ANA fire extinguisher wiring faults

[ITman]

Wiring Defect Found In ANA Dreamliner Fire Extinguishers JAL Aborts Helsinki-Bound Flight After Announcement


Faulty wiring has been discovered in the fire extinguishers aboard three
Dreamliners owned by All Nippon Airways (ANA). The discovery prompted Japan
Airlines to abort a Dreamliner flight en route to Helsinki Wednesday.



The problem aboard the ANA 787 was discovered before a scheduled departure
from Haneda airport in Tokyo for Frankfurt, Germany. It was repaired and the
flight later was allowed to depart. Subsequent inspections uncovered similar
issues in two other Dreamliners owned by ANA, which operates 20 of the
airplanes.


The French news service AFP reports that JAL recalled its Helsinki-bound
flight following the announcement, and that it would be inspecting its 10
Dreamliners for defects.


The problem could lead to a malfunction in the airplane's engine
fire-suppression systems, according to an ANA spokesman.

[Cows getting bigger]

Am I the only one who is somewhat concerned that 21st century Management Systems (Quality and Compliance) don't seem to capture some rather disturbing breakdowns in manufacture and/or maintenance process?

..... and before I get moderated, this isn't me having a pop at the 787. It is me querying the whole industry.

[willl05]

You are not the only one.

There is another thread that, for reasons that escape me, has been moved to the Spotters Corner:

http://www.pprune.org/spectators-balcony-spotters-corner/521345-another-dreamliner-problem.html

[bvcu]

Back to the 737 BMI , which resulted in 737/757's found with crossed wiring and extinguisher pipes crossed as well in a couple of cases. Hard to credit but its a low cost assembly industry. Skilled people cost , one of the reasons for the Charleston factory to get costs even further down. Its not just Boeing its the industry .

[DWS]

Boeing Traces Improperly Assembled Engine-Fire Extinguishers to Supplier's Bottles

No 'Safety-of-Flight Issue,' Jet Maker Says, Because of Redundant SystemsBy



JON OSTROWER

Boeing (http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=BA) Co. BA -1.37% (http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=BA?mod=inlineTicker) says it has traced the improperly assembled engine-fire extinguishers on 787 Dreamliners to the manufacturing of bottles at a supplier's facility.
Dreamliner operators have been conducting inspections recommended by Boeing of engine fire-extinguishing systems after three All Nippon Airways (http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=9202.TO) 9202.TO +0.48% (http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=9202.TO?mod=inlineTicker) jets were found to be improperly configured. An ANA 787 flight on Wednesday returned to its gate after the crew received a caution indication. Inspectors later found that the fire extinguisher nozzles were routed to the wrong engines.

http://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/OB-YO423_0815bo_G_20130816000501.jpgEuropean Pressphoto Agen


Boeing 787s congregating at Tokyo International Airport earlier this year; Boeing fingered a supplier for the improperly wired fire-extinguishing systems found on a number of 787s



The plane maker said in a written statement that the improper assembly, which has been confirmed to have been found on three ANA jets in Japan, "does not present a safety of flight issue because the bottles are not the only means of fire extinguishing for engines and there are multiple redundancies within the fire extinguishing system.
A Boeing spokeswoman said activating the 787's engine fire- extinguishing system "does not disable or impact [the engine's] performance."
"Regardless, improperly configured components are not acceptable and this issue is being addressed promptly," said the company's statement. "Boeing will follow standard disciplined procedures to understand how this discrepancy occurred and ensure it is not repeated."
United Continental Holdings Inc., which operates seven 787s, found "at least one" jet with improperly assembled extinguishers, according to one person familiar with its inspections.
A spokeswoman for United declined to comment on the airline's inspections, which continued Thursday.
Write to Jon Ostrower at [email protected]

[fergineer]

Does not pose a safety hazard!!!!!!!! Well what would it be then if you have an engine fire!!!!!! That does not go out on the first shot because its routed incorrectly!!!!! Fire the other one and hope that it is routed right. Boeing I will not be flying your jets for a while until you get your checking people on the right track.

[Cows getting bigger]

If an incorrectly configured safety system poses no safety hazard, why put it there in the first place?

[Volume]

...because it is required :ugh:

[OpenCirrus619]

I think many SLF will be a "little concerned" that the Dreamliner which has a reputation (justified or not) for spontaneously catching fire has now also been found to have defective fire fighting equipment :uhoh:

[EEngr]

I thought we (Boeing) had all this wiring and QA stuff ironed out 25 years ago. It was mis-wired fire systems then. Its mis-wired fire systems now. What did they do? Retire everyone who had the answer?
:uhoh:

[mixduptransistor]

Pardon my ignorance of the issue, but if you pull the fire extinguisher on an engine that is not on fire, will it shut down that engine? IE: If Engine 1 is on fire, you pull the handle and it discharges on Engine 2, will it shut down Engine 2?

[tdracer]

Pardon my ignorance of the issue, but if you pull the fire extinguisher on an engine that is not on fire, will it shut down that engine? IE: If Engine 1 is on fire, you pull the handle and it discharges on Engine 2, will it shut down Engine 2?


No.

Pulling the fire handle shuts down fuel and hydraulically isolates that engine. Rotating the handle fires the Halon bottle - if the Halon goes to the wrong engine it won't have an adverse affect on that engine - just waste the Halon. Rotating the handle the other way fires the other bottle which should extinguish the fire (assuming it doesn't have the same error).

The functional test at the aircraft level insures the aircraft wiring is correct. The fire bottle is an LRU - functional tests don't normally check the LRU. The vendor is supposed to verify the LRU wiring is correct.

Dump on Boeing all you want, but I'd bet good money that vendor supplies Halon bottles to brand A as well, and that brand A functional tests wouldn't catch a cross wired bottle either.

[Weeds round the prop]

Just to clarify this for me and any others- I take it that the bottles are co-located away from the engines, and the Halon is piped to the engines; thus there is the possibility of the control wiring from the cockpit being in error thus discharging the wrong bottle, and also the piping from the bottles could be in error sending the Halon to the wrong engine- in fact they both could be crossed and all would be hunky-dory fire-wise except the wrong engine would auto shut down!
Where is the Halon actually directed to? Into the fan cowl or to multiple areas?

[tdracer]

I don't work the 787, and I don't have any 'inside' info - what I know about this incident is what I've read in the news.

That being said, standard design on a twin is two bottles - one per wing in the inboard wing leading edge area. There is piping from each bottle to each engine - separate squibs in each bottle determine which engine the Halon goes to. From what I've seen in the news, the wiring on the bottle was reversed - such that the #1 squib actually fired #2, and visa-versa. As I noted earlier, the functional tests check the wiring to where it connects to the bottle. And the once-per-day fire system test basically checks continuity - there is no way to tell if the squibs are cross-wired (I'm actually a little curious how they discovered the problem - I'm guessing there was an unrelated fault with the system and during troubleshooting someone noticed something not right with the bottle wiring).

Once the Halon reaches the engine, there is a system of tubing that directs it to various undercowl locations with the requirement that all undercowl areas reach a Halon concentration of at least 5%. As you might imagine, the cert test to demonstrate this functionality is non-trivial.

The Halon system is intended to extinguish a fire in the undercowl area, external to the actual engine - nothing goes inside the engine. Directing Halon to a normally operating engine won't have any adverse affect other than wasting the Halon.

I don't know how 'unique' the 787 bottle configuration is, but I won't be surprised if other aircraft models are affected.

edited to add some more detail

Tim

[glad rag]

Stranger and stranger, without open access to any 787 documentation on the 'net it's quite difficult to actually work out how the 787 system is designed.

Is it a single, remote double headed bottle then plumbs to either engine? Or does each engine have it's own bottle? is that bottle double headed to it's own engine for redundancy? [my bet].

Thought for the day.......ANA do seem to be going through their 787's with a very fine tooth-comb [as well they might].......:D

[olasek]

is that bottle double headed to it's own engine for redundancy? [my bet].
My bet is the opposite.
Certification probably requires that each bottle must be able to feed both engines, yes, exactly for redundancy. You do want to be able to discharge both bottles at the same engine. I doubt Boeing had any freedom here to do otherwise.

[atakacs]

As other posters I am really curious to know how this problem was discovered in the first place. Being I obviously fairly new airframes they would have not gone through any heavy maintenance yet. Anyone ?

[fenland787]

What did they do? Retire everyone who had the answer? One would not be surprised - would one?

[Mr @ Spotty M]

It was found while trouble shooting a fault indication prior to despatch.
The bottle has two heads which contain the squibs, one is the L/H Head and the other is the R/H head.
Due to errors previously with plugs fitted to the incorrect head over the years, the heads cannot have the incorrect plug connected, thus stopping maintenance errors when the bottles or squibs are replaced (or so they thought).
However in this instance, my guess at bottle assembly by the OEM, they fitted the L/H head in the R/H position on the bottle and the R/H head in the L/H position.
Now should it have been picked up during testing, not if you used the wire idents, but if you used other methods by using AMM & IPD descriptions it would be a yes.
ANA managed to find it, so Boeing could have done so prior to delivery
The short term fix if you do not have replacement bottles, is to swap the wires at the plugs over.

[LeadSled]

Folks,
These things happen, and are not confined to Boeing.
First one I ever heard of was a 1049G Connie.
Next was a Viscount 700.
Saw miss-wiring (both engine anti-ice and cargo fire bottles) on a B767-200.
Long weekend aeroplanes, it shouldn't happen, but it does.
Even the most cunning experience-based design defenses will have the occasional lapse.
Tootle pip::

[tdracer]

Is it a single, remote double headed bottle then plumbs to either engine? Or does each engine have it's own bottle? is that bottle double headed to it's own engine for redundancy? [my bet

Glad Rag - did you not read the previous post, where I answer this exact question? Two bottles, each plumbed to go to either engine.

[glad rag]

Actually you stated

I don't work the 787, and I don't have any 'inside' info - what I know about this incident is what I've read in the news.

so I took that your input was, as mine, supposition.

[EEngr]

tdracer (http://www.pprune.org/members/414340-tdracer):

The functional test at the aircraft level insures the aircraft wiring is correct. The fire bottle is an LRU - functional tests don't normally check the LRU. The vendor is supposed to verify the LRU wiring is correct.And this is a problem with systems such as these. Because the fire bottles are 'one shot' systems, one cannot do a complete end-to-end functional test of them. The aircraft wiring can be tested, usually with a test tool that breaks out the squib signals. But that requires additional steps in the manufacturing process: hook up the tool, run the test, remove the tool, etc. After that, the bottles must be connected. And that must be done without introducing errors.

There are system designs that can eliminate crossed connections and other such mistakes. Keyed electrical connectors and/or wiring harnesses that won't allow the left connector to reach the right squib, for example, can be employed. But a lot of these require an attention on the part of engineering to not only eliminate system failures in operation, but to account for possible manufacturing errors in their designs. And to cover most error cases with the proper combination of designing them out and functional test/maintenance procedures to eliminate others.

Unfortunately, the trend in aircraft design and manufacturing is to separate engineering from manufacturing, both within organizations and across different companies. What used to be a matter of engineering paying visits to the shop floor and getting feedback from the people actually putting things together now consists of official inter-company correspondence, design change paperwork and lots of extra charges.

[DWS]

Interesting- RE the many news headlines based on supposition re wiring error, the eventual FACTS reveal a wrong ASSEMBLY error by the vendor.

Granted the 787 has had many electrical problems and some actual wiring errors or if not errors simple " what were they thinking " kinds of errors.

And of course the issue immdiately brought up the pundits re battery fiasco issue and the ELT issue- none of which are related to the fire bottle problem

Thus the legacy of the 787 will forever be " wiring " . . .

Which will be repeated for any problem- CFIT, runway overruns, solid clouds, etc.

Its like a lawyer friend once told us in class- when you read in the news about a case or a court opinion, you can be assured it is only partially correct as reported. IF you really want the details and facts - read the court documents.

:sad::sad:

[Mr @ Spotty M]

So you expect the operator to carry out periodic operational or function checks on the system, but not Boeing during system testing prior to delivery?
No wonder then, British Airways third B787, B1 flight lasted less than 20 minutes.

[EEngr]

So you expect the operator to carry out periodic operational or function checks on the system, but not Boeing during system testing prior to delivery?No. Both Boeing and the operator will have to do checks. Boeing during manufacturing and the operator if related aircraft wiring or the fire bottles are worked on.

The problem is that this is one of those functions that cannot be easily tested from end to end. because that would involve discharging the bottles. So some attention must be paid at the design stage to possible errors that could be introduced during the manufacturing or maintenance steps to ensure that the possibility of such errors are minimized. Basically, make things so there's only one way they can go together correctly. And this includes the suppliers of various components, like the fire bottles.

[tdracer]

BTW, if some of you are wondering if Boeing selected some fly-by-night vendor to save a few buck, press reports indicate the vendor was Kiddie - probably the largest manufacturer of commercial aircraft fire detection and fire extinguishing systems.

I expect there will be an investigation of Kiddie to understand how they could have botched this bad. Depending on the results of that investigation, I won't be surprised if inspections extend beyond the 787 (as I also noted in my first post).

[Mr @ Spotty M]

I am no avionics engineer but l know you can remove the plug and check that when you test the system, the signal you are sending to the R/H head does actually arrive at that head and not the other head.
With regards to Kiddie, Boeing normally has a choice for Fire Bottles on other types, but l believe the B787 has only Kiddie fitted, nine of them if my memory serves me.
So it will not only be other aircraft types being checked.

[cockney steve]

the vendor was Kiddie - probably the largest manufacturer of commercial aircraft fire detection and fire extinguishing systems.

Would this be the same Kiddie that sold the domestic smoke alarm that bears the proclamation "MADE IN CHINA " ?
As it's predominantly plastic and metal, I assume that it's a geographic ,as opposed to constituant reference :}
For at least 45 years, automotive and industrial wiring has routinely used non-interchangeable multiplugs A very basic safety-control on an unskilled or low-intelligence assembly-line. To improve speed even more, M-F connectors are often moulded in a unique colour,thus making it obvious if a forced mis-mate is attempted.

One has to question the sort of quality-control that allowed delivery of very expensive "rejects".

[Ancient Mariner]

It would probably be the KIDDE Aerospace, part of the Hamilton Sundstrand Group.
Per

[BARKINGMAD]

Sounds like another major aircraft tech problem which could have been arrested and stopped at the drawing board stage?

Eengr and others have nailed it with the speculation re the real engineers being fired and whizz-kids being employed who know the square root of :mad:all about aeroplanes and how they work.

Ever since crossed control connections killed pilots, it was a rule that NO system should be able to be misconnected.

Yet the RAF managed to lose a Hawk pilot due to such a misdesign where the controls were crossed post maintenance and now here we are in the 21st century with mega-buck civil transport aircraft suffering similar glitches.

When will THEY ever learn??!! :ugh:

[joy ride]

I cannot help wondering about the wisdom of management moving away from the shop floor.

[EEngr]

Mr @ Spotty M (http://www.pprune.org/members/19150-mr-spotty-m)

I am no avionics engineer but l know you can remove the plug and check that when you test the system, the signal you are sending to the R/H head does actually arrive at that head and not the other head.That's my recollection of the system as well. A simple test light can verify the cockpit to fire bottle wiring integrity. If Boeing can be bothered to spare two technicians and a couple of handheld radios. Likewise, proper routing of flexible Halon tubing can be verified with compressed air or dry nitrogen prior to installing squibs or burst discs. But that's a manufacturing step and the bean counters love eliminating those.

It might be the case that using keyed connectors is not possible due to the same model number fire bottle being used on too many different aircraft to retrofit a design change. However, I seem to recall that the layout of the electrical and halon plumbing on a fire bottle is such that the 'Left' plug is physically adjacent to the 'Left' Halon outlet. So fastening the plumbing and wiring in a simple clamp would prevent accidentally separating one system's connections.

A diagram of the bottles and 787 installation would help greatly.

[EEngr]

DWS (http://www.pprune.org/members/414452-dws)

Thus the legacy of the 787 will forever be " wiring " . . .

Having been on the inside at Boeing, the legacy of practically every screw-up there seems to be "wiring". Wiring is one of the biggest configuration control problems in the manufacturing of any aircraft. It touches every other system, so any changes within one subsystem also affects the wiring.

The configuration control systems needed to track changes in the wiring systems are orders of magnitude more complex than any other aircraft subsystem. Add to that the large number of engineering, manufacturing, QA and vendor groups involved, each with their own organizational empires and fixing anything becomes a nightmare. Everyone seems to have their own work-arounds to plug holes in the official processes. Enforcing one way of doing business is a problem (Airbus has their own issues getting bundles to fit a few years back if I recall correctly).

[fenland787]

The configuration control systems needed to track changes in the wiring systems are orders of magnitude more complex than any other aircraft subsystem.

EEngr is right, having recently arrived back in the UK myself after some years in Everett overseeing the development, installation, flight test and certification of a critical 787 system (on behalf of a vendor) getting control of changes and configuration was very difficult to say the least.

I hope one of the 'lessons learned' from all this is the need for a system that can respond to the need to handle rapid change. To be blunt, the systems just didn't do that, so what then happens is folk everywhere are using their best efforts to 'do the right thing' to keep the program moving forward - because there are a bunch of MBAs beating you with their schedules, spreadsheets and the really evil 'P4S' * - so it degenerates into a bit of a mare's nest.

* P4S or 'Plan for Success' seemed to be a management idea that stripped out every bit of contingency from your plan and thus enabled you to deliver earlier.
So, for instance, you plan to prototype of a bit of new and critical electronics then test it but allow for time to re-spin the circuit board if it didn't work quite right or failed EMC tests or whatever, P4S ensured that allowance would be pulled out at review and the plan assumed it would be 'right first time' - well guess what!

Still, you can tell it worked because we came in dead on schedule didn't we.....
...oh we didn't? That will be those pesky engineers again then.

[bcgallacher]

was once involved with a spoiler defect on an Airbus A300-600 - the spoilers are primary roll control and FBW - where some of the servo valves and the indication system were wired up wrongly. The aircraft had been in service for at least a year and the fault was not apparent until a valve showed a failure on the ECAM but a physical check showed that it was a different spoiler that had failed.
The wiring had been assembled incorrectly at manufacture - symmetrically so no handling control problem ensued.It was kept very quiet at the time!

[bcgallacher]

This thread set a train of thought in motion and I recalled another occasion when cooling #7 brake unit on a B747 with an air conditioning unit the temp indication stayed the same but #8 temp indication fell.The temp probes were cross connected.

[joy ride]

I have been concerned about Management style and attitude throughout business and industry for a number of years.

Nowadays it seems normal for managers NOT to know about the business itself, just how to make rules and create bureaucracy. This seems particularly so in UK and a recent TV series highlighted the far better management style in Germany.

This does not just apply to aviation or any one company, but Fenland's post about MBAs and P4S is exactly what concerned me when I first learned that Boeing's management had completely separated themselves from the actual business of making planes.

Developing and introducing a new airliner is such a complex affair, and to think of a remote management imposing rules and deadlines on the work, despite being hundreds of miles away and having little "hands-on" knowledge of it, just seems to me to be the wrong way to undertake any complex industrial project.

[Volume]

a recent TV series highlighted the far better management style in GermanyI don´t how bad it is in the UK, but I seriously doubt it is any better in Germany... You barely see those wo make decisions on the shopfloor here either, and they would not understand what they see anyway. Think of the A380 wiring issues, mainly happening in Hamburg.

[joy ride]

I agree that the opinion of a TV programme maker can be quite wide of reality, and as stated I was not aiming my remarks solely at Boeing!

From a lifetime of observation and experience I have seen that much British business has been "managed" into extinction!

[Basil]

ISTR Boeing would donate full tanks gratis if purchaser turned up and flew new jet away. An employer of Bas declined and it was worth it in the long run to get all minor snags fixed quickly there and then than to have the hairyplane out of service when scheduled to operate.

I don't have enough info to suggest that would have uncovered such a component defect.

[EEngr]

Looks like an error by the vendor. The fire bottles have two discharge heads, combining the electrical and plumbing connections for one squib each. These are practically identical but have different part numbers to account for different keying of the electrical connector. It appears that the vendor switched them at assembly. Upon installation, the Halon plumbing would be installed by mechanical fit. That is; the head in the Left Engine position on the bottle would be plumed to the left engine and vice versa. The electrical connectors however are keyed, so the Left Engine cable would only fit the discharge head keyed to fit it. Due to the proximity of the heads, it would not take much slack in the cables for the installer to move the electrical connector to the head that it fit on (the one plumbed to the opposite engine).

Now for the blame. At assembly, there should probably be some check for the proper head P/N installation. A visual check of part numbers can be done, but could be overlooked if the Q/A people were in a rush. A continuity test jig could be built (or modified) to fix the proper mating connectors in place physically, making a switch just to get the test passed difficult or impossible.

But the root cause might come down to people doing the assembly and/or installation process not having an understanding of the system. The discharge heads look the same, so what's the big deal? There's enough slack in the cables to get them to fit either side. So we can get the thing installed and check it off the job list. Its the mentality of me doing my little job and going home at quitting time. That and the thinking that everyone else up and down the line got their job done correctly. So why bother looking again?

[ATC Watcher]

Its the mentality of me doing my little job and going home at quitting time. That and the thinking that everyone else up and down the line got their job done correctly. So why bother looking again?

Geee, I honestly hope airplanes are not really built like this nowadays. Are you an informed insider on Boeing subcrontractors or are you just guessing ?:rolleyes:

[cockney steve]

Geee, I honestly hope airplanes are not really built like this nowadays. Are you an informed insider on Boeing subcrontractors or are you just guessing ?

Do you have any reason to believe otherwise?
Factory assembly line "droids" invariably clock on and switch off...."i'm paid to make xxxx , not to think" is the ruling mentality.
Those with a higher IQ ,invariably move on. It's always been so,in a repetitive production environment.

[EEngr]

Geee, I honestly hope airplanes are not really built like this nowadays. Are you an informed insider on Boeing subcrontractors or are you just guessing ?:rolleyes:Informed insider from back in my days at Boeing.

I've seen a few instances where Boeing bought off on vendor acceptance testing without understanding the scope of the tests run or their limitations. A few acceptance test procedures were defined as "plug unit under test into ACME model 1000 tester, press the execute button and verify that the green 'pass' light illuminates". As a new engineer given the task of approving such a test, I got slapped down by Boeing management when I asked for the details on what the ACME 1000 actually measured. No time for that. The ATP needs to be approved to meed schedule.

I can only hope that tings have changed since I left. Subsequent evidence seems to indicate otherwise.

[DWS]

eengr is correcte when he describes how things work.

Boeing is typical - I know- been there- done that as an engineer.

While things generally have improved in some areas over a few decades, there are still way too many bean counters and power point rangers that drive the bus.

Its the ' when we want your opinion- we will tell you what it is " or ' I want A way to do it - cannot afford the time or $$ to ' do it better"

even so- most of the workers are dedicated and try to do the right thing, but ultimately it still comes down to self preservation.

The better- experienced workers that make it to AOG crews are absolute wizards and VERY dedicated. But they cost a bit- and are retireing at a significant rate.

[fenland787]

most of the workers are dedicated and try to do the right thing, but ultimately it still comes down to self preservation.

The better- experienced workers that make it to AOG crews are absolute wizards and VERY dedicated. But they cost a bit- and are retiring at a significant rate.
I agree with all your comments - and similar ones from others - I spent eight years on 787, working closely with everyone from the production shop floor to engineering VP level.

Almost all individuals I met were capable people trying very hard to get the job done right. What let things down was I am afraid to say, a very flawed management structure and lack of coherent process. What utterly depressed and astonished me in turns was how this did not seem to be recognized and sorted.

Although no longer part of the program, I continue to try and understand how that could be and keep coming back to the conclusion that the vast, serried ranks of 'MBA wielding' middle management just lived in their own happy world where all the power-points and spreadsheets lined up elegantly and the fact that they bore no relation to reality (past, present or future) simply did not occur to them.

When reality did catch up, as it does in life, the response was usually to blame the engineers or the supplier or the production folk rather than the lack of process or management that allowed the thing to go pear-shaped in the first place.

Very sad, because in that time, I met so many smart, dedicated, hard working folk who really cared and were proud of being part of Boeing who were, in my view at least, let down by the system.

I would add that for the last three years I was the on-site support for a critical system, covering production and flight-line and with one or two exceptions perhaps, I do not recognise the 'don't care I just do my shift and leave' description of the folks working the 787 that I have seen on this thread. Most wanted to get the job done and done right and were very engaged when it came to sorting problems.

[EEngr]

I would add that for the last three years I was the on-site support for a critical system, covering production and flight-line and with one or two exceptions perhaps, I do not recognize the 'don't care I just do my shift and leave' description of the folks working the 787 that I have seen on this thread. Most wanted to get the job done and done right and were very engaged when it came to sorting problems.

When I was there (before the 787 program) there were two schools of thought: Give the shop floor people access to any and all information, tools and whatever it takes to sort problems out. Or give them what they need and only what they need to do the planned work. Anything outside of the scheduled work flow (i.e. troubleshooting problems) was, in theory, to be designed out of the process. And Boeing management was in love with their firm grip on 'the process'.

I worked on a system that gave shop floor technicians access to QA procedures including requirements for 'out of sequence' work and systems check out. The sorts of things that one has to do in the event systems need to be taken apart, debugged and reassembled. Our group was a great supporter of the 'give then everything they need' philosophy. However, we butted heads with management that didn't want anything that allowed deviation from 'the plan'. Needless to say, we got a lot of support from the shop floor, but not from management. When it came time to retire our system and repace it with management's 'preferred process', some of the techs proposed a race between our system and the incoming one. With ours, test procedures could be located and printed within a few seconds. The new system required shop floor personnel to locate one of the few managers in possession of the proper login authority to access out of sequence procedures. It took them about 40 minutes to locate such a person.

I'm not sure how things were finally settled, as I didn't hang around for much longer.

[PAXboy]

I think that EEngr says what I have thought - as an outsider. I have worked in commerce since 1978 and first saw outsourcing in 1988 at the HQ of the American merchant bank in NYC for whom I was then working in telecommunications. I did not like it then and nothing has substantially changed my mind.

BUT the current fashion in mgmt is spreading globally and must run it's course. One can easily understand that a big corporation can throw away 30 years of progress in pursuit of more profit, because lots and lots of companies do it all the time. Of course they think they are making things better and often act in good faith.

The UK goverments of the 1990s and 2000s made a hash of things - when they started outsourcing functions and making policy with too many mgmt graduates, rather than people who actually understood the job and the circumstances.

The financial crash of 2008 was but one consequence of this kind of thinking but it's way too late to stop it now. Like most things in humans, it will run through.

[ATC Watcher]

Osamu Shinobe, President & CEO, All Nippon Airways
» Interview
16/09/2013
ATN: How much affected you the grounding of 787? Do you intend to ask for a compensation from Boeing?
OS: The financial impact of the grounding on sales revenue was approximately ¥15 billion. We are currently negotiating compensation with Boeing and cannot make any further comment for confidentiality reasons.
Since restarting flights, 787 operations are stable.

Are the "stable" operations comment just diplomatic words or fact ?

[olasek]

Are the "stable" operations comment just diplomatic words or fact ?
Is it terribly important one way or the other?

Once in a while they publish dispatch reliability statistics - you can look at the numbers and draw your own conclusions.

Also ANA is not the only operator of the 787, is United for example writing angry letters to Boeing complaining about 787 unacceptable dispatch performance? They once did, in 1996, it then made headlines, United was bitterly complaining about 777's poor performance, still too many problems in the 2-nd year after its introduction to United's fleet, clearly United was unabashed and did not hide behind diplomatic words. Now the same 777 is the epitome of reliability among jetliners.

[DozyWannabe]

@cockney_steve:

I've got to throw my hat in with EEngr, DWS and fenland787. The problems are far more likely to be management-related than on the shop floor.

I have no trouble whatsoever believing that most of the workforce are as they describe, i.e conscientious and hard-working, and situations like that described by EEngr, where it took 40 minutes to find a manager capable of performing the task would try the patience of a saint.

The explosion in managerialism (and sorry PAXboy, but the rot really took hold in the '80s) is a far more widespread issue than simply outsourcing. Even in-house, you can have teams that can have communications issues when everything has to go through management, and managers don't necessarily understand the problems.