UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL [Archive] - Page 2

-JC-

16th Aug 2013, 21:17

Nothing particular unusual about it, there are many airports with similar "hills" in immediate runway vicinity (for example RNO).

I'm only talking about the last mile of the approach. As I mentioned earlier regarding Aspen and Telluride, and now Reno, yes terrain is a factor but not close to the runway (within 1nm) as is the case with runway 18 at BHM. From what I can see at RNO, with runways that have published instrument approaches, the terrain rises about 40 feet above the threshold elevation within a mile, and all these runways have significantly displaced thresholds.

The important point is that minimum vis for this approach is 1 mile so they would clearly see all the obstacles well in advance.

At night, when it's dark ?

Reports from pilots in this very thread appear to indicate it is not just another approach.

skysign: The last 1/2 to 1 mile you litteraly buze the hill all the ways down to the RWY. It is like doing a low flyby over a downhill slope to the rwy. Landing on 18, is like landing at the bottom of a bowl. And yes it is an " interesting approach " day or night !!!!!

It will be interesting to see what sort of briefing notes UPS provides their crews operating into this airport on runway 18 at night ? And whether or not the approach even meets certification requirements for night operations with large turbojet aircraft ?

mixduptransistor

16th Aug 2013, 21:41

Hey guys, just watched about half of today's NTSB press conference. The biggest news was that they have good data on both the CVR and the FDR. On the CVR, something like 10-20 seconds (don't quote the time until I/you re-watch the press conference) before the end of the recording the plane called out "SINKRATE". The captain was flying. They interviewed the controller and he saw a "bright flash" that looked "like lightning" that he believes was prior to the actual impact into the ground (I personally think this is the plane hitting the trees/powerlines). Finally they said BHM has software in the control tower that is supposed to alert if a plane is dropping too fast and that it did NOT alert in the tower.

And some people were talking earlier about how long that runway has been there. 6/24 has been there since the 30s, and 18/36 has been there since the very early 50s from what I can tell. There was a pretty big noise abatement buyout project funded by the FAA about 10 years ago, and of course since then there have continuously been people that were outside the project that have been complaining to get their homes bought out. Those neighborhoods are low-income already and most of those homes are probably sub $50,000 value.

wozzo

16th Aug 2013, 21:51

Are you saying that all FlightAware data is useless and cannot be trusted?

FlightAware is a nice toy for spotters and enthusiasts, not for serious accident investigation – this has been said now numerous times on this thread, how short is your attention span?

Murexway

16th Aug 2013, 21:53

Reports from pilots in this very thread appear to indicate it is not just another approachYou obviously haven't read all the posts. I previously expressed my opinion that a BHM RNY 18 approach, when all minimum requirements (airport, runway, weather, aircraft, weight, crew, etc) are met, is properly assigned by ATC, and briefed, set up, and flown by a professional crew should not result in catastrophe. If it were any other way, there would be no approaches to that runway. Not all approaches in the world are ideal, I can think of dozens right here in the USA that each present unique circumstances, many of which have already been mentioned in this thread.

Turbine D

16th Aug 2013, 22:00

Original Quote by Coagie: Of course, the airport is probably there since the '20's or '30's, and might not have been such a noisy place for the surrounding neighborhoods, since it may not have extended out so much, or had noisy jets.
That is indeed very true, this is how the airport looked in the late 50s. You can see what remained of a 4th runway (dark gray). All the runways were 4,000 feet to 5,500 feet in length. In the early 1990's, runway 18/36 was extended to its present length of 7,100 feet for use by airline jets. I suspect up until that point in time, the people that lived in Airport Hills didn't see much jet traffic, if any, landing on runway 18, but some had a view of the airport below.

http://i1166.photobucket.com/albums/q609/DaveK72/20080523011022BirminghamItlApt-9mar1951_zps07e8fba8.jpg (http://s1166.photobucket.com/user/DaveK72/media/20080523011022BirminghamItlApt-9mar1951_zps07e8fba8.jpg.html)

A Squared

16th Aug 2013, 22:05

Need I remind? UPS 1354 crashed and burned 1 nm short of RWY 18. Why is it surprising that the last data point in the FlightAware feed may be incorrect?

The FDR and CVR could very well be toast and all their data lost. Should the people who want to know what happened to UPS 1354 throw away all other data sources too?

Are you saying that all FlightAware data is useless and cannot be trusted?

I don't have time to explain all the defects in your "analysis", but as one example out of many:

It's pretty obvious that the data for the last position is grossly in error, right? I mean after all it shows the airplane on the national guard ramp about a mile from where we know it ended up. So, gotta be in error right? so we just delete that position from the analysis. Cool. Now here's the hysterical part, even though we know beyond a shadow of a doubt that the last data record in the FlightAware is hopelessly flawed, You still preserve the velocity reported in that defective record, and inexplicably incorporate it into your charts and "analysis

The fact that you don't see the folly of taking that velocity reported in the final record, and basing conclusions on it speaks volumes.

mixduptransistor

16th Aug 2013, 22:15

From The Birmingham News:

Cockpit voice recordings show the pilots were cleared to land on Runway 18/36 two minutes before the end of the recording, Sumwalt said. Sixteen seconds before the end of the recording, the pilots received the first of two "sink rate" warnings, a mechanism which kicks in if the plane's descent does not match its programmed path, he added. Thirteen seconds to the end, one crew member reported the runway was in sight. Nine seconds prior to the end, there are "sounds that are consistent with impact," Sumwalt said.

Airbubba

16th Aug 2013, 22:19

NTSB: UPS plane's cockpit voice recorder reveals first descent warning came 16 seconds before end of recording

BIRMINGHAM, Alabama -- The flight data recorders captured "good quality" information and recorded UPS Flight 1354's entire flight, a National Transportation Safety Board official said.

"I am very happy to say that the recorders did their job," said Robert Sumwalt, board member with the NTSB. "We have very good data from both the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder."

The UPS cargo plane crashed about 5 a.m. Wednesday on approach to Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport, killing the two pilots.

The plane's cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder were retrieved on Thursday and flown to NTSB's lab in Washington, D.C. There, analysts were able to open the recorders and begin retrieving data Friday morning, Sumwalt said.

Cockpit voice recordings show the pilots were cleared to land on Runway 18/36 two minutes before the end of the recording, Sumwalt said.

Sixteen seconds before the end of the recording, the pilots received the first of two "sink rate" warnings, a mechanism which kicks in if the plane's descent does not match its programmed path, he added.

Thirteen seconds to the end, one crew member reported the runway was in sight.

Nine seconds prior to the end, there are "sounds that are consistent with impact," Sumwalt said.

The voice recorder also revealed the captain, Cerea Beal, Jr., was the flying pilot.

The flight data recorder captured 70 hours of data, including the entire flight.

The data recorder contains more than 400 parameters which must all be validated to ensure they were accurately recorded, Sumwalt said.

Investigators also interviewed the two air traffic controllers who were on duty.

One was on an allowed break at the time of the crash. The controller who witnessed the crash said "he saw what appeared to be a bright spark flash, which he equated to what it would look like if a power line broke," Sumwalt said.

The air traffic controller said the landing lights disappeared and there was bright orange flash followed by a red glow.

NTSB: UPS plane's cockpit voice recorder reveals first descent warning came 16 seconds before end of recording (photos) | al.com (http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2013/08/ntsb_ups_planes_cockpit_voice.html)

Starting to look like there was no mechanical malfunction. 'SINK RATE' at night on approach should have triggered an immediate go around at most carriers in my experience.

Murexway

16th Aug 2013, 22:32

Sixteen seconds before the end of the recording, the pilots received the first of two "sink rate" warnings.

Nine seconds prior to the end, there are "sounds that are consistent with impact"Wow, only seven seconds.....

-JC-

16th Aug 2013, 23:29

Murexway,

You obviously haven't read all the posts. I previously expressed my opinion that a BHM RNY 18 approach ... should not result in catastrophe.

That assumes the obstruction clearance analysis was done correctly and the certification requirements were actually met for this approach ? Can you verify that ?

IF the Google Earth elevation data is accurate, then flying this approach on a 3.20 degree PAPI WILL take you to within 55 feet of terrain at just over 1/2 mile from the runway when you are 255 feet above threshold elevation.

If in your "opinion" you think that this is an acceptable risk to take in a large widebody aircraft, flying at 170 knots, 55 feet over terrain 1/2 mile final, in total darkness, then so be it. Apparently the FAA agrees with you (assuming they didn't screw up when they certified it), in which case I say you are both nuts.

Now maybe the Google elevation data is in error, or I've made a calculation error (I doubt it), then by all means please correct my data. But don't tell me it's your "opinion" that just because the FAA says it's safe means that it really is.

And yes I have read every post in this thread. Have you ?

JimField

16th Aug 2013, 23:40

@ A Squared

I don't have time to explain all the defects in your "analysis", but as one example out of many:

It's pretty obvious that the data for the last position is grossly in error, right? ...

If you had bothered to thoroughly read the article you're so roundly condemning, before casting aspersions and pointing fingers, you would have realized that all of the "defects" you mention in your last post are explained in clear and plain English in that article.

In the coming days the FDR should clear things up. Hopefully the NTSB will give us a taste of the FDR data, as they did with Asiana 214, or at least make statements hinting at the probable causes of the accident.

aterpster

16th Aug 2013, 23:48

JC:

That assumes the obstruction clearance analysis was done correctly and the certification requirements were actually met for this approach ? Can you verify that ?

IF the Google Earth elevation data is accurate, then flying this approach on a 3.20 degree PAPI WILL take you to within 55 feet of terrain at just over 1/2 mile from the runway when you are 255 feet above threshold elevation.

If in your "opinion" you think that this is an acceptable risk to take in a large widebody aircraft, flying at 170 knots, 55 feet over terrain 1/2 mile final, in total darkness, then so be it. Apparently the FAA agrees with you (assuming they didn't screw up when they certified it), in which case I say you are both nuts.

Now maybe the Google elevation data is in error, or I've made a calculation error (I doubt it), then by all means please correct my data. But don't tell me it's your "opinion" that just because the FAA says it's safe means that it really is.

There is indeed high terrain but it is not on centerline and just outside the PAPI 15 degree splay. That is why the PAPI is required at night. A professional flight crew should know that a VGSI is only good to 4 miles and within a 15 degree splay.

I assess FAA approach procedures all the time. Significant mistakes are very rare at a major airport like this one.

The U.S. VGSI criteria require a 1 degree obstacle clearance plane, which starts at approximately 1,000 feet from the approach end of the runway and crosses the threshold at the TCH. Thus, that is almost 50 feet of obstacle clearance at the threshold.

Where they apparently first hit the threes they were almost 200 feet below the PAPI vertical on slope.

If the FAA made any mistake in the design of the final segment of the two Runway 18 approaches and/or the alignment of the PAPI, it will come out in the NTSB's report. That approach is presently being reviewed with an electron microscope, so to speak, by the NTSB.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 00:10

If you had bothered to thoroughly read the article you're so roundly condemning, before casting aspersions and pointing fingers, you would have realized that all of the "defects" you mention in your last post are explained in clear and plain English in that article.

Right, actually I did read your silly article. Including your "explanation". to wit: However, we chose to keep the groundspeed of the FlightAware end-point because doing so does not affect our analysis.

Not an explaation at all, just "we're keeping it even though it's wrong".

Then your "analysis" says UPS1354 apparently collided with terrain while flying at 191 knots,

Even though you have no sound basis for making that claim, given that the 191 knots is lifted from a clearly defective data record.

-JC-

17th Aug 2013, 00:15

There is indeed high terrain but it is not on centerline and just outside the PAPI 15 degree splay.

That terrain I see on Google Earth rising to 844 feet asl is offset 5 degrees from the final approach course (measured from the center of the theshold).

PJ2

17th Aug 2013, 00:17

Should the people who want to know what happened to UPS 1354 throw away all other data sources too?

Are you saying that all FlightAware data is useless and cannot be trusted?If I may offer a respectful thought - these two statements are just rhetoric.

My question to you is, why and upon what basis is this amateur sleuthing work defendable? What is the motivation behind the work when we know that in time, the recorders may tell us what occurred.

The only motivation that is reasonable to consider is that someone just wants to be first, and that is about ego and prestige, not about finding out, and frankly that insults the crew's memory and those who do this work.

That this data may coincide with later findings is beside the point. Dressing up and masquerading Flight Aware data as "what happened" is misleading because the basis upon which the data is created and displayed is not proven as an investigative tool with high and reliable accuracy.

If you want to present an argument for your particular data sources such that the argument garners the respect due such arguments because they are based technical specifics, you might begin by describing/demonstrating the accuracy and robustness of your data sources further based upon your knowledge of flight data analysis.

There are a good number of people here who know their stuff and can argue the details about accident investigation, flight data, human factors as well as terminal and approach chart design. If you wish to convince, be specific about why Flightaware isn't just a consumer-interest entertainment website and can stand beside the recorders as a valid source of aircraft data.

PJ2

Murexway

17th Aug 2013, 01:13

That assumes the obstruction clearance analysis was done correctly and the certification requirements were actually met for this approach ? Can you verify that ?
Yes

IF the Google Earth elevation data is accurate, then flying this approach on a 3.20 degree PAPI WILL take you to within 55 feet of terrain at just over 1/2 mile from the runway when you are 255 feet above threshold elevation. Real pilots don't rely on Google Earth.

If in your "opinion" you think that this is an acceptable risk to take in a large widebody aircraft, flying at 170 knots, 55 feet over terrain 1/2 mile final, in total darkness, then so be it. Apparently the FAA agrees with you (assuming they didn't screw up when they certified it), in which case I say you are both nuts. These are not my figures - they're yours.

Now maybe the Google elevation data is in error, or I've made a calculation error (I doubt it), then by all means please correct my data. But don't tell me it's your "opinion" that just because the FAA says it's safe means that it really is.Nothing in life is totally safe, including aviation.

And yes I have read every post in this thread. Have you ?Yes

Now I have a question for you. Are you a professional pilot, type-rated in any commercial jet aircraft?

aterpster

17th Aug 2013, 01:18

JC

That terrain I see on Google Earth rising to 844 feet asl is offset 5 degrees from the final approach course (measured from the center of the theshold).

Fortunately, the FAA doesn't design the critical final approach segment using Google Earth.:)

SloppyJoe

17th Aug 2013, 01:19

Agree 100% with PJ2s post.

Sooeet nailed the Asiana 214 final approach profile days before the NTSB released several data points of FDR data for the last 3 nm of the approach.Says it all really. Your a sick individual who I expect felt happiness when this most recent accident happened as you could have the chance once again to beat the NTSB. People have died, families have been destroyed, stop being a :mad: idiot.

Any number of us could guess what happened and come up with the right answer but what is the point, we will have the facts soon enough.

The funny thing is you claim to be right but a lot of the stuff on your post is based on what people here have said and all of your mistakes, that show a total lack of aviation understanding, are removed once spotted here. Its pathetic and not even your own conclusions or knowledge based reasoning, just what you can pick up from here. Sad, sad individual.

Murexway

17th Aug 2013, 01:26

If I may offer a respectful thought - these two statements are just rhetoric.

My question to you is, why and upon what basis is this amateur sleuthing work defendable? What is the motivation behind the work when we know that in time, the recorders may tell us what occurred.

The only motivation that is reasonable to consider is that someone just wants to be first, and that is about ego and prestige, not about finding out, and frankly that insults the crew's memory and those who do this work.

That this data may coincide with later findings is beside the point. Dressing up and masquerading Flight Aware data as "what happened" is misleading because the basis upon which the data is created and displayed is not proven as an investigative tool with high and reliable accuracy.

If you want to present an argument for your particular data sources such that the argument garners the respect due such arguments because they are based technical specifics, you might begin by describing/demonstrating the accuracy and robustness of your data sources further based upon your knowledge of flight data analysis.

There are a good number of people here who know their stuff and can argue the details about accident investigation, flight data, human factors as well as terminal and approach chart design. If you wish to convince, be specific about why Flightaware isn't just a consumer-interest entertainment website and can stand beside the recorders as a valid source of aircraft data.

PJ2I wholeheartedly concur. All of this internet, aviation enthusiast, Google Earth, FlightAware info is total baloney when it comes to professional accident investigation. Bash the NTSB all you want, but they're not running around using Google Earth on their "smart"phones and making stupid, uninformed posts on rumor websites.

prayingmantis

17th Aug 2013, 01:39

Just my two cents worth so please don't jump down my throat on this one...

I'm surprised at how intact the cockpit looks, including the windows, and yet I realize that the two pilots unfortunately lost their lives.

The crash almost looks completely survivable based upon the integrity of the cockpit, at least with the pictures released so far.

I make these observations as a lowly pathologist, but still.... I've seen my share of blunt force trauma injuries and this one perplexes me. Of course, I've seen forces much less kill people, so you never can tell. It will be interesting to read the medical/pathological/survivability information that's released in this case from the NTSB.

Thanks for listening!

JimField

17th Aug 2013, 01:45

@ PJ2

Thank you for your civil and thoughtful post. Very refreshing in the aftermath of the violent verbal assaults on a newb by some PPrune members.

It is comforting to know that people like you exist in the commercial pilot community, and that hopefully people like you constitute a majority of that community, rather than a majority of knee-jerk reactionaries, as some other members of PPrune have proven themselves to be.

My concern and approach are those of a layman: are there serious systemic problems with commercial aviation, for example poor flight crew training, overworked flight crews, frequent day/night shift rotations that affect the normal sleep cycles of flight crew, etc., that may underlie or be causal to the rash of recent fatal accidents involving large airplanes?

I'm sure you agree that these issues go well beyond the community of ATP rated pilots, and affect all of the flying public, as well as the people on the ground, for example the residents of Birmingham Alabama who live in close proximity to BHM.

And as in many close-knit work communities, is there a reluctance on the part of insiders to speak the truth within the community, let alone in public, about these issues, for fear of reprisals such as demotions, pay cuts, lay-offs, etc.?

Thanks again for your thoughtfulness.

DH_call

17th Aug 2013, 01:48

JimField:
Are you saying that all FlightAware data is useless and cannot be trusted?

If this was sarcasm I'm laughing with you, if not then I'm laughing at you.

SLFinAZ

17th Aug 2013, 02:05

I'm somewhat amazed that 3 seconds go by after the sink rate warning with one of the crew then saying runway in sight....if it was a dive and drive wouldn't they intend to be level at MDA? If it was some sort of stabilized approach wouldn't that have been a clear signal the approach had gone unstable and an immediate go around was called for....???

Sadly seems like another clear case of pilot error...

mixduptransistor

17th Aug 2013, 03:07

Also from the news conference today, the FAA planned to do a flight test of the ILS equipment and the PAPI lights today but were unable to due to weather. Several questions were asked about the serviceability of these systems, specifically the PAPI lights and the NTSB did not have answers.

Coagie

17th Aug 2013, 03:31

I was born and raised in the deep south. My mother is from central Alabama (you don't have to tell anybody... I know what you're thinking "That explains a lot!"). Anyway, a 100 foot+ pine tree is not only, not unusual, it's the norm! 55 feet of altitude is usually described in two words ...too late!

olasek

17th Aug 2013, 03:33

If the FAA made any mistake in the design of the final segment of the two Runway 18 approaches and/or the alignment of the PAPI, it will come out in the NTSB's report.Again you are harping at this point ad nauseam already ...
This approach brings you to 1200 ft about 1 mile from the runway (in the worst weather), then you transition to your regular VFR flying. PAPI lights should by then be fully visible and as long you don't loose them or make sure at least on of them remain white you should be OK. Nobody can guarantee you terrain clearance when all lights turn red. If you count on a "mistake" in the design of this approach - I think you will be grossly disappointed. So yes, wait for NTSB report but the odds that NTSB will find fault with the approach itself are miniscule, it would be first in like 50 years. This approach had plenty of safety buffer that could have been flown by a competent crew in a partially disabled aircraft (say with one engine inop).

Fortunately, the FAA doesn't design the critical final approach segment using Google EarValid point, and they actually thoroughly flight-test every approach (not using armchair pilot playing Microsoft Flight Simulator) instead of sitting in an armchair with a calculator doing some trigonometry...:}

Capn Bloggs

17th Aug 2013, 04:12

Again you are harping at this point ad nauseam already ...
This approach brings you to 1200 ft about 1 mile from the runway (in the worst weather), then you transition to your regular VFR flying. PAPI lights should by then be fully visible
I hope not. With a threshold elevation of 644ft, that'd put you around 250ft above the desired profile, as your Garmin 1000 would show you. 8 whites on the PAPI, anyone?

instead of sitting in an armchair with a calculator doing some trigonometry...
Actually, that's probably exactly what the FAA does, or similar, when designing it.

ironbutt57

17th Aug 2013, 04:20

it would be first in like 50 years.

Oddly enough several years ago they did find fault with a non precision approach involving a light aircraft under very similar circumstances..in upstate New York I think

-JC-

17th Aug 2013, 04:23

Was it safe at night?

The smoking hole 1/2 mile from the threshold of the runway speaks for itself.

Do you really think they would have crashed if they were doing the ILS approach to runway 23 ?

Sink rate ... Sink rate ... I see the runway.

All you "Real" pilots have your head in the sand if you don't think the approach design criteria had anything to do with this accident.

A non-precision black hole approach over rising terrain, yeah it's prefectly safe. Have we not learned anything over the last 50 years of commerical aviation ?

Bunch of dinosours. Hate to tell you but the Global Earth generation is going to outlaw these stupid types of non-precison approaches, it's going to hurt your "real" pilots ego's, but at least it will save lives. Get with the times Grampa's.

And spare me this wait for the NTSB report BS, hello this isn't the NTSB, it's a pilots rumour forum on the internet FFS, what do you expect ?

olasek

17th Aug 2013, 04:24

I hope not. I know you like to play those word games :ugh:, I meant 1200 ft AND/OR 1 mile ....
Actually in my SR22 I should be able to land fine even being 250 ft above the profile. I am not bound by where I should touch down...

Actually, that's probably exactly what the FAA does, or similar, when designing it. Sure and like I was saying... they remain in their armchairs :rolleyes:

Bunch of dinosours. Hate to tell you but the Global Earth generation is going to outlaw these stupid types of non-precison approaches,Then start your crusade, and start in Canada, plenty of such approaches remain...
We will see how far you get... :bored:

Capn Bloggs

17th Aug 2013, 04:38

I know you like to play those word games , I meant 1200 ft AND/OR 1 mile ....

Word games? I simply responded to what you wrote; don't blame or criticise me for your inability to write what you meant. And now I come to think about it, "and/or" doesn't make any sense either.

Bunch of dinosaurs. Hate to tell you but the Global Earth generation is going to outlaw these stupid types of non-precision approaches, it's going to hurt your "real" pilots ego's, but at least it will save lives. Get with the times Grampa's.
Nice rant. The "authorities" are just as culpable as the ego-driven grandpas, IMO. The FAA could mandate VNAV-coupled approaches, or if unable to be flown by a type it could mandate an ILS. It could improve the charting. It could improve crew oversight. Companies could improve crew performance. The list goes on and on. To criticise crews for trying to do the job with the tools they have is simplistic and won't achieve anything.

-JC-

17th Aug 2013, 04:48

Then start your crusade, and start in Canada, plenty of such approaches remain... We will see how far you get...

RNAV RNP 0.1, already well underway.

To criticise crews for trying to do the job with the tools they have is simplistic and won't achieve anything.

I'm not critizing the crews at all, I'm critizing the "system" for not giving the crews the correct tools to do the job safely. I think we are on the same page, I'm just not expressing myself clearly.

PJ2

17th Aug 2013, 06:37

JimField;

Thank you for your response.

I believe in civil exchanges above all, but courtesy does not excuse; - however the exchange may take place, the question must still be addressed regarding Flight aware data, please.

On your other points regarding training, automation etc, these have been under intense discussion for many years here in particular on the ten or eleven AF447 threads. The points made are thoroughly understood and frankly something new to add to the dialogue would likely be welcome.

Regarding "treatment of a newbie", well, no one's special when the conversation is about flight safety - if an idea or a view isn't cutting it, like CRM, there should be no beating about the bush - for me it's about "what, not who", and if you have something to add which respects fellow aviators' experience while advancing an interesting notion you're likely to get a hearing.

My own view regarding Flightaware "data" is abundantly clear because I do flight data and nothing on the web cuts it. To use such sources for detailed analyses in advance of anything substantive from the usual sources indicates a particular naivete regarding flight data work and the notions it can accidently impose on those who may have deep interests in what happened but who cannot distinguish investigative techniques when not done well.

Nothing personal of course - but this is about safety work and about finding out things in ways that have worked successfully. It is not about being first off the blocks with notions of what happened and possibly embarrassing oneself with clearly indefensible statements about speeds for example, with sample rates and resolutions like Flightaware's. Nor is it about making allies for one's point of view. As you've noticed, it is not always a friendly place, but neither is aviation, particularly at times like these. Thick skin and restraint kinda works.

Respectfully,

PJ2

Airbubba

17th Aug 2013, 06:44

I was thinking the crew would probably shoot the RNAV (GPS) RWY 18 approach but they certainly were legal to do the LOC Rwy 18 (don't know why it's RWY on one plate and Rwy on the other).

From Robert Sumwalt's Friday NTSB presser, it looks like the UPS 1354 crew briefed and shot the LOC Rwy 18.

There are rumours, I stress rumors, of significant prior crew training issues, if so, I'm sure this will come out in the NTSB report.

So far, looks like there was no mechanical problem with the aircraft, as also apparently was the case with Asiana 214.

I wonder if the NTSB will harvest the chitchat about the company, the union, howya feelin', I'm tired, ready to go to the hotel, etc. from the CVR? They got a lot of what would previously be considered 'non-pertinent conversation' from the BUF Colgan 3407 crash.

RetiredF4

17th Aug 2013, 06:45

I'm not critizing the crews at all, I'm critizing the "system" for not giving the crews the correct tools to do the job safely. I think we are on the same page, I'm just not expressing myself clearly.

Now wait a second, are you now saying, that NPA approaches are unsafe?

DaveReidUK

17th Aug 2013, 07:12

You need to google "sock puppet" and learn what it means in the context of an online forum.Apologies for the digression, but before yesterday I didn't know what a sockpuppet was either, and then I encountered the term twice in the space of a couple of hours.

The first was when I was Googling the "Streisand Effect", another term with which I wasn't familiar but came across when I saw it used in the context of recent events involving a large Irish airline. And then here on this thread, where its use appears to be entirely appropriate in this instance.

the question must still be addressed regarding Flight aware data, pleaseWith hindsight, the very first post made, as well as being disingenuous, also demonstrated the level of understanding of what FlightAware "data" was and wasn't capable of telling us:

Sooeet did a new analysis for UPS 1354, including nice plots of position and airspeed

aterpster

17th Aug 2013, 07:23

Excerpts from the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual:

i. Vertical Descent Angle (VDA) on Nonprecision Approaches. FAA policy is to publish VDAs on all nonprecision approaches. Published along with VDA is the threshold crossing height (TCH) that was used to compute the angle. The descent angle may be computed from either the final approach fix (FAF), or a stepdown fix, to the runway threshold at the published TCH. A stepdown fix is only used as the start point when an angle computed from the FAF would place the aircraft below the stepdown fix altitude. The descent angle and TCH information are charted on the profile view of the instrument approach chart following the fix the angle was based on. The optimum descent angle is 3.00 degrees; and whenever possible the approach will be designed using this angle.

1. The VDA provides the pilot with information not previously available on nonprecision approaches. It provides a means for the pilot to establish a stabilized descent from the FAF or stepdown fix to the MDA. Stabilized descent is a key factor in the reduction of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incidents. However, pilots should be aware that the published angle is for information only - it is strictly advisory in nature. There is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA. Pilots must still respect the published minimum descent altitude (MDA) unless the visual cues stated 14 CFR Section 91.175 are present and they can visually acquire and avoid obstacles once below the MDA. The presence of a VDA does not guarantee obstacle protection in the visual segment and does not change any of the requirements for flying a nonprecision approach.

2. Additional protection for the visual segment below the MDA is provided if a VDP is published and descent below the MDA is started at or after the VDP. Protection is also provided, if a Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI); e.g., VASI or PAPI, is installed and the aircraft remains on the VGSI glide path angle from the MDA. In either case, a chart note will indicate if the VDP or VGSI are not coincident with the VDA. On RNAV approach charts, a small shaded arrowhead shaped symbol (see the legend of the U.S. Terminal Procedures books, page H1) from the end of the VDA to the runway indicates that the 34:1 visual surface is clear.

3. Pilots may use the published angle and estimated/actual groundspeed to find a target rate of descent from the rate of descent table published in the back of the U.S. Terminal Procedures Publication. This rate of descent can be flown with the Vertical Velocity Indicator (VVI) in order to use the VDA as an aid to flying a stabilized descent. No special equipment is required.

4. Since one of the reasons for publishing a circling only instrument landing procedure is that the descent rate required exceeds the maximum allowed for a straight in approach, circling only procedures may have VDAs which are considerably steeper than the standard 3 degree angle on final. In this case, the VDA provides the crew with information about the descent rate required to land straight in from the FAF or step down fix to the threshold. This is not intended to imply that landing straight ahead is recommended, or even possible, since the descent rate may exceed the capabilities of many aircraft. The pilot must determine how to best maneuver the aircraft within the circling obstacle clearance area in order to land.

5. In rare cases the LNAV minima may have a lower HAT than minima with a glide path due to the location of the obstacles. This should be a clear indication to the pilot that obstacles exist below the MDA which the pilot must see in order to ensure adequate clearance. In those cases, the glide path may be treated as a VDA and used to descend to the LNAV MDA as long as all the rules for a nonprecision approach are applied at the MDA. However, the pilot must keep in mind the information in this paragraph and in paragraph 5-4-5j.

j. Pilot Operational Considerations When Flying Nonprecision Approaches. The missed approach point (MAP) on a nonprecision approach is not designed with any consideration to where the aircraft must begin descent to execute a safe landing. It is developed based on terrain, obstructions, NAVAID location and possibly air traffic considerations. Because the MAP may be located anywhere from well prior to the runway threshold to past the opposite end of the runway, the descent from the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) to the runway threshold cannot be determined based on the MAP location. Descent from MDA at the MAP when the MAP is located close to the threshold would require an excessively steep descent gradient to land in the normal touchdown zone. Any turn from the final approach course to the runway heading may also be a factor in when to begin the descent.

1. Pilots are cautioned that descent to a straight-in landing from the MDA at the MAP may be inadvisable or impossible, on a nonprecision approach, even if current weather conditions meet the published ceiling and visibility. Aircraft speed, height above the runway, descent rate, amount of turn and runway length are some of the factors which must be considered by the pilot to determine if a landing can be accomplished.

2. Visual descent points (VDPs) provide pilots with a reference for the optimal location to begin descent from the MDA, based on the designed vertical descent angle (VDA) for the approach procedure, assuming required visual references are available. Approaches without VDPs have not been assessed for terrain clearance below the MDA, and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normally expected descent angle. Therefore, pilots must be especially vigilant when descending below the MDA at locations without VDPs. This does not necessarily prevent flying the normal angle; it only means that obstacle clearance in the visual segment could be less and greater care should be exercised in looking for obstacles in the visual segment. Use of visual glide slope indicator (VGSI) systems can aid the pilot in determining if the aircraft is in a position to make the descent from the MDA. However, when the visibility is close to minimums, the VGSI may not be visible at the start descent point for a “normal” glidepath, due to its location down the runway.

3. Accordingly, pilots are advised to carefully review approach procedures, prior to initiating the approach, to identify the optimum position(s), and any unacceptable positions, from which a descent to landing can be initiated (in accordance with 14 CFR Section 91.175(c)).

ironbutt57

17th Aug 2013, 07:33

the CVR reveals "low altitude" warning, not specific about what callout was heard

aterpster

17th Aug 2013, 07:53

JC:

That terrain I see on Google Earth rising to 844 feet asl is offset 5 degrees from the final approach course (measured from the center of the theshold).

The VGSI criteria are not part of the FAA's instrument procedures design criteria. They are contained in an FAA Airport Division's 1500 series advisory circular. I recalled from memory a 15 degree splay for the VGSI. That was an incorrect recollection. It is 10 degrees. I don't have the criteria at hand but the 10 degrees is from a 2004 article on the subject I wrote for Business and Commercial Aviation. I had the VGSI criteria in hand at that time.

If, and I emphasize if, the PAPI at hand were designed correctly, the Birmingham airport authority would have had a competent survey team survey all obstacles out to 4 miles to assure the 3.2 degree PAPI surface had not less than 1 degree of obstacle clearance.

Apparently the NTSB is now very interested in verifying such a survey.

In any cases my work involves assessing the IMC phase of instrument procedures, not VGSIs. The FAA has a big computer in OKC where the design work (prior to flight inspection) is done at a desk. As good as the obstacle data are, they are insufficient to design the final approach segment of approaches with vertical guidance "APVs (ILS, LPV, LNAV/VNAV, and RNP AR). On site surveys are usually required for APVs.

I have no doubt all the special RNP AR IAPs that exist in Canada today were most, if not all, subject to a rigorous survey for the final segment.

Sometime in the 1990s I wrote an article for IFR Refresher article, "What's Below DH or MDA." The FAA stance was worse then with respect to NPAs with straight-in MDAs than it is today. You can ferret out that article at www.terps.com (http://www.terps.com) if you care to.

Capn Bloggs

17th Aug 2013, 07:57

Airbubba

17th Aug 2013, 08:13

the CVR reveals "low altitude" warning, not specific about what callout was heard

You may have missed it, the alert was "SINK RATE", "SINK RATE".

See 3:09 here: Member Robert Sumwalt holds third press briefing on UPS flight 1354 crash in Birmingham, Alabama - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Tb57DXKifpU)

T-21

17th Aug 2013, 08:21

The approach was over a heavily wooded area, possibility of bird strikes in the engines causing the engine spluttering heard. Speculation but add it to the chain of probables please.

Bergerie1

17th Aug 2013, 08:24

PJ2

I was so very pleased to see your recent posts. I know nothing about Flightaware data and analysis but I do know quite a lot about FDR analysis in a major airline. We used to study the traces each month to provide useful operational feedback to our pilots, to modify SOPs and improve training programmes as required, etc.

You are so right to draw people's attention to the need to study genuine FDR data rather than the speculative attempts being made by too many amateurs from imprecise information.

The NTSB will, in due time, publish their findings based on the most reliable FACTS - not idle speculation. There are several professionals on this website who, based on their expertise, do their best to provide sound opinions. To a certain extent these are valuable but until facts are available they are only opinions.

In another post someone said too many people want instant results. In my experience, it is only after extensive analysis by the right experts that useful information emerges.

May I urge all those who want to know what really happened to await the published information from the NTSB.

aterpster

17th Aug 2013, 08:28

From FAA Flight Inspection Manual:

SECTION 1. VISUAL GLIDE SLOPE INDICATOR (VGSI)

7.10 INTRODUCTION. The Visual Glide Slope Indicators (VGSI) are ground devices that use lights to define a vertical approach path during the final approach to a runway. The visual signal must consist of not less than two and not more than four colors. Allowable colors are red, amber, green, or white. Color sectors must be distinct and identifiable throughout the horizontal beam width at all intensity settings. Only red is used to indicate the lowest below-path sector of the system.

The final approach area for VGSI(s) is 10° either side of the runway centerline extended, measured from the forward most bar or light extending from the threshold outward to a point a normal glidepath can commence from the en route or procedural altitude. VGSI(s) are aligned to provide a glidepath not less than 1.0° above obstacles 10° either side of the runway centerline to a distance specified for the system, usually 4 miles. Lateral guidance is obtained by reference to either visual cues or electronic aids.

Threshold crossing height (TCH) is the height of the lowest on-path signal at the threshold. The minimum TCH is determined by the most critical aircraft that normally operates on the runway. The TCH of VGSI(s) will normally be 25 to 75 ft. Specific TCH criteria for each type system is located in FAA Order 6850.2, Visual Guidance Lighting Systems.

Box Identification. The U.S. practice, as found in FAA Order 6850.5, Maintenance of Lighted Navigational Aids, is that individual VASI or PAPI light boxes are numbered starting at (1), with the box nearest the runway on each side and working outboard. ICAO Annex 14 and Aerodrome Design Manual reverse this, and number or letter the boxes starting with (1) or (A) at the outermost box and working toward the runway.

There are several different types of VGSI(s). The primary systems covered in this chapter are visual approach slope indicators (VASI), precision approach path indicators (PAPI), pulsating visual approach slope indicators (PVASI), T-VASI, three-color VASI, and helicopter approach path indicator (HAPI). Each of these systems presents a different type of visual indication to the pilot and requires different in-flight interpretation.

Bergerie1

17th Aug 2013, 08:45

aterpster

Further to my comments above, may I thank you for your good background information. This type of factual information educates and informs, and is a very valuable contribution to the debate.

sidishus

17th Aug 2013, 09:08

So, I am a low time/high wing pilot myself...But spend a pretty fair amount of time in heavy iron cockpit jumpseats for Day Job. Actually have a, "I learned about CFIT from that" story when I was once in the jumpseat of a tired DC-9 with an even more tired crew dealing with a last minute change to BHM RWY 1 (that was how long ago this was...its since been redesignated to 36/18) night arrival, due to a pranged check runner Aerostar on the long runway that I can share....

Also flew light GA aircraft into BHM back then too and routinely landed on the north south runway. The terrain was actually alot more scary back then on that north end.

Anyway...Just for historical perspective, in the late '80s the high terrain on the north end of the north south runway, and the east end of what was then 7/25 was considered unsafe and an impediment to growth at the airport. Indeed 1/19 didnt even have an instrument approach from the north as I remember. So the city bought the property where the crash site is and also on the east side of the field and scraped off a massive amount of both hills. Took a number of years to complete the project. This allowed extensions to be added to both runways and an approach from the north to be implemented (and I also think enough obstacle clearance for a CATII to the east as well if memory serves correctly).

The area where the crash site is was actually some of the earliest settled part of the city and was dotted with houses. There was one house that was dismantled which turned out to be an extension of one of the earliest built dwellings in the community, and which had been added onto and absorbed in a larger structure. So, the speculation that the houses were built on the north side after the airport was is incorrect.

As for my CFIT experience, it was the ridgeline of Red Mountain on the south side of town that nearly got us in that DC-9 into some twisted knickers (this was not too long after the AAL crash in Cali BTW).

And I'll tell yah...Don't ever think it can't happen to you.

Ian W

17th Aug 2013, 10:03

Retired F4
Quote:
I'm not critizing the crews at all, I'm critizing the "system" for not giving the crews the correct tools to do the job safely. I think we are on the same page, I'm just not expressing myself clearly.

Retired F4
"Now wait a second, are you now saying, that NPA approaches are unsafe?"

I don't think that is what was meant.

NPA approaches are 'safe' but an RNAV RNP AR approach to RNP 0.1 is safer that is why when flying them you have lower limits.

This is going to be a repeated argument. There were comments that the crash at SFO would not have happened if there had been a serviceable ILS or the crew had carried out an RNAV RNP APV and that perhaps visual approaches were less safe. These comments were immediately followed by the: "whaddya mean unsafe?!! - we do visual approaches from slam dunks all the time to that runway" comments.

So the question is a simple one. Why, with aircraft that are capable of flying RNP LPV approaches to RNP 0.1, are pilots and operators still using NPA that are less safe? Not only less safe by calculation but also, unfortunately, demonstrably less safe by accidents.

The argument that "I can do it so those {think of an epithet} other pilots should be able to as well or they should not be flying" does not impress the relatives of the dead SLF or people on the ground. Especially, when safer approach procedures are available.

NPAs, fully visual approaches, asymmetric and flapless landings etc etc., should all be practiced but perhaps they should be seen as what they are - less safe alternates to the approaches that the aircraft systems are capable of and only used in exception.

This highlights a change in operations from ground aid supported to GNSS and internal aid supported. It is no longer necessary to have an expensive FAA (or *AA) certified landing system for each runway, just approved RNAV RNP AR procedures. So small regional airports could have the same Cat III capability as hubs. This raises all the questions on deskilling pilots and therefore is seen as a threat and a safety risk in its own right.

Non-Precision Approaches are accepted as safe enough for normal operations, Nevertheless, it is unarguable that Non Precision Approaches are less safe than Precision Approaches with vertical guidance. The aircraft are capable of RNAV RNP LPV all that is needed is approved procedures.

This is not a technical question any more. Stand in front of an audience of family members of dead flight crew and SLF, and tell them why a less safe procedure was 'good enough'.

This is not an easy debate, but it should not be avoided.

Capn Bloggs

17th Aug 2013, 10:36

Ian W,

Some good points there but:

- Does the A300-600 have the gear to be RNP-AR (or indeed LPV or LNAV/VNAV) capable;

- Why doesn't KBHM 18 have a glideslope? I suspect cost or terrain (which was collided-with) prohibits (could also preclude an RNP-AR approach).

- RNP LNAV works well when the aircraft can use the FMS database-coded approach slope/VNAV (even if just following it with VS/FPA or handflying), but aircraft must be capable.

Ian W

17th Aug 2013, 10:58

Capn Bloggs,
Some good points there but:

- Does the A300-600 have the gear to be RNP-AR (or indeed LPV or LNAV/VNAV) capable;

- Why doesn't KBHM 18 have a glideslope? I suspect cost or terrain (which was collided-with) prohibits (could also preclude an RNP-AR approach).

- RNP LNAV works well when the aircraft can use the FMS database-coded approach slope/VNAV (even if just following it with VS/FPA or handflying), but aircraft must be capable.

I was responding to the issues raised by Retired F4's more generic question on safety of NPAs.

An RNAV LPV does not need to follow the 'rules' of an ILS as it is not constrained by needing to be 'in the beam'. The aircraft can be 'established' on the procedure while in a turn and with varying descent rates. Look at the approach into DCA along the Potomac. This makes RNP LPV approaches and departures more suited to complex terrain: there are some in China that zigzag along mountainous valleys.

I do not know whether the particular UPS A306 fit was capable of RNP LPV. However, if crews have a choice on which approach aids and procedures to use I would hope that they use the aid/procedure that provides the highest safety level; unless there is a justified requirement for doing otherwise.

RNP arrival and departure procedures could have been rolled out US wide but the rate has been very slow. Moreover, in many cases to make procedure generation and use simple the RNP arrival procedures are merely overlays of the existing ILS procedures. This means the ROI on equipping aircraft and training crews is insufficient for companies to do so. Therefore, despite the RNP LPV capability being nearly a decade old we are still seeing NPAs in use.

This is another discussion that perhaps could move to Tech Log

Bill Emanon

17th Aug 2013, 12:07

Hey guys,

Take a look at FlightAware's arrival history for BHM on Aug. 14 just before and just after the UPS crash at 4:49 a.m.

All reports so far have said RW06-24 (the long runway with an ILS to 06) was closed, BUT Mountain Air landed on RW06 at 3:32am and FedEx landed on RW06 at 5:08 a.m. FlightAware's track log confirms this.

So,
a) was Runway 06/24 really closed at the time of the UPS crash?
b) if so what were the closure times?
c) if not, why did the UPS crew elect to use RW 18 if RW 06 was available?

None of these questions however, no matter what the answer, change the apparent cause of the accident as crew error (barring some sort of ground or flight equipment malfunction, which is unlikely here).

1) failure of situational awareness,

2) failure to fly the standard instrument approach to RW 18 until glide path on final could be assured by visual PAPI light indications,

3) failure to monitor sink rate and observe altitude limitations on approach, and

4) apparent failure to either acquire PAPI visually (which would have shown all red lights) or initiate immediate go-around if that indication was acquired.

ironbutt57

17th Aug 2013, 12:08

Update on AvHerald including last 16 seconds of CVR transcript.....no surprises there...

Crash: UPS A306 at Birmingham on Aug 14th 2013, contacted trees and touched down outside airport (http://avherald.com/h?article=466d969f&opt=0)

20milesout

17th Aug 2013, 12:55

Gentlemen,
may I ask you to hold your breath for a second and re-read skysign´s testimony again. He seems to be the only one on this forum who has actually been there and done an NPA into Birmingham´s RWY 18. What I like most: he doesn´t judge, he just supplies useful information:
here
(http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/521370-ups-cargo-crash-near-birmingham-al-12.html#post7996542) here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/521370-ups-cargo-crash-near-birmingham-al-13.html#post7996601)

ironbutt57

17th Aug 2013, 12:59

i have done as well in the past, just found it unremarkable....

A37575

17th Aug 2013, 13:04

There are several different types of VGSI(s). The primary systems covered in this chapter are visual approach slope indicators (VASI), precision approach path indicators (PAPI), pulsating visual approach slope indicators (PVASI), T-VASI, three-color VASI, and helicopter approach path indicator (HAPI). Each of these systems presents a different type of visual indication to the pilot and requires different in-flight interpretation

Keep in mind that they can all emit erroneous light signals due to light beam refraction in weather conditions of low mist especially when the dew bulb and dry bulb temperatures are close together.

legomaniac

17th Aug 2013, 13:22

I wonder why they chose to fly the localizer and not the RNAV GPS approach which the A300 is capable of and the crews are trained for. I'm also curious if the standard of setting the missed approach altitude in the window instead of setting the MDA is a player.

I'm not judging the crew because I truly believe in "there but for the grace of God" and these things can happen to any of us.

RIP Shanda and Cerea (my friend)

aterpster

17th Aug 2013, 13:30

IAN W:

In order to have what the FAA these days calls an Approach with Vertical Guidance (APV), which could be either an ILS, LNAV/VNAV, LPV, GLS, or RNP AR, requires that an area between DA and the runway threshold be fairly flat. This is the Glideslope Qualification Surface (GQS). Because of the terrain in this area for KBHM Runway 18, an APV is not possible. If it was, the RNAV approach to Runway 18 at KBHM would have both an LPV and LNAV/VNAV line of minima.

As to RNP AR and its values as low as RNP AR 0.10, the accuracy and integrity of such an approach is not as good as an unrestricted ILS within the last approximate one and one-half miles of the runway. The advantage of RNP AR approaches are the use of RF legs to avoid terrain. If there is no significant terrain above several hundred feet, RNP AR offers no advantage whatsoever and requires an inordinate amount of aircraft avionics, particularly to values of less then RNP 0.30 or RNP AR missed approaches with RNP of less than 1.0

KBHM has two RNP AR approaches, one to Runway 6, and one to Runway 24.

These RNP AR IAPs have DAs and visibilities considerably higher than the Runway 6 CAT I and II IAPs, and the Runway 24 LPV IAP.

Outside of the airline world RNP AR is essentially a myth. OTOH, where runways qualify LPV is ubiquitous, but even LPV (thus far) cannot compare to a CAT II and especially a CAT III ILS.

Finally, thus far there are no RNP AR approaches that use LPV for the final segment. RNP AR was a concept to use air carrier avionics in use at the time; i.e., IRUs and Baro VNAV.

Sikpilot

17th Aug 2013, 13:53

Was the gear down?

Airbubba

17th Aug 2013, 14:38

I wonder why they chose to fly the localizer and not the RNAV GPS approach which the A300 is capable of and the crews are trained for. I'm also curious if the standard of setting the missed approach altitude in the window instead of setting the MDA is a player.

I was also puzzled why they would do the LOC instead of the RNAV (GPS).

It's been a long time since I've flown the A306, are you implying that perhaps the missed approach altitude instead of MDA was set prior to the FAF so there was no path guidance and a late descent was initiated when the error was realized?

DaveReidUK

17th Aug 2013, 14:55

Was the gear down?http://bloximages.chicago2.vip.townnews.com/trib.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/e/cd/ecd401d8-e8e1-5a1b-8c4b-4dedb33ffafe/520d7e232457b.preview-620.jpg

Desert185

17th Aug 2013, 15:05

I wonder if runway 18 was in existence when Ms Benson bought her house.

I bet it was.

Bingo. :ugh:

legomaniac

17th Aug 2013, 15:05

It's been a long time since I've flown the A306, are you implying that perhaps the missed approach altitude instead of MDA was set prior to the FAF so there was no path guidance and a late descent was initiated when the error was realized?

No. On the A306 once you start down on a profile approach, inside the FAF, you set the missed approach altitude, not MDA. (I don't remember if it's the same on a V/S approach but guessing it is) But that makes it possible to go below MDA without having the field in sight, the airplane won't automatically level off.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 15:21

I wonder why they chose to fly the localizer and not the RNAV GPS approach which the A300 is capable of and the crews are trained for.

It doesn't seem that it would have made any difference either way. Except for the source of the lateral guidance, the two procedures are essentially identical inside of Baskn. The FMS I use would have given a VNAV descent cue down to MDA but not below.

legomaniac

17th Aug 2013, 15:27

It doesn't seem that it would have made any difference either way.

yes, true because I was incorrectly assuming they used v/s on the localizer approach. They could have used profile either way.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 15:30

So, the speculation that the houses were built on the north side after the airport was is incorrect.

If you would go back and read the post, you will find that the speculation wasn't a general speculation. It was specifically about whether the runway was there when the woman complaining about the hazards of the airport (a Ms Benson) purchased her current house (which she wishes would be purchased from her by the airport) I'd say that the chances that it *wasn't* are very slim.

20milesout

17th Aug 2013, 15:44

"It doesn't seem that it would have made any difference either way"
(A Squared)

Correct.

NigelOnDraft

17th Aug 2013, 15:45

No. On the A306 once you start down on a profile approach, inside the FAF, you set the missed approach altitude, not MDA. (I don't remember if it's the same on a V/S approach but guessing it is) But that makes it possible to go below MDA without having the field in sight, the airplane won't automatically level off. But why would you want to "level off" at MDA??

I thought it was established "big planes" do not do "dive and drive", they fly a constant flight path approach and at (M)DA they either continue to descend (visually) or GA. In the event you put MDA in, and mistakenly, even though visual, allowed the AP to level you off you have now destabilised the approach significantly enough to require a GA anyway.

There are auto call outs, SOPs and 2 pilots to prevent inadvertent descent below (M)DA without the required visual refs.

PS the above is not intended to relate to the UPS accident - just the post above.

NoD

Desert185

17th Aug 2013, 15:50

JimField:

@ A Squared:

Quote:
immature and dishonest
Just a suggestion: Any chance we can discuss the substantive issues I raised, including systemic problems in the airline industry, such as poor crew training, overworked crews, etc., which are posing important public safety hazards, rather than engaging in personal attacks based on your feelings?

I retired from UPS as a crewmember after almost 20 years. I have been involved with flight crew/pilot training for almost my entire aviation career. I found their crew training to be within the top two of the five airlines and three corporate jobs with whom I was employed. Did something fall between the cracks? Possible, but we don't know yet.

As far as fatigue, I may have a better tolerance for it than most, but learning to mitigate it is, and should be, part of the job. Flying, for me, never was a job (which is probably why I still have a post-retirement hobby job), so perhaps that helped in the fatigue department. I still fly the occasional ten hour all-nighter. :ok:

There are cry babies in the industry who cry fatigue even after a three-day layover. Boo hoo. Sorry. Get a King Air job flying the owner to his ranch on the weekend.

legomaniac

17th Aug 2013, 15:51

But why would you want to "level off" at MDA??

When you don't have the field in sight...

There are auto call outs, SOPs and 2 pilots to prevent inadvertent descent below (M)DA without the required visual refs.

In a perfect world, yes.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 15:57

But why would you want to "level off" at MDA??

Well if they'd leveled off at MDA,they'd still be alive, wouldn't they?

I'm not trying to be flippant here, and I understand that on a continuous descent approach you wouldn't have leveling off at MDA as a part of your planned profile. But apparently, at some point they descended thru MDA.

I understand that there are a whole lot of unanswered questions at this point. But consider the possibility that a greater awareness of MDA and a greater awareness of exactly what conditions should exist before descending below MDA might have prevented this accident.

FIRESYSOK

17th Aug 2013, 16:00

Setting the MDA in the altitude window has been implicated in a couple of incidents. While is seems sensible to the dive-and-drive camp, a pilot would not desire the aircraft to level during a constant-angle approach. It would only serve to unstabilise the descent. The AP would have to be taken out and descent re-initated to the runway which could lead to a long landing.

The CANPA method requires the missed approach altitude to be set before starting the final descent to "unlock" the altitude hold. If that altitude happens to be the same as platform, our procedures require setting 100' above platform until the descent has begun, then reset to the missed approach alt. shortly thereafter. It requires deliberate action and thinking by a crew to get it right. It's an NPA, after all.

pipeliner

17th Aug 2013, 16:11

Sir,

Why would an approach (like LOC 18) have the minimums be NA for night only? Does that imply some terrain issues between MDA/DDA and the TDZ?

BTW, I can't believe you are still actively involved in this work! Thanks for your contributions both to the industry and to educating all of us over the internet for 'lo these many years'!

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 16:16

While is seems sensible to the dive-and-drive camp, a pilot would not desire the aircraft to level during a constant-angle approach. It would only serve to unstabilise the descent. The AP would have to be taken out and descent re-initated to the runway which could lead to a long landing.

OK, I'll preface this by saying that our company SOP is to set Missed Approach altitude in the alerter window, and that is what I do.

That said, why not set MDA in the alerter on a CANPA? You add 50' to the MDA for a pseudo DA, right? (surely you don't use MDA as a DA with the inevitable descent below?)

So, if you arrive at MDA, then one of two things have happened. You've reached MDA + 50, didn't see the runway and have already initiated the missed approach. Or You've reached MDA + 50, have the runway environment in sight, and are continuing the approach with the auto pilot disengaged. (At my airline, we don't continue below MDA on the autopilot, is this done at other airlines? )

So ..... hypothetically, if a Crew was so focused on following their VNAV cue that they missed the fact that they were descending through MDA wouldn't the autopilit pitching up to capture tthe MDA be a nice handy reminder to not descend below MDA?

legomaniac

17th Aug 2013, 16:33

Setting the MDA in the altitude window has been implicated in a couple of incidents. While is seems sensible to the dive-and-drive camp, a pilot would not desire the aircraft to level during a constant-angle approach. It would only serve to unstabilise the descent. The AP would have to be taken out and descent re-initated to the runway which could lead to a long landing.

On the MD-11 we do set MDA in the altitude window. Once you have the field you call "set missed approach altitude, VS one click down" and continue on down. On the A306 they set missed approach altitude. I think I would rather be high and have to go around then descend below MDA into terrain. Of note at UPS is that the A306 was not initially approved to fly Profile (VNAV) approaches so there is still a dive and drive mentality that might pervade. It's all good discussion and also why non precision approaches are so much harder than shooting the ILS.

FIRESYSOK

17th Aug 2013, 16:36

So, if you arrive at MDA, then one of two things have happened. You've reached MDA + 50 and have already initiated the missed approach. Or You've reached MDA + 50, have the runway environment in sight, and are continuing the approach with the auto pilot disengaged. (At my airline, we don't continue below MDA on the autopilot, is this done at other airlines? )

You've forgotten one scenario. In my company (also allowed by FAA), we are permitted to descend below MDA with *only* approach lights as reference, but *only* if the plane is in a position to continue a stabliised descent to the runway. (with AP disengaged)

In the above scenario, you legally cannot descend below 100' above TDZE unless the runway environs are in sight. If the AP has already started to round out the descent at MDA, the airplane will no longer be "stable", and you've given up the approach.

All that said, if you're continuing down a NPA based on approach lights alone, you are already rolling the dice IMO. Because it's allowed by regulation, my company has decided to give the option to pilots. Whether or not it is good practice in reality is another discussion.

Approach lights that extend out far enough to be seen at non-precision MDAs would most likely be installed on a precision runway. Those lighting installations provide good roll reference; vertical reference not so much.

I can see the above scenario working well to a precision runway with G/S out. An approach to 18 at BHM or most other NP runways, it would not come into play more than likely.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 16:52

A question for anyone with a better understanding of the actual equipment installed in this airplane.

In the avionics suite installed in my airplane, we have the ability to set the MDA/DA separately from the altitude in the altitude alerter window. This does two things: It superimposes a MDA line on the altitude tape, and it triggers two aural alert, "approaching minimums" and "minimums".

I don't see any mention of similar alerts in the NTSB briefing one the CVR, but of course it's not a complete transcript.

Would the system installed in the accident airplane have a similar capability, and would you expect similar aural alerts approaching and reaching MDA?

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 17:02

You've forgotten one scenario. In my company (also allowed by FAA), we are permitted to descend below MDA with *only* approach lights as reference, but *only* if the plane is in a position to continue a stabliised descent to the runway. (with AP disengaged)

In the above scenario, you legally cannot descend below 100' above TDZE unless the runway environs are in sight. If the AP has already started to round out the descent at MDA, the airplane will no longer be "stable", and you've given up the approach.

Thanks for the response.

One minor correction: You're allowed to descend to 100 ft lower than MDA, not down to TDZE + 100. I realize that on a standard Cat I ILS these are the same, but this is in the context of a NPA.

I guess I'm not following your how descending on the lights is different. Presumably on a CANPA, you would have the lights in sight (but not the runway) at MDA + 50 or you would have initiated the Missed Approach. If you're descending below MDA, the presumably you had lights in sight 50 feet prior and have already made the decision to continue below MDA and disengaged the A/P. I'm not seeing where having MDA set in the altitude alerter would affect either of those scenarios.

And yes, I agree that descending below MDA on the lights alone is rolling the dice.

NigelOnDraft

17th Aug 2013, 17:15

Quote:
But why would you want to "level off" at MDA??

When you don't have the field in sight...In all my airliner flying, if you don't have the field in sight at MDA you Go Around, not level off. I accept other operators / nations may differ...

NoD

Dream Land

17th Aug 2013, 17:16

That said, why not set MDA in the alerter on a CANPA? You add 50' to the MDA for a pseudo DA, right? (surely you don't use MDA as a DA with the inevitable descent below?) First of all, there is no need to add 50 ft to MDA, at least our Feds did away with that years ago, and I much prefer the Airbus method of setting MDA in the box, and setting missed approach altitude in the alt alert window, much more sensible, we call 100 above and minimums where the response is missed approach or landing, no need to fiddle around withe the altitude alert after passing the IAF, :ugh:

FIRESYSOK

17th Aug 2013, 17:19

Check FAR 91.175:

[(c) Operation below DH or MDA. Except as provided in paragraph (l) of this section, where a DH or MDA is applicable, no pilot may operate an aircraft, except a military aircraft of the United States, at any airport below the authorized MDA or continue an approach below the authorized DH unless-- ]
(1) The aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers, and for operations conducted under part 121 or part 135 unless that descent rate will allow touchdown to occur within the touchdown zone of the runway of intended landing;
(2) The flight visibility is not less than the visibility prescribed in the standard instrument approach being used; and
(3) Except for a Category II or Category III approach where any necessary visual reference requirements are specified by the Administrator, at least one of the following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
(i) The approach light system, except that the pilot may not descend below 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation using the approach lights as a reference unless the red terminating bars or the red side row bars are also distinctly visible and identifiable.
(ii) The threshold.
(iii) The threshold markings.
(iv) The threshold lights.
(v) The runway end identifier lights.
(vi) The visual approach slope indicator.
(vii) The touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings.
(viii) The touchdown zone lights.
(ix) The runway or runway markings.
(x) The runway lights.
[(d) Landing. No pilot operating an aircraft, except a military aircraft of the United States, may land that aircraft when--
(1) For operations conducted under paragraph (l) of this section, the requirements of (l)(4) of this section are not met; or
(2) For all other part 91 operations and parts 121, 125, 129, and 135 operations, the flight visibility is less than the visibility prescribed in the standard instrument approach procedure being used.

What you're missing is that the *effective* MDA is actually the DDA (Derived Decision Altitude) which is MDA + 50'.

Let's say the MDA is 500' baro. Add 50' for a new DDA of 550' baro.

Unless you can set 550' in your altitude alerter, you would have to round up to 600', giving up another 50'.

If your AP starts the altitude capture at say....around 650' baro, you've now given up *another* 50' and committed yourself to a missed approach.

In our airline, the pilot monitoring would call "minimum, approach lights/runway in sight" at 550' on the altitude tape, PF would disconnect, (the airplane still trimmed and descending), and you would continue manually to the runway.

I'm not understanding why an an autopilot-controlled level-off would be beneficial to any crew using CANPA procedures other than to make arses and elbows out of an already complex procedure.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 17:20

In all my airliner flying, if you don't have the field in sight at MDA you Go Around, not level off. I accept other operators / nations may differ...

I interpreted that not to mean "level off" exactly, but more : Not continue descending . .. . which you would be doing if you were initiating the missed approach.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 17:27

Firesysok, I stand corrected on the descent with the lights. Thanks. gues I didn't remember that as well as I thought I did.

I see your point about the MDA if the SOP is to set the "adjusted" MDA (MDA + 50, rounded up to the next 100') My commens were based on the assumption that you're set the actual published MDA in the alerter, and would have either decided to continue or decided to miss prior to having reached the MDA.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 17:33

First of all, there is no need to add 50 ft to MDA, at least our Feds did away with that years ago,

So you treat the MDA as a DA which it was not intended to be treated as? Nor is it legal do descend below, for that matter, unlike an actual DA, which is designed with the assumption that it is the altitude where the *decision* to continue or miss will be made, and the inevitable descent below is assumed?

FIRESYSOK

17th Aug 2013, 17:42

The 50' addition to MDA is for CANPA-type procedures only.

In a dive-and-drive procedure it is not needed because the aircraft is already level.

In a constant-descent procedure it is needed because of the inertia of an airplane already in descent. It ensures the crew can "round out" the descent when executing a missed approach and not descend below the published MDA.

aterpster

17th Aug 2013, 18:30

pipeliner:

Sir,

Why would an approach (like LOC 18) have the minimums be NA for night only? Does that imply some terrain issues between MDA/DDA and the TDZ?

The Jeppesen minimum box is wrong. The note at the top is correct. You can check the FAA chart, which is correct.

http://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/1308/00050L18.PDF

BTW, I can't believe you are still actively involved in this work! Thanks for your contributions both to the industry and to educating all of us over the internet for 'lo these many years'!

Never could learn to play golf. :)

legomaniac

17th Aug 2013, 18:36

I interpreted that not to mean "level off" exactly, but more : Not continue descending . .. . which you would be doing if you were initiating the missed approach.

Yes, exactly.

Machinbird

17th Aug 2013, 19:52

RetiredF4

17th Aug 2013, 20:05

JAN-W
iNPA approaches are 'safe' but an RNAV RNP AR approach to RNP 0.1 is safer that is why when flying them you have lower limits.

I think we have a different understanding here. An approach is either safe or it is unsafe. And as you state yourself, the NP approaches have higher minimums to make them safe as the P approaches are with lower minimums.

If you are talking about preferences, that's a different story, but it has nothing to do with safety.

If you are talking about various degrees of proficiency to fly NP approaches for individual crews, that might be the elephant in the room.

You are right, this discussion comes up with accidents like this one and Asiana in SFO, but i dont see the conection between the type of approach flown and the fact, that the aircraft ended with a CFIT short of the runway after droping well below glidepath and like in SFO being well below Vref.

In any approach there are min altitudes, min airspeeds and established procedures involved, some of those have been written in blood over the years. "Stabilized approach criteria and CRM " come into mind.

You deviate from those, and you have a good chance to hit the news some day regardless wether you fly an ILS or a NDB / V approach.

PopeSweetJesus

17th Aug 2013, 20:44

Something from the CVR is puzzling me.
At end of recording -16 seconds, we have the sink rate warnings.
At EOR -13 seconds, one of the crew remarks "Runway in sight".

Why was that call made? Based on the weather, the runway should have been visible well before this. Was this call for FOQUA reasons? Is it indicative of an "OPS Normal" mindset?

Just seems out of place in the context of 4 seconds before impact with the trees.

We don't know the whole picture on this yet, but that call isn't necessarily suspicious to me. Personally I don't think they were referring to the weather. I think it may have been the Capt (PF) who made the comment in response to the Sink Rate warning to let the FO know that he was planning on adjusting his flight path and continuing the approach. I don't know what UPS' manuals say but my airline's manuals do not require an automatic go-around in response to a sink rate call. You just have to adjust the path to silence the warning, but if you get the pull up at Night or IMC it's an automatic GA. Perhaps the FO said something to him in the 3 secs between the sink rate callout and the runway in sight call. Or it may have even been a concerned look to prompt the response. Who knows at this point, we'll find out in time.

filejw

17th Aug 2013, 21:14

Little info from a controller. Capt flying, a/c crossed FAF at or just below altitude specified on chart, at 1 mile a/c was at 150 ground speed and UPS normally use r/w 18 if available .

legomaniac

17th Aug 2013, 21:26

In all my airliner flying, if you don't have the field in sight at MDA you Go Around, not level off. I accept other operators / nations may differ...

If you are doing a non precision approach without VNAV minimums and a DA, aren't you supposed to level off at MDA? Then go missed at the MAP.

JPJP

17th Aug 2013, 21:28

So you treat the MDA as a DA which it was not intended to be treated as? Nor is it legal do descend below, for that matter, unlike an actual DA, which is designed with the assumption that it is the altitude where the *decision* to continue or miss will be made, and the inevitable descent below is assumed?

You can set a DA (using the NPA MDA) for a non precision approach. Yes, you will descend slightly below DA in the event of a missed approach. The approval is contained in many airlines Ops Specs these days. There are limitations on the procedure that provide obstacle clearence etc.

mm43

17th Aug 2013, 21:41

At EOR -13 seconds, one of the crew remarks "Runway in sight".Which "could" lead one to believe that until then they were not visual.

Mind you they may well have been visual earlier and have run into some predawn ground fog and an associated inversion which projected the PAPI at a reduced angle. Review of the KBHM Met data shows that conditions were right, e.g. 92% relative humidity and little wind. Conditions above the rising ground to the North of 18 may well have been more conducive to such a mirage.

OK465

17th Aug 2013, 21:46

...and UPS normally use r/w 18 if available.

:confused: You're kidding.

Good post RF4, and Mach's observation is not unreasonable at this point...

The chart thing is macabrely interesting...possibly flying an approach at night using a chart with ambiguities as to whether the approach is NA or not....an approach that apparently was not NA with the VGSI available...and then not making it to a point that it made a difference anyway.

Also of macabre interest is that the approach was flown at 0451 LCL, evidently 9 minutes before (0500) 06 would have been available with its magic ILS.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 21:52

Which "could" lead one to believe that until then they were not visual.

Or not. I know that I have been occasionally guilty of making the "runway in sight" call well after it was in fact sighted.

West Coast

17th Aug 2013, 21:56

Agreed, runway in sight is a required callout on an IAP even on a CAVU day in my SOP.That said, in response to a E-GPWS call, it seems a bit odd, correcting would seem more appropriate call out, go around call even better.

FIRESYSOK

17th Aug 2013, 22:02

If you are doing a non precision approach without VNAV minimums and a DA, aren't you supposed to level off at MDA? Then go missed at the MAP.

Even if LNAV-only minima are published, most airlines would still calculate and use a constant-descent profile. Dive and drive is old news.

If you arrive at the DDA and don't see anything, the missed approach is treated like an ILS missed. If for some reason you cocked up the descent rate and arrive at the DDA significantly prior to the MAP, you climb but don't turn yet.

A Squared

17th Aug 2013, 22:09

pipeliner:

Quote:
Sir,

Why would an approach (like LOC 18) have the minimums be NA for night only? Does that imply some terrain issues between MDA/DDA and the TDZ?
The Jeppesen minimum box is wrong. The note at the top is correct. You can check the FAA chart, which is correct.

Aterpster or pipeliner. What does this exchange refer to?

FIRESYSOK

17th Aug 2013, 22:10

The NTSB has also indicated that:

"The autopilot was engaged until last second of recorded data"

Assuming, and again, assuming that the recorded data ended at or very close to impact, this info is *very* interesting.

tubby linton

17th Aug 2013, 22:10

The NTSB have just concluded their latest press conference regarding this flight. They announced that the autopilot and autothrust were engaged until impact and that both engines were operating mormally. Target speed was 140kt so the aircraft must have been properly configured.
It is interesting that all of the automatics were being used below MDA. Do UPS advocate the use of CWS? The A300 can use CWS or CMD. With CWS the pilot makes the inputs.

Airbubba

17th Aug 2013, 22:21

Little info from a controller. Capt flying, a/c crossed FAF at or just below altitude specified on chart, at 1 mile a/c was at 150 ground speed and UPS normally use r/w 18 if available .

I'll raise the partial B.S. flag on this one. I talked with a friend who drives the 'bus for UPS. He's been to BHM many times and says he has never landed on 18. The captain was indeed flying from what the NTSB press conference said earlier.

Today's NTSB press conference said that the FDR data shows the autopilot was on until one second before the end of FDR data and the autothrottles were on until the end of the FDR data. The CVR recording runs for several seconds after the FDR data ended.

Airspeed on approach was about 140 knots, approximately what was expected for this approach configuration.

Flight control inputs seem to correlate with flight control surface position indications and engines seem to have responded normally to autothrottle commands.

An FAA flight test of the runway 18 PAPI showed that it was indicating within one hundredth of a degree of the correct path.

Robert Sumwalt misspoke while answering a question and at one point referenced the ILS to runway 18 but he knows the difference, he flew for Piedmont and US Air for 24 years.

PJ2

17th Aug 2013, 22:31

Maintaining autopilot & autothrust engagement at this point in the approach isn't that unusual - the disconnect and manual landing usually occurs somewhere between 600 and 400ft AAE, (ed., for non-pilots, to be clear, this would NOT have been an autoland). Autoflight use can be a significant aid on a challenging approach and/or when one is fatigued. Whether this is the case here is for the Human Factors people to determine.

What needs to be understood is the state of the FCU (Flight Control Unit) controls, particularly what descent mode was used - FPA, V/S or VNAV, and that hopefully will be in the data. The fact that the EGPWS sounded a Sink Rate warning may very well indicate the use of selected vs. programmed descent modes, in particular whether the mode was "FPA" or "V/S"...

FIRESYSOK

17th Aug 2013, 22:35

Are you saying it would be normal to allow the automatics to fly the airplane into the ground?

I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand.

PopeSweetJesus

17th Aug 2013, 23:06

The A300 doesn't have an FPA mode for an AP approach like the 320 series and beyond. It does have a Final Approach sub mode of it's standard Profile mode to do VNAV approaches. If properly setup, P.SPD and P.DES would be the FMA's, I believe and there is a vertical deviation scale in the box and on the ND. The AP also disconnects automatically at DDA -50 in Profile.

PJ2

17th Aug 2013, 23:17

PSJ, thank you very much for the clarification on FPA.

Firesysok, please re-read what I wrote.

tubby linton

17th Aug 2013, 23:17

The minimum altitude to use vertical speed is 160ft on the approach according to the FCOM 2.01.30p1. The question is why on a clear night would you continue to use the kit below MDA? I find that the transition from auto to manual flight on the A300 takes a little while to get the feel of the aircraft and I personally would have disengaged the automatics at MDA. The A300 automatics are not as harmonized as well as some of the later Airbus products.
As previous posters have written you cannot select the FPA mode through the autopilot but there is nothing to stop you displaying it on your PFD. The A300 allows each pilotto decide whether they want to look at FD ,the Bird or Raw data through a selector switch. The later Airbus architecture specifies that both pilots have the same presentation by using one button.

JamesGBC

17th Aug 2013, 23:25

Looking at history in Google earth you can see and confirm the work done 1997 removing buildings and later substantial earthworks being carried out on the approach to runway 18. Dates on GE can be out a few years.
Runway 18 stays the same extension was on runway 23 which was reclassified to runway 24, heading on 18 did not change? It does look to be leaning towards 190 heading on Google earth.

tubby linton

17th Aug 2013, 23:34

OK465 the answer is yes to both.

PopeSweetJesus

18th Aug 2013, 00:05

V/S or Profile can be used with a LOC appr and LOC* then LOC would be the FMA in either case. The A300 has a very old FMS and unless upgraded by UPS, it has likely been suffering from memory issues with all of the stuff that didn't exist when it was created back in the early 80's. EPGS, complex OPD's, RNAV approaches, huge influx of new enroute waypoints, etc.

Long story short, something has to give and operators sometimes selectively remove approaches and waypoints from the database to fit the space. UPS has a big theatre of ops, so it's easy to see this being an issue. It's possible that there were no database approaches available to the crew, which would X out the use of profile and put them in dive and drive mode with vertical speed. Also the NTSB reported 140kt approach speed is pretty high for an A300, probably pretty close to the landing weight limit for a flaps 30/40 landing

aterpster

18th Aug 2013, 01:09

Pope:

V/S or Profile can be used with a LOC appr and LOC* then LOC would be the FMA in either case. The A300 has a very old FMS and unless upgraded by UPS, it has likely been suffering from memory issues with all of the stuff that didn't exist when it was created back in the early 80's. EPGS, complex OPD's, RNAV approaches, huge influx of new enroute waypoints, etc.

Long story short, something has to give and operators sometimes selectively remove approaches and waypoints from the database to fit the space. UPS has a big theatre of ops, so it's easy to see this being an issue. It's possible that there were no database approaches available to the crew, which would X out the use of profile and put them in dive and drive mode with vertical speed. Also the NTSB reported 140kt approach speed is pretty high for an A300, probably pretty close to the landing weight limit for a flaps 30/40 landing

Excellent post!

I doubt we will hear on the CVR from the PNF, "PAPI in sight."

filejw

18th Aug 2013, 01:20

Airbubba..Just repeating what a Birmingham controller wrote on a union blog....

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 02:09

In the U.S. an unrestricted VGSI must clear all obstacles 1 degree below the commissioned angle, out to 4 n.m, and with a 15 degree splay.

Just out of curiosity, I projected this out to the see how much clearance would be afforded by this. I used the spot which JC identified on Google earth which everyone mocked him for. Turns out that a obstacle clearance plane of 2.2degrees would give a clearance of about 65 feet to an airplane exactly on a 3.2 degree PAPI, 3700 ft from the threshold. That's remarkably close to the clearance from the terrain which JC figured using Google earth. Granted, the first point of impact was quite a bit further out and lower than this, so this is only peripherally related to the accident. However it is interesting to note how little clearance you might have over a half mile from the threshold and perfectly centered on the PAPI.

Airbubba

18th Aug 2013, 02:10

Airbubba..Just repeating what a Birmingham controller wrote on a union blog....

Thanks for sharing it, most of what I know about the mishap outside of the NTSB briefings is similarly anecdotal.

Possibly not having any Rwy 18 NavDB stuff would definitely explain why they opted for the LOC (manually tuned I assume) and not the RNAV.

Perhaps not a player with UPS but some of the A306's I flew years ago had FMS's with very limited memory and internationally some procedures would not be in the database or, even worse, waypoints and constraints would be missing. I flew with Sperry, Smiths and some other kind of FMS, I can't remember. I think UPS only uses the A306's domestically these days so maybe this isn't a problem anymore.

Capn Bloggs

18th Aug 2013, 02:44

Turns out that a obstacle clearance plane of 2.2degrees would give a clearance of about 65 feet to an airplane exactly on a 3.2 degree PAPI, 3700 ft from the threshold. That's remarkably close to the clearance from the terrain which JC figured using Google earth. Granted, the first point of impact was quite a bit further out and lower than this, so this is only peripherally related to the accident. However it is interesting to note how little clearance you might have over a half mile from the threshold and perfectly centered on the PAPI.
This is ridiculous. How could such an approach be allowed, especially at night, with such little terrain clearance? The threshold crossing height is 50ft; 6000ft/1nm further back, you only have another 50ft higher (100ft in total) to give 2W/2R on the PAPI, with wheels hanging probably 30ft below that?

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 02:46

This is ridiculous. How could such an approach be allowed, especially at night, with such little terrain clearance? The threshold crossing height is 50ft; 6000ft/1nm further back, you only have another 50ft higher (100ft in total) to give 2W/2R on the PAPI, with wheels hanging probably 30ft below that?

Surprising isn't it? There's always the possibility that I misunderstood aterpster, but that's how it pencils out.

Sorry Dog

18th Aug 2013, 03:31

It will be interesting to see when more of the CVR is released. Considering the AP wasn't disengaged (or dis-engaged itself) until 1 second before it, one could wonder if they recognized the terrain issue in time to realize how low they really were. In context of the "black hole" visual anomaly, wouldn't it be rather ironic if lack of lighting and other visual features from the houses removed (for safety reasons) actually ended up contributing to the accident.

I really wonder if this still would have happened if there was some kind of marker lighting on hill where the cockpit currently resides or on the plateau towards the threshold.

I know I would rather have that to help judge the distance.

mixduptransistor

18th Aug 2013, 03:37

wouldn't it be rather ironic if lack of lighting and other visual features from the houses removed (for safety reasons) actually ended up contributing to the accident.

To be clear, the homes were purchased/removed for noise abatement, not safety.

skysign

18th Aug 2013, 04:02

Surprising ....but real....

As I posted before the last 1/2 to 1 mile you litteraly buze the hill all the ways down to the RWY. It is like doing a low flyby over a downhill slope to the rwy.

It has been several years since I have done that approach, so I can not really say how high above the terrain you are. But the first night I did that approach the only think that came to my mind was " Only sh.. that is close !!! and that is being on the Papi.
In my opinion, on a "normal approach" the ground appear that close when you are really close to crossing the threshold and not being 1/2 to 1 mile away from the rwy.

WillowRun 6-3

18th Aug 2013, 04:56

....implies the solution.

"This is ridiculous. How could such an approach be allowed, especially at night, with such little terrain clearance? The threshold crossing height is 50ft; 6000ft/1nm further back, you only have another 50ft higher (100ft in total) to give 2W/2R on the PAPI, with wheels hanging probably 30ft below that?"

So I'm assuming that FAA is the authority that decides what specific approach parameters will be published as officially sanctioned (or otherwise designated as safe and effective). And that in the ordinary course of the business of regulation of civil aviation in the US, FAA will await the outcome of the NTSB investigation and report process, prior to changing the approach parameters. Or is this not correct: might FAA change the published approach parameters on an interim basis? Has this happened after other mishaps on final? (And I'm sorry if there is a term more technically appropriate than 'parameters' for the (evidently) altitude and/or glideslope limits.)

Also, is there some periodic review process by which FAA checks on whether approach corridor limits have been shown, through the experience of the aviators who flew them, to need adjustments? It is easy to have the sense that FAA has its hands full just keeping the creaky ship afloat, and things like checking for any needed updates to APP corridors is a luxury the taxpayers have neither demanded nor realized they need to pay for. How does it work?

ironbutt57

18th Aug 2013, 07:50

obstacle clearance from FAF to VDP/MAP is SUPPOSED to be 250'

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/811.pdf

roulette

18th Aug 2013, 08:07

WillowRun 6-3, A-Squared, Capn Bloggs & All those who believe GoogleEarth Elevation/Hgt data:

GoogleEarth provides good approximations of real-earth elevations and is good for relative differences, but it cannot be considered accurate at any single location within confidence levels that you'd want to consider whether you have appropriate clearance or not for approach/dep procedure design. Sometimes it's spot on to the nearest metre, other times not. Depending on where the location is and also often where the location is in relation to nearby terrain and buildings, the elevations can easily be out by up to say ±8 mtrs / ±26.5ft. This is due to the various sources of the data and how the data is modelled. The positional referencing of the image data to WGS84 lat/longs however is far more accurate.
In a sense it's a bit like the FlightAware data, in that it's sampled from actual observations using available data sources. The data is not certified to a particular integrity level though and thus needs to be used and interpreted with care and qualifications, depending on the purpose.

If Capt Bloggs and ASquared calcs are actually more or less correct, then that will come out in the investigation as result of FLT inspection of the PAPIs and resurvey of the terrain and remaining obstacles near the crash site, as well as review of the procedure flown (as selected in the FMS and as flown). In any case, if as it seems to be that the aircraft was simply way too low at that point, the issues you raise may, or may not, in fact be relevant or significant.

ironbutt57:
Yes, you're right: obstacle clearance for an NPA (with a FAF) in the primary area of a final approach segment is 250' (246' actually, or 75m). Take the highest obstacle between the FAF and the MAPt, add the obstacle clearance margin (and any comfort buffer that the designers feel appropriate for whatever reason, including taking into account potential inaccuracy tolerances in the obstacle and terrain data they're using) and round up to the nearest 10' = MDA.
Use of stepdown fixes allow interim descent points in the final segment, obviously.

However, when flying on the VDA (or even dive & drive), once you get to the MDA, that's it: can't continue descent unless RWY in sight and intending to land, and from then on you're in the visual segment and obstacle clearance is up to the pilot.

See also the next bit.

For info: re Obstacle Clearance in the Visual Segment (of Charted APCHs):

Some time back ICAO mandated that all States should assess new and old procedures (when reviewed/amended) for obstacles in the visual segment - ie, between the MDA/DA and the THR (actually, 60m prior usually).
Basically this is done by assessing a pseudo surface at 1.12° less than the promulgated APCH angle. Safety assessments, mitigations (which could include removal or cutting down of obstacle) &/or amendments to the procedure would be required if an obstacle penetrated the visual segment surface. Safety assessment might also indicate additional mitigations, such as additional marking/lighting of obstacles / terrain in the visual segment - eg, like the hill area 1/2-1 mile prior to the runway - ref skysign's post #380).

As I posted before the last 1/2 to 1 mile you litteraly buze the hill all the
ways down to the RWY. It is like doing a low flyby over a downhill slope to the
rwy.

It has been several years since I have done that approach, so I can
not really say how high above the terrain you are. But the first night I did
that approach the only think that came to my mind was " Only sh.. that is close
!!! and that is being on the Papi.
In my opinion, on a "normal approach"
the ground appear that close when you are really close to crossing the threshold
and not being 1/2 to 1 mile away from the rwy.

Aterpster can elaborate on current FAA implementations of this ruling if required (in addition to the analysis that they do of 34:1 surfaces).
In any cases, statements regarding obstacles in the visual segment and implications for pilots are contained in the FAA AIM (relevant extracts are in this thread).
Note also previous posts on the 1° clearance for the PAPIs when installed and calibrated as additional mitigation.

Missed Approach:
To those who have discussed the relevant techniques when reaching the MDA whether flying dive & drive (heavies seriously still doing that?) or CDFA (or even DDA = MDA+50 for CANPA technique):
Unless the operator has a specific approval to do otherwise, the MDA is a legal minimum and busting it is a serious no-no.

With regard to this thread though, they'd gone well past the MDA and info provided by NTSB indicates that they were proceeding to land, so further discussion of handling the missed in this case is irrelevant.

ATerpster:

Thx for trying to correct the various misunderstandings of the different types of APCHs with regard to LNAV, LNAV/VNAV, RNAV GNSS APV, LPV, RNAV RNP AR, etc. Saved me some time. Well done on providing all of the other relevant AFM and FAA material for reference too.
Ian W: If, after reading Aterpster's reply and other material from qualified sites, then you could continue the discussion on the TechLog, but not in this thread as those issues are irrelevant here.

Speed of Sound

18th Aug 2013, 08:18

and UPS normally use r/w 18 if available .

Given that the UPS cargo area is at the south west end of 6/24 I can't see any reason at all why anyone would choose to land a widebody on a shorter, narrower runway with less navaids and a two and a half mile taxi to get where you need to be. :confused:

Which brings up another point about the flight planning on UPS1354. Whether or not 6/24 was ever an option. Although 6/24 was NOTAM'd closed until further notice it is being claimed that aircraft were being landed on it less than 15 minutes after the crash.

So when was 6/24 reopened and when was the decision to reopen made?

Were the crew of 1354 made aware of 6/24's availability albeit after a short delay and a few extra track miles? I appreciate that if your preferred runway is NOTAM'd 'CLSD UNTIL UFN' you plan for another approach but if it is onto an unfamiliar runway that puts you down in the wrong part of the airport surely at some point in the sector the question would have been asked "Does anybody know when 6/24 is due to reopen?"

ironbutt57

18th Aug 2013, 08:19

guess what we all don't know yet is whether the airplane had levelled off, then drifted below the appropriate altitude for that segment of the approach, (unlikely since the autopilot was engaged) or the aircraft was on a high rate of descent and continued below acceptable altitudes in an attempt to regain profile..(likely given the "sink rate" callout") wait and see what the DFDR reveals

de facto

18th Aug 2013, 09:56

All that said, if you're continuing down a NPA based on approach lights alone, you are already rolling the dice IMO. Because it's allowed by regulation, my company has decided to give the option to pilots. Whether or not it is good practice in reality is another discussion.

Ahhh now i know why at some airports,there is a note that says,for those pilots: Do NOT mistake the highway lights for the approach lights.:E

Cows getting bigger

18th Aug 2013, 10:10

Maybe 06/24 was reopened because there was a pile of smouldering wreckage and a few fire engines in the undershoot of 18. :zzz:

Ian W

18th Aug 2013, 11:05

Capn Bloggs
Quote:
Originally Posted by A Squared
Turns out that a obstacle clearance plane of 2.2degrees would give a clearance of about 65 feet to an airplane exactly on a 3.2 degree PAPI, 3700 ft from the threshold. That's remarkably close to the clearance from the terrain which JC figured using Google earth. Granted, the first point of impact was quite a bit further out and lower than this, so this is only peripherally related to the accident. However it is interesting to note how little clearance you might have over a half mile from the threshold and perfectly centered on the PAPI.

This is ridiculous. How could such an approach be allowed, especially at night, with such little terrain clearance? The threshold crossing height is 50ft; 6000ft/1nm further back, you only have another 50ft higher (100ft in total) to give 2W/2R on the PAPI, with wheels hanging probably 30ft below that?

And as Airbubba raised a lot earlier in the thread, the small vertical error margin does make altimeter setting something to return to - the difference between 29.92 and BHM QNH 29.97 just happens to be 50ft low - "with wheels hanging 30ft below that".

Capn Bloggs

18th Aug 2013, 11:30

if you're continuing down a NPA based on approach lights alone, you are already rolling the dice IMO.
Here, there are very few NPAs that have a true Visual Segment, where the visibility minimum is less than the distance to the runway. On any NPA, I would hazard a guess that if following a 3°-ish profile, you will always be able to see the threshold at the MDA if the vis is on the minimums or greater.

the small vertical error margin does make altimeter setting something to return to
True, however at this point the crew would be operating visually on the PAPI and well below the MDA, and the altimeter value would be not a consideration.

legomaniac

18th Aug 2013, 11:35

I wonder if the crew was fighting sleep. Micronaps are not uncommon flying overnight.

captjns

18th Aug 2013, 11:59

The FAA as well as EASA need to establish and approve GPS/LPV approaches at all airports in lieu on the traditional N/P/As.

It will help to keep pilots out of the dirt a mile short of the runway, with the advances in the glass cockpit for both GA and Transport Category Aircraft. TAWS technology could be improved too.

ironbutt57

18th Aug 2013, 13:34

All this talk about approach types etc is very interesting, however these folks appear to have been below airport elevation when striking trees and power lines....was somebody not monitoring inside??

aterpster

18th Aug 2013, 14:15

ironbutt57:

obstacle clearance from FAF to VDP/MAP is SUPPOSED to be 250'

Only at MDA, not below.

The VGSI provides 1 sloping 1 degree obstacle clearance surface, which begins about 1,000 feet south (in this case) of the runway threshold.

aterpster

18th Aug 2013, 14:19

captjns:

The FAA as well as EASA need to establish and approve GPS/LPV approaches at all airports in lieu on the traditional N/P/As.

It will help to keep pilots out of the dirt a mile short of the runway, with the advances in the glass cockpit for both GA and Transport Category Aircraft. TAWS technology could be improved too.

This runway does not qualify for LPV, LNAV/VNAV, or ILS because the necessary qualifying visual segment areas are not sufficiently free of obstacles. This is true of many runway ends. There also has to be the correct type of survey, which many smaller airports are unwilling to pay for. (that is not the limitation at KBHM).

aterpster

18th Aug 2013, 14:23

To be clear, the homes were purchased/removed for noise abatement, not safety.

True most of the time. But, the FAA does have weak advisory standards for safety areas like these

Smilin_Ed

18th Aug 2013, 14:32

Does this aircraft not have a radar altimeter? Every aircraft I ever flew in actual IFR conditions had a radar altimeter (some better than others). To my knowledge, no one has even mentioned it on this thread. I would think that once an approach is commenced the radar altimeter would be an integral part of the normal instrument scan.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 14:50

obstacle clearance from FAF to VDP/MAP is SUPPOSED to be 250'

Right that is true, but that applies to the obstacle cleareace afforded by the MDA *if* you are *at* the MDA.

That's a completely separate issue than the clearance afforded by the PAPI once you have descended below MDA on the PAPI.

pipeliner

18th Aug 2013, 14:51

A Squared,

The exchange between Aterpster and I was about the fact that the current Jepp plate lists the minimums to LOC Rwy 18 as NA at night. I was asking what could drive this requirement and he advised that the Jepp plate was inaccurate, the ball note making the approach NA if the VGSI are inop is accurate.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 14:59

And as Airbubba raised a lot earlier in the thread, the small vertical error margin does make altimeter setting something to return to - the difference between 29.92 and BHM QNH 29.97 just happens to be 50ft low - "with wheels hanging 30ft below that".

Well no, it really does not. You're confusing two different concepts. The obstacle clearance given by the PAPI has nothing to do with the obstacle clearance provided by being at MDA. And altimeter errors would have no effect on the clearance either way of the PAPI clearance.

The place where the airplane first started contacting trees was much lower than 50 feet below MDA and much lower than 50 feet below the PAPI so the approximately 50 ft altimeter error from not setting QNH on descent couldn't explain the accident.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 15:00

Thanks for clarifying that Pipeliner,

BOAC

18th Aug 2013, 15:09

All this talk about approach types etc is very interesting, however these folks appear to have been below airport elevation when striking trees and power lines... - has this been confirmed? I do not see that 'altimeters' would possibly be 'in scan' at the time of the crash ('visual') but if this is true it is difficult to argue against screwing up the visual slope on the VGSIs. I assume they were 'ON'? I cannot also see how this fits with descriptions earlier from someone of 'skiing down the slope to the runway?

bookworm

18th Aug 2013, 15:18

To be clear, the homes were purchased/removed for noise abatement, not safety.

"FAA fails to pick up on vital clue that the aircraft were getting close to houses on the 18 approach"

Dear Mr Administrator

I'm writing to you to complain about the noise emanating from those homes underneath the approach to 18 at BHM. It's like they have parties all night every night. When my buddy and I fly the LOC 18, we try real hard to keep to sterile cockpit procedures but it's impossible with all that din. Can't you tell 'em to keep it down?

Regards

UPS Crew

---

Dear UPS crew

You're right, it is pretty loud, isn't it!? But it's OK, we're gonna get the airport to buy the houses and leave them empty. That should keep the noise down.

Regards

The Administrator

:)

Seriously, lots to learn all round from this one, I imagine.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 15:25

Roulette,

As someone with a degree in surveying an mapping and who worked in that industry for years before I started flying for a living, I probably have a better understanding than most of the limitations of Google earth. I agree with your comments, especially that the accuracy varies widely in different locations. Certainly there are areas where even the 8 meters +/- accuracy in elevation would be optimistic. And again you're correct that there is no guaranteed level of accuracy anywhere, as here would be in a professionally prepared topographic product.

But given that the elevations at the airport match the published ones very well, it's probable the the errors are in the range of tens of feet, and not hundreds of feet. Which is useful for estimating things like: Did the crash happen above or below the airport elevation, or MDA.

In any case, if as it seems to be that the aircraft was simply way too low at that point, the issues you raise may, or may not, in fact be relevant or significant.

Completely agree with that. I pointed out the PAPI obstacle clearance issue, merely as a point of interest. I never meant to suggest that it was a a factor in this accident, clearly they were far below the PAPI when they started hitting trees.

And it is worth noting that the image of the USGS topographic map posted by aterpster, which *is* a professional topographic product with a specified level of accuracy, shows elevations of around 840 MSL at the high point, and about 750 where the trees were first contacted.

ironbutt57

18th Aug 2013, 15:41

boac....having previously operated there and reviewing the topography, the accident initial impact seems to be on an upslope, then sliding over the top to the top of the rise where the airport lies, also RE the monitoring, not sure of UPS' task sharing procedures, but generally speaking the pilot monitoring has the task of monitoring inside to assure the pilot flying has not fallen prey to some optical illusion and developed a wrong mental picture, resulting in significant deviation from the desired flight path...which is very possible during a night approach with scattered cloud layers...

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 15:42

Quote:
Originally Posted by ironbutt57
All this talk about approach types etc is very interesting, however these folks appear to have been below airport elevation when striking trees and power lines...

- has this been confirmed?

BOAC, no, it absolutely has not been confirmed. Both Google Earthj *and* the USGS topographic map (See previous discussion) indicate elevations in the neighborhood of 750 ft MSL in the area where the flight first started hitting trees. From there the ground slopes up toward the airport.

There is nothing to suggest that they were below the airport elevation.

WillowRun 6-3

18th Aug 2013, 15:46

Having finished the morning portion of APCH acronym & abbreviation soup (mostly), I would like to proffer a question. The finely-honed details being discussed here (if my zero-hours legal mind is working at all) coalesce around the critical inquiry "How could this have happened?" The incredulousness seems rooted in the sense that this flight crew - while not open to criticisms such as those being leveled at the Asiana crew (and they too, and the people who were killed in that accident, should rest in peace) - flew way too low. Somewhere in the approach sector they deviated from a minimally safe altitude and the Swiss cheese holes lined up such that they didn't realize it and had no substantial reason to wonder. Quite different than the non-FTFA op on the Asiana flight deck, right?

The clue-seeking and thinking out loud here, the data scrutiny, the contextualizaion of approach sector design - to an administrative law and regulatory mindset, all speak to some subtle flaw in the approach corridor design. Subtle, and no less fatal.

So, here's my question. The UPS freightdogs perished in a moment both tragic and revelatory. Tragic because they were working stiffs who were just doing their gigs, to provide for their families, or to chase wine and women, or whatever their lives were about. In our system we honor the workaday ones, we don't fly couches or practice the law of cutting the lawn, we work. And revelatory because the approach corridor design process is revealed here to need mending. (In my discipline of the law this sometimes is known as "mend your hold".)

What does your fraternity of PIC and civil aeronautics do to honor their memory? Will a scholarship fund be established for their children or nieces or nephews or the kids at the local church temple mosque or yoga studio if they have none of their own? or at the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts or 4-H or Explorers or the entity which the US ought to form combining all four of these groups? I began my career as a labor attorney and I don't even know if they were organized into a labor union! What can be done that will honor their memory, and at the same time help the taxpayers of this country realize that aviation safety doesn't just happen. It does not just happen by itself.

I'd gladly volunteer my legal services, saving to suitors the proverbial dollar (Sound as a Dollar), to set up a trust or scholarship. Or to press for legislative reform of how FAA updates approach corridors. I'm WillowRun Six-Three, good day.

BOAC

18th Aug 2013, 15:46

in the area where the flight first started hitting trees. From there the ground slopes up toward the airport.

There is nothing to suggest that they were below the airport elevation. - not making sense??

misd-agin

18th Aug 2013, 15:53

The trees are higher than the airport elevation on a ridge with an upslope. The ridge was higher than the airport elevation.

After clearing the crest of the ridge it slopes downward towards the airport.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 15:54

BOAC, sorry, that was worded poorly. Yes, where the accident occurred, the ground is sloping up in the direction of the airport. Somewhere in the vicinity of where the wreckage came to rest, the hill crests, then the terrain slopes *down* toward the airport.

TDZE for RWY 18 is 644 feet, significantly lower than the area of the accident.

Does that clarify what I meant?

BOAC

18th Aug 2013, 15:58

Yes thanks - do we have an initial impact elevation?

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 16:08

do we have an initial impact elevation?

The terrain in the vicinity of where the airplane started hitting trees is between 750 and 800 ft MSL. Trying to define it any closer than that without actually being there and measuring thing would be futile.

tubby linton

18th Aug 2013, 16:12

The following is from an FAA chart and lists the obstacles for a departure from RW36, i.e in the RW18 undershoot.

Rwy 36: Fence, tree, and vehicles on road beginning 130’ from DER, left and right of centerline up to 28’ AGL/662’ MSL. Tree and pole beginning 467’ from DER, 470’ right o fcenterline, up to 63’ AGL/726’ MSL. Trees beginning 637’ from DER, 420’ left of centerline, up to 13’ AGL/696’ MSL. Pole and tree beginning 1353’ from DER, 669 left of centerline, up to 37’ AGL/739’ MSL. Trees, poles, and fence beginning 1279 from DER, 492’ right of centerline, up to 19’ AGL/713’ MSL. Terrain beginning 43 feet from DER, left and right of centerline, up to 794’ MSL

DER=Departure end of runway.
On an FAA website I found an old version of the GPS approach and the descent angle was originally 3.04 degrees. Chart is dated July 2008.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 16:28

Tubby, that distance in the last item appears to be in error. It doesn't follow the trend in the list of getting further from DER, and 150 ft obstacles 43 feet from the runway??? :eek:

Airbubba

18th Aug 2013, 16:32

What does your fraternity of PIC and civil aeronautics do to honor their memory? Will a scholarship fund be established for their children or nieces or nephews or the kids at the local church temple mosque or yoga studio if they have none of their own? or at the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts or 4-H or Explorers or the entity which the US ought to form combining all four of these groups? I began my career as a labor attorney and I don't even know if they were organized into a labor union! What can be done that will honor their memory, and at the same time help the taxpayers of this country realize that aviation safety doesn't just happen. It does not just happen by itself.

I'd gladly volunteer my legal services, saving to suitors the proverbial dollar (Sound as a Dollar), to set up a trust or scholarship. Or to press for legislative reform of how FAA updates approach corridors. I'm WillowRun Six-Three, good day.

Some memorial information on one of the pilots is here:

UPS plane crash: Pilot Shanda Carney Fanning's funeral, life celebration planned | al.com (http://blog.al.com/breaking/2013/08/ups_plane_crash_pilot_1.html)

Both pilots were members of this labor union: Independent Pilots Association (http://www.ipapilot.org/)

tubby linton

18th Aug 2013, 16:35

I have re-read that a few times and that is what is says . The reference is here:
https://charts.aero/airport/KBHM and the specific chart is Birmingham 5 cont.1

PJ2

18th Aug 2013, 16:36

BOAC, re "Yes thanks - do we have an initial impact elevation? "

Even given the inaccuracies described regarding Google Earth's topographical data, using the "ruler" tool in G.E. to draw a line from the 1000ft point on 18 along the approach path over the two houses (photographs showing broken trees), and using the Altitude control, "Clamped to ground" feature available when saving the line to "My Places", one can obtain a slightly better appreciation for the character of the terrain.

And using the Altitude feature, "Relative-to-ground" and placing the same line at the runway elevation, one can see that the line "disappears" anytime it is going through terrain higher than the altitude selected by moving the slider on the "ground - space" control.

Viewing from the side, (perpendicular to the approach course, looking north for example), the same line "Clamped to the ground" shows a rough approximation of the undulation of the terrain.

The limitations are obvious (for example, the actual descent path obviously cannot be described at this time) but with the cautions expressed, it does give one something by which one may roughly examine the terrain.

PJ

WillowRun 6-3

18th Aug 2013, 16:49

Sorry this was left obscured. Volunteer my legal services, no charge, free, except for a nominal One Dollar U.S. (unfolded). But not pro bono, which is a slightly different concept of service. I am interested in what sometimes is called public advocacy, not the same thing as pro bono publico, and quite a lot not the same as politics or running for public office. No relation whatsoever to the fee-chasing lawyers who try to sign up injured parties or their surviving kinfolks after an accident - thank you, not why I went to law school.
Thanks for the info on the memorial and the union.
See ya.

BOAC

18th Aug 2013, 17:11

Thanks, PJ - I do not have time (I am familiar with the process from wireless broadband mast siting) but if, as you say, the line 'disappears', it presumably means the airfield would have disappeared largely or completely from sight (allowing of course for cockpit height.) Viewing 4 reds through trees is not a preferred option.

WillowRun 6-3

18th Aug 2013, 17:20

Speed of Sound

18th Aug 2013, 17:21

Although unfortunately the contours aren't labelled but you can see that the initial impact point was to the west of the highest point on the ridge although that's where the cockpit section of the aircraft came to rest as the rest of it continued down the hill.

http://i1280.photobucket.com/albums/a481/SoS57/topo_zps5af1082f.jpg (http://s1280.photobucket.com/user/SoS57/media/topo_zps5af1082f.jpg.html)

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 17:44

PJ, sir, is it reasonable and accurate - based on the data actually in hand and the review, analysis or other cogitation by learned professionals especially and particularly PJ2 - to say that there appears to be a significant mismatch between the terrain measurements or depictions (or some similar element) upon which the approach corridor was designed - and the actual terrain? It appears that a major factor here will be a deficit in reliable and accurate topographic data? (subject to the above-noted qualification of data preliminary in nature and probable cause analysis yet to be stated).

No. There is nothing in this discussion which should be construed to mean that the approach or PAPI was designed using erroneous terrain data, nor is there any suggestion that the LOC 18 approach and PAPI installation do not meet the applicable standards and specifications.

aterpster

18th Aug 2013, 17:57

Speed of Sound:

The dark contour line is 700 feet, msl. Trouble is, it is meaningless because so much surface material has been moved around since that chart was issued.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 18:00

Latest topographical map of area.
Although unfortunately the contours aren't labelled but you can see that the initial impact point was to the west of the highest point on the ridge although that's where the cockpit section of the aircraft came to rest as the rest of it continued down the hill.

No, that isn't the latest topo map of the area, it's the same vintage as the one previously posted by aterpster:

Aterpster's post with topo map. (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/521370-ups-cargo-crash-near-birmingham-al-12.html#post7996424)

And your view does not include the initial impact area, that was well to the north of your picture. The houses and streets in the north portion of your view have been removed. aterpster's map has a much close indication of the initial impact point. The aforementioned Ms Benson has stated that the airplane hit trees in her yard, and dropped airplane parts on her property which is located at the intersection of Tarrant-Huffman road and Treadwell road. That would be the intersection of the red and white striped roads, just west of the "impact" symbol on aterpster's map.

Sorry Dog

18th Aug 2013, 18:01

Quote: do we have an initial impact elevation?

The terrain in the vicinity of where the airplane started hitting trees is between 750 and 800 ft MSL. Trying to define it any closer than that without actually being there and measuring thing would be futile.

Comparing it to the topography map the first trees hit are on an elevation of 790 to 810 and the first trees are the smaller 40-50 foot tall variety. Google Earth appears to estimate 20 feet higher compared the topo. The second larger tree in front of the house is probably 30-40 feet lower in elevation, but nearly that much taller too. By that time the elevation had deteriorated another 20-30 feet based on it being topped off there. The hill elevation is 790 to 810.

This is based on the topo, and me actually taking a look at the site... so they were not below rwy elevation, but MDA is another matter....

PEI_3721

18th Aug 2013, 18:03

Re Terrain profile / EGPWS alerts;
I recall a briefing by Honeywell at an operator’s conference (8 yrs ago ?) which indicated continuing improvements in the terrain clearance warnings to help avoid undershoots.
The terrain clearance floor (TCF) ‘cut off’ distance originally ended at 1nm from the runway threshold, but was to be reduced to 0.5nm assuming accurate runway detection and availability of survey data, which should be the case in the US.
A further reduction to 0.25 nm might be available with GPS based aircraft position. The effect of these changes would provide a warning boundary of 150 ft above threshold datum at 1.25nm to 0 ft at 0.25nm.

Does anyone have further details of this, and if the modifications were adopted which software mod package (SW 218-218)?
w.r.t. this accident what was the EGPWS mod state, and what navigation source was used for EGPWS position?

barit1

18th Aug 2013, 18:18

Smilin_Ed:Does this aircraft not have a radar altimeter?

The undulating terrain at KBMH would make any use of RA problematic. Recall that the Polish presidential Tu-154 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/415657-polish-presidential-flight-crash-thread-2.html#post5704701) that crashed in Russia 10 Apr. 2010 was using RA, which misled the crew as they approached over a ravine.

In that case, the ravine was below the airfield elevation; at KBMH the ravine (or other low terrain) was below the intevening hill.

Sorry Dog

18th Aug 2013, 18:20

The dark contour line is 700 feet, msl. Trouble is, it is meaningless because so much surface material has been moved around since that chart was issued.

Most of the grading was done south of the final impact. Also, the house existed before then as well as the hill across the street where the trees were initially hit. Assuming the old topo is reasonably accurate, then that gives us a an approximate benchmark. Even if you say a +- of 40 feet then you can still start to draw some conclusions...

PJ2

18th Aug 2013, 18:31

WillowRun 6-3, I concur with A Squared's response. AFAIK, one would never use Google Earth's terrain data for such work or verification of such work.

I've plotted the approximate approach path described above but won't post it as it cannot be verified without proper topographic mapping data. The only intention was to view an approximation of the approach terrain, (hilly, vice flat, etc), possible visibility of the runway when lower than the IMTOY minimum altitude, etc. We may expect that the NTSB will do the precise work and the actual approach profile will be known then.

PJ2

WillowRun 6-3

18th Aug 2013, 18:45

PJ, I regret having interrupted the thread with an incorrect thought process. I shall continue with an effort (very inexperienced though it may be) to acquire a better understanding of the subject matters discussed herein, I mean, on this thread.

aterpster

18th Aug 2013, 19:01

A Squared:

That would be the USGS Birmingham North and Irondale 1:24,000 topos.

I have no idea of the date of mine because they are WSG84 seamless bitmaps from Delorme. For my purposes they are usually fine because I am interested primarily in terrain.

Speed of Sound

18th Aug 2013, 19:26

No, that isn't the latest topo map of the area, it's the same vintage as the one previously posted by aterpster:

My mistake.

I downloaded it from the US Geological Survey website and assumed it was a contemporary map. It is actually from 1978.

But as Sorry Dog (who is local to the area) says, the grading was done between the foot of the hill and the end of RWY18. In that case we can assume that the ridge shown is 794’ MSL as the FAA notice will have used information from an actual survey of the terrain and the hill top remains unaltered from 1978.

When I said initial impact I meant with the ground rather than the trees as I was referring to the area contained within the portion of the map I posted.

tubby linton

18th Aug 2013, 19:31

How often do the trees on the approach path get measured and have their tops cut?
There is a point just to the southeast of Imtoy that shows on the original GPS chart of 915ft with a + and - next to it. On the later chart this has been changed to 921 ft again with the + and -. Interstingly the same point is depicted on the current GPS 36 chart as 915 ft +-. This to me shows some sloppiness in the editing of the charts.

Speed of Sound

18th Aug 2013, 19:40

I would say not at all.

The trees in the area look fairly mature which means they will remain at that height until they fall or are felled.

Coagie

18th Aug 2013, 19:58

Some memorial information on one of the pilots is here:

UPS plane crash: Pilot Shanda Carney Fanning's funeral, life celebration planned | al.com (http://blog.al.com/breaking/2013/08/ups_plane_crash_pilot_1.html) Thanks for posting that, Airbubba. From reading this funeral notice for Shanda, it seems like she had the passion for flying, that folks might want in a pilot. I get the feeling that she was a competent pilot. I haven't seen much about the other pilot, other than he was rotor-wing in the Marine Corps, as stated in the article. It seems like there must have been some bad data, an oversight, or a random error, maybe coupled with some fog (that time of morning, with all the rain this summer, you see it clinging to the hills), leading to this crash, as this thread seems to be narrowing down, rather than incompetence, like in the Asiana crash. It's just the feeling I get. Of course, having a passion for and being good at something, don't necessarily follow one another. For instance, I have a passion for Golf ...

tubby linton

18th Aug 2013, 20:02

The current LOC18 chart also shows this point as 915+-.. It is only six feet but it is only that last six feet which will kill you.Again to me it shows poor editing.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 20:06

At this point it seems we can be fairly certain that the airplane started striking trees about a mile from the threshold, at an altitude somewhere around 300 feet or more below MDA, 150 feet or more below the PAPI, and at least 100 feet above airport TDZE.

So the question becomes "how did they arrive at that point, that far below the MDA and that far below the commissioned slope of the PAPI?"

Not to disparage anyone's efforts, but trying to refine those numbers any more precisely doesn't seem to change the overall scenario.

Coagie

18th Aug 2013, 20:16

The trees in the area look fairly mature which means they will remain at that height until they fall or are felled. I have a place, maybe 40 miles southeast of Birmingham, and the mature pine trees are over 100 ft (30 meters or so). I wonder if the trees involved in the crash are only 40 or 50 feet? I guess, if the soil isn't that deep, as on some hills, or if they aren't pine trees, the trees may stay as low as 40 or 50 feet at maturity, but it'd be worth double checking. I mention pine, as they are common around the south and grow very quickly, but there are others just as tall.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 20:21

The current LOC18 chart also shows this point as 915+-.. It is only six feet but it is only that last six feet which will kill you.Again to me it shows poor editing.

Keep it in perspective. It's 279 feet (or 285 feet) below the MDA. If you find yourself in a position where that 6 feet makes a real difference to how your day turns out, you had much larger problems which resulted in you being there at that altitude.

Speed of Sound

18th Aug 2013, 20:35

I wonder if the trees involved in the crash are only 40 or 50 feet?

Sorry Dog was actually at the site of the tree strike at Mrs Benson's house.

I think he said the trees were 60-70 feet tall. There is a photo somewhere.

tubby linton

18th Aug 2013, 20:43

My point was about the general editing standards of the FAA charts. Comparing them to the Jepp charts on the LOC 18 chart a point is shown at 910 ft SouthWest of the approach course ,but on the GPS chart a point is shown at 921 ft but further to the Southeast than the point shown on the FAA chart.
I have always been told that Jepp basically replicates the chart published by the state aviation authority but with their own formatting so why is my 915/921 feet point not shown correctly.
The Jepp chart for 36 does not show the point at all.

aterpster

18th Aug 2013, 21:04

Here are the official FAA runway and PAPI data for Runway 18-36. Have at it math gurus:

KBHM (http://avnwww.jccbi.gov/pls/datasheet_prd/pkg_airport.PRO_SINGLE_RUNWAY?v_air_cntl_num=388&v_rwy_cntl_num=118815)

Coagie

18th Aug 2013, 21:10

Sorry Dog was actually at the site of the tree strike at Mrs Benson's house.

I think he said the trees were 60-70 feet tall. There is a photo somewhere.Sorry Dog is, I think, who I got the 40 or 50 foot height from. I figured, since he's near the site, he could take out an old camera range finder or something and double check the height, since trees in central Alabama are often over 100 feet tall.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 21:19

but I think he has a valid point directed at the quality control of reasonably important documents.

Alright, I'll bite:

How would you describe "acceptable quality control" for sets of measured data?

I would suggest that it would be something like "correct to within the accuracy tolerances demanded by the purpose"

Seem reasonable?

OK, now, if you were preparing to fly a localizer approach to 18 and you noted the highest obstacle between the FAF and the runway showed a charted elevation of 921' How would you fly that approach differently than if that same obstacle had shown an elevation of 915' ?

If your answer is "exactly the same" then perhaps the quality control is within the standard I suggested?

tubby linton

18th Aug 2013, 21:53

Surely a pilot should have information as to all of the charted obstacles relating to their approach? At this airfield we have two chart sources that cannot agree as to which obstacles they are going to depict or the accuracy of the data.
Having cleared the undershoot area why has the airport not provided approach lighting? Perhaps they never intended it to be used regularly at night or in poor weather.
Standard minima as used in Europe does not allow the LOC approach to be used at night.
Another airfield I can think of that has steep terrain in the undershoot is Lanzarote on RW21. Even this airfield has HIALS and a papi set at 3.7 degrees for that runway.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 22:06

The runway has a PAPI. Assuming it was functioning as commissioned, (Unknown at this point) the accident would not have happened if they were on the PAPI.

I'll ask you: how would you fly the approach differently if you knew the obstacle was 921 ft vice 915?

Again, I would suggest if you wouldn't fly ten any differently, they you're getting wrapped around the axle over something of no consequence.

Did you happen to notice that the elevations in question are annotated with a plus-minus symbol. What is the significance of that?* and how does that affect how you would fly this procedure.

Jet Jockey A4

18th Aug 2013, 22:07

The autopilot was on until seconds before the impact and so were the auto throttle. The wording in the two different sentences is a bit confusing but the quote from the NTSB says it was on at impact.

For those type rated on the A300, is there an AFM restriction on how low you can fly with the A/P engaged on a non precision approach?

Copy and paste from the article...

BIRMINGHAM, Alabama (Reuters) - The UPS cargo jet that crashed in Alabama this week, killing its two crew members, was flying on autopilot until seconds before impact, even after an alert that it was descending too quickly, authorities said on Saturday

"The autopilot was engaged until the last second of recorded data," said Robert Sumwalt, a senior official with the National Transportation Safety Board.

He said information retrieved by investigators from the flight data recorder aboard the United Parcel Service jet showed that its auto throttle also was engaged until moments before the fiery crash.

The Airbus A300 jet was approaching the runway at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth airport before dawn on Wednesday when it clipped the trees in an adjacent residential area and crashed into a steep embankment well short of the runway.

Sumwalt, who spoke at a media briefing near the crash site, had said on Friday that the pilots received a low altitude warning barely seven seconds before the sound of impact. He repeated that in his remarks on Saturday but did not say whether the alert had triggered any attempt by the crew members to disengage the autopilot as part of a last-ditch attempt to abort landing and re-gain altitude.

The pilots did not issue a distress call.

Sumwalt stopped short of saying there was anything unusual about a so-called "instrument approach" to the airport using autopilot.

But he said the NTSB would be looking closely into "UPS's instrument approach procedures" and how it typically went about guiding a large cargo hauler to touchdown on Birmingham-Shuttleworth's Runway 18.

That's the runway the UPS jet was approaching when it crashed and Sumwalt said the investigation would include a flight test at the airport in a UPS A300.

Kevin Hiatt, president and chief executive officer of the Flight Safety Foundation, an Alexandria, Virginia-based international watchdog group, told Reuters in an interview on Thursday that a "full instrument" landing was not highly advisable at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth.

The airport can be tricky to land at because it is nestled among hills and that is especially true of Runway 18, said Hiatt.

Hiatt, a former Delta Airlines pilot, said he had touched down on the runway many times himself.

"It is not a full instrument landing. You have to visually fly into that runway," he said. "Sometimes it takes nuance to land there. You have to realize that hill is there or you could come in too low."

The crash occurred shortly before dawn in rainy conditions as low-lying clouds hung over Birmingham.

So far, Sumwalt said there was nothing to indicate the crash was caused by engine failure or any mechanical issues.

He also said the runway lights were examined and found to have been "within one one-100th of a degree of being properly aligned" at the time of the crash.

UPS has identified the dead crew members Cerea Beal Jr., 58, of Matthews, North Carolina, and Shanda Fanning, 37, of Lynchburg, Tennessee.

As a standard part of any accident investigation, Sumwalt said the NTSB was looking into the physical and mental well being of Beal and Fanning in the 72 hours before the accident.

Beal, the captain of the downed aircraft, had about 8,600 hours total flying experience, including more than 3,200 hours in the Airbus A300, according to the NTSB.

AKAAB

18th Aug 2013, 22:10

WAG - High on profile, Open Descent or selected V/S, APPR inadvertently armed instead of LOC (setting mental expectation of G/S capture), no glidepath to capture so aircraft continued in descent until 1sec(?) before impact when A/P is disengaged.

I've seen it happen several times in the past 13 years on the A320. Capture from above with no floor on the descent. Easy to fix if you catch it in time.

Speed of Sound

18th Aug 2013, 22:18

Surely a pilot should have information as to all of the charted obstacles relating to their approach?

Yes, but we are also talking about living creatures here.

They grow, they stop growing, bits fall off them they are bigger when they have leaves and smaller when they lose them.

They grow no more than a few feet a year so there is no point in chasing exact heights when you are not supposed to come within 100 feet of them in the first place?

tubby linton

18th Aug 2013, 22:25

A Squared I would fly the approach with my head looking out. Having seen a previous link to a video the undershoot are is dark and featurelss and I would be concentrating on trying to build a visual picture of where I was.
This crew really had nothing to help them. The terrain doesn't appear to have had any warning lights lights on it, the DME was showing a meaningless distance to the threshold, there were no approach lights only some very basic runway lights and the papis. The approach may have not been in the kit so it would be LOC and V/S without any electronic vertical guidance.
The area around and to the south of the runway appears to be well lit but they had the localizer for lateral guidance. Were they hanging on to the autopilot whilst they were trying to find the threshold in amongst all of the lights? The call on the CVR "Runway in Sight" may possibly confirm this.
The minimum altitude to use V/S is 160ft agl on approach.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 22:25

Having cleared the undershoot area why has the airport not provided approach lighting?

Non-precision approach lighting extends up to 1500 ft form the threshold. That seems like it would be of limited utility to someone hitting trees 4 times that distance from the runway.

Standard minima as used in Europe does not allow the LOC approach to be used at night.

Really? A LOC approach with a PAPI or other VSGI would be N/A at night?

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 22:30

I would fly the approach with my head looking out.

That wasn't the question. The question is: how would you fly the procedure *differently* if you knew the obstacle was 921 ft rather than 915 ft.

I guess that I've flown too many non-precision approaches over completely unlighted terrain to runways with nothing more than edge lights and a VASI to view this as recklessly dangerous.

tubby linton

18th Aug 2013, 22:45

The note on the standar minima page for KBHM states that the LOC procedure is not to be used at night.I compared it to other LOC procedures at different airfield and it seem specific to KBHM.
The provision of approach lighting would draw your vision towards the runway threshold and the rest of the runway surface. At Gatwick when they are using the standby runway two strobes are used to draw the pilots vision towards the runway threshold.
The only airfield I operate into at night without approach lights is Corfu on RW 17 but the runway stands out well as there is little lighting around it.
The argument is not about how I would fly the approach differently but the fact that the basic underlying terrain and obstace survey is not homogemous across the charts and is depicted differently by two different charting agencies. When was the last terrain and obstacle survey completed? I would also like to know the tolerances of the + and minus against one of the heights.
I have been wondering why a LOC was specified for this runway and I can only think it has been used to provide the necessary accuracy to funnel an aircraft into a path between the numerous obstacles. The RNAV approach is purely GPS and does not allow DME/DME 0.3 as I would imagine that it is not accurate enough.

WillowRun 6-3

18th Aug 2013, 22:46

That title is an attention-getting device. I'll explain (succinctly) and ask a plain and simple question.
A MOOC is a current innovation in higher ed and stands for massively open on-line course. It challenges the business model of higher ed and is built upon the massive power of Internet to provide a "place and a means" for many people in many different locations and situations to contribute information and learn from one another. ("asynchronous teaching and learning")

This thread seems to POSSIBLY represent a substantial example of how a message board concept isn't just people talking - it can be a place and a means for analysis to get done, for data to be sifted, and for the next set of questions to be identified (and for canards, malapropisms and the hobgoblins of small minds to be sent packing).

Question predicate: A-Squared says:
"At this point it seems we can be fairly certain that the airplane started striking trees about a mile from the threshold, at an altitude somewhere around 300 feet or more below MDA, 150 feet or more below the PAPI, and at least 100 feet above airport TDZE.

So the question becomes 'how did they arrive at that point, that far below the MDA and that far below the commissioned slope of the PAPI?'"

Question:
Should a layperson (that is, like me) understand phrase "fairly certain" as used by A-Squared to mean either: (a) no more certain than in the old order, before Internet communication such as this, and therefore all meaninglessly preliminary, because Only NTSB Knows, or (b) representative of a shift in relevant knowledge and communication parameters large enough to suggest a new order?

In an on-line course, if students posted the kind of data the cognoscenti have posted here, the discussion and analysis would proceed apace, waiting naught for any slow-moving authority outside of "the conversation", let alone one administered by Washington. A new order exists in the Academy, but not on the Flight Deck as in macrocosm? I object.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 23:15

The note on the standar minima page for KBHM states that the LOC procedure is not to be used at night.

No, the note says that the approach is N/A at night *IF* the PAPI is inop. So far I have seen nothing which suggests the PAPI was inop.

The argument is not about how I would fly the approach differently

Well, yeah, it is. I'm making a point with the question, and you're refusing to answer the question because you know that as soon as you answer the question, you have to concede the point.
So, I'll answer the question for you: Of course you wouldn't fly the approach one iota differently if you knew the trees had grown from 915 ft to 921 ft. Which leads inevitably to the conclusion that the 6 ft you're making such a noise about is completely inconsequential.

The provision of approach lighting would draw your vision towards the runway threshold and the rst of the runway surface. At Gatwick when they are using the standby runway two strobes are used to draw the pilots vision towards the runway threshold.

Ummm, yeah. Hey, did you notice that Runway 18 at Birmingham is equipped with REILs ? Do you know what REILs are? They're big-ass strobe lights located at the runway threshold to draw your eye to the runway threshold, just like at Gatwick.

I have been wondering why a LOC was specified for this runway and I can only think it has been used to provide the necessary accuracy to funnel an aircraft into a path between the numerous obstacles.

Uhhh, maybe because there's no conveniently located VOR to provide an IAP to the runway? Regardless, the procedure has you remaining more than 250 feet above all relevant obstacles until you have the runway in sight. You're drawing inferences that just don't make sense here.

This crew really had nothing to help them.

They had great big strobes on the runway to draw the pilots eye to the threshold, just like at Gatwick, they had a clever visual descent aid that would tell them at a glance whether they had strayed a fraction of a degree below a safe glidepath, and they had a published altitude that would keep them from hitting anything if they stayed above it.

Not sure how you can argue they had nothing to help them.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 23:25

Should a layperson (that is, like me) understand phrase "fairly certain" as used by A-Squared to mean either: (a) no more certain than in the old order, before Internet communication such as this, and therefore all meaninglessly preliminary, because Only NTSB Knows, or (b) representative of a shift in relevant knowledge and communication parameters large enough to suggest a new order?

Well, let me answer this way: If this were the pre-internet, pre Google-earth days, I could come to the same conclusions I stated using the USGS topo maps for the area, a scale, and the news report with Ms Benson's statement about the plane striking her trees and the location of her property

It just would have taken a little more effort.

tubby linton

18th Aug 2013, 23:34

The 10-9s chart published by Jepp for KBHM has two notes associated with the LOC approach for RW18. The first is that Minima is based on a CDFA, the second states that the approach is not authorised at night. This may be operator specific to our coverage but I thought most European operators are now using this.
Thank you for the education as to what the strobes are called. It has been a while since I read the Airway manual text. I don't remember seeing them in the clip posted of an approach onto this runway.
You seem to have decided from your personal experience that this crew had enough information provided to them to manage a succesfull aproach and landing but if so why did they fail in this task? Why were they ignoring the Papi and why were they slightly east of the centre line?
I am not sure what you mean by published altitude. You have to get low to land a friend of mine says and that means descending below MDA/DA at some point.
This aircraft has a fully functioning Radalt on both PFDs. It also has auto call out of pre programmed heights. If EGPWS was fitted they should have had a warning about approaching terrain in the undershoot, but only the Sink Rate warning has been disclosed.
I still stand by my assertion that there are charting discepancies at this airport.

A Squared

18th Aug 2013, 23:54

The 10-9s chart published by Jepp for KBHM has two notes associated with the LOC approach for RW18. The first is that Minima is based on a CDFA, the second states that the approach is not authorised at night. This may be operator specific to our coverage but I thought most European operators are now using this.

Well, I don't have a 10-9s in front of me, so I cant see what you're referring to. There was some discussion of this earlier. the Jepp plate for the LOC approach (posted in post #228 of this thread) seems to suggest in the minima section that it's N/A at night. However it also contains the note that the procedure is N/A *if* the PAPI is inop. That taken by itself implies the the procedure is approved for night ops if the PAPI is operative. So there seems to be conflicting information on the Jepp chart.

However, no such conflict exists (or if it does, I can't see it) on the Federal chart for the same procedure, only the not that the procedure is n/a at night if PAPI inop. So which is correct? Jeppesen or the FAA who designed the approach?

A Squared

19th Aug 2013, 00:11

Why were they ignoring the Papi and why were they slightly east of the centre line?

I don't know that they were ignoring the PAPI, or if they were, why they were.

Ms Benson's house, where they first struck trees is almost precisely on the extended runway center line.

I am not sure what you mean by published altitude.

The MDA. If they hadn't descended below MDA, they wouldn't have hit anything. Obviously, you have to do that to land. But if you *don't* descend below MDA until you are on the PAPI with 2 white and 2 red, you won't hit anything after you leave MDA.

That of course assumes:

1) No gross altimetry errors
2) The PAPI was working correctly as commissioned.

As far as I know, 1 and 2 haven't been ruled out, but if both are true, then in order to arrive where they did, they must have descended below MDA before being established on the PAPI g/s.

Why, we can only speculate at this point.

As far as the terrain warning, EGPWS will inhibit the terrain warning within a certain distance of a published runway. I don't know the specific parameters of thier system, but they may have been within that distance where the system doesn't give terrain warning.

Cosmo Beauregard

19th Aug 2013, 01:09

I'm afraid that our flight crew was unaware of their situation. The Cockpit Voice Recorder will be a witness to that if that is indeed the case. The Airbus A300 was and is a very very good aircraft. Just by looking at the Service Difficulty Report on this particular A300 one could only conclude that this A300 was an exceptional aircraft. Everything released so far has indicated that the aircraft was functioning perfectly. At 3 am to 4:30 am the radio airwaves are fairly quiet. Although they were flying parallel to the busiest airport in the world; even Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport is relatively peaceful at this hour of the morning. The old expression Hours of Boredom... applies.
My sole hope is they never knew what happened. I'm sure the Crew Rest rules that the FAA applied to the Passenger Carriers recently will surely come under fire for neglecting the Cargo Haulers even though they often fly the exact same equipment in the exact same environment. They just don't say good bye to every package flown. The Professionalism required is nearly identical. If you don't believe this is possible, There was a two man crew flying a commercial airliner bound for MSP that overflew the airport by a long long way before a Flight Attendant sensed something was wrong and demanded the Flight Crew's attention.

PEI_3721

19th Aug 2013, 01:15

A Squared, “As far as the terrain warning, …”
See #430. AFAIR the normal inhibit is at 0.5 nm. A warning envelope can be constructed from this point (0 ft rad alt), to 400ft at 4.5 nm.

Speed of Sound

19th Aug 2013, 09:32

and why were they slightly east of the centre line?

They weren't.

The trees they hit and where they first impacted the ground are both exactly on the extended centre line of RWY18.

On the question of what they could or could not see once they were below the scattered cloud, a witness in the tower (possibly a controller) could see the aircraft's landing lights between the first impact and the impact with the ground.

The distance from the tower to a position between Mrs Benson's house and the ground impact position is roughly double the distance from Mrs Benson's house to the PAPIs. Does anyone have any data on relative intensities between PAPI and landing lights? I do know that maintenance staff are advised to wear welding goggles when doing a daylight ground verification check on a PAPI but have never heard of that being recommended when within 20-30 metres of an aircraft landing light during daylight, so I will make the assumption that PAPIs are quite a bit brighter than a landing light.

Anyway, the point I am making is that in the absence of any other limiting factors, if the controller could see the landing lights from the tower, the flight crew should have been able to see the PAPIs at half that distance.

We know the PAPIs were switched on and working post crash, and we know that the were correctly calibrated (to within 1/100th of a degree).

Do we know that they were switched on during the approach?

If they were operating and we assume that the CVR recording ended around the time of impact with the ground, then the call "runway in sight", 13 seconds before that, would have been made half a mile from impact at 140KTS and a couple of seconds before they hit the trees.

Is it possible that they were so low that their view of the runway was obscured by the line of trees at the Tarrant-Huffman/Treadwell Road junction until 3 seconds before they hit those trees?

SteinarN

19th Aug 2013, 09:58

SoS;

Anyway, the point I am making is that in the absence of any other limiting factors, if the controller could see the landing lights from the tower, the flight crew should have been able to see the PAPIs at half that distance.

The line of sight along the PAPIs ends at the touch down zone, right?
If then, we know they impacted a hillside, that means they vere below the top of the hill. The runway on the other side of the hill is well below the top of the hill, don't remember by how many foot. That means they could NOT see the PAPIs in the moment before they impacted the hillside. Have anyone done some triangulation calculations to see if the top of the hill also was blocking the line of sight to the PAPIs so they couldnt see the PAPIs when they cut the first threes? Maybe they vere too low so early that they never saw the PAPIs?

Ian W

19th Aug 2013, 10:15

SoS;

Quote:
Anyway, the point I am making is that in the absence of any other limiting factors, if the controller could see the landing lights from the tower, the flight crew should have been able to see the PAPIs at half that distance.
The line of sight along the PAPIs ends at the touch down zone, right?
If then, we know they impacted a hillside, that means they vere below the top of the hill. The runway on the other side of the hill is well below the top of the hill, don't remember by how many foot. That means they could NOT see the PAPIs in the moment before they impacted the hillside. Have anyone done some triangulation calculations to see if the top of the hill also was blocking the line of sight to the PAPIs so they couldnt see the PAPIs when they cut the first threes? Maybe they vere too low so early that they never saw the PAPIs?

I was looking at this as well. Perhaps they were below the hill and could see the PAPI and the controller could see them -IF- there was some kind of refraction of the lights (both ways) due to humid air lying over the crest of the hill and they were effectively looking through a mirage. That would explain how a controller could see an aircraft that was below topographic line of sight and the otherwise inexplicable descent of the aircraft.

I am not sure how much refraction of the lights would be made by very humid colder air. But with the terrain being that close perhaps not much is needed.

There is also an interesting presentation from Airbus on Visual Illusions Awareness that could apply...

http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/media_gallery/files/safety_library_items/AirbusSafetyLib_-FLT_OPS-HUM_PER-SEQ11.pdf

see in particular pages 8 and 9

SteinarN

19th Aug 2013, 10:28

Ian W;

The point i'm making is the fact that the controller could see the planes landing lights doesn't necessarily mean the pilots could see the PAPIs. The controller is in a tower well above the runway and well past the PAPIs, and have a very different line of sight to the plane than the planes line of sight to the PAPIs. I probably have to sift through this thread to gather some height and distance data and do the calculations whether the pilots could see the PAPIs when they cut the first threes.

Ian W

19th Aug 2013, 10:43

Yes I understand the issue of the higher tower someone will have to see if the tower line of sight allows them to see the Benson residence.

However, I was raising the possibility of what I have now found out is called a 'Superior Mirage' that is a mirage that allows objects be seen 'over the horizon'. Here is one example showing what appears to be a hole in a hill.
http://astrophys-assist.com/vvla/images/vt001121.jpg

from VLA Pic o' Day, 11/21/00 (http://astrophys-assist.com/vvla/vt001121.htm)

Any FAA assessment of the PAPIs and runway lighting would need to be done in identical meteorological conditions or any potential mirage would not be visible.

Why else would an experienced crew descend further and call 'runway in sight' after a 'SINK RATE' warning?

Edit to add a video URL

Here is a video from a weather helo - Viewing a superior mirage from Chopper 7 | Sam Argier's Weather Blog | www.kirotv.com (http://www.kirotv.com/weblogs/sam-argiers-weather-blog/2013/jan/22/viewing-superior-mirage-chopper-7/)
http://astrophys-assist.com/vvla/vt001121.htm

Speed of Sound

19th Aug 2013, 11:27

Have anyone done some triangulation calculations to see if the top of the hill also was blocking the line of sight to the PAPIs

We need a North-South terrain profile to do this. We know exactly where the PAPIS are located to the left of RWY18 and we know that it was set at 3.2 degrees.

We also need to know whether the "runway in sight" call was a response to their first sighting of the runway or whether it was a response to 'reacquiring' a visual after temporary loss for whatever reason.

Was there an earlier 'runway in sight" call that hasn't been reported?

In one of the NTSB briefings we were told that the CVR group will sit down and transcribe every single voice and noise second by second, but prior to that they will inform the investigator of anything of significance that comes to their attention from a 'first listen' to the tape.

I'm assuming again I know, but in an investigation of a probable CFIT, any clues as to what that crew could or could not see is significant.

What we can probably draw from the call is that neither crew member was incapacitated prior to the first impact.

Petercwelch

19th Aug 2013, 12:16

Latest info is that autopilot/throttles were engaged essentially until ground contact. Doesn't this imply that the autopilot data base was inadequqte or in error, or that the wrong mode was engaged by the pilots? Presumably pilots thought that the auto pilot was managing the descent path as it seems that they weren't. Just asking.

Petercwelch

19th Aug 2013, 12:36

Sorry. Do we yet know what settings were entered by the crew, or what mode of autopilot functionwas engaged?

flyingchanges

19th Aug 2013, 13:26

I assume the "sink rate" warning overrode the "100" callout. The former is often ignored, the latter might have been a wake-up call.

Speed of Sound

19th Aug 2013, 14:41

Maybe Sorry Dog could give us an estimate of the height of those electricity poles, although the cables may have been damaged by falling tree branches rather than the landing gears.

Unless the perspective is way out however, they must have been less than 50 feet AGL when those trees were hit and below the tops of the other trees nearby. :-(

http://i1280.photobucket.com/albums/a481/SoS57/-c6e1ab89dfc8c931_zps82ef6d19.jpg (http://s1280.photobucket.com/user/SoS57/media/-c6e1ab89dfc8c931_zps82ef6d19.jpg.html)

http://i1280.photobucket.com/albums/a481/SoS57/UPS_Plane_Crash-0a295_zpse443cbe0.jpg (http://s1280.photobucket.com/user/SoS57/media/UPS_Plane_Crash-0a295_zpse443cbe0.jpg.html)

Lonewolf_50

19th Aug 2013, 14:45

Dressing up and masquerading Flight Aware data as "what happened" is misleading because the basis upon which the data is created and displayed is not proven as an investigative tool with high and reliable accuracy. PJ2's point restated for emphasis.
Sid: sidAnd I'll tell yah...Don't ever think it can't happen to you.
QFT
Aside: to whomever posted the CFIT pdf from flight safety ... that's using the forum to inform. Well done. For aterpster: your educational value in this thread has been great. Many thanks.
Info from the FAA approach plate (http://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/1308/00050L18.PDF), dated July 2013.
DME or Radar required.
When VGSI inop, procedure NA at night.
Visibility reduction by helicopters NA.
REIL Rwys 18 and 36
MIRL Rwy 18-36
Tubby: the second states that the approach is not authorised at night.
If Jepp and the FAA have a disagreement, to whom should you default?
Per A squared: the Jepp plate for the LOC approach (posted in post #228 of this thread) seems to suggest in the minima section that it's N/A at night. However it also contains the note that the procedure is N/A *if* the PAPI is inop. That taken by itself implies the the procedure is approved for night ops if the PAPI is operative. So there seems to be conflicting information on the Jepp chart.
Is Jepp liable?
TubbyI still stand by my assertion that there are charting discepancies at this airport.
Have you collected the data on how many approaches have been flown into this runway under IMC conditions in the past year? The past three years? The NTSB may, in the end, agree with you ... or not. We shall see.
We also need to know whether the "runway in sight" call was a response to their first sighting of the runway or whether it was a response to 'reacquiring' a visual after temporary loss for whatever reason.

Was there an earlier 'runway in sight" call that hasn't been reported?
Had not thought of that. Good question.

Airbubba

19th Aug 2013, 15:06

>>The note on the standar minima page for KBHM states that the LOC procedure is not to be used at night. <<

No, the note says that the approach is N/A at night *IF* the PAPI is inop. So far I have seen nothing which suggests the PAPI was inop.

the Jepp plate for the LOC approach (posted in post #228 of this thread) seems to suggest in the minima section that it's N/A at night. However it also contains the note that the procedure is N/A *if* the PAPI is inop. That taken by itself implies the the procedure is approved for night ops if the PAPI is operative. So there seems to be conflicting information on the Jepp chart.

And actually, the Jepp chart, 11-2 dated 17 AUG 12, LOC Rwy 18 indeed has both notations.

Note 2. at the top says 'When VGSI inop, procedure not authorized at night.'

And, in the minima boxes at the bottom of the approach plate under 'NIGHT' it says 'NA'.

Since the minima boxes are recently shuffled on Jepp charts and some precision approaches now have Cat I,II and III depicted on the same chart, I've certainly grabbed the wrong MDA or DA before through the habit of looking in the same place on the minima matrix as in years past.

Like most of us in large planes, I usually shoot either precision approaches (e.g. ILS) or visual approaches with precision guidance for backup. And I normally have the luxury of operating out of larger international airports. I'm pretty sure I would not have caught the discrepancy between Note 2. and the night minima box. I looked long and hard at that approach plate last week sitting at a desk and never saw the night minima notation at the bottom.

The NA on this Jepp chart is thought to be a typo given the note at the top and the lack of night minima NA on the corresponding government chart:

http://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/1308/00050L18.PDF

The UPS crew had paper Jepps from what I've read elsewhere.

I assume the "sink rate" warning overrode the "100" callout. The former is often ignored, the latter might have been a wake-up call.

In my experience, it is not at all normal to hear "SINK RATE" on any approach, it would sure get my undivided attention on a night non-precision approach to an unfamiliar runway. Sadly, as others have noted, the warning came very late for this crew.

WillowRun 6-3

19th Aug 2013, 15:15

Per Lonewolf_50 @ post #481:

"Per A squared:
Quote:
the Jepp plate for the LOC approach (posted in post #228 of this thread) seems to suggest in the minima section that it's N/A at night. However it also contains the note that the procedure is N/A *if* the PAPI is inop. That taken by itself implies the the procedure is approved for night ops if the PAPI is operative. So there seems to be conflicting information on the Jepp chart."
Is Jepp liable?
_____
Is this question (as to liability) a suggestion for a legal analysis (subject to all applicable caveats as to information flows and validity, lack of a full "totality of the queries" analytic framework, and others of similar kind or circumstance)? My client can spare me for a bit of time, I should think (particularly on such a subject both high in public importance and captivatingly interesting to WR63), though unsolicited legal garble is worse than sour beer in the pub, both to be avoided among friends and compatriots.

SLFgeek

19th Aug 2013, 15:21

Unless the perspective is way out however, they must have been less than 50 feet AGL when those trees were hit and below the tops of the other trees nearby. :-(

The tree (leftmost) of the first picture is a pine. I cannot tell which variety it is from that photo (likely are slash or longleaf). Typical crown height (when it reaches full maturity) is anywhere between 70-100 feet AGL. Some older examples of longleaf go up to 120-feet. The 17 y/o longleafs I have here are growing at roughly 3-feet/year. Many are over 60-feet tall.

tubby linton

19th Aug 2013, 15:22

AirBubba, your last post has reinforced my statement that there are charting discrepancies at this airport. It also probably explains why for Eu-OPs this procedure is not authorised at night, as there is no straight in landing minima published for night operations.The GPS approach for RW18 does not have this restriction even though it has the same caveat as to the servicability of the Papi.for night operations. Would anyone care to explain why these anomalies exist?
For those interested in tree heights in Alabama search for "Champion Trees of Alabama" published by the Alabama Forestry Commision.

aterpster

19th Aug 2013, 15:47

The FAA chart is correct. The Jepp chart is in error. Jepp picked up the Amendment 2A note but failed to update their minima section. Here are links to the applicable four pages of source documents for those who care to see them:

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC181_zpsc9733eda.jpg (http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC181_zpsc9733eda.jpg)

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC182_zps27053a33.jpg (http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC182_zps27053a33.jpg)

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC183_zps2d25df9b.jpg (http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC183_zps2d25df9b.jpg)

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC184_zps87fe4799.jpg (http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC184_zps87fe4799.jpg)

areobat

19th Aug 2013, 15:47

Unless the perspective is way out however, they must have been less than 50 feet AGL when those trees were hit and below the tops of the other trees nearby. :-(If it helps, the typical utility pole for 12.47/7.2KV Wye primary service (which is what this appears to be) is 45 feet with about 6 feet of that buried in the ground. This would make the primary conductors about 40 feet AGL.

Looking at these two pictures, it certainly looks like the distribution secondary/cable/phone were taken out by falling tree limbs, but I'm not sure about the primary. Primary conductors running both parallel to the flight path and perpendicular to it seem to be missing which seems unusual to me for tree damage.

Semaphore Sam

19th Aug 2013, 16:28

"The FAA chart is correct. The Jepp chart is in error. Jepp picked up the Amendment 2A note but failed to update their minima section."

Wanna bet that total ban on LOC at night (and maybe more) is re-instated PDQ?

tubby linton

19th Aug 2013, 16:29

Aterpster, what criteria would the originator of the LOC procedure have used to decide that it was not to be used at night and then a few years later change this policy? I have not had time to perform a thorough analysis of how many aircraft have used this approach since its inception but perhaps somebody with local knowledge could provide an estimate.
When was the last time the procedure was flight checked?

BOAC

19th Aug 2013, 16:35

I am certainly confused - what makes a LOC n/a at night but other approaches OK? With the published DAs there is no obstacle issue, and once you are visual off ANY approach................................ Was it just a typo?

Speed of Sound

19th Aug 2013, 17:12

If it helps, the typical utility pole for 12.47/7.2KV Wye primary service (which is what this appears to be) is 45 feet with about 6 feet of that buried in the ground. This would make the primary conductors about 40 feet AGL.

Thanks for that.

That is higher than my rough estimate based on the height of the engineers in the pic I posted, and the height of a semi trailer passing a pole on a Google streetview pic on a road nearby.

I made the poles about 25 feet tall with the cables at about 20 feet.

aterpster

19th Aug 2013, 17:16

tubby:

Aterpster, what criteria would the originator of the LOC procedure have used to decide that it was not to be used at night and then a few years later change this policy?

Penetrations of the visual segment's 20:1 surface. Later, the PAPI was determined to be accurate, thus (as is done on a case-by-case basis) the PAPI, when operating, was determined to be mitigating.

BOAC

19th Aug 2013, 17:32

I still cannot understand why the 'LOC' was special - the visual is surely the same for all from MDA?

BOAC

19th Aug 2013, 17:54

Likely it was not.I agree, but from one who 'knows'? Quote:
Aterpster, what criteria would the originator of the LOC procedure have used to decide that it was not to be used at night and then a few years later change this policy? Penetrations of the visual segment's 20:1 surface??? So why not ALL night visuals???

silverstrata

19th Aug 2013, 18:25

Ian

So the question is a simple one. Why, with aircraft that are capable of flying RNP LPV approaches to RNP 0.1, are pilots and operators still using NPA that are less safe?

Is there a published procedure for an GPS-RNP approach to 18? If there is not, you cannot do it. Is the company/aircraft authorised and trained for Rnav-Vnav approaches? If not, you cannot do it.

And regards why they may have descended below the nominal glideslope. One possible reason is mistaking/confusing the perspective of the approach, especially if you are not used to doing non-precision approaches.

There have been quite a number of aircraft over the years that have drifted below the glideslope, on a nice visual approach, and not realised it. Especially when making a 'black hole ' approach, where there are no ground lights below you to gain perspective from. There was an incident with a corporate jet, many years ago, on a gin-clear visual night approach to an island runway just inland from the sea in Scotland. The sea was, of course, completely pitch black. And they flew down so low, while still thinking they were on the perfect approach, that they touched down in the sea.

Silver

tubby linton

19th Aug 2013, 19:20

JPJP

19th Aug 2013, 20:07

For those of you curious about how a UPS A300 flies the LOC18 and RNAV18 into KBHM, here's a pretty detailed answer. From a UPS A300 F.O. -

"The FMS generates a VNAV angle that meets all of the intervening fix restrictions and a TCH of 50'. Thus the CDA versus a dive and drive....so, mins treated like a DA (H) versus the old school MDA hope you pick up the lights by the MAP.

For the LOC-FMS will generate a 3.28 CDA to comply with the FAF altitude of 2300' at BASKN and the 1380' crossing restriction at IMTOY. (looking at the plate, looks like the 910' hill is just past IMTOY so perfect world should have crossed the hill in the 400' AGL ball park)

RNAV (GPS) has a slightly different CDA (3.24)-no clue why, same points but may get to smooth it a bit for IMTOY versus the old school crossing restriction.

GPWS callouts were reportedly for Sink Rate, versus a terrain warning.

Have to remember that kind of expected to land once you get close to the airport and the Terrain warnings are inhibited".

Lonewolf_50

19th Aug 2013, 20:29

I pose the question again: if Jepps and the FFA approach plate are not the same on a bit of detail, to which one would you default? You are the captain on a given mission, or you are the FO preparing for a flight and you note a discrepancy in the approach info ... what do you do?

Willow: in this case, while "liability" may be an interesting question as you rephrase it, if the crew were using Jeppson and took the NA at night on Jeppson for guidance (even if it is an error) then they'd not have shot that approach at night. They'd have flown another approach to that airport.

For an error to have the kind of liability a lawyer might make a civil case over, I suspect it would need to be in the other direction: mark something as "OK" when it's not. In this case, the error would have the crew try a different approach, even though the FAA chart allows it with VGSI working.

(PS: aterpster once again shows up with facts and some expertise on this topic. Many thanks, sir! :ok: )

JimNtexas

19th Aug 2013, 20:46

Aviation Week summary of what is known about this accident as of August 18 (http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:7a78f54e-b3dd-4fa6-ae6e-dff2ffd7bdbb&plckPostId=Blog%3a7a78f54e-b3dd-4fa6-ae6e-dff2ffd7bdbbPost%3a54f0d442-ae8e-4fa6-afed-5e4f87157538).

Ozlander1

19th Aug 2013, 20:52

I was looking at this as well. Perhaps they were below the hill and could see the PAPI and the controller could see them -IF- there was some kind of refraction of the lights (both ways) due to humid air lying over the crest of the hill and they were effectively looking through a mirage. That would explain how a controller could see an aircraft that was below topographic line of sight and the otherwise inexplicable descent of the aircraft.

Just because the crew could see some of the runway lights over the crest of the hill doesn't mean the aircraft would clear the crest of the hill.

Airbubba

19th Aug 2013, 21:22

Do UPS have a FOQA programme and if they do was the aircraft fitted with a QAR? No mention has been made of a QAR module but if it exists the NTSB would know quite quickly what autopilot modes were being used and how the flight was conducted if the disc was readable.

NTSB member Sumwalt addresses the recovery of non-volatile memory from various electronic modules at 8:25 in this briefing:

Member Robert Sumwalt holds final media brieifing on UPS flight 1354 crash - YouTube

I would think the FDR data would give autopilot mode status as well.

Speed of Sound

19th Aug 2013, 22:17

15

Autopilot operating modes, autothrottle and AFCS systems engagement status and operating modes.

tubby linton

19th Aug 2013, 22:32

I saw that briefing and I thought it odd that he did not mention the QAR, perhaps it was destroyed in the crash. Using industry standard software it is very easy to recreate the flight and crew actions from QAR data.

PJ2

19th Aug 2013, 22:37

Airbubba, re, "I would think the FDR data would give autopilot mode status as well."

It may or may not.

I believe the prior reference to a QAR was intended to highlight the fact that QARs are often programmed with "richer" data frames, (more parameters, higher sample rates, higher resolutions) than SSFDRs.

Usually, data frames on DFDRs is somewhat standard from the manufacturer, (although I haven't met a truly standard data frame yet...nor do aircraft always have the best dataframe documentation). IIRC, there are about six or seven "standard" frames for the B737C (classic - 200, 300, 400).

Because QAR data is not legally scheduled and defined as with DFDRs, those who are capable of programming data frames from documentation can extend the utility (and available but not programmed parameters) of QARs substantially. It is intensely detailed work and therefore normally very expensive and time-consuming.

QARs are generally located either in the EE bay or the cockpit. If the installation is an older one with a "DAU*" (Digital Acquisition Unit), the QAR "mirrors" the DFDR. If the QAR is supported by a "DMU*", (Data Management Unit), it has it's own processor(s) and processes the data independently of the DFDR. With the substantial damage to the lower cockpit area I doubt if a QAR is available but if mounted in the cockpit it may be.

* terms may differ - the nice thing about standards within flight data systems is that there are so many to choose from.

tubby linton....re, "Using standard software it is very easy to recreate the flight and crew actions from QAR data."

I know what you mean but just so there isn't any misunderstanding regarding the term, "standard software" - such software is proprietary and very expensive - in other words, it can't be done using MS Excel, etc.

I know you know this but many who salivate at the thought of getting their mitts on accident flight data do not know this and believe everyone and anyone should have access to flight data so, not trusting those who do this work, they can make up their own minds about what happened.

PJ2

tubby linton

19th Aug 2013, 22:45

If you have never seen a QAR recreation of a flight, then I will describe it for you. The one my company uses has multiple windows which show the aircraft position overlaid on Google earth, the PFD with the modes selected, the position of slats flaps and gear , flying control positions and engine parameters.. There are probably other items displayed which I have forgotten but it is described here:
http://www.aerobytes.co.uk/docs/AerobytesKeyFeatures.pdf
By standard i meant industry standard software not something you can download for a few $$$$.
The PFD representation in the software replicates a 320 family pfd which consolidates all of the flight instruments on one screen. This is satisfactory for flight analysis purposes but differs slightly to a standard A300 PFD display.

Speed of Sound

19th Aug 2013, 23:02

It may or may not.

It is not optional, it is a ICAO required parameter.

Capn Bloggs

19th Aug 2013, 23:07

Jeppesen regularly makes transcription errors (from source documents to their own documents) in my part of the woods. A recent one quite bad.

"Sink Rate" below 1000ft AAL in my outfit is an immediate Go Around, no questions asked.

flyboyike

19th Aug 2013, 23:09

In my outfit only "Pull up, Pull up!" is an immediate go-around. A "sink rate" is only a go-around if the flying pilot doesn't respond with "correcting" and actually makes said correction to the sink rate.

serangga

20th Aug 2013, 00:18

Seems to me that this whole thread goes through ALL the possible technical causes of the accident in great detail. IF this incident had involved an ASIAN carrier, we would by now be having ALL the torrid discussions about ASIAN pilots' lack of basic flying skills.

SC_Pilot

20th Aug 2013, 00:34

Quoted:

"I saw that briefing and I thought it odd that he did not mention the QAR, perhaps it was destroyed in the crash. Using industry standard software it is very easy to recreate the flight and crew actions from QAR data."

I've been intimately involved with the FOQA program with two airlines, and typically the Quick Access Recorder (QAR) and the FDR have the same data. Some airlines program their QARs to record additional parameters, but most just mirror the FDR. Modern FDRs record hundreds of parameters, and animations/recreations can certainly be made from those data.

At one airline, no QARs were installed, so the FOQA program ran off of data downloaded directly from the FDR. Each airline will have the data frame set up for both the QAR and FDR data (if different from each other), so it takes almost no time to view the data once it is on-hand. For instance, once our safety department had a download from either a QAR or FDR, we could be viewing the data in as little as 10 - 20 minutes, depending on the size of the file.

So if UPS has QARs, they most likely do not contain any different data than the FDR, and the FDR data can be accessed and processed just as quickly as QAR data. They are functionally equivalent.

The one advantage to having a QAR is that if there is an incident, occasionally the NTSB will allow the airline to keep the QAR data media, and they can review the data independently from the NTSB. It appears that the NTSB is getting more permissive with its data policies, so that may become less of an advantage going forward.

400drvr

20th Aug 2013, 00:39

[CODE]Seems to me that this whole thread goes through ALL the possible technical causes of the accident in great detail. IF this incident had involved an ASIAN carrier, we would by now be having ALL the torrid discussions about ASIAN pilots' lack of basic flying skills./CODE]

Sad but true.

aterpster

20th Aug 2013, 01:22

sera

Seems to me that this whole thread goes through ALL the possible technical causes of the accident in great detail. IF this incident had involved an ASIAN carrier, we would by now be having ALL the torrid discussions about ASIAN pilots' lack of basic flying skills.

This UPS accident involves an instrument approach procedure with complex technical conditions and limitations.

Asiana fu*** up a visual approach on a wonderful clear day to a very benign runway.

That one was easy to throw stones at. The UPS accident is far more complex.

In any case, your rant is racist.

SomewhereFarAway

20th Aug 2013, 01:41

I'm a Captain with UPS (won't say which fleet) and work in our TC. Currently I am out of the country.

Our company charts for the LOC approach say NA at night. I'm not talking about the NA at night for lack of VGSI. This is due, undoubtedly to the terrain and black hole effect of night operations.

Also, interestingly, we have an RNAV GPS to 18 which does not have that restriction, but according to NTSB briefings they were using the LOC 18 as reference.

However, with the hourly observation, I would guess they shot a visual approach, "backed up" by the LOC and in that case, the reference for the LOC would be legit

I don't have much to say.. but if you all need facts that I can share, I will do so. It has been a long week of grieving for us.

I am not familiar with the A300, but I am typed in all of our other aircraft

THEPRFCT10

20th Aug 2013, 01:59

I was there yesterday. The wreckage is in easy site range of the passenger terminal. I watched several of them go the end of the glass to take a look and snap some pictures. Sad. Tragic. Lots to learn from this. Could've been any one of us.

Willie Everlearn

20th Aug 2013, 02:22

"This UPS accident involves an instrument approach procedure with complex technical conditions and limitations."

I'm not so sure.
To me, the NTSB briefings so far suggest a black hole illusion which seems to have resulted in CFIT. If so, it's not the first time and unlikely to be the last. So the mystery is in how this was set up?

It's extremely sad to lose assets both human and machine this way.
My sincerest sympathies go out to the entire UPS operation.

Willie :ok:

SC_Pilot

20th Aug 2013, 03:01

The QAR and the FDR typically have the same data, or at least very similar. Some airlines even directly download their FDR, instead of a QAR, for the FOQA program.

flyingchanges

20th Aug 2013, 03:03

physicus

20th Aug 2013, 03:31

I think it's become clear from the conversations and preliminary information that there likely was no technical flaw at the root of this (I'm not saying there wasn't one, but it would not have to be causal), nor was there any blatant crew misconduct apart from perhaps them not having shown the amount of discipline needed in a non precision approach.

There is no such thing as an "unsafe" instrument approach. They are all designed to have safety margins built in, IF the procedures outlined are adhered to. As JPJPs A300 FO friend states, no jet today flies a non precision approach as we used to in IFR school (dive and drive) the FMC will create an artifical glideslope (a continuous descent approach, or CDA, wiki for those who are not familiar: Continuous descent approach - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous_descent_approach)), the MDA is substituted by a DH (e.g. MDA+50 to account for the GA transition) which should match with the missed approach point (MAP). What does that mean? You are always above the step altitudes published in the approach plates.

The CDA provides you with check altitudes just as well as the classically flown approach does. If your FMC does not calculate them for you, you have to calculate them yourself. But even without calculation, you can read off the charts as you fly off the points: "BASKN, check 2300 or above, next IMTOY, 1380 or above." then "Minimum, visual, landing" or "Minimum, no contact, go around!".

It takes discipline to always, always do this. Complacency settles in with all of us unfortunately, it would be wonderful if somehow we could have a less costly reminder to keep the basic skills running even on flights we've done a million times!