“They’d all be walking, talking and alive if they went around”...

[Farrell]

Recent U.S. Air Crashes Highlight Leading Cause of Deaths - Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-06/recent-u-s-air-crashes-highlight-leading-cause-of-deaths.html?cmpid=yhoo)

[BOAC]

Amen to that.

[CaptainProp]

Crashes that occur during approach or touchdown are the world’s leading category of aviation mishaps and deaths, according to data compiled by Chicago-based manufacturer Boeing Co. (BA) The biggest risk factor for such accidents is failing to approach a runway at the proper speed, altitude and heading, known as an unstabilized approach.

....for the guys from the "Iberia" thread further down in "Rumours and News" yapping on about stabilized / unstabilized approaches not being an issue.... Like I said, don't take my word for it, just read the numerous reports available on the subject.

[Alexander de Meerkat]

I am interested in the view expressed in the article that some rules are so rigid that airlines do not enforce them. That may be the case in the States, although I am surprised to hear it, but it is absolutely not the case in Europe. With the notable exception of Air France who have a safety culture and record that is an embarrassment to modern aviation, I cannot think of any Western European airline where that would apply. I work for easyJet, one of two large low cost companies there, and I can promise you that the rules are rigidly applied. If you break the stabilized approach criteria and continue to land you will have a personal interview with someone very important and probably have remedial training. If you do it a second time, your chances of keeping your job are very slim indeed. Everyone knows the score and there is absolutely no turning of blind eyes when the rules are broken. May I humbly suggest, that is how it should be?

[Sky Wave]

Agree with ADM.

Have been with EZY for 7 years, 6 of them as an FO and never has a Captain attempted to disregard the stable criteria.

Now a Captain myself and I wouldn't dream of continuing if I wasn't stable. Even if I thought it was safe to do so the flight data monitoring is too good, they'd know about it before I got back to the crew room and it would not be tolerated. Of course, if I'm on fire or on my last tea spoon full of fuel that would be a different matter.

[fireflybob]

Also with ADM - same applies to the Irish one.

[DOVES]

Provided that unlike present times, a go-around must be intended as normal maneuver that any member of any crew, in any part of the world must be fully trained and ready to perform without hesitation at any moment of the approach.
What about:
Allowing the fleet manager to read the flight recorders, with no coupling to the names of the crew members involved (if there are not serious and/or recidivists offenders) and their regular publication and commentary in the various meetings of examiners, instructors, commanders, pilots.
Could it be a solution to this old and recurrent problem?

[CaptainProp]

DOVES - FDM is anonymous until you go beyond certain preset limits and get flagged with a red flag(-s). Even then, the company need to go through a FDM group / manager and involve union etc before names are released to management. You can also get called up by the FDM people for minor events as they just want to know what happened. You explain why / how things happened and that's the end of the story.

I guess every company has their own procedures but this is the basic idea anyway.

[DOVES]

To CaptainProp
I wrote:
Allowing the fleet manager to read the flight recorders, with no ... names of the crew members (nobody has to know) ... and their regular ... commentary in the various meetings ...

Aristotle says:
Correct those who are in error first time face to face, in front of a witness a second, and the third publicly.

[J.O.]

Unrealistic Criteria

At the same time, some pilots said the criteria for a stabilized approach weren’t realistic, Smith said in an interview.



Researchers are attempting to design new standards that require aborting landings only in dangerous situations, improving safety without unnecessarily boosting go-arounds, which can create their own dangers, Quevedo said.



“We should expect that if we have a policy, the people should follow the policy,” he said. “But that being said, we need to make sure that the policy is good before we make people follow it. I don’t think we’re there yet.”


Given the way ATC tries to manage traffic at some high density airports, there are definite issues with the criteria at some airlines, particularly those that require a stabilized approach at 1,000 ft in both IMC and VMC conditions. I understand the motivation for such policies but they aren't very well thought out if they don't consider all of the operational factors that affect the ability to comply. Until such requirements have been communicated and agreed with ATC providers everywhere, pilots are left with either getting ATC worked up at being unable to fly the controller's desired profile, or management worked up for not being able to fly theirs.


Some will say, "Stuff ATC, fly your profile".


It's not quite that simple. Some crews are allowed to go faster on approach in VMC because they have the 500 ft stabilized criteria and in many cases, ATC sees more of them than they do of the operators that set a higher limit. ATC tends to plan for the majority.

[Dan Winterland]

CaptainProp is expounding the principles of an enlightened Flight Data Monitorong Programme. It is the "Gatekeeper" who should be making the calls, not a line ops manager. Giving the latter access to Flight Data is a bit like giving the fox the keys to the chicken coop in flight safety terms. Policing of flight data by managers is a huge barrier to an effective and just safety culture - and should just not happen. The gatekeeper is a member of staff who can be trusted by both the pilots and managers. In my company, he is the head of the safety department who reports directly to the company CEO and bypasses the line managers - bearing in mind the CEO is not a pilot and doesn't get involved with day to day safety issues. In a truley enlightened flight safety culture such as BA's, the gatekeeper is appointed by his/her peers and is a Union member.

Sounds a little odd at first, but if you look at it from a pure safety culture perspective, this is the best way to encourage pilots to report issues which may implicate themselves, but others can learn from. It seems like the principles of the just culture are not yet clear to the Europes' two largest LoCo operators.

[Basil]

The requirement in most airlines to file a report in the event of a go-around is, IMHO, inimical to flight safety.
There was no such requirement in the RAF where a GA was treated as a normal flight manoeuvre.
Requiring a report means that the captain is thinking, at the back of his mind, that a GA report will admit a failing to perform an accurate approach and lead to questioning of his professional ability. I would suggest that the precise opposite is the truth and would laud the pilot who decides it is all too messy and we'll just:
Go around.
Max thrust (but watch that check alt :cool:)
Pos clb
Gear up
Retune (If steam driven)
Flaps up
Oops! 500 to go! (Buggah! Missed the thousand call) :}

[J.O.]

The requirement to report a go-around is only an impediment to doing go-arounds if the management and training cultures treat the need for a go-around as a sign of weakness.

Back in the day when I was processing ASRs, the boss made sure that my acknowledgement for every report of a go-around due to an unstable approach included a thank you for acting in a safe and responsible manner. Not once were the crew's actions second-guessed. In many cases, their reports prompted us to revise the briefing notes for airports where there was a greater likelihood of an unstable approach.

[Cows getting bigger]

The article seems to imply that certain parts of the Western World are decades behind others with their safety culture.:rolleyes:

[flyboyike]

I like how the article implies that the Asiana crash is somehow a US problem.

[DOVES]

I recall that a long time ago in AMI was a fighter wing "PROUD" to make all other pilots say with them : LA QUARTA NON RIATTACCA MAI

That made us, young professional pilots, learn so much!

[Flying Clog]

flyboyike,

Yes, I think it is partially a US problem. cowboy ATC basically. I see it all the time, mainly at JFK and SFO.

The other bits - fatigue, magenta line/poor scan mentality, yup, a major long haul issue.

But cowboy ATC, you yanks have got that covered nicely.

:D

[bubbers44]

We might be cowboys in your eyes but 99.9% of us cowboys can land on 28L at SFO on a clear day and not crash with no glide slope.

[flyboyike]

This should be good. How is cowboy (or any other) ATC to blame for the Asiana crash?

[Machinbird]

You left off some significant digits Bubbers.
More like 99.9999999% of US cowboys can do the VFR maneuver at SFO.:}

[theearl]

Ok so do you US ride reporters prefer being cleared to land in the US with a/c ahead / on r/w or do you like the UK / rest of world (safer) approach of being cleared once the r/w is clear?

Genuine question as i know which i prefer.

[bogeydope]

Can't think for yourself and like to be led through life by having your hand held theearl.......??

[roulishollandais]

Computerized flight-track records and a survey of 2,340 pilots sponsored by the safety foundation found that crews have a long way to go to comply with airline requirements to abort landings if their approaches were unstable. Almost all pilots, or 97 percent, continued to land in spite of the rules that they climb away from the runway and circle around to try again, according to the research.

“That’s a risk factor that we really need to work on,” Rudy Quevedo, director of global programs at the foundation, said in an interview.
You left off some significant digits Bubbers.
More like 99.9999999% of US cowboys can do the VFR maneuver at SFO.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/badteeth.gif
You are right Machinbird. Many more digits exist and are important, and not only US cowboys do that score. Pilots like you and Bubbers44 and the other mature pilots from that generation built that rate. We still must improve that number to avoid the crashes like these we were watching . Statistics and new rules cannot be established on 2,340 pilots. Automation is not enough tested.

[A Squared]

flyboyike,

Yes, I think it is partially a US problem. cowboy ATC basically. I see it all the time, mainly at JFK and SFO.


But cowboy ATC, you yanks have got that covered nicely.



Fact: Asiana 214was established on final for 28L at SFO 14 miles from the threshold and at 4300 ft altitude, slightly below a normal glide slope. Hardly a slam dunk by any measure. Now given that, I'd be fascinated to hear you explain why you think "Cowboy ATC" was a factor in the subsequent crash.

For extra credit you can explain how cowboy ATC caused Southwest to rip their nosegear off at LGA and UPS to crash at Birmingham.

[A Squared]

Ok so do you US ride reporters prefer being cleared to land in the US with a/c ahead / on r/w or do you like the UK / rest of world (safer) approach of being cleared once the r/w is clear?

Genuine question as i know which i prefer.

Given that I frequently fly in and out of fairly busy uncontrolled airports, I have a fair degree of confidence in my ability to not run into the airplane that landed ahead of me. As a result, I really don't worry much whether I get my landing clearance before or after the plane ahead clears.

[742]

Yes, I think it is partially a US problem. cowboy ATC basically. I see it all
the time, mainly at JFK and SFO.

The other bits - fatigue, magenta
line/poor scan mentality, yup, a major long haul issue.

But cowboy ATC,
you yanks have got that covered nicely.

:D


This is really getting old.

[bubbers44]

I agree mb, after I posted I realized 1 in a thousand wasn't right. We don't need glide slopes to land safely. Any descent pilot can do it. Just don't say man on the ground to man in the tower, give me the word and I'll give her the power because that isn't ICAO phraseology.

[Lonewolf_50]

The requirement in most airlines to file a report in the event of a go-around is, IMHO, inimical to flight safety. There was no such requirement in the RAF where a GA was treated as a normal flight manoeuvre.
Nor in the USN when I was serving.
Requiring a report means that the captain is thinking, at the back of his mind, that a GA report will admit a failing to perform an accurate approach and lead to questioning of his professional ability.
The human element of aviation.
I would suggest that the precise opposite is the truth and would laud the pilot who decides it is all too messy and we'll just:
Go around. Max thrust (but watch that check alt :cool:) Pos clb Gear up
Retune (If steam driven) Flaps up Oops! 500 to go! (Buggah! Missed the thousand call) :}
If only management understood what you just wrote.

[oceancrosser]

Ok so do you US ride reporters prefer being cleared to land in the US with a/c ahead / on r/w or do you like the UK / rest of world (safer) approach of being cleared once the r/w is clear?

Genuine question as i know which i prefer.

Well, not belonging to the group you are trying to deride, I can tell you I much prefer the US (and at CDG) system of getting the landing clearance on check-in with tower to the very late landing clearances at LHR (has happened below 100´) which creates an additional stress factor. All it takes is some other flight checking in on LHR Twr freq at the same time the Twr is clearing you to land, where a cross transmission will mean the difference between landing or a go-around. I find these late landing clearances ridiculous especially in weather where you can see the previous traffic (usually at around 2-2,5nm ahead) and they could well use "LAND AFTER" conditional clearances which I believe was mentioned once on these forums as an option available to ATC. Your post reeks of "holier than thou" attitude" and btw I am not American.

[J.O.]

Sheesh. The previous "Non-Standard US ATC" thread was beaten to death. Do we really need a 17th rehash of the same willy waving?

[thermostat]

There seems to be some confusion regards height above sea level and height above ground level. The difference would be the threshold crossing height at 50 feet over the threshold.
What is the TCH (or the TZE) on runway 28L at SFO please ??
If I divide the 4300 ft AGL by 14 nm I would get a gradient of 307 ft per nm and thats AGL. I would have to add the TCH (TZE) to get altitude ASL.
By the way, that works out to be a 2.9 degree flight path angle. Not too bad as long as you don't go any lower.
Thanks.

[cosmick251]

The TCH at runway 28 L at SFO ist 64 feet AGL

[Alycidon]

There was no such requirement in the RAF where a GA was treated as a normal flight manoeuvre.

Spot on mate, if the pillocks in management who require the filing of a safety report for what is a normal flight manoeuvre, could find it in themselves to restrict any comments they make to something like "correct crew actions" or similar then at least we would have some confidence that Big Brother was on our side.

Trouble is they always have to start an inquisition in order to find fault, even if the GA was flown due to environmental or operational factors, eg; RWY engaged. The idiots can't help themselves, they have to try to find a crew error in order to blame the drivers, even when there isn't one.

[Cows getting bigger]

Surely the point of the survey and this particular thread was that there appears to be a culture of breaking the rules (Company SOPs etc)? Personally I think that is far more worthy of discussion than bad RT and the TCH at SFO.

So, we have an Asiana hitting the wall, a SW doing a wheelbarrow, a UPS which may possibly have done an Asiana but at night and, over this side of the Atlantic, a Super Puma which appears to have flown into the sea on a NPA. Meanwhile, in my part of the World we are waiting on an accident report where a Metroliner had three goes on the ILS at Cork, crashing on the third attempt. I'll hazard a guess, but all of these look as if they failed to comply with SOPs.

[deefer dog]

No, let's keep trashing their ATC, RT and cowboy culture. Its more fun!

[bubbers44]

Basic flying skills normally take care of all of these accidents. They seem to be missing in all of these accidents.

SOP's are usually designed to take care of the pilots that have problems with basic flying skills and need to go to SOP's to survive.

[alf5071h]

The Bloomberg article is very retrospective and takes its journalistic lead from recent FSF activities.
It’s easy with hindsight to conclude ‘if only the pilots had …’.
The focus on ‘the lack of a GA decision’ implies human failure – end of investigation; this overlooks any underlying factors. Instead of viewing the failure to GA as a cause, it should be considered as a consequence of preceding activity or aspects of operation. Perhaps the crew never realised the need to make a decision; their (flawed) understanding of the situation (with hindsight) never triggered the unstable approach criteria. There was no ‘need’ to make a decision.

There could be many contributions to this situation – workload, weak cues, poor awareness, peer pressure, safety culture, habit, or biased perceptions of risk, most of which involve human performance – sharp end and blunt end of the organisation.
Often in these approach situations the human becomes mentally maxed out, and significantly in rare circumstances, both crew at the same time. Thus not only are there individual weaknesses, but also crew weaknesses, difficulties with monitoring, intervention, CRM.
Thus the industry should be asking why is human performance apparently limited in these circumstances, was human performance a dominant factor, or were there external factors which have stronger influence.

[Alexander de Meerkat]

Alycidon - that is not my personal experience. I cannot give an exact figure, but i think i have flown around ten go-arounds in the last ten years for one reason or another. All I have ever had is an acknowledgement of the ASR (Air Safety Report) followed a short time later by a one-liner from the flight data guys that the go-around was correctly flown and that the matter is now closed. If you make an honest error during the manoeuvre, you may hear something by quick telephone call and if you make a complete mess of it you will receive further sim training to ensure you do it right the next time. If, however, you continue to land from an unstable approach, you will most certainly hear a whole lot more about it and your job is at risk, as I said previously. Personally, I cannot find fault with any part of that process.

[Clandestino]

They’d all be walking, talking and alive if they went around Just like GF072 or 8U771, eh?

[olasek]

As a result, I really don't worry much whether I get my landing clearance before or after the plane ahead clears. Well stated, clearance to land and when it arrived had nothing to do with Asiana's accident. Asiana accident is of Asiana's own making, not the airport's, not Bay's approach, not FAA's for "poorly designed procedures", not Boeing's for bad auto-throttle.

[Cows getting bigger]

Basic flying skills normally take care of all of these accidents. They seem to be missing in all of these accidents.

SOP's are usually designed to take care of the pilots that have problems with basic flying skills and need to go to SOP's to survive.


Wht a bizarre statement. Forgive me, I've had a look at our SOPs and I don't see anything along the lines of "if you are a hot shot pilot please just sign and ignore".

[stilton]

Since when did Bloomberg become an authority on Aviation ? What idiots. :rolleyes:


According to them any crash in the US is a disparagement of American carriers in general.


Asiana is not American btw.


Unfortunately Southwest is doing it's usual thing and is a black mark on the record as they have been for some time.


UPS was tragic and the jury is still out, they are a top notch operation.

[bubbers44]

Both UPS and Southwest have excellent pilots. Name one airline that hasn't had an incident because of pilot error. Yes, we may have gone through our careers accident free but no matter how careful you are a bit of luck is involved too. I know that so don't put down pilots that had their luck run out once. Some day it may happen to you if you fly long enough.

[Alycidon]

I am concerned about a GA flown due to environmental reasons or operational reasons eg Rwy engaged and not unstable approaches. Most (not all,granted) GAs that I have flown at my present operator have started a paper chase involving phone calls, unnecessary comments on safety reports and a general feeling that somehow the missed approach was avoidable.

The unintended consequence of this is that I am more determined to get the aircraft on the ground than I should be, because I feel that I don't wish to have my ability called into question.

This is due to the Safety Department requiring a safety report for any GA flown below 1000' regardless of the reason eg. ATC instructions. The report is then always passed on to the line management for comment, this is where the process becomes intimidatory and undermines the professionalism of the crew, because the line management feel the need to obtain additional information even if the safety report already contains all the required information.

As Basil notes a GA is a normal manoeuvre and should only be the subject of a safety report if it is flown due to a non normal situation. To carry out an investigation for every missed approach undermines the judgement of the crew.

This would lead to the assumption that any GA flown from below 1000' is a non normal situation due to the unnecessary (IMO) follow up required.

[vilas]

bubbers44
Although First part of your post 36 may be true(I say that because the inquiry is not over yet) the second part is simply outrageous. No human being is gifted with any instinct to survive in the air otherwise your semi circular canals won't be playing the tricks they play and you would not need any instruments to fly. No hot shot pilot just because he can do a visual approach has overcome basic limitations of the specie,you are included. Only Birds don't have SOPs they have instinct.

[cosmo kramer]

There are unstable approaches and there are "unstable approaches".

Major speed, configuration and flight path deviations are unstable approaches.

Being interrupted in reading the landing checklist by ATC calling "cleared to land" and there after hearing "1000" is in my opinion not a cause for a go around. Being 10 kts too fast and having the thrust at idle in 1000' isn't a reason either, IF you can see you will have the engines spooled at e.g. 900'.

Most airlines grade unstable approaches and only severe deviations will be punished. I.e. correct thrust set in 900' would be noted in some statistics, but the flight crew will never hear anything for it. Not having the gear extended in 900 feet would be cause for an interview.

I assume that is what is meant in the article with:
In some cases, rules may be overly rigid, akin to imposing a highway speed limit that is so low drivers routinely exceed it, Quevedo said. Violating the rules has become so ingrained that airlines don’t enforce them and pilots don’t recognize when they are taking unnecessary risks, he said.

That is where airmanship comes in... or actually just common sense. If a captain can't tell the difference between not having completed the landing checklist in 1000', hearing a "sink rate" warning or racing down the glideslope with 210 kts, something is wrong.

[Capn Bloggs]

May I respectfully suggest that the failure to make a go-around decision, and the failure to realise you're in the position that requires such a decision, are two separate problems and need to be treated that way?
No respect needed, you're spot on. I've said a couple of times recently none of these crews deliberately crashed their aeroplanes (I hope!). Sticking my neck out a bit but...what you say is absolutely the nub of it; they were so "out of it" or overloaded that they failed to realise the predicament they were in until...crunch. Out of the comfort zone once in a blue moon in a normally highly automated and event-free environment... SIM training must change.

[Basil]

Flying for a very well known British airline, I went around (my decision) from my first base training approach in the B747 Classic. The BTC, one of our more intimidating gentlemen, was more ecstatic with joy than he would have been had I gently put it right on the spot first time. :ok:

[flyboyike]

Major kudos to the crew of SQ062 going into IAH yesterday. Apparently, they found themselves unstabilized and went around. We were right behind them on their second approach to 8L while we were going to 8R. All kidding aside, serious attaboys to those gentlemen for not trying to salvage a crappy approach.

[RobShan]

Interestingly the Australian Transport Safety Bureau recently released a video about pilots' reluctantance to initiate go arounds.

Handling Approach to Land - YouTube

[USMCProbe]

Cowboy ATC? Call it what you want. ATC in the US is outstanding, with a few exceptions. NY airports being the biggest exception. It simply sucks. 98% of the bad things that ATC did to me in the last 18 years was done at JFK, La Garbage, or EWR. The controllers in NY are rude, arrogant, pr%cks.

I have been to almost every major airport in Europe as well and the ATC is anywhere between just as good as the US, or at worst, just slightly behind. Listening to french on CDG tower makes me have less situational awareness.

Clearing several aircraft in sequence is a defensive measure. If KAL checks in, the tower controller might have to talk very slow and carefully, and an aircraft might go around for lack of landing clearance.

Many big airports in the US are so busy that we have huge sequences of aircraft in exactly 1 minute trail. 2.5 nm. It works extremely well. I have landed at O'hare more than any other airport in my career. I have never went around there, for any reason.

In contrast, I went around half a dozen times in 3 years in NYC, all of which was the controllers fault.

So what is "cowboy ATC", anyway. I have heard SW being told to keep their speed at a "Texas 250" by Dallas approach. LMAO

[bubbers44]

vilas, yes I have had vertigo in a Lear Jet descending from FL 410 and overcame the urge to let the semi circular canals take over my judgement but didn't because I knew the instruments were telling me the truth and my buddy who was hand flying screwed up. That was before my airline career so no SOP's had ever entered my mind. With 6,000 hrs of no SOP's with zero problems entered the airline world and with 23,000 hrs at retirement decided SOP's were for a large group of pilots with differing degrees of ability so all could fly safely. I know this is going to irritate a lot of folks but that is what SOP's are for.

[misd-agin]

If they went around they wouldn't have crashed? If they hadn't taken off they wouldn't have crashed either. If they hadn't screwed up they wouldn't have needed to go-around and wouldn't have crashed either.

A half dozen g/a's in NYC alone? Two g/a's in 20+ yrs of NYC flying, both preceeding landing a/c's fault.

And giving landing clearance before the other a/c has cleared the runway is dangerous? A major PITA is being at 200-300' in LHR, with no landing clearance, and someone starts talking with the controller. I'd prefer to have the landing clearance sooner while shouldering the responsibility to ensure the runway is clear.

[bubbers44]

I agree. Last minute clearances to land are distracting. I have gone around in a 4 engine jet with a clearance to land because the runway was not clear because I wasn't comfortable with the prior aircraft clearing the runway in time. I just told the tower I was going around because I wanted to be sure of a full runway since it was only 5700 ft long. SNA No big deal, also before SOP's

[Basil]

I'd prefer to have the landing clearance sooner while shouldering the responsibility to ensure the runway is clear.
Good point.
Remember mil "Land - one on."?
Only the taxpayers' money if a brake failure required one to take the scenic route :)

[RAT 5]

I was taught, ney it was drilled into me, years ago that "if there's doubt there is NO doubt." SOP's about G/A gates etc. are for those who have not had the pain of the drilling nor taken on board the message. I fail to understand anyone going through the 'will we, wont we' debate at <200' and not aborting the landing. Surely they would not, I hope, hesitate to abort the takeoff, so what's the difference? If it ain't going to work then try again! QED. There's so much data and examples of it not going to plan that I can not understand the psyche of those who throw history out of the window. It is an industry where we learn from other's mistakes. Could it be that, as one NTSB investigator has commented, pilots are 'mission orientated' and press-onitis is a 'complete the mission-itis. Sadly, they do not complete the mission as planned. WHY? oh why?

[bubbers44]

The first airline I flew with SOP's were about what my first 6,000 hrs were. When we got merged with a mega airline things changed so every pilot had to fly the same way. We all did it because it was required. I then chose airports that the standard SOP's didn't work so could fly my way. TGU or MHTG made my last six years a lot of fun without having to deal with SOP's. Yes, landing at MIA we did but that was never my leg because of captain only landings at TGU. I didn't bid the 777 because it flew to boring places mostly all nighters to stay in the 757 flying to fun airports.

[Ozlander1]

bubbers44
Only Birds don't have SOPs they have instinct.
And they also crash. :rolleyes:

[Chronus]

The advice from Airbus is at

http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/media_gallery/files/safety_library_items/AirbusSafetyLib_-FLT_OPS-APPR-SEQ01.pdf

In particular, the extract



II Statistical Data (Source: Flight Safety Foundation Flight Safety Digest Volume 17 & 18 – November 1998 / February 1999).
Continuing an unstabilized approach is a causal factor in 40 % of all approach-and-landing accidents.

Factors Involved in Unstabilised Approaches are dealt withe in para Vlll.
I wonder which of these were common in this instance.

[Alexander de Meerkat]

bubbers44 - times move on and what was acceptable once is no longer. It is perhaps no coincidence that during your extensive flying career safety has improved significantly due to a combination of better and more reliable aircraft, the advent of CRM, key technology advances (fly by wire, EGPWS, TCAS, GPS navigation etc), flight data monitoring and more prescriptive SOPs. I personally embrace all these changes as positive improvements. The environments where SOPs are optional do not fill me with confidence.

[bubbers44]

AF 447 had two crew members that couldn't hand fly so crashed into the Atlantic from RIO to Paris. They had everything but couldn't fly so everybody died. Unfortunately this is the new generation of pilots. Loss of AS in my career wasn't that big a deal. We had charts and attitudes depending on altitude and weight to keep flying.

[flarepilot]

alexander de meerket

maybe somethings are better...but we have a new breed of crashes...inattention to basic flying skills. an unintended consequence of computer gadgets.

spending hours figuring out gadgets and not making airspeed part of your scan is the wrong way of flying.

gadgets can help...love TCAS for example and I'm sure moving maps/GPS can help...but if you don't watch airspeed and know what altitude to keep all the gadgets will end up mocking you.

[bubbers44]

The last post was sent to me by the way. I hope eventually we will have the quality of pilots we had in the last decades. Not being able to land on 28L at SFO with out a GS means we have pilots who can not fly.

[flarepilot]

ditto bubbers.

[BARKINGMAD]

Interesting to note posting #s 4, 11, 12, 33 and 44 are bringing into the equation the very people who are also responsible for the unfortunate crews being FATIGUED or COMMERCIALLY PRESSURED as they make the continue or G/A decision?

In theory the accident investigations should highlight ALL factors affecting the "smoking hole/bent metal" scenario, but very few if any have hung out the "suits" in the company to dry in public.

Perhaps the media might like to do some informed research into what really goes on in the industry and start moving the emphasis away from the faceworkers and to shine the spotlight where it should be, viz illuminating the real villains?

[WeekendFlyer]

I know airbus have produced a runway over-run protection system (ROPS) that compares the aircraft speed and trajectory with that needed to gaurantee a safe stop on the runway.

What about something similar that checks whether your approach is stabilised or not, and warns you to "go around" if not? On modern aircraft with ILS, GPS, ADIRS (or similar), FMS and a runway database it would be possible to generate an algorithm that would do this. After all, many aircraft already have TCAS, GPWS and ROPS, all algorithm based warning systems that are in use and saving lives.

[Ian W]

I would think that is all possible - indeed it could all be automated why put the error prone human in the loop. Isn't this close to what the prof at Embry-Riddle was saying?

In Human Factors terms its called human on the loop, being a monitor but not actually getting involved in the minutiae of controlling the aircraft.

[16024]

Part of the problem with adding a further level of automation is where that system fails down the line somewhere, as it will, you will have even more out-of-the-loop pilots IN the loop, as it were. Also it won't work when you are diverting to Hicksville and already under pressure from time/fuel/weather/tech issues. Also it fails to address the problem of over-reliance on safety measures.
Note that here we are not being critical of safety measures per se.
See Homeostasis theory.

[BOAC]

To go with weekend flyer's idea of an 'approach monitor' let's have a full-blown auto g/a if conditions are not right.

The 'modern' generation seem to be quite adept at button-pushing etc and not at 'real' flying, so maybe it is also time to have new categories for pilots, which can be annotated on flight plans? 'I' for Instrument approaches only and 'A' for 'all' ie instrument and/or visuals, and a rigid SOP in airlines that all 'I' pilots are to remain in auto with autoland only approaches? That'll sort it, and the occasional 'failure' which requires an 'I' pilot to fly a visual or manually would just result in an acceptable crash statistic. It will also reduce training and checking costs significantly. Yes! I've cracked it! OK, a bit of a task for rostering and ops in alternate planning, but...........think of the safety:ok:

Lord help us.

[RAT 5]

All this reliance on automatics not being a good trend reminds of what might seem a minor issue, but shows a start point in this current philosophy. In late 80's my airline had just transferred from needles & dials to EFIS & EICAS a/c. The instructors were beating the pilots to 'follow the FD': no need to scan the panels overhead; let EICAS tell you there is a problem: no need to know power & attitude, the FD takes care of attitude and auto-throttle takes care of speed. My idea is that on a visual approach you need to know the latter to control the a/c; the former idea of EICAS being you eyes is that it only pops up when the limit is reached; your eyes notice a trend before it goes bang. This was a frightening attitude and it was the precursor to the laisse faire attitude more prevalent today and that which has led to incidents/accidents. It's been a subtle trend in training and operating over 25 years and now it is biting us.

[Lonewolf_50]

Lord help us. I say that before every takeoff, in my new role as a passenger. :( That's why I don't fly unless I am forced to.

[Lone_Ranger]

I sometimes just get fixated on the perceived touchdown point, its a bad thing, but I don't really know how to not do it, it feels like I am concentrating on arriving at that point so much, that I might miss important cues that its not quite right.

I think as pilots, we are more aware than some that things don't always go to plan and try to have contingencies thought out, but we are are human.

[Pugilistic Animus]

I`d like to see automatics handle s situation like the A380 Uncontained engine failure

[Capn Bloggs]

I sometimes just get fixated on the perceived touchdown point, its a bad thing, but I don't really know how to not do it, it feels like I am concentrating on arriving at that point so much, that I might miss important cues that its not quite right.
Hit the nail on the head. With lack of practice using the brain due to too much automation, we become overloaded/tunnel-vision more easily and just don't see that the situation is getting out of hand.

This notion of "they should have gone round"... is stating the bleedin' obvious. The question is why they couldn't see it. Rarely these days would the crew just say "to hell with it, we're gonna land regardless". Asiana, Turkish, possibly UPS all are shaping up to be crews trying to do the right thing but messing up, having lost the birdy tapping you on your shoulder saying "get out of here you idiot". How do you not mess up/keep that birdy on your shoulder when the pressure comes on? Be more familiar with the scenario that puts you under that pressure. You'll have more spare brain-power to evaluate what's happening and make the right decision when things start getting out of hand.

Less use of automatics when you don't need them!

[hifly787]

Cowboy ATC ? Who averted the Eva AIR Fiasco at SFO ?

[Alycidon]

I`d like to see automatics handle s situation like the A380 Uncontained engine failure

or look out of the window to see if icing conditions exist

[J.O.]

Many aircraft now have quite effective automatic icing detection systems that turn the anti-ice on automatically.

[Gretchenfrage]

I`d like to see automatics handle s situation like the A380 Uncontained engine failure



You mean having one donkey explode, getting a big hole in your wing, AP/AT told you to freaking do-it-yourself, not being able to control two other donkeys, unable to dump and slowly but constantly having your CG runing out of limit, nevertheless continuing for almost 3h, interpolating between 4 tables to determine if you are able to land from a 4k runway that let you do a balanced take-off?

Sounds very much like some of todays automatics and their followers.
I guess the still common sensed pilos would have put such a deadly injured bird back on safe ground asap. If it can take-off from a strip, it can land there.
Too many automatics failed there, why wish for some more of the same??

[Back Seat Driver]

Gretchenfrage, as a follower of your continuing ignorance of the nuances of that event, would you kindly expound your limited understanding of Brake Energy Limits and how the reduced brake availability along with the much higher approach speed courtesy of the absence of the leading edge slats would effect the landing distance required.
Please take your time because nitpicker330 is giving me a great big laugh with his meanderings on another thread.
I'm not sure the mods will allow me 2 wind-ups in one day.

[GLuis103]

Interesting to note posting #s 4, 11, 12, 33 and 44 are bringing into the equation the very people who are also responsible for the unfortunate crews being FATIGUED or COMMERCIALLY PRESSURED as they make the continue or G/A decision?

In theory the accident investigations should highlight ALL factors affecting the "smoking hole/bent metal" scenario, but very few if any have hung out the "suits" in the company to dry in public.

Perhaps the media might like to do some informed research into what really goes on in the industry and start moving the emphasis away from the faceworkers and to shine the spotlight where it should be, viz illuminating the real villains?

Could not agree more, no one seems to give the right importance to how much fatigue and stress these pilots are under every single day...

[Gretchenfrage]

Gretchenfrage, as a follower of your continuing ignorance of the nuances of that event, would you kindly expound your limited understanding of Brake Energy Limits and how the reduced brake availability along with the much higher approach speed courtesy of the absence of the leading edge slats would effect the landing distance required.
Please take your time because nitpicker330 is giving me a great big laugh with his meanderings on another thread.
I'm not sure the mods will allow me 2 wind-ups in one day.

BSD, your condescending tone might be forgiven, it sounds professional but resounds more wise-ass than other.
You can present me with any BTM or BEL table, but it will not take away some common sense numbers:
You accelerate to a MTOW V1 of some 190kts 2/3rds down the RWY, losing one donkey and not considering revs, telling us that we can still brake before the end lights, at the same time pretending you should not be able to land on the same strip with about 210kts Vcl on an EM Appr, touching down on the numbers and still be able to get survivable speed by the end lights, even without the crap AB brakes and no revs?
Look yourself in the mirror and copy paste your trivial contribution, if you still feel like it ....

[Pugilistic Animus]

that brake energy limits should be reached in a normal weight landing at the correct speed....highly unlikely

[Back Seat Driver]

Gretchenfrage, it is obvious by the speeds you give in your post above that you have absolutely no knowledge of A380 performance data. MTOW V1 190 knots is so far removed from fact that I now believe I am talking to at best a teenage flight simmer so I will be a little kinder.
Suffice to say that the Brake Kinetic Energy required to be absorbed by the available brakes (12) on QF32 was in the order of 90 million foot pounds, approx 34% more than is required by max braking after an RTO at MBRW.
If the aircraft had made an earlier return, with a higher weight and therefore a higher approach speed it would not have stopped 150 meters before the runway end but have continued on to the grass.
What is the braking coefficient on grass as compared to asphalt?
Disaster was averted and nobody got hurt.
That would most likely not have been the case if Capt. Gretchenfrage had been in command.

[nitpicker330]

Made the bunk for me yet Backseat??? :E

[Gretchenfrage]

BSD, (why does this sound like an unhealthy sandwich?)

I sure do not fly the 380, too ugly. I did not pretend to know its speeds, i merely stated some physical analogies in terms of speed so that the normal pilot gets the drift. Maybe that's why you don't.
On paper your weight/speed/length calculation might apply. In real life i prefer to decelerate the last few knots on grass or on water and survive than lose the turkey airborne and die stupidly because it became uncontrollable due to its injuries or because its CG was more aft than your bunk-sleep.

But i guess you would rather follow ECAM and wish for more of such automatics than apply what was taught on the first lesson in a Chip or L4.

Brave new world and with that i'm out. :ugh:

[DozyWannabe]

I`d like to see automatics handle s situation like the A380 Uncontained engine failure

Gretchenfrage's sarcasm aside, the Captain of that flight wrote a very thorough and enlightening book on the subject which explains exactly what the thought processes of his team were and why they handled the situation the way they did. PPRuNe rules forbid me from linking to it, but it can be found quite easily on Amazon by entering the flight number (which also happens to be the book's title).

I can say that Back Seat Driver is essentially absolutely correct, and the time spent working through the ECAM was entirely justified in terms of the crew making certain just which systems they had left. Also that said Captain was previously First Officer on the 707 and 747 Classic, which makes GF's assertion that the guy was one of "today's followers of automatics" not only incorrect, but frankly insulting.

In fact the Captain states that his initial instinct was to turn back ASAP, but that his crew persuaded him not to do so until their damage was fully assessed. He concedes quite willingly that they were correct to do so.

[Pugilistic Animus]

DW thanks for all the additional information:)

[Deep and fast]

Weekend flyer,

This pretty much covers what you are asking for.

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Runway_Awareness_and_Advisory_System_(RAAS)

[DozyWannabe]

DW thanks for all the additional information:)

No probs - happy to help!

If you haven't already, I must recommend getting hold of the book if you have the spare pennies to do so. Aside from a very interesting memoir as a preface, it also contains what I'd consider a textbook example of applying practical experience, technical nous and Aussie-style CRM to an aviation problem, such that as many "what-ifs" as possible are covered before the first approach is attempted.

It is clear from reading the book that from the time of the initial engine failure to the time all the passengers were back in the terminal safely, no decision was entered into lightly and as many parameters as possible (including fuel status) were taken into account. In fact one of the tensest sections of the story relate to the wait on the tarmac while they tried to shut the stuck engine down and his hope that he'd made the right decision to stay put.

[bubbers44]

Going around is always an option on approach. It is only necessary if the wx is below minimums or the pilot screws up the approach. A visual approach should never require a go around because it is so easy but once in a while a pilot messes it up. Any pilot that can not execute a visual missed approach should not be flying an airplane.

[DaveReidUK]

It is only necessary if the wx is below minimums or the pilot screws up the approach.The most common cause of GAs at busy airports isn't either of those.

[flarepilot]

johnsmith

tell us, would you go around if ATC ordered you to go around but you didn't think it was safe to do so.

if you think ATC orders you to do anything, you have a fundamental misunderstanding of YOUR duties as PIC.


bubbers didn't put every possibility in a short post. and we understood what he was getting at.

and his opening statement was that a go around was an OPTION.

I've seen a situation in which a go around in a windshear wasn't the best thing to do

I've seen a situation in which an ATC instructed go around actually put an airplane in more jeopardy than landing behind a plane still on the runway (but with adequate room).

What did someone say about a Novice in a nunnery? From Gilbert & Sullivan...

Judgement and experience beats tactics in a nunnery.

johnsmith, you might learn from bubbers.

[bubbers44]

It is amazing how if you eliminated all but one section of a post, any post can be made to look rediculous, isn't it?

Maybe we could play this game in Jet blast with all posts.

A few posts back I said I had a clearance to land in a Jetstar landing at SNA and went around because a 737 hadn't cleared the runway on the 5700 ft strip. The controller said he would have cleared in time and I said, no problem, I just prefer a clear runway. It was a clear day and I didn't mess anything up and yes, there are a lot of reasons to go around. Most I have witnessed have been those two.

[bubbers44]

Yes, I know I spelled ridiculous wrong. It didn't seem worth fixing but in your world saved you a post. Have a nice day. In the future don't edit out the part of the post that supports a sentence.

[Capn Bloggs]

bubbers didn't put every possibility in a short post. and we understood what he was getting at.
Yes we did. :ok: Posts on PPrune are not required to be understandable by non-Professional Pilots, are they?