Tee Emm
5th Jul 2013, 14:03
Several years ago, Boeing changed the after take off checklist in the 737 Classics by deleting the first item which was Air Conditioning and Pressurisation... Check. It was replaced with:
Engine Bleeds....On
Packs...............Auto.
If I recall correctly (very long time since I flew a 737) Vol 1 in those days, amplified the earlier check list item by stating that as part of the Pressurisation part of the check, the crew verified Engine Bleeds on and Packs on and - critically - mentioned a check that the aircraft was indeed pressurising, by looking at the pressurisation instruments on the Cabin Altitude Panel. Now it may be that last bit was only published in the Boeing 737-200 FCOM and I am getting my series mixed up.
The current B737 Classic FCOM Vol 1 After take off amplified procedures states: After flap retraction is complete:
Set or verify that the engine bleeds and air conditioning packs are operating.
There is no mention at all to check the Cabin Altitude Panel for correct pressurisation taking place. The problem being that unless it is a specific checklist item, many pilots simply don't want to know about it. The old word Airmanship again comes to mind in these instances.
For what it's worth, this writer did a unofficial simulator study of over 50 sessions over a period of several months during B737 type rating training and recurrent checks, involving how crews conducted the after take off checklist.
About 90 percent of crews failed to include the Cabin Altitude instruments in the after take off scans. When faults were induced that meant the cabin altitude rate of operation was clearly displaying an inappropriate reading, or the cabin was not pressurising, crews did not pick this up until the Cabin Altitude Warning sounded at 10,000 ft cabin altitude. The "defect" could have been picked up much earlier during the after take off scan - providing the scan had been done as per Boeing recommendation once the flaps had been retracted.
Where the crew delay the after take off scan until later in the climb, either for operational reasons or published company procedures, then the delay in picking a defective pressurisation can compress trouble shooting action by the crew.
The original Boeing after take off scan and checklist item of "Air Conditioning and Pressurisation.....Set" covered things nicely, IMHO, as it forced the crew to check the Cabin Altitude Panel in order to pick up a problem much earlier in the climb.
Finally (again for what it is worth), during the unofficial study, it was noticed that the PF (whether the captain or F/O) very rarely verified by looking that the PM had indeed completed the after take off checklist correctly. Most of the time, the PF would later admit hearing the PM reading out the Challenge and Response items but the PF was too busy (or too lazy perhaps) to check if in fact the items were correctly completed. It was if the PF thought that the after take off scan and checklist reading was not his problem but the full responsibility of the PM.
It used to be a well established principle of checklist operation that one pilot reads (challenges) and the other pilot verbally responds. That principle of a double check by both pilots has since been replaced by the current situation in some checklists where the checklist reader states out aloud the item (challenge) and then answers his own challenge.
It could be argued this tends to leave the other pilot out of the loop so to speak? If the subject interests you, then comments are most welcome
Engine Bleeds....On
Packs...............Auto.
If I recall correctly (very long time since I flew a 737) Vol 1 in those days, amplified the earlier check list item by stating that as part of the Pressurisation part of the check, the crew verified Engine Bleeds on and Packs on and - critically - mentioned a check that the aircraft was indeed pressurising, by looking at the pressurisation instruments on the Cabin Altitude Panel. Now it may be that last bit was only published in the Boeing 737-200 FCOM and I am getting my series mixed up.
The current B737 Classic FCOM Vol 1 After take off amplified procedures states: After flap retraction is complete:
Set or verify that the engine bleeds and air conditioning packs are operating.
There is no mention at all to check the Cabin Altitude Panel for correct pressurisation taking place. The problem being that unless it is a specific checklist item, many pilots simply don't want to know about it. The old word Airmanship again comes to mind in these instances.
For what it's worth, this writer did a unofficial simulator study of over 50 sessions over a period of several months during B737 type rating training and recurrent checks, involving how crews conducted the after take off checklist.
About 90 percent of crews failed to include the Cabin Altitude instruments in the after take off scans. When faults were induced that meant the cabin altitude rate of operation was clearly displaying an inappropriate reading, or the cabin was not pressurising, crews did not pick this up until the Cabin Altitude Warning sounded at 10,000 ft cabin altitude. The "defect" could have been picked up much earlier during the after take off scan - providing the scan had been done as per Boeing recommendation once the flaps had been retracted.
Where the crew delay the after take off scan until later in the climb, either for operational reasons or published company procedures, then the delay in picking a defective pressurisation can compress trouble shooting action by the crew.
The original Boeing after take off scan and checklist item of "Air Conditioning and Pressurisation.....Set" covered things nicely, IMHO, as it forced the crew to check the Cabin Altitude Panel in order to pick up a problem much earlier in the climb.
Finally (again for what it is worth), during the unofficial study, it was noticed that the PF (whether the captain or F/O) very rarely verified by looking that the PM had indeed completed the after take off checklist correctly. Most of the time, the PF would later admit hearing the PM reading out the Challenge and Response items but the PF was too busy (or too lazy perhaps) to check if in fact the items were correctly completed. It was if the PF thought that the after take off scan and checklist reading was not his problem but the full responsibility of the PM.
It used to be a well established principle of checklist operation that one pilot reads (challenges) and the other pilot verbally responds. That principle of a double check by both pilots has since been replaced by the current situation in some checklists where the checklist reader states out aloud the item (challenge) and then answers his own challenge.
It could be argued this tends to leave the other pilot out of the loop so to speak? If the subject interests you, then comments are most welcome