comprehensive but still leaves some questions unanswered, one amongst all others for me. The report is written with the certain knolwedge that an attack took place that could be judged succesful (by Taliban standards, not by coalition standards, I am sure that we would't have accepted the odds offered).

If the total force size is set and commanders are left with the task of balancing risks against resources then what would have happened if the generals had rebalanced towards FP of Bastion and an attack had not occured, but there was an increased loss of life in Task Force Helmand/ Task Force Leatherneck AORs because the force density was reduced there? Hindsight is a wonderful tool but I would contend that the issues here are far from black and white.

[SASless]

When you look at the 1,000s of square kms around the base that need to be dominated,

You from Texas?

Unsuccessful Raid.....six Harriers destroyed and several other aircraft damaged.....a PR Victory to boot? I would suggest that was a very successful raid. The Taliban are not bothered greatly about losses so that doesn't figure much into the equation.

[Whenurhappy]

By all accounts Maj Gen Studevent was a good all-round egg And thought highly of the RAF and the RAF Regiment in particular. He was also a guest speaker at Last years'CAS/RUSI Air Power Conference in London.

[Wallah]

SASless et al,

I can't get the CentCom link to work, so appologies if this is not relevant. Just to add some context, I would like to make the following observations:

1. The Towers date from the early days of Bastion and did not reflect the expanded fence line. So much so that several were demolished during the building of the new runway and others were a considerable distance inside the fence line.

2. Having helped host the Tongans when they arrived they were highly disciplined, extremely competent and a significant number had served in Iraq. They were, in one Army colleges words "as hard as a Wood Peckers' lips..". Unfortunately there was only 55 of them.

3. Due to the Theatre cap, the rest of the UK guarding was an unestablished commitment spread across the permenant garrison (with a few exceptions such as medics).

4. Having made numerous visits to Leatherneck it was clear that the Marines had fortified the place ready for another Khe Sahn and then manned the various watch towers according to the perceived threat.

5. Although Bastion was built in the middle of the desert, it is neither flat nor uninhabited. The terrain to the north and east is low hills and deep gullies, so much so the amount of earth work required just to construct the new facilities was simply staggering. Also a civilian population has sprung up in the relatively secure shadow if the base; this includes "the King of Sh*t Creek" who, having monopolised the sewage output of the base had a thriving melon plantation (and no doubt lots of tommatoes).

6. The resident RAF Regiment Sqn's primary task was to sanitise the approach and departure footprints, which they did a bloody good job at. They were neither scaled or tasked with securing the entire AOR.

Please note that these observations date from the back end of 2010, so things will have no doubt changed.

[TEEEJ]

Wallah,

Try the following USMC link. There is an Executive Summary.

CENTCOM 15-6 Executive Summary

http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/USCENTCOM%20Bastion%20Attack%20Investigation%20Executive%20S ummary.pdf

From

Read Camp Bastion Attack Investigation Documents > Headquarters Marine Corps > News Article Display (http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/3488/Article/151114/read-camp-bastion-attack-investigation-documents.aspx)

[Wallah]

Thanks for that, the situation seems to have been pretty much unchanged from my time (though the Jordanians etc weren't present then). If I may, I would just offer the following:

1. There was a Major Incident Plan in place in 2010 (I wrote the Aircraft Accident Annex). Certainly my Annex was a joint document and we table topped various scenarios with the USMC. I even had a Marine Capt liaison officer working for me in Air Ops.

2. Contractor security and vetting was always a problem and one which nobody really wanted to grip. It reached farcical proportions when an attempt was made to get Air Traffic Control to vet them and issue an Air Side permit, on the principle they had to drive around the airfield to get to the construction site. ATC was promptly inundated by thousands of applications, most of whom could not speak English. We eventually got this turned off but it was not satisfactorily resolved during my stint.

3. The Jan 11 MOU essentially formalised the status quo. Leatherneck and Shorabak were essentially separate, self contained, autonomous camps. I suspect that the greatest level of cooperation was on the ATC / Airfield Ops side (which worked very well).

As always, my comments are caveated that I am a mere Ops Wallah and not a FP guru.

[Wallah]

Thanks for that, the situation seems to have been pretty much unchanged from my time (though the Jordanians etc weren't present then). If I may, I would just offer the following:

1. There was a Major Incident Plan in place in 2010 (I wrote the Aircraft Accident Annex). Certainly my Annex was a joint document and we table topped various scenarios with the USMC. I even had a Marine Capt liaison officer working for me in Air Ops.

2. Contractor security and vetting was always a problem and one which nobody really wanted to grip. It reached farcical proportions when an attempt was made to get Air Traffic Control to vet them and issue an Air Side permit, on the principle they had to drive around the airfield to get to the construction site. ATC was promptly inundated by thousands of applications, most of whom could not speak English. We eventually got this turned off but it was not satisfactorily resolved during my stint.

3. The Jan 11 MOU essentially formalised the status quo. Leatherneck and Shorabak were essentially separate, self contained, autonomous camps. I suspect that the greatest level of cooperation was on the ATC / Airfield Ops side (which worked very well).

As always, my comments are caveated that I am a mere Ops Wallah and not a FP guru.

[Roland Pulfrew]

SAS

My comment was about your (and I may have misunderstood) implication that the Tongans had deliberately left a point unguarded to allow Taliban entry. I apologise if I misinterpreted your statement.

As for aggressive patrolling of the perimeters. Do you honestly believe that the USMC, RAF, British Army, Jordanian Army etc didn't do that? FFS only someone who has been there can understand the scale of the tri-base area. As others have pointed out, you could had a division on the ground around the base and they still might have got through!! I'm afraid you could have provided the best protection, the best kit, the best aircraft, armoured vehicles etc and people will still die. That may be harsh, but it is a combat zone.

[West Coast]

And when it happens, it needs to be thoroughly investigated to determine the facts.People need to be held accountable. As a former US Marine I am heartened to see the Commandant moving forward with this. You should similarly expect accountability (if a proper investigation reveals there is blame) of the British leadership rather than chalking it up to it's a big base and and **** happens mentality.

[Wallah]

West Coast,

I'm quite happy that people should be held to account. The C2 arrangement, amongst other things, was a cluster but it had been for YEARS. It should have been gripped much earlier but a mired by a combination of:

1. US interservice rivalry. The USMC were desperate to maintain their autonomy and keep the USAF out of Bastion. The USAF, who after all had just spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the place, were desperate to get in and take over as Airfield Operating Authority. We were the lesser of 2 evils, in that we kept the USAF out with minimal impact on the USMC manpower cap.

2. Nation pride. We'd damn well built the place in we were bally well going to keep in charge of it for as long as possible. All whilst putting the minimum amount of resources, in terms of people and mony in, to do the job.

By all means let's hold people accountable, and it is a refreshing change that does credit to the USMC that they have started at the top, but let's make sure we get them all.

Again these are just my own views as an Ops Wallah based on my working relationship with the USMC, dealings with the USAF (both at Bastion and further afield) and having done this far too many times not to be a touch synical.

[West Coast]

Appreciate the insight. The USMC/USAF dust up doesn't come as a surprise. It however doesn't explain how the attack was so spectacularly successful.

[500N]

They probably read some history books.
The VC raid on the MACV-SOG compound in Vietnam
being one example. It's not brain surgery with good planning.

I was reading a book about the Iraq war and it said that the US
used history of fights in Vietnam as examples of what to expect,
how to fight. Hue being one.

No reason the enemy can't do the same.

[Melchett01]

I was reading a book about the Iraq war and it said that the US
used history of fights in Vietnam as examples of what to expect,
how to fight. Hue being one

Yep, IIRC, the JHF(A) IntO had 2 books on his desk in summer 2006 - The Bear Came Over the Mountain and Afghanistan the Bear Trap.

His rationale was that as we had just arrived and had precious little experience of our own at the time and as the higher level J2 organisations couldn't provide material at the level of tactical detail required, historical books on tactical Russian and Mujahideen ops were as good a starting point as any as most of the people on the ground probably had links to the people in the books.

As you rightly say, doesn't take the brains of an archbishop to at least try to fill gaps in knowledge and understanding through a quick trip to Amazon / your local variant of.

[500N]

In case anyone is interested, the book I was reading was

Running the War in Iraq by Maj Gen Jim Molan.

Yes, an Australian General got to be Deputy Chief of Operations
for the whole Iraq war, mostly under General Casey but also others.

[Easy Street]

I heard some scuttlebutt at the office today that these two generals were the sixth and seventh starred officers to be relieved of their commands by Gen Amos during his tenure as USMC Commandant. If true, and if he was responsible for approving the appointments of these men, does this not raise questions over Gen Amos' judgement? Perhaps he should find himself accountable... like this? (http://www.duffelblog.com/2013/06/gen-amos-fire-relieved-command/) :E

Seriously, though, I'm all for sackings when negligence is there in black-and-white, which is usually the case only when written rules and regulations have been transgressed. As soon as you start talking about generals and their ilk, very little is in black and white, and everything is in nuanced shades of grey. It's funny that someone brought up Nimrod and airworthiness a few posts back, because the parallels are more stark than you might imagine at first. With Nimrod, the rot started when the money that supported airworthiness was taken away, but the rot took so long to take effect that those held accountable after the crash were the ones wrestling manfully with the hospital pass they'd received from their predecessors. In this (Bastion) case, I'm led to understand that the Maj Gens were severely constrained by a large reduction in theatre manpower that had been in the pipeline for some time, but that was not accompanied in any way by a reduction in immediate ambition. Keep delivering more with less... What were they to do except spread what they had, thinly, in a vain attempt to achieve everything asked of them? They were forced into taking a risk, and it got called. True accountability stops at the person who ordered the manpower reduction, yet failed to change the corresponding task. Not these two generals.

[500N]

I thought this quote was an interesting one from Maj Gen Jim Molan
in his book Running the War in Iraq.

He wrote this as he was summing up at the end of the book and applies to the insurgents. His time in Iraq spanned 2004/2005.

"I suggested that none of us should be surprised if the enemy surprises us. Our enemy doesn't have perfect knowledge and the worst does not always happen, but often the insurgents in Iraq seemed to know intimately what our options were and they worked to our weaknesses."

As has been said, the enemy only need to be lucky once.


A few other choice quotes in the book as well plus it gives a very good understanding of the detail that needs to be gone through before a strike is authorised. Detail that includes scrutiny and analysis by legal teams before and after.

[SASless]

Easy,

Sometimes one has to grow a pair of balls and stand up and say what is not wanted to be heard.....the TRUTH!

Perhaps some of the GenGen's should have scaled back Operations and then defended their decisions to those demanding excessive pie in the sky expectations from the forces who was plainly not in a position to carry them out.

The Bad Guys are not the ones that fight against us....they are the guys who are on our side who set us up for failure....and they need to be sought out and be dealt with just as aggressively as the other enemy.

Every Commander has a responsibility to ensure no unnecessary risks are taken in the execution of their mission. That certainly has been a central point failure of our Senior Military leadership starting with Iraq and working forward to today. Too many have put their fingers to their forehead and backed off to cary out Orders they know were wrongheaded.

[Party Animal]

You should similarly expect accountability (if a proper investigation reveals there is blame) of the British leadership rather than chalking it up to it's a big base and and **** happens mentality.


Will never happen in the UK - it's not cricket! Our system is to find any and every reason not to have an investigation. Meanwhile, people who are clearly responsible for f*ck ups are moved on. Their peer group will not want to work alongside them and it would be seen as unfair to demote them. So the answer is to write them up for an award and promote them quickly into a position of no major responsibility.

Of course, no politician will ever be accountable for any decision ever made. It will always be blamed on the previous government. All very simple really :mad: